A Bill of Rights: what for?
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The Bill of Rights debate is back on the political agenda, but not as we have known it before. For the first time there is all-party agreement on some kind of Bill of Rights for the UK. David Cameron has committed the Tory Party to “work towards” a “British Bill of Rights.” The Government has belatedly begun to defend the “benefits which the Human Rights Act (HRA) has given ordinary people” and the Liberal Democrats supported the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into UK law decades before Labour did.

The only argument now is what kind of bill of rights? In other words, should the HRA be defended as Britain’s bill of rights by any other name, based on “a single clear catalogue of … rights and freedoms” shared across Europe, as the Lord Chancellor has described it? Or should a ‘home-grown’ Bill of Rights replace the HRA as David Cameron has suggested? Alternatively could a British Bill of Rights build on the ECHR as the Labour Party once advocated before it took power and it is rumoured Gordon Brown may now be considering? These are no longer purely constitutional questions, of interest only to an informed elite. They feed into a national preoccupation with the appropriate balance between liberty and security that has come to dominate the era in which we now live.

Backstory
Not since Tom Paine wrote Rights of Man in 1791 has so much national attention focussed on fundamental rights and how to protect them. Published amidst mounting panic by the British government that the French Revolution would prove contagious, Paine’s best seller called on the state to secure fundamental social rights as well as refrain from abusing individual liberties.

In his day, Paine electrified political debate in Britain. Within two years about a quarter of a million copies of Rights of Man were sold in a population of ten million.

Over the next 150 years the radical rights movement that Paine represented was buffeted from all sides. By the beginning of the twentieth century he was eclipsed as a leading thinker of the labour movement by social democrats and Marxists who championed public ownership over constitutional reform and collective bargaining over individual rights.

Interest in bills of rights remained largely dormant until 1968 when the Wilson government introduced the Commonwealth Immigrants Act. Passed in only three days amidst a tabloid frenzy, the Act prevented British Asians expelled from East Africa from entering the UK. This was a

1 British Bill of Rights, Speech to Centre for Policy Studies, 26 June 2006.
4 A new Agenda for Democracy: Labour’s proposals for constitutional reform, NEC, 1993
5 See, for example, Andrew Grice, Tory Leader is stealing Brown’s best tunes, Independent, 30.9.06.
6 Marx famously mocked Paine’s “so-called rights of man” in On the Jewish Question, 1843.
Labour government using its parliamentary majority to ride roughshod over the rights of a minority. The expelled East African Asians were eventually vindicated by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. But the ECHR was not enforceable in the domestic courts. Without a bill of rights or written constitution to turn to, British democracy offered these citizens virtually no protection.\(^7\)

The bulk of the Tory and Labour parties remained un-persuaded about the benefits of constitutional reform\(^8\). Conservative opinion tended to dismiss bills of rights as lethal for the doctrine of ‘parliamentary sovereignty,’\(^9\) resisting virtually any restraints on the ‘will of the legislature.’ The idea that certain values are so fundamental to democracy that they should receive special protection, was deemed almost alien to Britain’s political traditions\(^10\).

Opposition to bills of rights within the Labour party was more political than constitutional. The spectre of public school educated judges overturning laws passed by a democratically elected, centre left government hung over the debate\(^11\). Support for a UK bill of rights remained largely the preserve of lawyers and liberals (with a lower and upper case L).

A growing perception amongst opinion formers and some leading politicians that the British political system amounted to an ‘elective dictatorship,’\(^12\) kept the bill of rights debate on the boil. Hidden within Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 election manifesto was the promise of all-party discussions on a bill of rights. Once in power this commitment was air brushed away. But it was 18 years of Conservative rule that was to turn the tide in the Labour Party in favour of constitutional reform.

The reputation of the legislature as a check on the executive sunk to (what was then) an all time low. Parliamentary sovereignty was exposed as government sovereignty in all but name. From the poll tax to the Spycatcher ban, the Conservatives enacted any measures they wished, on a minority of the popular vote. Judges gained the reputation for providing virtually the only effective challenge to executive measures as they developed their own powers of judicial review, much to the frustration of the Tory government\(^13\).

When the late Labour leader, John Smith, committed the Labour Party to a British Bill of Rights in February 1993, it was as part of a package of proposals to “restore democracy to our people.”

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\(^7\) The government, by way of concession, created a special voucher scheme to allow entry to an annual quota of British Asians from East Africa, as refugees rather than as British subjects exercising their right of residence.

\(^8\) Exceptions included Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams, Sir Keith Joseph, Sir Michael Havers, Leon Brittain and Lord Hailsham.

\(^9\) The doctrine of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ hailed from the first British Bill of Rights in 1689 which is less a bill of rights for ‘the people’ and more a set of protections for peers and MPs. The essential component of the doctrine is that one parliament should not bind its successor.

\(^10\) Bills of rights are sometimes known as ‘higher laws’ in that all other laws, whenever passed, are supposed to confirm with their broad principles or be reinterpreted or repealed.

\(^11\) The first Labour Party document to propose the incorporation of the ECHR into UK law, A Charter of Human Rights, was published in 1976. The National Executive Committee (NEC) would not allow the paper to be presented as official policy; only as an issue for debate.

\(^12\) It was Lord Hailsham, former Conservative Lord Chancellor, who gave this phrase currency in a stinging critique of the British constitution in the Dimbleby Lecture, 1976. He pledged support for a written constitution and bill of rights based on the ECHR.

\(^13\) Judicial review of executive acts and decisions grew significantly from 491 cases in 1980 to 2,439 in 1992. The eminent Guardian journalist, Hugo Young, wrote in April 1992 “For Thatcherite Whitehall, the judges were a curse.”
Echoing the sentiments of the former Conservative Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham, 18 years earlier, he bemoaned that “what we have in this country at the moment is not real democracy; it is elective dictatorship”.\footnote{\textit{A New Way Forward}, \textit{Speech}, John Smith, Leader of the Labour Party, Bournemouth, 7 February 1993.}

Smith concluded that “the quickest and simplest way” of introducing “a substantial package of human rights” would be to pass a Human Rights Act “incorporating into British law the European Convention on Human Rights,”\footnote{\textit{A Citizen’s Democracy}, Charter 88, March 1993. The IPPR published \textit{A British Bill of Rights} in 1990 drafted by Anthony Lester QC and others based on the ECHR and the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.} completing the process that began in 1951 with the ratification of the ECHR\footnote{It was the Atlee government that ratified the ECHR in 1951 and the Wilson government in 1966 that granted individuals the right to directly petition the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.}. The 1993 Labour Conference adopted an NEC Statement, introduced by home affairs spokesperson, Tony Blair, supporting an all-party Commission to “draft our own Bill of Rights,” following the incorporation of the ECHR into UK law\footnote{Note 4 above.}.

After John Smith’s untimely death Labour’s commitment to constitutional reform was recognised as one of his strongest legacies. Tony Blair pledged to introduce a bill of rights as part of a package of “democratic renewal” in his 1994 campaign literature for party leader. The new shadow Home Secretary, Jack Straw, committed a future Labour government to a “two stage process.” The incorporation of the ECHR into UK law would be followed by “the establishment of our own British Bill of Rights.”\footnote{\textit{Speech}, Community Links, November 1995.} The 1997 manifesto reflected the first part of this commitment and the Human Rights Act was introduced the following year.

\section*{The HRA: What Went Right, What Went Wrong?}

The cracks in the new government’s approach to constitutional reform soon became apparent. John Smith’s manifesto for a ‘citizen’s democracy,’ which he had “wanted to make the hallmark of the next Labour Government”\footnote{Elizabeth Smith, \textit{Introduction, A Citizen’s Democracy}, March 1993.} gave way to a set of significant, but piecemeal, reforms; their relationship to invigorating democracy increasingly opaque.

Nevertheless, if the world hadn’t shifted on its axis after 11 September 2001, the HRA may well have bedded down to become an accepted part of the legal and constitutional landscape of the UK. Many of the early predictions about clogged up courts and a new litigious culture did not materialise, at least not as a consequence of the HRA. Research by the Lord Chancellor’s Department\footnote{Now the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA).} indicated that very few cases were wholly reliant on the Act.\footnote{See Raine and Walker, ‘The Impact on the Courts and the Administration of Justice of the Human Rights Act 1998’, October 2002, which found relatively limited impact of the HRA on the courts in terms of challenges and additional workload, although it had invoked a number of significant policy and practice changes and was felt to be engendering a stronger human rights culture within the courts.} Then, as now, the HRA was mainly cited as a defence in criminal trials or as an additional argument in judicial reviews or civil cases.
The shocking events of 9/11 - less than a year after the HRA came into force – provided a jolt to the political system. The Prime Minister and the new Home Secretary, David Blunkett, rapidly came to the see the Act as an obstacle in the so-called ‘war on terror’. In particular, they became frustrated that judges would not deport foreign suspects to countries where there was a real risk they may be tortured, including those accused of involvement in international terrorism. This was blamed on the HRA although the government was bound to comply with this European Court of Human Rights interpretation of ECHR Article 3, prohibiting torture, before Labour came to power. Regardless of the HRA, this mandate would still have applied.

Many other controversial policies, from the introduction of ASBOS to the retention of DNA, were found to be compatible with the HRA. The assumption that the Act would usher in a new era of rampant libertarianism - based on a ‘black letter’ (or liturgical) reading of the ECHR – was not substantiated. The courts put down an early marker that, “inherent in the whole of the Convention,” is “a search for balance between the rights of the individual and the wider rights of the society…neither enjoying an absolute right to prevail over the other.”

More recently, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips, described the HRA as “an important and successful part of the legal structure.” This followed the (largely) clean bill of health given to the Act in July 2006 by both the Home Office and Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) in reviews initiated by the Prime Minister and overseen by the Home Secretary and Lord Chancellor respectively. The Home Office concluded that the HRA represents a “powerful

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22 A phrase coined by the American President, George Bush, in the wake of 9/11.
23 Contrary to some media reports, the ECHR does not prohibit all deportations to particular countries but requires the courts to protect individuals where there is evidence they personally face torture if they are returned.
24 Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413 which built on the case law in Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439. In times of national emergency states can usually ‘derogue’ from most provisions of the ECHR but this excludes the prohibition on torture. This is why the government cannot legislate to require the courts to take national security considerations into account when adjudicating on deportations to countries where the courts judge there is a real risk that an individual deportee may be tortured or subject to the death penalty. The government is trying to persuade the European Court of Human Rights to change this interpretation of Article 3 by intervening in a Dutch case, Ramzy v Netherlands. It is also seeking ‘memoranda of understanding’ with certain states that they will not torture named suspects if they are deported.
25 When the government introduced legislation to indefinitely detain, without charge, the foreign suspects it could not deport, the House of Lords declared this to be a disproportionate breach of the HRA in that there was no evidence that the threat to national security was from non-British nationals alone; a prescient observation as it turned out (A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56). In response, the government introduced ‘control orders’ to severely inhibit the movement of British and foreign suspects alike and has subsequently detained many of the original suspects again, this time with a view to deporting them.
26 An early example was Brown v Procurator Fiscal and Advocate General for Scotland [2001] 2 WLR 817 which found that the submission in trials of self-incriminating evidence by car owners was compatible with the HRA provided the trial as a whole was fair. This is currently being appealed at the European Court of Human Rights.
27 Lord Bingham, Leeds City Council v Price and others [2006] UKHL 10 at para 32. See also Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35; Soering v UK 1989. The exception to this search for ‘balance’ are the rights to be free from torture and slavery which are neither qualified nor limited under the ECHR.
28 Interview, The Observer, 8.10.06.
framework” to deliver “a commonsense balance between the rights of individuals and the rights of victims and communities to be protected against harm.”

The DCA report claimed the HRA “has had a significant, but beneficial, effect upon the development of policy.” Although further training and guidance are necessary, the HRA “framework,” promotes “greater personalisation and therefore better services.”

Certainly many individuals and groups can testify to tangible benefits from the HRA in their everyday lives. Widely respected organisations like the Disability Rights Commission and Help the Aged have embraced the HRA and campaigned for an extension of its scope. They cite the benefit of human rights values like dignity and respect to thousands of people for whom anti-discrimination legislation on its own provides insufficient protection.

Speaking at the LSE after the publication of the Review in September 2006, the Lord Chancellor urged: “Now is the time to stand up for human rights” for “in a whole range of unsung areas the Act has improved the lot of those who deserve help.”

Yet considerable damage had already been done to the perception of the Act. The more disenchanted the government became with the HRA after 9/11, the more the Act was presented as a technical measure to “bring rights home” and avoid queues at the European Court of Human Rights. It was as if the Government hoped that the more it played down the Act’s significance, the less effect it would have.

The tabloid onslaught against the HRA has been relentless, fuelled by a combination of Euroscepticism and apocryphal stories which ministers showed little or no appetite to rebut.
until recently. After the 2005 London bombings in particular, the Prime Minister sometimes sounded like a cheer-leader for this negative spin, threatening to “amend the Human Rights Act in respect of the interpretation of the ECHR.”

Much of this is reminiscent of the media frenzy which accompanied the introduction of race and sex discrimination legislation in the 1970s. In simple terms, stories about ‘politically correct’ legislation that benefit the ‘undeserving’ at the expense of the ‘average British citizen’ sell copy. The absence of a statutory champion, like the CRE or EOC, and the lack of consistent political leadership on the purpose and benefits of the HRA, have taken their toll. Time will tell whether the new Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR), the first British statutory body charged with promoting the values in the HRA, will succeed in rehabilitating it.

**Can the HRA act in lieu of a Bill of Rights?**

Soon after Labour came to power it became clear that, outside the context of Northern Ireland, ministers had lost any appetite they might have once have had for building on the HRA with a ‘second stage’ bill of rights.

Yet largely because the ‘bill of rights debate’ provided the original impetus for the HRA, it was designed to be far more than an incorporated treaty. As the ‘second stage commitment’ receded, so there was a push to draft the HRA ‘in lieu’ of a bill of rights. The Home Secretary Jack Straw conceded this when it came into force in October 2000, describing the HRA as “the first Bill of Rights this country has seen for three centuries.”

In legal and constitutional terms most of the salient features of bills of rights are present in the HRA. First, like most post-war bills of rights, its pedigree is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its broad, ethical values aimed at establishing fair and tolerant societies. Characteristically, most of the rights incorporated in the HRA can be legitimately, and proportionately, limited to protect other rights or interests, including what would be recognised as

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38 This largely comprises the wilful misconception that the ECHR is a creature of the EU rather than the post-war Council of Europe, comprising 46 states across the whole of Europe, all of which have ratified the ECHR and incorporated it into their domestic law.

39 The DCA Review (note 2) distinguishes between urban myths, rumours and partial reporting which leave the impression that a claim which fails at its first hurdle is successful e.g. Dennis Nelsen’s bid to receive pornography in his prison cell, which was dismissed at the permission stage, meaning it wasn’t even heard by a full hearing.

40 Prime Minister’s statement on anti-terror measures, Press Conference, 5 August 2005.

41 The CEHR, due to operate from October 2007, will have a duty to clarify and promote the values in the HRA to both officials and the wider public. It is also mandated to champion the importance of human rights in general, like human rights commissions throughout the world. There will also be a separate Human Rights Commission for Scotland.

42 The 1998 Good Friday Agreement mandated the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission to consult on supplementary rights which “together with the ECHR” would “constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.” Nearly ten years on, it is still being consulted upon in conjunction with the all-party Bill of Rights Forum.

43 *Speech*, IPPR, 13 January 2000.

44 The 1948 UDHR was a direct response to the horrors of the Holocaust and World War Two. The ECHR gives legal expression to most of the civil and political rights in the UDHR, as its preamble makes clear, but excludes nearly all of its economic, social and cultural rights.
‘the common good’. The HRA has to be interpreted purposefully, rather than literally. In this sense it is a different species from the technical, ‘black letter’ law characteristic of most British statutes. This is one of the reasons why the tabloids so often get it wrong when they invent stories based on a literal interpretation of its provisions.

Second, the HRA provides individuals with a set of fairly simple, written rights which they can use to hold public authorities to account, inside or outside the courtroom. Remedies are available, at the discretion of the courts, where unjustified breaches occur.

Third, British courts can develop their own interpretation of the broad values in the HRA, provided this does not ‘weaken’ the protection afforded by the ECHR. Contrary to misleading statements by the Leader of the Conservative Party, Judges are required to “take account of” the European Court case-law, but are not bound by it. Amendments tabled by the Tories, but rejected by the Government, during the passage of the HRA were aimed at tying the domestic courts to Strasbourg jurisprudence. As Conservative MP, Edward Leigh, observed, without such a mandate “we are in danger of not simply incorporating the Convention in our law but going much further. What we are creating is an entirely new bill of rights.”

Most importantly, the HRA, like all bills of rights, is effectively a ‘higher law’ to which virtually all other law and policy must conform where ‘possible.’ The ‘possible’ relates to the prohibition on striking down statutes; parliament still has the final say. Instead, Judges can declare Acts incompatible with the HRA, but it is a decision for parliament, or more realistically government, whether, and if so how, to respond.

This so-called ‘dialogue model’ was a direct response to criticisms of bills of rights within the Labour Party. The point was to give parliament a primary role as the custodian of fundamental

45 ECHR Article 5, for example, allows for the deprivation of liberty where there is “reasonable suspicion” that an individual has committed a crime or where it is necessary to prevent one, provided this is promptly followed by release or charge and trial.

46 HRA s2. Recently, however, the courts have started to interpret this section as if it required the courts to stay within the confines of the case law of the Strasbourg court. See R (Ullah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 26 and R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWCA Civ 327. This was not the original intention behind the HRA, one of whose stated aims was to influence Strasbourg jurisprudence via the interpretations that might be put on it by British courts, a development which has started to occur in practice.

47 In his speech declaring his intention to support a British Bill of Rights, David Cameron wrote that the HRA “makes things worse in that it obliges British courts to base their judgments on the ECHR and [its] case law…giving them no scope to develop their own principles.” See note 1.

48 313 HC 398 (3 June, 1998).

49 Liberty’s draft bill of rights, A People’s Charter published in 1991, proposed such an approach. This was developed further in unpublished papers on the HRA that I drafted for the Home Secretary in 1997 at the Human Rights Incorporation Project, King’s College Law School, London.

50At the time of writing, there have been 21 Declarations of Incompatibility by the higher courts since the HRA came into force in 2000 of which 15 are still standing and 6 have been overturned on appeal. However if a court or tribunal finds that a provision in an Act of the Scottish Parliament is incompatible with Convention rights, it will be able to strike it down as ultra vires. The Australian Capital Territory and the state of Victoria have both recently passed Human Rights Acts explicitly based on the UK model.

51 Describing the intention behind the HRA, Jack Straw said “Parliament and the judiciary must engage in a serious dialogue about the operation and development of the rights in the Bill…this dialogue is the only way in which we can ensure the legislation is a living development that assists our citizens.” (314 HC 1141 4 June 1998). See also Francesca Klug, “The Long Road to Human Rights Compliance,” Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, Special Issue: Human Rights and Equality, Vol 57, No 1, Spring 2006. The former Lord
human rights. Jack Straw emphasised from the outset that higher courts “could make a Declaration [of Incompatibility] that, subsequently, Ministers propose and Parliament accepts, should not be accepted.” The example he gave was abortion law, but he might have added fox hunting bans, gun control and election expenditure limits; issues that many people would agree are more appropriately decided by elected MPs, working within a human rights framework, rather than judges.

**Should the HRA be replaced by a British Bill of Rights?**

Bills of rights are not just legal and constitutional documents, however. They do not only protect the rights of individuals but can have a symbolic role in highlighting the fundamental principles of a democracy and signifying what a country stands for, even when their legal protection falls short of their high ideals. In a modern context, bills of rights can act as a baseline of common values in a diverse society.

Assessed against this criteria, the HRA has clearly failed to past muster. The reality is that it has never been sufficiently ‘owned’ by British people as truly ‘theirs.’ The absence of prior consultation, and the adoption of a European human rights treaty wholesale, has reduced the likelihood of the HRA ever reaching the iconic status of the American or South African bills of rights.

This was David Cameron’s point when he argued for “a modern British Bill of Rights… to define the core values which give us our identity as a free nation.” The Conservatives have pledged to scrap the HRA whilst remaining signed up to the ECHR, as Cameron confirmed at his first Party conference as Leader.

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Chancellor, Lord Irvine, described the HRA as a “new and dynamic co-operative endeavour… between the Executive, the Judiciary and Parliament… in which each works in its respective constitutional sphere.” Lecture, Durham Human Rights Centre, November 2002.


53 Constitutionally speaking, there was no obligation on the government to comply with the Belmarsh indefinite detention ruling either (see note 23) although realistically the European Court of Human Rights was likely to take a similar approach to the domestic courts on this issue.

54 It cannot be assumed that the European Court of Human Rights will always take the same view as the domestic courts that an Act of Parliament breaches Convention rights. Where there is no ‘human rights consensus,’ the Strasbourg Court is likely to affirm the right of national authorities – parliaments as well as courts – to use their own discretion to determine where the balance of rights should lie. This is known as the ‘doctrine of a margin of appreciation’ to national authorities and can even be applied to national security issues where there is no European-wide consensus.

55 In contrast to the years of local, as well as national, public consultation that preceded bills of rights in Canada, New Zealand and South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, and more recently in the Australian Capital Territory and state of Victoria, there was no prior consultation in the UK beyond the publication of *Bringing Rights Home*, see note 36.

56 Or even the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is also partly based on an international treaty, the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that draws heavily on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as does the ECHR.

57 See Note 1.

Commentators of various political persuasions instantly questioned the ‘constitutional literacy’ of this package. Probably the strongest critique came from Ken Clarke, chair of the Conservative Party’s Democracy Task Force, who dismissed the proposals as “xenophobic” and “legal nonsense”.

Is this fair? Legally and constitutionally, the Conservative package seems confused, at the very least. Were a British Bill of Rights to be weaker or more qualified than the ECHR, the UK government would fall foul of the Strasbourg court with increasing regularity. If, to avoid this, the Bill of Rights were broadly similar to the ECHR, the domestic courts would strive to iron out any differences by interpreting it to comply with the Convention whenever they can, as happens elsewhere in Europe.

Cameron’s main pitch was that a home-grown Bill would encourage the European Court of Human Rights to back off and interfere less with “British parliamentary sovereignty.” This is simply wrong. The suggestion that a less broad, more ‘specific,’ Bill will ‘protect’ the UK from Strasbourg jurisprudence on fundamental rights, is a misreading of the Court’s ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine. The whole point of the ECHR was to provide a floor of basic rights across Europe. Evidence from countries like France or Germany clearly demonstrates this point. A domestic bill will provide no get out clause from the absolute prohibition on torture.

Yet Cameron has subsequently declared this goal to be the main purpose of repealing the HRA.

As for the charge of Xenophobia, the pledge to replace the HRA with “a clear articulation of citizen’s rights that British people can use in British courts” has to be taken seriously. This could just be a ‘sound bite’ but the reference to ‘Britishness’ appears to extend beyond the kind of rights that are enshrined, to the people who can lay claim to them.

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59 See, for e.g. Mary Ann Sieghart, The Times, 30.6.06; Vernon Bogdanor, Guardian, 1.7.06.
60 Quoted in Guardian 29.6.06.
61 This would be a reversal of recent years. The number of violations involving the British government has fallen since the effect of the HRA started to bite. See DCA review, note 2, at p4. The number of cases where at least one violation of the ECHR was found has fallen from 30 in 2002, when pre-HRA cases were still being heard, to 15 in 2005.
62 Cameron seems to have confused the Strasbourg’s court ‘doctrine of a margin of appreciation,’ which applies when there is no European consensus on what minimum standards consist of, with the concept of subsidiarity, an EU term for retaining national ‘independence,’ not applicable to notions of fundamental, universal human rights. See note 54.
63 In Germany, for example, the ECHR has the rank of a statute over which the constitution is supreme. However, the European Court of Human Rights does not generally apply the margin of appreciation any differently to Germany than any other state.
64 As we have seen, there are many areas where the European Court of Human Rights accepts that domestic courts are best placed to use their ‘own discretion,’ provided this does not weaken the baseline protection provided by the ECHR; but torture is not one of them. Alongside slavery it is one of the only rights to receive absolute and unqualified protection under the ECHR. See note 24.
65 Cameron wrote in the Sunday Times on 12 November 2006, “It is time to replace the Human Rights Act with a British bill of rights that will enable ministers to act within the law to protect our society. If M15 tells the government that a foreign national is …a danger to national security, then the home secretary should be free to balance the rights of the suspect with the rights of society …and proceed with the deportation if necessary.”
66 Note 1. My emphasis.
67 Like jury trial or restrictions on the introduction of ID cards; rights with a traditional British pedigree.
The underlying philosophy of human rights is, of course, that every human being is entitled to fundamental rights simply because they are human. British citizens who live and travel abroad protest if they are not treated according to internationally recognised standards. Whilst voting rights and many welfare benefits are usually dependent on citizenship or residence, nearly all the fundamental rights in democratic bills of rights apply to everyone within the jurisdiction of a state. The Bush government built the Guantanamo Bay detention centre for foreign nationals to bypass the natural justice protections of the American Constitution. The Conservative package hints at a Bill of Rights that would exclude non-citizens from some of its provisions from the outset.

Once subjected to deeper scrutiny, these proposals may well unravel as unworkable and illogical. But if they make it into the Tory manifesto un-amended, and a Conservative government takes power, a likely scenario would be swift repeal of the HRA whilst consultation on a Bill of Rights becomes mired in dispute and delay. Obtaining consensus on a bill of rights, particularly given the conflicting goals of some of the likely participants, is not a simple task.68

What is to be done?

The immediate effect of the Tory proposals on the Labour administration was to galvanise senior ministers, including the Prime Minister, into belatedly defending the HRA and claiming that an additional bill of rights would be "a recipe for confusion, not clarity."69

This is disingenuous. All 46 members of the Council of Europe have incorporated the ECHR into their law, through one means or another.70 At least 21 of these have their own bill of rights or written constitutions, enshrining fundamental freedoms. Confusion is avoided by the national courts interpreting their domestic Bills to broadly conform with the Strasbourg case law which has only very occasionally proved difficult or controversial.71 The argument that a domestic Bill of Rights, alongside the HRA, is necessarily confusing does not stand up to scrutiny. The claim that introducing a Bill of Rights necessitates the repeal of the HRA is nonsense.

So what are the choices for a future Prime Minister committed to democratic renewal and constitutional reform?

One option is to reinvigorate the DCA's belated efforts, led by the Lord Chancellor, Charlie Falconer, and Human Rights Minister, Cathy Ashton, to defend and promote the HRA as "common sense"72 and relevant for everyone.73 A rebuttal strategy has finally been developed to

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68 Shadow Constitutional Affairs Minister, HenryBillingham, hinted at the fragility of the Tories' commitment when he said in a recent parliamentary debate that “the only answer is to repeal the HRA and consider introducing a new, modern Bill of Rights…” ,457 HC 80 (19 February 2007). My emphasis.
70 In states with a monist tradition, the rights in the Convention can be applied by domestic courts on ratification. In states with a dualist approach to international law, like the UK, the substantive rights must be incorporated by statute to become applicable in domestic law.
71 See the German Gorgulu case, Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1481/04.
72 Human Rights and Common Sense, Harry Street lecture, Manchester University, Lord Chancellor 9 February 2007
respond to the more outlandish claims about the Act. An increasing number of public sector bodies are finding the HRA useful in levering up standards in their sectors.\textsuperscript{74}

Despite the relentless tabloid bashing inflicted on the HRA, a YouGov Survey commissioned by the Disability Rights Commission in June 2006 found that 62% of respondents thought it was good to have an Act to protect everyone’s rights, although ignorance of what is in the HRA was profound\textsuperscript{75}.

Opinion polls indicate that bills of rights are popular in principle. Support for a bill of rights, at nearly 80%, has remained fairly consistent over the last 15 years according to the ICM ‘State of the Nation’ polls\textsuperscript{76}. What these findings also suggest is that even if the HRA can fairly be described as a Bill of Rights, most people in the UK are ignorant of the fact.

At one level it is extraordinary that the Government is in danger of being upstaged by the Opposition on the introduction of a bill of rights, when the former has already effectively introduced one. If the Government has received virtually no credit for doing so, it largely has itself to blame. Far from consistently promoting the HRA as Britain’s bill of rights, enshrining values like free speech and a fair trial that have a long British pedigree, the Act has sometimes been presented like an elaborate European directive! Yet without the HRA it is highly unlikely there would now be all-party support for some kind of catalogue of written rights\textsuperscript{77}.

The Conservative support for a bill of rights opens up a second option: the opportunity to consult on additional rights that might supplement — but not replace — the HRA to create a distinctively British Bill of Rights\textsuperscript{78}. If the UK is to remain within the ECHR, as every mainstream political party intends, no other approach to a Bill of Rights makes sense. This, as we have seen, is what Labour had originally envisaged, and is an ongoing process in Northern Ireland\textsuperscript{79}. An inclusive and deliberative process could, ironically, rehabilitate the HRA more successfully than any campaign, by clarifying the rights it already enshrines and its purpose, and relevance, to everyone in the UK.

The Tories have suggested a British bill of rights should include issues like data protection, which is inadequately protected by the HRA, or jury trial, which is absent from it\textsuperscript{80}. Their list is not large because the HRA includes all the minimum, standard rights present in bills of rights the

\begin{itemize}
\item[(73)] Human Rights are Majority Rights, The Lord Morris Memorial Lecture, Bangor University, Lord Chancellor, 23 March 2007.
\item[(74)] The British Institute of Human Rights works with a range of public bodies to apply the standards in the HRA in every day life.
\item[(75)] 70% of respondents could not name three of their rights.
\item[(76)] In 1991 79% thought their rights would be better protected if written in a single document. By 2006 77% agreed strongly or slightly that Britain needs a Bill of Rights to protect the liberty of individuals, with only 6% disagreeing. However some of the rights attracting strongest support in 2006 are not included in the HRA such as right to a fair trial by jury and free hospital treatment.
\item[(77)] All 3 major parties either support the introduction of a Bill of Rights or the Incorporation of the ECHR.
\item[(78)] ‘British’ as in the pedigree of some of the rights it upholds; not as in the people who are entitled to its protection. A British Bill of Rights could either consolidate the rights in the HRA or, as effectively happens in much of Europe, run alongside it.
\item[(79)] See notes 4 and 42.
\item[(80)] See in particular Dominic Grieve, “Liberty and Community in Britain,” Speech for Conservative Liberty Forum, 2 October 2006.
\end{itemize}
world over. Other potential candidates for consultation could include a stronger equality clause, a more extensive right to education; a right to health care free at the point of need; provisions from the Children’s Convention; and carers’ and independent living rights from the new UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Some commentators propose introducing a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. The 2006 Victoria Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities asserts in a preamble that “human rights come with responsibilities and must be exercised in a way that respects the human rights of others.” This was drafted, in response to community consultation, to underline the implied or explicit vision of all post war human rights treaties, including the ECHR. Rights can, and sometimes should, be limited when necessary to protect the rights of others or the wider community. But very few bills of rights contain legally enforceable duties aimed at individuals. These are contained in a host of other statutes.

As significant as the rights upheld by any bill of rights, is the body selected to be the final arbiter of its broad values. The current ‘dialogue model’ adopted by the HRA, in which Parliament has the final say, is not one any government is likely to alter significantly to give stronger powers to the courts, least of all one concerned to reduce judicial ‘interference’ with its anti-terrorism policy.

The strongest case for consulting on a British Bill of Rights in this period of ongoing debate on our national identity, is that we have no equivalent to the American or South African Bills of Rights to turn to at times of national tension. Yet there has arguably never been a time in modern history where a foundational document is more necessary; a Charter that reinforces the right to choose to be ‘different’, as well as the bottom line values of fairness, equality and

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81 ECHR Article 14 is limited to outlawing discrimination in relation to the civil and political rights enshrined in the Convention and does not explicitly include categories like age, disability and sexual orientation, although the interpretation of Article 14 has increasingly included these groups.

82 Rights to education and health could reflect state obligations that already exist—for example, providing health care at the point of need— but which are ‘unprotected’ from easy repeal. Polls suggest that such social and economic rights are the most popular candidates for a bill of rights. Following the path of the South African argument, to guard against excessive individualism overriding the public interest, the state could be duty bound only to “progressively realise” economic and social rights that are not already enshrined in law. This reflects the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights which the UK has been bound by since 1976.

83 The 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child includes recognition of the “rights and duties of parents.”

84 See www.un.org/disabilities/convention/

85 Note 55.

86 ECHR Article 10, for example, refers to the “duties and responsibilities” which correspond with the right to free expression which can be limited, to the extent that it is necessary, to protect national security, public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime and the reputation and rights of others.

87 UDHR Article 29 states “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.”

88 Exceptions include the Constitution of the former Soviet Union and some African bills of rights.

89 Cameron proposes to semi-entrench a Bill of Rights by amending the Parliament Act so that the House of Commons could not amend or repeal it without the support of the Second Chamber. This seems an innovative idea.

90 See note 65. America, Canada, Germany and South Africa all have ‘legislative strike down’ powers, by contrast.
tolerance that are definitive of modern British democracy. A Bill of Rights can provide a unifying force in a diverse society, as the Conservative Party has suggested, but it will not do this if it ignores the contribution of many countries, and most religions and cultures, to the human rights values recognised throughout the world today.

The process of adopting a bill of rights can be as important as the rights themselves. If the objectives are clear and the process is inclusive, this is an opportunity to return to the unfinished project begun by John Smith. A project he referred to as a “new deal” between “the people and the state.” A deal that “gives people new powers and a stronger voice in the affairs of the nation;” one that “restores a sense of cohesion and vitality to our national life.”


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91 In a speech on “multiculturalism and integration” for the Runnymede Trust on 8 December 2006 the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, spoke of the need to “conform” to “our common values” which he defined as the rule of law, democratic decision-making, and freedom from violence and discrimination.

92 The UDHR reflects the insights and values of all major religions and cultures and many of these are reflected in the ECHR, in spite of its European designation. South African MP, Professor Kader Asmal, in a speech on the South African Constitution at Chatham House on 10 November 2006, warned that a “shared vision of national identity” could, if based on a “mythical past,” rather than the future, bring with it “the alienation of many immigrants and communities” whose experience belies the “imagining” of a Britain “that has always held dear the values of liberty, tolerance and social justice.”