

# *Default, Liquidity and the Yield Curve*

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
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
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# Real estate 'liquidity'

## Months of Supply of Existing Homes For Sale




# Market liquidity index (Bank of England)



source: Bank of England, 2009.

# Counterparty risk and interbank rates: the TED spread

TED Spread (in bp)



# The crisis raises several questions

- 1 How does illiquidity in asset/commodity markets affect the demand for money and the role of monetary policy?
- 2 How does default risk affect the demand for money and the role of regulation and monetary policies?
- 3 What are the implications of liquidity and default risk for activity, asset prices and the yield curve?


# To answer these questions, we need

- 1 A monetary model, i.e. a model where money is needed to conduct transactions
- 2 A model where *endogenous* default is allowed in the interbank market
- 3 A model with heterogeneous agents, so that illiquidity has an effect on activity and asset prices
- 4 Illiquidity and default risk should be uninsurable; we assume this is the only uninsurable risk

# Results


- 1 Illiquidity in asset and commodity markets increases the demand for money
- 2 Default risk increases the short-term interest rate and the elasticity of money demand to short-term rate is lower the higher the default penalty.
- 3 Higher interest rates lower trade activity, and the more so for illiquid commodities.
- 4 Even in absence of aggregate uncertainty, uncertainty in funding costs generate a risk-premium in the yield curve.

# Summary





# Summary




# Uncertainty and Complete Markets

The model is an exchange economy with cash-in-advance constraints and incomplete markets: liquidity risk is uninsurable. All other risks are insurable.

There are two periods. The first period is indexed by 0. The second period has  $S$  states, indexed by  $s = 1, \dots, S$ .

There are two agents:  $i = \alpha, \beta$ , and a consolidated banking system.  $\alpha$  is the borrower.  $\beta$  is the lender.

# Cash-in-Advance Constraints



# Maximization problem

$$\max_{q_0, (q_s, \mu_s, h_s, d_s)_{s \in \{1 \dots S\}}} u^\alpha(q_0) + \frac{1}{S} \left( \sum_{s=1}^S u^\alpha(e_s - q_s) - \delta \max(d_s \mu_s; 0) \right)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad p_0 q_0 \leq \sum_{1 \leq s \leq S} \theta_s h_s$$

$$\forall s \in \{1, \dots, S\} \quad h_s \leq \frac{1}{1 + r_s} \mu_s$$

$$\mu_s(1 - d_s) \leq p_s q_s$$

# Quantity Theory of Fiat Money

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$$\forall s \in \{0, \dots, S\} \quad p_s q_s = M_s$$

### Intuition:

Money is used for transaction purposes. All money available is used in liquidity-constrained economies.

Velocity and liquidity are set to 1.

We will come back to this later.

# Value of Money and Default

## Value of Money

$$\forall s \in \{0, \dots, S\} \quad r_s \approx d_s = 1 - \delta M_s$$

### Proof:

Outcome of four equilibrium conditions:

- ① marginal cost of default = marginal cost of repaying

$$\implies \delta = u'^\alpha(c_s)/p_s$$


- ②  $(1 - d_s)(1 + r_s)M_s = M_s \implies r_s \approx d_s$

- ③ marg. default cost of borrow. = value of \$1 to release liquidity constraint

$$\implies \delta(1 + r_s) \approx \frac{u'^\beta(q_s)}{p_s} = \frac{1}{p_s q_s} = \frac{1}{M_s}$$


# Higher money supply decreases default and interest rates

Intuition: Inflation  $\implies$  higher cost of default.  $\implies$  default and interest rates decrease



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
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
# “Slutsky” decomposition of effect of regulation: 1

Tighter regulation (harsher penalties) increases the utility cost of default  $\implies$  reduces the default rate and therefore the interest rate.




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
# “Slutsky” decomposition of effect of regulation: 2

Tighter regulation (harsher penalty) increases the cost of default due to interest rates  $\implies$  reduces the elasticity of interest rates to money supply.



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# Endogenous State Prices

## Theorem

Assume  $RRA \geq 1$ .

$$\forall s \neq s', r_s > r_{s'} \iff \theta_s > \theta_{s'} \iff \hat{\pi}_s > \hat{\pi}_{s'}$$

**Intuition: Risk-neutral probabilities are higher in states of nature with tighter liquidity constraints.**

- ① The financing cost acts like a tax and decreases trade.
- ② Higher interest rate means lower trade
- ③ Lower trade implies higher marginal utility for the buyer...
- ④ ...and higher demand for the asset  $\implies$  higher state price.

# Proof

For the buyer

$$\frac{\theta_s}{\theta_{s'}} = \frac{u'(q_s)/p_s}{u'(q_{s'})/p_{s'}} \quad (1)$$

For the seller

$$\frac{\theta_s}{\theta_{s'}} = \frac{u'(e_s - q_s)(1 + r_s)/p_s}{u'(e_s - q_{s'})(1 + r_{s'})/p_{s'}} \quad (2)$$

Combining FOCs:

$$1 = \frac{(1 + r_s)u'(e_s - q_s)/u'(q_s)}{(1 + r_{s'})u'(e_s - q_{s'})/u'(q_{s'})} \quad (3)$$

$u'(e - q)/u'(q)$  is increasing in  $q$ . Hence,  $r_s > r_{s'} \Rightarrow q_s < q_{s'}$ .

# Proof

For the buyer

$$\frac{\theta_s}{\theta_{s'}} = \frac{u'(q_s)/p_s}{u'(q_{s'})/p_{s'}} \quad (4)$$

For the seller

$$\frac{\theta_s}{\theta_{s'}} = \frac{u'(e_s - q_s)(1 + r_s)/p_s}{u'(e_s - q_{s'})(1 + r_{s'})/p_{s'}} \quad (5)$$

Combining FOCs and quantity theory of money :

$$\frac{\theta_s}{\theta_{s'}} = \frac{u'(q_s)q_s/p_s q_s}{u'(q_{s'})/p_{s'} q_{s'}} = \frac{u'(q_s)q_s/M_s}{u'(q_{s'})q_{s'}/M_{s'}} \quad (6)$$

$q$  is decreasing in  $r$ .  $u'(q)q$  is decreasing in  $q \iff RRA \geq 1$ .

# Example: CRRA

Comparing state prices (or risk-neutral probabilities) across states of nature  $s$  and  $s'$

$$\frac{\theta_s}{\theta_{s'}} = \overbrace{\left(\frac{e_{s'}^\alpha}{e_s^\alpha}\right)^{\rho-1}}^{\text{aggregate uncertainty}} \overbrace{\frac{M_{s'}}{M_s}}^{\text{inflation}} \overbrace{\left(\frac{q_s^\alpha/e_s^\alpha}{q_{s'}^\alpha/e_{s'}^\alpha}\right)^{1-\rho}}^{\text{heterogeneity}}$$

where

$$\underbrace{\frac{q_s^\alpha/e_s^\alpha}{q_{s'}^\alpha/e_{s'}^\alpha} = \frac{\left(\frac{1+r'_s}{1+r_0}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} + \frac{e_0^\beta}{q_0^\beta} - 1}{\left(\frac{1+r_s}{1+r_0}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} + \frac{e_0^\beta}{q_0^\beta} - 1}}_{\text{higher interest rate decreases trade}}$$



# Upward Term Structure

## Puzzle

The risk premium in the term structure (the term premium) is above what would be predicted in a Lucas-type economy

$$p_t = \mathbb{E}[u'(c_{t+1})y_{t+1}/u'(c_t)]$$

# Explanations of Puzzle

- ❶ Lucas' model fails in tests from Backus *et al.* (1989) and Grossman *et al.* (1987)
- ❷ Liquidity (Hicks, Lutz, 1940)
- ❸ Preferred Habitat (Modigliani and Sutch, 1967), etc.
- ❹ Uninsurable income risk, as in Weil (1990) and Ayagari (1994), would increase precautionary savings and decrease rates, depending on the shape of the utility function
- ❺ In Elul (1997), with general incomplete market structure, there is no general result

# Our term premium

- 1 Uninsurable monetary costs...
- 2 ...reduce trade, for any given aggregate income.
- 3 With any concave utility function, lower trade implies higher marginal utilities and state prices.
- 4 This generates a risk premium in the term structure.
- 5 The result holds in an economy with multiple commodities, as long as one commodity is always purchased by agent  $\alpha$ , across all states of nature.


# Another look at liquidity: max. problem for agent $\beta$

$$\sum_{s \in \{1 \dots S\}} \theta_s h_s^\beta \leq \Lambda_0 p_0 q_0^\beta + \frac{\mu_0^\beta}{1 + r_0} + m_0^\beta$$

$$\mu_0^\beta \leq (1 - \Lambda_0) p_0 q_0^\beta$$

$$\forall s \in \{1, \dots, S\}, p_s q_s^\beta \leq \frac{\mu_s^\beta}{1 + r_s} + \lambda_s h_s^\beta + m_s^\beta$$

$$\mu_s^\beta \leq (1 - \lambda_s) h_s^\beta$$



# Cash-in-Advance Constraints

## Quantity theory of Money

$$p_s q_s = \frac{M_s + m_s^\beta}{1 - \Lambda_s + (1 - \lambda_s)(\Lambda_s + \frac{1 - \Lambda_s}{1 + r_s})}$$

- When  $\lambda_s = 1$ ,  $p_s q_s = \frac{M_s + m_s^\beta}{1 - \Lambda_s}$ . When  $\Lambda_s = 1$ ,  $p_s q_s = \frac{M_s + m_s^\beta}{1 - \lambda_s}$
- Link with  $PQ = vM = 1/k M$  where  $k$  is the liquidity of money
- $1 - \Lambda$  is the illiquidity of commodities, or the relative liquidity of money.
- $\Lambda$  can also be thought of as the period in which the asset/commodity is unsold.

# Trade and asset prices

$$\frac{u'(e_s - q_s)}{u'(q_s)(\Lambda_s + (1 - \Lambda_s)/(1 + r_s))} = \frac{u'(e_{s'} - q_{s'})}{u'(q_{s'})(\Lambda_{s'} + (1 - \Lambda_{s'})/(1 + r_{s'}))}$$

# Slope of the Yield Curve

- The transaction cost is decreasing in  $\Lambda$  and increasing in the interest rate.
- Another interpretation: The cost of the inefficiency is increasing in the period in which the asset/commodity is unsold and is increasing in the cost of time.
- Trade is lower the lower  $M_s$ , the lower  $\lambda_s$  and the lower  $\Lambda_s$ .
- $\Rightarrow$  State prices (risk neutral probabilities) are lower the higher expected 'liquidity' of assets and commodities
- The slope of the yield curve is also determined by expected liquidity and liquidity risk.

# This is on top of the other determinants:

- ① lower expected inflation (nominal effect)
- ② lower inflation volatility (asset payoff volatility)
- ③ Reduction in the volatility of real activity (SDF volatility)
- ④ Others (change in preferences, regulations, government supply, demography, etc.)



# Concluding Remarks

We showed how:

- Default risk is sufficient to generate nominal determinacy
- Liquidity in asset/commodities affect the demand for money
- Changes in default penalties (regulation) shift money demand and affect the elasticity of money demand to interest rates.
- Asset prices are a function of money supply, asset liquidity and trade efficiencies
- Liquidity risk in endowments and assets matter for the slope of the yield curve