

NICOLA MASTROROCCHO

## LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

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### RESEARCH FIELDS:

Primary: **Political Economy, Comparative Politics**  
Secondary: **Applied Microeconomics**

### ACADEMIC POSITIONS:

- [Fellow in Political Science](#), London School of Economics (2014 to date)
- [Visiting Fellow](#), Harvard University, Institute of Quantitative Social Science (Spring 2016)

### EDUCATION

- PhD in Political Science. 2012 – 2016 (expected)
- Principal Advisors: *Valentino Larcinese* and *Simon Hix*
- Mres in Political Science and Political Economy December 2012
- BSc and MSc in Economics and Political Science, University of Bologna, Italy, 2010 (with distinction)

### TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

2015/16	<b>Economic Institutions of Europe</b> , BSc, LSE, <i>Lecturer</i>
2014/15 & 2015/16	<b>Introduction to Political Science</b> , BSc, LSE, <i>Research Fellow</i> .
2014/15 & 2015/16	<b>Empirical Methods for Public Policy</b> , EMPA, Teaching Assistant
	<b>Mathematics and Statistics Refresher</b> , EMPA, Teaching Assistant
	<b>Fiscal Budgeting</b> , EMPA, Teaching Assistant
2012, 2013	<b>Economic Policy Analysis</b> , Summer School, Teaching Assistant

### FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:

2016	Unicredit Best Presentation Award – Applied Economics Workshop – Petralia S.
2014-2016	LSESU Student-Led Teaching Excellence Awards 2016
2014-2015	ESRC Research Grant, LSE
2012-2014	Government Department Research Studentship Scheme, LSE
2009-2010	Erasmus Scholarship, University of Bologna

### INVITED PRESENTATIONS:

2016	Petralia Sottana, Applied Economics Workshop
	Bocconi University – Political Economy Seminar
	LSE – NYU Political Economy Conference
	Princeton Political Economy Seminar
	Yale Leitner Political Economy Seminar
	NYU Political Economy Seminar
	Harvard Positive Political Economy Seminar
2015	Nuffield College, Oxford

**CONFERENCES**

2016 American Political Science Association, Philadelphia  
European Political Science Association, Bruxelles  
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago  
2015 American Political Science Association, San Francisco.  
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago  
European Political Science Association, Vienna  
Political Economy Seminar, University of Bologna  
2014 Political Science Association, Oxford  
Political Economy of Media, University of Naples,

**OTHER EMPLOYMENT**

2012 - 2014 **MainStreet Capital Partners, London, UK**  
Investment Analyst, Emerging Markets Asset Management  
2010 - 2012 **International Growth Centre (UK Dfid and LSE)**  
Economist, South Sudan and Uganda

**LANGUAGES**

Italian (native), English (fluent), French (fluent), Spanish (intermediate)

**COMPUTERS SKILLS**

Stata, Latek, R, Lyx, Mathlab, Bloomberg, Python

**OTHERS**

Co-Editor of the economic think-tank: [www.quattrogatti.info](http://www.quattrogatti.info)  
Semi- Professional Football Player, FIGC Youth League

**REFERENCES:**

**Prof. Simon Hix**

(Advisor)  
Department of Government  
London School of Economics  
Email: [s.hix@lse.ac.uk](mailto:s.hix@lse.ac.uk)

**Prof. Torun Dewan**

(Referee)  
Department of Government  
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**Prof. Valentino Larcinese**

(Advisor)  
Department of Government,  
London School of Economics  
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**Prof. David Soskice**

(Referee)  
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**RESEARCH PAPERS (PhD Dissertation)**

**Organized Crime within Politics: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Italy**

*with Marco Di Cataldo (LSE)*

*What is the impact of organised crime on the allocation of public resources and on revenue collection?* This paper studies the consequences of the collusion between members of criminal organisations and local politicians in Italian local governments. In order to capture the presence of organised crime, we exploit the staggered enforcement of a national law allowing the dissolution of a municipal government upon evidence of collusion between elected officials and the criminal organisations. We measure the consequences of this collusion by using a newly collected data on public spending, local taxes and elected politicians at the local level. Differences-in-differences estimates reveal that infiltrated local governments spend on average more on construction and waste management, less on policing, and collect fewer fiscal revenues. In addition, we uncover key elements of local elections associated with mafia-politics collusion. In particular, Regression Discontinuity estimates show that infiltration is more likely to occur when right-wing parties win local elections.

**Information and Crime Perceptions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment** (Submitted

*American Economic Journal, Applied Economics*) *with Luigi Minale (Carlos III)*

In modern democracies voters rely on media outlets to learn about politically salient issues. This raises an important question: *how strongly can media affect public opinion?* This paper studies the case of Italy and use a natural experiment – the staggered introduction of the Digital TV signal – to measure the effect of media persuasions on the beliefs and perceptions individuals hold. We focus on crime perception, and we show that the reduced exposure to crime related news decreased individual concerns about crime. The effect is particularly strong for the elderly who are more exposed to television and less to other sources of information. Finally, we show that this change in crime perceptions is likely to have important implication for voting behaviour.

**Political Information and Sovereign Bonds Volatility**

What is the impact of a variation in the nature and transparency of political information on markets behaviour? This paper attempts to answer this question by studying both theoretically and empirically the impact of political information flows on sovereign volatility during the European Debt Crisis. I develop an extension of a standard Global Game setting and I then test the prediction of the models exploiting a unique Twitter data collection of political news in five European Countries. The estimates reveal that the frequency and the type of political news presented by the media is positively correlated with high volatility for sovereign bonds but that the level of volatility is a function of each national government's credibility.

**WORK IN PROGRESS**

**Electoral Rules, Legislative Behaviour and Accountability: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design in Italian Municipalities**

*With Jack Blumenau (LSE)*

**The Hidden Underworld: Organised Crime and Firms**

**The Business Model of the Narcos: Criminal Organisations' Response to the Legalisation of Cannabis in the United States**

**The Effect of Digital Television on Voting Behaviour in Italy**

*with Luigi Minale (Carlos III)*

**Local Democracy, Crime and Punishment in the United States.**

*With David Soskice (LSE) and Øyvind Skorge (University of Oslo)*