Note from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V.M. Molotov, to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, I.V. Stalin, dated December 1945

To Comrade STALIN

I have a question whether we need to insist on including the Indonesian situation in the agenda of the meeting of the three. In this case, we could propose that information and explanations of the situation in Indonesia be given, and that the three ministers exchange their views informally on this issue, with regard to the need to stop bloodshed and interference from foreign (British) troops[[1]](#footnote-1), and to resolve the issues in Indonesia in a peaceful and democratic way.

Such a proposition is of predominantly tactical importance, so that we have additional leverage against the English, who, we anticipate, will be strongly contradicting the proposal; the Americans, however, may assume a neutral position. Even if our proposal on putting this issue on the agenda is not accepted, our proposition on Indonesia will still play its role, as certain information will inevitably leak out to the press.

I await your directions.

Molotov

[FPARF, f. 0430, inv. 2, fold. 1, file 1, p. 34]

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1. The end of the Second World War in Indonesia (Dutch East Indies) essentially coincided with the start of a revolution for national independence. The declaration of independence was proclaimed by a group of young nationalists headed by Sukarno on 17 August – two days after the Japanese surrendered. Although interested in resurrecting Dutch colonial rule, the British were careful to avoid becoming embroiled in the Indonesian internal conflict. On 6 September, deciding on troop numbers to be deployed there, the British Chiefs of Staff proceeded from the possibility of detailing a small contingent for ‘occupational duties in Java in/or Sumatra’ (C.O.S. (45) 565 (O), Report by COS, 06/09/1945 // TNA, CAB 80/97). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)