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Short-termism

 

Short-termism

Fit for purpose? Does UK company law contribute to short termism in UK companies?

Whether or not managers of UK companies are subject to short term pressures is one of the most important current policy debates. The mechanisms through which institutional investors invest in capital markets are thought to be subject to several pressures to invest with the short rather than the long term in mind. The remuneration structures and reporting requirement of fund managers provide one such example of such pressures. However as Professor Roe of the Harvard Law School has argued, in order for capital market short termism to be translated into business short termism there needs to be a transmission mechanism to transfer such pressures into the board room.

This seminar series explores whether such transmission mechanisms exist in the UK context and whether UK company law facilitates or dampens the transmission of such short term pressures. 

William Underhill7

Short-termism, the market for corporate control and takeover regulation|

22nd October 2014, 6.00pm - 7.30pm

Room 1.07, New Academic Building, LSE

Ian Gilham, David Kershaw|, William Underhill|

This first seminar in this series explored the role of the market for corporate control and its regulation by the Takeover Code in encouraging short term behaviour by UK companies. Other seminars in the series address the relationship between short termism and Shareholder activism and Shareholder rights and Disclosure regulation.

> Watch seminar video|

 
Kershaw_L_1

Short-termism and Shareholder Rights

21st May 2015, 6.00pm - 7.30pm

Room LG.04, 32 Lincolns Inn Fields, LSE

David Kershaw|, William Underhill|, Andrew Wood

In the Second Seminar of this series we consider whether Shareholder rights - including removal rights, pre - emption rights, and transaction approval rights - can act as mechanisms for transmitting market short-termism into the board room.

This event is free and open to all, to pre - register please email fmg@lse.ac.uk|

 

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