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Setting the rules of the border:
The Carrot, the Stick... and the Fence?
The case of Albanian-Greek migration
Ada Shima



ABSTRACT

This essay seeks to explore how migration policies and development have influenced migration process(es) at the case of Greek-Albanian border after 1991. To analyze this, it draws on literature from the migration-development nexus and the impact of migration policies on migration process(es). It will be argued that although these two approaches have been introduced as ways to indirectly or directly curb, manage, or control migration, they not only fail to achieve their goals, but they also have unintended consequences. This conclusion presents challenges for various assumptions about migration at large, and as well the actors and interests involved in setting rules of the border. The essay will conclude with policy implications and suggestions about areas of further research.

Setting the rules of the border: *The Carrot, the Stick... and the Fence?*

The case of Albanian-Greek migration



Master of Science in Social Policy and Development

London School of Economics and Political Science

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¹ © by E.Peponis in the Albanian Greek border. Translation by Anisa Loli: ‘Caution; STOP; Control; in 50 meters’ <http://www.flickr.com/photos/d-aruma/876098075/>

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² Skeldon (2007, 5)

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abstract

This essay seeks to explore how migration policies and development have influenced migration process(es) at the case of Greek-Albanian border after 1991. To analyze this, it draws on literature from the migration-development nexus and the impact of migration policies on migration process(es). It will be argued that although these two approaches have been introduced as ways to indirectly or directly curb, manage, or control migration, they not only fail to achieve their goals, but they also have unintended consequences. This conclusion presents challenges for various assumptions about migration at large, and as well the actors and interests involved in setting rules of the border. The essay will conclude with policy implications and suggestions about areas of further research.

Chapter I: Introduction

In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 13 is stated that “*Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.*” According to the United Nations (UN, 2009), in 2005 about 3 percent of the world’s population, 191 million, lived or worked outside their country of birth.

Despite being a human right, migration is still regarded a social problem which needs to be curbed, managed, and controlled. The debate on border control becomes even more intense today with issues of international security, fight against terrorism, and international financial crises.

This essay will try to explore how do migration policies³ and development influence migration process(es) in the case of Albanian migration to Greece after 1991. While border crossing became an *issue* only in the last century, policy maker, politicians and academia have suggested different types of solution to *it*. On one hand putting harsh migration policies and resources to the borders – *stick or fence* - such as militarization, visa control, physical walls and other has been considered as efficient ways to achieve this goal (de Hass, 2007a). Recently, in the development-migration nexus (Nyberg-Sorensen et al, 2003) - *carrot* - it has been argued that as international labour migrants economically remit, they will contribute to the development of the home country. Furthermore, as countries develop, out-migration will decrease. However, it has been argued that both these approaches have been based in wrong assumption which do not reflect empirical evidence (Skeldon, 2007, De Hann, 1999, de Hass, 2007b). These

³ By policy here is meant both the legal framework concerning immigration and the practices of Greek authorities and their agencies regarding immigrants.

approaches have little to say about achieving their intended goals. However they have had unintended consequences in the migration process(es). The dynamics involved have challenged the nation based politics and international aversion at taking issues of migration on board.

The first part will try to explore the literature on migration theories and the links constructed between migration-development and policies-migration. While this literature remains divided, an attempt will be made, following Skeldon (2007) to explore the link between migration, policy and development.

The second part will outline the journey taken during the process of research and, the context of the case study selected to illustrate the dynamics. Following, its relevance and limitations to this debate will be highlighted.

The last chapter will focus on the case of Greek-Albanian border, policies and migration process after 1991. It will later be argued that (1) migration policies have little impact on curbing, managing or controlling migration, but their presence does impact migration processes. (2) Migration policies have unequal impact on different migrant groups. Lastly, (3) restrictive migration policies can contribute to the generation and perpetuation of lucrative businesses, such as smugglers which increase the cost and risk of migration.

Chapter II: Literature review

Understanding the approaches to migration, and its links to development, and related policies requires an inter-disciplinary approach. Thus, this part of the essay will draw from literature in social policy, development and geography disciplines. The first part will try to explain the main migration theories, and continue with the way migration has been linked firstly to development, and secondly migration policies. The last part of this chapters aims at exploring the link between the three literatures which will shape the approach to the case study, and attempting to answer the research question.

IIa: and the question still remains: why do people migrate?

Migration is a multi-scale, multi-motive, multi-dynamic process. To be explain it by only one particular theory is a difficult project, because each of them will fail to include its multiplicities. The literature aiming at answering the question on why people migrate is vast. The question has been approached from the micro – individual-, macro – structural - and recently more integrated micro-macro-institutional approaches (Massey, et al.1998). At one extreme migrants have been viewed as victims to structural forces and shifts in the global or regional economy (ibid), while in other extreme migration has been viewed as a rational choice, a site of resistance, a survival strategy for the poor (Tadaro, Stark, cited in De Hass, 1999). This part of the essay will present the main theories on migration, and their critiques.

Ravenstein, named the father of migration studies, suggested that migration is an integral part of development, by which he meant development of industries, commerce, and

transportation (1885, cited in Skeldon, 2008)). He argued that the causes of migration were economic and migration process would continue until the spatial inequalities decreased. Thus migration and development were positively correlated. Some have argued that this core assumption of why people migrate has prevailed and is still rooted in the international movement during the industrialization process (Massey et al, 1998).

Even though most migration theories are trying to explore the same question, i.e. why international migration begins, they all employ different assumptions, concepts and frameworks. Neoclassical economics with its key writers in the 70s like Michael Tadaro and John Harris focused on differentials in wages and employment conditions between rural and urban areas - later to be applied to international migration - where migration was understood as an individual rational choice. This approach saw development as an outcome of migration, where migration was contributing to building an industrial economy. The latter was embedded in the 'developmentalist' modernization theory, based on a linear, universal developmental process (Rostow, 1960, cited in de Hass, 2008). Portes(2008) criticizes neo-classical theory of migration in that wage differentials seize to explain the reason why migration flow is not maintained even though the wage differentials still persist, and why these flows only apply to certain spaces and not others. Additionally this theory is not able to address issues of government restriction of migration (De Hass, 2008), as well as has been criticized for being a-historical, euro-centric which supposes to explain migration dynamic of the 21st century with those of industrial revolution (Skeldon, 1997). On a further note, this theory has been critiqued from a gender approach in that it assumes that both men and women have the same motivation to migrate (Chant, 1998).

The new economics of labour migration prevalent in the 80s and 90s with proponents like Oded Stark, views the movement as a result of more factors involved than just the labour market. According to this theory, rather than a process influenced by absolute deprivation, migration was influenced by relative deprivation, not only in terms of labour market access but also credit market, land, education etc. Livelihood approaches were integrated in this theory, where other factors besides incomes could be taken into consideration. The underlining idea in this theory was that migration is a household strategy which aims at diversifying income and minimizing risk in order to overcome constraints. This theory has been criticized in that it draws specifically from the rural Mexican case which can not be generalized and that it concerns itself solely to sending places (Arango, 2000)

Inspired by Immanuel Wallerstein, the world system theory, referred to as historical-structural approach (De Hass, 1999), has barely touched upon migration, as its main concern was to explain how the penetration of capital through national boundaries interacts with labour. This theory did not see development as a progressive process, but rather underdeveloped countries were seen as trapped by their disadvantage in the global geo-political structures (De Hass, 2008) Additionally, in this theory migration is not seen as a step toward development, but as reinforcing global inequalities. Historical-structural approaches have been criticized for not taking into account the migrant agency, and leaving all the migration processes to be explained only by structural, institutional dynamics (Massey et al, 1998).

Arango (2000) questioned the extent to which we can call these 'theories', theories. He argued that they are not based on enough or relevant evidences which leaves them in the

stage of frameworks. Additionally, he argues that cultural, social and political factors should be included into the analysis of migration. Thus, recent approaches to migration have focused on the factors that facilitate the perpetuation of migration flows, despite restrictive policies over borders. These approaches has been put under the umbrella or migrants network approaches which have been influenced by the concept of ‘social capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986). Massey, as the first to identify migrants networks as a form of social capital (et al, 1998: 42-43), argues:

‘ migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin. They increase the likelihood of international movement because they lower the costs and risks of movement and increase the expected net returns to migration ’.

Access to these networks will determine which groups will benefit from international migration. It has been argued elsewhere that lack of access to these networks will create greater inequality in the sending communities (Gold, 2005). Nevertheless, this approach has been viewed as better suited for looking at both the individual agency and structural factors that have dominated international migration theories (ibid).

Iib migration policies and migrants

The right to set rules on country borders and under what condition the borders should be crossed has been considered as a symbol of state sovereignty (Haus, 2001). *‘Paradoxically, the ability to control migration has shrunk as the desire to do so has*

increased' (Bhgwati, 2003, cited in Castles, 2003:852). Many have argued that migration policies hardly ever have had the intended effect. This gap between intention and effect in migration policies has been referred to as the 'gap hypothesis' (Cornelius et al, 1994, Hollifield, 2001). Additionally, restrictive migration policies have been followed by unintended consequences (De Haas, 2007b, Castels, 2004).

Macro economic and policy scope reveals a tendency of perceiving humans as essentially sedentary, hereinafter to be referred to as the *sedentary assumption*. Policies tend to take for granted that populations are immobile. While if we are to take a glance at historical projections, one could observe that populations have always moved (Massey, King et al, Nyberg-Sorensen et al, 2003). However, migration has been looked upon as in crises, where adjectives such 'flood', 'wave' have been associated to it, especially because of the comparison frames. It has been argued that in 1960s the number of international migrants was about 20 percent lower than that in 2005 (UN 2009). Zolberg (2001) argues that recent migration is not a new phenomenon, but it's a result of the end of slavery and the collapse of USSR and other communist countries. Rarely has migration numbers been compared to a century ago when the percentage of international migration in the total to the world population was at similar levels as today (2.5 -3%) (de Haas, 2005: 1270)

The literature on border control is mixed, but they all agree that restrictive migration policies such as issuance of different types of visas or residence permits, have had an effect on *legitimate arrivals*, but they have also generated unintended effects of encouraging irregular migration and permanent settlement, while disrupting patterns of circular migration (De Haas, 2007b:824).

'The imposition of qualitative and quantitative limits on entry creates different classes of migrants with differently selected traits who ultimately occupy different positions in the socio-economic structure of the receiving society: legal immigrants, undocumented migrants, refugees, asylees, students, trainees, business executives and 'temporary workers'. As countries of destination adjust their policies in response to changing conditions, migrants adjust theirs strategies and tailor their schemes to fit the prevailing rules and regulations' (Massey et al, 1998:13)

Restrictive migration policies have been counteracted by the professionalization of smuggling and diversification of strategies and itineraries of migration. The border patrolling in the Strait of Gibraltar has prompted Moroccan and other African migrants to move toward the Mediterranean coast and other crossing points such as the Canary Islands (de hass, 2006). Massey et.al. (1998, 44) argues that:

'once international migration has begun, private institutions and voluntary organization also tend to arise to satisfy the demand created by a growing imbalance between the large number of people who seek entry into capital-rich countries and the limited number of immigrant visas these countries typically offer. This imbalance, and the barriers that core countries erect to keep people out, create lucrative economic niches for entrepreneurs and institutions dedicated to promoting international movement for profit, yielding black market in migration.'

This approach fits with the migration theory of networks. Migrants networks once put in place gain their own momentum over time, which becomes very difficult to control (Massey et al 1998). Restrictive migration policies has increased the cost and risk of

migration which frequently have resulted in the death of migrants. Stricter border controls have diverted undocumented migration into riskier routes which are more exposed to smugglers or other routes which exploit their position. The Otranto strand in the Adriatic sea, the closest sea link between Albanian and Italy, has witnessed the sinking of many irregular carrying speed boats. On the southern border, the mountains dividing Albania to Greece has experienced similar migration stories (King and Mai, 2004; King, 2003)

IIc 'the migration tails is beginning to wag the development dog'

The president of the European Commission (EC) José Manuel Barroso in October 2005, stated that:

'The problem of immigration, the dramatic consequences of which we are witnessing, can only be addressed effectively [. . .] through an ambitious and coordinated development [plan] to fight its root causes' (EUROPA, 2005, cited in De Haas, 2007:821).

Recently migration has been linked to development, and migrants have been considered as instruments or agents of how developed countries are contributing to development in the poorer countries of origin (Skeldon, 2008). In this nexus, it is still unclear what constitutes development, and who is regarded a migrant.

Development has been conceptualized from different political economic viewpoints, ranging from modernization theories, towards neo-liberal and new public management theories (Beatley and Larbi, 2004; and Sheng, 2007). The first ones have a bigger focus on macro economic dynamics of growth which would translate into trickling down to the

poor, who had low level of income. In the latter, the focus shifted to the dynamics among the market, government, civil society and household. This shift of paradigm shaped the development discourse of many nations as well as international organization such as World Bank or IMF with their infamous Structural Adjustment Policies to Good Governance and Pro poor growth policies (Craig and Porter, 2003).

Development policies have not had the intended outcomes, and have sometimes created inequalities of access and contributed to marginalization of groups. Still poverty and deprivation remain overarching issues on the development agenda. Additionally, the problem of ensuring long term effect has raised awareness on sustainability issues of development.

Amartya Sen (1999), departing from monetary understanding of poverty and growth, argued that poverty is not related only to monetary achievement, i.e. having an income. Other factors such as socio-cultural, caste, age, gender etc determine poverty. He introduced the notion of capability which was explained to be the freedom that one has to choose the life that one has reason to value, '*the freedom to be and to do*'. This approach influenced UN institutions' creation of human development indexes, which could give a broader picture of the dynamics of poverty (Gordon, 2003). This led to MDG development framework, with eight general goals aiming to alleviate poverty, ensure universal education, gender equality, and maternal health, reduce child mortality, combat HIV/AIDS support environmental sustainability and global partnership⁴.

⁴ <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

In 2003, due to the absence of migration in the development discourse, the mandate of Global Commission on International Migration provided a framework for formulating comprehensive, coherent and global response to international migration. (GCIM, 2005). The main focus was on South-North labour migration, and was mainly preoccupied on how to make migration work for the development of countries of origin. Skeldon (2005) argues that linking migration to development would be the only way to justify the involvement of multilaterals on issues of migration. Different from other international policy debates, migration-development nexus debates are held on *state-led format*. Indeed making so many countries come to an agreement about migration policies is difficult, considering the complexity and ‘delicate nature’ of the subject matter (Skeldon, 2008).

A theoretical overview of the relationship has been properly discussed and conceptualized in the literature by Nyberg-Sorensen et al, 2003 and King et al 2003. Migration-development nexus as we know today is the celebration of the relationship built between migrants and the process of development in the migrant sending countries. It signified a shift toward migrants bearing the responsibility and agency which necessarily would benefit the development of migrant, the household and the sending nation. Here development is understood in terms of poverty alleviation and improved livelihood. This relationship is perceived to be of crucial importance in times of crises and in places of economic upheaval and when their livelihood were under threat (King, et.al.2003, 29).

Migration-development nexus suggests that migration will rise until the level where there is not anymore a motivation for people to migrate as the conditions become the same in both the receiving and sending countries. This has been called the 'migration hump' (Martin, and Taylor, 2001). This view fitted with the development approaches of World Bank and IMF, which still remain crucial in shaping the approach to development in international development arena. Others have operationalized this link through the 3R recruitment, remittance, and return (Papademetriou and Martin, 1991) under which recruitment is the major cause for initiating migration through which migrants remit until they have accumulated enough capital to return and invest in their countries of origin. This approach has led to many bilateral agreements between countries in im/exporting labour across borders, in the well-researched programmes of 'Guest workers' in European countries such a Germany, France and Holland with the Turkish government (Castles, 2004).

In this debate remittances are considered a product of migration or the glue to migration-development nexus. Remittance', as opposed to the bureaucratic development institutions', benefits have been praised due to its efficiency by being channelized directly to the families in need. Stark (1991:25) describes remittances as inter-temporal contractual arrangements between the migrant and the family rather than purely altruistic considerations. (Cited by De Haan, 1999:13). Here migration is understood as a household livelihood strategy where remittance will be an 'insurance contract' where the options to receive remittances is weighted against possibility to gain income in the place of origin. The reason why this relationship is maintained is explained in that remittances will be an investment on what the remitter will inherit (De la Briere et al. (1997)) (ibid.).

This model sheds light on the gender differences on remitting in patrilineal societies, in which there is greater expectation for men to remit than for women (King, Dalipaj, Mai, 2006).

On the other hand, Rubenstein (1992:147) sees remittances as 'a minor component of surplus labour extraction, a small charge to capital in a grossly unequal process of exchange between core and peripheral societies' (cited in De Haan 1999:12).. Rubenstein definition on the other hand, brings back the idea that migration and remittances reinforce the capitalist system based on inequality (De Haas,2007).

The nexus has had other criticisms as well (Skeldon, 2007; Raghuram, 2009; Levitt, 1998; De Haas, 2005, Jones, 2000). Firstly, looking at statistics provided by UN in 2005, only 15% of migration to OECD countries come from low-income countries. Additionally, they also had the lowest out-migration: 0.5% when you compare to 3.3% in lower-middle income, 4.2% from upper-middle income and 2.8% for high-income countries (Skeldon, 2007b). So, migration from countries that are mostly in need of 'development' is small in proportion to other countries.

When looking at remittance figures, a similar pattern emerges in the international distribution of remittances. National statistics on this matter are very low. However, if migration is a strategy embraced due to relative deprivation (Skeldon, 2007; De Haas, 2005) rather than absolute poverty, distribution of remittances on a national scale might be unequal and not reaching to the poorest. It has also been argued that remittances are usually spent on 'conspicuous' consumption which leads to dependency on remittances, lack of economic engagement and not creating economic opportunities (Skeldon, 2007).

Further questions have been raised concerning the spatiality and temporality of development narratives within the nexus, where the developed/northern/industrialized countries have finished the developing process, accumulated *all possible* knowledge and having opened the way for the developing fellows (Raghuram, 2009; Jones, 2000).

On the other hand, the migrant in the nexus is exclusively regarded as an international labour migrants who economically remit. Some have integrated new communities to the nexus and their engagement to development like Nyberg-Sorensen et al (2003) on how refugees or displaced population engage with development and Levitt (1998, 927) introducing the term social remittances, which she defines as '*ideas, behaviours, identities, social capital that flow from receiving to sending country community*'. The latter has given rise to a new academic field, that of transnationalism. Here migration is not understood as emigrating from and immigrating to particular nations, but as social process which links together different places by giving examples of diasporas or transnational communities (Levitt, 1998).

IId Migration, development and policy – who is *the* migrant?

UN defines '*international migrant as a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year*' (UN).

IOM (2004. 40) on the other hand, operates with a definition that '*...all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of 'personal convenience' and without intervention of an external compelling factor*'. While UN differentiates in terms of length of stay, IOM does this in terms of the degree of

individual agency in deciding to migrate, which excludes movements such as refugees, exiles, trafficking, displacement or other forms of forced migration. However, the line differentiating voluntary and involuntary migration is often blurred and has not fully informed policy thinking.


These two definitions to migration will be used in order to categorize different form of migration and explore who are the kind of migrants that migration theories and migration-development nexus are concerned about.

Theories that try to inform the motivations behind migration, tend to focus on the disparities between the sending and receiving countries. Migration-development nexus has the same approach, as well. They exclude all other kind of migration such as all the types of movement that are in the left hand side of the frame. Thus all other forms of migration under which the decision is voluntary should be included in migration policies.

What constitutes a migrant is not only his/her motivation to cross the border, but also how this migrant is being received in the host country, which does not seem to have been included in migration theories. A development worker and an ‘unskilled labour migrant’ is not and should not be but under the same category when considering their reception in the host country. However, they are part of the border crossing, and their could have an impact on other forms of migration.

The frame that follows is used only as an illustration of what is included or not in the migration-development nexus and migration policies. Usually both of them are concerned

about the right hand side of the table. While the left side, i.e. involuntary migration, is left outside of migration policy, and is dealt under border security and police.



As one can observe, even though many criticisms have been articulated from left and right approaches, there is not yet a unified theory which could fully explain migration process(es); what initiates, establishes or perpetuates different migration patterns; even more important who constitutes or not a migrant. The question then becomes, do we really need a theory which would explain all human mobility? Indeed this not only would be too big of a project, but also it would fail to explain *all* its dynamics. Migration does not happen only for one or another reason. There are too many factors that put into place ‘worlds in motion’ (Massey et al, 1998). Instead of trying to understand why people migrate, one would rather agree with the question that De Hass (2007) poses on why

people do not migrate which would rather be a more appropriate question for the fact that only 3% of world population live outside of her country of birth.

The idea that through migration-development nexus, that is as countries develop through remittances sent by migrant worker out-migration will decrease, has been criticized. Migration is mostly influenced by relative deprivation rather than absolute or chronic poverty (Skeldon, 2002). Thus, poverty reduction is not a migration reducing strategy (Nyberg-Sorensen et al , 2003). As it was shown in previously, migration does not benefit directly the poorest and most excluded. Following this line of argumentation, the more ‘developed’ populations become, the more likely it is that they will migrate (De Haas, 2007). Whether migration or development comes first is indeed important, because this will shape the way migration policies are being articulated.

With this in mind further questions can be posed on migration policies. Rather than regulating it, one might agree with Skeldon (2007) when he suggests that migration should be one of MDG indicator which denotes development the more populations are mobile. However policy tend to understand the linkage in the opposite direction. This shift in migration process approach, has brought about new area of social policy on how migration can be managed in order to bring about development through the agency of migrants as remitters.

Massey et al (1998) suggests that in order to understand international migration today, the state and policies should be central for theoretical as well as practical reasons. Zolberg (1989, cited in Massey, 1998) adds to this debate that *‘it is precisely the control which states exercise over borders that defines international migration as a distinctive social*

process'. The case that will be presented in the following chapter aims at exploring this dynamic, i.e. the relationship between policy, development and migration.

Chapter III Methodology and Context

The journey

The journey of this essay was substantially influenced by a question that Skeldon (2007) posed on migration: why isn't migration a development indicator? This question brought me to the literature on why people migrate, and how migration, not only has not been seen as a development indicator, i.e. an end to itself, but continuous policies have been suggested to stop populations from moving. They have been articulated in terms of migration policy and migration-development nexus, as explored in the literature review. While migration up until now has been grounded on economic or structural explanations, recent paradigms suggest for migration processes to be understood in their social, political, and economical context.

The methodology of this research is a literature review of academic books, articles, journal and other mass media on the effect of restrictive migration policies and development on migration process(es). The framework established through the literature review, presented a ground in which the case study can be analyzed. The Albanian-Greek migration is introduced in order the better explore the dynamics of the border. Secondary data (quantitative and qualitative) are used to illustrate the scale and depth of the experiences of migrants in the border.

The data presented in this part need to be taken with caution for the following reasons. Firstly, migration between Albania and Greece is mainly shaped by continuous and irregular movement, and there is no systematic research that can fully represent it.

Secondly, there is not yet yearly statistics of how many migrants have entered or been living in Greece by any Albanian or Greek institutions. Additionally, the institutions were reluctant on providing any data that concerned number of migrants. Thirdly, studies that have been made by statistic institute like INSTAT, or by Greek government, have outnumbered crossing in and out the Greek-Albanian border. Many migrants that have been subjugated to deportation, might have experienced this more than once.

Thus, this paper will focus on international labour migration, in the Albanian-Greek border, while other forms of migration such as trafficking, refugees, or displacement will not be included. This will pose a limitation to the study as the area of research is the border and migration processes that happen there.

The context

The case of Albanian migration to Greece has been chosen to illustrate and explore the question because of several reasons. Firstly, Greece is the receiving country of most Albanian migration. Out of one million Albanian migrants outside of Albania, 600,000 are estimated to be in Greece (Eurostat, 1999; Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 1999, cited in Barjaba, 2000).

Secondly, Greece is the biggest remittance sending country to Albania, due to its geographical vicinity, migrants networks, and well established banking networks (Karafolas and Konteos, 2009). So, the ‘development’ impact in scale of its remittances can be felt more than from other sending countries.

Thirdly, Greece serves as the springboard for Albanian international migration. Migrants' journey starts with Greece given its proximity and the well established networks (Barjaba and King, 2005). So, the way that Greece determines and *marks* its borders, has a big impact on shaping Albanian international migration.

Chapter IV Case study - Albanians migrants in Greece

This chapter will focus on presenting the case study on Albanian-Greek migration processes. The first part will explore the migration policies that Greek government implemented and development indicators, as well as, experiences from the Albanian migrants will be included. The second part will introduce a discussion on how migration policies and development influenced migration processes in the border. Following the results of this research, the last part will suggest several policy implications.

IVa The case: Greek migration policy and impact on Albanian migrants

Very little seem to have been written on migration policies of Mediterranean countries. Even though, compared to international migration statistics Mediterranean migration constitutes a small percentage, its relevance is immense in the debates on policies of migration because of its sudden, intensive, massive, and mainly irregular nature.

In the aftermath of the collapse of communist regime in Albania, and liberalization of borders, almost 25% of her population migrated. The countries that received most of the so called ‘wave’ of migrants were Greece and Italy. While Italy did not feel as much the threat of this particular ‘wave’, mostly due to its large population number and other bigger migrant communities, Greece had more restrictive and sudden policies⁵ toward it⁶. From 1991 to 1998 Greek authorities had no clear migration policies (Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Fakiolas, R.,1998). However this is not to say that they took no action in dealing

⁵ Policy here will refer to the legal framework concerning immigration and the practices of Greek authorities and their agencies regarding immigrants.

⁶ Both this countries up to a few decades ago were major migration sending countries and becoming migration receiving one, was an unexpected one

with migrants, a process which has been complex and contradictory. Despite continues inflow of migrants, Greece' (lack of) migration policies was shaped by the idea that Greece is not a migrant receiving country, which delayed any political action in terms of regulating migration, or setting new migration policies (ibid).

1991: the first attempt

Until 1991 the only piece of legislation regulating the status of 'aliens'⁷ in Greece was Law 4310 of 1929. The first law after that, which aimed at regulating entrance, was passed 1991 by the Greek parliament named as Law 1975 'Entrance-exit, sojourn, employment, expulsion of aliens, determination of refugee status and other provisions'. This law mainly dealt with two policy areas: admission and control, leaving out measures on integration of migrants in the social, economic, and cultural life in Greece. In the first part regulations on legal stay of aliens, family reunification and work permit were regulated, while within the framework of the later a special police squad was formed to control irregular migration, having full rights to detain any migrant and deport without any formal trial⁸ (Konidaris, 2005). For all those that provided false documents, employer or any other false documentation, fines or imprisonment could be applied (Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Fakiolas, R., 1998, 189).

From 1991-1995 there is a slight increase in the permits granted to Albanians, though many of them were what was considered ethnic Greeks in Albania. Most of the migrants that were granted visa were other born or residing in South Albania. Even though the aim

⁷ According to IOM Glossary on Migration and Greek Legislation, an alien is 'A person who is not a national of a given state', which in this case is Greece.

⁸ To this date irregular migrants are still considered illegal according to Greek legislation, which criminalizes undocumented migration.

of the first law was to benefit the legal entrance of migrants, when looking at the number permits issued, they consist of a very little percentage of what the real figure could show.

However this strict regulation did not restrict migration to Greece (Kiprianos et al, 2003). In the 1990s, it was estimated that around 200,000 to 400,000 migrants were working and living in Greece (Fakiolas and King, 1996, cited in Barjaba and King, 2005). In the 1991 census it appeared that 48.5% of migrant population was Albanian, former USSR nationals and Polish, and from them 20 thousands were Albanians (nearly 50%) (Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Fakiolas, R., 1998).

1998: toward regularization

In 1998 an amnesty bill was passed by the Greek parliament which intended to regulate irregular migrants in Greece and migration policy in general⁹. This bill, passed through a presidential decree, intended to regulate irregular migrants that was already living in Greece by application of ‘white card’ (the first regularization) and ‘green card’ (permanent regularization). The first had many bureaucratic requirements (Baldwin-Edwards 1998) and only those showing evidence of a social security contribution booklet were eligible to apply. This lasted only 6 months, expiring on 31st May 1998. The first process would lead to the attainment of the second permit. For the latter, there were two types; Type A which would last 1-3 years, and the applicant had to proof employment for 40days and special consideration would be given to length of residence and profession, while Type B required five years residence in Greece and annual income of more that

⁹ In a session of the Cabinet on June 1997 an amendment was suggested that all Albanian others bordering Greece nationals would not be included in this bill. However after many protest from the General Confederation of Greek Workers (the largest labour union) and other influential pressure groups, this amendment was not passed.

\$2500, and gives the right to leave and re-enter for a period of two months and grants the right for family reunification. (Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Fakiolas, R., 1998, 192). 241,561 of the applicants (65%) were Albanians, of which 74.4% were male applicants (Barjaba and King, 2005). According to Greek Employment Organization (OAED) among all the 371,641 applications, only 171,700 were issued white cards.

However, Barjaba and King argue that many did not or could not apply or benefit from this regularization process. Fakiolas (2003:540, cited in Barjaba and King) estimates that around 300,000 irregular migrants did not apply. This results in an crude estimation that in 1998 around 436,000 Albanian migrants were living in Greece¹⁰. Given the incentive to regulate and legalize their migration to Greece, Barjaba argues that during this time there could have been more migrants crossing the border. However, there is not statistics on this.

2001: regularization and citizenship

In 2001, a new migration policy named as Law 2910 ‘Entry and residence of aliens on Greek territory. Acquisition of Greek by naturalization and other provisions’ was adopted in Greece as part of harmonizing with migration policies in other EU member states. This was the most important law passed in the Greek parliament regarding regularization of migrants, because for the first time migrants could get citizenship. This was a turning point for many European countries as well, where citizenship by descendant was changed to citizenship by birth or residency (Castles, 2004).

¹⁰ The number is estimated to be much higher if ethnic-Greek Albanians are included. This category had less procedures for gaining legal status in Greece.

In this regularization process, out of 367,860 applicants, 351,110 were given six-month permit. The demographic statistics of this regularization are yet to be published. Barjaba and King (2005) suggest that if the ratio is kept at 65% of the applicants to be Albanian, and around 200,000 ‘irregular’ migrants, it builds up to around half a million of Albanian living in Greece. The 2001 Greek census enumerated 443,550 Albanians in Greece. This coincides with the number of legal migrants paying national insurance. This calculation could lead to a rough number of 600,000 Albanian migrants living in Greece (Barjaba and King, 2005, 13).

The recurring law of deportation

Additionally, the 1991 law of deportation remained at bay¹¹ and the most affected migrant group was that of Albanian origin. Under this law undocumented, irregular migration is still criminalized. Whoever is not able to provide the proper documentations can be detained without a formal trial, and deported. However this process is regulated only under Greek legislative framework, where the Albanian government has little to contribute. Figure 1 shows the number of deportations according to years in thousands.

¹¹ This law was popularly known and referred to as the ‘Scoupa’, or the Broom law

EXPULSIONS FROM GREECE 1991–95, SIGNIFICANT NATIONALITIES (000S)

Nationals of:	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Albania	84.3	277.0	221.0	216.5	241.2
Bulgaria	0.0	0.4	1.0	0.8	1.4
Iraq	0.2	0.3	11.5	1.8	3.9
Pakistan	0.0	0.3	1.5	1.6	1.8
Romania	0.5	2.2	2.2	2.0	0.4
Turkey	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.6	2.3
Bangladesh	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.5
GRAND TOTAL	86.0	282.0	239.0	225.0	250.4

Figure 1: Source Baldwin-Edwards (1998)

Together with these policies, patrolling and policing of borders between Albania and Greece became much stricter. In February 1994, the Ministry of Public Order authorized a special unit of 400, and helicopter to patrol the Greek borders.

development in Albania

Up until the beginning of the 90s Albanian poverty was never researched, or considered a social problem. This is not to deny that poverty existed during communist regime. However, the implementation of neo-liberal economic reforms, under the shock therapy, in post-communist period contributed to an increase in the level of poverty (King and Vullnetari, 2003). Decreased agricultural production and rural living standards, the decay of previously industrial cities, resulted in high unemployment rates and absence of adequate social protection system (Oxfam, 2003). The registered unemployment in 2001 INSTAT statistics figured 22.7%, affecting young people in particular. Every year 70,000 young people were entering the market, and the economy was not able to saturate them. (King and Vullnetari, 2003)

The disparities in level of poverty in geographical terms were considerable, where poverty was more present in remote, northern and rural areas. These areas bear poorest housing, greatest reliance on state social assistance and high level of illiteracy (King et al, 2003) However, with the rapid urbanization and creation of peri-urban areas around Tirana and Durres, poverty has become an urban problem. Because of lack of access to education and work, young people living in these areas are forced to migrate to secure their own and their families survival (ibid)

In 2002 Human Development Report for Albania, Albania has a 0.764 HDI, placing her on the 70th place among 173 UN 173 list of countries. This was the lowest ranking for European countries. Referring to UN-promoted Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy, Albania had a 46.6% its population living below the \$2per capita/day, while 17.4 living in extreme poverty below \$1/day (King and Vullnetari, 2003)

European Commission, in a discussion documents on migration-development nexus in 2002, puts Albania among Mexico and Morocco, as countries which are positioned in the 'migration band'. These are low income-to-middle income countries which are at present passing the so-called 'migration hump', which means that migration will continue for some more time, until all economic indicators approach those to the host countries (Kind and Vullnetari, 2003)

The Albanian government has not introduced any programme aiming at assisting the migrants in the border or information about how the legal framework about regularization process in Greece works. In the webpage of Migration Directorate of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, there are only information on assisting

migrants in Italy and Germany¹². Additional information is given about legal routes to migrating to different European countries. Nothing is mentioned about Greek routes, or assisting migration who are in Greece.

IVb discussion: exploring migration process(es) in the border

Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas (1998, 1999) analyze Greek migration policy under three distinctive theoretical frameworks: ‘institutional/bureaucratic’, ‘external relations’, and ‘modernizing/technocratic’. In the first, migration policies are seen as just part of an institutional arrangement which does not go beyond laws amendments. The Greek police for example was unaware of different types of migrants. So, there is general divide between what the policies decided and how they were translated in terms of their implementation.

In the second, the migration policy is connected to how political relations are shaped between the sending and receiving countries. In this case, this was formed by how Greek nationals were treated in the migrant’s home country, Albania. In 1993, 20,000 Albanians were deported after a Greek priest was expelled from southern Albania; in 1994, after the trial of five Greek minority activists in Tirana 100,000 Albanians were expelled from Greece, and in 1996, 7000 and the motivation this time was less clear, but some suggested an intra-state intrigue to undermine the Foreign Minister’s visit to Albania, the ‘normalization’ of Greek-Albanian relations and the proposed Regularization Bill (Dimitras 1998, cited in Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Fakiolas, R., 1998).

¹² <http://www.mpcs.gov.al/migracioni?start=14>

In the third, the reality of immigration is accepted in Greece, and access to Greek citizenship is reconsidered. Together with this, other rights such as education, health and other social services were granted to migrants. This progress was seen as part of 'modernization' and EU law harmonization process.

The incentives to migrate has been many. In the same study, King et al (2003) find out that the factors motivating migration included the general conditions of poverty and lack of work in Albania. More specific reasons were also mentioned such as conditions of violence, political antagonism and lack of security following the events of 1997 after the pyramid scheme collapse; dissatisfaction with conservatism of Albanian society and frustration over their professional ambitions; and more directly gender-sensitive reasons.(King et al, 2003:39-40)

There are many factors that put in motion migration processes in the border. On one side seasonal, permanent or temporary migrants, crossing through or outside the border points, on their behalf or through smuggling networks; and deportation, or return migration on the other, have shaped the migration processes at the Albanian-Greek border. These border dynamics pose a complex case study, because of their continuous and irregular nature. Greek migration policies, both the regulating laws and their implementation side; economic development within the Albanian border have been crucial factors in shaping migration processes in the border. However, their impact has not been as intended.

The three bills passed by the Greek government in 1991, 1998 and 2001 aimed to (1) control the border (2) regulate entrance (3) regulate residency and employment (4) provide political, economic, or social rights to migrants (Baldwin-Edwards, M. and

Fakiolas, R., 1998). Though there is a serious lack of in-depth or representative statistics on the subject matter, other data and researches have shown that neither of them have been achieved. The flow of migrants crossing the border has not been managed or controlled fully through these policies. Neither of the bills achieved at stopping people from migrating to, working or living in Greece. However, they did have an impact on shaping different migration processes in the border.

The impact these policies have had on migration processes has been of a geo-political and socio-economic kind. Firstly, the so-called Greek minorities in Albania who migrated to Greece, were the biggest Albanian migrant groups to benefit from both regularization processes of 1998 and 2001 (Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Fakiolas, R., 1998). This institutional acknowledgment created an incentive for this group to cross the border. Up until 1991, the Greek authorities accepted 13,000 Greek minorities to enter Greece, and a lot more were regulated under the 1998 and 2001 bill (King, 2003).

In the modernization and development discourse, Greece could place itself as a contributor to development, a ‘donor’ country. Firstly, observing the list of priority countries where the Hellenic Aid was operating, they coincide with the major migration sending countries, i.e. North Africa and Balkans¹³. This indeed brings back the development-migration nexus, under which the more countries will develop, the less out-migration these countries will generate. Secondly, Albanian migrants could legitimate this statement because of the big scale of remittances sent from Greece. Thirdly, after trade liberalization, Greek foreign direct investment constituted the biggest percentage in this statistics.

¹³ <http://www.hellenicaid.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=8&clang=1>

Additionally, if sedentary assumption, underlies the idea of development, what Greek migration policies are doing is to ‘keep migrants migrating’. The law of expulsion reached to a total of around one million Albanian being deported from 1991-1995, and this was only due to policies. Even though, many migrants were counted more than once, this is exactly the point. What this policy did, and is doing, is to increase the movements in the border. A migrant who is expelled will come back to restore her/his own/household livelihood (Skeldon, 2007; Ellis, 2003).

Secondly, the restrictive migration policies aiming at controlling the border, have contributed to the creation of lucrative business such as smugglers, which became crucial in creating the networks for border crossing. The media has been the only source until now shedding light on the trafficking networks and the type of migrants involved in this¹⁴.

Criminalization of irregular migration, apart from being an infringement of human rights, has had devastating impact on migration processes in the border. These processes can be put in a dual axis, where in the vertical one is the issue of providing legal documents, and on the horizontal the issue of permission from the ‘gate keeper’¹⁵. By criminalizing migration, the responsibility for allowing or not the migrant in, is placed on the ‘gate keeper’, i.e. the border police. The stories of the police being included in the smuggling business and generation or perpetuation of these networks, has not been sporadic (see newspaper articles section in bibliography). Additionally, these police, who

¹⁴ See Appendix 1 for a list of newspapers articles on this issue. The articles are selected to represent a case from each Albanian-Greece Border points. They suggest that within the trafficking network state officials, police, and other citizens from both the Greek and Albanian side are included.

¹⁵ This framework needs to be researched under a different theory and further research, however herein is used only for the sake of argument.

is the major implementer of the laws passed through the Greek parliament, was not trained to recognize different types of migrants, i.e. a irregular migrant from a refugee for example (Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Fakiolas, R., 1998).

These networks do provide opportunities for migrants to cross the border when they intend to, however they have increased the cost and the risk of migrating (de Hass, 2007b). If regular travelling expenses to from Tirana to Athens would reach to a maximum of 100¹⁶ Euros, irregular migration would cost at about 3000 to 4000 Euro. So, the migrant groups who do not have access to legal ways of attaining a visa to cross the border due to the high degree of formalities - which include, not to say the least, having a bank account – see smuggling the only route to crossing the border.

Additionally, migrants are put in vulnerable situation when faced with the border experience which include stories of maltreatment, death, rape, destruction of identification documents etc.. The following excerpt is taken from one of the interviewees of the study of King et al on Albanian migrants in UK¹⁷:

‘...In March I was back to Greece illegally to find work. This time we couldn’t complete our journey deeper into Greece because a friend of ours broke his ankle and we had to go back to Albania. We gave ourselves up to the Greek military, who happened to be driving in a country road near where we were. They took us in the back of their truck to their barracks. When we arrived there we were given a welcome beating up. I was dragged by my hair and the soldier said in Greek ‘where do you think you are going with

¹⁶ Here including the cost of the visa application and the bus trip from Tirana to Athens.

¹⁷ Most of the interviewees journey was not aimed at migrating go UK directly, but rather to Greece. They went to UK much later.

your long hair?’ I asked another soldier in English what I had done and why I was subject to such treatment and he said he was a new soldier...’

(Besnik’s Story, King et al, 2003:50-51)

Chapter V: Policy Implications and Conclusion

Va can policies support migration?

Having explored the dynamics of migration processes in the Greek-Albanian border through the conceptual framework reached in chapter two, this chapter will focus on policy implications that arise from the analysis elaborated in chapter three.

Migration policies are based on a short term assessment of migration patterns (Castles, 2004). However, migration processes are of long-term in nature. Even though when arranging migration policies, governments have been very euphoric about their efficient impact, in the long run these policies not only have not reached their intended objectives but have had unintended impacts. Migration's link to development and migration, on the other hand, has been assumed to have a negative relationship. It has been argued that as countries develop, out-migration will be decreased. Exploring the dynamics of migration processes that happen in the border by including all actors in the discussion is crucial. Without understanding what happens in the border, policies will not be able to influence, shape or control it.

On the other hand, the argument that has been introduced by many now, is that policies should be supportive to migration, creating enabling environments (de Haan, 1999), rather than aiming to implicitly or explicitly reducing or stopping it. Understanding the role that migration has on livelihood diversification strategies should shape the thinking behind migration policies. Several programs have been introduced in other countries to support migrants in the border. This could be done through measures of social protection

provided in collaboration with both countries. Matters of migration needs to be discussed in a reciprocal level, which represent the interest of all parties involved.

In the migration development nexus migrants are seen as heroes of the countries of origin who are contributing to the economic progress and development of countries. However, this perspectives sees migration as a means to development, and the migrants bear the responsibility of this development. In the capability framework suggested by Amartya Sen (1999), and the view of Skeldon (2007) migration should be seen as an end to itself, a right that everyone should exercise, regardless of nationality. Following this line of argumentation, the Greek migration policies enforces and perpetuates lack of development within the Albanian border. If migration is a viewed as a capability to develop, restrictive migration policies are restricting its achievement.

This raises a question on the development frameworks suggested by Northern countries. Learning from European industrial revolution experience, borders where less restricted, and inequality was considered a temporary side effect which could be, and was to a large extend, that decreased through time (Skeldon, 2007; Castles, 2004). Why are social, economic, or development policies in the international discourse, are grounded in the sedentary assumption? Why is migration still viewed as a problem, when according to this experience, it could lead to development?

Indeed going back to historical structural approach, with trade liberalization, and the immense presence of Greek foreign direct investment (FDI) in Albania, the disparities between countries will be enforced and perpetuated. As the financial crises becomes more acute in Greece, this might effect Albania, the former being the biggest remittance

sending source to Albania as well. Albanian government, or other supportive agencies, together with NGOs need to arrange programs or project at facilitating the integration process of return migrants and social protection for migrant' depending households. In setting up this programmes, particular attention should be put in assuring long-term sustainability and smooth social, economic, and political integration. Non-migration policies have been more effective in shaping migration than migration policies themselves (Castles, 2004).

It is important, that policies create environments in which migrants and their families conduct transnational lives and adopt transnational identities (Vertovec, 1999). Transnational communities, or differently referred to as 'deterritorialized' communities, challenge the nation-state based citizenship, and the political, economic and social rights that come with it. The way that governments engage in social policy making or social provision need to comply with population movement and their spatial engagement This might require different approaches to social policy. Creating enabling environments, such as less visa requirements, lower cost money transfer systems which are not tied to traditional banking system.

Migrant definition should be expanded, to include other forms of movement. The way international bodies engage with it, is fragmented. IOM, tends to deal only with labour migrants moving from South to Northern countries, and excludes other forms of movements. UNCHR, on the other hand, deals only with refugees and displaced population. Categorization of migrants until now has been shaped by the motivation of migration, this shaped mainly by the condition of migrants in their countries of origin and

the perception about receiving countries. Theories of migration, seem to be interested and mainly grounded on labour migration, while all other forms of movements are integrated only through patching old theories. The way definitions of what constitutes a migrant, and what constitutes a migration process, will shape policy thinking, thus the more types are included in this, the more it will reflect the realities of the border.

Vb Concluding remarks

In the national and international political discourse, migration still remains a problem that needs to be *solved*. Two have been the approaches aiming at indirectly - through the *carrot* – and/or directly - through the *stick* or the *fence* - *solving* this problem.

The migration-development nexus (Nyberg-Sorensen et al, 2003) claims to be concerned about utilizing migrant's agency and the embedded responsibility they carry to develop their *home* countries. However, this approach follows that as countries develop, individuals will not have any incentive to migrate, thus resulting in a reduced out-migration. Migration policies, on the other hand, tend to aim at curbing, managing or controlling migration pattern directly by putting laws, militarising the border, or building physical walls(de Haas, 2007b). Both these imperatives are grounded on assumptions which do not reflect empirical evidences (de Haas, 2007a,b; Skeldon, 2007; de Hann, 1999).

The *carrot* or the *fence*, policies that aim at curbing, managing or controlling migration have had little results and there is great evidences to assume that they will continue to fail. In the case of Albanian-Greek border, the Greek migration policies had little impact

on migration *per se*, in the degree and extent anticipated. However, these policies had many unintended consequences which increased vulnerability of migrants in the border. These policies did not stop migration; had unequal impact on different migrant categories; and they generated and perpetuated existing or new routes of smuggling. These policies apart from contributing to marginalization of migrants and perpetuation of xenophobia and racism in receiving countries (de Haas, 2007), are restricting possibilities of enabling environment for development in the countries of origin.

With this in mind, questions arise on what is best way to understand migration. Should policies move away from state-based politics and comply or adopt to population movements and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or should we still focus more energy on understanding why people migrate? Goss and Lindquist (1995: 345) argue that:

‘international migration is best examined not as a result of individual motivations and structural dominations, although these must play a part in any explanation, but as the articulation of agents with particular interests and playing specific roles within an institutional environment, drawing knowledgeably upon sets of rules in order to increase access to resources.’

This approach might indeed be beneficial, and addressing the root causes of how and who sets the rules of border. But how can this be achieved when migration even in international conferences or agencies such as GCIM, is still regarded a state based policy? And one might agree with Skeldon, when he says that making 189 countries agree on a common migration policy is almost impossible (2007). But when one asks

why is it impossible, the snake goes back to biting its own tail: setting the rules of borders is still a symbol of state sovereignty which can not be trespassed.

More rigorous research is needed on how internal migration contributes to development, as well, as what kind of development this constitutes. Macro-economic indicators can give a broad development picture however they are limited to the modernization development paradigm. Livelihood approaches (Scoones, 2009; Ellis, ;Moser, 2006) could inform about how migrants engage with development, and what kind of development.

Additionally more needs to be known the actors that from the border institutions. Gate keeper, legislative frameworks, different categories of migrations, smugglers, traffickers and others' action shape the contours of the border. Understanding how this process is formulated might indeed inform policies which aim at creating enabling environments in the border.

Worlds are and will be in motion and policies need to take this into account. The sedentary assumption needs to be challenged as long as reality remains that people move. Policies that find recipes on the best way to organize national 'boxes', are doomed to fail considering the global dynamics of the world we live in.

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Newspaper articles on irregular (clandestine) migration to Greece

<http://www.shekulli.com.al/news/45/ARTICLE/10648/2007-05-28.html> Tre Urat (Three Bridges) border point: Every day there are at least 30 irregular migrants being returned home by the Greek police **28 May 2007**

<http://lajme.shqiperia.com/lajme/artikull/iden/62339/titulli/Trafiku-i-klandestineve-mes-te-arrestuarve-edhe-prifti-i-Karavastase> Kapshtice border point: A group of traffickers is found by the Albanian state police where Albanian nationals and a Greek priest was involved in building the trafficking network. Every migrant had to pay 3500 euros. **20 June 2008**

<http://www.balkanweb.com/kryesore/1/kalon-klandestine-ne-kakavije-kapet-polici-kufitar-43372.html> Kakavije border point: The border police allows seven irregular migrants to cross the border, later to be discovered that he had received 3000 euros from each person. **10 June 2010**

Blogs of border crossing stories

<http://florjan-yzeiraj.blogspot.com/2007/06/tjetr-skandal-ushtart-grek-plagosin.html> A Greek police squad has shot with arms toward a group of young man crossing the border outside from the official border points.

Other publications on Albanian-Greek border

http://www.ahc.org.al/kshh/eng/ark/studimi_emigrantet.pdf Publication of Albanian Helsinki Committee on Greek police abuses on irregular migrants. This report includes different cases showing that the most affected group are young male from 16-25 years old.