From the note ‘On the desirable foundations for the future of the world’ from the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, head of the Commission of the USSR People's Commissariat for damages caused by Nazi Germany and its allies to the Soviet Union, I.M. Maisky, to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.M. Molotov, dated 10 January 1944.

TOP SECRET

[...]

23. RESULTS

For added convenience, I briefly summarize the above-expressed thoughts on the basics of the desired future of the world:

1) The overall aim: It is necessary for Soviet Union to ensure peace in Europe and in Asia for a period of 30-50 years.[[1]](#footnote-1)

2) In accordance with above, USSR should come out of this war with advantageously strategic borders, the basis of which should be the borders of 1941. Moreover, it would be very important for the USSR to acquire Petsamo, southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands chain. The USSR and Czechoslovakia should share a common border.[[2]](#footnote-2) Between the USSR on one side, and Finland and Romania on another - pacts of mutual assistance must be concluded, with the Soviet Union being granted military, air and naval bases on the territories of the said countries[[3]](#footnote-3). The USSR should also be guaranteed free and convenient use of transit routes through Iran to the Persian Gulf.

3) After the war, Germany must be occupied by the Allies for no less than 10 years, divided into several more or less independent states[[4]](#footnote-4), and subjected to three dismantles - military, industrial and ideological. Heavy reparation payments should be imposed on Germany (including manual labour) and war criminals in the broadest sense of the term should be subjected to severe punishment.

4) The rest of Europe must not be allowed to form separate states or combinations of states with strong land armies. In post-war Europe, there must remain just one mighty land power - the USSR, and only one strong naval power - Britain.

5) France should be restored to more or less a major power, although it would be inadvisable to promote the revival of its former military power.[[5]](#footnote-5)

6) Italy should be retained as a European country (including Sicily and Sardinia), but without any possessions in Africa.

7) The Iberian Peninsula is not within the USSR’s scope of direct interest. However, in the sphere of pan-European policy, it is important for the Soviet Union that the Republic of Spain experiences a revival of democracy and has friendly relations with us.[[6]](#footnote-6) It would be useful to establish diplomatic relations with Portugal, which in the conditions of post-war Europe is likely to survive on its own.

8) From the USSR’s perspective, it would be undesirable if various federations of small countries (the Danube. Balkan. Scandinavian, etc.) emerged in post-war Europe.

9) Poland should be restored as an independent and viable state but, as much as possible, to having the most minimal territorial size. In the East, the basis for the Polish-Soviet border should be the 1941 border.[[7]](#footnote-7) The whole or part of East Prussia, as well as some parts of Silesia, should be permitted to be absorbed into western Poland. On this basis, Poland, if it wishes to, may join the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact.

10) Czechoslovakia should be strengthened as much as possible - geographically, politically and economically. It should be seen as an outpost of our influence in central and south-eastern Europe.

11) Through the revision of the arbitration awarding Transylvania[[8]](#footnote-8) and through other means, Hungary’s territory should be reduced on the basis of rigorous ethnographic principles. Reparations should be imposed on Hungary and during the first years after the war, it must be left in a state of international isolation.

12) In the Balkans, it is desirable to conclude mutual assistance pacts between Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union - on the other. Relations with Greece, if necessary, may be established in the form of a triple pact between Britain, USSR and Greece. Yugoslavia must be restored to its former borders. In addition to its pre-war territory, Greece should receive the Dodecanese.[[9]](#footnote-9) Bulgaria is expected to return annexed lands to Yugoslavia and Greece. The border between Bulgaria and Romania should be set in accordance with the interests of the USSR. Romania and Bulgaria must be involved in the reparation payments. In carrying out the above program it is necessary to observe great caution.[[10]](#footnote-10) It is also important to avoid complications with England.

13) On the whole, the pre-war ‘status quo’ in Scandinavia should be left intact. The same applies to Belgium and Holland. The USSR might not object to Britain obtaining bases in latter countries[[11]](#footnote-11), although Britain obtaining bases on the Atlantic coast of Norway would be in conflict with our interests.

14) the Soviet Union is interested in reducing Turkey’s influence, especially in the Balkans. Every opportunity should be taken to weaken the role of Turkey as a "clock" on the Straits.

15. The Soviet Union is interested in developing and strengthening friendly relations with Iran.[[12]](#footnote-12) It is necessary to maintain (with certain modifications) the triple Anglo-Soviet-Iranian pact of 1941, strengthen of Soviet influence in northern Iran and establish an international body to the support and develop a transit routes through Iran.

16) The Soviet Union is interested in spreading and strengthening its political and cultural influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt, - for which diplomatic steps of cultural and political steps nature should be taken.[[13]](#footnote-13) With regard to the pan-Arab movement, we should adopt a fundamentally benevolent position, but without rendering it active support. In its work in these regions, the USSR should avoid conflicts and complications with England.

17) the Soviet Union is not interested in a war with Japan, but is very much interested in Japan’s defeat by the Anglo-American forces. The most appropriate action in terms of USSR’s interests of the USSR would be to manoeuvre in such a way as obtain the southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, in accordance with the general land survey maps of the world, after the defeat of the axis without the Soviet Union being drawn into hostilities with Japan.[[14]](#footnote-14) This is not easy, but not impossible.

18) Soviet Union is interested in expanding and strengthening friendly relations with China. However, the degree of support for China in its development and transformation into a truly great power should be determined by the nature of the forces that will be in power in China in the post-war period.[[15]](#footnote-15)

19) The Soviet Union is interested for the post-war regime in enemy and enemy-occupied countries to be built on the principles of participatory democracy. To achieve this, there needs certain and acceptable impact on the internal politics of these countries from the outside, in co-operation with Britain and the United States.

20) the Soviet Union is interested in the creation of international bodies for the maintenance of peace and security in the post-war period, built on the principle of the leadership of the "Big Four" (USSR, USA, England, China) and the possibility for these bodies, if necessary, to carry out its decisions by force.[[16]](#footnote-16) During the first post-war period, the former enemy countries should not be permitted to take part in these types of international bodies.

21) The Soviet Union is not directly interested in the question of the colonies. However, it will have to participate in the peace conference and in other places on the decisions on the colonial question. There is an urgent need to solve this problem.

22) The USSR is extremely interested in US and Britain’s assistance to it own recovery after the war. Negotiations on this issue would have to start now. It is desirable to obtain within 5-10 years after the war, the most relevant goods for the recovery on the basis of a loan/lease, as well as the less relevant - by way of long-term loans.

24. PROSPECTS

In conclusion, I would like to make a few observations on the alignment of the top international powers, which can be expected after the war, at least in the first post-war period.

After the defeat of Germany and Japan, in the presence of a relatively weak France and Italy, there will really be 4 great powers in the world - the USSR, USA, England, China, the last of which (China) during the lifetime of the next generation, judging by all accounts, will be only nominally be among the great powers.[[17]](#footnote-17) Thus, the leading role in the field of world politics will in the hands of the Soviet Union, the United States and England, and the course of events will greatly depend on the nature of the relationship between these three powers.

What will the United States’ position likely be after the war, especially in the first post-war period? All indications are that in this period the US will firmly enter a high stage of dynamic imperialism that will vigorously strive for broad expansion in different parts of the world - in the Americas and in Asia, Australia and Africa. This expansion will not likely come to pass in Europe, although here it will take on a slightly different form relative to other places. It goes without saying that American expansion is the expansion of a new type: rather than territorial annexation (although in certain cases, and it is not ruled out), its weapon will be financial and economic annexation. Already this trend is quite clearly being laid out for the colonial question, in the field of civil aviation, and in the field of commercial shipping after the war. After all, the US will come from the current struggle with the world's greatest shipping and air fleets and almost unlimited technical possibilities for their further increase. The war contributed to the strong growth of US’s overall production capacity - this means that after the war, and much more than prior to the war, they will be interested in expanding their foreign trade, in finding new and lucrative markets. It’s no coincidence that Americans are now already attempting to lay down roots in West and North Africa, Arabia, and Iran. They have particularly high expectations for China. With the Republicans coming to power, it is inevitable that sooner or later the US imperialist policy will take on a much blunter and cynical form than what is possible under Roosevelt. And since for the time being it’s impossible to see signs foretelling the possible rise of a strong internal opposition in the United States to such a policy, all the other nations of the five continents will have to very seriously consider the imperialist tendencies of America as the most important factor in the post-war international situation.

England will find itself in an entirely difference position after the war. It is in a stage of its historical development where British imperialism has lost most of its former dynamism and transformed into conservative imperialism. Of course, the British are not averse to seizing something that is not nailed down and on one or another side of the world, in order "round out" its gigantic empire. That is probably how it will be during the end of the present war. However, in general England is not thinking about new conquests, but about maintaining what it already has.

To this we must add that England will undoubtedly come out of the war greatly weakened and impoverished in comparison with the past. During these years it has swallowed up, for example, almost all of its foreign investments[[18]](#footnote-18) and was forced to go into debt with US and pay for US torpedo boats with bases and territories.[[19]](#footnote-19) England is now receiving foodstuffs and arms from the ocean by way of loan/lease, and still does not know how it will be paying off on this. Influential American circles are going to demand compensation from the UK in the form of the abolition of imperial preferential treatment, i.e. opening the doors of the British Empire to US market penetration. In the spring of 1941 (before the German invasion of the USSR), the late Beatrice Webb[[20]](#footnote-20) told me with a somewhat sense of deep sadness, that by the end of the war she expects England’s economic annexation to the United States. At that time many thinking people in Britain thought the same. Of course, the Soviet entry into the war changed the overall situation, and to some extent saved England from the American annexation. Nevertheless, the overall economic situation in the UK after the war will be difficult and fraught with various dangerous consequences, including mass unemployment.

Further ahead in the post-war period, Britain will encounter in all its magnitude the very same problem of population that had played such a decisive role in France. In the last 15-20 years, the birth rate in England has systematically fallen, and according to the estimation of statisticians, if this trend does not experience serious changes, then from 1950 the population of England will begin to totally decline. The population problem is now a cause of extreme uneasiness in England, but no one yet is able to offer any effective measures to solve it. Indeed, this is not so simple within the framework of bourgeois society. This fact should, of course, even more so dictate Britain’s post-war policy of caution and avoiding any dangerous adventures.

Finally, another factor that is heading in the same direction is the trend of internal development in the British Empire. Before the current war, there was a widespread belief that this empire would collapse in the face of the first serious challenge. This proved to be wrong. But it would be a big mistake to fall into the opposite extreme, and from the experience of the present war to conclude that British Empire is forever and ever inviolable. Even today, the behaviour of individual parts of the Empire might be quite different if England’s enemy was not Hitler's Germany but any other country, such as the USA. They should be more cautious in their judgments about the future. In fact, the main trend unfolding in the British Empire is the gradual increase of centrifugal forces. However, London, with its inherent agility and flexibility, is able to slow down this process to a certain extent. However, it is no state to defer the process. London is slowly retreating, but retreating nonetheless. Canada, Australia, and South Africa (not to mention Ireland, which still has diplomatic relations with Germany) now very much resemble independent countries rather than England’s overseas vassals. The outward manifestation of this is the growing number of diplomatic representatives of these dominions abroad, including to the USSR. The more far-sighted politicians in London see a way out of the current difficulties with the creation of a post-war British union of equal states as part of the metropolis and dominions, in which Britain retains power over the rest of the Empire, and will occupy the position of ‘first among equals’. It is difficult, however, to say whether such projects will come into fruition. There are large obstacles in the path to their realization - internal order (India problem) and external order (US trend towards the "appropriation" of Canada and Australia[[21]](#footnote-21)). In all circumstances, however, one thing is clear: the state of intra-imperial affairs will but again prompt the British towards a policy of prudence and delicate manoeuvring.

Therefore, since we are talking about England itself, it can be expected that in the period of interest to us, it will be a stabilizing factor in the system. The point, however, is that this not only about England. From what I have mentioned of the US position, it is clear that the global situation in the post-war era will be painted in the colours of the Anglo-American contradictions, because the interests of both countries are clash and will clash on a number of issues and in a number of areas. At the same time the United States will be the attacking side and England - the defending side, one that is also generally weaker and exhausted. For all its desire to peacefully dissolve what it has, Britain will be forced to undertake a heavy economic and political struggle against the United States and may lose one significant position after another.

This seems to be the situation in which the Soviet Union would have to develop its policy after the war.

What will the USSR’s relations to the United States and Britain likely be?

There are two possibilities.

If the first post-war period will lead to the outbreak of proletarian revolutions in Europe, then relations between the USSR, on the one hand, and the United States and Britain, on the other, will take on an intense and even acute character. The basic contradiction between capitalism socialism will come to the forefront. An especially pronounced contradiction in relations will emerge between the USSR and the United States, because in this case each country is on the opposite pole of social tension.

If, however, there are proletarian revolutions in Europe in the near future, then there is no reason to expect that the relationship between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the US and Britain - on the other, will be poor. The USSR is interested in maintaining good relations with the US and Britain, on account of its needs for economic recovery after the war and the preservation of peace - for which the cooperation of both these countries is essential. On the other hand, neither the US nor Britain have (and is not expected to) any unresolvable territorial and economic disputes with the USSR and the US imperialist expansion, which we discussed above, will basically bypass us. On the contrary, it is conceivable that the United States, at the very least, will be interested in neutralizing the Soviet Union during its imperialist plans.

As for England, it will have two souls inhabiting it at the same time. The nature of the socio-economic system and the common, cultural and historical traditions will push England toward America, but in fact it will be America that will as its powerful enemy and competitor on the world market, in the colonies, in civil aviation, in merchant navy, etc. On the contrary, England’s interests in the struggle for its global position will push England towards the Soviet Union, but the difference in the nature of the socio-economic system and in the cultural and historical traditions will create difficulties in the rapprochement between the two countries. In such circumstances, England is likely to go on as usual in her way of political brokerage and will play the American card against the Soviet Union and the Soviet card against the United States. It will also try with all the means at its disposal to find compromises on various specific issues with its formidable overseas rival, and it is likely that in this way it will be able to achieve significant (albeit temporary) success. For England is far superior to the United States in that it is one of the most important factors in the struggle of global forces – it has at its disposal huge historical experience and excellently trained staff implement its desired foreign policy.

For all of this, the logic of things should push England more and more in the Soviet Union’s direction, for its main battle in the post-war period will still be a struggle with the United States. It is possible that this logic of things will also be reinforced in some processes that promise in the not too distant future to bring to power more progressive elements than has been possible until now.[[22]](#footnote-22)

Proceeding from what has been discussed, I am inclined to think that a 20-year alliance treaty concluded between the USSR and Britain in 1942 has a real basis for being strengthened and developed in the post-war period. I also tend to think that in this period the Soviet Union will be interested in having England remain as a powerful country. In particular, the Soviet Union will be interested in Britain having a strong Navy at its disposal, as such an England may be necessary for us as counterweight in face of US imperialist expansion (England will never be a mighty land power - for that it lacks the traditions, skills, aptitudes, necessary[[23]](#footnote-23)). And although in the coming years after the war it will unlikely be necessary to expect some particularly unpleasant surprises in store for us from Washington, we cannot vouch for it in the more distant future.

Of course, the US is not a mighty land power in our sense of the word, and will unlikely ever become such. In this respect, they have much in common with England. Of course, between the USSR and the United States two oceans lay, which makes our country relatively invulnerable even to American aviation (at least in the first post-war period). However, what is not ruled out is, if there are any sharp contradictions between the USSR and the United States in the more distant future, then America could create many serious challenges for the Soviet Union. For example, it could start in various ways to encourage the revival of Germany and Japan after both countries suffer a heavy defeat brought on by the present war. They could also begin to cobble together an anti-Soviet bloc in Europe, using, for example, countries such as France, - especially if France had a strong land army. Even more dangerous would be an alliance between the US and China with its sights set against the USSR. American technology plus Chinese manpower could become the biggest threat to the Soviet Union. Needless to say, such a risk is ruled out for the immediate post-war period, during which a ravaged, weakened, and poorly organized China will have to think about only healing their heavy and painful wounds. But who knows what the situation will be in 20-25 years’ time? Who can guarantee that in that time a Soviet-hostile US-China combination would be impossible?

As such, the USSR is faced with the following possible and desirable strands of foreign policy in the post-war period: the strengthening of friendly relations with the United States and England; exploiting Anglo-American contradictions for Soviet Union’s own interest, with the prospect of increasingly close contact with England; all-round strengthening of Soviet influence in China; the transformation of the USSR into a centre of attraction for all genuinely democratic medium and small countries, and genuinely democratic elements in all countries, especially in Europe; maintenance of international unhelpfulness towards Germany and Japan until the time when and if these countries find a sincere desire to move towards the path of true democracy and socialism.

25. GENERAL DISCLAIMER

All of the above thoughts on the basics of the desired future of the world are valid only if the war does not lead to a genuine proletarian revolution in Germany. If, however, such a revolution has taken place, then these thoughts and the practical conclusions drawn from them would be subject to revision.

I. MAISKY

January 10, 1944

[FPARF, f. 06, inv. 06, fold. 14, file 145, pp. 1-41]

[Published in: Istochnik. 1995. №4–5. pp. 124–144]

Keywords: Post-war order, inter-allied relations, post-war Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Balkans

1. Here and further underlined, as in the original. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This idea was not mentioned once during Beneš’ visit to Moscow in December 1943. However, it was broached sometime later in a conversation Beneš had with Churchill, in which Czechoslovak President informed the British Prime Minister of the Moscow talks of 11 January 1944. Beneš informed Ambassador Z. Fierlinger in Moscow: “Churchill stressed to me that he fully understands and recognizes the need for a common Czechoslovak-Soviet border, the complete transfer of Germans out of the Republic and appreciates the importance of the Czech-Russian agreement" (Peregovory E. Benesha v Moskve (dekabr’ 1943 g.) // Voprosy istorii. 2001. №1. p. 11). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The idea of strengthening the USSR’s security on the northern and southern border flanks by military alliances with Finland and Romania was formulated in the early stages of the war. Stalin announced the idea to Eden during the Moscow talks in December 1941 (SSSR i germanskiy vopros. 1941 – 1949: Dokumenty iz Аrkhiva vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii. T. 1 / Sost. G.P. Kynin i Y. Laufer. M., 1996. p.127). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. This idea was being actively developed in the autumn of 1943, and was being worked out by the People’s Commissariat on Foreign Affairs’ Commission on the Preparation of Peace Treaties and the Post-war Settlement, under Litvinov’s chairmanship. See for example: SSSR i germanskiy vopros. T. 1. p. 286–305. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The mood Stalin expressed in May 1944 during a conversation with the Polish Professor O. Lange in Moscow was somewhat different. Stalin not only expressed concern over the possibility of a strong France, but considered its revival as difficult and time-consuming: "We need decades in order for France to be reborn as a great power" (published in: Noskova А.F. Stalin i Pol’sha, 1943 – 1944 gody // Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya. 2008. №3. p. 135). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The Foreign Office gave a similar assessment in August 1944: “There is clearly little prospect of any resumption of normal, still less of friendly relations between the present Spanish régime and the Soviet Union. It is, however, unlikely that the present Spanish régime will long survive the war”. British diplomats believed that in place of Franco’s there. could either emerge a moderate Republic, one with a liberal monarchy and relying on the army, or a far-left revolutionary regime, which would engender a new civil war (WP (44) 409, Memo by Eden, 09 / 08/1944, Annex VII // TNA, CAB 66/53 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Subsequently, voices in favour of reducing the territories transferred to Poland from the Soviet Union were often heard within the Soviet leadership. In March 1944, this was publicly voiced by the first secretary of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine N.S. Khrushchev ("The Ukrainian people will strive for the inclusion of native Ukrainian lands – among them, Chełm Land, Zamość, Tomaszów, and Jarosław – into the Ukrainian Soviet state). In a secret memorandum from October 1944, the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral, N.G. Kuznetsov, wrote about the need to include in the USSR (for strategic reasons) the eastern part Danzig bay, along with Elbing (now Elbląg), (SSSR i germanskiy vopros. T. 1. p. 560). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. This was in reference to Germany and Italy decision on 30 August 1940 (the so-called Second Vienna Award) on the transfer of previously-owned Romanian territory of Northern Transylvania to Hungary. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Earlier, in December 1941, Stalin did not exclude the transfer of the Dodecanese islands to Turkey, which caused objections from Eden (SSSR i germanskiy vopros. T. 1. p. 125). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. A similar attitude was reflected, inter alia, in the directives of the Bulgarian Communist leader, G. Dimitrov, sent on 1 March 1944: " One must also bear strictly in mind that in current conditions any steps and actions that create the false impression that we are supposedly dealing with the sovietization of Bulgaria can only play into the hands of various provocateurs and enemies of the Bulgarian people, and all such steps and actions must therefore be strictly avoided” (the Diary of Georgi Dimitrov. p. 302.). There were also exchanges on the possible formation of a Balkan federation in the future. "Although such a desire exists among all our nations, at the moment it is not appropriate to emphasize this, as some of our allies are very scared of this and might find that this is done under the influence of the Soviet Union", - DImitrov instructed his subordinates to Tito in April 1944 (Otnosheniya Rossii (SSSR) s Yugoslaviyey 1941 – 1945 gg. Dokumenty i materialy. M., 1998. p. 555). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The Soviet position on this issue remained unchanged, beginning with Stalin’s statements to Eden in Moscow in December 1941 (SSSR i germanskiy vopros. T. 1. p. 126), i Molotovym Idenu v Londone v maye 1942 g. (Rzheshevskiy O.А. Stalin i Cherchill’. p. 119). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. An important milestone in this respect was the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s visit to Stalin on 1 December 1943 (during Stalin’s visit to Tehran at the "Big Three" Conference). The British embassy in Tehran, having been informed by the Iranian authorities about Stalin's conversation with the Shah, reported to London: "The Shan was delighted with what Stalin told him. He had now no fear of Russian policy in Persia” (From Tehran to FO, Dec. 7, 1943 // TNA, FO 371/35104). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The idea expressed by Maisky will soon begin to be put into practice. In this respect, one of the most important milestones was the establishment of diplomatic relations with Syria and Lebanon in July - August 1944. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. As follows from Maisky’s words, he was not informed of the assurances Stalin gave (in Moscow, and then the Tehran Conference) to the Allies over the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan. Judging from Maisky’s written complaint to Molotov (24 November 1944), he was far from allowed to deal with all foreign policy information (especially information contained in the coded telegrams). See: SSSR i germanskiy vopros. T. 1. S. 697. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. As can be seen from Dimitrov’s correspondence with the chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong, from the end of 1943 to the beginning of 1944, Moscow focused on the Chinese Communists as a priority in the fight against the Japanese invaders, implementing tactics of a united national front and abstaining from armed clashes with the Kuomintang (The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov. pp. 290, 294-295). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. A similar view was previously stated by B.E. Stein in the secret memorandum, "Basic Principles of the statute of the International Organization for Safety and Peace" (16 December 1943): "All members of international organizations are obliged, according to the decision of the Council, to take part in the employment of sanctions against an aggressor state. No reference to neutral, geographical and other conditions can be grounds for refusing to implement the sanctions. If such a failure is to occur, then that state refused to take part in the implementation of sanctions shall be excluded from the International Organization" (АVP RF. F. 0512. Op. 4. P. 31. D. 298. L. 9). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Stalin voiced a similar position to Roosevelt in Tehran. It was reflected in the original version of the telegram on out the outcomes of the conference (later deleted by Stalin). See draft of the telegram from December 10, 1943 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. In May 1945, looking back at the history of the war, Keynes wrote: " We started the war with reserves of £ 600,000,000. By April 1941 we had spent the lot and our reserves were literally nil. With the inauguration of lend-lease we began slowly to recoup. But until recently it was a dogma of the United States Treasury that reserves of £ 250,000,000 would be as much as were good for us, and that lend-lease aid should be reduced whenever we looked likely to reach that figure” (Keynes, Overseas Financial Policy in Stage III, 03/04/1945 (in WP (45) 301) // TNA, CAB 66/65). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. This is in reference to the so-called Destroyers for Bases Agreement from September 2nd, 1940, according to which the United Kingdom received 50 destroyers the United States in exchange for granting the Americans the right to long-term lease of a number of British possessions in the Western Hemisphere (Newfoundland Jamaica and others) in order to establish of military bases there. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Webb, Martha Beatrice (1858 - 1943) - British sociologist and public figure. In his memoirs, Maisky recalled B. Webb and her husband Sidney as his "old spiritual friends," describing in detail his first visit to them. See: Maisky I.M. Vospominaniya sovetskogo diplomata. 1925 – 1945 gg. M., 1971. p. 190–195. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. British diplomats also observed similar trends. In June 1945 E. Dening, a political adviser to the Commander in Chief of the allied forces in Southeast Asia, Admiral L. Mountbatten, called for the active participation of the UK in the final stages of the war with Japan, including on the basis of the need to restore its prestige in the Far East and strengthen its inter-imperial ties. "Amongst the Dominions, Canada occupies a special place in her relationship with the United States and seems likely to consider her contribution to the war with Japan in the light of that relationship rather than from the point of view of the Empire as a whole. As regards Australia and New Zealand both these Dominions feel that they owe a debt to the United States for saving them from Japanese invasion, in addition to which they may expect that in the future too they will have to look largely to America for security in the Pacific” (Note by Dening, 15/06/1945 (in: COS (45) 413 (O)) // TNA, CAB 80/95). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. In May 1944, in a conversation with the Polish priest S. Orleman’skiy, Stalin also emphasized the relationship, in his view, between the internal political processes in the UK and the nature of its relations with the US. In reply to S. Orleman’skiy’s remark that "currently in America there is growing dissatisfaction with the British, as they use US resources for some selfish ends", Stalin said that "while the Tories are in power in England, that is how it will always be" (Sovetskiy faktor v Vostochnoy Evrope. 1944–1953. T. 1. Dokumenty / Otv. red. T.А. Volokitina. M., 1999. p. 61). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Maisky had earlier described the British attitude towards the army ground forces in an October 1942 telegram to Moscow: "It has never been loved in England. It was always the last refuge for various misfits and adventurers with a dark past. Its military experience has not extended beyond the colonial operations in Asia and Africa” (DVP. 1942. T. XXV. Kn. 2. Tula, 2010. S. 296). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)