Bank Bailout Menus

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Abstract

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Bailing out banks requires overcoming debt overhang, in order to sustain their incentives for new lending, as well as dealing with adverse selection with respect to the quality of banks’ balance sheets. We examine bailouts that eliminate debt overhang, while attempting to minimize subsidies to banks’ equityholders. When banks do not differ with respect to the extent of debt overhang, it can be fully overcome with the minimal amount of subsidies, providing each bank’s equity holders no more than their pre-bailout values, with a partial new equity injection, or an asset buyout. When levels of loss given default covary with underlying probabilities of default, we characterize the conditions for attaining a similar minimal subsidy outcome, with a Menu of either equity injection or asset buyout plans, satisfying suitable self-selection constraints. These involve global rather than local conditions, with multiple intersections of indifference curves among bank types, and imply strictly greater funds injections than those needed to make existing debt default-free. More troubled banks optimally choose larger bailouts, and these involve a lower price per share (or unit of assets). We also examine the role of coupling asset purchases with providing the bailout agency Options to buy bank equity, to enhance its capture of rents arising from new investments by banks. We compare its performance with equity injections on this dimension, as well as others such as post-bailout stakes held by prior inside equity holders of banks.

Keywords: Bailouts, Subsidies, Debt overhang, Private information, Self-selection.

JEL: G28, G01, D82
1 Introduction

The recent spate of banking crises, arising in part from “unanticipated” declines in the quality of mortgage-backed loans and securities in US markets in particular, has brought to the fore issues of optimal mechanisms for restoring banks to well-functioning entities capable of further lending to the real sector of an economy. Banks are characterized not only by their specialized role as relationship-based lenders with hard-to-replace informational advantages vis-a-vis small and medium sized firms, they are also often funded with high leverage from dispersed creditors, be they depositors with demandable claims or (increasingly) wholesale market lenders with short-term claims which may not be refinanced. These features of bank liabilities make it extremely difficult to renegotiate their debt – to a combination of debt reduction and equity-like claims for example – directly with their creditors, and hence governments often play a direct role in ameliorating the problems arising from banks having a large degree of “debt overhang” – a surfeit of future fixed claims relative to potential future values of their extant assets in adverse scenarios.

As Myers (1977) recognized in a path-breaking paper, this gives rise to underinvestment by equity holders, or management acting in their interest, since much of any future cash flows generated by such investments could accrue to extant creditors, while the costs of investments would be borne by existing equity holders – either directly, or via a reduction in their future payoffs arising from additional promised repayments to new financiers whose claims would typically be junior to those of existing creditors. At the same time, a policy of injecting funds into such banks – in order to improve their incentives to invest, and lend – has to take into account the fact that their existing equity holders have an option value that arises from the expectation of profits after repaying their creditors in the upper tail of the distributions of their future asset values. Thus, any equity stakes, or sales of assets, that are demanded as a quid pro quo for such fund injections must leave existing equity holders with an expected payoff that is no lower than what they would have obtained in the current status quo.
In this paper, we investigate the properties of two often-used mechanisms for providing such cash injections to troubled banks, namely Equity Injections in return for the government acquiring a partial share of a bank’s equity capital, and Asset Buy Backs (or, asset buyouts) whereby the government injects cash into a bank in return for acquiring ownership of a subset, or fraction, of its (troubled) assets. The latter may also be combined with Options or Warrants to buy bank equity shares in future, at a price higher than their current values. We do so in a setting in which bank managements, who we assume to be acting in the interests of their shareholders, are privately informed about the qualities of their illiquid and risky troubled assets. As a clear consequence of such asymmetric information, fund injection mechanisms to alleviate debt overhang must be carefully designed, so as not to leave too much surplus for banks’ current equity holders, relative to the status quo values of their claims in the absence of alleviating debt overhang related problems.

Not surprisingly, given the enormity of the scales of recent fund injections, or Bailouts, of especially larger banks with significant holdings of “toxic” assets, these issues have received much attention in policy-related debates as well as in the emerging academic literature. In the former sphere, policy makers have vacillated, regarding massive asset buyout programs such as TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program) in the US, much of the budgeted resources for which were later switched to equity injections as with Citibank, for example. Bebchuk (2008) provides a summary of considerations involved in evaluating asset qualities and their likely equilibrium valuations for such buyout programs; Schaefer and Zimmermann (2009) consider a related set of issues for bank recapitalization, coupled with creation of “bad banks” to manage assets acquired by the bailout agency.

In a more detailed analytical vein, Landier and Ueda (2008), as well as Philippon and Schnabl (2009), have discussed the relative merits of some alternative bailout mechanisms that have been considered. Landier and Ueda consider an asymmetric information environment in which banks have private information about their default risks, but there is no issue of their incentives to invest in new assets. They conclude that an efficient mechanism for bailing out banks from defaulting is to provide an ex post guarantee to their creditors,
to pay them the difference between the face values of their claims and what their debtor bank can repay in an adverse future state. In our context, of an investment disincentive problem arising from debt overhang, such a purely ex post debt guarantee would do nothing to resolve the problem. The reason is that, when a debtor bank would invest, much of any additional cash flows generated by such investment would accrue to their extant creditors in the adverse future states, and hence serve to reduce the value of any guarantee from the perspective of the bank’s equity holders who would bear (directly or indirectly) the cost associated with the investment. That is the case since, by assumption, cash flows arising within the bank from new investments can not be distinguished – neither by their creditors, nor by their debt guarantor – from those accruing from the old assets in place.

Philippon and Schnabl (2009), on the other hand, do analyze a full-fledged debt overhang environment with asymmetric information as above, in which the resulting disincentive to invest is of concern. They do so postulating full knowledge, on the part of the designer of the bailout plan, of the joint distribution of the likelihoods (and extents) of defaults on any extant debt, and the profitability of new investment opportunities, among the cross-section of banks. They provide a comparison among alternative bailout mechanisms – such as equity injections and asset buyouts – under some simplifying assumptions, which include the following. The supports of the distributions of banks’ future asset values, adjusted for the scale of their debt liabilities, are assumed to be the same across banks. Furthermore, the menus of equity injection and asset buyout plans they consider are restricted to ones with a linear pricing structure, constrained by upper bounds on the amount of assets offered to be bought or the fractional equity stake to be acquired, at pre-specified unit prices. Within this restricted class of mechanisms, they allow for partial bailouts (relief of debt overhang), and non-participation in bailouts by a subset of banks with very profitable (high NPV) investment opportunities, preferring to invest on their own. They note that equity injection plans have the advantage, relative to asset buyouts, of capturing part of these NPVs.

In our model, we allow for the minimum future value of a bank’s extant assets to vary
with its “type”. Across types, both the probability of reaching their minimum values – which are strictly lower than banks’ common (scale-adjusted) debt repayment obligations – and the extent of “loss given default”, may differ in a correlated manner. Indeed, it is entirely plausible that banks having lower quality debt-related assets, with higher likelihood of not repaying their par values, would also suffer higher proportionate losses on these in the adverse economic states; for example, on a junior tranche of a set of mortgage-backed securities on the same mortgage pool. However, unlike in Philippon and Schnabl (2009), we do not ascribe any knowledge of the joint distribution of future returns on extant assets and new investment opportunities to the designer of the bailout mechanism. Instead, we focus on mechanisms, or menus of bailout plans (see below), which would fully relieve debt overhang (eliminate default risk on prior debt claims) at each type of bank in the cross-section. Moreover, we do so allowing for quite general bailout menus of price, quantity tuples – of cash to be injected in return for some fraction of equity in a bank, or in return for acquiring a subset of its assets. In particular, we do not impose any restriction of linearity in quantities, i.e., constant unit prices, across components/elements of such bailout menus. With this additional flexibility, our bailout mechanism designer aims to attain a more efficient solution to the problem of minimizing the payoff to the banks’ existing equity holders.

We are able to show that, under plausible conditions, it is feasible to design a Menu of equity injection tuples – each element of which specifies a fractional stake to be awarded to the government in return for a given level of cash injection to the bank choosing it – such that each type of bank is fully relieved of its debt overhang, while its current equity holders obtain an expected payoff equal to that in the status quo. We also show that whenever such a “first-best” menu of equity injections exists there may exist an equivalent menu of asset buyout proposals achieving at least full debt overhang relief, while providing the same state-by-state future payoffs to all claimholders. Such an equivalence result does depend on when and how new investment (including lending) opportunities arise in a bank. It holds when such opportunities are also associated with (in proportion to) the
assets acquired in a buyout, and in some limited circumstances otherwise. Moreover, as we shall show, once a suitably designed menu of Warrants/Options is attached, to each element of our asset buyout menu, the combined menu can often perform at least as well in capturing the same share of the NPV arising from new investments made, post-bailout, as does the menu of equity injections. This is the case especially when the set of all banks in the cross-section are all solvent in an ex ante valuation sense.

A key feature of our results, pertaining to both optimal equity injection and asset buyout menus satisfying self-selection conditions across bank types, is that such menus involve injecting strictly more funds into worse type banks than the minimum amounts needed to fully resolve their debt overhang problems, by eliminating any risk of default on their debt. This aspect of our solution arises from an interesting analytical feature of the underlying self-selection problem across different bank types, within a specified menu of contracts. The indifference curves for different types, in the space of say the fraction of equity surrendered in return for a given amount of cash injected, do not satisfy the commonly assumed “single-crossing” condition, of the slopes of these curves being uniformly ordered the same way across types, as a function of their probabilities of financial distress for example. Instead, under plausible conditions, the indifference curves for two different types of banks, arising from their (differing) status quo equity payoffs, intersect at multiple points, which serves to characterizes our solution. We then argue that this key result has implications for a fully optimal solution, combining subsets of the optimal menus of equity injection and asset buyout (coupled with warrants) plans. This is the case once one takes into account their differing implications for government outlays, and post-bailout private equity stakes.

Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out the notation for our space of bank types, their return distributions, and two main bailout programs. In section 3, we first derive simple results characterizing the necessary cum sufficient conditions for achieving (at least) full relief of debt overhang problems at each type of bank with equity injections, without providing its equity holders with any surplus beyond their status quo expected
payoff, plus their share of the NPVs from any future investments. Following these steps, in Section 4 we consider issues relating to net payoffs arising from post-bailout investments by banks, and the partial capture of these by the bailout agency using equity injections, or asset buyouts, potentially coupled with receiving Options to acquire bank equity in good future states. In the concluding Section 5, we elaborate on the implications of our results for Policy choices over different types of bailout mechanisms. In doing so, we allow for consideration of the implications of these for the post-bailout incentives of banks’ insiders cum managers, vis-a-vis monitoring activities on their future lending for example. An appendix contains all proofs that are not provided in the text.

2 The Model

Our model addresses the problem as to how to restructure a “weak” bank’s balance sheet, in preparation for its return to normal banking activities, including raising fresh capital. The bailout needs to happen ex ante, since there will not be sufficient time to do a bailout once investment (lending) opportunities arrive. The notion that the bailout process is slow while investment opportunities can be fleeting echoes Huberman (1984).¹

There are two dates, \( t = 0, 1 \). A central agency (a government with powers of taxation) is considering bailing out banks at date 0. At this point, the asset values of banks are uncertain. At date 1, uncertainty about the assets in place are resolved, according to a binomial distribution that depends on a bank’s type. Only a bank’s management knows its type and the management’s objective is to maximizes the value of existing shareholders’ equity.

Banks are indexed by \( s \in S \). The assets in place of a bank of type \( s \) can be described by a three-tuple, \((H_s, L_s, p_s)\). Here \( H_s > L_s \) represent the values of the assets in place in the

¹Huberman develops a model of external financing and liquidity in which there is not sufficient time to raise funds once an investment opportunity arises. It has to be raised in advance. We only assume that there is not sufficient time to do a bailout.
up and down states in future, respectively, and $p_s$ is the probability of the up state.\(^2\) There is universal risk neutrality and the riskfree rate is 0, implying that the full information date 0 value of the assets in place of a bank of type $s$ is

$$A_s = p_s H_s + (1 - p_s) L_s.$$ (1)

$H_s$ and $L_s$ are (weakly) increasing and decreasing, respectively, in $s$, and $p_s$ is strictly increasing in $s$. Thus, the quality of a bank is increasing in $s$, in the sense that the distribution of asset values for a bank of type $s$ first order stochastically dominates that of a bank of type $s' < s$. Moreover, $A_s$ is increasing in $s$.

Banks have only two types of claims outstanding, senior debt (including demand deposits) and common stock. All debt matures at date 1. The promised payment on debt is independent of bank type and satisfies $F \in (L_s, H_s)$ for all $s$; this is meant as a scale normalization. Thus, without a bailout, each bank would default in its down state, but not in the up state. Furthermore, in the case of default, writedowns, $F - L_s$, are (weakly) larger for lower quality banks. In other words, the problem of debt overhang is more severe for lower quality banks, in the senses of both likelihood of, as well as loss given, default on their extant debt claims.

In the baseline model laid out in this section, NPV from new investments can be interpreted as being incorporated in $H_s$ and $L_s$, with the assumption thus being that new investment opportunities arrive at date 1. This NPV follows the assets rather than the bank itself, so that the NPV that accrues to the bank is reduced if assets are sold.\(^3\) In Section 4 we go beyond our baseline model and consider the case that investment opportunities arrive at an interim date, before payoffs to assets-in-place are realized, and where these opportunities and their NPV, which may be type and state dependent, follow the bank rather than the assets.

\(^2\)Note that we are not making any assumption about the correlations among the asset value distributions across banks. Each bank can be viewed as having its own solvency and default states.

\(^3\)Think of $H_s$ as being the sum of actual assets-in-place $H_a^s$ and the NPV from new ex post investments $X_{h,s}$. Similarly, $L_s = L_a^s + X_{l,s}$. See footnotes 4, 5, and 7 for further discussion.
We solve for bailout plans that fully remove debt overhang for each type of bank. These are plans that make their debt free of default risk. However, our notation and analysis below recognizes that some bailout plans may leave bank debt risky.

A bailout plan is a pair of two-tuples

\[ B = \{(\phi, C), (\lambda, E)\} \in (\mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}^+) \times (\mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}^+) \]

that describe an asset buyout and an equity injection, respectively. \( \phi \in [0, 1] \) is the fraction of assets that are bought and \( C \geq 0 \) is the price that is paid for these assets. \( \lambda \in [0, 1] \) is the fraction of all shares the bailout agency obtains if it injects \( E \geq 0 \) in fresh equity capital. After a bailout, \( B \), asset values in the up and down states for a bank of type \( s \) are, respectively

\[
H_s^B = (1 - \phi)H_s + C + E \quad \text{and} \quad L_s^B = (1 - \phi)L_s + C + E.
\]

(2)

This assumes that the stochastic rates of return on a banks’ remaining assets after a partial sale remain the same as that on its assets as a whole, which requires homogeneity of asset quality within a bank. It also assumes that all cash injections are (temporarily) placed in the riskfree asset.\(^4\)

The payoff to existing equityholders in the up and down states are, respectively,

\[
Z_{s,H}^B = (1 - \lambda) \max \{H_s^B - F, 0\} \quad \text{and} \quad Z_{s,L}^B = (1 - \lambda) \max \{L_s^B - F, 0\}.
\]

(3)

The payoffs to creditors in the up and down states are, respectively:

\[
D_{s,H}^B = \min \{H_s^B, F\} \quad \text{and} \quad D_{s,L}^B = \min \{L_s^B, F\}.
\]

(4)

If there is no bailout, payoffs to equity and creditors are equivalent to those under the “null plan”, \( B_0 \equiv \{(\phi = 0, C = 0), (\lambda = 0, E = 0)\} \). All these payoffs are standard; they

\(^4\) Referring back to footnote 3, if \( B \) does not solve the moral hazard problem (i.e. the new investment would not be taken in the down state), we have \( L_s^B = (1 - \phi)L_s + C + E \). See footnotes 5 and 7 for further discussion of the implications this would have for our analysis.
recognize that equity is a call option on the bank’s assets with a strike price equal to the promised payment to debt. Note that fully eliminating debt overhang with a pure equity injection requires \( E \geq F - L_s \). Under a pure asset buyout, the corresponding condition is \( C \geq F - L_s(1 - \phi) \).

Let
\[
E[Z^B_s] = p_s Z^{B,H}_s + (1 - p_s) Z^{B,L}_s
\]
denote the conditional expected payoff to existing shareholders for a bank of type \( s \) given bailout plan \( B \). A necessary condition for the bank to accept the plan is that existing shareholders’ wealth (weakly) improves, that is,
\[
E[Z^B_s] \geq E[Z^{B_0}_s].
\]

Let \( B \) be a collection, or menu, of bailout plans and let \( B_s \in B \) satisfy\(^6\)
\[
B_s = \arg \max_{B \in B} E[Z^B_s].
\]
In other words, for any menu of bailout plans, the best plan for the existing shareholders of a bank of type \( s \) is denoted \( B_s \). The dependence of \( B_s \) on a given menu, \( B \), is suppressed in the notation, for ease of reading. We write
\[
B_s = \{(\phi_s, C_s), (\lambda_s, E_s)\}.
\]

Let \( q_s \) be the prior (unconditional) probability that a bank is of type \( s \). The problem faced by the bailout agency is to choose a menu that induces banks to pick bailout plans so that the total subsidy to existing claimholders is minimized, subject to the constraint that debt overhang is to be eliminated. Since the aggregate subsidy to existing claimholders equals the cash injected by the plan less the expected value of the bailout agency’s holdings under the plan, this amounts to choosing a menu \( B \) to minimize

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\(^5\) Referring to footnotes 3 and 4, these conditions could be written \( E \geq F - (L^a_s + X_{t,s}) \) and \( C \geq F - (L_s + X_{t,s})(1 - \phi) \).

\(^6\) We require that \( B \) be compact in the space of menus of bailout plans. If for a given \( s \) there are multiple plans that satisfy (7), \( B_s \) can be picked arbitrarily among them.
\[
\int_{S} q_s \left\{ \begin{array}{c}
C_s - \phi_s(p_sH_s + (1-p_s)L_s) \\
\text{subsidy from asset buyout}
\end{array} \right\} + \left\{ \begin{array}{c}
E_s - \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} E[Z_s^{B_s}] \\
\text{subsidy from equity injection}
\end{array} \right\} ds
\] (9)

subject to (7), (6), and

\[D_{B_s,H} = D_{B_s,L} = F \quad \text{for all } s.\] (10)

Constraint (7) means that each bank chooses the plan in the menu that maximizes the wealth of its existing shareholders. Constraint (6) means that doing so leaves the existing shareholders as least as well off as without a bailout. Constraint (10) says that under the best plan, \(B_s\), for a bank of type \(s\), its debt is riskfree, or equivalently, debt overhang is eliminated. Thus, we can also write the minimization problem as

\[
\min_{B_s} \int_{S} q_s E[Z_{s}^{B_s}] ds
\] (11)

subject to the same constraints, (6), (7), (10).

3 Analysis

We provide conditions under which it is possible to design a menu of bailout plans so that first best can be achieved, that is, for every \(s\) debt overhang is eliminated and expected subsidies equal their minimal level, \((1-p_s)(F-L_s)\), or equivalently, existing equityholders receive their status quo payoff, \(E[Z_s^{B_0}]\). Our analysis also shows how to construct such optimal menus and describes the explicit form they take. We start with a simple observation, from which we can deduce an irrelevance result with respect to equity injections versus asset buyouts.

Lemma 1 There is a one-to-one mapping with respect to payoffs to (old) equityholders between equity injection and asset buyout bailout plans. In particular, the pure equity injection plan \(\{\lambda, E\}\) and the pure asset buyout plan \(\{\phi, C\}\) give the same state-by-state
payoff to (old) equityholders provided that $\phi = \lambda$ and $C = (1 - \lambda)E + \lambda F$.\footnote{Recall that in our baseline model, we can view NPV from new investments as being embedded in $H_s$ and $L_s$. Using the notation and observations in footnotes 3, 4, and 5, it should be straightforward to see that if we in our notation explicitly separated the payoffs from actual assets-in-place and the NPV from new ex post investments, the one-to-one mapping in Lemma 1 still gives the same state-by-state payoffs to old equityholders. That the NPV would not be achieved in the down state under the status quo and under some bailout plans has no significance for this mapping or for our subsequent analysis, since old equityholders simply have a payoff of zero in the down state in these cases. Of course, it would obviously affect the payoff to old creditors in the down state if only $L_a$ obtains. But this does not affect old equityholders’ payoffs and therefore also not their incentive compatibility constraints when it comes to choosing between different bailout plans. Hence, our analysis and conclusions are not affected. Embedding the NPV from new investments in $H_s$ and $L_s$ has the advantage of notational simplicity. In Section 4, we consider a variation of our model where new investments arrive at an interim date. Here, the NPV from new investments will need to be written explicitly.}

This has two immediate and important implications. First, the set of payoffs to old equityholders induced by a menu of equity injection plans can be replicated with a menu of asset buyout plans (and vice versa). Second, for an equity injection plan that solves the debt overhang problem for a bank of type $s$, there is a corresponding asset buyout plan that gives the same state-by-state payoffs to all claimholders and the bailout agency (and vice versa). This follows immediately from the lemma by observing that if the debt overhang problem is solved, then creditors get $F$ regardless of the state, $w$. As a corollary of these two observations, we have

**Proposition 1** If there is a menu of pure equity injection plans that yields first best, then there is also a menu of pure asset buyout plans that does so (and vice versa). One can go from one to the other by applying the mapping in Lemma 1.

The one-to-one mapping in Lemma 1 (in terms of payoffs to old equityholders) holds regardless of the distribution of the returns. It follows that the equivalence between equity injections and asset buyouts described by Proposition 1 also does so. If a first best outcome can be achieved by a menu of pure equity injection or asset buyout plans, then it can also
be achieved by a menu of mixed plans (being convex combinations of the pure equity and asset buyout plans that achieve first best).

Furthermore and importantly, Lemma 1 also implies that for any mixed plan there is an equity injection plan that gives the same payoff to old equityholders. Thus, if there is a menu of mixed plans that achieve first best, there is also a set of pure equity plans that does so. In short, in terms of findings conditions under which first best can be achieved, it suffices to study pure equity injection plans. We have therefore chosen to cast our analysis in terms of these. However, we also compare the characteristics of optimal equity injection plans to their corresponding optimal asset buyout plans.

3.1 Homogeneous Debt Overhang

We begin by studying the simple setting of homogeneous debt overhang, that is, \( L_s = L \) for all \( s \). When banks differ only in their probabilities of default, but have the same loss given default relative to their debt obligations, there is an equity injection plan, as well as an asset buyout one, that achieves first best.

**Proposition 2 (Homogeneous debt overhang)** Suppose banks differ only in \( p_s \), that is, for all \( s \) we have \( L_s = L \) and \( H_s = H \). Then for each type, \( s \), full relief of debt overhang with a minimal subsidy to existing claimholders is achieved by either of the following two plans, of equity injection or asset buyout:

\[
B_E : \lambda = \frac{F - L}{H - L} \quad \text{and} \quad E = F - L
\]

or

\[
B_A : \phi = \frac{F - L}{H - L} \quad \text{and} \quad C = \phi H = F - L(1 - \phi)
\]

These two plans are unique (in terms of achieving first best for every \( s \)) in the class of pure equity injection or pure asset buyout plans, respectively.

Proposition 2 establishes that if banks differ only in the probability of default, one plan works for all banks. The choice between equity injection or asset buyout is immaterial
insofar as payoffs to claimholder is concerned. But as the expressions for the optimal $E$ and $C$ reveals, asset buyouts involve larger cash contributions by the bailout agency than equity injections. This is simply because buying out some of the bank’s assets also reduces its future cash flows. Thus, more capital needs to be injected in order to overcome the debt overhang problem in the down state.

having to replace bought out assets with new capital in order to generate sufficient return in the down state to overcome debt overhang.

That the same equity injection plan works for all banks may seem to be inconsistent with the idea expressed by Myers and Majluf (1984) that overvalued firms that wish to raise equity financing will necessarily have to dilute their equity excessively. However, what is happening in Proposition 2 is that the while the bailout plan leaves old equityholders equally well off as under the status quo, regardless of the type of their bank, the expected subsidy is decreasing in the type, $s$. Thus, the values of the new shares are not equal to the equity injection; they are less by an amount equal to these subsidies.

Proposition 2 also asserts that the optimal pure equity injection or asset buyout bailout plans involve the minimal injection of capital that resolves the debt overhang problem, since $E = F - L$ and $C = F - L(1 - \phi)$. Focusing without loss of generality on equity injections, one way to understand the logic behind this result is in terms of share-cash indifference curves that leave equityholders indifferent between a bailout and the status quo. Specifically, this indifference curve is given by the locus of $\lambda$’s and $E$’s that satisfy

$$p_s(H_s - F) = \begin{cases} (1 - \lambda)p_s(H_s + E - F) & \text{if } E \leq F - L_s \\ (1 - \lambda) \{p_s(H_s + E - F) + (1 - p_s)(L_s + E - F)\} & \text{if } E > F - L_s. \end{cases}$$

(12)

Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, $H_s = H$ and $L_s = L$. Thus, it is straightforward that for all $E \leq F - L$, the indifference curves of different bank types coincide. However, if the bailout overcapitalizes the bank, in the sense that $E > F - L$, $\lambda$ is decreasing in $p_s$. Intuitively, as the probability of the up state increases, the relative contribution
of the up state to overall payoff must increase, which can only be accomplished by decreasing \( \lambda \). This can be seen by rewriting the bottom part (the case that \( E > F - L_s \)) of equation (12) as

\[
(1 - \lambda) \left\{ \frac{H + E - F}{H - F} + \frac{1 - p_s}{p_s} \frac{L_s + E - F}{H - F} \right\} = 1
\]

(13)

and keeping in mind that, for now, \( L_s = L \) for all \( s \).

Thus, under homogeneous debt overhang, the indifference curves \( \lambda_s(E) \) coincide for \( E \leq F - L \). But for \( E > F - L \), the indifference curve of higher bank types lie below those of lower bank types. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Put differently, the indifference curves have a single point in common where debt overhang is solved, namely the \((\lambda, E)\) combination referred to as plan \( B_E \) in Proposition 2, and this plan also provides the minimal level of equity injection that resolves debt overhang.

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

3.1.1 Upside Heterogeneity

If \( H_s \) varies across types, the above argument breaks down because the indifference curves of different types never intersect. The following result holds in the general case where we consider equity injections, asset buyouts, and combinations thereof.

**Proposition 3** Suppose banks have the same debt overhang but have different asset values in the up state, that is, for all \( s \), \( L_s = L \), while \( H_s \) is strictly increasing in \( s \). Then a first best bailout outcome cannot be achieved.

If two bank types are equivalent in all respects expect that one has a higher asset value in the up state, the bailout agency needs to hold a larger fraction of the shares for the lower quality bank, ceteris paribus, in order to achieve first best. Thus, any plan that leaves the higher quality type with its status quo payoff will give an excess subsidy to the lower quality type. Since there is nothing to stop the lower quality type from choosing the plan tailored for the higher quality type, a first best outcome cannot be achieved. This
is essentially a standard Akerlof (1970) type result. The contrast to Proposition 2 arises because it is now not possible to give the same payoff in the up and down states to different quality banks.

3.2 Heterogeneous Debt Overhang

In the heterogeneous debt overhang setting, $L_s$ varies across types. This is most relevant to settings in which assets held by banks are of the debt(-based security) type, with contractual upper bounds (Par values) on their payoffs. Here, lower quality assets may suffer from greater losses given default. In contrast to the homogeneous debt overhang setting, it is now no longer feasible to find a single bailout plan that for each bank type injects just the minimal amount of capital necessary to eliminate debt overhang. As we shall show, overcapitalization of lower-quality bank types will now have to be part of any optimal bailout menu, which minimizes the subsidies to bank equity holders. Note that, in what follows, the homogeneity of banks in their (scale-adjusted) high state net payoffs, $(H - F)$, may be thought of as arising from similar ex ante capital requirements.

**Proposition 4** Suppose a bank is one of two types, $s = 1, 2$, where $L_1 < L_2$, $H_s = H$, $p_1 < p_2$, so that the future asset values of the two banks can be strictly ordered by first order stochastic dominance (FOSD). There is a unique pure equity injection bailout plan, $B_E(1, 2) = \{\lambda^{(1,2)}, E^{(1,2)}\}$, that for both banks resolves debt overhang and achieves the minimal subsidy. Under this plan, both banks obtain an equity injection which is strictly greater than the minimum needed to overcome debt overhang fully, that is $E > F - L_1$.

The bailout plan is given by:

$$\lambda^{(1,2)} = \frac{(H - F)(p_2 - p_1)}{p_2H + (1 - p_2)L_2 - (p_1H + (1 - p_1)L_1)} = 1 - \frac{(H - F)(p_2 - p_1)}{A_2 - A_1} \quad (14)$$

and

$$E^{(1,2)} = F - \frac{p_2(Hp_1 + L_1(1 - p_1)) - p_1(Hp_2 + L_2(1 - p_2))}{p_2 - p_1} = F - \frac{p_2A_1 - p_1A_2}{p_2 - p_1}. \quad (15)$$
**Proof:** Equation (12) implies that for any type \( s \), its share-cash indifference curve vis-a-vis its status quo expected equity payoff is given by

\[
\lambda_s(E) = \begin{cases} 
1 - \frac{H-F}{H+E-F} & \text{if } E \leq F - L_s \\
1 - \frac{p_s(H-F)}{p_s(H+E-F)+(1-p_s)(L_s+E-F)} & \text{if } E > F - L_s.
\end{cases}
\] (16)

We see that the indifference curve changes functional form and shape as \( E \) goes from representing undercapitalization, \( E < F - L_s \), to overcapitalization, \( E > F - L_s \). It is straightforward to verify that (a) \( \lambda_s(E) \) is strictly increasing and, on each region, strictly concave;\(^8\) (b) \( \lambda_s'(E) \) rises strictly as \( E \) enters the overcapitalization region; and (c) \( \lambda_s'(E) > \frac{d}{dE} E/(H + E - F) \) for \( E > F - L_s \).

We also see that \( \lambda_1(E) \) and \( \lambda_2(E) \) coincide for \( E \leq F - L_2 \). Thus, \( \lambda_2(E) > \lambda_1(E) \) immediately to the right of \( E = F - L_2 \), by observation (b) above. Furthermore, by observation (c), \( \lambda_2(E) > \lambda_1(E) \) for all \( E \in (F - L_2, F - L_1] \). To establish the proposition, we therefore need to show that \( \lambda_2(E) \) and \( \lambda_1(E) \) intersect once and only once for \( E > F - L_1 \).

Observe now that for \( E > F - L_s \), \( \lambda_s'(E) \) is strictly decreasing in \( p_s \). Therefore, \( \lambda_2(E) \) and \( \lambda_1(E) \) can at most intersect once. Now, inspection of (16) shows that for sufficiently large \( E \), we have \( \lambda_2(E) < \lambda_1(E) \), since \( p_2 \) is strictly larger than \( p_1 \). Thus, since the two curves are continuous, there is a (unique) point of intersection. Indeed, straightforward calculations show that the two curves intersect at \( E \) as given by (15), and at this point, \( \lambda_1 \) and \( \lambda_2 \) are as given by (14).\(^9\)

---

\(^8\)That is, \( \lambda_s(E) \) is piecewise strictly concave; it is strictly concave on \([0, F - L_s]\) and on \([F - L_s, \infty)\). Concavity is a simple implication of the fact that an additional dollar of new equity contributes less and less towards total equity value as the equity injection increases.

\(^9\)The proposition (and the proof) assumes that \( H_1 = H_2 = H \). If \( H_2 - H_1 \) is sufficiently small, the share-cash indifference curves will still cross and first best will be possible. However, if \( H_2 - H_1 \) is sufficiently large (and this will depend on the difference in debt overhang between the two types), first best is not possible (along the lines of Proposition 3).
The subsidy minimizing debt relief program can also be implemented with a menu of two bailout plans, which can be chosen so as to ensure separation between the two types. Any menu \(\{(\lambda_1, E_1), (\lambda_2, E_2)\}\) satisfying the following conditions will do: (i) \((\lambda_i, E_i)\) is on the indifference curve of type \(i\); (ii) \(E_2 \in (F - L_2, E^{(1,2)})\); and (iii) \(E_1 > E^{(1,2)}\), where \(E^{(1,2)}\) is given by (14). The common feature of all optimal bailout menus is that the low type must be overcapitalized so as to ensure that the high type is not oversubsidized.

The proposition is illustrated in Figure 2. The two indifference curves coincide as long as \(E\) is so small that debt overhang is not resolved for either type. However, as \(E\) moves into the region where debt overhang is solved for the higher-quality type, the curve for the higher type moves above that for the lower type. The slope for the lower type starts to increase as \(E\) increases beyond the minimal amount that solves debt overhang for the lower type. As illustrated, at \(E = F - L_1\), the higher type’s indifference curve is above that of the lower type. However, the greater slope of the indifference curve of the lower curve eventually allows it to cross the curve of the higher type at the point described in the proposition. With a bailout plan defined by this point, debt overhang is solved, and by construction of the indifference curves, the minimal level of subsidy to existing claimholders is obtained.

**INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE**

If the FOSD condition of Proposition 4 is NOT satisfied, for example if \(p_2 > p_1\) but \(L_2 < L_1\), then there is no equity injection menu which fully relieves debt overhang for both bank types and also achieves the minimal level of subsidy. In this case, the indifference curve of type 1 would be above that of type 2 at any level of equity injection that solves the debt overhang problem for type 2. Thus, any plan that works for type 2 would oversubsidize the equity of type 1.

The assumption that the future asset values of different types is ordered by strict FOSD, i.e., \(p_2\) is strictly larger than \(p_1\), is explicitly used in the proof of Proposition 4. Without strict FOSD, the result would not hold.
Proposition 5 Suppose $L_s$ is strictly increasing in $s$. Suppose also that $H_s = H$ and $p_s = p$ for all $s$. Then a first best outcome cannot be achieved.

In this case, FOSD holds, but only weakly. First best is now not possible because higher quality types could improve their payoffs relative to the status quo by adopting plans tailored to lower quality types. The reason is that high types have the same payoffs as low types in the up state, but strictly higher payoffs in the down states, and the probabilities of these states do not vary across types under the conditions of the proposition.

When there are more than two types of banks differing in their $p_s$ as well as $L_s$ values, then their Binomial future value distributions being ordered by strict first order stochastic dominance is no longer sufficient for the existence of a first best bailout menu. We also need the intersection points of the share-cash indifference curves (in $E \times \lambda$ space) to be monotonic in the following sense:

Definition 1 (Monotonicity of indifference curve intersection points)

Suppose there are $S \geq 3$ bank types and for each type $s > 1$ let $\{\lambda^{(s-1,s)}, E^{(s-1,s)}\}$ be the intersection point of the share-cash indifference curves of bank types $s-1$ and $s$, as defined by (14) and (15). These $S-1$ intersection points are monotonic if $E^{(s-1,s)} \leq E^{(t-1,t)}$ whenever $s > t$.

The intersection points referred to here represent the unique first best common equity injection bailout plans for two adjacent bank types, as given in Proposition 4. Intersection point monotonicity is necessary to ensure that no type is oversubsidized. A graphical illustration of intersection point monotonicity and its importance for first best is provided in Figure 3.

**INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE**

Figure 3 depicts the indifference curves of three types, $s = 1, 2, 3$, with $p_1 < p_2 < p_3$, and $L_1 < L_2 < L_3$. The red, blue, and green lines are the curves for types 1, 2 and 3,

---

10 Substitute $s$ for 2 and $s-1$ for 1 in these equations.
respectively. Focusing on the segments of these curves after they no longer coincide, we see that the green (type 3) and blue (type 2) curves intersect at a smaller $E$ than does the blue and red (type 1) curves. This is intersection point monotonicity.

As a result of intersection point monotonicity, there is also indifference curve monotonicity with respect to which type has the maximum $\lambda$ for a given equity injection. Specifically, we see in Figure 3 that for low $E$, type 3 is willing to give away a larger share of the equity than types 2 and 1. For intermediate $E$’s, type 2 is willing to give away a larger $\lambda$ than the other two types. And for high $E$’s, type 1 is willing to give away a larger share. Thus, it is possible to design a menu of three bailout plans that achieves first best by offering: (i) a plan with a low $E$ and a $\lambda$ that falls on the indifference curve of type 3; (ii) a plan with an intermediate $E$ and a $\lambda$ that falls on the indifference curve of type 2; (iii) a plan with a high $E$ and a $\lambda$ that falls on the indifference curve of type 1.\textsuperscript{11}

If intersection point monotonicity does not hold, this construction is not possible. Indeed, obtaining a first best outcome is not feasible.

**Theorem 1 (Heterogeneous debt overhang)** Suppose $L_s$ is strictly increasing in $s$, and $H_s = H$ for all $s$. A menu of equity injection plans which (a) achieves full relief of debt overhang for each bank type, $s = 1, \ldots, S$ and (b) provides the equity holders of each type with an expected payoff equal to the pre-bailout level, exists if and only if: (i) the Binomial future value distributions are ordered by strict FOSD; and (ii) the indifference curve intersection points are monotonic, which holds if and only if:

$$
\frac{p_{s+1}(1-p_s)L_s - p_s(1-p_{s+1})L_{s+1}}{p_s(1-p_{s-1})L_{s-1} - p_{s-1}(1-p_s)L_s} > \frac{p_{s+1} - p_s}{p_s - p_{s-1}}
$$

for $s = 2, \ldots, S - 1$.

Remark: Using the mapping from equity injections to equivalent asset buyouts described in Lemma 1, any optimal menu of equity injections can be replicated with a corresponding menu of asset buyouts.

\textsuperscript{11}“Low” $E$ means $E < E^{(2,3)}$; “intermediate” $E$ means $E \in [E^{(2,3)}, E^{(1,2)}]$; and “high” $E$ means $E > E^{(1,2)}$
3.2.1 Example

Here, we present an example that illustrates the role of the indifference curve intersection points in constructing first best menus of bailout plans. The example also illustrates the equivalence result between equity injections and asset buy back plans (Proposition 1). Finally, it highlights the nonlinear pricing structure that results from first best menus.

The example considers three types, all with $F = 100$, $H_s = 120$, and $L_s$ and $p_s$ as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type:</th>
<th>$s = 1$</th>
<th>$s = 2$</th>
<th>$s = 3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$L_s$</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_s$</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E[Z^{B_0}]$</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final row provides the status quo payoffs to inside (old) equity. These parameter values satisfy strict FOSD. They also satisfy (17) so that indifference curve intersection point monotonicity holds. First best menus of bailout plans therefore exist. The intersection points of the indifference curves are as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda & \quad E \\
\text{Types 2 and 3} & \quad .59 \quad 22.89 \\
\text{Types 1 and 2} & \quad .76 \quad 42.50
\end{align*}
\]

By the analysis above, a menu consisting of these intersection-points contracts will achieve first best. A feature of such a menu is that type 2 is, by construction, indifferent between the two plans. As discussed above, the intersection points also can be used to construct other menus consisting of three plans that strictly separate out the three types.

Table 1 presents the payoffs to equity holders and the bailout agency in the high and low states as well as the expected subsidy under the two “intersection point plans”. Both plans completely solve the debt overhang problem for all three types, implying that the ordering of the plans according to payoff to existing equityholders is equivalent to their
ordering by the total subsidy to all claimholders. Thus, the plan that gives the higher total subsidy to some type s also gives the higher subsidy to its old equityholders (as pointed out in the discussion leading up to equation (11)). This ordering equivalence can be seen in the final two columns of Table 1.

The table shows that Plan 1, which corresponds to the intersection point of types 2 and 3, leaves equityholders of these types with their status quo payoff (zero subsidy to inside equity); whereas it leaves equityholders of type 1 worse off. In contrast, Plan 2, which corresponds to the intersection point of types 1 and 2, leaves equityholders of these types indifferent; whereas it makes type 3 equityholders worse off. Thus, Plan 1 will be chosen by type 3 banks, while Plan 2 will be chosen by type 1 banks. Type 2 banks may choose either plan.

Table 2 illustrates the one-to-one mapping between equity injections and asset buyouts. This table presents asset buyout plans that leaves all existing debt and equityholders (as well as the bailout agency) with identical payoffs as under the equity injection plans in Table 1.

These examples illustrate the nonlinear pricing under first best menus. If there are $n$ old shares, under a pure equity injection plan, the number of new shares is $\lambda n/(1 - \lambda)$. Thus, if $n = 1$, the price per new share under a pure equity injection plan is $E(1 - \lambda)/\lambda$. Under an asset buyout, the price per 100% of the assets is simply $C/\phi$. Thus the plans in Tables 1 and 2 yield:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Plan 1</th>
<th>Plan 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equity Injection, Price per new share</td>
<td>15.89</td>
<td>13.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset buyout, Price per 100% of assets</td>
<td>116.44</td>
<td>113.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred by</td>
<td>Highest type</td>
<td>Lowest type</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see that as the dilution, $\lambda$, or share of assets sold, $\phi$, increases (moving from Plan 1 to Plan 2), the price per share (equity injection) or price per 100% of the assets (asset buy back) falls.
The low type prefers selling at the lower price because at the higher price, the total size of the cash injection is too small. Any bailout that overcapitalizes the firm will have to reduce the value to old shareholders in the up state, to offset the gain they have in the down state. But the high price/low dilution plan preferred by the high type does not give the low type sufficient gain in the low state to compensate for the loss in the up state. Too much of the cash injection is used to cover the debt overhang. This nonlinear pricing structure under first best bailout menus is a consequence of the (piecewise) concavity of the share-cash indifference curves.

This illustrates that any bailout plan that allows a bank to sell any quantity of assets or shares that it wishes at a fixed price – possibly subject to an upper bound – is fundamentally limited, as a first best outcome generally cannot be achieved under such plans. In this precise sense, our unrestricted bailout menus function better than those considered by Philippon and Schnabl (2009), in minimizing the expected payoffs to banks’ extant shareholders, while at the same time eliminating default risk on bank debt. The latter feature of our model may be especially important in the context of banks, in which much of their debt is demandable.
### Table 1: Example of First Best Menu of Equity Injections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Prob</th>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Equity</th>
<th>Bailout</th>
<th>Equity</th>
<th>Inside Equity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>low w/o bailout</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Inside</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>w/ bailout</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All types</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>142.86</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>17.39</td>
<td>25.47</td>
<td>30.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 1</td>
<td>L₁</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>102.86</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>2.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2</td>
<td>L₂</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>107.86</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3</td>
<td>L₃</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>112.86</td>
<td>12.86</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>7.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel a: Plan 1. $\lambda = .59$ and $E = 22.86$

Panel b: Plan 2. $\lambda = .76$ and $E = 42.50$

Inside equity refers to that of the old equityholders.
Table 2: Example of First Best Menu of Asset Buyouts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Prob</th>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Equity</th>
<th>Bailout</th>
<th>Equity</th>
<th>Inside</th>
<th>Expected Subsidy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>low w/o bailout</td>
<td>w/ bailout</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Inside</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel a: Plan 1. $\phi = .59$ and $C = 68.70$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All types</td>
<td>$H$</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>117.39</td>
<td>17.39</td>
<td>17.39</td>
<td>71.30</td>
<td>14.82%</td>
<td>14.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 1</td>
<td>$L_1$</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>101.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>47.54</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2</td>
<td>$L_2$</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>103.19</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>50.51</td>
<td>3.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3</td>
<td>$L_3$</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>105.22</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>53.48</td>
<td>4.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel b: Plan 2. $\phi = .76$ and $C = 86.47$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All types</td>
<td>$H$</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>114.71</td>
<td>14.71</td>
<td>14.71</td>
<td>91.76</td>
<td>12.82%</td>
<td>12.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 1</td>
<td>$L_1$</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>105.29</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>61.17</td>
<td>5.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2</td>
<td>$L_2$</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>106.47</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3</td>
<td>$L_3$</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>107.65</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>68.82</td>
<td>7.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3.2.2 Minimal Capital Outlay

The menus focused on in the example above induce first best outcomes, but they do not minimize the bailout agency’s capital outlay. If this were to be considered as a secondary objective, we would need $S$ (the number of bank types) plans in the menu, in contrast to $S - 1$ as in the example above.

In the example above, the menu consists of the two “intersection point plans,” that is, (i) $(\lambda_1, E_1)$ being the intersection point of the indifference curves of types 2 and 3, (.59, 22.89); and (i) $(\lambda_2, E_2)$ being the intersection point of the indifference curves of types 1 and 2, (.76, 42.5). To this menu, we add $(\lambda_3, E_3)$ equal to $(\lambda_3(F - L_3), F - L_3) = (1/3, 10)$. That is, we add the plan that just solves debt overhang for the highest type while leaving equityholders of that type with their status quo payoff.

A menu of these three plans achieves minimal capital outlay subject to first best being obtained – provided that, on the margin, banks prefer lower capital injections. This is important, since under the structure we have just described, all banks have exactly two plans between which they are indifferent. If we cannot be certain that banks will choose the plan with the lowest capital injection, then we can get arbitrarily close to minimal capital outlay by replacing the “intersection point plans” with plans immediately to the right of them. This construction works regardless of how many types there are, provided, of course, that the conditions described in Theorem 1 are met. By Proposition 1, a similar construction can be employed for asset buyouts.

4 Extensions

It has been argued by Paul Krugman\textsuperscript{12} and Philippon and Schnabl (2009), among others, that an advantage to equity injections is that the bailout agency gets to share in the NPV of new investments. It is not clear, however, why this cannot be compensated for in an asset bailout by a relatively larger share of the assets in place per dollar of fresh capital

injected. A complaint that can be leveled at our analysis thus far is that it skirts around this question, since the NPV from new investments follow the assets rather than the bank charter. Thus, in an asset buyout in our baseline model, the bailout agency gets to share in the NPV of new investments since these accrue to the holder of the assets.

We now consider an extension of our basic framework where new investments arrive at an interim date and follow the bank rather than the asset. Assuming that only the bank itself can take the investment opportunity opens the door to the possibility that equity injections are better for the bailout agency, since it will not share in the investment’s NPV in an asset buyout. In a second extension, we discuss augmenting asset buyouts with warrants, which provide an alternative way for the bailout agency to share in the upside of a bailed out bank.

4.1 Interim Investments

Denote the NPV of the new investment opportunity of a bank of type $s$ at the interim date by $X_s = p_s X_{H,s} + (1 - p_s) X_{L,s}$, where $X_{H,s}$ and $X_{L,s}$ are the payoffs at date 1 in the up and down states, respectively, net of the initial cost of investment, $I$. We assume that $X_{H,s}$ and $X_{L,s}$ and thus also $X_s$ are weakly increasing in $s$. For simplicity, let us assume also that if the new investment is taken, creditors will be paid off in full in the down state, that is, $L_s + I + X_{L,s} \geq F$. However, the NPV is not sufficiently large to overcome the debt overhang without a bailout, that is, $X_s < (1 - p_s)(F - L_s)$.

We first consider equity injections. Shareholders will make the investment if and only if the NPV of the interim project exceeds the debt overhang; that is, $X_s \geq (1 - p_s)(F - E - L_s)$, or $E \geq F - L_s - \frac{X_s}{1 - p_s}$. We denote this threshold injection by $\hat{E}_s$. Thus, under a pure equity injection plan, the expected payoff to old equityholders is given by

$$E[Z_s^{B=(\lambda,E)}] = \begin{cases} (1 - \lambda)(A_s + X_s + E - F) & \text{if } E \geq F - L_s - \frac{X_s}{1 - p_s} \quad (\equiv \hat{E}_s) \\ (1 - \lambda)p_s (H + E - F) & \text{if } E < F - L_s - \frac{X_s}{1 - p_s} \quad (\equiv \hat{E}_s). \end{cases}$$ (18)

We can analyze the model using the same share-indifference curve technique as in the
previous section. The indifference curve is now found by setting the status quo payoff of old shareholders, \( p_s(H - F) \), equal to RHS(18).\(^{13}\) It is straightforward that this has an upward jump at \( E = \hat{E}_s \), since this is the injection required to make equityholders willing to take the new investment and therefore brings about an increase in the value of the bank and its shares. It is also straightforward that \( \hat{E}_s \) is decreasing in \( s \). Thus, we can describe the share indifference curves as follows: Initially, for \( E < \hat{E}_s \) (where \( S \) denotes the highest type), all indifference curves coincide. At \( \hat{E}_s \) and to the immediate right of \( \hat{E}_s \), the indifference curve of a higher type is above that of lower types. Eventually, for sufficiently large \( E \), the indifference curves of lower types will cross those of higher types and remain higher for all larger \( E \). Thus, along the same lines as in Section 3, it is possible to separate types and achieve first best when there are only two types. For multiple types, similar monotonicity conditions as in Section 3 can be derived.

While the gist of the conclusions of the analysis of the baseline model are thus retained under pure equity injection plans, the one-to-one correspondence with asset buyouts breaks down. To see this, note that the corresponding expression to (18), for a pure asset buyout plan is

\[
E[Z_s^{B=(\phi,C)}] = \begin{cases} 
(1 - \phi)A_s + X_s + C - F & \text{if } C \geq F - (1 - \phi)L_s - \frac{X_s}{1 - p_s} \\
 p_s[(1 - \phi)H + C - F] & \text{if } C < F - (1 - \phi)L_s - \frac{X_s}{1 - p_s}.
\end{cases}
\]  

(19)

Thus equity injections and asset buyouts are not equivalent. To see this more clearly, note first that for the break-even points for investing at the interim dates to be the same, we need to have \( C = E + \phi L_s \).\(^{14}\) A necessary condition for having a one-to-one mapping with respect to payoffs to old equityholders is that \( \phi = \lambda \). But with these values for \( \phi \) and \( C \), asset buyouts always yield a smaller (larger) expected payoff to old equityholders than the corresponding equity injection in those cases when the cash injection is large enough (too small) for the investment to be made at the interim date.

\(^{13}\)We assume that \( H_s = H \) for all \( s \).

\(^{14}\)This follows by comparing the expressions on the right hand side of the “if” in (18) and (19).
4.2 Asset Buybacks with Call Options

If the conditions that yield equivalence between equity injections and asset buyouts are not satisfied, is it true that equity injections are superior to asset buyouts? That this should be so is not obvious. The extra value to the bailout agency from the NPV would presumably have to be paid for through an increase in the price per share. Moreover, if being able to participate in the upside is desirable, this can be achieved also through asset buyout plans that are augmented with warrants or options. A warrant augmented asset buyout plan could even increase the bailout agency’s share of the new NPV.

Proposition 6 Suppose $X_{H,s} \geq X_{L,s}$ and let $\{\lambda_s, E_s\}$ be an equity injection plan chosen by, or designed for, a bank of type $s$. Attaching an Option to buy equity in the bailed out bank to an asset buy back plan for a price equal to the per share value corresponding to the equity value in the High state in the absence of any new profitable investments, that is $[(1 - \phi)H + C - F]$, for a fraction of equity equaling $w_s = \frac{\Delta_s}{p_s}$, enables the bailout agency to capture at least the same share of any NPV arising from new post-bailout investments as does the equity injection plan. Such attachment is feasible as long as $w_s < 1$.

Proof: In the good state of a bank of type $s$, these options are worth $w_sX_{H,s}$. This has an expected value of $\lambda_sX_{H,s}$, which (weakly) exceeds the share of positive NPV from new investments accruing to the equity acquired by the bailout agency via injecting $E_s$, namely $\lambda_s[(p_sX_{H,s} + (1 - p_s)X_{L,s}]$, from which the result follows.  

Consider equity injections that just resolve debt overhang. It is straightforward from Proposition 2 that a necessary and sufficient condition for the option component of an asset buy back plan for type $s$ to have $w_s < 1$ is that the bank is solvent on an ex ante basis, that is, $p_sH + (1 - p_s)L > F$. 

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5 Policy Choices and Concluding Remarks

The main results of importance for economic policy emerging from our analysis are the following. When banks have troubled assets, having potential future values strictly below their debt cum deposit obligations, and they are heterogeneous on multiple dimensions—here their probabilities of default and losses given default—it is nevertheless feasible to structure a bailout program which minimizes the implied subsidies to the equity holders of different, and privately informed, bank types, holding their payoffs at the same level as their status quo equity values in the absence of such bailouts. This can be done, under the conditions spelled out in Proposition 4 and Theorem 1 above, using separating menus of either equity injection, or asset buyout menus, which induce self-selection among heterogeneous bank types. Such optimal menus of bailout plans involve nonlinear pricing, whereby price per share (or per unit of asset) is decreasing in the size of the bailout.

Furthermore, quite robustly, with heterogeneous losses given default that covary positively with likelihoods of default across banks, such menus necessarily induce overcapitalization—cash injections over and above the minimal amounts needed to overcome debt overhang—at weaker banks. The extent of such overcapitalization, and thus the degree to which the bailout agency must acquire equity stakes in the bailed out banks, increases as the quality of the bank declines, in terms of both its likelihood of default and loss given default. As a result, under an equity injection based bailout plan, weaker banks are left with lower inside equity stakes for their prior shareholders. That is not the case with asset buyout based bailout plans, in which prior equity holders retain full ownership stakes in the assets remaining with the bank.

These features of the two types of bailout programs may impinge on policy choices over these. As discussed in the paper, equity injection menus typically involve much lower cash outlays by the bailout agency. This is of importance if there are deadweight (including political) costs associated with raising government funding. However, equity injections also leave the existing equity holders with a strictly lower proportionate stake in their bank.
Such lower inside equity stakes may ill serve banks’ incentives to monitor the quality of their future investments, since government capital would bear some or even much of the costs of future losses arising from such lax monitoring. A possible resolution then is to prefer equity injections for better types of banks, with lower default probabilities and loss given default, in which the dilution of prior inside equity stakes are lower post-bailout, and choosing (equivalent, and separating) asset buyout plans for weaker banks in which equity injections would dilute insiders’ stakes more substantially, harming their monitoring incentives. Of course, this simple criterion overlooks the problems associated with finding new private buyers for the assets acquired by the bailout agency, who would exploit these optimally.

Our analysis also shows that when capturing a share of net present values arising from post-bailout new investments by banks would increase payoffs to the bailout agency, then augmenting (partial) asset buyout plans with options to buy the equity of bailed-out banks matters a great deal, a finding that complements the analysis of Philippon and Schnabl (2009). Especially in the current financial crisis, and unlike in prior crisis such as the US S&L Crisis of the early 1990s, potential future upside values of “toxic” assets (cum asset-backed securities) held by banks, and the lack of transparency regarding their qualities, have given rise to vexing issues about how best to structure bank rescue programs which contribute to their healthy functioning as lenders to the economy, without overly rewarding their extant equity holders. We hope that our paper has made a useful beginning in our understanding of the (subtle) tradeoffs involved, in designing bank bailout menus.
References


Appendix 1: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1
In state \( w \in \{ H_s, L_s \} \) the pure equity plan \( \{ \lambda, E \} \) and the pure asset buyout plan \( \{ \phi, C \} \) give the following payoffs to old equityholders: \((1 - \lambda) \max((w + E - F), 0)\) and \(\max((1 - \phi)w + C - F, 0)\), respectively. A necessary condition for these be equivalent regardless of \( w \) is that \( \phi = \lambda \), which in turn implies that we must also have \( C = (1 - \lambda)E + \lambda F \). \( \square \)

Proof of Proposition 2
Pure equity injection: Since \( E = F - L \) under plan \( B_E \) described in the statement of the proposition, (10) is satisfied, i.e., debt overhang is eliminated. Furthermore, in the down state, the payoff to equity of all bank types is 0. In the up state, equityholders of all bank types receive \( H + E - F \). To leave old equityholders indifferent between \( B_E \) and the status quo and thus minimize expected subsidies, \( \lambda \in [0, 1] \) must satisfy \( E[Z_s^B] = E[Z_s^{B_0}] \) for all \( s \), or
\[
p_s(H + E - F)(1 - \lambda) = p_s(H - F).
\]
This is satisfied for all \( s \) provided
\[
\lambda = \frac{E}{H + E - F} = \frac{F - L}{H - L}.
\]
(21)
Since \( \lambda \) as specified by (21) is in the open interval \((0,1)\), since by assumption \( F < H \), we have shown that Plan \( B_E \) works as claimed.

Next we will show that there is no other subsidy minimizing pure equity injection plan that works for all \( s \). Since debt overhang must be eliminated, such an alternative plan must have \( E > F - L \). (If \( E = F - L \), we would just have plan \( B_E \)). Thus, to leave old equityholders indifferent between the plan and the status quo, we must have
\[
p_s(H + E - F)(1 - \lambda) + (1 - p_s)(L + E - F)(1 - \lambda) = p_s(H - F).
\]
(22)
Rearranging yields
\[
1 - \lambda = \frac{p_s(H - F)}{p_sH + (1 - p_s)L + E - F},
\]
(23)
implying that, given $E$, $\lambda$ depends on bank type. This is what we wanted to show.

**Pure asset buyout:** This follows immediately from Proposition 1. It can also be established explicitly as follows:

Consider a bailout plan that satisfies

$$L(1 - \phi) + C = F. \quad (24)$$

This eliminates debt overhang. Given (24), a necessary and sufficient condition for minimizing subsidies is that

$$H(1 - \phi) + C = H, \quad (25)$$

since this leaves old equityholders with the same payoffs in the up and down states as under the status quo, regardless of type.

Combining (24) and (25), we see that $\phi$ must satisfy $(H - L)(1 - \phi) = H - F$, or

$$\phi = \frac{F - L}{H - L}. \quad (26)$$

Substituting this expression for $\phi$ into either (24) or (25), we have

$$C = \frac{F - L}{H - L}H. \quad (27)$$

Since conditions (26) and (27) describe bailout plan $B_A$ in the statement of the proposition (together with $\lambda = 0$ and $E = 0$), we have shown $B_A$ solves the debt overhang problem while minimizing subsidies for each $s$, as claimed.

Next, we will show that there is no other pure asset buyout bailout plan that works for all $s$. Consider therefore a plan with $L(1 - \phi) + C > F$. Thus, to leave old equityholders indifferent between the plan and the status quo, we must have

$$p_s[H(1 - \phi) + C - F] + (1 - p_s)[L(1 - \phi) + C - F] = p_s(H - F). \quad (28)$$

Rearranging this, we have

$$1 - \phi = \frac{p_sH + (1 - p_s)F - C}{p_sH + (1 - p_s)L}. \quad (29)$$
Thus, given $C$, $\phi$ depends on bank type. Hence, $B_A$ is the unique asset buy back bailout plan that for all $s$ achieves the dual objective of eliminating debt overhang and minimizing subsidies to existing claimholders. \hfill \Box

**Proof of Proposition 3**

Consider any plan, $B$, that achieves first best for a bank of type $s > 1$. The proposition will be established if we can show that the subsidy under this plan is larger than the status quo for a bank of type $s' = 1$. Since $L_1 = L_s = L$, a plan that solves debt overhang for a bank of type $s$ also solves it for a bank of type 1. Thus, we only need to show that, for a bank of type 1, equityholders’ payoff increases (as pointed out in (11)). We will write the asset value under the plan in the down state simply as $L_B$.

For the plan in question, we have $L_B \geq F$ and

\[
(1 - \lambda)[p_s(H_s^B - F) + (1 - p_s)(L^B - F)] = p_s(H_s - F). \tag{30}
\]

Thus,

\[
(1 - \lambda) = \frac{p_s(H_s - F)}{p_s(H_s^B - L^B) + L^B - F} \tag{31}
\]

The plan would yield the following expected payoff to shareholders of a bank of type 1:

\[
E[Z_1^B] = \frac{p_s(H_s - F)}{p_s(H_s^B - L^B) + L^B - F} \left\{ p_1(H_1^B - L^B) + L^B - F \right\}. \tag{32}
\]

This is greater than the status quo payoff for type 1, $p_1(H_1 - F)$, if and only if

\[
\frac{p_s(H_s - F)}{p_s(H_s^B - L^B) + L^B - F} > \frac{p_1(H_1 - F)}{p_1(H_1^B - L^B) + L^B - F},
\]

or

\[
\frac{p_s(H_s - F)}{p_s(1 - \phi)(H_s - L) + L^B - F} > \frac{p_1(H_1 - F)}{p_1(1 - \phi)(H_1 - L) + L^B - F}, \tag{33}
\]

or $g(p_s, H_s) > g(p_1, H_1)$, where

\[
g(p, H) = \frac{p(H - F)}{p(1 - \phi)(H - L) + L^B - F}. \tag{34}
\]

Now, if $L^B > F$, $g(p, H)$ is strictly increasing in both arguments, since $F > L$. Thus, (33) is satisfied. If $L^B = F$, $g(p, h)$ is unaffected by $p$ but strictly increasing in $H$, since
Since, by assumption, $H_s > H_1$, this establishes that a bank of type 1 receives strictly more than its status quo payoff from plan $B$, implying that first best cannot be achieved. \hfill \Box

**Proof of Proposition 5**

Consider any plan, $B$, that achieves first best for a bank of type $s = 1$. We will prove the proposition by showing that a bank of type $s = 2$ can achieve a payoff which is larger than its status quo payoff, $p(H - F)$, by adopting plan $B$. In what follows, we will write $H_s^B$ simply as $H^B$, since $H_s = H$ for all $s$.

For the plan in question, we have $L^B_1 \geq F$ and

$$(1 - \lambda)[p(H^B - F) + (1 - p)(L^B_1 - F)] = p(H - F). \tag{35}$$

Since $L_2 > L_1$, we also have $L^B_2 > L^B_1$. Thus

$$E[Z^B_2] = (1 - \lambda)[p(H^B - F) + (1 - p)(L^B_2 - F)] > p(H - F), \tag{36}$$

which is what we wanted to show. \hfill \Box

**Proof of Theorem 1**

The statement that first best can be achieved if and only if (i) types can be ordered by strict FOSD and (ii) indifference curve intersection monotonicity holds, follows from preceding results and the discussion in the text (it is straightforward to formalize and extend the discussion regarding intersection monotonicity in the text to an arbitrary number $S$ of types). However, we need to show that indifference curve intersection monotonicity holds if and only if (17) holds for all $s = 2, \ldots, S - 1$. To this end, pick any $s \in \{2, \ldots S - 1\}$. Indifference curve intersection monotonicity implies that $E^{(s, s+1)} < E^{(s-1, s)}$, or by (15),

$$F - \frac{p_s A_{s-1} - p_{s-1} A_s}{p_s - p_{s-1}} > F - \frac{p_{s+1} A_s - p_s A_{s+1}}{p_{s+1} - p_s}. \tag{37}$$

Using $A_s = p_s H + (1 - p_s)L_s$ (and the analogous expressions for $s - 1$ and $s + 1$), (37) simplifies to (17). \hfill \Box
Appendix 2: Figures

Figure 1: Share-Cash Indifference Curves under Homogeneous Debt Overhang

The indifference curves represent \( \{\lambda, E\} \) combinations that keep existing equity to its status quo expected payoff. The parameter values used in the plots are as follows: \( H = 120, F = 100, L = 80, p_1 = .5, \) and \( p_2 = 2/3. \) The unique plan that implements first best is: \( E = 20 \) and \( \lambda = .5. \) For \( E < 20, \) debt overhang is not solved. For \( E > 20, \) any \( \lambda \) that keeps Type 1 to its status quo payoff improves the payoff to equityholders of the Type 2 bank, since Type 2’s indifference curve lies below that of Type 1.
The indifference curves represent \( \{ \lambda, E \} \) combinations that keep existing equity to its status quo expected payoff. The parameter values used in the plots are as follows: \( H = 120, F=100, L_1 = 80, L_2 = 90, p_1 = .5 \) and \( p_2 = 2/3 \). Thus, first order stochastic dominance is satisfied. First best is achieved, for example, by choosing the plan represented by the intersection point \( \{ \lambda = 2/3, E = 30 \} \) of the two curves. Any combination of two plans designed as follows will also work: Plan 1 – any point on Type 2’s indifference curve with \( 10 < E < 30 \). Plan 2 – any point on Type 1’s indifference curve with \( E > 30 \).
The indifference curves represent \( \{ \lambda, E \} \) combinations that keep existing equity to its status quo expected payoff. The parameter values used in the plots are as follows: \( H = 120, F=100, L_1 = 80, L_2 = 85, L_2 = 90, p_1 = .5, p_2 = .55, \) and \( p_2 = 2/3. \) Strict first order stochastic dominance and intersection point monotonicity is satisfied. The indifference curves of Types 2 and 3 intersect at \( \{ \lambda = .59, E = 22.86 \} \), while the indifference curves of Types 1 and 2 intersect at \( \{ \lambda = .76, E = 42.5 \} \). First best can be achieved, for example, by offering a menu of the two plans corresponding to these two intersection points.