Human Security After Collapse: Global Security in Post-Earthquake Haiti
Human Security After State Collapse: Global Governance in Post-Earthquake Haiti

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“Haiti: Hell on earth...what do we do now?”
“The answer is not in Logbase or in your email.”

- Graffiti exchange on toilet door on UN Logistics Base, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, just after 2010 earthquake.

On 12 January 2010, Haiti suffered literal state collapse, as thousands of buildings crumbled in the 21st century’s deadliest earthquake. Over 200,000 were killed, 300,000 injured and 1.5 million displaced.¹ Almost 20% of federal government employees were killed.² The Presidential Palace lay in ruins and 27 of 28 federal government buildings were destroyed.³ An estimated 4,000 prisoners escaped from incarceration.⁴ In a remaining government building a couple months after the earthquake, one could still see civil servants rolling up bedmats in the morning, as they sought nightly refuge in their offices and the surrounding compounds. One UN official described it as the worst disaster the UN had ever had to confront.⁵ In this nightmarish context, to whom should a Haitian turn for protection from violence and ‘downside risks’ (cf. Sen 2002, p. 2)?

For five centuries, since Hobbes and Locke, political thought has located the provision of security in the institutions of the state. This was reified by Weber’s definition of the state as the societal institution that held the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Weber 1918). However, in recent years, numerous studies have shown that this supposed monopoly, if it ever truly existed, is fraying. The provision of ‘protection’ (in both the positive and menacing senses of the word) has fragmented, privatized and globalized. In many parts of the world, a person seeking defense from a violent threat is more likely to turn to a gangleader, warlord, private security firm or multinational peacekeeping force, than to the security services of their own state (Duffield 1998).

A similar scenario exists when one looks at the provision of ‘social security.’ Religious groups, NGOs, community associations, private companies, militant factions and drug gangs all serve social service functions that were, at least between the Great Depression and the Reagan/Thatcher years, once considered the preserve of the state. The state is beginning to resemble a ‘hollowed out’ contract manager, rather than a service provider, if it exists meaningfully at all.

This paper shows how this global phenomenon is being played out in post-earthquake Haiti, where the state has had a troubled history, only complicated by the recent disaster. Into the vacuum left by the implosion of the state apparatus, compounded by a sudden and overwhelming need for physical and social protection, has rushed a vast complex of global public and private actors. Street patrols, food

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⁵ Devi 2010, p. 267.
distributions, teacher training, epidemiological surveys and child protective services are being provided by a mix of bilateral, multilateral and NGO agencies. In this paper, I explore and interrogate this emerging political system of global governance in Haiti, particularly regarding its implications for ‘human security.’

My analysis here is rooted in my intimate, yet self-critical, involvement in the post-earthquake relief and reconstruction effort in Haiti, primarily in the education sector, as the emergency coordinator and later advisor for a small American NGO. As such, the paper draws on ethnographic methods of participant observation, in which I have tried to be a reflexive and reflective participant in the meetings, conversations and implementation efforts of the humanitarian community in Haiti. I have tried to cast a critical eye as I have walked around and interacted with the buildings, structures and spaces of the international aid and peacekeeping system. What results below is thus inevitably limited by my own experiences, biases and technical training as a white, Anglo-Saxon, male political scientist and aid worker.

I will first review the state of human security in Haiti in light of the earthquake, but also with reference to its protracted political crisis and history of authoritarian government. The bulk of this article will then describe and analyze Haiti’s emerging complex of global governance, focusing in particular on five important characteristics. I will show that the system of actors stepping into Haiti’s governance vacuum is:

1. Globalized
2. Privatized
3. Militarized
4. Technologized and Technocratized
5. Fragmented and Shifting

Within these each of these sections, I will examine the implications of this system for human security in Haiti. To do this I will draw on the human security principles developed by Mary Kaldor and others (e.g. Beebe & Kaldor 2010, pp. 7-9). I close with conclusions and reflections on how best to shape this emergent system so it is more likely to produce progressive policy outcomes.
1. Haiti’s Human Security Crisis

Human security as a concept has been advanced by a variety of scholars and agencies that have critiqued traditional understandings of security. The literature on human security adds value to understandings of security, and thus to this paper, in three crucial ways. First, it recognizes that the state is not the only source of insecurity, or protection. Second, it argues that the object of protection, and of analysis, should be the individual human being, not the state. Finally, it acknowledges that existential threats to humans and their communities can come in many more forms than war and crime, for example natural disasters, climate change, poverty and disease. (UNDP 1994; Human Security Centre 2005; Glasius 2005; Kaldor 2007).

There is considerable debate among adherents to the concept of human security about whether it should have a narrow definition, focusing on overt violence (Human Security Centre 2005) or a broad definition including poverty, environmental degradation, natural disasters and disease (UNDP 1994). Elsewhere, I have preferred the narrow definition, because I believed it provided a conceptual sharpness and clarity that was lost when ‘insecurity’ became a synonym for ‘anything bad that happens’ (Bolton 2010, p. 52). However, working in post-earthquake Haiti has demonstrated to me the added value that can come from considering the insecurity caused by houses and other buildings falling down in a natural disaster. In a subtle way, the failure of the Haitian built environment was a violent threat caused by human systems and structures. The lack of effectively enforced building codes was a failure of law and
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order, a failure of government regulation and resulted in bodily harm and death for hundreds of thousands of people. Just as the law in many countries considers negligence of safety regulations on a building site that results in fatality a crime of manslaughter – a violent crime – state-level negligence can also be considered a form of violence.

Moreover, threats not traditionally defined in terms of security can become quickly entwined with security structures. Indeed, the US military reacted to the Haitian earthquake as if it were a security threat – rapidly deploying troops, often prioritizing military movements over civilian aid transports. The recent cholera crisis, itself the result of socio-political negligence of adequate water and sanitation, developed into a security issue when rumors blamed UN troops for the disease and Haitians demonstrated outside UN installations. Finally, prostitution linked with UN troops has actively created insecurity for the women entangled within the criminal networks that control their lives. As a result, the situation in Haiti challenges security scholars to expand their understanding of security beyond inter-state conflict, subversion and even violent crime, to consider how other social phenomena can cause people to feel insecure, or influence the security environment.

The 2010 earthquake, while certainly the worst natural disaster to hit Haiti in modern times, is by no means the first. Haiti has suffered over 20 internationally-recognized natural disasters in the last 15 years (Faubert 2004, p. 14). Haiti’s vulnerability to such shocks is increased by environmental degradation that heightens its susceptibility to landslides, mudslides and flooding (Arthur 2002, p. 42; Faubert 2004, p. 14). If, like Sen, we define human insecurity as a society’s exposure to “downside risks” (2002, p. 2), then Haiti is indeed a highly insecure place.

The earthquake has also created a crisis of protection in Haiti. The government failed in its responsibility to protect people from their own buildings (through lack of attention to enforcing building codes) and, after the earthquake, failed to provide an adequate safety net for the millions of people without shelter, food, sanitation or medical attention. Sexual violence hit new highs, particularly in the displacement camps (MADRE 2010; Amnesty International 2011). The collapse of a major prison in Port-au-Prince released thousands of criminals into the city.6 The state itself, including its security services, has struggled to rise out of its literal collapse. It has faced an increasing legitimacy crisis, with an increasing number of political demonstrations and rumors of potential coups. This hit new lows in the Presidential elections, which were widely viewed as flawed, leading to civil unrest, plummeting trust in public authority and further uncertainty when no clear winner emerged.7

The sudden collapse of Haiti’s state infrastructure, while definitely a crisis, is simply the latest, most deadly blow to a system that was already unraveling – or ‘re-raveling’ in new, non-statist, ways. Since Independence, Haiti has suffered under a series of authoritarian and violent leaders that used state and paramilitary structures to terrorize and intimidate actual and perceived opponents. Particularly during the Cold War, during the Duvalier regimes of ‘Papa Doc’ and ‘Baby Doc’, leaders maintained their

positions with the support of powerful international protectors such as the United States and France. Since the fall of Baby Doc in 1986, the Haitian state has cycled through periods of fragmentation, intense violence and instability. At times, the state has been the primary source of insecurity – as in the military junta period of the early 1990s – but criminal gangs and private militias have become increasingly powerful. (Weinstein & Segal 1992, p. 2; Mendelson-Forman 2006). Small arms have proliferated outside the state structures, with estimates of between 170,000 and 220,000 weapons in circulation (Faubert 2004, p. 26).

The violence has hit hardest those who suffer chronic underprotection by the state security apparatus. In particular, the Port-au-Prince slum of Cite Soleil, home to some 500,000 residents, is often considered a ‘black-hole’ of insecurity and few expatriates or Haitians without links to the neighborhood dare to enter it (MSF 2008; Haxton 2010). This has led to people being chronically underserved by public institutions. Women have also borne the brunt of insecurity, as victims of Haiti’s staggering levels of sexual violence (Amnesty International 2008; Gerntholtz 2010). Illustrative of the blurred lines between sexuality and security is the popular advertisement, sponsored by the NGO Population Services International, for Pante (“Panther”) condoms, found on many street corners in Port-au-Prince. The mural or poster depicts a close-up of a Panther’s eyes with the slogan “Plaisir et Securite” (“Pleasure and Security”). The advertisement draws on symbols of power, strength and security and combines it with
the male predatory “gaze” of the panther, implicitly evoking complicity in sexualized surveillance. The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS further demonstrates the sexual dimensions of Haiti’s human insecurity that are often overlooked by ‘realist’ approaches to security.³

Security in Haiti has also long had an international dimension (James 2009), from the colonial genocide of the island’s indigenous people to the transnational slavery system, from the Dominican dictator Trujillo’s slaughter of some 20,000 Haitian migrants in the 1930s (Roorda 2007) to the Dominican Republic’s complicity with exiled right-wing militias that provoked subversion of the Aristide government (Farmer 2004; Buss & Gardner 2008, pp. 167-168). Particularly important is the manner in which industrialized countries, such as France and the US, have attempted to cordon off Haiti through hostile immigration policies, preventing outflows of migrants eager to escape the country (Frantzblau 1997, p. 14; James 2009). At times, concerns about migration (as well as pressure from human rights groups) have led to greater international involvement in Haitian politics in an attempt to prevent a mass exodus. Indeed, US President Clinton’s justification for the 1994 US military intervention in Haiti explicitly invoked the threat of migration to the United States (Frantzblau 1997, pp. 18-19).

In summary, Haiti’s crisis demonstrates a complexity of security landscapes that stretch the bounds of the realist preoccupation with threats to the state from either other states or rebel movements. For many Haitians, the state itself is a source of insecurity, along with a host of non-state actors and non-human elements like natural disasters and HIV/AIDS.

In response to such problems, advocates of the human security approach have encouraged governments, militaries and international agencies to follow a ‘human security doctrine’ that places civilians, individuals and communities at the center of security provision, rather than the structures and institutions of the state. Beebe & Kaldor (2010, pp. 7-9) have suggested that agencies intervening in regions of security be guided by the following principles:

1. The Primacy of Human Rights:
2. Legitimate Political Authority
3. Effective Multilateralism
4. The Bottom-up Approach
5. Regional Focus

In describing the structures and systems of global governance in Haiti below, I will evaluate their implications for human security through the lens offered by these principles. While each aspect of the systems may have implications for multiple principles, I will focus in each section on one or two that seem most relevant. I will show how globalization is reconfiguring conceptions of the principle of “Legitimate Political Authority” while making it perhaps easier to have a “Regional Focus.” Similarly, privatization offers both opportunities for and challenges to “Effective Multilateralism.” Militarization, though an understandable response to insecurity, may erode the “Clear Civilian Command” of global governance.

governance in Haiti. A heavy emphasis on technology and technocracy, while powerful tools for social policy, may make it difficult to follow a “Bottom-Up Approach” when the privileging of certain information marginalizes people from the decision-making process. Finally, the fragmentation and shifting nature of the global governance complex in Haiti may make it difficult to prioritize the “Primacy of Human Rights”, when access to legal protection and socio-economic services is governed by ad hoc and disparate systems rather than a clear social contract.

2. Haiti’s Emerging Complex of Global Governance

![Image: A US military vehicle on patrol in Petionville, a suburb of Port-au-Prince. Note the presence of foreign civilian medical personnel and a Haitian civilian in the vehicle. © outreach-international.org, by Matthew Bolton, February 2010.]

Responding to, and intertwined with, Haiti’s post-statist and globalized security landscape, is an emerging political complex that governs the country through a network of global and local, public and private actors. This complex is reminiscent of theoretical work of Mark Duffield (1998; 2001a; 2001b; 2007), who has analyzed the ways in which political and economic power are exercised in the world’s insecure “borderlands” – those areas beyond the effective reach of nation-state authority. He demonstrates how the political economy of places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Somalia fundamentally differ from traditional Weberian understandings of bureaucratic, centralized government. Rather, these so-called “complex emergencies” are governed by a shifting alliance, collusion and competition between UN agencies, international troops, private companies, NGOs, local associations, warlords, clandestine operators and ethno-nationalist movements.
In this context, ‘international intervention’ in conflict and disaster zones, whether in the form of peacekeeping operations or food aid distributions, is not an apolitical humanitarianism. Rather it is one among many other practices that surveil, control, influence and ultimately govern wide swaths of the developing world. International aid agencies, troops and civilian police missions form part of a new political-economic constellation that should be analyzed as a form of governance, an organization of power relations, which empowers some people and disempowers others.

In the aftermath of the earthquake, and its longer history of state disintegration, Haiti is now governed by a complex system of local and international actors that provide security and public services. The rest of this paper analyzes this system – how it operates, who it empowers and its implications for human security – drawing on the theoretical work of Duffield and Mary Kaldor as its foundation.

**a. Globalized**

“In the long run, human security can only be provided by local authorities whom people trust. ... The job of outside forces is to create safe spaces where people can freely engage in a political process that can establish legitimate authorities” (Beebe & Kaldor 2010, p. 8).
In the last year, I have had several discussions with North American and European aid workers on airplanes flying in and out of Port-au-Prince, which resulted in decisions involving hundreds of thousands, even millions, of dollars in reconstruction programming. This seems an apt metaphor for the globalized and removed system of governance that is developing in Haiti. Our decisions, affecting the lives of thousands of Haitians, were made by white foreigners, in a hermetically-sealed, technologically-sophisticated space, high above the populace, which only the privileged global elite could enter.

Haiti has a long history of external involvement in its affairs (Arthur 2002, pp. 15-28; Farmer 2005). Colonized by the Spanish, British and French, it had to fight hard to win its Independence, which was soon crippled by French and American meddling. From 1915 to 1934, Haiti was under US military occupation, and US support helped prop up Duvalierism during the Cold War. In 1994, US troops, with UN backing, intervened to re-install democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide and through covert action and political intervention, facilitated his removal in 2004. Since then, there has been a considerable presence of UN troops and police that have played a wide-ranging role in internal security operations and had a significant political impact on the country. With the deregulation of international trade and finance, multinational corporations also hold significant sway over the Haitian economy. Simultaneously, Haitian politics has taken on an increasing international dimension as more of its citizens migrate abroad, particularly to the Dominican Republic, Miami, New York, Montreal and Paris. Almost 20% of Haitians now live outside the country and use their wealth and influence obtained overseas to finance political factions and lobby for their host countries’ support for particular Haitian policies. Indicating the scale of resources wielded by the diaspora, remittances equaled some $800 million in 2004, “double the budget of the State” (Faubert 2004, p. 15).

The aftermath of the earthquake has turbo-charged the globalization of governance in Haiti, as hundreds of agencies have rushed into the vacuum left by the Haitian government to provide a vast array of services. In the earthquake zone, global actors hold unprecedented sovereignty over Haitian people’s lives, as providers of food, education, health, shelter and many other services. The revenues supporting this system overwhelmingly come from outside the country, in the form of public foreign aid and private donations, rather than internal taxation. The relief effort has moved enormous amounts of commodities into the country. The top managers of the agencies providing relief and reconstruction are more often than not expatriates who may speak French, but rarely speak any Haitian Creole, the language spoken by most Haitians. Many of the big reconstruction contracts are awarded to international rather than Haitian companies. An Associated Press investigation found that for every $100 the US spent on Haitian reconstruction, only $1.60 went to Haitian firms.9

The importance of this global presence in Haiti is illustrated by the fact that the UN/NGO 2010 ‘Flash Appeal’ budget for Haiti (which represented their estimation of required funding to address humanitarian needs) was $1.4 billion ($1.0 billion of which was funded)10 – surprisingly close to the size

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of Haitian government’s own total budget ($1.3 billion in expenditures, $1.0 billion in revenues). Supposedly coordinating this complex of actors is the ‘Cluster System.’ This system, formed as a result of a UN review of humanitarian responses to major emergencies after the Tsunami (UN OCHA 2005), consists of “of groupings of UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other international organizations around a sector or service provided during a humanitarian crisis” (UNMIT n.d.). The intent of this system has been to achieve more strategic responses and better prioritization of available resources by clarifying the division of labour among organizations, better defining the roles and responsibilities of humanitarian organizations within the sectors, and providing the Humanitarian Coordinator with both a first point of call and a provider of last resort in all the key sectors or areas of activity. (IASC 2006, p. 2).

Each of the sectoral clusters (Protection, Camp Coordination and Management, Water Sanitation and Hygiene, Health, Emergency Shelter, Nutrition, Emergency Telecommunications, Logistics, Early Recovery, Education and Agriculture) has a ‘cluster lead,’ usually a UN agency, which chairs meetings and coordinates the group. They are assisted by a ‘co-chair,’ which is usually a large international NGO prominent in the particular sector. The clusters are responsible for needs assessment, planning, coordination, monitoring, evaluation, advocacy and resource mobilization and in post-earthquake Haiti, it can be very difficult for an NGO to obtain major donor funds without being registered with and having demonstrated active participation in the appropriate cluster. Each cluster has its own staff, committee structures and regular all-agency meetings. Each country-level cluster relates to a similar global-level cluster (e.g. the Haiti Logistics Cluster coordinates with the Global Logistics Cluster), and reports to the country’s UN Humanitarian Coordinator. While there have been earlier humanitarian coordination mechanisms, the cluster system is much more institutionalized. (UNMIT n.d.; IASC 2006; IASC 2007)

The cluster system has not been without controversy. In December 2010, the head of Medecins Sans Frontieres criticized the cluster system in Haiti, arguing that it had failed to coordinate the relief response effectively, and “Instead of providing the technical support that many NGOs could benefit from, these clusters, at best, seem capable of only passing basic information and delivering few concrete results during a fast-moving emergency.” For its part, the International Committee of the Red Cross, has refused to participate in the cluster system (IASC 2006, p. 1, fn. 1), concerned that doing so would compromise its principles of neutrality and operational independence. Two defenders of the system have also acknowledged that it has had its problems, “Misunderstanding... has led in some cases to a proliferation of meetings, overemphasis on funding issues, unnecessary clusters at country level, involvement of non-operational actors and additional bureaucratic layers” (Jury & De Maio 2007, p. 37).

In post-earthquake Haiti, the clusters have become key governance structures, as the fora where major aid funding, policy, and implementation decisions are made. In the absence of clear governmental

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leadership from the Haitian parliament, they have become para-parliaments where policy is debated and discussed. Akin to the traditional lobby of a parliament, where interest groups can network with and influence policymakers, many decisions are made in the informal discussions before and after meetings. However, unlike a national parliament, which is at least somewhat representative of the local population, cluster meetings are chaired, dominated and populated largely by foreigners, many of whom (including myself), have spent very little time in the country. This does not bode well for creating a democratic and participatory policymaking process. As Merrill observed, historically, foreigners in Haiti routinely have misunderstood, ignored, trivialized, or suppressed fundamental tenets of traditional Haitian culture. Policies conceived first in Paris during the colonial era, then at the Vatican, later in Washington during the U.S. Marine occupation of 1915-1934, and most recently by the United Nations, have all tended to provoke internal friction and exacerbate social divisions, making stable governance and political development even more elusive (Merrill 1996, p. 31).

The cluster system claims that it ensures “humanitarian actors build on local capacities and maintain appropriate links with Government and local authorities....” (IASC 2006, p. 8). However, meetings are often held in spaces controlled by the UN, often at the UN Logistics Base or in other UN buildings around Port-au-Prince. These spaces can be difficult for ordinary Haitians to enter, and even if they can, many feel intimidated by the presence of armed guards and large numbers of foreigners. The vast majority of cluster meetings are held in French or English (often with some limited translation between the two languages. This means that the few Haitians that take part will be largely from the educated elite, often with considerable global connections, training and experience, as only 20% of Haitians speak French; even fewer speak English.

Theoretically, the cluster system is supposed to focus primarily on issues of relief. However, it has also begun to coordinate many reconstruction and recovery efforts. In this, it runs parallel to the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), which was established to develop reconstruction plans, coordinate and monitor reconstruction efforts and raise money from international donors. While it is mandated by Haitian legislation, it has the novel distinction of being co-chaired by both the Haitian Prime Minister and former US President Clinton. Its board includes Haitian government officials and appointees from local business and civil society, as well as international officials representing bilateral and multilateral officials and CARICOM (the Caribbean Community). The IHRC is not without controversy – for instance, Haitian Senator Youri Latortue said he could not vote in favor of the IHRC, because “it violates our sovereignty.” In January 2011, Oxfam issued a blistering criticism of the IHRC, describing it as “lackluster” and having “failed” in its coordination responsibilities. Further, Oxfam showed how the IHRC had not adequately consulted with the Haitian people – privileging the voices of international donors over Haitian organizations (Oxfam 2011, pp. 11-12).

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Satirizing the globalization of Haiti’s culture and political economy, the Haitian newspaper *Nouvelliste* declared that “Every Haitian Has His Own Foreigner Reserved for Himself” – whether that foreign patron is an émigré cousin, a missionary or an NGO aid worker. However, the reality is that some Haitians have more foreigners reserved for themselves than others, and some Haitians – who speak only Creole and live far from the internationally-connected cities – have no foreign patron at all. As Oxfam’s recent report observed, “The voices of poor Haitians are seldom heard in the policy-making process that directly affects their lives” (Oxfam 2011, p. 3).

The globalization of governance in Haiti has important implications for Haitians’ human security. In particular, while globalization may make it easier for intervening agencies to maintain an overall ‘Regional Focus’ (such as understanding the complex interplays between the US and Haiti) it also poses challenges to thinking about the notion of ‘Legitimate Political Authority.’ Traditionally, Liberal political thought has held up the democratic nation state as the ideal form of legitimate political authority. It is assumed that significant decisions about people’s interests, values and institutions ought to be made either directly or by representatives who hold similar cultural and linguistic commonalities with their constituents and are elected freely and fairly. However, the globalized system of relief in Haiti, embodied in the Cluster System and IHRC, represents a form of trusteeship, rather than democratic representation. The international aid agencies derive legitimacy from their global standing and their ability to disperse funds, not from selection by the people they serve. In fact, many of the top managers of these organizations share little in common – class, education, language or culture – with ordinary Haitians.

Moreover, as will be explored in the below sections, the radically diffused and fragmented nature of Haiti’s globalized aid sector means that there is no single, constant or necessarily accessible address for Haitian concerns. If a Haitian community would like to access funds for a new borehole, they may have to contact many different agencies – both public and private – to determine who has the ‘mandate’ for their area and issue. Once they have pinpointed the right agency(ies), they may face a rotating merry-go-round of officials on short-term assignments who do not speak their language. Ultimately, the final decision about whether they get their new borehole may be made in an NGO boardroom half a world away. As Merrill has argued

> Haiti’s history illustrates that the broad constituency of ordinary citizens must be engaged in political change. Earlier reforms have been short-lived because Haitian peasants were not active participants in reform, perceived no stake in its outcome and consequently did not demand that it endure. Those who should have benefited from reform were instead estranged from it. (1996, p. 32).

There is no clear hierarchy of command and control that can be traced upwards and pinpoint responsibility in particular offices. And there are few institutional levers for Haitians to express their discontent with this situation, as the global governance system is largely beyond the control of the Haitian electorate. There are few equivalents of the ‘constituent surgery’ where Haitians can bring their complaints to the central nodes of political power, particularly since the international elite are actually

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sealed off into protected enclaves.\textsuperscript{16} This enables the international governance system to evade accountability for its actions, but also reduces the reliable information it receives, in turn hindering the effectiveness and responsiveness of the international aid and security system. It is therefore unsurprising that the last few months have seen many political demonstrations against the international community's presence in Haiti.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{b. Privatized}

"[P]olicies cannot be effective if they are spread out among many different agencies, governments and NGOs" (Beebe & Kaldor 2010, p. 8).

The Human Security Doctrine calls for "effective multilateralism", but as one article described the 1994 international intervention, the global governance complex in Haiti has more resembled "Mangled Multilateralism" (Martin 1994). Indeed, the dizzying array of organizations involved in the post-earthquake response in Haiti, and the resultant problems of coordinating such networks, highlight the importance of 'Effective Multilateralism.' However, many discussions of human security have a very

\textsuperscript{16} There is considerable literature on the way globalization, particularly in terms of trade policy, constrains the choices of governments and may, as a result, undermine democracy: Cox 1997.

state-centric understanding of multilateralism. This leads to a myopic focus on relationships between states, the traditional structure of state foreign policy (diplomatic and military institutions) and inter-state institutions (such as the EU and UN) as the vehicles for multi-lateral endeavors. But the Haitian experience shows that international intervention is conducted by a public-private complex that incorporates thousands of NGOs, private companies, churches and individual philanthropists that can be highly influential in shaping the human security agenda. Indeed, the global governance complex in Haiti is marked by its radically privatized nature.

In her book, *The Shock Doctrine*, Naomi Klein argues that major societal shocks like natural disasters are often used by authorities and international capital to impose neo-liberal economic reforms, which would never normally be accepted by the population. Klein showed that in Iraq after ‘Shock and Awe,’ New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and Sri Lanka after the Tsunami, a ‘disaster capitalism complex,’ rooted in an agenda of privatization and liberalization, developed as the structure of relief and reconstruction. Similarly, at the time of writing, it appeared that “Despite their track record and universal bad publicity, it appears Halliburton, Dyncorp and other US military contractors are poised to grab up the lion share of US government contracts to rebuild Haiti.” However, Klein’s analysis, though useful for understanding the fire-sale nature of a post-disaster reconstruction market, sometimes lacks the subtlety to recognize much deeper systematic changes that cannot simply be explained by ‘greed,’ the profit motive and corporate capture of the public sphere.

To enrich Klein’s framework, it is helpful to turn to Hedley Bull (1977) and Mark Duffield’s (2001) concept of ‘Neo-medievalism.’ They argue that the Weberian nation-state system with its bureaucratic structures of command and control is unraveling and being ‘re-raveled’ into diffuse and overlapping networks of global and local, public and private actors. Some of these private actors are certainly motivated by greed, but many are not. For instance, in the case of humanitarian assistance, private, not-for-profit actors may be driven by other motivations such as a charitable impulse, paternalism, faith or a psychological need to be needed. This means that analyzing the emergent governance complex requires an intimate understanding of how these many motivations and drivers of action interact with each other and produce institutional systems. Klein’s ‘disaster capitalism’ fails to adequately explain the diverse range of private actors that take on governance functions in a post-disaster situation. Indeed, focusing only on for-profit actors in Haiti misses the pivotal role played by NGOs, which, due to mistrust of the Haitian state, have become a favored conduit for public donor aid allocations (Buss & Gardner 2008, p. 112).

There are an estimated 3,000 to 10,000 NGOs in Haiti, which conduct a vast array of services that one might typically attribute to the public sphere, including relief, health, education and displacement camp management (Kristoff & Panarelli 2010). Many of these agencies are not registered with the Haitian government and exhibit a wide range of quality and ability. As noted above, a few key NGOs hold

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considerable authority over the earthquake response, as co-chairs of the sectoral clusters – giving them influence over the coordination, funding and management of the relief and reconstruction process. Indeed a sizable portion of the emergency funding has been foreign private donations, at times outstripping public money.\footnote{Jonathan M. Katz. (5 March 2010) “Billions for Haiti, a criticism for every dollar.” The Associated Press. \textless http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5idZiVQhHcyG1gpBjzXaAmmk4_OtAD9E8PTRO0\textgreater . Accessed 6 March 2010.}

This disparate system, fragmented between thousands of agencies, each with their own funding streams, administrative structures, recruitment procedures and policies is sometimes called ‘NGOism’ in the literature on Haitian politics. It is a system of non-governmental sovereignty, whose legitimacy and power largely derives from agencies’ ability to raise funds, usually from outside the country, rather than any social contract with the local people. Kristoff & Panarelli argue that “Funneling aid through NGOs perpetuated a cycle of low capacity, corruption and accountability among Haitian government institutions” (2010, p. 2; cf. Buss & Gardner 2008, pp. 115-119).

NGOism is supplanting traditional state authority in interesting ways in post-earthquake Haiti. One NGO doctor was overheard berating his colleagues for wearing Canadian flag pins on their uniforms. He asked them to replace the badges with their agency’s logo and branding, explaining that their identity in Haiti was that of their NGO, not Canada. In essence, he was asking them to transfer their loyalty from their nation-state to that of a non-governmental institution. One sees the trappings of this emerging non-governmental sovereignty all over the earthquake-affected zones, with NGO banners hanging over displacement camps, branding on sacks of aid supplies, and agency flags flying above hospitals (cf. Schuller 2009, p. 87). Moreover, the insistence by many NGOs that both their own workers and the unskilled laborers on their cash-for-work programs wear agency-branded clothing implicitly claims sovereignty and ownership over people’s actual bodies – a ‘non-governmentality’ of the body (c.f. Foucault 1977; Duffield 2007; Feher, Krikorian & McKee 2007). Some NGOs are even making a claim on the legitimate use of force, by contracting private security firms to provide armed guards at their compounds and vehicles. In one case, a US-registered NGO called ‘Humanitarian Defense’ provided non-profit security services to a “US sponsored orphanage” in Haiti.\footnote{Humanitarian Defense. (1 February 2010) “Haitian Orphans Welcome HUMDEF With Open Arms.” Humanitarian Defense. \textless http://blog.humanitariandefense.org/?p=28\textgreater . Accessed 9 January 2011.}

NGOism exists in the broader context of neoliberalism and structural adjustment in Haiti, which has seen the erosion and privatization of state assets, authority and services. This is partly the result of external conditionalities imposed by donor countries. For instance, ‘Washington Consensus’ policies were condition placed by the US on securing Aristide’s return in 1994 (Arthur 2002, pp. 27, 50-53). However, privatization has also had internal causes. For a variety of reasons Haiti has long had a radically privatized educational sector (Salmi 2000). Moreover, successive regimes have found it in their interests to collude with non-state paramilitary networks, vigilante groups and criminal gangs to intimidate and eliminate opponents (Faubert 2004, p. 9, 11-12; Mendelson-Forman 2006, pp. 22-23). This hints at an underlying complexity of privatization often overlooked by the more polemical anti-privatization hyperbole – that privatization simultaneously both augments and erodes the power of the
state. Indeed, a strategic abdication, or contracting-out, of authority by state leaders can sometimes increase their power. NGOs provide services for which the state can then avoid responsibility: “When assistance was channeled through NGOs, the Haitian government seemed indifferent to the programs – they were someone else’s worry” (Buss & Gardner 2008, p. 119). This enables the state to profit from the legitimacy that ‘rubs off’ on them from the provision of services and NGO investment in their constituency. It also provides someone else to blame – plausible deniability – if the program stalls or goes wrong. However, by abdicating the authority for a particular service to an NGO, the state erodes its own ability to control and govern services. (cf. Bolton 2010). Schuller (2009, pp. 86-87) has argued that in Haiti, NGO provision “depoliticizes” services, acting as a “putty” to fill in the gaps of a “splintered” state.

NGOism, and the privatization of services generally in Haiti, has both positive and negative potential. For example, one small US evangelical NGO responded immediately to the earthquake by mobilizing funds, volunteers and supplies through a network of churches. Within two days, while the government was still reeling from the disaster, they were already in remote mountainous regions handing out hygiene supplies. Within two weeks they had deployed teams of doctors and nurses. However, they did not coordinate with other agencies, tended to favor working through local churches (undoubtedly privileging evangelical Haitians) and their staff was largely untrained in relief work, culturally unaware and linguistically hampered. This reflects the findings of a study of human security following the Tsunami:

The unprecedented outpouring of aid by hundreds of international NGOs was of immense psychological value for the survivors, and the aid was more speedily delivered than any government bureaucracy is able to, but it was not unproblematic. Some foreign NGOs were accused of proselytizing and adoption of orphans into Christian families.... There was also a considerable amount of competition, duplication and overlap... (Glasius 2005, p. 4).

Thus, the thousands of NGOs in Haiti form a network of capillary aid pipelines that can penetrate further and faster than the state or public aid donors. They also bring in expertise and knowledge from other countries and are able to mobilize funding from a far wider network than the Haitian state. In these ways, they represent an augmentation of public services. This shows that privatization sometimes helps facilitate “Effective Multilateralism”, by assigning services to agencies that have an appropriate comparative advantage. However, they also can be impossible to coordinate, pull skilled workers out of the public and private sectors and opt out of regulations because of the lack of state enforcement. This raises critical legitimacy questions. Any person who is able to bring together sufficient friends to make up a board of directors and finds a reliable funding stream is able to appoint themselves a provider of social services in Haiti. There is no system-wide equivalent of a civil service examination or election for the self-appointed aid worker. Likewise, they are “dependent on the decision of foreign donors, not responsive to the will of the people as citizens” (Schuller 2009, p. 90). Moreover, too radical an erosion of state power may leader state officials with little authority other than obstruction, which they may be tempted to yield in order to assert what power they have.

Thus, ‘effective multilateralism’ is not just about states, nor UN resolutions, multinational troop commitments and EU budgets. It requires a sophisticated understanding of the myriad interests, norms
and institutions that shape the behavior of a vast spectrum of agencies, whether they be government donors, UN bodies, private companies or non-profit groups. It requires the political and diplomatic skill to build coalitions between vastly different types of organizations that are called agencies for a reason – they have their own agency, their own internal drivers, motivations and agendas. Provision of human security requires an ability to overcome the multiple inertias and cross-pressures that pull networks in multiple directions and constant attention to coordination and relationship-building.

This is not easy. Malcom Gladwell (2010) has written about the deficiency of the network as a form of political organization. A network’s lack of internal cohesiveness, hierarchy or command-and-control make it difficult to produce sustained, strategic and steady political action, particularly in the face of resistance: “Because networks don’t have a centralized leadership structure and clear lines of authority, they have real difficulty reaching consensus and setting goals. They can’t think strategically; they are chronically prone to conflict and error” (p. 48). The agents of international governance in Haiti should be chastened by Gladwell’s warning that networks’ fragmentation and impermanence enable speed and adaptability, but not a long and costly political struggle. As such, wrote Gladwell, while they can create ‘flash-in-the-pan’ political moments, networks have difficult posing a sustained threat to entrenched unjust political systems (pp. 48-49). ‘Effective multilateralism’ thus requires mastery of “network diplomacy” (Heine 2006, pp. 3-10), a savvy appreciation of how different actors work together, an understanding of points of potential tension and a coherent utilization of different organization’s comparative advantages.

Finally, the NGOist system privileges those that are part of existing programs, projects that are easily funded or beneficiaries that share the same religious affiliation as the agency (Salmi 2000, pp. 163-164). The latter issue is particularly important in Haiti, where the majority of the rural poor practice Vodoun, which is regarded with suspicion or contempt by many Protestant NGOs. NGOs that deliver assistance through their church networks thus systematically marginalize people of other faiths, including Vodoun. One thus has to question the justice and fairness of this system, in which the humanitarian assessment of need and non-discrimination in distribution is tainted, sometimes even hijacked, by the privileging of certain identities and communities. As Salmi earlier observed in Haiti’s education sector, the involvement of private actors “has undeniably been the main vehicle for expanding access” to public services, but the costs in terms of “the resulting degree of social injustice, have been very high” (2000, p. 177).
c. Militarized

Figure 6: UN peacekeepers on patrol outside a tent camp near the Port-au-Prince airport. © outreach-international.org by Matthew Bolton, November 2010.

“In human security operations, civilians are in command. This means the military must operate in support of law and order and under rules of engagement that are more similar to those of police work than to the rules of armed combat. Everyone needs to know who is in charge, and leaders must be able to communicate politically with local people as well as people in the sending countries” (Beebe & Kaldor 2010, p. 9).

The history of Haitian politics and governance has long been dominated by men with guns. Haiti’s early years were marked by a colonial regime imposed with shockingly brutal force that in turn sparked a deeply violent, though successful, slave insurrection (James 1989). The generals that dominated the liberation struggle secured a principal role in Haiti’s early postcolonial politics, which were characterized by internal conflict and successive coups (Arthur 2002, pp. 19-22; Girard 2010, pp. 39-79). During the US occupation and counter-insurgency of 1915-1934, the US Marines organized and trained Haiti’s National Army, creating a formidable force that would dominate the country’s political life through much of the 20th century (Arthur 2002, p. 22-23). The use of armed violence, however, was not constrained only to the national military institutions. The dictator Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier, empowered a shadowy
paramilitary network, the notorious *Ton Ton Macoutes* (named after a Haitian mythological character who roamed the night kidnapping children) who conducted politically motivated torture and extrajudicial killings at the behest of the ruling regime (Arthur 2002, pp. 23-25). The junta that overthrew the democratically-elected Jean Bertrand Aristide in 1991, inaugurated a particularly vicious orgy of violence against their political opposition, human rights activists and trade unionists (Arthur 2002, pp. 25-26). Through much of Haiti’s history, then, “security forces act[ed] as a predatory institution that oppresses, rather than protects, private individuals” (Girard 2010, p. 11).

As a result, following the US-led international intervention to re-instate Aristide in 1994, the Haitian military was disbanded, and replaced by a significantly truncated police force (Arthur 2002, p. 26). But the elimination of the national military did not usher in a new era of non-violent politics. Armed men remain a potent force in shaping the social, economic and political life of the country. The difference is that the concentration of state violence has fragmented and been redistributed above and below the state, in the form of armed gangs, politicians’ personal militias, private security companies and international troops.

Military forces make up a significant dimension of the international presence in Haiti – so much so that street artisans have begun carving small statues of UN soldiers. The UN peacekeeping mission – MINUSTAH – has 8,766 troops, 3,082 police and 685 international civilians (including UN volunteers). These globalized security services serve as a deterrent against coups and insurgency, conduct regular street patrols, arrest high value criminals and train the Haitian police. In essence, citing a long history of abuse by the Haitian armed services, the forces of international governance in Haiti have determined that the Haitian government and people cannot really be trusted with providing their own security. Rather than having a Haitian standing army, that might threaten a democratically-elected government, it is perceived better to have a large contingent of UN forces, from many different countries, speaking many different languages and fragmented through many different command structures. This, of course, runs counter to the currents of modern nationalism, which demanded that those who wielded the legitimate monopoly of violence should share the same language and culture as the populace they ruled. As described by scholars like Duffield (2001a; 2001b), Ignatieff (2003), Fearon and Laitin (2004), Caplan (2005) and Chesterman (2005) there is a liberal consensus that in some areas of the world – ‘violent borderlands’ – the mandate to use force is more responsibly managed by foreigners. National security in Haiti has thus been outsourced to international actors. There is significant evidence that suggests the presence of a proactive and engaged UN peacekeeping force has indeed improved security in Haiti (Buss & Gardner 2008, pp. 170-171). In certain areas of the country, such as Cite Soleil, UN troops are the primary face of the international presence in Haiti. Few NGOs or international civilians feel comfortable having a permanent presence in the slums. One international aid worker doing some work in Cite Soleil remarked to me “You won’t see a white SUV anywhere in Cite Soleil – unless the people in it are wearing blue helmets.”

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The human security doctrine stipulates that civilians, rather than military officers, should be the dominant force in any intervention into insecure regions of the world. This is to stem processes of militarization, which risk marginalizing civilians and nonviolent political actors from the policy process. It also aims to constrain the military to clear rules of engagement that prioritize protection rather than warfighting (Beebe & Kaldor 2010, p. 9). In Haiti, the top levels of the international presence are often civilians, but the occasionally aggressively militaristic posture of the UN troops unsettles local civilians.

For instance, while the ‘presence patrols’ by UN troops around Port-au-Prince are intended to demonstrate a forceful deterrent against public violence and reassure the population, not all Haitians feel more secure when observing Armored Personnel Carriers and Toyota trucks filled with troops from other countries pointing automatic weapons at the public. Riding in vehicles with Haitians, I have commonly heard complaints about how they feel nervous and insecure when foreign troops have guns aimed out of their vehicles at the surrounding traffic. Indeed, some have remarked that by doing this, the UN troops are in effect “criminalizing Haitians” (MCC 2010).

Many Haitians lack basic trust in the UN troops. For instance, when a cholera epidemic broke out in late 2010, there were widespread rumors that the disease had been brought into the country by Nepalese peacekeepers. Rather than focusing on how the weakened Haitian socio-political system increased the country’s vulnerability to cholera, many Haitians directed their anger at the UN “for bringing cholera here.” This is an example of how the presence of international troops may make people feel more insecure, and how traditional understandings of security may not take seriously the way threats like infectious diseases can erode trust in security institutions.

There is a gendered and sexualized dimension to Haiti’s international security and governance system that also contributes to a lack of trust. A Haitian colleague of mine complained to me that, “The UN troops steal our women.” Their presence may be seen as an affront to Haitian masculinity. Simultaneously, as in several other countries, UN troops have been mired in prostitution and sexual abuse scandals that erode its credibility as a benevolent actor (Jennings & Nikolić-Ristanović 2009). Likewise, some activists have criticized the UN mission for focusing on traditional masculinized forms of insecurity – like insurrection and organized crime – and paying inadequate attention to domestic and gender-based violence, which is soberingly high in Haiti. Concentrated on their bases, the UN troops are too removed from the population to develop the familiarity with the community needed to intervene in the private sphere of the Haitian home. (MADRE 2010)

The presence of the US military, with its long and ambivalent history in Haiti, evoked particularly mixed feelings in the initial months after the earthquake when it deployed some 13,000 troops. The US came...
under particular criticism in the first few days after the earthquake, when, taking control of the Port-au-
Prince airport, it prioritized its own military and diplomatic flights over ones carrying humanitarian
assistance. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) was especially critical, following the diversion of one of their
planes carrying medical supplies to Santo Domingo because Port-au-Prince airport was clogged with US
military flights. (Devi 2010, p. 267-268). According to Devi, “many Haitians were discomfited by the sight
of so many armoured personnel carriers and US soldiers carrying guns while they were still experiencing
severe shortages of water, food and medicine” (2010, p. 268). Indeed, the arrival of US troops prompted
graffiti like the following, “USA: Respect Haitians stop imperialism. Go out now!!!” and objections from
NGOs involved in peacebuilding (MCC 2010). Distrust of the US military runs deep in Haiti:

> the sight of Black Hawk helicopters circling over the presidential palace and Marines patrolling
> the streets of the capital brought back painful memories of past U.S. occupations. ... [R]umors
> soon spread that the U.S. relief effort somehow fit into an elaborate imperialistic plot to take
> over the country (Girard 2010, p. 5).

The centrality of the military forces to Haiti’s international governance is illustrated by the fact that the
epicenter of the post-quake humanitarian effort is the UN Logistics Base, which is largely a military base,
housing troops from a variety of countries including Uruguay, Chile, Jordan and Canada. Even the
humanitarian ‘neighborhood’ of the base has the spatial and architectural feel of a barracks, with offices
fashioned from canvas tents and shipping containers. The international troops have played a particularly
significant role in the Logistics Cluster, providing logistical capacity and offering military escorts to aid
convoys and distributions.27 US troops “delivered more than 2.6 million bottles of water, 2.2 million food
rations, 17 million pounds of bulk food and 149,000 pounds of medical supplies into Haiti.”28 That troops
are involved in relief is often used as a justification of their presence in Haiti, though some have
questioned whether the military are the most effective institution for distributing humanitarian aid
(MCC 2010). This raises the same concerns that have been raised in other parts of the world where the
military has become significantly involved in humanitarian and development aid. Military and
humanitarian actors have different goals. Military reconstruction and relief projects are often much
more expensive than civilian ones, and focus on “quick impact” and high-profile activities aimed at
“winning hearts and minds” – a weaponization of aid. This often makes humanitarian actors nervous, as
they feel more likely to become targets of discontent and protest (cf. Action Aid et al. 2010). It is thus
possible that the prominence of the international military presence in Haiti may erode the human
security principle of clear civilian command, particularly when the military maintain an aggressive,
sometimes even abusive posture.

d. Technologized and Technocratized

Figure 7: UN maps plastered on wall of an NGO’s office in Port-au-Prince. © outreach-international.org, by Matthew Bolton, June 2010.

“The population affected by violence and insecurity must be involved in a human security strategy and yet the international community often operates in protected enclaves without communicating with people. … Outsiders can help but only if they understand what is needed; otherwise they risk making things worse” (Beebe & Kaldor 2010, p. 8).

“Technology comes to the rescue in Haiti,” fawned one particularly blustery industry article.29 The international relief effort in Haiti is high-tech, digital and wired to an unprecedented degree.30 In fact, the high volume of internet traffic has led to complaints that aid agencies were causing problems for local internet service providers.31 The digital epicenter of the aid community is OneResponse, the official website of the cluster system. Cluster contact lists, meeting minutes, key documents and important information are all uploaded onto this website. All of the clusters also have an email list serve where meeting times are posted and major policy decisions are announced. Applications for grants must be emailed, or in the case of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) uploaded onto an online database that requires a login and password approved by UN OCHA. Given that decisions on aid allocation often require consultation with persons and organizations scattered around the globe (including NGO headquarters, offices of funding bodies, logistical bases in nearby countries) a significant portion of the discussion on social services and governance in Haiti occurs in cyberspace – through email, Skype and

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instant messaging. Obtaining access to the cyber-policymaking process is not easy in the Haitian context. It requires the appropriate electronic equipment, an expensive internet connection, a reliable source of electricity and digital literacy – all beyond the means of the average Haitian, and a stretch for many smaller civil society organizations. In other contexts, scholars have shown how privileging the internet as a space for policy discussion excludes those people who are not wired (Beier 2004; Zheng & Walsham 2008).

The digital bent of the aid effort is also expressed in aid agencies’ appetite for quantitative, technocratic data and the cluster system’s obsession with “information management.” This is illustrated in the aid community’s fixation with GPS data and satellite mapping. Within the Haitian context, information regarding location is most commonly expressed in an oral and communal mode. For instance, when asking for the location of a school my NGO was supporting, my Haitian colleagues typically responded with verbal directions that placed the building in its communal landscape of relationships – “it is near my house”, “it is on the same land as our church.” This information was accurate – it enabled one to find the building without much trouble. However, it was not considered adequate for the international aid effort, which privileged GPS information, a numerically-represented point, that could be easily digitized and scientifically processed. As others have observed (Chambers 1997; Mather 2002), the privileging of techno-scientific forms of data in policymaking shifts power to those who are able to converse in this discourse and who have access to the equipment and skills needed to produce it: “Deprivation and poverty come to be defined, not by the changing and varied wants and needs of the poor, but by the static and standardized wants and needs of professionals” (Chambers 1997, p. 46).

A Haitian joke illustrates the occasional absurdity of the international aid worker’s fixation with technology and expert knowledge:

The story goes like this: a woman is sitting on the side of the road, selling vegetables. A slick new shiny car pulls up, driven by a Haitian. A white man gets out, who also looks slick in his new suit and tie.

The man asks the woman, “If I tell you exactly how many onions are in each box, will you give me one box for free?”

The woman is intrigued and agrees. The man then pulls out his computer. The screen shows a satellite image of the woman and her vegetables. Then it zeroes in on one box and computes a calculation. A few minutes later the man looks at the woman and says, “There are exactly 250 onions in each box.”

The woman is thoroughly surprised. “That’s exactly right!”

So she gives the man a free box, then she looks at him and offers a counter bet, “If I tell you who you are, you will give me back the box and pay me the cost of one box.”

The man, who is also intrigued and with little to lose, agrees. The woman exclaims, “You are an International Expert!”

“That’s exactly right! How did you know?”
There are three things that gave it away. First, you came to me; I did not invite you here. Second, you told me something that I already knew. Third, these are not onions, they are turnips.” (In: Sitther 2008, p. 5).

A significant portion of the policy discussion and relief management resources in post-earthquake Haiti have been directed towards mapping. UN OCHA, Map Action and Google Earth have produced a steady stream of sophisticated digital maps depicting food distributions, earthquake damage, health data and population movements. Each of the clusters have also produced regularly-updated ‘4W’ (‘Who does What Where and When’) maps that display the distribution of NGO programs throughout the country. Such maps have given the host of incoming expatriate aid workers access to immense amounts of data depicted in a format that is easily accessible and understandable to those with an education that enables them to comprehend it. However, it is a highly sanitized and processed representation of reality that strips away complexity and human socio-political dimensions (cf. Chambers 1997). The literature on political geography has shown the importance of mapping in the surveillance and control of territory and population (Black 1997; Short 2004). A digital map also gives an illusion of accuracy and sophistication that is not always the case – the representation is only as good as the data it is based upon. For instance, early maps showing the distribution of earthquake damage showed the ‘red’ damage clustered not where it was most severe, but where surveyors had visited – often the most easily accessible regions of the city.

The complex, human reality of Haiti is thus boiled down into one that can be represented as a statistic or digital map. This simplified, apolitical and asocial version of Haiti is then ready for the application of technological ‘solutions.’ For instance, in a discussion with the shelter advisor for a major international NGO, he explained to me how he believed that the solution to Haiti’s emergency shelter crisis was to import plastic pre-fabricated buildings from the US that had to be put together by specially-trained technicians wearing chemical hazard suits to protect against the toxic epoxy used to assemble them. The solution to the lack of housing was thus not one that could be implemented by ordinary Haitians using locally available materials, but rather one involving industrial chemicals and imported plastics.

Aid agencies’ fixation with technology is embedded in a broader technocratic culture that tends to bureaucratize and depoliticize the policymaking process (cf. Chambers 1997; Ferguson 1994). Cluster meetings tend to be highly technocratic affairs, conducted in the rarified discourse of ‘aid-speak’ and UN-ese that is all but impenetrable to ordinary people. The use of acronyms (‘We are liaising with UNICEF to integrate INEE standards on DRR into ECD’) is frequent as well as the use of common-sense buzzwords and slogans like ‘Building Back Better’ or ‘Child-Friendly Spaces.’ An inability to understand this discourse or to describe programs in this way is an immediate disadvantage. When attending these meetings one feels that they are less about understanding the situation outside the room and more about the performance of decisionmaking. Meetings are carefully controlled to avoid politicization. For example, the structure of one cluster was rearranged because there was frustration with a trade unionist asking pointed, hyperbolic questions. A cluster meeting is thus not a parliament where political actors mediate their divergent interests and values. Indeed, I have found that the informal discussions before and after a cluster meeting are far more productive and result in more actual policy and implementation decisions being made. A cynic might suggest that the meeting is a performance that
functions to exclude unwanted voices, so that those who remain – who offer ‘practical solutions’ – can have cordial discussions informally after it ends.

In other words, reminiscent of Ferguson’s ‘Anti-Politics Machine’ (1994), the technological and technocratic nature of ‘governance by cluster’ strips away the human dimensions – social and political – of public policy. It simplifies the complex reality of Haitian society into a quantifiable, digitizable and map-able problematic that can be solved through the application of technological solutions through a depoliticized technocratic governance structure. This makes it difficult for aid agencies to follow the human security principle of the “Bottom Up Approach”, as the technological and technocratic nature of the aid response, as well as the primacy of the French and English languages marginalizes most ordinary Haitians. The physical enclavization of the international agencies cuts them off from the grassroots, while their myopic focus on certain kinds of knowledge prevents them from understanding those at the grassroots.

e. Fragmented and Shifting

Figure 8: Small school in the remote rural areas of the mountains in the South-East of Haiti. © Article 25, August 2010.
“[H]uman rights, including the rights to life, education, clean water, and housing must be respected – even in the midst of conflict” (Beebe & Kaldor 2010, p. 8).

The emergency relief system in Haiti is in constant flux. Particularly in the first few months after the earthquake, the personnel staffing the UN and NGO agencies changed frequently and unpredictably. Many expatriate aid workers were sent in for assignments of only a few weeks or months and many, including myself, were visiting the country for the first time. I have had to update my contact list many times – emails bouncing back, phone calls answered by ‘no longer in service’ messages and proposals lost in the aid agency ether. Plans and decisions agreed with one official would be lost, scrapped or radically reversed by their replacement, only to be picked up again by the next replacement. In one cluster whose meetings I have regularly attended, the UN official in charge changed three times in six months.

In the first weeks of the earthquake response, this shifting nature of the aid effort was illustrated dramatically by the changing landscape of the UN Logistics Base, where many aid workers camped. Tents would go up one day and be gone the next. Even those who were there for a while, found themselves lost in the confusion. One IOM official told me, “Three times I came back after work and my tent had been moved.”

How do you find the address for your concerns if the official himself does not know where his tent will be at the end of his workday? How do you find the person who is responsible for your particular problem if they are come and gone in a few weeks? This is exacerbated by the sheer volume of different agencies involved, with shifting and overlapping mandates. For instance, where a single public water board might have made sense, there are around 150 agencies listed as members of the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Cluster. At a time when constancy and steadiness were needed, the international governance system in Haiti was confusing, uncertain, fragmented and shifting. This is unfortunately not a new situation – an evaluation of the history of foreign aid to Haiti found the constant ebb and flow of aid funding was “unraveling many positive benefits they may have produced” (Buss & Gardner 2008, p. 103).

The oft-rotating officials from the major aid establishments are also joined by hundreds of short-term volunteers, wearing coordinated and brightly colored T-shirts, often young, inexperienced, and non-francophone. These groups are often associated with evangelical churches in the US and are rarely staffed by trained aid professionals. In contrast to the technocratic culture of the major aid agencies, qualifications are less important to the short-term mission groups than what one teenage volunteer in the Dominican Republic told me was her “big heart for the poor.” Tony Campolo, an American evangelical minister with a history of involvement in Haiti has criticized these short-term missions, saying:

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Does it ever occur to those leaders who take bright, enthusiastic American young people to Haiti to build hundreds ... of ... buildings ... that Haitians are capable of building them? Do they even consider how many jobs they take away from Haitians because of their well-intentioned construction enterprises?

The offices at the UN Logistics Base have now largely been transitioned out of tents and into air-conditioned containers. While these convey more of a long-term investment than tents, they still evoke a sense of impermanence, compared to the solid architecture of traditional government administrative and legislature buildings. This air of transience is reflected too in the buildings built by international agencies to accommodate and provide services to the vast populations made homeless by the earthquake. Thousands of people continue to live in tent cities and makeshift camps. As the Haitian government has delayed the release of building standards for reconstructing schools, they and UNICEF have urged aid agencies to construct “semi-permanent” schools instead — a bizarre twisting of English/French language, in which the word permanence is altered so it becomes the opposite of its actual meaning. With the slow progress of the reconstruction process, this ‘temporary’ situation may have a surprising sticking power. Indeed, the post-disaster experience in many other countries has shown that ‘temporary’ solutions have a remarkable ability to become permanent, especially if international donors’ attention shifts away from the country before more expensive and complicated permanent solutions can be put in place. For instance, reflecting on the Indian Ocean Tsunami response, Glasius wrote:

...while all donors are to some extent fashion-driven, NGOs are even more dependent than institutional donors on publicity and one-off donations, and many are therefore not in a position to make a long-term commitment to a particular region or project. The spike in tsunami giving was unprecedented, and the drop may therefore be all the harder. (2005, p. 11).

The lack of stability made it very difficult for aid agency officials to make commitments to communities. My most often repeated refrain in community meetings was that “we cannot promise anything specific, except that we will try to help.” This was frustrating for people to hear — what they needed was clear commitments from aid agencies, so that they could plan and know where to expend and invest the few resources they had left. However, aid agencies were unable to predict precisely the directions the donor winds would blow, how much resources they would receive and what conditions would be imposed on a grant. On several occasions my organization was promised resources by donors who later reneged or drastically revised their pledges. This meant rational budgeting rooted in a careful assessment of humanitarian need was very difficult. Rather than a carefully calculated assignment of resources, the aid sector in Haiti sometimes resembled a system of windfall. As a 2004 evaluation of UNDP assistance in Haiti observed, “The international community shares some of the responsibility for the crisis in Haiti in the absence of a proactive prevention strategy and a sustained long-term commitment” (Faubert 2004, p. 4). The shift and flux plays into, and exacerbates a broader dynamic of Haitian politics and society that James (2010) has called “‘routinized ruptures’ — waves of seemingly random political and criminal violence that render all in Haiti vulnerable.” (James 2010, p. 107). In this context, people need constancy.

and stable commitment (a social contract) not a fickle and rapid escalation and de-escalation of international attention (a sort of social liaison/one-night-stand).

The fragmentation of time is mirrored by the international community’s fragmentation of Haitian space. I have already reviewed the NGOs’ tendency to fragment Haitian territory into ‘program areas’, marked with signboards, flags and banners. Additionally, as in many ‘insecure countries,’ international agencies’ security precautions have divided Haiti into highly secured compounds – enclave ‘Green Zones’ such as the UN Logistics Base – and the rest of the country. The LogBase is surrounded by high walls, tight security and is distinctly unwelcoming to Haitians not working for the UN system. For the first few months after the earthquake, the rules about who was able to enter the base, and what clearances they required, changed several times, making it a challenge for smaller NGOs and Haitian organizations to attend meetings with UN agencies. At times I had to go through multiple checks to get past the front gate, at other times, bluster and a flimsy homemade ID card was enough to be waved through. Within LogBase there are enclaves within enclaves. Even when I had appointments with specific officials, I occasionally had difficulty persuading the receptionists and security guards at UNICEF’s section of the base to let me visit the appropriate office.

This enclave system privileges the security of the international elite over the ordinary Haitian people, and places literal barriers between them, reducing the ability of international aid workers and civil servants to understand what is happening “outside the fence.” In an email I received from one UN official, she said, “Were you visiting schools in Carrefour [a town 10 miles from Port-au-Prince]? I’d love to hear about the situations you saw... (we don’t get to go out!” If the people who hold significant power in Haiti’s international governance system “don’t get to go out”, how will they know that their efforts are not misguided? As Robert Chambers has observed in the history of development aid errors

Distance blocks, blurs and distorts vision, and distance is institutionalized. Most of those who were wrong were physically, organizationally, socially and cognitively distant from the people and conditions they were analyzing, planning and prescribing for, and making predictions about (1997, p. 31).

The enclavization of the international community in Haiti reflects wider political, social and economic systems in Haiti that fragment the country into a privileged core and underprivileged periphery. Haitian politics and business have long been dominated by a small group of wealthy families clustered around Petionville. Infrastructure is densely concentrated in the Port-au-Prince-Croix des Bouquets-Carrefour-Leogane urbanized corridor and is practically non-existent in many of Haiti’s rural areas. This is the result of a reinforcing cycle in which areas are underserved by public services and infrastructure because they are considered ‘inaccessible’, in turn reinforcing their inaccessibility compared with the cities. In Haiti, the population living in poverty is twice as high in rural areas than in metropolitan ones.

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34 cf. Barnett Rubin’s writing on the complicity of the aid sector in the fragmentation of Afghanistan’s political economy (Rubin 2002).

35 David Keen has written an insightful analysis of how international agencies in Sudan in the 1980s used the excuse of ‘inaccessibility’ to neglect the same underprivileged areas the Sudanese government was aiming to punish and politically exclude. As a result, the international aid effort became complicit in the Sudanese political elite’s efforts to privilege certain areas of the country over others (Keen 1994).
77% of Haitians in extreme poverty live in rural areas. Similarly, metropolitan areas themselves have internal core and periphery dynamics. Cite Soleil’s insecurity has discouraged many NGOs from investing in public services there. Even some NGOs with significant experience in conflict zones have avoided significant operations in Cite Soleil. This in turn increases the resentment of Cite Soleil’s residents and their reliance on patronage of politico-criminal networks. (Faubert 2004, p. 18). Thus, ‘inaccessibility’ and ‘insecurity’ have been used to excuse aid agencies tendency to underserve underprivileged areas. Indeed, a 2004 evaluation of UNDP in Haiti found that “at least 90 percent of UNDP’s project activities are implemented in Port-au-Prince” (Faubert 2004, p. 35). Likewise, another evaluation of foreign aid found that “a significant Achilles heal in foreign assistance” in Haiti was that “everything focuses on the capital” (Buss & Gardner 2008, p. 125).

This division of Haiti into ‘accessible’ and ‘inaccessible’ regions, may be exacerbated by the way in which the international aid effort after the earthquake divided Haiti into “affected” and “unaffected” zones. Due both to their ease of access and proximity to the earthquake’s epicenter, the areas clustered in the urbanized corridor around Port-au-Prince have seen the greatest concentration of NGOs and ‘crowding-in’ of aid operations. However, based on my own organization’s assessments, and those of other aid agencies, the ‘affected area’ has fuzzy boundaries. The impact of displacement ripples out from the urban areas into the rural areas beyond the West and South East regions, as people have fled the cities to resettle in the rural areas. This has put an increased burden on the rural economy, and stretched communal resources to deal with the trauma of the new arrivals. A hard division of the country into ‘affected’ and ‘unaffected’ is thus a false binary, perhaps imposed by the bureaucratic logic of the aid system.

Aid agencies are also complicit in a subtler division of the country that occurs through the legal system. As Weinstein and Segal argue, since Haiti’s Independence, “almost every political elite ... has imposed its own kind of servitude on the masses” – using the formal structure of the state, as well as private power to further their own interests (1992, p. 1). The Haitian politico-legal system, like its infrastructure, has been dominated by its elite and had privileged the urbanized core, where formalized legal norms hold more sway, over the peripheries of the slums and rural areas, which are characterized by significant informality (Weinstein & Segal 1992, pp. 1-13; cf. Chabol & Daloz 1999). This echoes Mahmood Mamdani’s analysis of the ways European civil law only governed the urban colonized areas of Africa – remoter regions were governed through more informal ‘customary law’ (Mamdani 1996). Indeed, Haitian scholar Jean-Jacques Honorat has said that formal Haitian law holds little sway in the rural areas; they are governed by a type of “underground customary law” (in Weinstein & Segal 1992, p. 7). Since international agencies are rooted in countries where compliance with the law is difficult to resist, NGOs and UN agencies are more comfortable working within legally-structured space, than the grey, twilight spaces of informality.

This dynamic can be illustrated by the education sector. Within Haiti’s radically privatized and decentralized education system, “only 10% of the private schools have been licensed at the primary

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level, and not more than one-third at the secondary level” (Salmi 2000, p. 172). School directors of unlicensed schools usually cite the cost of registration and the difficulty of meeting the minimum building standards as the main reasons behind opting to remain unregistered. However, the mainstream aid agencies are nervous about providing long-term assistance to unregistered schools, and are discouraged from doing so by institutional donors. Indeed, in conversation, officials of one major international agency seemed surprised that there were a significant numbers of schools that were not covered by their assessments that focussed only on registered schools. From my own agency’s limited assessments, it appears that registered schools are clustered in the already privileged urbanized core of the country, while unregistered schools were in the slums or mountainous rural areas (see Figure 8 below). This reflects the work of Bolton & Jeffrey (2008), who examined how NGO registration laws are a political practice that reward or marginalize sections of civil society, conferring official acknowledgement of existence on some groups and legal invisibility on others. As a result, layered on top of the fragmentation of the country into infrastructure-rich/infrastructure-poor, ‘affected’/’unaffected’, the core-periphery dynamic is reinforced by the division of registered versus unregistered space.

Schools in the periphery thus exist in the world of the informal. They provide a public service – education of marginalized people – but since they remain outside the realm of the formal, the state and its partners (e.g. major international NGOs) do not have to take responsibility for them. If they are effective, they reduce the pressure on the state and international aid sector for public services. If they are ineffective, they can be dismissed as “unregistered” and not taken seriously. This dynamic is reflected in the wider economy, where 90% of formal employment positions are concentrated in Port-au-Prince and significant numbers of poor and marginalized people make their livelihood in the informal sector (Arthur 2002, pp. 46-47). Similarly, rural areas have long been under-policed by the Haitian state and have “reverted to old self-policing behaviour” (Mendelson-Forman 2006, p. 24). As Chabol and Daloz (1999) have demonstrated, leaving some spaces in the social system outside of formalized governance enables the powerful core to avoid being tied down to predictable and stable commitments to the periphery. As Weinstein and Segal have argued

The absence of government services makes the state irrelevant in peasants’ thoughts. Irrelevance is a form of protection for the [Haitian elite]. Peasants would not, at least in the recent past, make demands on the state; they would sooner turn to foreigners if they want beyond what their families can provide (1992, p. 10).

However, many such foreigners are reluctant to step too far outside the canopy of formally regulated space, making them unwitting collaborators with the core-periphery dynamic. As Merrill observed in 1996, “foreign initiatives in Haiti have paid attention only to the tiny, mostly urban, self-interested ruling elite, who have little in common with the Haitian population as a whole” (Merrill 1996, p. 32).

This has implications for the “Primacy of Human Rights” demanded by the human security doctrine. The complexes of international governance have not been able to successfully reverse the privileging of some Haitians’ entitlements over others. By being confined to specific enclaves, international aid workers and bureaucrats shut themselves off from the rest the country, constraining Haitian rights to proper representation and access to information. Likewise, the somewhat arbitrary geographic
allocation of aid violates the socio-economic rights of Haiti’s marginalized people. Moreover, it is unclear whether a governance system that is constantly in flux can be a reliable guarantor of people’s rights and entitlements. While the international community has been more capable at protecting Haitians’ right to life and public services than the Haitian state, the ‘liaison’ of aid agencies with Haitians is not as secure as a long-term social contract, with stable and predictable norms and institutions.

Figure 9: Schools in West and South-East departments covered by an NGO assessment. Green dots indicate schools registered with the government, red dots represent unregistered schools. The red dots are clustered in the slum of Cite Soleil or the mountainous rural areas.

3. Conclusion and Reflections

Haiti faces a human security crisis – a million people live in ad hoc tented camps, subject to high levels of crime and instability. The political system faces periodic convulsions and frequent demonstrations. State structures have literally crumbled. Into the vacuum, a complex of international public and private agencies has stepped forward to provide social services and security. While it performs many functions traditionally associated with the state, this global governance system differs significantly from the bureaucratic structure of the Weberian state. It is globalized – staffed by international experts, soldiers and volunteers and funded by a combination of foreign tax systems and philanthropic donations. It is privatized – involving a wide range of NGOs, churches and businesses that are primarily accountable to their private mandates and constituents. It is technologized and technocratized – emphasizing digitizable and quantitative over informal and qualitative information. It is fragmented and shifting – diffusing decisions, authority and organizational structures over networks and interacting with local core-periphery divisions. These systems, and the problems they attempt to address, have been
strengthened in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, but are rooted in the history of Haiti’s social, political, cultural and economic life.

The emergence of this globalized complex of liberal governance in Haiti raises questions about the legitimacy of such forms of political authority, opportunities for political contestation and accountability and the possibility for sustained political action against entrenched unjust socio-political systems. The solutions to such problems with the global governance system should not necessarily lead to an uncritical nostalgia for the state system. The nation-state as an institution has created great progressive gains but has also been used to oppress and kill. Just because the global complexes of liberal governance in Haiti and other ‘failed states’ have flaws does not mean there are not possibilities for progressive gains.

Politics is the art of the possible and there may be political space to work within this globalized, networked and privatized system to create and institutionalize systemic feedback loops, hyper-reflexive self-criticism, participation and consultation. Moreover, progressive Haitian actors have unprecedented opportunities to link up and create alliances with like-minded actors around the world, to push for human security and development. However, exploiting these possibilities will require an understanding that the aid and peacekeeping system in Haiti is not a form of apolitical humanitarianism – it is a system of governance, deeply political, that empowers some and disempowers others. Indeed, one evaluation of foreign aid in Haiti argued that “Aid shortcomings originated in the collective failure of donors to grasp that issues of Haitian politics and governance were the important drivers of success – or failure” (Buss & Gardner 2008, p. 100. Emphasis in original). Therefore, progressive policy success in this context will require political savvy, strategy and maneuver – a mastery of ‘network politics.’

The focus of the international intervention in Haiti must be to reduce people’s vulnerability to ‘downside risks’ – whether caused by violence, neglect or natural disaster. To do this, international public servants, must be willing to engage in the long-term, to make a clear and predictable commitment of time and resources. They must be willing to partner with ordinary Haitians – make themselves vulnerable and listen to what Haitians have to say. They must engage in the political task of redressing the country’s imbalanced core-periphery dynamic, by being willing to extend access to rights and entitlements beyond the urbanized and privileged core.
Bibliography


Global Governance in Post-Earthquake Haiti


