

BORDERS, BOUNDARIES AND KIN-STATE (QUASI-)CITIZENSHIP: A BOTTOM-UP PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

This paper uses a bottom-up perspective to analyse engagement with kin-state citizenship and quasi-citizenship and assess the impact of this engagement on conceptions of borders and boundaries. The paper compares engagement with kin-state citizenship (Romanian citizenship in Moldova) and kin-state quasi-citizenship (Russia's Compatriot policy in Crimea) based on fieldwork interviews in Moldova and Crimea (2012-2013). The paper argues that, even with fragmenting and multiplying citizenship regimes, citizenship (and not quasi-citizenship) remains the key point of entry to the state, offering access to more desirable institutions than quasi-citizenship policies, by reducing the social and political impact of borders between kin and kin-state and beyond (i.e. via access to EU citizenship). Equally, use of kin-state citizenship regimes does not imply the switching (or replacing) of affiliation from home-state to kin-state, but rather the ability of individuals to multiply their political affiliations and participate in multiple states over and across borders (Kovacs 2009).

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1 Introducing the Kin Citizenship Puzzle

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of kin-state policies. These policies include citizenship (Romania, Hungary) and quasi-citizenship policies (Russia, Hungary, Poland, India, South Korea) (Table 1), and are used by kin-states to maintain relations with co-ethnic communities residing extra-territorially. However there has been a lack of bottom-up engagement concerning what these policies mean, what motivates individuals to engage with these policies and how they are used by those eligible (i.e. extra-territorial kin communities). This paper argues this bottom-up perspective is crucial, where questions of motivation and engagement are fundamental for advancing the understanding of the social and political impacts of these policies for kin-states and home-states, where these co-ethnic communities reside.

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Table 1: Examples of Kin-State Citizenship and Quasi-citizenship Policies

Citizenship	Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia, China
Quasi-Citizenship	Hungary (Status Law), Poland (Karta Polaka), Russia (Compatriot Policy), Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea (Overseas Korean Act), India (Person of Indian Origin, Non-Resident Indian)

Secondly, this paper focuses on the phenomenon of kin majorities, as communities claimed as co-ethnic by a kin-state while comprising a majority in the state or sub-state unit in which they reside (see Knott 2015). Previous kin-state research has either focused on kin minorities, or has treated kin majorities as if they are kin minorities. This paper argues kin-state policies for kin majorities need to be a particular concern of research since they comprise local majorities, and therefore can have greater impacts for the home-state and kin-state.

This paper uses the cases of Crimea and Moldova as two kin majority cases, selected from a wider typology (including Republika Srpska, Kosovo, Macedonia). The paper compares, from a bottom-up perspective, engagement with Russian kin-state quasi-citizenship policies in Crimea (Compatriot policy) and engagement with Romanian kin-state citizenship policies in Romania. Here quasi-citizenship policies are defined as “fuzzy” and “not full citizenship” by offering a “documented relationship”, and certain benefits (scholarships, preferential treatment, cultural support) (Deets 2008:196), but not full rights (voting), benefits (healthcare, pensions) and obligations (taxation) that citizenship does (Fowler 2004; Bieber 2010; Bellamy 2008).

The paper explores the lived experience of engagement with citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices, focusing on two aspects: the motivations underpinning engagement and respondents’ perceptions about the impacts of this engagement. The paper argues that citizenship remains a more effective policy by offering more tangible rights, at least when comparing these two cases. The article argues that the differences between engagement with these policies, i.e. prevalent engagement in Moldova vs. rarer engagement in Crimea, cannot be explained only by instrumental aspects (i.e. the desirability of policy), but also concerning the accessibility and availability of the policy, and the legitimizing rhetoric underpinning, and justifying, engagement with Romanian policies in Moldova vis-à-vis Russian policies in Crimea (pre-annexation).

2 Theorizing Kin Majorities Within Kin-State Relations

This section outlines existing approaches to kin-state relations and institutions, to demonstrate the gap that exists in terms of understanding:

1. the phenomenon of kin majorities, and
2. kin-state institutions (citizenship, quasi-citizenship) from a bottom-up perspective.

2.1 Existing Approaches to Kin-State Relations

This paper uses Brubaker’s (1996:55) “triadic” model which conceptualizes relations between a co-ethnic/kin minority, an “external national homeland” state (kin-state), and a “nationalizing” home-state where the kin minority reside. The kin-state, as the “external homeland” of the kin minority claim an “obligation” to

“protect the interests of ‘their’ ethnonational kin” residing in other states (Brubaker 1996:5). While the nationalizing home-state of “newly independent (or newly configured) states” advanced claims, and policies, “in the name of a ‘core nation’” as the “legitimate ‘owner’ of the state” (Brubaker 1996:4-5).

The paper argues not for a conflict-centered understanding of contemporary kin-state relations, centered on territorial claims that Brubaker and others explore, premised on analyzing the likelihood of conflict and secession arising from kin-state relations (Laitin 2001; Fearon 1998; Laitin 1998; Saideman and Ayres 2008; van Houten 1998; D. J. Smith 2002). Rather the paper argues for an institutional focus, that examines the growing assemblage of citizenship and quasi-citizenship regimes provided by kin-states that offer rights and benefits to kin communities which work around borders, rather than overtly contesting them, to maintain and strengthen co-ethnic interaction across state borders (Waterbury 2009:2; Kovács 2006; Csgero and Goldgeier 2004, 2001).

However this paper differs also from institutional perspectives by focusing on two kin majority cases, rather than kin minorities. Here kin majorities are defined as communities claimed as co-ethnic by external kin-states, and eligible for kin-state citizenship and quasi-citizenship policies, forming a majority in the state or sub-state unit in which they reside. This paper argues that kin majorities need to be considered separately from kin minorities because, as local majorities, they form a more dominant constituent of the state or sub-state than kin minorities, that does not fit the “host” frame of kin minorities (e.g. Russian communities Estonia and Latvia). However kin majorities are not diaspora, arising often because of border shifts during periods of politico-territorial configuration (e.g. the annexation of Moldova by the Soviet Union 1941-1944), rather than from migration (e.g. migration of ethnic Russians to Estonia and Latvia) (Melvin 1995). Kin majority cases provide an interesting perspective, therefore, for studying kin-state citizenship and quasi-citizenship policies because the eligible community comprise a local majority. While this paper focuses on examining these policies in two kin majority cases, it argues that other papers, according to these criteria, could also be studied as kin majorities (e.g. Republika Srpska, Nagorno Karabakh, Kosovo, expanded in Knott Forthcoming).

2.2 Citizenship and Quasi-Citizenship as Kin-State Institutions

This section conceptualizes these different and varied policies that kin-states make available (citizenship, quasi-citizenship) and discusses how these can be studied, from below, as practices. Citizenship is the cornerstone institution binding together individuals and the state, as a vital democratic (and democratizing) institution, providing access to political and social rights and formalizing individuals’ reciprocal obligations to the state (Isin and Turner 2007:16; Marshall 1950, 1998; Turner 1997).

Until the late twentieth century, citizenship was conceived as a singular relation between individual and the state, where dual citizenship was pathologized as a form of “polygamy”, with the Hague Convention (1930) establishing an international principle of “one nationality only”. More recently, with the rise of migration and the norm of including immigrants within societies and polities, states have desecuritized dual and/or multiple citizenship, no longer seeing the multiplying of these ties as a threat (Pogonyi 2011; Spiro 2010). Thus, in line with theories of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, states have been analysed as increasingly inclusive, in terms of citizenship, where political boundaries no longer regulate “membership” (Tambini 2001; Soysal 1994). Instead states are becoming “fuzzy” entities, granting political and social rights via citizenship to migrants and, crucially, increasingly do not require individuals to renounce their original citizenship (Benhabib et al. 2007:1; Benhabib 2005:1; see also Kastoryano 2005).

This growing acceptance of dual citizenship, as an issue of inclusion immigrants, has allowed kin-states to use the same instrument, of citizenship, by arguing that it is a normally existing phenomenon in line with “transnational, post-national or cosmopolitan” and not concerned with extra-territorial nation-building (Pogonyi 2011:685). However, as Pogonyi (2011:691) argues, kin-states’ use of dual citizenship and their desire to maintain, and strengthen, co-ethnic ties via citizenship has “nothing to do with cosmopolitan norms”. Rather kin-states disguise their strategic and symbolic interests, both domestically, via populist policies of nation-building or electioneering strategies, financially from wealthy external co-ethnic communities (e.g. in China), and externally, by increasing the influence of the kin-state in a neighboring state (Isin and Turner 2007:11; Waterbury 2014:37; Pogonyi 2011:691), constructing “post-territorial” (i.e. beyond kin-state territory/borders) solutions to maintain relations with kin rather than post-national models of citizenship, by extending citizenship to these communities (Ragazzi and Balalovska:2).¹

This paper argues there is a gap in understanding the bottom-up lived experiences of these co-ethnic “citizenship constellations” (Bauböck 2010:849), where existing analyses focus on the institutional and legal bases of these policies. Rather, this paper argues more analysis is needed of how and why individuals engage with citizenship and quasi-citizenship, to unpack how these policies are used and their wider social and political impacts. These lived experience perspectives, which explore the “contexts, meanings and practices that make citizenship possible”, are recognized as vital, yet remain an under-developed area within citizenship scholarship (Nyers 2007:79; Isin and Turner 2007:16), from the perspective of the “contexts, meanings and practices that make citizenship possible” (Nyamnjoh 2007:79). Citizenship practices have been analyzed elsewhere, in anthropology, sociology and social psychology, from the perspective of informal and “everyday encounters” in particular in terms of debates around the relationship between multiculturalism and experiences of citizenship (Hopkins and Blackwood 2011:226). Dual citizenship has been considered too in terms of the symbolic and ritualistic aspects of citizenship tied up with citizenship acquisition ceremonies (Farquet 2014). However not enough attention is paid to engagement with citizenship and quasi-citizenship constellations from below, particularly regarding those tied to kin-state policies. As such it is necessary to study citizenship practices from below and from within political science, to understand the motivations of the agents who are eligible for these policies.

Here the work of Vasiljević (2014:3, 10) stands out as a unique approach, by analysing how citizenship from the perspective of its “identity-forming and recognition-bearing social role” acquisition policies” and citizenship acquisition from the perspective of how it is experienced. However Vasiljević (2014:3, 10) focuses only on citizenship as a kin-state practice. However citizenship is becoming fragmented and is no longer a “unitary concept” with the increasing prevalence of “partial citizens” (Stavilă 2010:9). As such, this paper argues it is important to consider, and compare, experiences of citizenship and quasi-citizenship, as a “fuzzy” and “not full (type of) citizenship” which offers partial but not the full array of rights (voting), benefits (healthcare, pensions) and obligations (taxation) that citizenship does (Fowler 2004; Bieber 2010; Bellamy 2008). Quasi-citizenship policies are also informal and fluid, allowing them to morph over time, as opposed to citizenship policies which form a core part of already existing and fixed institutions as part of kin-states’ overall citizenship legislation (Shevel 2011b).

In the diverse field of kin-state policies, this paper compares engagement with kin-state citizenship and

¹ Astutely, kin-states (at least in the case of Romania) stay true to the claim that kin-state citizenship is not ethnically but territorially defined. Here individuals do not have to prove Romanian ethnic/cultural identification, or linguistic ability, but have to prove descent from previous Romanian citizens, implying a civic model of citizenship. However in, in practice, Romania’s policy can still be conceptualized as an example of “nonresident ethnic citizenship” (Waterbury 2014:37).

quasi-citizenship, as opposed to diaspora engagement (Gamlen 2006). That is to say the paper is concerned with claims to kin majorities existing beyond kin-states because of changing borders rather than because of migration. This research moves beyond studying only citizenship from below, and instead analyses engagement with citizenship alongside quasi-citizenship, to compare engagement, motivations and the impact of these practices.

3 Kin-State Citizenship and Quasi-Citizenship in Moldova and Crimea

This section details the citizenship and quasi-citizenship policies in Moldova and Crimea. These cases were selected on the basis that both Crimea and Moldova, as kin majority cases, where the kin-states offer contrasting policies (Russia: Compatriot policy/quasi-citizenship, Romania: citizenship, see Table 1).

3.1 Romanian Citizenship Policy

Alongside offering favorable kin-state policies of scholarships (5-6,000 per year), cultural funding and direct aid to Moldova, Romania facilitates the right to acquire Romanian citizenship. Discursively, Romania frames this as a policy of re-acquisition (*redobândire*) for those who lost (up to third generation descendants) Romanian citizenship when the territories of Bessarabia (present-day Moldova) and Bukovina were annexed by the Soviet Union.

While Romania has received criticism by EU agencies (though not EU Commission)² and right wing media, for facilitating policies that might lead to mass migration of Moldovans to the EU, Romania has tried to deflect these criticisms in several respects. Firstly, Romania is not facilitating a policy of naturalization “en masse” because individuals must apply themselves to reacquire Romanian citizenship (Iordachi 2004). The process of *redobândire* is also more complicated than right wing European press have claimed (Bidder 2010 in Der Spiegel; see also Bran 2009; Daily Mail Reporter 2010; Barrett 2013), requiring significant investment of money and time.

For example, it is common for individuals to have to recover and translate grandparents’ birth certificates from archives. Secondly, Romania frames itself a “moral and reparatory” actor trying to atone for leaving “their former citizens at the mercy of the Soviet annexation” (Milevschi 2012:176).³

However Romania has been (seemingly) unwilling to be transparent about how many have reacquired Romanian citizenship in Moldova, in particular since 2009. For example Romania has not declared its statistics of citizenship acquisition to Eurostat since then.⁴ Before 2009, Romanian statistics submitted to Eurostat indicate that (only) 11,993 Moldovans acquired Romanian citizenship between 1998 and 2009 (Eurostat 1998-2012). However a report by Soros Romania reports a higher number where 226,507 cases were “solved” between 1991 and 2011 (Panainte and Nedelciuc 2012).

Meanwhile academic studies of *redobândire* have focused either on the institutional or normative per-

²There is suspicion too that Romania’s reopening of this policy explains the hesitance of EU member-states to allow Romania to join Schengen, concerned both by migration from Moldova and the trafficking of arms, drugs and people from the “black hole” of Transnistria (Pierre Lellouche, cited by Pop 2010).

³As Traian Băsescu argued (Romanian president 2004-2014), it was not Moldovans’ fault they “lost” their Romanian citizenship; rather it was “Stalin who has decided” for them (cited by EurActiv 2010).

⁴Personal correspondence with Romania’s National Citizenship Authority (*Autorității Naționale pentru Cetățenie*, ANC) revealed that the agency does not collect citizenship acquisition data by country of origin, even though Romania is required by Eurostat to do so.

spectives of this policy (Iordachi 2010:14; Dumbrava 2013; Waterbury 2014; Iordachi 2004, 2009). Among a minority of academic researchers who have considered why Moldovans engage with Romanian citizenship, researchers have argued that use of Romania's policies is just for material, rather than symbolic reasons (Heintz 2008; Suveica 2013; Iordachi 2004), because of the opportunities offered by Romanian citizenship via its attachment to EU rights. This paper argues that research needs to go deeper into understanding and unpacking the material and symbolic motivations which underpin practices of *redobândire*, i.e. the reacquisition of Romanian citizenship. Beyond this symbolic/material spectrum, other motivations need to be considered, in particular the notion that Romanian citizenship for Moldovans is a "remedial right" by returning rights that were taken from individuals' grandparents and great-grandparents during Moldova's Soviet annexation (see Dumbrava 2014; Bauböck 2006).

3.2 Russia's Quasi-Citizenship Compatriot Policy

This paper analyzes Russia's Compatriot policy as a quasi-citizenship policy, which formalizes and legitimizes relations between Russia and those Russia claim as "compatriots" (*sootechestvenniki*), offering some rights and benefits (such as facilitated migration) to those considered compatriots, without offering full citizenship.⁵ Russia's definition of who is a Compatriot is uncertain, based on a "very loose concept of 'compatriots'" due to an "amorphous conglomerate" that the policy refers to, including former Soviet citizens speaking Russian and "retaining some emotional links to Russia" (Kosmarskaya 2011:60). This vagueness, concerning who is a compatriot, Shevel argues (2009:4, 2011a:179), is deliberate and allows Russia flexibility to modify over time who qualifies, without requiring change of legislation.

A second approach investigates, more discursively, the soft power potential of Compatriot policies. This divides scholars between those who argue the Compatriot policy is passive (Zevelev 2008; Rutland 2010) and those who argue for the "soft power" and "soft propaganda" potential of the Compatriot policies" (Nozhenko 2006:np; Conley and Gerber 2011). On the soft power side, Grigas (2012:9) argues that Russia is building Kremlin-friendly networks of influence" in post-Soviet space to entrench "loyal interests groups [...] through financing and valuable connections and contracts".

Alongside these top-down perspectives, it is important to analyze the Compatriot policy from a bottom-up and agency-centered perspective to analyze who engages as a Compatriot and with the Compatriot policy and why, to improve understanding of the impact of these policies. Empirically, this bottom-up perspective also provides the opportunity to scrutinize engagement with the Compatriot policy within Crimea. With Crimea's annexation by Russia, the assumption that Crimea was a region of Russian passportization, like the de facto states of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria, and the framing of Crimea as a region of pro-Russian nationalist and separatist sentiments, it could be assumed that Crimea might be the most likely case of Compatriot engagement (Malyarenko and Galbreath 2013:924; Kuzio 2008; Heden-skog 2008:35). However, this paper offers a different agency-centred perspective which problematizes this holistic framing of Crimea, which assumes Russian citizenship was available and accessible,⁶ and overlooks engagement (or a lack of engagement) with Russian quasi-citizenship Compatriot policies.

⁵Others have described the Compatriot policy as a citizenship policy (G. Smith 1999a; Grigas 2012), however this is incorrect because Compatriot policy does not facilitate citizenship rights, but offers some favourable rights and benefits, which reach out to Compatriots without granting them equal legal status or rights (e.g. enfranchisement) as Russian citizens.

⁶Indeed, from a legal perspective, Russia facilitated passportization only for those considered stateless (i.e. residents of de facto states but not of Crimea), while Ukrainian legislation prohibits the holding of dual citizenship (Shevel 2010).

4 Meanings and Practices: a Bottom-Up Perspective

4.1 Research Methodology

In line with agency-centred perspective argued for in this paper, this paper applies the everyday nationalism approach to analyse citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices from the bottom-up. This everyday nationalism approach examines ethnicity and nationalism examines the “lay” categories of “everyday social experience” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:4), via unpacking everyday “categories of practice” as opposed to top-down “categories of analysis” to understand how people “enact (and ignore and deflect) nationhood and nationalism in the varied contexts of their everyday lives” (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008:537; see also Brubaker et al. 2006; Dawson 2012; Gagnon 2006; Day and Thompson 2004; de Cillia et al. 1999; Miller-Idriss 2009).

To operationalize the everyday nationalism approach, I conducted 50 semi-structured interviews in both cases with everyday actors (2012-2013).⁷ I combined this everyday nationalism approach with an interpretive ontology, to gain “experience-near”/emic understandings of identities, institutions and concepts (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012; Geertz 1975:29), as opposed to deductive, top-down or experience-far concepts. The interviews tried to engage with respondents’ experiences of these citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices, in terms of their experiences of using these practices, their motivations underpinning these practices and personal impacts of these practices. Analytically, the paper analyses the association between identification with the kin-state and engagement with kin-state practices, hypothesising that those who identify more strongly co-ethnically (i.e. *as* Russian or Romanian) and with the kin-state (i.e. *with* Russia or Romania) will be more likely to engage with kin-state practices.

In selecting respondents, the aim was not for a representative sample (Small 2009), but rather an in-depth study of a broad range of respondents to seek out “multiple perspectives” and “contradictory narratives” by interviewing across the political spectrum (e.g. across the youth wings of political parties) as well as with organizations and individually that were not directly politically active (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012:51). Interviews were primarily conducted in the capitals of each case (Chişinău, Simferopol) with control interviews conducted in second cities (Bălţi, Yalta).⁸

4.2 Kin-State Meanings

To test the relationship between identification/belonging and engagement with kin-state practices, this paper uses identification categories derived from interview data (Table 2). These categories were inductively derived, elaborated in Knott (Forthcoming), as a tool to conceptualize respondents’ co-ethnic identification and identification with the kin-state, showing kin majorities to be internally fractured in terms of these dimensions.

These inductive categories are used in this paper to structure the analysis of practices, by allowing an analysis of how those identifying in different ways engage in citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices similarly or differently, and hence, an analysis of the relationship between co-ethnic identification and kin-state practices. This approach also allows for a more structured and rigorous cross-case comparison.

⁷See Knott (2015) for a greater explanation of this application of everyday nationalism to kin-state relations.

⁸By control interview, I mean interviews that were conducted in a second site within the same case to test if there were significant differences between the respondents in the main site where interviews were being conducted (Chişinău, Simferopol).

Table 2: Explaining the Identification Categories

Crimea	Moldova
<i>Discriminated Russians</i> (n=9) emphasized not just a strong Russian identification but also how they felt threatened by the Ukrainian state	<i>Organic Romanians</i> (n=22) professed strongest and organic identification as ethnically Romanian
<i>Ethnic Russians</i> (n=18) identified primarily as Russian but this was expressed without feeling discriminated	<i>Cultural Romanians</i> (n=15) identified ethnically as Romanian, but qualified this by identifying Moldova as their home
<i>Political Ukrainians</i> (n=15) identified primarily as citizens of Ukraine, regardless of ethnic identification	<i>Ambivalent Romanians</i> (n=5) identified as partially but not wholly both Romanian and somewhat Moldovan
<i>Crimeans</i> (n=5) identified primarily regionally and inter-ethnically, identifying as between Ukrainian and Russian	<i>Moldovans</i> (n=10) identified primarily as Moldovan but explained this in terms of being a citizen of Moldova
<i>Ethnic Ukrainians</i> (n=6) identified ethnically and linguistically as Ukrainian	<i>Linguistic Moldovans</i> (n=3) identified primarily as Moldovan on the basis that they were culturally and linguistically Moldovan and distinct from those who were Romanian

When discussing each category's practices, there will be a brief explanation also of how each category identified.

5 Romanian Citizenship Practices in Moldova

This section examines the motivations underpinning respondents' engagement with (*redobândire*), examining both the material reasons, and symbolic reasons, related to spiritual and cultural identification. The section analyses also normative motivations, which are overlooked elsewhere, to analyze how far *redobândire* is linked to its institutional roots, as returning a status that was withdrawn from relatives.

Figure 1: Status of acquisition of Romanian citizenship by respondents in Moldova



5.1 Organic Romanians

Organic Romanians identified most strongly as Romanian and framed this identified as organic, on the basis that they shared not only the “same language” as Romanians (in Romania) but also the “same blood”. In terms of Romanian citizenship, most *Organic Romanians* had reacquired Romanian citizenship, or had applied for Romanian citizenship (17/22); only a minority (5/22) did not want to acquire Romanian citizenship (Figure 1).

The minority who did not have Romanian citizenship, explained that they “already consider[ed]” themselves Romanian and saw no reason to “change” this with Romanian citizenship [MD-47, MD-42]. However this already-existing identity, was buffered either by the idea that applying was too difficult and costly, particularly for the older respondents, [MD-47, MD-48, MD-42], or unnecessary given they were willing to “wait for visa liberalization” with the EU which the Moldovan administration had “promised” would happen in 2014 [MD-47, MD-48]. More sentimentally, two respondents objected to *redobândire*, as a process of applying, because they considered Romanian citizenship a “natural right” that should be conferred on them automatically [MD-14, MD-8].

Most *Organic Romanians* opted to reacquire Romanian citizenship. However they set themselves apart from instrumentality of those who sought Romanian citizenship “not [as] a way to feel Romanian” but as a “formula to go abroad legally” [MD-42, MD-47, MD-28]. Hence they delegitimized “profiteers” in particular those who were “true Russian, like speaking native Russian” [MD-42, MD-18, MD-49], framing *redobândire* as an ethnic right that required evidence of linguistic/ethnic attachments to Romania.

For *Organic Romanians* material motivations were still important on a personal level because it would be “a little disingenuous” to deny they played “a bit” of a role in practicing *redobândire* [MD-46]. However these material motivations were complex, concerning not only issues of EU travel and work rights [MD-35, MD-39, MD-11, MD-16, MD-32] but also issues of security, where Romanian citizenship functioned as a form of “insurance”, on a personal level against future instability [MD-32] and geopolitically, as a “balance, so to speak, in the area” in case of an eventuality such as if Russia were to “strike” Moldova [MD-46].

Symbolic motivations were also important, and more important for *Organic Romanians* than other categories, reflecting their organic identification. They framed *redobândire* as “natural” [MD-35, MD-18, MD-28, MD-25a, MD-25b, MD-10, MD-15, MD-39], but significant in allowing respondents to become “Romanian like them” (in Romania) where they could live in Romania “not as [an] immigrant but as a citizen with all rights and obligations” [MD-32]. Lastly, in symbolic terms, it allowed *Organic Romanians* to “become European” because “through Romanian citizenship” they became also a “European citizen” [MD-35, MD-39, MD-16, MD-39].

Normatively, too, *Organic Romanians* framed *redobândire* as “my right” because their grandparents had lost their “natural right” to Romanian citizenship in a “very abusive way” when Moldova was annexed by the Soviet Union [MD-1, MD-2, MD-28, MD-25a, MD-26a, MD-46]. This echoed official Romanian discourse in describing *redobândire* as a process of “recovery”, which recognized the “historic truth” by signifying they had “finally got their right citizenship” [MD-11, MD-26a].

Overall, material motivations were a guiding factor behind *Organic Romanians*’ engagement with *redobândire*, but were accompanied, if not superseded, by important symbolic (both Romanian and European) and normative motivations also where Romanian citizenship was a source of pride [MD-16, MD-10]. However, *redobândire* was not a zero-sum practice where their “obligations” and support for Romania came

after, and did not replace, their obligations and support towards Moldova [MD-32, MD-2, MD-14]. Rather, in relation to citizenship, the zero-sum game was between closer affiliation with the EU (via Romania) or Russia, because citizenship was a “political tool” used both by Romania and Russia to “take more influence” in Moldova [MD-10, MD-26a]. *Redobândire* for *Organic Romanians* was therefore more a signifier of geopolitical allegiances, of a symbolic shift towards Romania and the EU, than political allegiances.

5.2 Cultural Romanians

Cultural Romanians identified as ethnically Romanian and Moldovan citizens, framing Moldova as their home. The majority of *Cultural Romanians* had acquired (8/15), were acquiring (1/15) or would apply (4/15), while a minority had not applied (2/15).

Those who had not practiced *redobândire* noted its material benefits but criticized those who were motivated only by the “benefits” of citizenship, allowing them to go to Italy or Spain for work [MD-26b]. They indicated either regret for not having applied [M-20] or a possible desire [MD-26b], while combining this with inhibitions that it was “too late” to apply [MD-20] or too materialist to apply [MD-26].

Thus, as *Organic Romanians*, *Cultural Romanians* were also critical of the “opportunism” of others, explaining how there were those who could not speak Romanian and had to falsely “create [...] some sort of lineage” to Romania to acquire Romanian citizenship [MD-43, MD-19, MD-12, MD-4, MD-43, MD-24]. However, from a personal perspective, *Cultural Romanians* who had who had acquired, or were applying for, *redobândire* appeared more materially motivated than *Organic Romanians*, where *redobândire* was a “necessity” that offered the “certainty” and flexibility to travel beyond post-Soviet space [MD-44, MD-26b, MD-33, MD-9, 43, MD-19, MD-51, MD-12, MD-40]. These “practical reasons” of behind *redobândire* were amplified by acquiring EU rights, where *redobândire* was “our backdoor” to the EU [MD-40, MD-33]. However, as *Organic Romanians*, they also described the complexity of these material motivations, where *redobândire* was a form of insurance, demonstrating their desire to seek security from Romania “just in case” the situation in Moldova deteriorated [MD-9, MD-12].

By contrast to *Organic Romanians*, symbolic reasons were less important for *Cultural Romanians* in motivating their engagement with *redobândire*. However they still acknowledged the significance of Romanian citizenship, which was not “another passport” but a “privilege” they were “proud” of by granting them a sense of “legitimacy” in their “connection with Romania that’s also certified in an official manner” [MD-24, MD-23, MD-45].]. *Cultural Romanians* also problematized these symbolic discourses indicating the psychological anguish and interpersonal conflicts that could arise from *redobândire*. For MD-55 whose father was a veteran of the Moldovan army in the Transnistrian conflict (1992-1993), she felt a sense of betrayal: “how could I consider myself a citizen of another state?”. For her *redobândire* signified the need to “renounce my principles, any patriotic principles I have” by practising *redobândire* as a material necessity.

Outside symbolic frames, *Cultural Romanians*, as *Organic Romanians* framed *redobândire* normatively as an “apology” which “recogniz[ed] our common history” and allowed them to get back their “real” citizenship which was deprived from their grandparents [MD-19, MD-45, MD-24]. However, others did not feel “real” Romanian citizens [MD-12, MD-23, MD-24], by residing outside of Romania. Thus, as *Organic Romanians*, *redobândire* did not replace their identification or affiliation with Moldova, where they remained “in love” with Moldova but now “just had two passports, one blue and one red” [MD-9, MD-5, MD-19, MD-12].

5.3 Ambivalent Romanians

Ambivalent Romanians identified as partially Romanian and Moldovan, differentiating themselves from being wholly Romanian due to different political experiences from Romania, historically (in terms of the Soviet Union) and presently (in terms of Romania being more European). *Ambivalent Romanians* were split equally between those who had (3/5) and had not (2/5) practiced *redobândire*.

Those who had not practiced *redobândire* recognized the “important advantages” of Romanian citizenship, by permitting access to EU rights and the “big European family” [MD-3]. Rather it was the financial and time costs of application which inhibited their desire to practice *redobândire*, where they did not want to spend time changing family documents [MD-17].

As *Cultural* and *Organic Romanians*, *Ambivalent Romanians* criticized material motivations where “not everyone” practiced *redobândire* “in a normal or good way” by using it only to “work in a shitty job (in Spain or Italy) and come back here and buy a cool car” [MD-50]. Yet, it was still a material and not a “very nationalistic” practice [MD-50]. Here the temporal element was noticeable: for those acquiring in the late 2000s, the material benefits, of access to EU rights such as travel, were a popular reason [MD-27, MD-50] and contrasted with those who acquired in the 1990s, while studying in Romania, because “why not” have it [MD-6]. The material opportunities of citizenship, such as access to a “better education” and to “change” where you live, were also important.

Although symbolic discourses were absent from *Ambivalent Romanians*’, they still framing *redobândire* normatively as “getting back the citizenship [...] because my grandpa, grandmother had it” [MD-27], where Romania’s policy of “gathering citizens” was a “way of (Romania) saying we are sorry” for having “evacuated” Moldova [MD-27]. Hence they normalized *redobândire* believing that Romania was neither “exceptional” in providing this right nor were they “breaking any laws” in practicing *redobândire* [MD-27, MD-6].

As *Cultural* and *Organic Romanians*, *redobândire* did not affect *Ambivalent Romanians*’ partial identification as Romanian, or with Romania [MD-6]. Instead, *redobândire* enabled a bottom-up process of “individual European integration” over the last twenty years. This was the “greatest outcome” for them: to be able to travel to the EU and “feel for the first time that I’m a European citizen” [MD-27].

5.4 Moldovans

Moldovans identified both culturally and politically as Moldovan. Most *Moldovans* had acquired (4/10) or were waiting to reacquire (3/10) Romanian citizenship, while a minority had not (3/10).

Those *Moldovans* who had not practiced *redobândire* explained they did not “need” Romanian citizenship [MD-52, MD-21]. As *Ambivalent Romanians*, they were either discouraged by the “bureaucratic” process, or did not see the feel the necessary push factors to see *redobândire* as materially useful [MD-52, MD-21]. The exception was MD-56 who had recently decided he was now “forced” to practice *redobândire*, after he had a Romanian visa application refused. He previously felt constrained by the costs, watching his wife spend “all the time and money and nerve cells [...] to collect all the papers”. However because his brother would apply, he could share the costs (financial and time) of applying, because his brother would “take care of the papers”, demonstrating the familial aspects which collectivised the decisions of individuals in seeking *redobândire* [MD-56].

For *Moldovans* who had practiced *redobândire*, material motivations dominated. Romanian citizenship

“makes life easier” by opening “more possibilities”, enabling them to travel a “few times a year” to EU states and the opportunity of a “good education in western universities” [MD-34, MD-38, MD-37]. By comparison, only a minority explained symbolic motivations originating from the idea they had “Romanian ancestry” which legitimized their right to practice *redobândire* [MD-36, MD-34]. Unlike some Ambivalent and *Cultural Romanians, Moldovans*, interestingly, did not discuss symbolic conflicts either, indicating their framing of *redobândire* as a material practice.

While *Moldovans* did not describe changes to how they identified with Romania, they indicated changes from their equalizing status vis-à-vis the EU and Romania. *Moldovans* were more critical, than other categories, of the potentially negative impacts of *redobândire*, both in terms of the social phenomenon that *redobândire* could contribute to Moldova’s depopulation, demonstrated by their greater willingness to work abroad [MD-36]. Other *Moldovans* resisted this discourse believing that “most” who wanted to leave “they already did that”, without practicing *redobândire* though not legally [MD-34].

Although they did not frame *redobândire* as a form of security, *Moldovans* discussed it as a proxy of weak state capacity, because it was an “indicator of lack of performance” and belief in Moldova’s “commitments” to its citizens [MD-21, MD-56]. Here *Moldovans*, unlike previous categories, pathologized elite practices of *redobândire* believing this signified a lack of belief “in the future of the country they rule” by accessing something that could allow them to invest outside of Moldova [MD-56]. They did not frame Romania’s practices like Russia’s policy of passportization [MD-34], yet they saw it as a “very strong tool” of influence even if it would act “aggressively” towards Moldova, because Romania was able to “at least attract[ing] people from Moldova to become closer with Romania [MD-34, MD-56]. *redobândire* allowed Romania to at least “claim” its “influence” and “right” in Moldova even if this was not “with arms” [MD-56]. Indeed some respondents believed the proliferation of *redobândire* went beyond influence, as a process of unification “post-factum”, where it would become a fact via the growing Romanian body citizenry in Moldova [MD-7c]. *Moldovans*’ discussion of the impacts of *redobândire* was more wide reaching, and critical, politically and geopolitically, than that of categories (*Organic* and *Cultural Romanians*) with stronger symbolic attachments to Romania.

5.5 Linguistic Moldovans

Linguistic Moldovans identified as Moldovan, identifying as culturally and linguistically Moldovan, and distinct from Romanian. They were therefore the only respondents who identified their language as different to Romania.

Unlike previous categories, they were also the only category where none had practiced, or had any interest to practice, *redobândire*. They felt neither the same push factors, stemming from problems acquiring visas as previous categories, nor pull the factors, of wanting to work abroad that *Linguistic Moldovans* believed “forced” others to apply for Romanian citizenship [MD-41, MD-57b].

Rather they maligned *redobândire*, framing it as a “taboo” to be anything other than a Moldovan citizen [MD-54] and indicative of Romania’s “capture” of the Moldovan state [MD-41]. While they were open to citizens practicing *redobândire*, they saw elite practices of *redobândire* as demonstrating a conflict of interest because “whose state interests do they [officials] defend? Moldovan or Romanian? I have my doubts” [MD-41, MD-57b]. Unlike most respondents, who legitimized and normalized *redobândire*, *Linguistic Moldovans* framed Moldova as an anomaly for allowing public officials to hold dual citizenship:

Table 3: Engagement in Moldovan case with Romanian kin-state practices

Category	Practice	Motivation
<i>Organic Romanians</i>	Y	Symbolic, Material, Normative
<i>Cultural Romanians</i>	Y	Material, Normative
<i>Ambivalent Romanians</i>	Y	Material, Normative
<i>Moldovans</i>	Y	Material, Normative
<i>Linguistic Moldovans</i>	N	Malign

“imagine that the [UK] Queen has a US passport. Is that even possible?” [MD-41, MD-57b].⁹ These conflicts of interest, heightened their feelings of being “under occupation” from Romania because they questioned who the current administration were working for and which state they were loyal too given they “swore allegiance to Romania” [MD-41, MD-57b].

*

Overall, this section argues there was a wide engagement with *redobândire* where all categories, except *Linguistic Moldovans*, were interested to, and were engaging, in *redobândire* (Table 3). This indicates the prevalence and legitimacy of *redobândire* and demonstrates the extent to which identification as Romanian or with Romania was not a motivating factor for practicing *redobândire*, except for the strongest critics of Romania, *Linguistic Moldovans*, who pathologized *redobândire* as signifying the colonial attitude of Romania towards Moldova.

However respondents’ motivations for practicing *redobândire* were more associated with respondents’ identification. Material and normative motivations were important across the categories; what differed was how these were combined with symbolic motivations (*Organic* and *Cultural Romanians*) or not (*Ambivalent Romanians*, *Moldovans*). These material motivations were also complex, imbued with the desire to seek *redobândire* as an alternative source of security, to insure themselves against domestic risks, and with the rights (and status, for *Organic Romanians*) that could be gained from the EU, of becoming equal not only to Romanian citizens, but also to citizens within the whole EU space. For *Organic Romanians*, symbolic motivations were given greater weight, outpacing but not wholly replacing material motivations. For *Cultural Romanians*, symbolic motivations were not necessarily as important as material motivations, but still, as *Organic Romanians*, they criticized those who became Romanian citizens without adequate connection, or commitment, to Romania (i.e. ethnic Russians and Russian speakers).

Lastly, this section has shown the normality and legitimacy of *redobândire* as Romanian kin-state practice, indicating that Moldova is becoming a state comprised by a large Romanian post-territorial citizenry. This process of *redobândire*-ization brought respondents closer to Romania. It affected also their identification as European, more than as Romanian, and did not imply a loss of loyalty to Moldova. Of respondents who were engaging with this practice, it is interesting that Moldovans were most critical, in terms of its facilitation of depopulation, but also in terms of the state weakness it implied, where public goods, such as security, jobs and opportunities for development, could now be sought from Romania.¹⁰ This shift of

⁹This law was changed, with Moldova’s change of government in 2009, following the ECHR ruling on *Tănase and Chirtoacă v Moldova* (see 2010), to permit politicians and public officials to hold dual citizenship.

¹⁰Neofotistos (2009) discusses too the idea that acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship by Macedonians, who are acquiring Bulgarian citizenship “by Bulgarian origin”, does not replace their political or cultural identification, or sense of loyalty, to Macedonia.

dependency towards Romania concerns not only mass everyday practices, but also the everyday practices of the elite, framed as both banal (*Cultural Romanians*) and malevolent (*Moldovans*, *Linguistic Moldovans*) by respondents who saw it as communicating a lack of faith in Moldova's future. Here there is a tension between the ideational/symbolic legitimacy that Moldova is able to maintain, which does not replace loyalty to the Moldovan state, and the indication of Moldova's weak political/geopolitical and social capacity to provide the security and opportunities that its citizens want, and can now access elsewhere.

6 Quasi-Citizenship Practices in Crimea

This section analyzes quasi-citizenship practices, i.e. the exercise of partial but not full citizenship rights and benefits, by analyzing respondents' engagement with Russia's Compatriot policy and citizenship policy. The section focuses on two elements to analyze these Compatriot practices:

1. Identification as a Compatriot, and
2. Engagement with specific Compatriot rights and benefits.

In terms of identification, the section addresses how the "loose" and deliberately "ambiguous" but equally "communitarian logic of protecting the collective rights" of Compatriots (*sootchestvenniki*) is reflected by engagement with the Compatriot policy as a kin-state practice, by analyzing whether respondents conceived of themselves as Compatriots and the basis of this identification, e.g. nostalgia for Soviet Union and/or common language and culture (Kosmarskaya 2011:60; Shevel 2009:179; G. Smith 1999b:509).

6.1 Discriminated Russians

Discriminated Russians identified most strongly as Russian, and with Russia, and combined this with identifying as the victims of what they pathologized as Ukraine's policies of Ukrainization. They were also the only category who actively participated in pro-Russian organizations in Crimea, such as *Russkoe Edinstvo* (Russian Unity, RE) and *Russkaia Obschina Kryma* (Russian Community of Crimea, ROC); the same organizations whose leaders Sergei Aksenov (RE) and Sergei Tsekov (ROC) would be instrumental in Crimea's annexation by Russia in 2014.

Citizenship: *Discriminated Russians*, as other categories, had not acquired Russian citizenship, but, unlike other categories, wanted to be able to access Russian citizenship as an "element of defense" against Ukraine [C-25]. Even though they felt discriminated by Ukraine, they respected Ukraine's legislative legitimacy by wanting to not "break any law of Ukraine in anyway" [C-24]. Rather, they criticized Russia's unwillingness to lobby or insist Ukraine legalized the right of holding dual citizenship [C-24].

Quasi-Citizenship: Interestingly, *Discriminated Russians* were the only respondents (excluding a few *Ethnic Russians* and *Crimeans*) who identified as Compatriots and were interested in the Compatriot policy. In part, this was because they did not identify with the Ukrainian state, being left "sort of abroad" from their "homeland" after the collapse of the Soviet Union and, on this basis, "we are their [Russia's] Compatriots" [C-48a, C-48b, C-46]. Their identification as Compatriots was therefore tied to their sense of nostalgia and loss vis-a-vis Russia and the Soviet Union, as well as their loss of status vis-a-vis Ukraine. Hence, they

felt the Compatriot policy was “certainly necessary” because of the “infringement of my rights” to speak Russian whereas Russia’s “compatriots should live with dignity in any country of the world” [C-25, C-46].

However, *Discriminated Russians* were dissatisfied with the Compatriot policy. *Discriminated Russians* did “appreciate” that Russia “does not forget about our compatriots”, yet they wanted to “see Russia doing more active steps” to *actually* help them [C-19a, C-25, C-24]. They were disappointed by what the Compatriot Policy offered (resettlement) while it failed to offer citizenship rights [C-48a, C-48b, C-46]. They maligned Compatriot resettlement because they wanted to stay in “sunny Crimea”, their “homeland” where they had “roots”, rather than move to “snowy Siberia” [C-48b, C-19a, C-48a, C-55, C-24, C-46]. Instead of facilitating their exit from Crimea, they wanted Russia to require changes within Ukraine that would improve their situation in Crimea.

It is likely, therefore, that *Discriminated Russians* would never have been satisfied with a Compatriot policy that fell short of offering full citizenship rights, but which, at the same time, was prohibited by Ukrainian law.

6.2 Ethnic Russians

Ethnic Russians identified as Russian, but exhibited more political concerns regarding how Russia was governed, limiting their identification with Russia as a state where Ukraine was their legitimate state. Secondly, they did not accompany their ethnic identification as Russian with sentiments of discrimination (as *Discriminated Russians*).

Citizenship: Most *Ethnic Russians* were uninterested in, and negative about, acquisition of Russian citizenship. They believed it was neither a common nor a “necessary” practice because it offered no material benefits, such as the right to travel and work in Russia, that they could not already access [C-9, C-51, C-57b].

Quasi-Citizenship: *Ethnic Russians* were more divided, compared to *Discriminated Russians* and *Ethnic Russians’* citizenship practices. They were split between:

1. A few who identified as Compatriots, and had positive associations,
2. A few who identified as Compatriots but had negative associations with the Russian state, and
3. Most who did not, and had no interest to, identify as Compatriots.

In the first group, few respondents identified as Russian Compatriots and believed that Russia should offer support to them [C-34, C-9, C-53]. They identified as Compatriots because of their symbolic identification, as “Russian” (*russkii*), and their cultural and spiritual closeness to Russia and/or Moscow, as somewhere they felt they had a personal relationship with, because it was “part of my identity” [C-9, C-53, C-34]. The second group did not understand Russia’s official conception of what it meant to be a Compatriot. They identified an interpersonal “kinship” with their “native people” in Russia but this sense of closeness remained “at the level of the household” and did not extent to the state, because of how Russia governed, and especially “because of Putin” [C-22, C-51]. They identified as Compatriots of Russian people, but not as Compatriots of the Russian state. However most *Ethnic Russians*, the third group, did not

identify as Russian Compatriots [C-57b, C-7, C-1]. They were apathetic, if not negative, about these practices believing they were not effective but rather an “excuse” for Russia to engage with Russians abroad [C-3, C-8].

While divided in whether they identified as Compatriots, *Ethnic Russians* were unified in their antipathy towards what the Compatriot policy offered. As *Discriminated Russians*, *Ethnic Russians* were “not interested” in resettlement because, as a “Russian enclave” it was not necessary to “leave Crimea” where they lived freely [C-53, C-51, C-34]. Secondly, they criticized Russia’s “uncomfortable” and under-developed regions, such as Tuva (southern Siberia), that Russia promoted for resettlement [C-51]. Instead, they wanted to remain in Crimea where it was “warm”, or migrate to believed it was “better” locations, such as the UK [C-33, C-51 C-53]. Hence their hypothetical choice of emigration destinations was not motivated by linguistic or cultural closeness, but rather by material understandings of where would further personal development and opportunities.

6.3 Political Ukrainians

Political Ukrainians identified themselves as primarily Ukrainian citizens because it was their place of birth. They often distinguished themselves from their parents, who they identified as ethnically Russian, because of their post-Soviet socialization, which made it possible to be from Crimea and politically Ukrainian (even if their parents were not ethnically Ukrainian).

Citizenship: Similar to *Ethnic Russians*, *Political Ukrainians* framed Russian citizenship as unnecessary and undesirable, offering rights, such as the right to reside and work in Russia, that they did not need [C-37, C-23, C-32]. They supported the singular norm of citizenship in Ukraine, believing that those individuals wanting Russian citizenship should “leave to Russia” if they “needed” or wanted Russian citizenship because people “should be citizens of their state” [C-31, C-40, C-47, C-21, C-30].

Quasi-Citizenship: *Political Ukrainians* were unified than *Ethnic Russians* in their apathy towards the Compatriot policy. Few had heard of Russia’s policy [e.g. C-32, C-37, C-11a, C-11b, C-12, C-29, C-18, C-47, C-31, C-23] and none identified themselves as Compatriots. Rather they identified as compatriots of each other and were confused why Russia would consider them compatriots (of Russia) [C-11a, C-11b, C-31]. This lack of self-identification as being a Compatriot contributed to their sense of confusion about what the purpose of the policy was [C-11a, C-11b] and who Russia considered to be Compatriots, whether you had to have “both passports, Russian and Ukrainian” [C-18] or whether you had to have relatives from Russia [C-30]. Beyond this lack of identification with the policy, they maligned what the policy offered, as “not promis[ing] good things” and not being used “very widely” by people from Crimea because it did not offer the ability to live in Moscow, which was where those who wanted to move to Russia wanted primarily to live [C-18, C-59].

The exception was C-28 who, as a beneficiary of the Compatriot policy receiving a Russian scholarship, saw Compatriot practices as “cool” (*kruto*) and “very great” (*ochen’ klassno*). She was grateful for the material benefits it provided, namely access to better opportunities in Russia compared to Crimea/Ukraine.

Overall, it was significant that the only *Political Ukrainian* who reflected positively on Compatriot practices was a material beneficiary of Russian opportunities.

6.4 Crimeans

Crimeans identified inter-ethnically and regionally, because they identified themselves as having both Ukrainian and Russian parents, and identified, geographically, Crimea as being between Ukraine and Russia.

Citizenship: As *Ethnic Russians* and *Political Ukrainians*, for *Crimeans* Russian citizenship was “not necessary”, materially, for “us mere mortals” because they could already travel to Russia and had no desire to immigrate to Russia, associating it, as *Political Ukrainians*, largely with being resident in Russia [C-2a, C-57a, C-36]. Most *Crimeans* supported Ukraine’s policy of singular citizenship believing that it was “better” to have single citizenship to ensure people do not “commute” between different states [C-36, C-57a].

Quasi-Citizenship: *Crimeans* also, as most *Ethnic Russians* and *Political Ukrainians*, had little knowledge and interest in Russia’s Compatriot Policy and did not identify as Compatriots [C-36, C-4, C-57a]. Only C-2a described Compatriots as those whose parents and/or grandparents were born in the former territory of the USSR, but did not identify herself within this framework [C-2a].

Most *Crimeans* did not connect Russia’s policy of resettlement to the Compatriot Policy, and, as previous categories, were uninterested in resettlement because “no one will go to the hinterland” to live in Russia [C-4, C-2a, C-57a]. Rather, if they did ever move to Russia, it would not be where Russia wanted them to move, but to live where they had familial connections [C-2a], demonstrating the importance of interpersonal connections over state-sponsored programs. Others oriented themselves away from Russia explaining that they were more likely to want to visit, or move to elsewhere in Ukraine such as Kyiv and L’viv, as places to which they felt closer [C-36].

6.5 Ethnic Ukrainians

Ethnic Ukrainians resided in Crimea but had been born outside the peninsula, and identified their native language as Ukrainian and themselves as ethnically Ukrainian.

Citizenship: *Ethnic Ukrainians*, as *Ethnic Russians* and *Political Ukrainians*, pathologized Russian citizenship, upholding Ukraine’s singular legislating of citizenship [C-6, C-45, C-49]. They were also uninterested in Compatriot practices did not identify as Compatriots of Russia, because they do not “have a relationship with the Russian Federation” and instead were “supporter[s] of Ukrainian statehood” [C-6, C-45, C-49].

Quasi-Citizenship: *Ethnic Ukrainians* did not identify as Compatriots. As previous categories, they criticized Compatriot resettlement, arguing that “at least in Crimea, very few people [...] use” the Compatriot policy because it was only concerned, from their perspective, with resettlement to “remote areas (okrainy) of Russia [...] where no one from Sevastopol, from Crimea wants to go” [C-26, C-45, C-49]. Here they alluded to the rift between the proposed recipients of the policy, for whom resettlement did not appeal, and the Russian state, who were motivated to try to solve its “very bad demographic situation” and “erosion of the Slavic population, by trying to restock the population via resettlement of Compatriots [C-26].

*

Overall, no categories engaged with Russian citizenship, with only *Discriminated Russians* wanting to engage with Russian citizenship (Table 4) because Russia neither provided it nor Ukraine tolerated it. Hence they felt bound by, and respected, the legal situation in Ukraine, which prohibited dual citizenship, demonstrating that even if they felt discriminated by Ukraine, the state still held legal, and thus political, legitimacy from their perspective. For all other categories, Russian citizenship was not only unavailable but undesirable, by offering rights they neither wanted nor needed.

In terms the Compatriot policy, similar to citizenship practices, it was only *Discriminated Russians* who identified as Compatriots, framing the Compatriot policy as necessary to protect them from discrimination. Beyond this, one *Political Ukrainian*, as a beneficiary of the Compatriot policy, and several *Ethnic Russians* identified as Compatriots wanting to either feel more spiritually close to Russia, or seeing the Russian people, but not the Russian state, as their compatriots; however, this did not contest their political affiliation to Ukraine.

In contrast, the majority of respondents (*Ethnic Russians*, *Crimeans*, *Political Ukrainians*, *Ethnic Ukrainians*), did not identify as Compatriots. They showed a lack of understanding and interest in what the policy offered (*Political Ukrainians*, *Ethnic Ukrainians*, *Crimeans*), and even pathologized these practices, given their links to corrupt pro-Russian organizations (some *Ethnic Russians*, *Ethnic Ukrainians*). Thus, respondents' identification did not determine their identification as Compatriots. Rather, it was only those who directly benefited from Compatriot practices (in terms of being a scholarship recipient or employee) who were engaged and interested in these practices.

Interestingly, even if there was differentiation in which categories did and did not identify as Compatriots, all categories were dissatisfied with Compatriot practices. For *Discriminated Russians*, Compatriot practices did not going far enough in offering rights they sought (full citizenship rights), or in protecting their interests, given their perception of discrimination vis-à-vis Ukraine. Hence, the policy of resettlement was not attractive to any respondents, and even failed to be connected as a Compatriot practice by *Crimeans*, because it offered neither an attractive climate (*Discriminated Russians*, *Ethnic Russians*), nor economic opportunities (*Ethnic Ukrainians*). Rather if respondents wanted to leave Crimea, it would be to places of their choosing, such as where they had relatives (*Crimeans*), to elsewhere in Ukraine (*Crimeans*) or to Western Europe (*Ethnic Russians*).

Table 4: Engagement in Crimean case with Russian Kin-State Practices

Category	Practice Citizenship	Want Citizenship	Compatriot?	Rights & Benefits
<i>Discriminated Russians</i>	N	Y	Y	Disappointing
<i>Ethnic Russians</i>	N	N	A few	Unnecessary, undesirable
<i>Political Ukrainians</i>	N	N	N	Unnecessary, undesirable
<i>Crimeans</i>	N	N	N	Unnecessary, undesirable
<i>Ethnic Ukrainians</i>	N	N	N	Unnecessary, undesirable

7 A Theoretical Analysis: Citizenship vs. Quasi-Citizenship

The remainder of this paper explores the comparative and theoretical insights from the empirical comparison of the citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices. In particular, this section tries to unpack why engagement with kin-state practices differed in these cases between a wide engagement in Moldova and a narrow/niche engagement in Crimea. This is not to generate a general theory of engagement with kin-state practices, in particular citizenship vs. quasi-citizenship, but generates useful analytical insights that could be tested elsewhere.

Empirically, this paper observed a difference between the wide engagement with Romanian practices in Moldova (across identification categories) and the narrow engagement with Russian practices in Crimea (predominantly *Discriminated Russians*). To conceptualize the reasons behind this wide vs. narrow difference, Table 5 explores the different dimensions in which the cases differ:

1. the availability of the policy,
2. the justification underpinning the policy, and
3. the rights and benefits offered by the kin-state (i.e. its desirability).

Firstly, the accessibility and availability of the policy concerns kin-state provision, i.e. how far it is made accessible by the kin-state both in terms of who is eligible to access these rights and how they can become aware of their eligibility, and home-state willingness, i.e. how far home-states accept or limit access (e.g. by making dual citizenship illegal). Secondly, the desirability of the policy concerns the rights and benefits that can be derived from the policy, how far these rights and benefits are superior to those already held, and how far these rights and benefits can be exercised in situ (within the kin-state) or can be exercised only by relocating to the kin-state. Thirdly, the justification of the policy concerns the way in which the policy is (or is not) framed as legitimate, i.e. how far it might be underpinned by reversing past injustice. These dimensions, as expanded below, explain why there is wide engagement with Romanian citizenship in Moldova compared to narrow/niche engagement with Russian citizenship and quasi-citizenship in Crimea.

In Moldova, engaging with Romanian citizenship was legal, legitimized by a reparative discourse, widely accessible (due to wide eligibility) and desirable by offering rights that significantly improved the rights of Moldovan residents in situ (work and travel, sense of status equality with Romania and EU). This says

Table 5: Conceptualising Citizenship and Quasi-Citizenship Practices

	Moldova Citizenship	Crimea Citizenship	Quasi-citizenship
Engagement	Wide	None	Narrow
Dimensions			
1) <i>Accessibility & availability</i>	Legal (in Romania & Moldova), Widely accessible	Illegal (in Ukraine & Russia)	Niche in practice (via organizations)
2) <i>Desirability</i>	Yes: superior, in situ	No: insignificant rights (except <i>Discriminated Russians</i>)	No: insignificant rights
3) <i>Justification</i>	Reparative	Absence of perceived injustice (except <i>Discriminated Russians</i>)	Absence of perceived injustice (except <i>Discriminated Russians</i>)

nothing of the legitimacy of this restitution claim, which Dumbrava (2014) argues is a “weak claim” which is “rewarded with an undeserved and potentially unfair political privilege”, but rather argues that, in the mind of respondents and the Romanian state, these are justified claims that embed the popularity of this policy.

In comparison, in Crimea, Russian citizenship was recognized not only as illegal but, predominantly, as undesirable and buffered by an absence of perceived injustice. By comparison, this discourse of perceived injustice was prevalent in Moldova vis-à-vis Romanian citizenship. This finding is significant, firstly because Crimea was framed as a region of passportization, where acceptance of Russian citizenship was associated with weak support for Ukraine; however this paper argues for the reverse: that there was little desire, or legitimacy in *being* passportized. It was only *Discriminated Russians* who saw interaction with Russia via citizenship as a right restricted from them, but only so long as they felt discriminated by their home-state. In terms of quasi-citizenship, this too provided rights and benefits that were seen as undesirable and insignificant (e.g. the right to resettle in Russia’s “*okrayni*” (periphery)), even for those who wanted interaction with Russia (*Discriminated Russians*). Most respondents were uninterested in becoming informed about how to access these rights, given that access to these rights was restricted to Russian Compatriot networks, while those who were informed and had access, via these organizations, used these organizations to lobby Russia for what they wanted (citizenship).

It is ironic, therefore, that in 2014 it was Russia which securitized the Compatriot policy by legitimizing Russia’s intervention and annexation of Crimea as an act legitimized by a kin-state who claimed it had a “moral obligation to protect Compatriots (*sootchestvenniki*)” in Crimea (Wanner 2014:428). As Wanner (2014:430) argues, this indicates a Russian political logic in which compatriots in Crimea were “easily identifiable”, and indeed, that they identified themselves as compatriots, and wanted engagement with Russia as compatriots. This paper has shown the extent to which Compatriot practices were an interest and undertaking of a specific (minority) community within Crimea, concerning those who were involved in pro-Russian organizations (ROC, RE) who imbued an ideology of discrimination buttressed by their membership in these organizations and identification as Compatriots. However, as this paper has shown, even these niche supporters felt dissatisfied by what Russia, in 2012 and 2013, was willing to offer: namely quasi-citizenship and not full citizenship.

8 Conclusion

The lived experience perspective offers crucial insight into understanding the different perspectives concerning engagement with citizenship and quasi-citizenship. From this, important theoretical differences are evident. Firstly, in the functioning of citizenship, by comparison quasi-citizenship lacks the ability to offer “real” and desirable political, social rights and benefits, in particular by offering rights which are not in situ (e.g. facilitated migration rights). Similarly, in Hungary, Waterbury (2014) argues that it was the introduction of non-resident citizenship became potentially more meaningful once it was attached to real political rights Hungary. Even when citizenship as social and political institution, is theorized as being eroded and becoming fragmented by quasi-citizenship (Turner 2001), citizenship remains the key gateway to the (kin-) state (so long as it offers desirable/superior rights). Citizenship facilitates participation and sentiments of obligation that quasi-citizenship does not (perhaps deliberately), rendering quasi-citizenship a tokenistic kin-state gesture designed to maintain symbolic ties, without rights and benefits.

Citizenship therefore remains a significant and salient political institution, in particular in regions (such as Moldova) where individuals seek to gain more from kin-state citizenship (i.e. desirable rights) and when this citizenship is buffered by a powerful legitimizing discourse which naturalizes this acquisition even for those who do not identifying with the kin-state (e.g. Moldovans). It will be critical therefore, going forward, to observe the way in which kin-states modify their kin-state practices and, indeed, if they do upgrade policies of quasi-citizenship to “full” citizenship on the basis of its greater effectiveness in fostering engagement, and hence greater institutional, political and social interaction “over and above” state borders (Kovács 2006:442).

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