

# **National or European Parliamentarians?**

## **Evidence from a New Survey of the Members of the European Parliament**

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## 1. INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Over the last quarter century, the European Parliament (EP) has experienced a greater degree of change than any other major EU institution. Following successive EU enlargements, the EP has become a larger and more diverse body; its internal organization has undergone substantial reform; and it has acquired a greatly enhanced role in EU lawmaking. But at the same time, the broader political environment facing the parliament has, in some important respects, become much more difficult. European publics have grown increasingly willing to express dissatisfaction with the EU; and as the elected EU institution, the EP is central to a model of political representation that has failed to build effective links between the people and the Union (Farrell and Scully 2007). For all these reasons and more, it has never been more important to know about Europe's elected institution.

In this paper, we seek to make two distinct contributions to knowledge about the EP. First, we introduce a significant new source of data about the parliament, from a new survey of the MEPs.<sup>2</sup> We explain the overall purpose of the survey, its content, and how the survey instrument was implemented via the internet, as well as considering any limitations of the survey results as a data source.

Second, we draw on the data gathered to examine a specific question about the EP: what has been the impact of recent EU enlargements on the chamber? The sort of EP that had emerged in this century has in recent years had to cope with a significant exogenous 'shock'. EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 greatly boosted the size of the EP and substantially increased the national and partisan diversity of the chamber. Enlargement also brought into the chamber MEPs from countries with very different political histories and political cultures to those of existing member-states. Data from our 2006 survey of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) indicated that the 2004 enlargement had moved the ideological direction of the EP towards the right, and somewhat away from strong support for closer European integration. In this paper, we use data from our new survey to answer several important questions about the impact of enlargement. Several years further on, and after an additional EU enlargement to

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<sup>1</sup> The survey research was funded by a grant from the UK Economic and Social Research Council, grant number RES-062-23-1983.

<sup>2</sup> See <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/EPRG/MEPsurveyData.aspx>.

include Bulgaria and Romania, do the findings from 2006 still hold true? Do the differing political orientations of MEPs from new member states persist; or, has several years' experience within the Union and its parliament helped to socialize representatives from these countries into more centrist and integrative norms? Has the ideological coherence of the EP's multinational party groups declined as a result of successive EP enlargements, and the growing diversity of the groups? And are there any new cleavages emerging along lines of nationality within the EP: between those from new versus older member states, or along any other lines of potential division?

## **2. A CHANGING (AND GROWING) PARLIAMENT**

The most significant change in the institutional structure of the EP over the past two decades has been the growing power of the EP (cf. Hix and Hoyland 2011). Over the last twenty-five years, the European Parliament (EP) has experienced a greater amount of change than any other major EU institution. Indeed, either the EP's legislative powers or its executive oversight powers, or both, have been increased in every reform of the EU Treaties since the mid-1980s. The cumulative effect has been to enhance greatly the role of the parliament within European politics. For much of its life, the EP could have been justly labelled a 'multi-lingual talking shop'. This is no longer the case: the EP is now one of the most powerful legislatures in the world. The parliament has for some years been a major player in EU legislative politics. And, as Señor Barroso discovered when attempting to appoint his new Commission in October 2004, the EP's powers of executive scrutiny can no longer be ignored either.<sup>3</sup>

Following on from the growth in the power and influence of the EP has come a substantial development in scholarly work on the institution. In recent years, the literature on the parliament has expanded in both scope and scale, and also in

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<sup>3</sup> José Manuel Barroso had been nominated as President by the EU member-state governments and approved by Parliament in July 2004. However, his proposed team of Commissioners met with opposition from the Parliament, particularly focused on the proposed Italian Commissioner, Rocco Buttiglione, who had made some ill-chosen comments prior to and during his 'confirmation' hearing with an EP committee. Many MEPs found the prospect of Buttiglione as Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security as unacceptable, and threatened to vote down the new Commission. This opposition placed the EU into a minor crisis before Barroso conceded to the Parliament and removed Buttiglione from the team of Commissioners; his Commission belatedly took office in November 2004.

theoretical and methodological sophistication. Nonetheless, the ability of this work to develop a well-grounded and secure understanding of the EP have been challenged by the problems of analysing the ‘moving target’ of an institution undergoing rapid reforms. A particularly stark challenge was posed by EU enlargement. The entry of 10 new member states to the Union in May 2004 – and hence the entry of members from those states into the Union’s parliament – made the chamber significantly larger and more heterogeneous in its membership. And enlargement raised the question of whether the established structures and practices that had developed within the parliament, and about which analysts had been developing an increasingly detailed and sophisticated knowledge, would prove sufficiently robust to withstand this latest substantial change.

A survey of MEPs conducted early in 2006 – thus, less than two years after the May 2004 enlargement, and prior to the January 2007 entry of Bulgaria and Romania – suggested that enlargement had indeed made some immediate and noticeable changes to the attitudinal and ideological landscape of the EP. On a direct measure of representatives’ self-placement position on the left-right spectrum, those from the 2004 enlargement states were substantially further to the right (more than 1 point on a 1 to 10 scale).<sup>4</sup> There were also differences in terms of enthusiasm for integration: on average, MEPs from the new member states scored more than half a point lower than others on a 1 to 10 scale of enthusiasm for European unity.<sup>5</sup> And when it came to questions relating directly to the role of the EP itself, there were again differences, with those from the enlargement states notably less enthusiastic about empowering the chamber (Farrell et al 2006).<sup>6</sup>

Four years on, it is possible to test whether these and other potential differences between MEPs from ‘new’ and ‘old’ Europe persist. And doing so may offer us some

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<sup>4</sup> The question asked was “Where would you place yourself on the left-right spectrum?”. Response options ranged from 1 (which was labelled as ‘Left’) to 10 (which was labelled as ‘Right’). The average score for MEPs from the EU15 states on this item was 4.82; the average for those from the enlargement states was 5.93.

<sup>5</sup> The question asked here was “Where would you place yourself on the question of European integration?”. Response options ranged from 1 (which was labelled as ‘European integration has gone much too far’) to 10 (which was labelled as ‘The EU should become a federal state immediately’). The average score for MEPs from the EU15 states on this item was 6.49; the average for those from the enlargement states was 5.96.

<sup>6</sup> Respondents were asked a series of six questions concerning the powers of the European Parliament. Responses from these items were combined into a scale, which ran from 6 for those adopting the least supportive positions on all items to 30 for those supporting the greatest degree of EP empowerment on all items. The average score for MEPs from the EU15 states on this item was 22.27; the average for those from the enlargement states was 21.00.

deeper lessons about the nature of the EP, and even about European integration as a whole. The distinctiveness of MEPs from enlargement states in 2006 was potentially consistent with two quite different perspectives on the parliament, EU institutions and the integration process. The first perspective could be said to encompass not only important aspects of neo-functionalist understandings of European integration (e.g. Haas 1968), but also some of the intellectual descendents of neo-functionalism, such as many strands of social constructivist thought that have been applied to the EU (e.g. Christiansen et al. 2001). This perspective would suggest that an important reason for MEPs from enlargement states being different in 2006 was the very newness of both themselves as members of the EP, and of their countries within the European Union. In particular, we should not be surprised at the relative lack of enthusiasm of enlargement MEPs for integration and for the EP itself: this reflected a paucity of the socialisation experiences that come with a more prolonged exposure to the inner workings of the EU. But after four years' further experience within the EU, things should have begun to change amongst representatives of the enlargement states. By 2010, some of their MEPs would themselves have served six years within the EP; even those newer to the chamber would be part of a national political elite that should be significantly more comfortable in, and committed to, the EU and its institutional structures. In short, according to this understanding, while the differences found in 2006 between MEPs from enlargement and other states are quite explicable, by 2010 we should expect these differences to be significantly attenuated, if not quite eliminated altogether, as a direct result of the greater degree of experience that the 2004 enlargement states have now had within the EU.

An alternative perspective is one that would be based on a far greater degree of scepticism about the longer-term impact of socialisation within EU institutions. This perspective would note the distinct paucity of empirical evidence for substantial and significant individual-level socialisation effects leading towards some of the attitudinal or behavioural changes that have sometimes been posited (Hooghe 2001). And in the specific instance of MEPs, this perspective suggests that they are, and continue to remain, in orientation primarily national politicians – in most instances by background and political experience, as well as in depending on their national parties in most cases for (re)election and any future political career (Scully 2005). According to this

perspective, attitudes among MEPs from any EU member state can be expected to be a function of prevailing attitudes to the EU in that state, and the relative electoral success of different parties in elections to the EP. A convergence towards more centrist and pro-integration attitudes among MEPs from the enlargement states could therefore be expected only if there had either been a general move in this direction across the political spectrum within those states over recent years, or if more centrist and pro-European parties had been more successful in the 2009 EP elections than they were in 2004.

To summarize, the European Parliament has been subject to enormous changes over the past quarter century. And the 2004 EU enlargement was perhaps the most dramatic change of all. The available evidence suggests that enlargement altered more than simply the size and diversity of the EP; it also shifted the political balance of the chamber in some significant respects. Testing whether these effects have persisted, some years later, promises to tell us not merely about any lasting impact on the EP of EU enlargement. It will also offer insights into broader processes of political change in the EU.

### **3. THE EVIDENCE: A NEW SURVEY OF MEPS**

To explore the questions outlined above, we conducted a new survey of MEPs. Our survey is far from being the first such attempt to explore the membership of the EP. To date, each directly elected EP has been surveyed. The details are as follows:

- The 1979-84 parliament saw a survey conducted by a group led by Karlheinz Reif and Rudolf Wildenman (e.g. Bardi 1989; Westlake 1994);
- In the 1984-89 parliament there was a survey conducted by Rudolf Hrbek and Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (Hrbek and Schweitzer 1989);
- In the 1989-94, there was a survey conducted by Shaun Bowler and David Farrell (see Bowler and Farrell 1993);
- In the 1994-99 parliament, a survey was conducted by a group led by Bernhard Wessels (e.g. Katz and Wessels 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). This

survey was linked to a parallel study conducted with members of national parliaments in 11 EU member states;

- In the 1999-2004 parliament a survey was conducted by the European Parliament Research Group (EPRG) (e.g. Hix 2002, 2005; Scully 2005).
- In the 2004-2009 parliament, a survey was conducted in early 2006 by the European Parliament Research Group (EPRG) (e.g. Farrell et al 2006; Farrell and Scully 2007)

With substantial continuity between the teams designing the current survey and those conducted in 2006 and 2000, we were able to replicate many questions from these previous surveys.

Like the 2006 survey, the 2010 one was implemented via the internet.<sup>7</sup> This remains a relatively innovative method for the conduct of surveys, particularly elite-level ones such as this. But its potential is increasingly being exploited both by commercial market research companies and by more academic surveys.<sup>8</sup> The internet potentially offers many of the advantages of computer-assisted interviewing (CAI), such as the ability to implement complex routing within the questionnaire, so that people with certain characteristics can be asked additional questions of relevance, whilst those not in possession of such characteristics need not be. A computer enforcing such routing means that everyone who should be asked a question is; errors associated with interviewers or respondents misreading or misunderstanding routing instructions are thus eliminated. Furthermore, CAI surveys obviate the need for data to be entered into a database separately after the survey is conducted: this not only reduced the possibility of coding errors, but may allow data to be made available much more quickly and at lower cost. At the same time, CAI can also provide some of the advantages of postal surveys. Prominent among these is the greater degree of anonymity offered to respondents, something that many respondents value. Additionally by eliminating the interviewer the potential impact on data consistency of interviewer variability is also eliminated. Related to this, the lack of an interviewer means that respondents are not under pressure to give answers, and thus may take more time to give greater thought to

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<sup>7</sup> The discussion in this paragraph and the following one draws heavily on that in Farrell et al. (2006).

<sup>8</sup> An example of the use of the internet within academic surveys is the substantial internet component within the 2005 and 2010 British Election Studies.

them. Furthermore, the costs associated with employing qualified interviewers are avoided.

Internet surveys of the general population have been questioned, because of the absence of an adequate method for producing random samples of e-mail addresses, as well as the limited internet coverage among certain groups (particularly, the older, less educated and lower paid parts of the population). But for elite surveys, internet interviewing is very attractive. These groups have high internet access; sample frames with e-mail addresses are generally available. Furthermore, they are also groups that may be particularly difficult to reach with traditional interviewer-administered surveys (because they are geographically dispersed and busy people). At the very least, interviewer-administered surveys may become very costly; this is particularly so when the sample is international and the questionnaire needs to be translated. Postal methods may be used for such surveys, but the internet holds great promise. This is not only because of the advantages of CAI mentioned above, but also because the immediacy of an e-mail approach may well result in higher response rates than postal questionnaires.

Another important feature of the conduct of the current survey was the number of languages in which it was available. Respondents were offered the choice to complete the survey in any one of 23 official EU languages.<sup>9</sup> Each translation was made from English by at least two speakers of the language in question. All the translators were familiar with the aims and objectives of the research, and all had considerable knowledge about European politics. The use of such a wide range of languages was desirable in order to help the response rate, and avoid response biases which might be introduced by (in effect) only permitting multilingual MEPs from some states to complete the survey.

The implementation of the survey was conducted by the agency Ipsos-MORI, in close consultation throughout with the academic team leading the project. Ipsos-MORI designed the web-site on which the survey was hosted. Each MEP was contacted personally by e-mail (with the message translated into their mother tongue), and invited

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<sup>9</sup> The languages offered were: Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Spanish, Slovak, Slovene and Swedish. Limited resources prevented us from being able to offer the survey in any minority languages (such as Catalan or Welsh).



to participate in the survey. MEPs were directed to the website established for the survey, where the purpose of the survey was explained and respondents asked to give their password (the initial contact letters had each contained a unique password for each MEP) in order to begin. The content of the survey was then divided between seven subsequent pages, that each contained questions from one section of the survey. The seven sections were:

1. Personal Details (member-state, date first elected to EP, previous political experience etc)
2. Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection
3. Campaigning Aims and Activities in 2009 Elections
4. Attitudes/Behaviour to Representation
5. Committees and Voting Inside the Parliament
6. General Political Attitudes
7. Attitudes to EU Policies and Institutional Reform

After the initial contact letter, MEPs were sent further reminders by e-mail (again, translated into their mother tongues) if they had failed to respond to the initial invitation to participate. MEPs received up to four reminder contacts.

[Table 1 about here]

The survey site went 'live' in late April 2010, and initial letters were then sent to all 736 MEPs. The first respondent logged-in on 28 April; responses continued to be generated subsequently, with notable surges in responses after each wave of reminder messages. The web-site remained open until November 2010.

The empirical evidence presented and analysed in the remainder of this paper draws on the responses of the 270 MEPs who responded to the survey. Summary statistics on the respondents are presented in Table 1. They suggest that the sample is a reasonable one. Both by nationality and by party group, the sample is reasonably representative of the EP as a whole, and the sample secured in this survey is comparable to the samples we obtained in the 2000 and 2006 surveys.

#### 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: PREDICTORS OF MEP POLICY PREFERENCES

As an example of what can be done with the survey data, we have conducted an analysis of the battery of questions relating to MEPs' positions on a range of issues on the EU policy agenda. This battery of questions covers the following topics:

- **EU regulatory policies** - whether an MEP prefers more or less EU level regulation of labour markets, gender and race discrimination, environmental standards, food safety, financial services, corporate taxes, and personal taxes;
- **EU budgetary policies** – whether an MEP prefers more or less EU spending on agricultural subsidies, social and regional policy ('cohesion' in EU speak), research, development aid, unemployment assistance, and refugee assistance;
- **economic and monetary union** – which cover MEPs' preferences on the current Euro interest rate level, the power of EU finance ministers, the powers of the EP over the ECB, and rules on government deficits;
- **justice and home affairs policies** – which cover MEPs' preferences on EU policies on asylum, economic migration, illegal migration, migrant integration, terrorism, police cooperation, and judicial cooperation;
- **EU trade policies** – which cover MEPs' attitudes towards free trade, the World Trade Organization, global labour standards, global environmental standards, and EU-US trade relations;
- **EU foreign policies** – which cover MEPs' attitudes towards NATO, relations with the US, the EU security strategy, relations with Russia, the use of sanctions, and the use of development aid; and
- **EP powers** – which cover MEPs' attitudes towards whether the EP should have legislative initiative power, more legislative power, more budgetary power, be able to elect the Commission President, be able to remove individual Commissioners, and be able to hold all its plenary sessions in Brussels rather than Strasbourg.

In other words, the survey provides a rich dataset of MEP preferences on a wide range of EU level policy issues.

In addition to these specific EU issues, the section of the survey on policy preferences includes questions which ask the MEPs to place themselves (and their

national parties and EP groups) on a left-right policy scale (where 0=left and 10=right) and an EU integration policy scale (where 0=EU integration has gone too far, and 10=EU should become a federal state). The survey also includes a set of questions on general policy topics, unrelated to the EU, which are commonly asked in mass survey instruments, relating to income inequality, immigration, abortion etc. And this part of the survey also included a question on MEPs' identity.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

[Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 about here]

Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of MEP preferences on the two self-placement scales, while Tables 2 to 5 show the distribution of MEP preferences on several of the policy questions. As Figure 2 shows, a plurality of MEPs is relatively pro-European integration, although there is some heterogeneity on this dimension. The attitudes on the policy questions in Tables 3, 4 and 5 also suggest that a majority of MEPs are clearly in favour of more powers for the European Parliament and the EU. Figure 3 shows the responses to the identity question, which shows that only a very small proportion of MEPs do not see themselves as 'European' in some respect.

[Figure 3 about here]

But, what are the determinants of these policy positions? One key issue, as previously discussed, is whether there is a difference between MEPs from the 'old' EU15 states and the 'new' 12 accession states. We found some differences between the two groups of MEPs in the previous survey. We can test whether the attitudes of the MEPs from the 'old15' and the 'new12' are statistically different in this new survey using a series of difference-of-means tests. The results of these tests are presented in Table 6. The MEPs from the new member states in the current EP are on average more right-wing than the MEPs from the old member states. However, the two groups of MEPs have statistically indistinguishable opinions on EU regulatory powers, EU powers and the powers of the EP, although MEPs from new member states have a stronger European identity than MEPs from the EU15.

[Table 6 about here]

To delve a bit deeper we next look at the determinants of MEPs' preferences on the full battery of questions relating to EU policy issues. How far are these preferences on EU level policy issues determined by: (1) personal ideological preferences (i.e. MEPs'

left-right and EU integration positions); (2) political group affiliation; and (3) nationality. One might immediately assume that the nationality of an MEP is likely to be highly significant. For example, British MEPs are likely to be less pro-European than Italian MEPs. However, research on how voting behaviour in the EP shows that MEPs' left-right policy positions and EP group affiliations are stronger predictors of how MEPs' behave in record (roll-call) votes than which member state an MEP comes from (e.g. Hix et al. 2007). In other words, left-wing MEPs from Britain are more likely to vote with left-wing MEPs from Italy than they are with right-wing MEPs from Britain.

[Table 7 about here]

159 MEPs answered all 41 questions on EU and EP powers. Table 7 shows the results of a factor analysis (principal-components) of the responses of these MEPs to these questions. The first factor extracted from the analysis captures 29 per cent of the variance in attitudes, with the second and third factors capturing a further 9 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. This first factor is highly correlated with several of the questions in each of the seven policy areas. The second factor is most related to justice and home affairs issues, while the third factor to the powers of the European Parliament.

The first factor loadings for each question were then used to generate a single 'score' for each MEP, which hence captures the average policy preferences of the MEPs in a single policy dimension. It is worth noting that *higher* scores on this dimension mean that an MEP supports *more* EU and EP powers. Table 8 presents several linear regression models of the predictors of MEPs' scores on this single policy dimension. Several regularities are worth highlighting.

[Table 8 about here]

First, individual MEPs' preferences on EU integration more broadly, as captured by the EU integration self-placement question in the survey, are strong predictors of MEP positions on policy issues on the EU agenda. Moreover, these individual MEP preferences are significant in all model specifications. In other words, within each EP political group and member state, generally pro-European MEPs are more likely to support further EP and EU powers than less pro-European MEPs.

While this first point might seem fairly obvious, a second point is that individual MEP left-right preferences are also relevant. More precisely: the further right an MEP, the more likely she will oppose more EU and EP powers. Again, this variable is

significant even when controlling for EP political group membership and member state affiliation.

Third, and related to the second point, EP group membership is a good predictor of MEPs' policy positions on EU policy issues. In models 2, 3 and 4, the non-attached MEPs were dropped. The line-up of the groups on the dimension of MEPs' policy preferences, however, neither fits a left-right line-up of the groups nor a pro-/anti-EU line-up (where the EPP group is usually considered to be the most pro-European). The coefficients in model 2, for example, reveal a line-up of the groups on the dependent variable as follows (from highest scores to lowest scores): S&D, EPP, G/EFA, ALDE, ECR, EFD, and EUL/NGL.

Fourth, adding the member state of an MEP (in model 3) adds some explanatory power, but only for some member states. The R-squared increases to .413 in model 3 from .346 in model 2. The German MEPs (who are the baseline group in model 3) seem to be relatively moderate on EU policy questions. While Greek, Hungarian, Finnish, and Italian and Polish MEPs are on average more supportive of EU policies than German MEPs, Slovak and British MEPs are on average less supportive of EU policies than German MEPs. MEPs from the other member states are indistinguishable in their attitudes towards EU policies from German MEPs.

Fourth, as model 4 shows, once EP political group affiliation is controlled for, there is no statistical difference in the positions of the MEPs on EU policy issues from the new member states and the old member states.

One problem with the set up of the models in Table 8 is that it is difficult to identify the relative effects of individual MEP ideology, EP political group, and nationality on MEP policy preferences. Table 9 consequently presents a pared-down model. Here, the two individual ideology measures are recoded between 0 and 1, and these two variables are set up against the average score of each EP political group and each national delegation of MEPs on the single integrated policy scale, in a straightforward 'contest'. With this set-up, the beta coefficients give a rough estimate of the relative effects of the variables (e.g. Levitt 1996).

[Table 9 about here]

The result is surprising. First, the individual ideological measures are both powerful predictors of MEPs' positions on EU policies. Second, the combined effects of

the two individual ideological variables explain approximately the same amount of variance in MEP attitudes as the two variables that measure MEP political group and national affiliation. In fact, approximately 45 percent of the variance in MEPs' policy positions (as expressed in our survey) can be explained by individual ideological preferences (in a two-dimensional left-right and EU integration space), 20 per cent can be explained by MEPs' EP political group affiliation, and almost 40 per cent can be explained by MEPs' nationality.

## **5. CONCLUSION**

Given the growing significance of the European Parliament, and the significant changes it has experienced in recent times, it is of considerable importance to students of the EU to have a regular, high-quality body of evidence on the attitudes of the MEPs. In this paper we have introduced a survey which is the latest in a series that has attempted to provide such evidence. We have presented some of the findings of this survey, on attitudes to many aspects of EU politics, and explored the main factors underpinning those attitudes.

When combined with evidence from our previous surveys of the MEPs, the data from this new survey offer the opportunity to researchers to develop substantially their knowledge of the EP, and to test prevailing theories of the political dynamics of the EU's only directly-elected chamber. We intend to use the data from the survey in our on-going research. However, even before publishing any of our findings we have made the data freely available to the scholarly community, both separately and in files which integrate the evidence from this survey with the data from our previous two surveys (in 2006 and 2000). The datasets are available from a dedicated page on the European Parliament Research Group website (see <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/EPRG/MEPsurveyData.aspx>). This webpage also contains information about how to cite the datasets and a detailed description of the datasets. We invite the scholarly community to draw upon this valuable new source of data.

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


**Table 1. The 2000, 2006 and 2010 MEP Survey Samples Compared**

	2000 Survey				2006 Survey				2010 Survey			
	No.		%		No.		%		No.		%	
	MEPs	Survey	MEPs	Survey	MEPs	Survey	MEPs	Survey	MEPs	Survey	MEPs	Survey
<b>Member States</b>												
Austria	21	2	3.4	1.0	18	7	2.5	2.6	17	5	2.3	1.9
Belgium	25	6	4.0	3.1	24	13	3.3	4.8	22	9	3.0	3.3
Bulgaria									17	7	2.3	2.6
Cyprus					6	5	0.8	1.8	6	4	0.8	1.5
Czech Rep.					24	11	3.3	4.0	22	9	3.0	3.3
Denmark	16	7	2.6	3.6	14	6	1.9	2.2	13	8	1.8	3.0
Estonia					6	3	0.8	1.1	6	2	0.8	0.7
Finland	16	7	2.6	3.6	14	5	1.9	1.8	13	7	1.8	2.6
France	87	22	13.9	11.3	78	23	10.7	8.5	72	24	9.8	8.9
Germany	99	27	15.8	13.8	99	34	13.5	12.5	99	33	13.5	12.2
Greece	25	8	4.0	4.1	24	2	3.3	0.7	22	6	3.0	2.2
Hungary					24	8	3.3	2.9	22	4	3.0	1.5
Ireland	15	4	2.4	2.1	13	7	1.8	2.6	12	8	1.6	3.0
Italy	87	23	13.9	11.8	78	29	10.7	10.7	72	32	9.8	11.9
Latvia					9	4	1.2	1.5	8	3	1.1	1.1
Lithuania					13	6	1.8	2.2	12	3	1.6	1.1
Luxembourg	6	5	1.0	2.6	6	3	0.8	1.1	6	3	0.8	1.1
Malta					5	1	0.7	0.4	5	3	0.7	1.1
Netherlands	31	15	5.0	7.7	27	9	3.7	3.3	25	7	3.4	2.6
Poland					54	22	7.4	8.1	50	23	6.8	8.5
Portugal	25	11	4.0	5.6	24	9	3.3	3.3	22	6	3.0	2.2
Romania									33	14	4.5	5.2
Slovakia					14	3	1.9	1.1	13	6	1.8	2.2
Slovenia					7	5	1.0	1.8	7	6	1.0	2.2
Spain	64	17	10.2	8.7	54	11	7.4	4.0	50	14	6.8	5.2
Sweden	22	10	3.5	5.1	19	9	2.6	3.3	18	9	2.4	3.3
UK	87	31	13.9	15.9	78	37	10.7	13.6	72	15	9.8	5.6
<i>Correlation</i>				0.940				0.940				0.927
<i>Index of dissimilarity</i>				0.117				0.110				0.128
<b>Political Groups</b>												
EPP	232	72	37.1	36.9	263	95	35.9	34.9	265	100	36.0	37.0
S&D (PES)	180	61	28.8	31.3	201	73	27.5	26.8	184	64	25.0	23.7
ALDE (ELDR)	52	20	8.3	10.3	89	44	12.2	16.2	85	43	11.5	15.9
G/EFA	48	13	7.7	6.7	42	18	5.7	6.6	55	23	7.5	8.5
EUL/NGL	42	14	6.7	7.2	41	15	5.6	5.5	35	10	4.8	3.7
UEN	30	5	4.8	2.6	30	11	4.1	4.0				
ECR									54	12	7.3	4.4
EFD (EDD/IND-DEM)	16	5	2.6	2.6	29	8	4	2.9	30	10	4.1	3.7
Na	26	5	4.2	2.6	37	8	5.1	2.9	28	8	3.8	3.0
<i>Correlation</i>				0.994				0.989				0.985
<i>Index of dissimilarity</i>				0.050				0.051				0.065
<b>Totals</b>	626	195	100.0	31.2	732	272	100.0	37.2	736	270	100.0	36.7


*Note:* The (Duncan) Index of dissimilarity measures the relationship between the sample of MEPs who responded to the surveys and the population of MEPs at the time of the surveys. Lower values on this measure indicate a greater similarity between the sample and the population (Duncan and Duncan 1955).

**Figure 1. MEPs' Self-Placement on Left-Right Scale**



Source: 2010 MEP Survey

**Figure 2. MEPs' Self-Placement on European Integration Scale**



Source: 2010 MEP Survey

**Table 2. MEPs' Opinions (%) on Left-Right Issues**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	<i>N of respondents</i>
Greater effort should be made to reduce inequality of income	30.1	32.9	23.7	10.4	2.9	173
Tougher action should be taken against criminals	21.6	42.7	23.4	9.9	2.3	171
Government should play a greater role in managing the economy	12.8	33.7	32.0	18.6	2.9	172
Current welfare spending should be maintained even if it means raising taxes	13.4	37.2	25.0	20.9	3.5	172
The use of marijuana should be decriminalized	8.2	14.0	24.0	25.7	28.1	171
It is more important to reduce inflation than to reduce unemployment	4.7	16.3	26.7	43.6	8.7	172
There should be fewer restrictions on immigration	7.0	31.6	26.9	22.8	11.7	171
Women should be free to decide for themselves on abortion	41.3	24.4	18.6	6.4	9.3	172

Source: 2010 MEP Survey

**Table 3. MEPs' Opinions (%) on the Powers of the EP**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	<i>N of respondents</i>
The EP should have more power to influence interest rates in the Eurozone	7.6	20.3	26.2	27.9	18.0	172
The EP should have the right to initiate legislation	44.2	32.0	12.8	8.7	2.3	172
The EP should have equal power with the Council in all areas of law-making	44.2	30.8	14.0	9.9	1.2	172
The EP should have equal power with the Council to amend <b>all</b> areas of expenditure in the budget	43.6	37.2	11.0	7.0	1.2	172
The Commission President should be nominated by the EP, rather than the European Council	30.8	27.9	29.1	10.5	1.7	172
The EP should be able to remove individual Commissioners from office	43.5	35.3	12.9	7.1	1.2	170
The EP should be allowed to hold all its plenary sessions in Brussels	52.3	18.0	16.3	7.6	5.8	172

*Note:* For all items in this table, the survey question was worded as "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the powers of the European Parliament?", except for the first item, where the relevant question was "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Economic and Monetary Union and EU monetary policies?". *Source:* 2010 MEP Survey

**Table 4. MEPs' Opinions (%) on the Extent of EU Regulation**

<i>Do you think there should be more or less EU-wide regulation in the following areas?</i>	<i>A lot more</i>	<i>A little more</i>	<i>About the same</i>	<i>A little less</i>	<i>A lot less</i>	<i>N of respondents</i>
Labour rights (e.g. working time rules)	23.1	32.4	26.6	11.6	6.4	173
Discrimination (on the grounds of gender, race, religion, age, disability and sexual orientation)	30.8	30.2	25.0	5.2	8.7	172
Environmental protection standards	32.6	40.1	20.3	3.5	3.5	172
Food safety standards	28.1	38.0	29.2	1.2	3.5	171
Financial Services	39.5	40.7	13.4	1.7	4.7	172
Corporation Taxes	22.1	29.1	27.3	10.5	11.0	172
Personal Income Taxes	11.1	24.0	35.7	14.0	15.2	171


Source: 2010 MEP Survey

**Table 5. MEPs' Opinions (%) on EU Powers in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs and Foreign Policy**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	<i>N of respondents</i>
There should be a common EU policy on asylum burden-sharing	22.8	46.2	18.7	6.4	5.8	171
There should be a common EU policy on how to treat illegal migrants	22.2	54.4	13.5	4.1	5.8	171
For serious crimes, the police in each member state should be able to issue arrest warrants which apply throughout the EU	39.2	42.1	12.3	3.5	2.9	171
The EU rather than NATO should be responsible for European defence	14.0	33.1	29.1	18.0	5.8	171
EU foreign policy should develop as a counterweight to the US	14.0	32.6	24.4	20.3	8.7	171
The member states should make every effort to adhere to the EU's security strategy	19.9	50.3	20.5	3.5	5.8	171

Source: 2010 MEP Survey

**Figure 3. National and European Identities (%)**



*Source: 2010 MEP Survey*

**Table 6. Difference of Means Tests on Several Measures**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Mean: EU15 MEPs</i>	<i>Mean: Accession MEPs</i>	<i>T statistic</i>	<i>No. of Respondents</i>
EU integration self-placement (0-10 scale; pro-integration = 10)	7.06	7.39	0.93	179
Left-Right self-placement (0-10 scale; right = 10)	5.53	6.57	2.81**	179
Left-Right issues scale (8-40, right = high score)	21.77	24.26	2.87**	169
EU regulation issues scale (7-35 scale; more regulation = high score)	25.79	25.40	0.38	173
EU powers issues scale (6-30 scale, more powers = high score)	21.73	22.65	1.16	172
National/European identities scale (1-4 scale, more European = higher score)	1.99	2.50	3.19**	168
EP powers issues scale (6-30 scale, more powers = high score)	24.71	23.42	1.82	173

*Note:* \*  $\Pr(|T| < |t|) \leq .050$ , \*\*  $\Pr(|T| < |t|) \leq .010$ . The issues scales are calculated by summing the MEP responses to the questions relating to these scales.

**Table 7. Factor Analysis of MEP Preferences on EU Policy Issues**

<i>EU policy issue</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>	<i>Factor 3</i>
<i>Regulatory policies</i>			
Labour markets	<b>0.723</b>	-0.337	-0.113
Gender and race discrimination	<b>0.619</b>	-0.007	-0.372
Environment standards	<b>0.700</b>	-0.094	-0.269
Food safety	<b>0.698</b>	0.029	-0.231
Financial services	<b>0.748</b>	-0.080	0.032
Corporate taxes	<b>0.673</b>	-0.301	-0.062
Personal taxes	<b>0.622</b>	-0.255	-0.053
<i>Budgetary policies</i>			
Agriculture	0.255	-0.267	0.030
Cohesion	<b>0.670</b>	-0.147	-0.156
Research	<b>0.652</b>	0.153	-0.013
Development aid	<b>0.651</b>	-0.034	-0.254
Unemployment assistance	<b>0.541</b>	-0.127	<b>-0.429</b>
Refugee assistance	<b>0.589</b>	-0.053	-0.382
<i>Economic and monetary union</i>			
Interest rates	0.163	0.011	0.048
Power of finance ministers	0.353	-0.029	-0.006
Powers of EP	<b>0.409</b>	-0.293	0.074
Government deficits	0.144	-0.351	-0.135
<i>Justice and home affairs</i>			
Asylum	0.216	<b>0.801</b>	-0.086
Economic migrants	0.153	<b>0.783</b>	-0.103
Illegal migrants	<b>0.549</b>	0.184	-0.287
Migrant integration	<b>0.594</b>	0.240	-0.233
Terrorism	0.115	<b>0.792</b>	-0.157
Police cooperation	<b>0.758</b>	-0.048	0.036
Judicial cooperation	<b>0.757</b>	0.046	-0.053
<i>Trade policies</i>			
Free trade	<b>0.735</b>	0.118	-0.026
World Trade organization	<b>0.708</b>	-0.016	-0.143
Global labour standards	0.354	<b>0.446</b>	0.292
Global environmental standards	<b>0.544</b>	0.326	0.312
Free trade area with USA	0.353	0.336	0.396
<i>Common foreign and security policies</i>			
Policy towards NATO	<b>0.610</b>	-0.229	0.147
Foreign policy cooperation with USA	<b>0.532</b>	-0.062	0.080
EU security strategy	<b>0.726</b>	0.249	0.144
Policy towards Russia	<b>0.356</b>	0.144	-0.135
Use of sanctions	<b>0.437</b>	0.054	0.058
Use of aid	0.092	0.301	0.201
<i>EP powers</i>			
Legislative initiative	<b>0.515</b>	-0.032	<b>0.467</b>
Legislative powers	<b>0.546</b>	-0.085	<b>0.532</b>
Budgetary powers	<b>0.555</b>	-0.094	<b>0.568</b>
Election of Commission President	<b>0.475</b>	-0.180	<b>0.565</b>
Remove individual Commissioners	0.269	-0.038	<b>0.539</b>
Brussels rather than Strasbourg	0.063	<b>0.442</b>	0.014
Percent of variance explained	28.7	8.6	6.9
Cumulative percent	28.7	37.3	44.2

*Note:* The method used is principal-components analysis, unrotated.

**Table 8. Predictors of Factor 1 Locations of MEPs**

<i>Independent variable</i>	<i>(1) ideology</i>	<i>(2) + political group</i>	<i>(3) + member state</i>	<i>(4) + new member state</i>
Constant	-.498 (.304)	.454 (.464)	.007 (.533)	.455 (.465)
EU integration self-placement	.181*** (.030)	.151*** (.034)	.153*** (.036)	.150*** (.034)
Left-Right self-placement	-.136*** (.028)	-.115** (.045)	-.118** (.047)	-.118*** (.045)
S&D group		-.725* (.404)	-.588 (.453)	-.735* (.406)
EPP group		-.796** (.402)	-.611 (.454)	-.810** (.403)
G/EFA group		-.812* (.444)	-.376 (.494)	-.803* (.445)
ALDE group		-.917** (.416)	-.505 (.476)	-.923** (.417)
ECR group		-1.431*** (.500)	-.643 (.584)	-1.441*** (.502)
EFD group		-1.486*** (.457)	-1.285*** (.517)	-1.475*** (.459)
EUL/NGL group		-1.785*** (.603)	-1.420*** (.651)	-1.775*** (.605)
New member state				.083 (.455)
Slovakia			-.693*	
United Kingdom			-.648*	
Czech Republic			-.390	
Netherlands			-.213	
Belgium			-.113	
Estonia			-.053	
Ireland			-.045	
Sweden			-.012	
Portugal			.051	
Austria			.112	
Denmark			.118	
Romania			.305	
Poland			.357*	
Lithuania			.434	
Bulgaria			.448	
France			.457	
Slovenia			.469	
Italy			.540**	
Spain			.549	
Finland			.737*	
Hungary			.881*	
Cyprus			1.104	
Greece			1.182**	
Latvia			1.194	
No. of observations	159	159	159	159
Adjusted R-squared	.299	.346	.413	.343

*Note:* The dependent variable is the score of an MEP on the dimension generated from the factor 1 loadings (see Table 7). The models were estimated with linear OLS regression. The baseline group in model 2 are the non-attached MEPs, in model 3 are the non-attached and German MEPs, and in model 4 are the non-attached and MEPs from the Old15 states. Standard errors in parentheses (not reported for member state coefficients). \*  $p \leq .050$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .010$ , \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$ . Abbreviations: S&D = Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, G/EFA = Greens/European Free Alliance, EPP = European People's Party, ALDE = Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, ECR = European Conservatives and Reforms Group, EUL/NGL = European United Left/Nordic Green Left, EFD = Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group.



**Table 9. Explanatory Power of Key Predictors of MEPs' Policy Preferences**

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
EU integration self-placement	1.322	.283	4.68	0.000	.295
Left-Right self-placement	-.693	.292	-2.37	0.019	-.162
Mean EP group score	.353	.146	2.42	0.017	.185
Mean member state score	.728	.117	6.20	0.000	.379
Constant	-.477	.225	-2.12	0.035	
No. of observations	159				
Adjusted R-squared	.479				

*Note:* The dependent variable is the score of an MEP on the dimension generated from the factor 1 loadings (see Table 7). The two self-placement scales were re-scaled between 0 and 1. The models were estimated with linear OLS regression.