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An Institutional Theory of Momentum and Reversal

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Abstract

We propose a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio management. Flows between investment funds are triggered by changes in fund managers’ efficiency, which investors either observe directly or infer from past performance. Momentum arises if fund flows exhibit inertia, and because rational prices do not fully adjust to reflect future flows. Reversal arises because flows push prices away from fundamental values. Besides momentum and reversal, fund flows generate comovement, lead-lag effects and amplification, with all effects being larger for assets with high idiosyncratic risk. Managers’ concern with commercial risk can make prices more volatile.

Keywords: Asset pricing, delegated portfolio management, momentum, reversal

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1 Introduction

Two of the most prominent financial-market anomalies are momentum and reversal. Momentum is the tendency of assets with good (bad) recent performance to continue overperforming (underperforming) in the near future. Reversal concerns predictability based on a longer performance history: assets that performed well (poorly) over a long period tend to subsequently underperform (overperform). Closely related to reversal is the value effect, whereby the ratio of an asset’s price relative to book value is negatively related to subsequent performance. Momentum and reversal have been documented extensively and for a wide variety of assets.\footnote{Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document momentum for individual US stocks, predicting returns over horizons of 3-12 months by returns over the past 3-12 months. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) document reversal, predicting returns over horizons of up to 5 years by returns over the past 3-5 years. Fama and French (1992) document the value effect. This evidence has been extended to stocks in other countries (Fama and French 1998, Rouwenhorst 1998), industry-level portfolios (Grinblatt and Moskowitz 1999), country indices (Asness, Liew, and Stevens 1997, Bhojraj and Swaminathan 2006), bonds (Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen 2008), currencies (Bhojraj and Swaminathan 2006) and commodities (Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst 2008). Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2008) extend and unify much of this evidence and contain additional references.}

Momentum and reversal are viewed as anomalies because they are hard to explain within the standard asset-pricing paradigm with rational agents and frictionless markets. The prevalent explanations of these phenomena are behavioral, and assume that agents react incorrectly to information signals.\footnote{See, for example, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong and Stein (1999), and Barberis and Shleifer (2003).}

In this paper we show that momentum and reversal can arise in markets with rational agents. We depart from the standard paradigm by assuming that investors delegate the management of their portfolios to financial institutions, such as mutual funds and hedge funds. We also contribute to the asset-pricing literature methodologically, by building a parsimonious and tractable model of delegated portfolio management that can speak to a broad range of phenomena. These include not only momentum and reversal, but also comovement, lead-lag effects, amplification, and the management of commercial risk.

Our explanation of momentum and reversal is as follows. Suppose that a negative shock hits the fundamental value of some assets. Investment funds holding these assets realize low returns, triggering outflows by investors who update negatively about the efficiency of the managers running these funds. As a consequence of the outflows, funds sell assets they own, and this depresses further the prices of the assets hit by the original shock. Momentum arises if the outflows are gradual, and if they trigger a gradual price decline and a drop in expected returns. Reversal arises because outflows push prices below fundamental values, and so expected returns eventually rise. Gradual outflows can be the consequence of investor inertia or institutional constraints, and we simply assume them.\footnote{The inertia in capital flows and its relevance for asset prices are being increasingly recognized. See, for example,
We explain, however, why gradual outflows can trigger a gradual decline in rational prices and a drop in expected returns. This result, key to momentum, is new and surprising. Indeed, why do rational investors absorb the outflows, buying assets whose expected returns have decreased?4

Rational investors in our model buy assets whose expected returns have decreased because of what we term the “bird in the hand” effect. Assets that experience a price drop and are expected to continue underperforming in the short run are those held by investment funds expected to experience outflows. The anticipation of outflows causes these assets to be underpriced and to guarantee investors an attractive return (bird in the hand) over a long horizon. Investors could earn an even more attractive return on average (two birds in the bush), by buying these assets after the outflows occur. This, however, exposes them to the risk that the outflows might not occur, in which case the assets would cease to be underpriced. In summary, short-run expected underperformance is possible because of long-run expected overperformance; and more generally, momentum is possible because of the subsequent reversal.

The bird-in-the-hand effect can be illustrated in the following simple example. An asset is expected to pay off 100 in Period 2. The asset price is 92 in Period 0, and 80 or 100 in Period 1 with equal probabilities. Buying the asset in Period 0 earns an investor a two-period expected capital gain of 8. Buying in Period 1 earns an expected capital gain of 20 if the price is 80 and 0 if the price is 100. A risk-averse investor might prefer earning 8 rather than 20 or 0 with equal probabilities, even though the expected capital gain between Periods 0 and 1 is negative.

Momentum and reversal are dynamic phenomena, and their analysis requires an intertemporal model of asset-market equilibrium. The analysis of delegation and fund flows requires additionally that the model includes multiple assets and funds, portfolio choice by fund managers (over assets) and investors (over funds), and a motive for investors to be moving across funds. We build a parsimonious and tractable model of asset-market equilibrium that includes all these elements.

Section 2 presents the model. We consider an infinite-horizon continuous-time economy with multiple risky assets, which we refer to as stocks, and one riskless asset. A competitive investor can invest in stocks through two investment funds. We assume that one of these funds tracks mechanically a market index. This is for simplicity, so that portfolio optimization concerns only the other fund, which we refer to as the active fund. To ensure that the active fund can add

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4 Barberis and Shleifer (2003) draw a link between gradual flows and momentum in a behavioral model, and Lou (2010) does the same in an empirical study. Moreover, Lou emphasizes institutional flows as we do in this paper. These papers do not address, however, why rational investors buy assets whose expected returns have decreased. Addressing this issue is key to any rational explanation of momentum.
value over the index fund, we assume that the market index differs from the true market portfolio characterizing equilibrium asset returns. This can happen, for example, because the market index does not include some assets belonging to the market portfolio, or because unmodelled buy-and-hold investors hold a portfolio different from the market portfolio. To ensure that the investor has a motive to move across funds, we assume that she suffers a time-varying cost from investing in the active fund. The interpretation of the cost that best fits our model is as a managerial perk, although other interpretations such as managerial ability could fit more complicated versions of the model. The active fund is run by a competitive manager, who can also invest his personal wealth in stocks through the fund. The latter assumption is for parsimony: in addition to choosing the active portfolio, the manager acts as trading counterparty to the investor’s flows, and this eliminates the need to introduce additional agents into the model. Both investor and manager are infinitely lived and maximize expected utility of intertemporal consumption.

We solve three cases of the model, in order of increasing complexity and realism. Section 3 assumes that the cost is observable by both the investor and the manager, and so information is symmetric. Section 4 introduces inertia in fund flows. Section 5 assumes that the cost is observable only by the manager, and so information is asymmetric. We start with symmetric information because it is simpler analytically and conceptually, while also yielding momentum and reversal.

When information is symmetric, an increase in the cost causes the investor to flow out of the active and into the index fund. This amounts to a net sale of stocks that the active fund overweights relative to the index fund, and net purchase of stocks that it underweights. The manager takes the other side of this transaction by raising his holdings of the active fund. Because the manager is risk-averse, overweighted stocks become cheaper and underweighted stocks become more expensive. In impacting overweighted and underweighted stocks in opposite directions, flows increase comovement within each group, while reducing comovement across groups.

We introduce inertia in fund flows through an exogenous cost that the investor incurs when changing her holdings of the active fund. Inertia implies that the outflows triggered by an increase in the manager’s cost are gradual, and generate momentum and reversal because of the mechanism described earlier. (The bird-in-the-hand effect concerns the manager, who absorbs the outflows.) In addition to momentum and reversal, there is cross-asset predictability, i.e., lead-lag effects. For example, a price drop of a stock that the active fund overweights forecasts low expected returns of other overweighted stocks in the short run and high returns in the long run.

Asymmetric information generates amplification: cashflow shocks trigger fund flows, which amplify the effect that these shocks have on stock returns. Amplification arises because fund flows
not only cause stock returns, as under symmetric information, but are also caused by them. For example, a negative cashflow shock to a stock that the active fund overweights lowers the active fund’s performance relative to the index fund. The investor then infers that the cost has increased and flows out of the active and into the index fund. This lowers the stock’s price, amplifying the effect of the original shock. Amplification generates new channels of momentum, reversal and comovement. For example, momentum and reversal arise conditional not only on past returns, as under symmetric information, but also on past cashflow shocks. Moreover, a new channel of comovement is that a cashflow shock to one stock induces fund flows which affect the prices of other stocks.

Momentum, reversal, lead-lag effects and comovement are larger for stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. This result holds under both symmetric and asymmetric information, with the intuition being different in the two cases. For example, in the case of asymmetric information, a cashflow shock to a stock with high idiosyncratic risk generates a large discrepancy between the performance of the active and of the index fund. This causes large fund flows and price effects.

Finally, our model can speak to the asset-pricing effects of commercial-risk management, i.e., of actions that managers can take to protect themselves against the risk of experiencing outflows. A manager concerned with commercial risk is reluctant to deviate from the market index. The intuition in the case of asymmetric information is that a deviation subjects the manager to the risk of underperforming relative to the market index and experiencing outflows. Commercial-risk concerns thus lower the prices of stocks that the active fund overweights and raise those of underweighted stocks. We show additionally that the manager’s efforts to protect himself against commercial risk can have the perverse effect to make prices more volatile and increase comovement.

Momentum and reversal have mainly been derived in behavioral models, e.g., Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong and Stein (1999), and Barberis and Shleifer (BS 2003). BS is the closest to our work. They assume that stocks belong to styles and are traded between switchers, who over-extrapolate performance trends according to an exogenous rule, and fundamental investors, who are also not rational because they fail to anticipate the switchers’ predictable flows. Following a stock’s bad performance, switchers become pessimistic about the future performance of the corresponding style, and switch to other styles. Because the extrapolation rule involves lags, switching is gradual and leads to momentum. Switching also generates comovement of stocks within a style, lead-lag effects, and amplification. We show that these effects do not require any behavioral assumptions and are consistent with rational behavior. This is particularly surprising in the case of momentum because one must address why investors
buy assets whose expected returns have decreased. (BS sidestep this issue because they assume that fundamental investors fail to anticipate the switchers’ predictable flows.) We additionally study the effects of idiosyncratic risk and commercial risk, neither of which is examined in BS. In particular, BS assume no delegation and fund managers, and hence no commercial risk.

Rational models of momentum include Berk, Green and Naik (1999), Johnson (2002), Shin (2006), and Albuquerque and Miao (2010). In the first three papers, a risky asset’s expected return decreases following bad news because uncertainty decreases. In the last paper, investors bear less risk following bad news because the expected return of a private technology in which they can invest and which is positively correlated with the risky asset also decreases.

The equilibrium implications of delegated portfolio management are the subject of a growing literature. In Shleifer and Vishny (SV 1997), fund flows are an exogenous function of the funds’ past performance, and amplify the effects of cashflow shocks. SV show additionally that the managers’ concern with future outflows (commercial risk) increases mispricing. In He and Krishnamurthy (2009, 2010) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010), the equity stake of fund managers must exceed a lower bound because of optimal contracting under moral hazard, and amplification effects can again arise. In Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2010), reputation concerns cause managers to herd, and this generates momentum under the additional assumption that the market makers trading with the managers are either monopolistic or myopic. In Basak and Pavlova (2010), flows by investors benchmarked against an index cause stocks in the index to comove. We contribute a number of new results to this literature, e.g., momentum with competitive and rational agents, larger effects for high-idiosyncratic-risk assets, and commercial-risk management can increase volatility and comovement. Moreover, from a methodological standpoint, we bring the analysis of delegation and fund flows within a flexible normal-linear framework that yields closed-form solutions for asset prices.

Finally, our emphasis on fund flows as generators of comovement and momentum is consistent with recent empirical findings. Coval and Stafford (2007) find that mutual funds experiencing large outflows engage in distressed selling of their stock portfolios. Anton and Polk (2010) and Greenwood and Thesmar (2010) find that comovement between stocks is larger when these are

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5 Amplification effects can also arise when agents face margin constraints or have wealth-dependent risk aversion. See the survey by Gromb and Vayanos (2010) and the references therein.

6 Other models exploring equilibrium implications of delegated portfolio management include Brennan (1993), Vayanos (2004), Dasgupta and Prat (2008), Petajisto (2009), Cuoco and Kaniel (2010), Guerrieri and Kondor (2010), Kaniel and Kondor (2010), and Malliaris and Yan (2010). See also Berk and Green (2004), in which fund flows are driven by fund performance because investors learn about managers’ ability, and feed back into performance because of exogenous decreasing returns to managing a large fund.
held by many mutual funds in common, controlling for style characteristics. Lou (2010) finds that momentum of individual stocks can be partially explained by predictable flows into mutual funds holding the stocks, especially for large stocks and in recent data where mutual funds are more prevalent.

2 Model

Time \( t \) is continuous and goes from zero to infinity. There are \( N \) risky assets and a riskless asset. We refer to the risky assets as stocks, but they could also be interpreted as industry-level portfolios, asset classes, etc. The riskless asset has an exogenous, continuously compounded return \( r \). The stocks pay dividends over time, and their prices are determined endogenously in equilibrium. We denote by \( D_{nt} \) the cumulative dividend per share of stock \( n = 1, \ldots, N \), by \( S_{nt} \) the stock’s price, and by \( \pi_n \) the stock’s supply in terms of number of shares. We specify the stochastic process for dividends later in this section.

A competitive investor can invest in the riskless asset and in the stocks. The investor can access the stocks only through two investment funds. We assume that the first fund is passively managed and tracks mechanically a market index. This is for simplicity, so that portfolio optimization concerns only the other fund, which we refer to as the active fund. We assume that the market index includes a fixed number \( \eta_n \) of shares of stock \( n \). Thus, if the vectors \( \pi \equiv (\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_N) \) and \( \eta \equiv (\eta_1, \ldots, \eta_N) \) are collinear, the market index is capitalization-weighted and coincides with the market portfolio.

To ensure that the active fund can add value over the index fund, we assume that the market index differs from the true market portfolio characterizing equilibrium asset returns. This can be because the market index does not include some stocks. Alternatively, the market index can coincide with the market portfolio, but unmodelled buy-and-hold investors, such as firms’ managers or founding families, can hold a portfolio different from the market portfolio. That is, buy-and-hold investors hold \( \hat{\pi}_n \) shares of stock \( n \), and the vectors \( \pi \) and \( \hat{\pi} \equiv (\hat{\pi}_1, \ldots, \hat{\pi}_N) \) are not collinear. To nest the two cases, we define a vector \( \theta \equiv (\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_N) \) to coincide with \( \pi \) in the first case and \( \pi - \hat{\pi} \) in the second. The vector \( \theta \) represents the residual supply left over from buy-and-hold investors, and is the true market portfolio characterizing equilibrium asset returns. We assume that \( \theta \) is not collinear with the market index \( \eta \).

The investor determines how to allocate her wealth between the riskless asset, the index fund,
and the active fund. She maximizes expected utility of intertemporal consumption. Utility is exponential, i.e.,

$$-E \int_0^\infty \exp(-\alpha c_t - \beta t) dt,$$

(2.1)

where $\alpha$ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, $c_t$ is consumption, and $\beta$ is the discount rate.

The investor’s control variables are consumption $c_t$ and the number of shares $x_t$ and $y_t$ of the index and active fund, respectively.

The active fund is run by a competitive manager, who can also invest his personal wealth in the fund. The manager determines the active portfolio and the allocation of his wealth between the riskless asset and the fund. He maximizes expected utility of intertemporal consumption. Utility is exponential, i.e.,

$$-E \int_0^\infty \exp(-\bar{\alpha} \bar{c}_t - \bar{\beta} t) dt,$$

(2.2)

where $\bar{\alpha}$ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, $\bar{c}_t$ is consumption, and $\bar{\beta}$ is the discount rate.

The manager’s control variables are consumption $\bar{c}_t$, the number of shares $\bar{y}_t$ of the active fund, and the active portfolio $\bar{z}_t \equiv (z_{1t}, \ldots, z_{Nt})$, where $z_{nt}$ denotes the number of shares of stock $n$ included in one share of the active fund.

The assumption that the manager can invest his personal wealth in the active fund is for parsimony: it generates a simple objective that the manager maximizes when choosing the fund’s portfolio, and ensures that the manager acts as trading counterparty to the investor’s flows. Under the alternative assumption that the manager must invest his wealth in the riskless asset, we would need to introduce two new elements into the model: a performance fee to provide the manager with incentives for portfolio choice, and an additional set of agents who could access stocks directly and act as counterparty to the investor’s flows. This would complicate the model without changing the main intuitions (e.g., bird-in-the-hand effect). The manager in our model can be viewed as the aggregate of all agents absorbing the investor’s flows.

Under the assumptions introduced so far, and in the absence of other frictions, the equilibrium takes a simple form. As we show in Section 3, the investor holds stocks only through the active
fund since its portfolio dominates the index portfolio. As a consequence, the active fund holds the true market portfolio $\theta$, and there are no flows between the two funds.

To generate fund flows, we assume that the investor suffers a time-varying cost from investing in the active fund. Empirical evidence on the existence of such a cost is provided in a number of papers. For example, Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Wermers (2000), and Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zhang (KSZ 2008) study the return gap, defined as the difference between a mutual fund’s return over a given quarter and the return of a hypothetical portfolio invested in the stocks that the fund holds at the beginning of the quarter. The return gap varies significantly across funds and over time. It is also persistent, with a half-life of about three years according to KSZ. The high persistence indicates that the return gap is linked to underlying fund characteristics—and indeed there is a correlation with fund-specific measures of operational costs (e.g., trading costs) and agency costs.

We model the return gap in a simple manner: we assume that the investor’s return from the active fund is equal to the gross return, made of the dividends and capital gains of the stocks held by the fund, net of a time-varying cost. Empirical studies typically attribute the return gap to operational costs, agency costs, and managerial stock-picking ability; do these interpretations fit our model? All three interpretations—with agency costs and ability in reduced form—fit the more complicated version of the model where the manager must invest his wealth in the riskless asset. Because, however, we are assuming (for parsimony) that the manager can also invest in the active fund, we need to specify how his own investment in the fund is affected by the cost. The most convenient assumption is that the manager does not suffer the cost on his investment: this ensures, in particular, that changes in the cost generate flows between the investor and the manager. This assumption rules out the operational-cost and ability interpretations of the cost, which imply that the cost hurts the manager. We adopt instead the agency-cost interpretation, assuming that the cost is a perk that the manager can extract from the investor. Examples of perks in a delegated portfolio management context are late trading and soft-dollar commissions. The main intuitions coming out of our model, however, are broader than the managerial-perk interpretation.

We assume that the index fund entails no cost, so its gross and net returns coincide. This is for simplicity, but also fits the interpretations of the return gap. Indeed, managing an index

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8. Modeling ability explicitly, rather than in reduced form, would require private signals, heterogeneous managers and non-fully revealing prices. This would make the model less parsimonious and probably intractable.

9. Managers engaging in late trading use their privileged access to the fund to buy or sell fund shares at stale prices. Late trading was common in many funds and led to the 2003 mutual-fund scandal. Soft-dollar commissions is the practice of inflating funds' brokerage commissions to pay for services that mainly benefit managers, e.g., promote the fund to new investors.
fund involves no stock-picking ability, and operational and agency costs are smaller than for active funds.

We model the cost as a flow (i.e., the cost between $t$ and $t + dt$ is of order $dt$), and assume that the flow cost is proportional to the number of shares $y_t$ that the investor holds in the active fund. We denote the coefficient of proportionality by $C_t$ and assume that it follows the process

$$dC_t = \kappa(\bar{C} - C_t)dt + sdB_t^C,$$

(2.3)

where $\kappa$ is a mean-reversion parameter, $\bar{C}$ is a long-run mean, $s$ is a positive scalar, and $B_t^C$ is a Brownian motion. The mean-reversion of $C_t$ is not essential for momentum and reversal, which occur even when $\kappa = 0$.

To remain consistent with the managerial-perk interpretation of the cost, we allow the manager to derive a benefit from the investor’s participation in the active fund. This benefit can be interpreted as a perk that the manager can extract, or as a fee. We model the benefit in the same manner as the cost, i.e., a flow which is proportional to the number of shares $y_t$ that the investor holds in the active fund. If the cost is a perk that the manager can extract efficiently, then the coefficient of proportionality for the benefit is $C_t$. We allow more generally the coefficient of proportionality to be $\lambda C_t + B$, where $\lambda$ and $B$ are scalars. The parameter $\lambda$ can be interpreted as the efficiency of perk extraction, while the parameter $B$ can derive from a constant fee.10

Varying the parameters $\lambda$ and $B$ generates a rich specification of the manager’s objective. When $\lambda = B = 0$, the manager cares about fund performance only through his personal investment in the fund, and his objective is similar to the fund investor’s. When instead $\lambda$ and $B$ are positive, the manager is also concerned with commercial risk, i.e., the risk that the investor might reduce her participation in the fund. The parameters $\lambda$ and $B$ are not essential for momentum and reversal, which occur even when $\lambda = B = 0$. As we show in later sections, $\lambda$ affects volatility, comovement and the size of momentum relative to reversal, while $B$ affects only the average mispricing.

The cost and benefit are assumed proportional to $y_t$ for analytical convenience. At the same time, these variables are sensitive to how shares of the active fund are defined (e.g., they change with a stock split). We define one share of the fund by the requirement that its market value equals the equilibrium market value of the entire fund. Under this definition, the number of fund shares

If, for example, the cost $C_t y_t$ is the sum of a fee $F y_t$ and a perk $(C_t - F)y_t$, and the manager can extract a fraction $\lambda$ of the perk, then the benefit is

$$[F + \lambda(C_t - F)]y_t = [\lambda C_t + (1 - \lambda)F]y_t,$$

which has the assumed form with $B = (1 - \lambda)F$.
held by the investor and the manager in equilibrium sum to one, i.e.,

\[ y_t + \bar{y}_t = 1. \]  

(2.4)

We define one share of the index fund to coincide with the market index \( \eta \). We define the constant

\[ \Delta \equiv \theta \Sigma \theta' \eta \Sigma \eta' - (\eta \Sigma \theta')^2, \]

which is positive and becomes zero when the vectors \( \theta \) and \( \eta \) are collinear.

The manager observes all the variables in the model. The investor observes the returns and share prices of the index and active funds, but not the same variables for the individual stocks. We study both the case of symmetric information, where the investor observes the cost \( C_t \), and that of asymmetric information, where \( C_t \) is observable only by the manager. In the asymmetric-information case, the investor seeks to infer \( C_t \) from the returns and share prices of the index and active funds. The symmetric-information case is simpler analytically and conceptually, while also yielding momentum and reversal. The asymmetric-information case is more realistic and delivers additional results.

We denote the vector of stocks’ cumulative dividends by \( D_t \equiv (D_{1t}, \ldots, D_{Nt})' \) and the vector of stock prices by \( S_t \equiv (S_{1t}, \ldots, S_{Nt})' \), where \( v' \) denotes the transpose of the vector \( v \). We assume that \( D_t \) follows the process

\[ dD_t = F_t dt + \sigma dB^D_t, \]  

(2.5)

where \( F_t \equiv (F_{1t}, \ldots, F_{Nt})' \) is a time-varying drift equal to the instantaneous expected dividend, \( \sigma \) is a constant matrix of diffusion coefficients, and \( B^D_t \) is a \( d \)-dimensional Brownian motion independent of \( B^C_t \). The expected dividend \( F_t \) is observable only by the manager. Time-variation in \( F_t \) is not essential in the symmetric-information case, where momentum and reversal occur even when \( F_t \) is a constant parameter known to the investor. Time-variation in \( F_t \) becomes essential for the analysis of asymmetric information: with a constant \( F_t \), the investor would infer \( C_t \) perfectly from the share price of the active fund, and information would be symmetric. We model time-variation in \( F_t \) through the process

\[ dF_t = \kappa (\bar{F} - F_t) dt + \phi \sigma dB^F_t \]  

(2.6)

where the mean-reversion parameter \( \kappa \) is the same as for \( C_t \) for simplicity, \( \bar{F} \) is a long-run mean, \( \phi \) is a positive scalar, and \( B^F_t \) is a \( d \)-dimensional Brownian motion independent of \( B^C_t \) and \( B^D_t \). The diffusion matrices for \( D_t \) and \( F_t \) are proportional for simplicity.
3 Symmetric Information

This section solves the model presented in the previous section in the case of symmetric information, where the cost $C_t$ is observable by both the investor and the manager. We look for an equilibrium in which stock prices take the form

$$S_t = \bar{F} \frac{r}{r+\kappa} + \frac{F_t - \bar{F}}{r+\kappa} - (a_0 + a_1 C_t),$$

(3.1)

where $(a_0, a_1)$ are constant vectors. The first two terms are the present value of expected dividends, discounted at the riskless rate $r$, and the last term is a risk premium linear in $C_t$. As we show later in this section, the risk premium moves in response to fund flows. The investor’s holdings of the active fund in our conjectured equilibrium are

$$y_t = b_0 - b_1 C_t,$$

(3.2)

where $(b_0, b_1)$ are constants. We expect $b_1$ to be positive, i.e., the investor reduces her holdings of the fund when $C_t$ is high. We refer to an equilibrium satisfying (3.1) and (3.2) as linear.

3.1 Manager’s Optimization

The manager chooses the active fund’s portfolio $z_t$, the number $\bar{y}_t$ of fund shares that he owns, and consumption $\bar{c}_t$. The manager’s budget constraint is

$$dW_t = rW_t dt + \bar{y}_t z_t (dD_t + dS_t - rS_t dt) + (\lambda C_t + B) y_t dt - \bar{c}_t dt.$$

(3.3)

The first term is the return from the riskless asset, the second term is the return from the active fund in excess of the riskless asset, the third term is the manager’s benefit from the investor’s participation in the fund, and the fourth term is consumption. To compute the return from the active fund, we note that since one share of the fund corresponds to $z_t$ shares of the stocks, the manager’s effective stock holdings are $\bar{y}_t z_t$ shares. These holdings are multiplied by the vector $dR_t \equiv dD_t + dS_t - rS_t dt$ of the stocks’ excess returns per share (referred to as returns, for simplicity). Using (2.3), (2.5), (2.6) and (3.1), we can write the vector of returns as

$$dR_t = [r a_0 + (r + \kappa) a_1 C_t - \kappa a_1 \bar{C}] dt + \sigma \left( dB_t^D + \frac{\phi dF_t^F}{r + \kappa} \right) - sa_1 dB_t^C.$$

(3.4)
Returns depend only on the cost $C_t$, and not on the expected dividend $F_t$. The covariance matrix of returns is

$$\text{Cov}(dR_t, dR'_t) = (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a'_1) \, dt,$$

where $f \equiv 1 + \phi^2/(r + \kappa)^2$ and $\Sigma \equiv \sigma \sigma'$. The matrix $f \Sigma$ represents the covariance driven purely by dividend (i.e., cashflow) news, and we refer to it as fundamental covariance. The matrix $s^2 a_1 a'_1$ represents the additional covariance introduced by fund flows, and we refer to it as non-fundamental covariance.

The manager’s optimization problem is to choose controls $(\bar{c}_t, \bar{y}_t, z_t)$ to maximize the expected utility (2.2) subject to the budget constraint (3.3) and the investor’s holding policy (3.2). The active fund’s portfolio $z_t$ satisfies, in addition, the normalization

$$z_t S_t = (\theta - x_t \eta) S_t.$$

This is because one share of the active fund is defined so that its market value equals the equilibrium market value of the entire fund. Moreover, the latter is $(\theta - x_t \eta) S_t$ because in equilibrium the active fund holds the true market portfolio $\theta$ minus the investor’s holdings $x_t \eta$ of the index fund. We conjecture that the manager’s value function is

$$\bar{V}(W_t, C_t) \equiv - \exp\left[-\left(\bar{r} W_t + \bar{q}_0 + \bar{q}_1 C_t + \frac{1}{2} \bar{q}_{11} C_t^2\right)\right],$$

where $(\bar{q}_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_{11})$ are constants. The Bellman equation is

$$\max_{\bar{c}_t, \bar{y}_t, z_t} \left[- \exp(-\bar{\alpha} \bar{c}_t) + D\bar{V} - \beta \bar{V}\right] = 0,$$

where $D\bar{V}$ is the drift of the process $\bar{V}$ under the controls $(\bar{c}_t, \bar{y}_t, z_t)$. Proposition 3.1 shows that the value function (3.7) satisfies the Bellman equation if $(\bar{q}_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_{11})$ satisfy a system of three scalar equations.

**Proposition 3.1** The value function (3.7) satisfies the Bellman equation (3.8) if $(\bar{q}_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_{11})$ satisfy a system of three scalar equations.

In the proof of Proposition 3.1 we show that the optimization over $(\bar{c}_t, \bar{y}_t, z_t)$ can be reduced to optimization over the manager’s consumption $\bar{c}_t$ and effective stock holdings $\hat{z}_t \equiv \bar{y}_t z_t$. Given
\( z_t \), the decomposition between \( \bar{y}_t \) and \( z_t \) is determined by the normalization (3.6). The first-order condition with respect to \( \hat{z}_t \) is
\[
E_t(dR_t) = r\hat{\alpha}\text{Cov}_t(dR_t, \hat{z}_t dR_t) + (\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\alpha}_1 C_t)\text{Cov}_t(dR_t, dC_t).
\] (3.9)

Eq. (3.9) links expected stock returns to the risk faced by the manager. The expected return that the manager requires from a stock depends on the stock’s covariance with the manager’s portfolio \( \hat{z}_t \) (first term in the right-hand side), and on the covariance with changes to the cost \( C_t \) (second term). The latter effect reflects a hedging demand by the manager. We derive the implications of (3.9) for the cross section of expected returns later in this section.

### 3.2 Investor’s Optimization

The investor chooses a number of shares \( x_t \) in the index fund and \( y_t \) in the active fund, and consumption \( c_t \). The investor’s budget constraint is
\[
dW_t = rW_t dt + x_t \eta dR_t + y_t (z_t dR_t - C_t dt) - c_t dt.
\] (3.10)

The first three terms are the returns from the riskless asset, the index fund, and the active fund (net of the cost \( C_t \)), and the fourth term is consumption. The investor’s optimization problem is to choose controls \((c_t, x_t, y_t)\) to maximize the expected utility (2.1) subject to the budget constraint (3.10). The investor takes the active fund’s portfolio \( z_t \) as given and equal to its equilibrium value \( \theta - x_t \eta \). We conjecture that the investor’s value function is
\[
V(W_t, C_t) \equiv -\exp\left[-\left(r\alpha W_t + q_0 + q_1 C_t + \frac{1}{2} q_{11} C_t^2\right)\right],
\] (3.11)

where \((q_0, q_1, q_{11})\) are constants. The Bellman equation is
\[
\max_{c_t, x_t, y_t} \left[-\exp(-\alpha c_t) + D V - \beta V\right] = 0,
\] (3.12)

where \(D V\) is the drift of the process \( V\) under the controls \((c_t, x_t, y_t)\). Proposition 3.2 shows that the value function (3.11) satisfies the Bellman equation (3.12) if \((q_0, q_1, q_{11})\) satisfy a system of three scalar equations. The proposition shows additionally that the optimal control \( y_t \) is linear in \( C_t \), as conjectured in (3.2).

**Proposition 3.2** The value function (3.11) satisfies the Bellman equation (3.12) if \((q_0, q_1, q_{11})\) satisfy a system of three scalar equations. The optimal control \( y_t \) is linear in \( C_t \).
In the proof of Proposition 3.2, we show that the first-order conditions with respect to $x_t$ and $y_t$ are

\begin{align}
E_t(\eta dR_t) &= r\alpha \text{Cov}_t[\eta dR_t, (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) dR_t] + (q_1 + q_{11} C_t) \text{Cov}_t(\eta dR_t, dC_t), \tag{3.13} \\
E_t(z_t dR_t) - C_t dt &= r\alpha \text{Cov}_t[z_t dR_t, (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) dR_t] + (q_1 + q_{11} C_t) \text{Cov}_t(z_t dR_t, dC_t), \tag{3.14}
\end{align}

respectively. Eqs. (3.13) and (3.14) are analogous to the manager’s first-order condition (3.9) in that they equate expected returns to risk. The difference with (3.9) is that the investor is constrained to two portfolios rather than $N$ individual stocks. Eq. (3.9) is a vector equation with $N$ components, while (3.13) and (3.14) are scalar equations derived by pre-multiplying expected returns with the vectors $\eta$ and $z_t$ of index- and active-fund weights. Note that the investor’s expected return from the active fund in (3.14) is net of the cost $C_t$.

3.3 Equilibrium

In equilibrium, the active fund’s portfolio $z_t$ is equal to $\theta - x_t \eta$, and the shares held by the manager and the investor sum to one. Combining these equations with the first-order conditions (3.9), (3.13) and (3.14), and the value-function equations (Propositions 3.1 and 3.2), yields a system of equations characterizing a linear equilibrium. Proposition 3.3 shows that a linear equilibrium exists, and determines a sufficient condition for uniqueness.

**Proposition 3.3** There exists a linear equilibrium. The constant $b_1$ is positive and the vector $a_1$ is given by

\begin{equation}
a_1 = \gamma_1 \Sigma p_f, \tag{3.15}
\end{equation}

where $\gamma_1$ is a positive constant and

\begin{equation}
p_f \equiv \theta - \frac{\eta \Sigma \theta'}{\eta \Sigma \eta} \eta \tag{3.16}
\end{equation}

is the “flow portfolio.” There exists a unique linear equilibrium if $\lambda < \bar{\lambda}$ for a constant $\bar{\lambda} > 0$.

Proposition 3.3 can be specialized to the benchmark case of costless delegation, where the investor’s cost $C_t$ of investing in the active fund is constant and equal to zero. This case can be derived by setting $C_t$, as well as its long-run mean $\bar{C}$ and diffusion coefficient $s$, to zero.

\footnote{We conjecture that uniqueness holds even if $\lambda \geq \bar{\lambda}$. Moreover, most of the properties that we derive hold in any linear equilibrium: this applies, for example, to (3.15) and $\gamma_1 > 0$, as we show in the proof of Proposition 3.3, and to Corollaries 3.2-3.6.}
Corollary 3.1 (Costless Delegation) When $C_t = \bar{C} = s = 0$, the investor holds $y_t = \bar{\alpha}/(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})$ shares of the active fund and $x_t = 0$ shares of the index fund. Stocks’ expected returns are given by the one-factor model

$$E_t(dR_t) = \frac{r\alpha f}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \sum \theta' dt = \frac{r\alpha}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} Cov_t(dR_t, \theta dR_t),$$

(3.17)

with the factor being the true market portfolio $\theta$.

The investor holds only the active fund because it offers a superior portfolio than the index fund at no cost. The relative shares of the investor and the manager in the active fund are determined by their risk-aversion coefficients, according to optimal risk-sharing. Stocks’ expected returns are determined by the covariance with the true market portfolio. The intuition for the latter result is that since the index fund receives zero investment, the true market portfolio coincides with the active portfolio $z_t$, which is also the portfolio held by the manager. Since the manager determines the cross section of expected returns through the first-order condition (3.9), and there is no hedging demand because $C_t$ is constant, the true market portfolio is the only pricing factor. Note that when $C_t = \bar{C} = s = 0$, expected returns are constant over time. Thus, return predictability can arise only because of time-variation in $C_t$. We next allow $C_t$ to vary over time, and determine the effects on fund flows, prices and expected returns.

Corollary 3.2 (Fund Flows) The change in the investor’s effective stock holdings, caused by a change in $C_t$, is proportional to the flow portfolio $p_f$:

$$\frac{\partial (x_t \eta + y_t z_t)}{\partial C_t} = -b_1 p_f.$$

(3.18)

Following an increase in the cost $C_t$ of investing in the active fund, the investor flows out of that fund and into the index fund. The net change in the investor’s effective stock holdings is proportional to the flow portfolio $p_f$, defined in (3.16). This portfolio consists of the true market portfolio $\theta$, plus a position in the market index $\eta$ that renders the covariance with the index equal to zero.\(^{12}\) The zero covariance between the market index and the flow portfolio follows from the more general result of Corollary 3.3: premultiply the last equality in (3.19) by $\eta$ and note that $\eta_{C_t} = 0$.
market index. Because investing in the index fund is costless, the investor maintains a constant overall exposure to the index. Therefore, the net change in her portfolio is uncorrelated with the index, which means that she is selling a slice of the flow portfolio.

In selling a slice of the flow portfolio, the investor is effectively selling some stocks and buying others. The stocks being sold correspond to long positions in the flow portfolio. Therefore, they correspond to large components of the vector $\theta$ relative to $\eta$, and are overweighted by the active fund relative to the index fund. Conversely, the stocks being bought correspond to short positions in the flow portfolio, and are underweighted by the active fund.

**Corollary 3.3 (Prices)** The change in stock prices, caused by a change in $C_t$, is proportional to stocks’ covariance with the flow portfolio $p_f$:

$$\frac{\partial S_t}{\partial C_t} = -\gamma_1 \Sigma f' = -\frac{\gamma_1}{\sum_{ij}^{\Delta}} \text{Cov}(dR_t, p_f dR_t) = -\frac{\gamma_1}{\sum_{ij}^{\Delta}} \text{Cov}_t(d\epsilon_t, p_f d\epsilon_t), \quad (3.19)$$

where $d\epsilon_t \equiv (d\epsilon_{1t}, \ldots, d\epsilon_{Nt})'$ denotes the residual from a regression of stock returns $dR_t$ on the market-index return $\eta dR_t$.

An increase in $C_t$ lowers the prices of stocks that covary positively with the flow portfolio and raises the prices of stocks covarying negatively. This price impact arises because of two distinct mechanisms: an intuitive mechanism involving fund flows, and a more subtle mechanism involving the manager’s hedging demand that we discuss at the end of this section. The fund-flows mechanism is as follows. When $C_t$ increases, the investor sells a slice of the flow portfolio, which is acquired by the manager. As a result, the manager requires higher expected returns from stocks that covary positively with the flow portfolio, and the price of these stocks decreases. Conversely, the expected returns of stocks that covary negatively with the flow portfolio decrease, and their price increases.

A stock’s covariance with the flow portfolio can be characterized in terms of the stock’s idiosyncratic risk. The last equality in Corollary 3.3 implies that the covariance is positive if the idiosyncratic part $d\epsilon_{nt}$ of the stock’s return, i.e., the part orthogonal to the index, covaries positively with the idiosyncratic part of $p_f d\epsilon_t$ for the flow portfolio.\(^{13}\) This is likely to occur when the stock is overweighted by the active fund because it then corresponds to a long position in the flow portfolio. Thus, stocks that the active fund overweight are likely to drop when the investor flows

\(^{13}\)Note that we consider idiosyncratic risk relative to the market index $\eta$ and not relative to the market portfolio $\pi$. This is typically how idiosyncratic risk is computed in empirical studies.
out of the active fund and into the index fund. Conversely, stocks that the active fund underweights are likely to rise.

While a stock’s relative weight in the active and the index fund influences the sign of a stock’s covariance with the flow portfolio, the stock’s idiosyncratic risk influences the magnitude: stocks with high idiosyncratic risk have higher covariance with the flow portfolio in absolute value, and are therefore more affected by changes in $C_t$. The intuition can be seen from the extreme case of a stock with no idiosyncratic risk. Since changes in $C_t$ do not change the investor’s overall exposure to the market index, they also do not change her willingness to carry risk perfectly correlated with the index. Therefore, they do not affect the price of the index, or of a stock that correlates perfectly with the index.

Since changes in $C_t$, and the fund flows they trigger, affect prices, they contribute to comovement between stocks. Recall from (3.5) that the covariance matrix of stock returns is the sum of a fundamental covariance, driven purely by cashflows, and a non-fundamental covariance, introduced by fund flows. Using Proposition 3.3, we can compute the non-fundamental covariance.

**Corollary 3.4 (Comovement)** The covariance matrix of stock returns is

$$\text{Cov}_t(dR_t, dR'_t) = (f\Sigma + s^2\gamma_1^2\Sigma p_f'p_f\Sigma) dt. \quad \text{(3.20)}$$

The non-fundamental covariance is positive for stock pairs whose covariance with the flow portfolio has the same sign, and is negative otherwise.

The non-fundamental covariance between a pair of stocks is proportional to the product of the covariances between each stock in the pair and the flow portfolio. It is thus large in absolute value when the stocks have high idiosyncratic risk, because they are more affected by changes in $C_t$. Moreover, it can be positive or negative: positive for stock pairs whose covariance with the flow portfolio has the same sign, and negative otherwise. Intuitively, two stocks move in the same direction in response to fund flows if they are both overweighted or both underweighted by the active fund, but move in opposite directions if one is overweighted and the other underweighted.

The effect of $C_t$ on expected returns goes in the opposite direction than the effect on prices. We next determine more generally the cross section of expected returns.

**Corollary 3.5 (Expected Returns)** Stocks’ expected returns are given by the two-factor model

$$E_t(dR_t) = \frac{r\alpha}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \eta \Sigma \theta' \text{Cov}_t(dR_t, \eta dR_t) + \Lambda_t \text{Cov}_t(dR_t, p_f dR_t), \quad \text{(3.21)}$$

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with the factors being the market index and the flow portfolio. The factor risk premium $\Lambda_t$ associated to the flow portfolio is

$$\Lambda_t = \frac{\rho \alpha \bar{\alpha}}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} + \frac{\gamma_1}{f + s^2 \gamma_2 \Delta} \left[ (r + \kappa)C_t - \frac{s^2 (\alpha q_1 + \bar{\alpha} \bar{q}_1)}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \right].$$

(3.22)

Changes in $C_t$ affect expected returns through the factor risk premium $\Lambda_t$ associated to the flow portfolio. For example, an increase in $C_t$ raises $\Lambda_t$, thus raising the expected returns of stocks that covary positively with the flow portfolio and lowering those of stocks that covary negatively. Note that changes in $C_t$ are the only driver of time-variation in expected returns.

The time-variation in expected returns gives rise to predictability. We examine predictability based on past returns. As in the rest of our analysis, we evaluate returns over an infinitesimal time period; returns thus concern a single point in time. We compute the covariance between the vector of returns at time $t$ and the same vector at time $t' > t$. Corollary 3.6 shows that this autocovariance matrix is equal to the non-fundamental (contemporaneous) covariance matrix times a negative scalar.

**Corollary 3.6 (Return Predictability)** The covariance between stock returns at time $t$ and those at time $t' > t$ is

$$\text{Cov}_t(dR_t, dR_{t'}) = -s^2 (r + \kappa) \gamma_1^2 e^{-\kappa (t' - t)} \Sigma p_f' p_f \Sigma (dt)^2.$$  

(3.23)

A stock’s return predicts negatively the stock’s subsequent return (return reversal). It predicts negatively the subsequent return of another stock when the covariance between each stock in the pair and the flow portfolio has the same sign (negative lead-lag effect), and positively otherwise (positive lead-lag effect).

Since the diagonal elements of the autocovariance matrix are negative, stocks exhibit negative autocovariance, i.e., return reversal. This is because expected returns vary over time only in response to changes in $C_t$, and these changes move prices in the opposite direction. Thus, a lower-than-expected price predicts a higher-than-expected subsequent return, and vice-versa.

The non-diagonal elements of the autocovariance matrix characterize lead-lag effects, i.e., whether the past return of one stock predicts the future return of another. Lead-lag effects are negative for stock pairs whose covariance with the flow portfolio has the same sign, and are positive
otherwise. For example, when the sign is the same, changes in \( C_t \) move the prices of both stocks in the same direction and their expected returns in the opposite direction. Therefore, a lower-than-expected price of one stock predicts a higher-than-expected subsequent return of the other, and vice-versa.

We next examine how prices and expected returns depend on the manager’s concern with commercial risk, i.e., the risk that the investor might reduce her participation in the fund. Recall that the manager derives the benefit \((\lambda C_t + B) y_t \) from the investor’s participation, where \( y_t \) is the number of shares owned by the investor, \( \lambda \) is the efficiency of perk extraction, and \( B \) is a fee.

**Corollary 3.7 (Commercial Risk)** An increase in \( \lambda \) raises \( \gamma_1 \), and thus increases the non-fundamental volatility of stock returns and the extent of return reversal. An increase in \( B \) has no effect on \( \gamma_1 \), but raises the factor risk premium \( \Lambda_t \) associated to the flow portfolio.

Since \( B \) raises \( \Lambda_t \), it lowers the prices of stocks that covary positively with the flow portfolio and raises those of stocks covarying negatively. Since the former are generally stocks that the active fund overweights and the latter stocks that it underweights, our result implies that a manager concerned with losing his fee is less willing to deviate from the market index. A common intuition for this result is that a deviation subjects the manager to the risk of underperforming relative to the index and experiencing outflows.\(^\text{14}\) In the symmetric-information case, where the investor observes \( C_t \), the causality is not from performance to flows, as the previous intuition requires, but from flows to performance: an increase in \( C_t \) triggers outflows from the active fund, and the negative price pressure these exert on the stocks that the fund overweights impairs fund performance. The intuition for the effect of \( B \) is different as well: a manager concerned with losing his fee seeks to hedge against increases in \( C_t \) since these trigger outflows. Hedging can be accomplished by holding a portfolio closer to the index since changes in \( C_t \) do not affect the index price.

The parameter \( B \) has an effect only on average prices, but not on how prices vary with \( C_t \). By contrast, \( \lambda \) renders prices more sensitive to \( C_t \), i.e., raises \( \gamma_1 \). Indeed, \( \lambda > 0 \) implies that when \( C_t \) increases, the manager can extract a larger perk from each share of the fund held by the investor, and is therefore more willing to hedge against future changes in \( C_t \). Thus, an increase in \( C_t \) not only generates outflows, but also makes the manager more concerned with future outflows.\(^\text{15}\) The

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\(^{14}\) This is, for example, the mechanism in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who assume that fund flows are an exogenous function of fund performance. Causality from performance to flows is endogenous in our model, and arises in the asymmetric-information case, where the investor does not observe \( C_t \) and seeks to infer it from fund performance. In the asymmetric-information case, \( B \) raises \( \Lambda_t \) because of a mechanism similar to that in Shleifer and Vishny.

\(^{15}\) The same effect would arise under the non-perk interpretations of the cost, discussed in Section 2, if the manager’s benefit is concave in the number of shares \( y_t \) owned by the investor. Intuitively, concavity means that the value of a
managers’ increased hedging demand raises $\Lambda_t$, and this adds to the effect that the increase in $C_t$ has through outflows. Note that since $\lambda$ raises $\gamma_1$, it also increases non-fundamental volatility and comovement (Corollary 3.4), as well as return reversal (Corollary 3.6). Thus, the manager’s demand to hedge against outflows can have the perverse effect to render returns more volatile.

4 Gradual Adjustment

Section 3 shows that returns exhibit reversal at any horizon. To generate short-run momentum and long-run reversal, we need the additional assumption that fund flows exhibit inertia, i.e., the investor can adjust her fund holdings to new information only gradually. Gradual adjustment can result from contractual restrictions or institutional decision lags.\textsuperscript{16} We model these frictions as a flow cost $\psi(dy_t/dt)^2/2$ that the investor must incur when changing the number $y_t$ of active-fund shares that she owns. The advantage of the quadratic cost over other formulations (such as an upper bound on $|dy_t/dt|$) is that it preserves the linearity of the model.

We maintain the assumption that information about $C_t$ is symmetric, and look for an equilibrium in which stock prices take the form

$$S_t = \bar{F} + \frac{F_t - \bar{F}}{r + \kappa} - (a_0 + a_1 C_t + a_2 y_t),$$

(4.1)

where $(a_0, a_1, a_2)$ are constant vectors. The number $y_t$ of active-fund shares that the investor owns becomes a state variable and affects prices since it cannot be set instantaneously to its optimal level. The investor’s speed of adjustment $v_t \equiv dy_t/dt$ in our conjectured equilibrium is

$$v_t = b_0 - b_1 C_t - b_2 y_t,$$

(4.2)

where $(b_0, b_1, b_2)$ are constants. We expect $(b_1, b_2)$ to be positive, i.e., the investor reduces her investment in the active fund faster when $C_t$ or $y_t$ are large. We refer to an equilibrium satisfying (4.1) and (4.2) as linear.

\textsuperscript{16}An example of contractual restrictions is lock-up periods, often imposed by hedge funds, which require investors not to withdraw capital for a pre-specified time period. Institutional decision lags can arise for investors such as pension funds, foundations or endowments, where decisions are made by boards of trustees that meet infrequently.
4.1 Optimization

The manager chooses controls \((c_t, y_t, z_t)\) to maximize the expected utility (2.2) subject to the budget constraint (3.3), the normalization (3.6), and the investor’s holding policy (4.2). Since stock prices depend on \((C_t, y_t)\), the same is true for the manager’s value function. We conjecture that the value function is

\[
V(W_t, X_t) \equiv - \exp \left[ - \left( r\alpha W_t + \bar{q}_0 + (\bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2) X_t + \frac{1}{2} X_t^\prime Q X_t \right) \right],
\]

(4.3)

where \(X_t \equiv (C_t, y_t)'\), \((\bar{q}_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2)\) are constants, and \(Q\) is a constant symmetric 2 \(\times\) 2 matrix.

**Proposition 4.1** The value function (4.3) satisfies the Bellman equation (3.8) if \((\bar{q}_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, Q)\) satisfy a system of six scalar equations.

The investor chooses controls \((c_t, x_t, v_t)\) to maximize the expected utility (2.1) subject to the budget constraint

\[
dW_t = rW_t dt + x_t \eta dR_t + y_t (z_t dR_t - C_t dt) - \frac{1}{2} \psi v_t^2 dt - c_t dt
\]

(4.4)

and the manager’s portfolio policy \(z_t = \theta - x_t \eta\). We study this optimization problem in two steps. In a first step, we optimize over \((c_t, x_t)\), assuming that \(v_t\) is given by (4.2). We solve this problem using dynamic programming, and conjecture the value function

\[
V(W_t, X_t) \equiv - \exp \left[ - \left( r\alpha W_t + q_0 + (q_1, q_2) X_t + \frac{1}{2} X_t^\prime Q X_t \right) \right],
\]

(4.5)

where \(X_t \equiv (C_t, y_t)'\), \((q_0, q_1, q_2)\) are constants, and \(Q\) is a constant symmetric 2 \(\times\) 2 matrix. The Bellman equation is

\[
\max_{c_t, x_t} [- \exp(-\alpha c_t) + \mathcal{D} V - \beta V] = 0,
\]

(4.6)

where \(\mathcal{D} V\) is the drift of the process \(V\) under the controls \((c_t, x_t)\). In a second step, we derive conditions under which the control \(v_t\) given by (4.2) is optimal.

**Proposition 4.2** The value function (4.5) satisfies the Bellman equation (4.6) if \((q_0, q_1, q_2, Q)\) satisfy a system of six scalar equations. The control \(v_t\) given by (4.2) is optimal if \((b_0, b_1, b_2)\) satisfy a system of three scalar equations.
4.2 Equilibrium

The system of equations characterizing a linear equilibrium is higher-dimensional than under instantaneous adjustment, and so more complicated. Proposition 4.3 shows that a unique linear equilibrium exists when the diffusion coefficient \( s \) of \( C_t \) is small. This is done by computing explicitly the linear equilibrium for \( s = 0 \) and applying the implicit function theorem. Our numerical solutions for general values of \( s \) seem to generate a unique linear equilibrium. Moreover, the properties that we derive for small \( s \) in the rest of this section seem to hold for general values of \( s \).

**Proposition 4.3** For small \( s \), there exists a unique linear equilibrium. The constants \((b_1, b_2)\) are positive, and the vectors \((a_1, a_2)\) are given by

\[
a_i = \gamma_i \Sigma p'_f, \tag{4.7}
\]

where \( \gamma_1 \) is a positive and \( \gamma_2 \) a negative constant. Eq. (4.7) holds in any linear equilibrium for general values of \( s \).

Since \( \gamma_1 > 0 \), an increase in \( C_t \) lowers the prices of stocks that covary positively with the flow portfolio and raises the prices of stocks covarying negatively. This effect is the same as under instantaneous adjustment (Corollary 3.3) but the mechanism is slightly different. Under instantaneous adjustment, an increase in \( C_t \) triggers an immediate outflow from the active fund by the investor. In flowing out of the fund, the investor sells the stocks that the fund overweights, and the prices of these stocks drop so that the manager is induced to buy them. Under gradual adjustment, the outflow is expected to occur in the future, and so are the sales of the stocks that the fund overweights. The prices of these stocks drop immediately in anticipation of the future sales.

We next examine how \( C_t \) impacts stocks’ expected returns. As in the case of instantaneous adjustment, expected returns are given by a two-factor model, with the factors being the market index and the flow portfolio. The key difference with instantaneous adjustment lies in the properties of the factor risk premium associated with the flow portfolio.

**Corollary 4.1 (Expected Returns)** Stocks’ expected returns are given by the two-factor model (3.21), with the factors being the market index and the flow portfolio. The factor risk premium \( \Lambda_t \)

\[^{17}\text{This applies to } b_1 > 0, b_2 > 0, \gamma_1 > 0, \gamma_2 < 0, \text{ and to Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 (with a different threshold } \lambda^{R}).\]
associated to the flow portfolio is

$$\Lambda_t = r\bar{\alpha} + \frac{1}{f + \frac{s^2 \gamma R}{\eta \Sigma}} \left( \gamma_1^R C_t + \gamma_2^R y_t - \gamma_1 s^2 \delta_t \right), \quad (4.8)$$

where \((\gamma_1^R, \gamma_2^R)\) are constants. For small \(s\), the constant \(\gamma_1^R\) is negative if

$$\lambda < \lambda^R \equiv \frac{\bar{\alpha}}{2(\alpha + \bar{\alpha}) + \frac{\psi \Sigma \eta'}{2f \Delta} \left[ r + (r + 2\kappa) \sqrt{1 + \frac{4(\alpha + \bar{\alpha}) f \Delta}{r \psi \Sigma \eta'}} \right]}, \quad (4.9)$$

and is positive otherwise, and the constant \(\gamma_2^R\) is negative.

When \(\gamma_1^R < 0\), the effect of \(C_t\) on expected returns goes in the same direction as the effect on prices. For example, an increase in \(C_t\) not only lowers the prices of stocks that covary positively with the flow portfolio, but also lowers their subsequent expected returns. This seems paradoxical: given that \(C_t\) does not affect cash flows, shouldn’t the drop in price be accompanied by an increase in expected return? The explanation is that while expected return decreases in the short run, it increases in the long run, in response to the gradual outflows triggered by the increase in \(C_t\).

Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic behavior of fund flows and expected returns following a shock to \(C_t\) at time \(t\). We assume that the shock is positive, and trace its effects for \(t' > t\). We set the realized values of all shocks occurring subsequent to time \(t\) to zero: given the linearity of our model, this amounts to taking expectations over the future shocks. To better illustrate the main effects, we assume no mean-reversion in \(C_t\), i.e., \(\kappa = 0\). Thus, the shock to \(C_t\) generates an equal increase in \(C_{t'}\) for all \(t' > t\). We assume parameter values for which the constant \(\gamma_1^R\) of Corollary 4.1 is negative. The constant \(\gamma_2^R\) is also negative for these parameter values, a result which our numerical solutions suggest is general.

The solid line in Figure 1 plots the investor’s holdings of the active fund, \(y_t\). Holdings decrease to a lower constant level, and the decrease happens gradually because of the adjustment cost. The dashed line in Figure 1 plots the instantaneous expected return \(E(dR_t)/dt\) of a stock that covaries positively with the flow portfolio. Immediately following the increase in \(C_t\), expected return decreases because \(\gamma_1^R < 0\). Over time, however, as outflows occur, expected return increases. This is because the manager must be induced to absorb the outflows and buy the stock—an effect which can also be seen from Corollary 4.1 by noting that \(y_t\) decreases over time and \(\gamma_2^R < 0\). The increase in expected return eventually overtakes the initial decrease, and the overall effect becomes
Figure 1: Effect of a positive shock to $C_t$ on the investor’s holdings of the active fund $y_{t'}$ (solid line) and on the instantaneous expected return $E(dR_{t'})/dt$ of a stock that covaries positively with the flow portfolio (dashed line) for $t' > t$. Time is measured in years. The figure is drawn for $(r, \kappa, \bar{\alpha}/\alpha, \psi/\alpha, \phi^2, \Delta/(\eta \Sigma \eta'), s^2, \lambda) = (0.04, 0, 4, 0.1, 0.4, 0.1, 0, 0.1, 1, 0)$. The equations describing the dynamics of $y_{t'}$ and $E(dR_{t'})/dt$ are derived in the proof of Corollary 4.2.

an increase. It is the long-run increase in expected return that causes the initial price drop at time $t$.

While Figure 1 reconciles the initial price drop with the behavior of expected return, it does not explain why expected return decreases in the short run. The latter effect is, in fact, puzzling: why is the manager willing to buy in the short run a stock whose expected return has decreased? The intuition is that the manager prefers to guarantee a “bird in the hand.” Indeed, the anticipation of future outflows causes the stock to become underpriced and offer an attractive return over a long horizon. The manager could earn an even more attractive return, on average, by buying the stock after the outflows occur. This, however, exposes him to the risk that the outflows might not occur, in which case the stock would cease to be underpriced. Thus, the manager might prefer to guarantee an attractive long-horizon return (bird in the hand), and pass up on the opportunity to exploit an uncertain short-run price drop (two birds in the bush). Note that in seeking to guarantee the long-horizon return, the manager is, in effect, causing the short-run drop. Indeed, the manager’s buying pressure prevents the price in the short run from dropping to a level that fully reflects the future outflows, i.e., from which a short-run drop is not expected.
The bird-in-the-hand effect can be seen formally in the manager’s first-order condition (3.9), which in the case of gradual adjustment becomes

\[ E_t(dR_t) = r\bar{\alpha}Cov_t(dR_t, \hat{z}_tdR_t) + (\bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_{11}C_t + \bar{q}_{12}y_t)Cov_t(dR_t, dC_t). \]  

(4.10)

Following an increase in \( C_t \), the expected return of a stock that covaries positively with the flow portfolio decreases, lowering the left-hand side of (4.10). Therefore, the manager remains willing to hold the stock only if its risk, described by the right-hand side of (4.10), also decreases. The decrease in risk is not caused by a lower covariance between the stock and the manager’s portfolio \( \hat{z}_t \) (first term in the right-hand side). Indeed, since outflows are gradual, \( \hat{z}_t \) remains constant immediately following the increase in \( C_t \). The decrease in risk is instead driven by the manager’s hedging demand (second term in the right-hand side), which means that a stock covarying positively with the flow portfolio becomes a better hedge for the manager when \( C_t \) increases. The intuition is that when \( C_t \) increases, mispricing becomes severe, and the manager has attractive investment opportunities. Hedging against a reduction in these opportunities requires holding stocks that perform well when \( C_t \) decreases, and these are the stocks covarying positively with the flow portfolio. Holding such stocks guarantees the manager an attractive long-horizon return—the bird-in-the-hand effect.

The manager’s hedging demand is influenced not only by the bird-in-the-hand effect, but also by the concern with commercial risk (Corollary 3.7). The two effects work in opposite directions when \( \lambda > 0 \). Indeed, a stock covarying positively with the flow portfolio is a bad hedge for the manager because it performs poorly when \( C_t \) increases, which is also when outflows occur. Moreover, \( \lambda > 0 \) implies that the hedge tends to worsen when \( C_t \) increases because the manager becomes more concerned with future outflows. When \( \lambda \) is small, the bird-in-the-hand effect dominates the commercial-risk effect in influencing how the manager’s hedging demand depends on \( C_t \). Thus, when \( \lambda \) is small, changes in \( C_t \) impact prices and short-run expected returns in the same direction (\( \gamma_{R}^1 < 0 \)), as Corollary 4.1 confirms in the case of small \( s \).\(^{18}\)

The time-variation in expected returns implied by Corollary 4.1 gives rise to predictability. As in the case of instantaneous adjustment, the autocovariance matrix of returns is equal to the non-fundamental covariance matrix times a scalar. But while the scalar is negative for all lags under instantaneous adjustment, it can be positive for short lags under gradual adjustment.

**Corollary 4.2 (Return Predictability)** The covariance between stock returns at time \( t \) and

\(^{18}\)Note that in the more complicated version of the model where the manager must invest his wealth in the riskless asset, \( \lambda \) would naturally be small. Indeed, since the agents acting as counterparty to the investor’s flows would not be fund managers, they would not be affected by commercial risk.
those at time \( t' > t \) is

\[
\text{Cov}_t(dR_t, dR'_{t'}) = \left[ \chi_1 e^{-\kappa(t' - t)} + \chi_2 e^{-\beta_2(t' - t)} \right] \Sigma_p' p_f \Sigma (dt)^2,
\]

(4.11)

where \((\chi_1, \chi_2)\) are constants. For small \( s \), the term in the square bracket of (4.11) is positive if \( t' - t < \hat{u} \) and negative if \( t' - t > \hat{u} \), for a threshold \( \hat{u} \) which is positive if \( \lambda < \lambda^R \) and zero if \( \lambda > \lambda^R \). A stock’s return predicts positively the stock’s subsequent return for \( t' - t < \hat{u} \) (short-run momentum) and negatively for \( t' - t > \hat{u} \) (long-run reversal). It predicts in the same manner the subsequent return of another stock when the covariance between each stock in the pair and the flow portfolio has the same sign, and in the opposite manner otherwise.

When \( \lambda \) is small, stocks exhibit positive autocovariance for short lags and negative for long lags, i.e., short-run momentum and long-run reversal. This is because expected returns vary over time only in response to changes in \( C_t \) and the changes in \( y_t \) that these trigger. Moreover, changes in \( C_t \) move prices and short-run expected returns in the same direction, but long-run expected returns in the opposite direction. When instead \( \lambda \) is large, autocovariance is negative for all lags because changes in \( C_t \) move even short-run expected returns in the opposite direction to prices.\(^{19}\)

Lead-lag effects have the same sign as autocovariance for stock pairs whose covariance with the flow portfolio has the same sign. This is because changes in \( C_t \) influence both stocks in the same manner.

### 5 Asymmetric Information

This section treats the case of asymmetric information, where the investor does not observe the cost \( C_t \) and seeks to infer it from the returns and share prices of the index and active funds. Asymmetric information involves the additional complexity of having to solve for the investor’s dynamic inference problem. Yet, this complexity does not come at the expense of tractability: the equilibrium has a similar formal structure and many properties in common with symmetric information. For example, the autocovariance and non-fundamental covariance matrices are identical to their symmetric-information counterparts up to multiplicative scalars.

We maintain the adjustment cost assumed in Section 4, and look for an equilibrium with the following characteristics. The investor’s conditional distribution of \( C_t \) is normal with mean \( \hat{C}_t \). The

\(^{19}\)The result that stocks exhibit short-run momentum and long-run reversal when \( \lambda \) is small, but reversal for all lags when \( \lambda \) is large is consistent with the implication of Corollary 3.7 that an increase in \( \lambda \) increases the extent of reversal.
variance of the conditional distribution is, in general, a deterministic function of time, but we focus on a steady state where it is constant. Stock prices take the form

\[ S_t = \frac{\bar{F}}{r} + \frac{F_t - \bar{F}}{r + \kappa} - (a_0 + a_1 \hat{C}_t + a_2 C_t + a_3 y_t), \]  

(5.1)

where \((a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3)\) are constant vectors. The conditional mean \(\hat{C}_t\) becomes a state variable and affects prices because it determines the investor’s target holdings of the active fund. The true value \(C_t\), which is observed by the manager, also affects prices because it forecasts the investor’s target holdings in the future. We conjecture that the effects of \((\hat{C}_t, C_t, y_t)\) on prices depend on the covariance with the flow portfolio, as is the case for \((C_t, y_t)\) under symmetric information. That is, there exist constants \((\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3)\) such that for \(i = 1, 2, 3\),

\[ a_i = \gamma_i \Sigma_{p'_f}. \]  

(5.2)

The investor’s speed of adjustment \(v_t \equiv dy_t/dt\) in our conjectured equilibrium is

\[ v_t = b_0 - b_1 \hat{C}_t - b_2 y_t, \]  

(5.3)

where \((b_0, b_1, b_2)\) are constants. Eq. (5.3) is identical to its symmetric-information counterpart (4.2), except that \(C_t\) is replaced by its mean \(\hat{C}_t\). We refer to an equilibrium satisfying (5.1)-(5.3) as linear.

### 5.1 Investor’s Inference

The investor seeks to infer the cost \(C_t\) from fund returns and share prices. The share prices of the index and active fund are \(z_t S_t\) and \(\eta S_t\), respectively, and are informative about \(C_t\) because \(C_t\) affects the vector of stock prices \(S_t\). Prices do not reveal \(C_t\) perfectly, however, because they also depend on the time-varying expected dividend \(F_t\) that the investor does not observe.

In addition to prices, the investor observes the net-of-cost return of the active fund, \(z_t dR_t - C_t dt\), and the return of the index fund, \(\eta dR_t\). Because the investor observes prices, she also observes capital gains, and therefore can deduce net dividends (i.e., dividends minus \(C_t\)). Net dividends are the incremental information that returns provide to the investor.

In equilibrium, the active fund’s portfolio \(z_t\) is equal to \(\theta - x_t \eta\). Since the investor knows \(x_t\), observing the price and net dividends of the index and active funds is informationally equivalent

\(^{20}\)The steady state is reached in the limit when time \(t\) becomes large.
to observing the price and net dividends of the index fund and of a hypothetical fund holding the true market portfolio $\theta$. Therefore, we can take the investor’s information to be the net dividends of the true market portfolio $\theta dD_t - C_t dt$, the dividends of the index fund $\eta dD_t$, the price of the true market portfolio $\theta S_t$, and the price of the index fund $\eta S_t$. We solve the investor’s inference problem using recursive (Kalman) filtering.

**Proposition 5.1** The mean $\hat{C}_t$ of the investor’s conditional distribution of $C_t$ evolves according to the process

$$d\hat{C}_t = \kappa (\hat{C}_t - C_t) dt - \beta_1 \left\{ p_f [dD_t - E_t(dD_t)] - (C_t - \hat{C}_t) dt \right\}$$

$$- \beta_2 p_f \left[ dS_t + a_1 d\hat{C}_t + a_3 dy_t - E_t(dS_t + a_1 d\hat{C}_t + a_3 dy_t) \right],$$

(5.4)

where

$$\beta_1 = T \left[ 1 - (r + \kappa) \frac{\gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] \frac{\eta \Sigma \eta'}{\Delta},$$

(5.5)

$$\beta_2 = \frac{s^2 \gamma_2}{(r + \kappa)^2 + \frac{s^2 \gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}},$$

(5.6)

and $T$ denotes the distribution’s steady-state variance. The variance $T$ is the unique positive solution of the quadratic equation

$$T^2 \left[ 1 - (r + \kappa) \frac{\gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right]^2 \frac{\eta \Sigma \eta'}{\Delta} + 2\kappa T - \frac{s^2 \phi^2}{(r + \kappa)^2 + \frac{s^2 \gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}} = 0.$$  

(5.7)

The term in $\beta_1$ in (5.4) represents the investor’s learning from net dividends. Recalling the definition (3.16) of the flow portfolio, we can write this term as

$$- \beta_1 \left\{ \theta dD_t - C_t dt - E_t (\theta dD_t - C_t dt) - \frac{\eta \Sigma \theta'}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} [\eta dD_t - E_t(\eta dD_t)] \right\}. $$

(5.8)

The investor lowers her estimate of the cost $C_t$ if the net dividends of the true market portfolio $\theta dD_t - C_t dt$ are above expectations. Of course, net dividends can be high not only because $C_t$ is

\[\text{We are assuming that the investor’s information is the same in and out of equilibrium, i.e., the manager cannot manipulate the investor’s beliefs by deviating from his equilibrium strategy and choosing a portfolio } z_t \neq \theta - x_t \eta.\]

This is consistent with the assumption of a competitive manager. Indeed, one interpretation of this assumption is that there exists a continuum of managers, each with the same $C_t$. A deviation by one manager would then not affect the investors’ beliefs about $C_t$ because these would depend on averages across managers.
low, but also because gross dividends are high. The investor adjusts for this by comparing with the dividends $\eta D_t$ of the index fund. The adjustment is made by computing the regression residual of $\theta dD_t - C_t dt$ on $\eta D_t$, which is the term in curly brackets in (5.8).

The term in $\beta_2$ in (5.4) represents the investor’s learning from prices. The investor lowers her estimate of $C_t$ if the price of the true market portfolio is above expectations. Indeed, the price can be high because the manager knows privately that $C_t$ is low, and anticipates that the investor will increase her participation in the fund, causing the price to rise, as she learns about $C_t$. As with dividends, the investor needs to account for the fact that the price of the true market portfolio can be high not only because $C_t$ is low, but also because the manager expects future dividends to be high ($F_t$ small). She adjusts for this by comparing with the price of the index fund. Note that if the expected dividend $F_t$ is constant ($\phi = 0$), learning from prices is perfect: (5.7) implies that the conditional variance $T$ is zero.

Because the investor compares the performance of the true market portfolio, and hence of the active fund, to that of the index fund, she is effectively using the index as a benchmark. Note that benchmarking is not part of an explicit contract tying the manager’s compensation to the index. Compensation is tied to the index only implicitly: if the active fund outperforms the index, the investor infers that $C_t$ is low and increases her participation in the fund.

5.2 Optimization

The manager chooses controls $(\bar{\alpha}_t, \bar{\beta}_t, z_t)$ to maximize the expected utility (2.2) subject to the budget constraint (3.3), the normalization (3.6), and the investor’s holding policy (5.3). Since stock prices depend on $(\hat{C}_t, C_t, y_t)$, the same is true for the manager’s value function. We conjecture that the value function is

$$\bar{V}(W_t, \bar{X}_t) \equiv -\exp \left[ - \left( r\alpha W_t + q_0 + (q_1, q_2, q_3)\bar{X}_t + \frac{1}{2}\bar{X}_t' \bar{Q} \bar{X}_t \right) \right],$$

(5.9)

where $\bar{X}_t \equiv (\hat{C}_t, C_t, y_t)'$, $(\bar{q}_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, \bar{q}_3)$ are constants, and $\bar{Q}$ is a constant symmetric $3 \times 3$ matrix.

**Proposition 5.2** The value function (5.9) satisfies the Bellman equation (3.8) if $(\bar{q}_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, \bar{q}_3, \bar{Q})$ satisfy a system of ten scalar equations.
The investor chooses controls \((c_t, x_t, v_t)\) to maximize the expected utility (2.1) subject to the budget constraint (4.4) and the manager’s portfolio policy \(z_t = \theta - x_t\eta\). As in the case of symmetric information, we study this optimization problem in two steps: first optimize over \((c_t, x_t)\), assuming that \(v_t\) is given by (5.3), and then derive conditions under which (5.3) is optimal. We solve the first problem using dynamic programming, and conjecture the value function (4.5), where \(X_t \equiv (\hat{C}_t, y_t)'\), \((q_0, q_1, q_2)\) are constants, and \(Q \) is a constant symmetric \(2 \times 2\) matrix.

**Proposition 5.3** The value function (4.5) satisfies the Bellman equation (4.6) if \((q_0, q_1, q_2, Q)\) satisfy a system of six scalar equations. The control \(v_t\) given by (5.3) is optimal if \((b_0, b_1, b_2)\) satisfy a system of three scalar equations.

### 5.3 Equilibrium

Proposition 5.4 shows that a unique linear equilibrium exists when the diffusion coefficient \(s\) of \(C_t\) is small. Our numerical solutions for general values of \(s\) seem to generate a unique linear equilibrium, with properties similar to those derived in the rest of this section for small \(s\).

**Proposition 5.4** For small \(s\), there exists a unique linear equilibrium. The constants \((b_1, b_2, \gamma_1)\) are positive, and the constant \(\gamma_3\) is negative. The constant \(\gamma_2\) is positive if \(\lambda \geq 0\).

When information is asymmetric, cashflow news affect the investor’s estimate of the cost \(C_t\), and so trigger fund flows. These flows, in turn, impact stock returns. We refer to the effect that cashflow news have on returns through fund flows as an indirect effect, to distinguish from the direct effect computed by holding flows constant. To illustrate the two effects, consider the dividend shock \(dD_t\) at time \(t\). The shock’s direct effect is to add \(dD_t\) to returns \(dR_t = dD_t + dS_t - rS_t dt\). The shock’s indirect effect is to trigger fund flows which impact returns \(dR_t\) through the price change \(dS_t\). Eqs. (5.1), (5.2) and (5.4) imply that the indirect effect is \(\beta_1 \gamma_1 \Sigma p' p dD_t\).

The indirect effect amplifies the direct effect. Suppose, for example, that a stock experiences a negative cashflow shock. If the stock is overweighted by the active fund, then the shock lowers the return of the active fund more than of the index fund. As a consequence, the investor infers that \(C_t\) has increased, and flows out of the active and into the index fund. Since the active fund overweighted the stock, the investor’s flows cause the stock to be sold and push its price down. Conversely, if the

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\(^{22}\)This applies to \(b_1 > 0, b_2 > 0, \gamma_1 > 0, \gamma_2 > 0, \gamma_3 < 0\), and to Corollaries 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
stock is underweighted, then the investor infers that $C_t$ has decreased, and flows out of the index and into the active fund. Since the active fund underweights the stock, the investor’s flows cause again the stock to be sold and push its price down. Thus, in both cases, fund flows amplify the direct effect that the cashflow shock has on returns.

Amplification is related to comovement. Recall that under symmetric information fund flows generate comovement between a pair of stocks because they affect the expected return of each stock in the pair. This channel of comovement, to which we refer as ER/ER (where ER stands for expected return) is also present under asymmetric information. Asymmetric information introduces an additional channel involving fund flows, to which we refer as CF/ER (where CF stands for cashflow). This is that cashflow news of one stock in a pair trigger fund flows which affect the expected return of the other stock. The CF/ER channel is the one related to amplification.

While the ER/ER and CF/ER channels are conceptually distinct, their effects are formally similar: the covariance matrix generated by CF/ER is equal to that generated by ER/ER times a positive scalar (Corollary 5.1). Thus, if ER/ER generates a positive covariance between a pair of stocks, so does CF/ER, and if the former covariance is large, so is the latter. Consider, for example, two stocks that the active fund overweights. Since outflows from the active fund (triggered by, e.g., a cashflow shock to a third stock) push down the prices of both stocks, ER/ER generates a positive covariance. Moreover, since a negative cashflow shock to one stock triggers outflows from the active fund and this pushes down the price of the other stock, CF/ER also generates a positive covariance. The former covariance is large if the two stocks have high idiosyncratic risk since this makes them more sensitive to fund flows. But high idiosyncratic risk also renders the latter covariance large: cashflow shocks to stocks having low correlation with the index generate a large discrepancy between the active and the index return, hence triggering large fund flows.

Corollary 5.1 computes the covariance matrix of stock returns. The fundamental covariance is identical to that under symmetric information, while the non-fundamental covariance is proportional. The intuition for proportionality is that the covariance matrices generated by ER/ER and CF/ER are proportional, the non-fundamental covariance under symmetric information is generated by ER/ER, and that under asymmetric information is generated by ER/ER and CF/ER. Corollary 5.1 shows, in addition, that for small $\alpha$ the non-fundamental covariance matrix is larger under asymmetric information, i.e., the proportionality coefficient with the symmetric-information matrix is larger than one. This result, which our numerical solutions suggest is general, implies that the non-fundamental volatility of each stock is larger under asymmetric information, and so is
the absolute value of the non-fundamental covariance between any pair of stocks. Intuitively, these quantities are larger under asymmetric information because the amplification channel CF/ER is present only in that case.

**Corollary 5.1 (Comovement and Amplification)** The covariance matrix of stock returns is

\[
\text{Cov}_t(dR_t, dR'_t) = (f \Sigma + k \Sigma p'_f p_f \Sigma) \text{dt},
\]

where \( k \) is a positive constant. The fundamental covariance is identical to that under symmetric information, while the non-fundamental covariance is proportional. Moreover, for small \( s \), the proportionality coefficient is larger than one.

The cross section of expected returns is explained by the same two factors as under symmetric information.

**Corollary 5.2 (Expected Returns)** Stocks’ expected returns are given by the two-factor model (3.21), with the factors being the market index and the flow portfolio. The factor risk premium \( \Lambda_t \) associated to the flow portfolio is

\[
\Lambda_t = r \bar{\alpha} + \frac{1}{f + \frac{A}{n_2 \gamma}} \left( \gamma^R_1 \hat{C}_t + \gamma^R_2 C_t + \gamma^R_3 y_t - k_1 \bar{q}_1 - k_2 \bar{q}_2 \right),
\]

where \( (\gamma^R_1, \gamma^R_2, \gamma^R_3, k_1, k_2) \) are constants. For small \( s \), the constants \( (\gamma^R_1, \gamma^R_3) \) are negative and the constant \( \gamma^R_2 \) has the same sign as \( \lambda \).

Using Corollary 5.2, we can examine how expected returns respond to shocks. Consider a cashflow shock, which we assume is negative and hits a stock in large residual supply. The shock raises \( \hat{C}_t \), the investor’s estimate of \( C_t \). The increase in \( \hat{C}_t \) lowers the prices of stocks covarying positively with the flow portfolio (including the stock hit by the cashflow shock) since \( \gamma_1 > 0 \), and lowers the subsequent expected returns of these stocks since \( \gamma^R_1 < 0 \). The simultaneous decrease in prices and expected returns is consistent because expected returns increase in the long run. Expected returns decrease in the short run because of the bird-in-the-hand effect.

The time-variation in expected returns following cashflow shocks can be characterized in terms of the covariance between cashflow shocks and subsequent returns. Corollary 5.3 computes the covariance between the vectors \((dD_t, dF_t)\) of cashflow shocks at time \( t \) and the vector of returns at
time $t' > t$. Both covariance matrices are equal to the non-fundamental covariance matrix times a scalar which is positive for short lags and negative for long lags. Thus, cashflow shocks generate short-run momentum and long-run reversal in returns, consistent with the discussion in the previous paragraph. Note that predictability based on cashflows arises only under asymmetric information because only then cashflow shocks trigger fund flows.

**Corollary 5.3 (Return Predictability Based on Cashflows)** The covariance between cashflow shocks $(dD_t, dF_t)$ at time $t$ and returns at time $t' > t$ is given by

$$\text{Cov}_t(dD_t, dR'_{t'}) = \frac{\beta_1(r + \kappa)\text{Cov}_t(dF_t, dR'_{t'})}{\beta_2\phi^2} = \left[ \chi_1 e^{-(\kappa + \rho)(t' - t)} + \chi_2 D^2 e^{-b_2(t' - t)} \right] \Sigma p'_fp_f \Sigma(dt)^2,$$

where $(\chi_1^D, \chi_2^D)$ are constants. For small $s$, the term in the square bracket of (4.11) is positive if $t' - t < \hat{u}_D$ and negative if $t' - t > \hat{u}_D$, for a threshold $\hat{u}_D > 0$. A stock’s cashflow shocks predict positively the stock’s subsequent return for $t' - t < \hat{u}_D$ (short-run momentum) and negatively for $t' - t > \hat{u}_D$ (long-run reversal). They predict in the same manner the subsequent return of another stock when the covariance between each stock in the pair and the flow portfolio has the same sign, and in the opposite manner otherwise.

We finally examine predictability based on past returns rather than cashflows. This predictability is driven both by cashflow shocks and by shocks to $C_t$. Predictability based on past returns has the same form as under symmetric information (Corollary 4.2), except that short-run momentum arises even for large $\lambda^2$.

**Corollary 5.4 (Return Predictability)** The covariance between stock returns at time $t$ and those at time $t' > t$ is

$$\text{Cov}_t(dR_t, dR'_{t'}) = \left[ \chi_1 e^{-(\kappa + \rho)(t' - t)} + \chi_2 e^{-\kappa(t' - t)} + \chi_3 e^{-b_2(t' - t)} \right] \Sigma p'_fp_f \Sigma(dt)^2, \quad (5.13)$$

The latter result relies on the assumption that $s$ is small. Recall that when information is symmetric, short-run momentum does not arise for large $\lambda$ because of commercial risk. Indeed, an increase in $C_t$ lowers the prices of stocks covarying positively with the flow portfolio because of the anticipation of future outflows from the active fund. Moreover, the subsequent expected returns of these shocks increase, even in the short run, because the manager becomes more concerned with commercial risk (and this effect dominates the bird-in-the-hand effect for large $\lambda$). Both effects are also present when information is asymmetric. Under asymmetric information, however, predictability is driven not only by shocks to $C_t$ but also by cashflow shocks. Moreover, the latter have a dominating effect when shocks to $C_t$ have small variance (small $s$). Indeed, for small $s$, shocks to $C_t$ are not only small but also trigger a small price reaction holding size constant. This is because the price reaction is driven by the anticipation of future flows as the investor learns about $C_t$, and learning is limited for small $s$. 33
where \((\chi_1, \chi_2, \chi_3, \rho)\) are constants. For \(\lambda \geq 0\) and small \(s\), the term in the square bracket of (5.13) is positive if \(t' - t < \hat{u}\) and negative if \(t' - t > \hat{u}\), for a threshold \(\hat{u} > 0\). Given \(\hat{u}\), predictability is as in Corollary 4.2.

6 Conclusion

We propose a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio management. Flows between investment funds are triggered by changes in fund managers’ efficiency, which investors either observe directly or infer from past performance. Momentum arises if fund flows exhibit inertia, and because rational prices do not fully adjust to reflect future flows—a result which is new and surprising. Reversal arises because flows push prices away from fundamental values. Besides momentum and reversal, fund flows generate comovement, lead-lag effects and amplification, with all effects being larger for assets with high idiosyncratic risk. Managers’ concern with commercial risk can make prices more volatile. We bring the analysis of delegation and fund flows within a flexible normal-linear framework that yields closed-form solutions for asset prices.

The result that prices do not fully adjust to changes in expected future flows can extend to settings beyond institutional flows. Indeed, changes in expected future flows can occur, for example, because margin calls trigger a gradual deleveraging, or because lower costs of acquiring information trigger entry into the market of a new asset. Our analysis suggest that these phenomena too could be associated with predictable returns and momentum. We focus on institutional flows because they are relevant in practice and we can model them in a tractable framework.

Our emphasis in this paper is to develop a framework that allows for a general analysis of the price effects of fund flows. An important next step, left for future work, is to examine more systematically the empirical implications of our analysis, both to confront existing empirical facts and to suggest new tests. For example, is momentum larger for individual assets or asset classes? Are momentum winners correlated and is there a momentum factor? If so, how do momentum and value factors correlate?
Appendix

A Symmetric Information

Proof of Proposition 3.1: Eqs. (2.3), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) imply that

$$d\left( r\tilde{\alpha}W_t + \tilde{q}_0 + \tilde{q}_1C_t + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{q}_{11}C_t^2 \right) = Gdt + r\tilde{\alpha}\tilde{z}_t\sigma\left( dB_t^D + \frac{\phi dB_t^F}{r + \kappa} \right) - s\left[ r\tilde{\alpha}\tilde{z}_t a_1 - \tilde{f}_1(C_t) \right] dB_t^C, \quad (A.1)$$

where

$$G \equiv r\tilde{\alpha} \left\{ rW_t + \tilde{z}_t \left[ ra_0 + (r + \kappa)a_1C_t - \kappa a_1 \tilde{C} \right] + (\lambda C_t + B)(b_0 - b_1 C_t) - \tilde{c}_t \right\}$$

$$+ \tilde{f}_1(C_t)\kappa(\tilde{C} - C_t) + \frac{1}{2}s^2\tilde{q}_{11},$$

$$\tilde{f}_1(C_t) \equiv \tilde{q}_1 + \tilde{q}_{11}C_t.$$  

Eqs. (3.7) and (A.1) imply that

$$D\tilde{V} = -\tilde{V}\left\{ G - \frac{1}{2}(r\tilde{\alpha})^2\tilde{z}_t\Sigma\tilde{z}_t' - \frac{1}{2}s^2\left[ r\tilde{\alpha}\tilde{z}_t a_1 - \tilde{f}_1(C_t) \right]^2 \right\}. \quad (A.2)$$

Substituting (A.2) into (3.8), we can write the first-order conditions with respect to $\tilde{c}_t$ and $\tilde{z}_t$ as

$$\tilde{c}_t = rW_t + \frac{1}{r} \left[ \tilde{q}_0 + \tilde{q}_1C_t + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{q}_{11}C_t^2 - \log(r) \right]. \quad (A.7)$$

Eqs. (3.7) and (A.3) imply that

$$\tilde{c}_t = rW_t + \frac{1}{r} \left[ \tilde{q}_0 + \tilde{q}_1C_t + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{q}_{11}C_t^2 - \log(r) \right]. \quad (A.7)$$
Substituting (A.7) into (A.6) the terms in \( W_t \) cancel, and we are left with

\[
\begin{align*}
& r \dot{a}_t [ra_0 + (r + \kappa)a_1C_t - \kappa a_1\dot{C}_t] + r\bar{\alpha}(\lambda C_t + B)(b_0 - b_1C_t) - r \left( \bar{q}_0 + \bar{q}_1C_t + \frac{1}{2}\bar{q}_{11}C_t^2 \right) \\
& \quad + f_1(C_t)\kappa(C - C_t) + \frac{1}{2}s^2\bar{q}_{11} + \beta - r + r\log(r) \\
& \quad - \frac{1}{2}(r\bar{\alpha})^2\dot{z}_t(f\Sigma + s^2a_1a_1')\dot{z}_t' + r\bar{\alpha}s^2\dot{z}_t a_1f_1(C_t) - \frac{1}{2}s^2f_1(C_t)^2 = 0.
\end{align*}
\]  

(A.8)

The terms in (A.8) that involve \( \dot{z}_t \) can be written as

\[
\begin{align*}
& r\bar{\alpha}\dot{z}_t [ra_0 + (r + \kappa)a_1C_t - \kappa a_1\dot{C}_t] - \frac{1}{2}(r\bar{\alpha})^2\dot{z}_t(f\Sigma + s^2a_1a_1')\dot{z}_t' + r\bar{\alpha}s^2\dot{z}_t a_1f_1(C_t) \\
& \quad = r\bar{\alpha}\dot{z}_t h(C_t) - \frac{1}{2}(r\bar{\alpha})^2\dot{z}_t(f\Sigma + s^2a_1a_1')\dot{z}_t' \\
& \quad = \frac{1}{2}r\bar{\alpha}\dot{z}_t h(C_t) \\
& \quad = \frac{1}{2}h(C_t)'(f\Sigma + s^2a_1a_1')^{-1}h(C_t),
\end{align*}
\]  

(A.9)

where the first step follows from (A.5) and the last two from (A.4). Substituting (A.9) into (A.8), we find

\[
\begin{align*}
& \frac{1}{2}h(C_t)'(f\Sigma + s^2a_1a_1')^{-1}h(C_t) + r\bar{\alpha}(\lambda C_t + B)(b_0 - b_1C_t) - r \left( \bar{q}_0 + \bar{q}_1C_t + \frac{1}{2}\bar{q}_{11}C_t^2 \right) \\
& \quad + f_1(C_t)\kappa(C - C_t) + \frac{1}{2}s^2[\bar{q}_{11} - f_1(C_t)^2] + \beta - r + r\log(r) = 0.
\end{align*}
\]  

(A.10)

Eq. (A.10) is quadratic in \( C_t \). Identifying terms in \( C_t^2, C_t, \) and constants, yields three scalar equations in \( (\bar{q}_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_{11}) \). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition 3.3 (see (A.40) and (A.41)).

**Proof of Proposition 3.2:** Eqs. (2.3), (3.4) and (3.10) imply that

\[
d \left( rW_t + q_0 + q_1C_t + \frac{1}{2}q_{11}C_t^2 \right) = Gdt + r\alpha(x_t\eta + y_tz_t)\sigma \left( dB_t + \frac{\phi dB_t^F}{r + \kappa} \right) \\
\quad - s [r\alpha(x_t\eta + y_tz_t)a_1 - f_1(C_t)] dB_t^C,
\]  

(A.11)

where

\[
G = r\alpha \left\{ rW_t + (x_t\eta + y_tz_t) [ra_0 + (r + \kappa)a_1C_t - \kappa a_1\dot{C}_t] - y_tC_t - c_1 \right\} + f_1(C_t)\kappa(C - C_t) + \frac{1}{2}s^2q_{11},
\]
where the first step follows from (A.16) and the second from

\[(x_i \eta + y_i z_i) h(C_t) - y_i C_t = r \alpha (x_i \eta + y_i z_i)(f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') (x_i \eta + y_i z_i)'\]  

(A.19)
which in turn follows by multiplying (A.14) by \(x_t\), (A.15) by \(y_t\), and adding up. To eliminate \(x_t\) and \(y_t\) in (A.18), we use (A.14) and (A.15). Noting that in equilibrium \(z_t = \theta - x_t\eta\), we can write (A.14) as

\[
\eta h(C_t) = r \alpha \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') [x_t(1 - y_t)\eta + y_t\theta'] .
\] (A.20)

Multiplying (A.14) by \(x_t\) and adding to (A.15), we similarly find

\[
\theta h(C_t) - C_t = r \alpha \theta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') [x_t(1 - y_t)\eta + y_t\theta'] .
\] (A.21)

Eqs. (A.20) and (A.21) form a linear system in \(x_t(1 - y_t)\) and \(y_t\). Solving the system, we find

\[
x_t(1 - y_t) = \frac{1}{r \alpha D} \left\{ \eta h(C_t) \theta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta' - [\theta h(C_t) - C_t] \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta' \right\} ,
\] (A.22)

\[
y_t = \frac{1}{r \alpha D} \left\{ [\theta h(C_t) - C_t] \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \eta' - \eta h(C_t) \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta' \right\} ,
\] (A.23)

where

\[
D \equiv \theta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta' \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \eta' - [\eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta']^2 .
\]

Eq. (A.23) implies that the optimal control \(y_t\) is linear in \(C_t\). Using (A.22) and (A.23), we can write (A.18) as

\[
\frac{1}{2} r \alpha (x_t\eta + y_t z_t) h(C_t) - \frac{1}{2} r \alpha y_t C_t
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2} r \alpha [x_t\eta + y_t(\theta - x_t\eta)] h(C_t) - \frac{1}{2} r \alpha y_t C_t
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2D} \left\{ [\eta h(C_t)]^2 \theta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta' - 2 [\theta h(C_t) - C_t] \eta h(C_t) \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta'
\]

\[
+ [\theta h(C_t) - C_t] \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \eta' \right\} .
\] (A.24)

Substituting (A.24) into (A.17), we find

\[
\frac{1}{2D} \left\{ [\eta h(C_t)]^2 \theta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta' - 2 [\theta h(C_t) - C_t] \eta h(C_t) \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta'
\]

\[
+ [\theta h(C_t) - C_t] \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \eta' \right\} - r \left( q_0 + q_1 C_t + \frac{1}{2} q_{11} C_t^2 \right)
\]

\[
+ f_1(C_t) \kappa (\bar{C} - C_t) + \frac{1}{2} s^2 \left[ q_{11} - f_1(C_t)^2 \right] + \beta - r + r \log(r) = 0.
\] (A.25)
Eq. (A.25) is quadratic in $C_t$. Identifying terms in $C_t^2$, $C_t$, and constants, yields three scalar equations in $(q_0, q_1, q_{11})$. We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition 3.3 (see (A.44) and (A.45)).

**Proof of Proposition 3.3:** We first impose market clearing and derive the constants $(a_0, a_1, b_0, b_1)$ as functions of $(\bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_{11}, q_1, q_{11})$. For these derivations, as well as for later proofs, we use the following properties of the flow portfolio:

$$\eta \Sigma p'_f = 0,$$

$$\theta \Sigma p'_f = p_f \Sigma p'_f = \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}.$$

Setting $z_t = \theta - x_t \eta$ and $\bar{y}_t = 1 - y_t$, we can write (A.4) as

$$\bar{h}(C_t) = r \bar{\alpha}(f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a'_1)(1 - y_t)(\theta - x_t \eta)' \quad (A.26)$$

Premultiplying (A.26) by $\eta$, dividing by $r \bar{\alpha}$, and adding to (A.20) divided by $r \alpha$, we find

$$\eta \left[ \frac{h(C_t)}{r \alpha} + \frac{\bar{h}(C_t)}{r \bar{\alpha}} \right] = \eta(f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a'_1) \theta'. \quad (A.27)$$

Eq. (A.27) is linear in $C_t$. Identifying terms in $C_t$, we find

$$\left( \frac{r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11}}{r \alpha} + \frac{r + \kappa + s^2 \bar{q}_{11}}{r \bar{\alpha}} \right) \eta a_1 = 0 \Rightarrow \eta a_1 = 0. \quad (A.28)$$

Identifying constant terms, and using (A.28), we find

$$\eta a_0 = \frac{\alpha \bar{\alpha} f}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \eta \Sigma \theta'.$$  

(A.29)

Substituting (A.28) and (A.29) into (A.20), we find

$$\frac{r \alpha \bar{\alpha} f}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \eta \Sigma \theta' = \alpha f \eta \Sigma [x_t (1 - y_t) \eta + y_t \theta']' \Rightarrow x_t = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} - \frac{y_t}{1 - y_t} \frac{\eta \Sigma \theta'}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}.$$  

(A.30)

Substituting (A.30) into (A.26), we find

$$\bar{h}(C_t) = r \bar{\alpha}(f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a'_1) \left[ \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \eta \Sigma \theta' \eta + (1 - y_t) p_f \right]'$$

$$= r \bar{\alpha}(f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a'_1) \left[ \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \eta \Sigma \theta' \eta + (1 - b_0 + b_1 C_t) p_f \right]', \quad (A.31)$$

39
where the second step follows from (3.2). Eq. (A.31) is linear in \( C_t \). Identifying terms in \( C_t \), we find

\[
(r + \kappa + s^2 \bar{q}_{11}) a_1 = r \bar{a} b_1 \left( f \Sigma p'_f + s^2 a'_1 p_f a_1 \right). 
\]

(A.32)

Therefore, \( a_1 \) is collinear to the vector \( \Sigma p'_f \), as in (3.15). Substituting (3.15) into (A.32), we find

\[
(r + \kappa + s^2 \bar{q}_{11}) \gamma_1 = r \bar{a} b_1 \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma n'} \right). 
\]

(A.33)

Identifying constant terms in (A.31), and using (3.15), we find

\[
a_0 = \frac{\alpha \bar{a} f}{\alpha + \bar{a}} \frac{\eta \Sigma \theta' \Sigma n}{\alpha + \bar{a} \eta \Sigma n'} + \frac{\gamma_1 (\kappa C - s^2 \bar{q}_1)}{r} + \bar{a} (1 - b_0) \left[ f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma n'} \right] \Sigma p'_f. 
\]

(A.34)

Using (3.2) and (A.30), we can write (A.21) as

\[
\theta h(C_t) - C_t = r a \bar{b} (f \Sigma + s^2 a'_1 a_1) \left[ \frac{\bar{a} \eta \Sigma \theta'}{\alpha + \bar{a} \eta \Sigma n'} \eta + (b_0 - b_1 C_t) p_f \right]'. 
\]

\[
= \frac{r c a \bar{a} f}{\alpha + \bar{a}} \frac{\eta \Sigma \theta' \Sigma n}{\eta \Sigma n'} + r \alpha (b_0 - b_1 C_t) \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma n'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma n'}. 
\]

(A.35)

where the second step follows from (3.15). Eq. (A.35) is linear in \( C_t \). Identifying terms in \( C_t \), and using (3.15), we find

\[
(r + \kappa + s^2 \bar{q}_{11}) \gamma_1 \Delta = -r \bar{a} b_1 \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma n'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma n'}. 
\]

(A.36)

Identifying constant terms, and using (3.15) and (A.34), we find

\[
b_0 = \frac{\alpha \bar{a}}{\alpha + \bar{a}} + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1 (q_1 - \bar{q}_1)}{r (\alpha + \bar{a}) \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma n'} \right)}. 
\]

(A.37)

Substituting \( b_0 \) from (A.37) into (A.34), we find

\[
a_0 = \frac{\alpha \bar{a} f}{\alpha + \bar{a}} \frac{\eta \Sigma \theta' \Sigma n}{\alpha + \bar{a} \eta \Sigma n'} + \left[ \frac{\gamma_1 \kappa C}{r} - \frac{s^2 \gamma_1 (\alpha q_1 + \bar{a} q_1)}{r (\alpha + \bar{a})} + \frac{\alpha \bar{a} \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma n'} \right)}{\alpha + \bar{a}} \right] \Sigma p'_f. 
\]

(A.38)

The system of equations characterizing equilibrium is as follows. The endogenous variables are \( (a_0, a_1, b_0, b_1, \gamma_1, \bar{q}_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_{11}, q_0, q_1, q_{11}) \). The equations linking them are (3.15), (A.33), (A.36), (A.37),
(A.38), the three equations derived from (A.10) by identifying terms in \( C_t^2, C_t \), and constants, and the three equations derived from (A.25) through the same procedure. To simplify the system, we note that the variables \((\bar{q}_0, q_0)\) enter only in the equations derived from (A.10) and (A.25) by identifying constants. Therefore they can be determined separately, and we need to consider only the equations derived from (A.10) and (A.25) by identifying linear and quadratic terms. We next simplify these equations, using implications of market clearing.

Using (A.31), we find
\[
\frac{1}{2} \dot{h}(C_t)'(f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1')^{-1} \dot{h}(C_t) = \frac{r^2 \alpha^2 \bar{\alpha}^2 f (\eta \Sigma \theta')^2}{2(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})^2 \eta \Sigma \eta'} + \frac{1}{2} r^2 \alpha^2 (1 - b_0 + b_1 C_t)^2 \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} = \frac{r^2 \alpha^2 \bar{\alpha}^2 f (\eta \Sigma \theta')^2}{2(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})^2 \eta \Sigma \eta'} + \frac{1}{2} r^2 \alpha^2 \left[ \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1(\bar{q}_1 - q_1)}{r(\alpha + \bar{\alpha}) (f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'})} + b_1 C_t \right] \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'},
\]
(A.39)

where the second step follows from (A.37). Substituting (A.39) into (A.10), and identifying terms in \( C_t^2 \) and \( C_t \), we find
\[
(r + 2 \kappa) \bar{q}_{11} + s^2 \bar{q}_{11}^2 - r^2 \alpha^2 b_1^2 \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + r \bar{\alpha} \lambda b_1 = 0,
\]
(A.40)
\[
(r + \kappa) \bar{q}_1 + s^2 \bar{q}_1 \bar{q}_{11} - r \bar{\alpha} b_1 \left[ \frac{r \alpha \bar{\alpha} \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + \bar{\alpha} s^2 \gamma_1(\bar{q}_1 - q_1)}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \right] \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} - \kappa \bar{C} \bar{q}_{11} + r \bar{\alpha}(B b_1 - \lambda b_0) = 0,
\]
(A.41)

respectively. Using (3.15) and (A.30), we can write (A.20) as
\[
\eta h(C_t) = \frac{r \alpha \bar{\alpha} f}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \eta \Sigma \theta'.
\]
(A.42)

Eq. (3.15) implies that the denominator \( D \) in (A.25) is
\[
D = f \Delta \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right).
\]
(A.43)

Using (3.15), (A.35), (A.37), (A.42) and (A.43), we find that the equations derived from (A.25) by
identifying terms in $C_t^2$ and $C_t$ are

\[(r + 2\kappa)q_{11} + s^2q_{11}^2 - r^2\alpha^2b_1^2 \left( f + s^2\gamma_1^2\Delta \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta\Sigma \eta'} = 0, \quad (A.44)\]

\[(r + \kappa)q_1 + s^2q_1q_{11} + r\alpha b_1 \left[ \frac{r\alpha}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \left( f + \frac{s^2\gamma_1^2\Delta}{\eta\Sigma \eta'} \right) + \frac{\alpha s^2\gamma_1(q_1 - \bar{q}_1)}{\gamma} \right] \frac{\Delta}{\eta\Sigma \eta'} - \kappa\bar{C}q_{11} = 0, \quad (A.45)\]

respectively.

Solving for equilibrium amounts to solving the system of (3.15), (A.33), (A.36), (A.37), (A.38), (A.40), (A.41), (A.44) and (A.45) in the unknowns $(a_0, a_1, b_0, b_1, \gamma_1, \bar{q}_1, q_{11}, q_1, q_{11})$. This reduces to solving the system of (A.33), (A.36), (A.40) and (A.44) in the unknowns $(b_1, \gamma_1, q_{11}, q_1)$. Given $(b_1, \gamma_1, q_{11}, q_1)$, $a_1$ can be determined from (3.15), $(\bar{q}_1, q_1)$ from the linear system of (A.41) and (A.45), and $(a_0, b_0)$ from (A.38) and (A.37). Replacing the unknown $b_1$ by

\[\hat{b}_1 \equiv r\alpha b_1 \sqrt{f + \frac{s^2\gamma_1^2\Delta}{\eta\Sigma \eta'}},\]

we can write the system of (A.33), (A.36), (A.40) and (A.44) as

\[(r + \kappa + s^2\bar{q}_{11})\gamma_1 = \hat{b}_1 \sqrt{f + \frac{s^2\gamma_1^2\Delta}{\eta\Sigma \eta'}}, \quad (A.46)\]

\[\frac{r + \kappa + s^2\bar{q}_{11}}{r\alpha} \frac{\gamma_1\Delta}{\eta\Sigma \eta'} + \frac{\hat{b}_1 \sqrt{f + \frac{s^2\gamma_1^2\Delta}{\eta\Sigma \eta'}}}{r\alpha} \frac{\Delta}{\eta\Sigma \eta'} = \frac{1}{r\alpha}, \quad (A.47)\]

\[(r + 2\kappa)\bar{q}_{11} + s^2\bar{q}_{11}^2 - \frac{\hat{b}_1^2\Delta}{\eta\Sigma \eta'} + \frac{\lambda\hat{b}_1}{\sqrt{f + \frac{s^2\gamma_1^2\Delta}{\eta\Sigma \eta'}}} = 0, \quad (A.48)\]

\[(r + 2\kappa)q_{11} + s^2q_{11}^2 - \frac{\alpha^2\hat{b}_1^2\Delta}{\alpha^2\eta\Sigma \eta'} = 0. \quad (A.49)\]

To show that the system of (A.46)-(A.49) has a solution, we reduce it to a single equation in $\hat{b}_1$.

Eq. (A.49) is quadratic in $q_{11}$ and has a unique positive solution $q_{11}(\hat{b}_1)$, which is increasing in $\hat{b}_1 \in (0, \infty)$, and is equal to zero for $\hat{b}_1 = 0$ and to $\infty$ for $\hat{b}_1 = \infty$.\(^{24}\) Substituting $q_{11}(\hat{b}_1)$ into

\(^{24}\)The positive solution of (A.49) is the relevant one. Indeed, under the negative solution, the investor’s certainty equivalent would converge to $-\infty$ when $|C_t|$ goes to $\infty$. The investor can, however, achieve a certainty equivalent converging to $\infty$ by holding a large short position in the active fund when $C_t$ goes to $\infty$, or a large long position when $C_t$ goes to $-\infty$.\(^{24}\)
\[ r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11}(\hat{b}_1) \frac{\gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + \frac{\hat{b}_1 \sqrt{f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}}}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \frac{\Delta}{r \alpha} = \frac{1}{r \alpha}. \] (A.50)

The left-hand side of (A.50) is increasing in \( \gamma_1 \in (0, \infty) \), and is equal to \( \hat{b}_1 \sqrt{\Delta/(r \alpha \eta \Sigma \eta')} \) for \( \gamma_1 = 0 \) and to \( \infty \) for \( \gamma_1 = \infty \). Therefore, (A.50) has a unique positive solution \( \gamma_1(\hat{b}_1) \) if \( \hat{b}_1 \in (0, \hat{b}_1^*) \), where \( \hat{b}_1^* \equiv \hat{b}_1 \eta \Sigma \eta'/(\alpha \sqrt{\Delta}) \), and no solution if \( \hat{b}_1 \in (\hat{b}_1^*, \infty) \). The solution is decreasing in \( \hat{b}_1 \) since the left-hand side of (A.50) is increasing in \( \hat{b}_1 \), and is equal to \( \eta \Sigma \eta'/(r + \kappa) \Delta \) for \( \hat{b}_1 = 0 \) and to zero for \( \hat{b}_1 = \hat{b}_1^* \). Substituting \( \gamma_1(\hat{b}_1) \), and \( q_{11} \) from (A.46), into (A.48), we find

\[ -\frac{(r + \kappa) \kappa}{s^2} - \frac{r \hat{b}_1}{\gamma_1(\hat{b}_1) s^2} \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) + \frac{b_1^2 f}{\gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) s^2} + \frac{\lambda \hat{b}_1}{\sqrt{f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}}} = 0. \] (A.51)

Eq. (A.51) is the single equation in \( \hat{b}_1 \) to which the system of (A.46)-(A.49) reduces. Since the left-hand side of (A.51) is equal to \(- (r + \kappa) \kappa / s^2 \) for \( \hat{b}_1 = 0 \) and to \( \infty \) for \( \hat{b}_1 = \hat{b}_1^* \), (A.51) has a solution \( \hat{b}_1 \in (0, \hat{b}_1^*) \). Therefore, a linear equilibrium exists. The equilibrium is unique if the solution \( \hat{b}_1 \) of (A.51) is unique, which is the case if the derivative of the left-hand side with respect to \( \hat{b}_1 \) and evaluated at the solution is positive. The derivative is

\[ \frac{1}{\hat{b}_1} \left[ -\frac{r \hat{b}_1}{\gamma_1(\hat{b}_1) s^2} \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) + \frac{b_1^2 f}{\gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) s^2} + \frac{\lambda \hat{b}_1}{\sqrt{f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}}} \right] \]

\[ + \frac{d \gamma_1(\hat{b}_1)}{d \hat{b}_1} \frac{1}{\gamma_1(\hat{b}_1)} \left[ \frac{r \hat{b}_1}{\gamma_1(\hat{b}_1) s^2} \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) - \frac{r \hat{b}_1^2 \gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} - \frac{2 \hat{b}_1^2 f}{\gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) s^2} - \frac{\lambda \hat{b}_1 \gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) \Delta}{(f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2(\hat{b}_1) \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'})^2} \right]. \] (A.52)
If \( \hat{b}_1 \) solves (A.51), we can write (A.52) as

\[
\frac{1}{b_1} \left[ \frac{(r + \kappa)\kappa}{s^2} + \frac{\hat{b}_1^2 f}{\gamma_1^2(b_1)s^2} \right] + \frac{d\gamma_1(\hat{b}_1)}{db_1} \cdot \frac{1}{\gamma_1(b_1)} \left[ \frac{(r + \kappa)\kappa}{s^2} - \frac{\hat{b}_1 s^2 \gamma_2^2(b_1) \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + \frac{\hat{b}_1^2 f}{\gamma_1^2(b_1)s^2} - \frac{\lambda \hat{b}_1 f}{\left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_2^2(b_1) \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right)^{\frac{3}{2}}} \right].
\]

(A.53)

The term inside the first squared bracket is positive. The term inside the second squared bracket is negative for \( \lambda = 0 \) and by continuity for \( \lambda < \bar{\lambda} \) for a \( \bar{\lambda} > 0 \). Since \( \gamma_1(\hat{b}_1) \) is decreasing in \( \hat{b}_1 \), (A.53) is positive for \( \lambda < \bar{\lambda} \).

**Proof of Corollary 3.1:** Eq. \( y_t = \bar{\alpha}(\alpha + \bar{\alpha}) \) follows from (3.2) and (A.37). Eq. \( x_t = 0 \) follows from (A.30) and \( y_t = \bar{\alpha}(\alpha + \bar{\alpha}) \). The first equality in (3.17) follows from (3.4) and (A.38), and the second equality follows from (3.5).

**Proof of Corollary 3.2:** The investor’s effective stock holdings are

\[
x_{\lambda \eta} + y_{\lambda \eta} = x_{\lambda \eta} + y_t(\theta - x_{\lambda \eta}) = y_t p_f + \frac{\bar{\alpha}}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \eta \Sigma \theta',
\]

(A.54)

where the second step follows from (A.30). Eq. (3.18) follows from (3.2) and (A.54).

**Proof of Corollary 3.3:** The first equality in (3.19) follows from (3.1) and (3.15). The second equality follows from (3.5) and (3.15). To derive the third equality, we note from (3.5) and (3.15) that

\[
\text{Cov}_t(\eta dR_t, p_f dR_t) = 0.
\]

Therefore, if \( \beta \) denotes the regression coefficient of \( dR_t \) on \( \eta dR_t \), then

\[
\text{Cov}_t(dR_t, p_f dR_t) = \text{Cov}_t(dR_t - \beta \eta dR_t, p_f dR_t)
\]

\[
= \text{Cov}_t(d\epsilon_t, p_f dR_t)
\]

\[
= \text{Cov}_t[d\epsilon_t, p_f (dR_t - \beta \eta dR_t)]
\]

\[
= \text{Cov}_t(d\epsilon_t, p_f d\epsilon_t),
\]

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where the second and fourth steps follow from the definition of \(d\epsilon_t\), and the third step follows because \(d\epsilon_t\) is independent of \(\eta dR_t\).

**Proof of Corollary 3.4:** The corollary follows by substituting (3.15) into (3.5).

**Proof of Corollary 3.5:** Stocks’ expected returns are

\[
E_t(dR_t) = \left[ ra_0 + (r + \kappa)a_1C_t - \kappa a_1\bar{C} \right] dt
\]

\[
= \left\{ \frac{r\alpha f}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \sum \eta' \right\} dt
\]

\[
= \left[ \frac{r\alpha f}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \sum \eta' \right] \sum p' \left[ f + \sum \left( f \sum \right) \right] dt,
\]

(A.55)

where the first step follows from (3.4), the second from (3.15) and (A.38), and the third from (3.15) and (3.22). Eq. (A.55) is equivalent to (3.21) because of (3.5).

**Proof of Corollary 3.6:** The autocovariance matrix is

\[
Cov_t(dR_t, dR_t') = Cov_t \left[ \sigma \left( DB_t^D + \frac{\phi DB_t^F}{r + \kappa} \right) - sa_1DB_t^C \right] + Cov_t \left[ \sigma \left( DB_t^D + \frac{\phi DB_t^F}{r + \kappa} \right) - sa_1DB_t^C \right] dt
\]

\[
= Cov_t \left[ \sigma \left( DB_t^D + \frac{\phi DB_t^F}{r + \kappa} \right) - sa_1DB_t^C \right] \left[ (r + \kappa)a_1C_t' dt + \sigma \left( DB_t^C + \frac{\phi DB_t^F}{r + \kappa} \right) - sa_1DB_t^C \right] dt
\]

\[
= Cov_t \left[ -sa_1DB_t^C, (r + \kappa)a_1'C_t' dt \right]
\]

\[
= -s(r + \kappa)'Cov_t \left( DB_t^C, C_t' \right) \sum p' \Sigma dt,
\]

(A.56)

where the first step follows by using (3.4) and omitting quantities known at time \(t\), the second step follows because the increments \((DB_t^D, DB_t^F, DB_t^C)\) are independent of information up to time \(t'\), the third step follows because \(DB_t^C\) is independent of \((BP_t^D, BF_t^F)\), and the fourth step follows from (3.15). Eq. (2.3) implies that

\[
C_t' = e^{-\kappa(t' - t)}C_t + [1 - e^{-\kappa(t' - t)}] \bar{C} + s \int_t^{t'} e^{-\kappa(t' - u)} dB_u^C.
\]

(A.57)

Substituting (A.57) into (A.56), and noting that the only non-zero covariance is between \(dB_t^C\) and \(dB_t^C\), we find (3.23).
Proof of Corollary 3.7: The left-hand side of (A.48) is increasing in $\lambda$. Since, in addition, the derivative (A.53) is positive, the solution $\hat{b}_1$ of (A.48) is decreasing in $\lambda$. Since $\gamma_1(\hat{b}_1)$ is decreasing in $\hat{b}_1$, it is increasing in $\lambda$.

Since $B$ does not enter into the system of (A.46)-(A.49), it does not affect $(b_1, \gamma_1, q_{11}, q_{12})$. Therefore, its effect on $\Lambda_t$ is only through $(\bar{q}_1, q_1)$. Differentiating (A.41) and (A.45) with respect to $B$, we find

$$
(r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11}) \frac{\partial \bar{q}_1}{\partial B} - r\bar{b}_1 \frac{\alpha s^2 \gamma_1 \left( \frac{\partial \bar{q}_1}{\partial B} - \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial B} \right)}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \Delta + r\bar{a}_b = 0, \quad (A.58)
$$

$$
(r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11}) \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial B} + r\bar{b}_1 \frac{\alpha s^2 \gamma_1 \left( \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial B} - \frac{\partial \bar{q}_1}{\partial B} \right)}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \Delta = 0. \quad (A.59)
$$

The system of (A.58) and (A.59) is linear in $(\partial \bar{q}_1/\partial B, \partial q_1/\partial B)$. Its solution satisfies

$$
\alpha \frac{\partial \bar{q}_1}{\partial B} + \bar{\alpha} \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial B} = -\frac{Y}{Z}, \quad (A.60)
$$

where

$$
Y \equiv r\alpha \bar{a}_b \left( r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11} + \frac{r\alpha s^2 b_1 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right),
$$

$$
Z \equiv (r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11})(r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11}) + \frac{r\alpha^2 s^2 b_1 \gamma_1 \Delta(r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11})}{(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})\eta \Sigma \eta'} - \frac{r\bar{\alpha}^2 s^2 b_1 \gamma_1 \Delta(r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11})}{(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})\eta \Sigma \eta'}
$$

$$
= r\bar{a}_b \left[ \frac{f}{\gamma_1} + \frac{\alpha s^2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] (r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11}) + \frac{r^2 \alpha^2 \bar{\alpha} s^2 b_1^2 \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right)}{(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})\eta \Sigma \eta'},
$$

and where the second equation for $Z$ follows from (A.33). Since $(b_1, \gamma_1, q_{11})$ are positive, so are $(Y, Z)$. Therefore, $\alpha q_1 + \bar{\alpha} q_1$ is decreasing in $B$, and (3.22) implies that $\Lambda_t$ is increasing in $B$. \quad \blacksquare

B Gradual Adjustment

Proof of Proposition 4.1: Eqs. (2.3), (2.5), (2.6), (4.1) and (4.2) imply that the vector of returns is

$$
dR_t = (r a_0 + a_1^R C_t + a_2^R y_t - \kappa a_1 C_t - b_0 a_2) dt + \sigma \left( dB_t^P + \frac{\partial dB_t^P}{r + \kappa} \right) - sa_1 dB_t^E, \quad (B.1)
$$

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where
\[ a_1^R \equiv (r + \kappa)a_1 + b_1a_2, \]
\[ a_2^R \equiv (r + b_2)a_2. \]

Eqs. (2.3), (3.3), (4.2), (4.3) and (B.1) imply the following counterpart of (A.2):
\[ \mathcal{D}\dot{V} = -\dot{V} \left\{ \dot{G} - \frac{1}{2}(r\dot{\alpha})^2f\dot{\Sigma}\dot{\Sigma}' - \frac{1}{2}s^2[r\alpha\dot{a}_1 - \dot{f}_1(X_t)]^2 \right\}, \tag{B.2} \]
where
\[ \dot{G} \equiv r\alpha \left[ rW_t + \dot{z}_t (r\alpha_0 + a_1^R C_t + a_2^R y_t - \kappa a_1 \dot{C} - b_0 a_2) + (\lambda C_t + B)y_t - \ddot{c}_t \right] 
+ \dot{f}_1(X_t)\kappa(\dot{C} - C_t) + \dot{f}_2(X_t)v_t + \frac{1}{2}s^2\ddot{q}_{11}, \]
\[ \dot{f}_1(X_t) \equiv \ddot{q}_1 + \ddot{q}_{11}C_t + \ddot{q}_{12}y_t, \]
\[ \dot{f}_2(X_t) \equiv \ddot{q}_2 + \ddot{q}_{12}C_t + \ddot{q}_{22}y_t, \]
and \( \ddot{q}_{ij} \) denotes the \((i, j)\)'th element of \( \ddot{Q} \). Substituting (B.2) into (3.8), we can write the first-order conditions with respect to \( \ddot{c}_t \) and \( \ddot{z}_t \) as (A.3) and
\[ \ddot{h}(X_t) = r\alpha(f\Sigma + s^2a_1a_1')z'_t, \tag{B.3} \]
respectively, where
\[ \ddot{h}(X_t) \equiv r\alpha_0 + a_1^R C_t + a_2^R y_t - \kappa a_1 \dot{C} - b_0 a_2 + s^2a_1\ddot{f}(X_t). \tag{B.4} \]

Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we find the following counterpart of (A.10):
\[ \frac{1}{2}\ddot{h}(X_t)'(f\Sigma + s^2a_1a_1')^{-1}\ddot{h}(X_t) + r\alpha(\lambda C_t + B)y_t - r \left[ \ddot{q}_0 + (\ddot{q}_1, \ddot{q}_2)X_t + \frac{1}{2}\dot{X}'_t\dot{Q}\dot{X}_t \right] 
+ \ddot{f}_1(X_t)\kappa(\dot{C} - C_t) + \ddot{f}_2(X_t)v_t + \frac{1}{2}s^2[\ddot{q}_{11} - \ddot{f}_1(X_t)^2] + \ddot{\beta} - r + r \log(r) = 0. \tag{B.5} \]
Eq. (B.5) is quadratic in \( \dot{X}_t \). Identifying quadratic, linear and constant terms yields six scalar equations in \((\ddot{q}_0, \ddot{q}_1, \ddot{q}_2, \ddot{Q})\). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition 4.3 (see (B.38)-(B.40)).

**Proof of Proposition 4.2:** Suppose that the investor optimizes over \((c_t, x_t)\) but follows the control \( v_t \) given by (4.2). Eqs. (2.3), (4.2), (4.4), (4.5) and (B.1) imply the following counterpart of (A.12):
\[ \mathcal{D}V = -V \left\{ G - \frac{1}{2}(r\alpha)^2f(x_t\eta + y_t\dot{z}_t)\Sigma(x_t\eta + y_t\dot{z}_t)' - \frac{1}{2}s^2[r\alpha(x_t\eta + y_t\dot{z}_t)a_1 - f_1(X_t)]^2 \right\}, \tag{B.6} \]
where
\[ G \equiv r \alpha \left[ r W_1 + (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) \left( r a_0 + a_1^R C_t + a_2^R y_t - \kappa a_1 C - b_0 a_2 \right) - y_t C_t - \frac{1}{2} \psi v_t^2 - c_t \right] 
+ f_1(X_t) \kappa (\bar{C} - C_t) + f_2(X_t) v_t + \frac{1}{2} s^2 q_{11}, \]
\[ f_1(X_t) \equiv q_1 + q_{11} C_t + q_{12} y_t, \]
\[ f_2(X_t) \equiv q_2 + q_{12} C_t + q_{22} y_t, \]

and \( g_{ij} \) denotes the \((i, j)\)'th element of \( Q \). Substituting (B.6) into (4.6), we can write the first-order conditions with respect to \( c_t \) and \( x_t \) as (A.13) and
\[ \eta h(X_t) = r a \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') (x_t \eta + y_t z_t)', \quad (B.7) \]
respectively, where
\[ h(X_t) \equiv r a_0 + a_1^R C_t + a_2^R y_t - \kappa a_1 C - b_0 a_2 + s^2 a_1 f_1(X_t). \quad (B.8) \]
The counterpart of (A.17) is
\[
\begin{align*}
ra(x_t \eta + y_t z_t) & \left( r a_0 + a_1^R C_t + a_2^R y_t - \kappa a_1 C - b_0 a_2 \right) - r a y_t C_t - \frac{1}{2} r a \psi v_t^2 \\
- r \left[ q_0 + (q_1, q_2) X_t + \frac{1}{2} X_t' Q X_t \right] & + f_1(X_t) \kappa (\bar{C} - C_t) + f_2(X_t) v_t + \frac{1}{2} s^2 q_{11} + \beta - r + r \log(r) \\
& - \frac{1}{2} (ra)^2 (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') (x_t \eta + y_t z_t)' + r a s^2 (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) a_1 f_1(X_t) \frac{1}{2} s^2 f_1(X_t)^2 = 0. \quad (B.9)
\end{align*}
\]
The terms in (B.9) that involve \( x_t \eta + y_t z_t \) can be written as
\[
\begin{align*}
ra(x_t \eta + y_t z_t) & \left( r a_0 + a_1^R C_t + a_2^R y_t - \kappa a_1 C - b_0 a_2 \right) \\
- \frac{1}{2} (ra)^2 (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') (x_t \eta + y_t z_t)' & + r a s^2 (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) a_1 f_1(X_t) \\
= ra(x_t \eta + y_t z_t) h(X_t) & - \frac{1}{2} (ra)^2 (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') (x_t \eta + y_t z_t)' \\
= r a y_t \theta h(X_t) & - \frac{1}{2} (ra)^2 y_t^2 \theta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta' \\
+ r ax_t (1 - y_t) \left\{ \eta h(X_t) - \frac{1}{2} r a \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') [x_t (1 - y_t) \eta + 2 y_t \theta]' \right\}', \quad (B.10)
\end{align*}
\]
where the first step follows from (B.8) and the second from the equilibrium condition $z_t = \theta - x_t \eta$.

Using $z_t = \theta - x_t \eta$, we can write (B.7) as

$$\eta h(X_t) = r\alpha \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') [x_t(1 - y_t) \eta + y_t \theta']$$

$$\Rightarrow x_t(1 - y_t) = \frac{\eta h(X_t) - r\alpha y_t \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta'}{r\alpha (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \eta'}.$$

(Eqs. B.11) and (B.12) imply that

$$r\alpha x_t(1 - y_t) \left\{ \eta h(X_t) - \frac{1}{2} r\alpha \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') [x_t(1 - y_t) \eta + 2 y_t \theta'] \right\}'$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} [r\alpha x_t(1 - y_t)]^2 \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \eta'$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \frac{[\eta h(X_t) - r\alpha y_t \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta']^2}{\eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \eta'}.$$

Substituting (B.10) and (B.13) into (B.9), we find

$$r\alpha y_t \theta h(X_t) - \frac{1}{2} (r\alpha)^2 y_t^2 \theta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta' + \frac{1}{2} \frac{[\eta h(X_t) - r\alpha y_t \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta']^2}{\eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \eta'} - r\alpha y_t C_t - \frac{1}{2} r\alpha \psi v_t^2$$

$$- r \left[ q_0 + (q_1, q_2) X_t + \frac{1}{2} X_t^2 Q X_t \right] + f_1(X_t) \kappa (C - C_t) + f_2(X_t) v_t + \frac{1}{2} s^2 \left[ q_{11} - f_1(X_t)^2 \right]$$

$$+ \beta - r + r \log(r) = 0.$$

(B.14)

Since $v_t$ in (4.2) is linear in $X_t$, (B.14) is quadratic in $X_t$. Identifying quadratic, linear and constant terms yields six scalar equations in $(q_0, q_1, q_2, Q)$. We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition 4.3 (see (B.42)-(B.44)).

We next study optimization over $v_t$, and derive a first-order condition under which the control (4.2) is optimal. We use a perturbation argument, which consists in assuming that the investor follows the control (4.2) except for an infinitesimal deviation over an infinitesimal internal.\(^{25}\) Suppose that the investor adds $\omega \delta e$ to the control (4.2) over the interval $[t, t + \delta e]$ and subtracts $\omega \delta e$ over the interval $[t + \delta t - \delta e, t + \delta t]$, where the infinitesimal $\delta e > 0$ is $o(\delta t)$. The increase in adjustment cost over the first interval is $\psi v_t \omega (\delta e)^2$ and over the second interval is $-\psi v_{t+\delta t} \omega (\delta e)^2$. These changes

\(^{25}\)The perturbation argument is simpler than the dynamic programming approach, which assumes that the investor can follow any control $v_t$ over the entire history. Indeed, under the dynamic programming approach, the state variable $y_t$ which describes the investor’s holdings in the active fund must be replaced by two state variables: the holdings out of equilibrium, and the holdings in equilibrium. This is because the latter affect the equilibrium price, which the investor takes as given.
reduce the investor’s wealth at time $t + dt$ by
\[
\psi v_t \omega (de)^2 (1 + rd_t) - \psi v_{t+dt} \omega (de)^2 \\
= \psi \omega (de)^2 (rv_t dt - dv_t) \\
= \psi \omega (de)^2 (rv_t dt + b_1 dC_t + b_2 dy_t) \\
= \psi \omega (de)^2 \left\{ (r + b_2)v_t dt + b_1 \left[ \kappa (\bar{C} - C_t) dt + s dB_t^C \right] \right\} ,
\]
where the second step follows from (4.2) and the third from (2.3). The change in the investor’s wealth between $t$ and $t + dt$ is derived from (4.4) and (B.1), by subtracting (B.15) and replacing $y_t$ by $y_t + \omega (de)^2$:
\[
dW_t = G_\omega dt - \psi \omega (de)^2 b_1 \left[ \kappa (\bar{C} - C_t) dt + s dB_t^C \right] \\
\quad + \left\{ x_t \eta + [y_t + \omega (de)^2] z_t \right\} \left[ \sigma \left( dB_t^D + \frac{\phi dB_t^F}{r + \kappa} \right) - sa_1 dB_t^C \right] ,
\]
where
\[
G_\omega \equiv r W_t + \left\{ x_t \eta + [y_t + \omega (de)^2] z_t \right\} \left( ra_0 + a_1^R C_t + a_2^R y_t - \kappa a_1 \bar{C} - b_0 a_2 \right) - [y_t + \omega (de)^2] C_t \\
\quad - \frac{\psi v_t^2}{2} - a_t - \psi \omega (de)^2 (r + b_2)v_t .
\]
The investor’s position in the active fund at $t + dt$ is the same under the deviation as under no deviation. Therefore, the investor’s expected utility at $t + dt$ is given by the value function (4.5) with the wealth $W_{t+dt}$ determined by (B.16). The drift $DV$ corresponding to the change in the value function between $t$ and $t + dt$ is given by the following counterpart of (B.6):
\[
DV = -V \left\{ G - \frac{1}{2} (ra)^2 f \left\{ x_t \eta + [y_t + \omega (de)^2] z_t \right\} \Sigma \left\{ x_t \eta + [y_t + \omega (de)^2] z_t \right\}' \\
\quad - \frac{1}{2} s^2 \left\{ ra \left\{ x_t \eta + [y_t + \omega (de)^2] z_t \right\} a_1 - f_1 \omega (X_t) \right\} \right\} ,
\]
where
\[
G \equiv raG_\omega + f_1 \omega (X_t) \kappa (\bar{C} - C_t) + f_2 (X_t)v_t + \frac{1}{2} s^2 q_{11} .
\]
\[
f_1 \omega (X_t) \equiv f_1 (X_t) - ra \psi \omega (de)^2 b_1 .
\]
The drift is maximum for $\omega = 0$, and this yields the first-order condition
\[
z_t h(X_t) - ra \psi b_1 s^2 (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) a_1 - C_t = r a z_t (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1' a_1')(x_t \eta + y_t z_t)' + \psi h_\psi (X_t) ,
\]
(18)
where

\[ h_\psi(X_t) \equiv (r + b_2)v_t + b_1 \kappa(\bar{C} - C_t) - b_1 s^2 f_1(X_t). \]

Using (B.7) and the equilibrium condition \( z_t = \theta - x_t \eta \), we can write (B.18) as

\[
\theta h(X_t) - r \alpha \psi b_1 s^2 [x_t(1 - y_t) \eta + y_t \theta] a_1 - C_t = r \alpha \theta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') [x_t(1 - y_t) \eta + y_t \theta]' + \psi h_\psi(X_t).
\]

(B.19)

Using (B.12), we can write (B.19) as

\[
\theta \left[ h(X_t) - r \alpha \psi b_1 s^2 y_t a_1 \right] - r \alpha \psi b_1 s^2 \eta h(X_t) - r \alpha \psi \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta' \eta a_1 - C_t
\]

\[
= r \alpha \theta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \left[ y_t \theta + \frac{\eta h(X_t) - r \alpha \psi \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta' \eta}{r \alpha (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \eta} \right]' + \psi h_\psi(X_t).
\]

(B.20)

Eq. (B.20) is linear in \( X_t \). Identifying linear and constant terms, yields three scalar equations in \((b_0, b_1, b_2)\). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition 4.3 (see (B.29)-(B.35)).

Proof of Proposition 4.3: We first impose market clearing and follow similar steps as in the proof of Proposition 3.3 to derive the constants \((a_0, a_1, a_2, b_0, b_1, b_2)\) as functions of \((\bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, Q, q_1, q_2, Q)\).

Setting \( z_t = \theta - x_t \eta \) and \( \bar{y}_t = 1 - y_t \), we can write (B.3) as

\[
\bar{h}(\bar{X}_t) = r \bar{\alpha} (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') (1 - y_t)(\theta - x_t \eta)'.
\]

(B.21)

Premultiplying (B.21) by \( \eta \), dividing by \( r \bar{\alpha} \), and adding to (B.11) divided by \( r \alpha \), we find

\[
\eta \left[ \frac{h(X_t)}{r \alpha} + \frac{\bar{h}(\bar{X}_t)}{r \bar{\alpha}} \right] = \eta (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1') \theta'.
\]

(B.22)

Eq. (B.22) is linear in \((C_t, y_t)\). Identifying terms in \( C_t \) and \( y_t \), we find

\[
\left( \frac{r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11}}{r \alpha} + \frac{r + \kappa + s^2 q_{11}}{r \bar{\alpha}} \right) \eta a_1 + \frac{b_1 (\alpha + \bar{\alpha})}{r \alpha \bar{\alpha}} \eta a_2 = 0,
\]

(B.23)

\[
\left( \frac{s^2 q_{12}}{r \alpha} + \frac{s^2 q_{12}}{r \bar{\alpha}} \right) \eta a_1 + \frac{(r + b_2)(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})}{r \alpha \bar{\alpha}} \eta a_2 = 0,
\]

(B.24)

respectively. Eqs. (B.23) and (B.24) imply

\[
\eta a_1 = \eta a_2 = 0.
\]

(B.25)
Identifying constant terms in (B.22), and using (B.25), we find (A.29). Substituting (A.29) and (B.25) into (B.11), we find (A.30).

Substituting (A.30) into (B.21), we find

\[ \tilde{h}(X_t) = r\tilde{\alpha}(f\Sigma + s^2a_1a'_1) \left[ \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \tilde{\alpha}} \eta\Sigma\theta' + (1 - y_t)p_f \right]'. \] (B.26)

Eq. (A.31) is linear in \( X_t \). Identifying terms in \( C_t \) and \( y_t \), we find

\[ (r + \kappa + s^2\bar{q}_{11})a_1 + b_1a_2 = 0, \] (B.27)
\[ s^2\bar{q}_{12}a_1 + (r + b_2)a_2 = -r\tilde{\alpha} \left( f\Sigma p'_f + s^2a'_1p'_f a_1 \right), \] (B.28)

respectively. Therefore, \((a_1, a_2)\) are collinear to the vector \( \Sigma p'_f \), as in (4.7). Substituting (4.7) into (B.27) and (B.28), we find

\[ (r + \kappa + s^2\bar{q}_{11})\gamma_1 + b_1\gamma_2 = 0, \] (B.29)
\[ s^2\bar{q}_{12}\gamma_1 + (r + b_2)\gamma_2 = -r\tilde{\alpha} \left( f + s^2\gamma_1^2\Delta \right) \frac{\eta\Sigma\eta'}{\eta\Sigma\eta'}, \] (B.30)

respectively. Identifying constant terms in (B.26), and using (4.7), we find

\[ a_0 = \frac{\alpha\tilde{\alpha}f}{\alpha + \tilde{\alpha}} \eta\Sigma\theta' + \left[ \frac{\gamma_1(\kappa\tilde{C} - s^2\bar{q}_1) + b_0\gamma_2}{r} \right] + \tilde{\alpha} \left( f + s^2\gamma_1^2\Delta \right) \frac{\eta\Sigma\eta'}{\eta\Sigma\eta'} \Sigma p'_f. \] (B.31)

Using (A.30), we can write (B.19) as

\[ \theta h(X_t) - r\alpha\psi b_1s^2 \left( \frac{\tilde{\alpha}}{\alpha + \tilde{\alpha}} \eta\Sigma\theta' \eta + y_t p_f \right) a_1 - C_t = r\alpha\theta \left( f\Sigma + s^2a_1a'_1 \right) \left( \frac{\tilde{\alpha}}{\alpha + \tilde{\alpha}} \eta\Sigma\theta' + y_t p_f \right)' + \psi h_\psi(X_t) \]
\[ \Rightarrow \theta h(X_t) - r\alpha\psi b_1 s^2\gamma_1 \frac{\Delta}{\eta\Sigma\eta'} y_t - C_t = r\alpha\tilde{\alpha}f \left( \eta\Sigma\theta' \right)^2 \frac{\Delta}{\alpha + \tilde{\alpha}} \frac{\Delta}{\eta\Sigma\eta'} + r\alpha \left( f + s^2\gamma_1^2\Delta \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta\Sigma\eta'} \eta\Sigma\eta' y_t + \psi h_\psi(X_t), \] (B.32)

where the second step follows from (4.7). Eq. (B.32) is linear in \((C_t, y_t)\). Identifying terms in \( C_t \) and \( y_t \), and using (4.2) and (4.7), we find

\[ \left[(r + \kappa + s^2q_{11})\gamma_1 + b_1\gamma_2 \right] \frac{\Delta}{\eta\Sigma\eta'} - 1 = -\psi b_1(r + \kappa + b_2 + s^2q_{11}), \] (B.33)
\[ \left[(r + b_2)\gamma_2 + (q_{12} - r\alpha\psi b_1)s^2\gamma_1 \right] \frac{\Delta}{\eta\Sigma\eta'} = r\alpha \left( f + s^2\gamma_1^2\Delta \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta\Sigma\eta'} - \psi \left[(r + b_2)b_2 + b_1 s^2q_{12}\right], \] (B.34)
respectively. Identifying constant terms, and using (4.2), (4.7) and (B.31), we find

\[
\left[ s^2 \gamma_1 (q_1 - \bar{q}_1) + r \bar{\alpha} \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \right] \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} = \psi \left[ (r + b_2) b_0 + b_1 (k \bar{C} - s^2 q_1) \right]. \tag{B.35}
\]

The system of equations characterizing equilibrium is as follows. The endogenous variables are \((a_0, a_1, a_2, b_0, b_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, \bar{Q}, q_1, q_2, Q)\). (As in Proposition 3.3, we can drop \((\bar{q}_0, q_0)\).) The equations linking them are (4.7), (B.29)-(B.31), (B.33)-(B.35), the five equations derived from (B.5) by identifying linear and quadratic terms, and the five equations derived from (B.14) through the same procedure. We next simplify the latter two sets of equations, using implications of market clearing.

Using (B.26), we find

\[
\frac{1}{2} \bar{h}(\bar{X}_t)'(f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a_1')^{-1} \bar{h}(\bar{X}_t) = \frac{r^2 \alpha^2 \alpha^2 f (\eta \Sigma \theta')^2}{2(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})^2 \eta \Sigma \eta'} + \frac{1}{2} r^2 \alpha^2 (1 - y_t)^2 \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}. \tag{B.36}
\]

We next substitute (B.36) into (B.5), and identify terms. Identifying terms in \(C_t^2, C_t y_t\) and \(y_t^2\), we find

\[
\frac{1}{2} X_t' \left( \bar{Q} \bar{R}_2 \bar{Q} + \bar{Q} \bar{R}_1 + \bar{R}_1' \bar{Q} - \bar{R}_0 \right) X_t = 0, \tag{B.37}
\]

where

\[
\bar{R}_2 \equiv \begin{pmatrix} s^2 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
\bar{R}_1 \equiv \begin{pmatrix} \frac{r}{2} + \kappa & 0 \\ b_1 & \frac{r}{2} + b_2 \end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
\bar{R}_0 \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 0 & r \bar{\alpha} \lambda \\ r \bar{\alpha} \lambda & \frac{r \bar{\alpha}^2}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \end{pmatrix}.
\]

Eq. (B.37) must hold for all \(X_t\). Since the square matrix in (B.37) is symmetric, it must equal zero, and this yields the algebraic Riccati equation

\[
\bar{Q} \bar{R}_2 \bar{Q} + \bar{Q} \bar{R}_1 + \bar{R}_1' \bar{Q} - \bar{R}_0 = 0. \tag{B.38}
\]
We next identify terms in \( C_t \) and \( y_t \), which yield
\[
(r + \kappa + s^2 \bar{q}_{11}) \bar{q}_1 + b_1 \bar{q}_2 - \kappa \bar{C} \bar{q}_{11} - b_0 \bar{q}_{12} = 0,
\]
(B.39)
\[
(r + b_2) q_2 + s^2 \bar{q}_{12} + r^2 \alpha^2 \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} - r \alpha B - \kappa \bar{C} \bar{q}_{12} - b_0 \bar{q}_{22} = 0.
\]
(B.40)
respectively. Using (3.15) and (A.30), we can write (B.11) as
\[
\eta h(X_t) = \frac{r \alpha \bar{f}}{\bar{\alpha}} + \frac{\alpha \eta}{\Sigma}. \tag{B.41}
\]
Using (4.2), (4.7), (B.32) and (B.41), we find that the equation derived from (B.14) by identifying terms in \( C_t^2, C_t y_t \) and \( y_t^2 \) is
\[
Q \mathcal{R}_2 Q + Q \mathcal{R}_1 + \mathcal{R}_0' Q - \mathcal{R}_0 = 0,
\]
(B.42)
where
\[
\mathcal{R}_2 \equiv \begin{pmatrix} s^2 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix},
\]
\[
\mathcal{R}_1 \equiv \begin{pmatrix} \frac{r}{2} + \kappa & r \alpha \psi b_1 s^2 \\ b_1 & \frac{r}{2} + b_2 \end{pmatrix},
\]
\[
\mathcal{R}_0 \equiv \begin{pmatrix} -r \alpha \psi b_1^2 & -r \alpha \psi b_1 (r + \kappa + 2b_2) \\ -r \alpha \psi b_1 (r + \kappa + 2b_2) & r^2 \alpha^2 \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} + 2r^2 \alpha^2 \psi b_1 s^2 \gamma_1 \Delta \eta \Sigma' - r \alpha \psi b_2 (2r + 3b_2) \end{pmatrix},
\]
and the equations derived by identifying terms in \( C_t \) and \( y_t \) are
\[
(r + \kappa + s^2 \bar{q}_{11}) q_1 + b_1 q_2 - r \alpha \psi b_0 b_1 - \kappa \bar{C} \bar{q}_{11} - b_0 \bar{q}_{12} = 0,
\]
(B.43)
\[
(r + b_2) q_2 + s^2 (q_{12} + r \alpha \psi b_1) q_1 - r \alpha \psi [(r + 2b_2) b_0 + b_1 \kappa \bar{C}] - \kappa \bar{C} q_{12} - b_0 q_{22} = 0,
\]
(B.44)
respectively.

Solving for equilibrium amounts to solving the system of (4.7), (B.29)-(B.31), (B.33)-(B.35), (B.38)-(B.40) and (B.42)-(B.44) in the unknowns \((a_0, a_1, a_2, \bar{b}_0, \bar{b}_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, \bar{Q}, q_1, q_2, Q)\). This reduces to solving the system of (B.29), (B.30), (B.33), (B.34), (B.38) and (B.42) in the unknowns \((b_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \bar{Q}, Q)\): given \((b_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \bar{Q}, Q)\), \((a_1, a_2)\) can be determined from (4.7), \((b_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, q_1, q_2)\) from the linear system of (B.35), (B.39), (B.40), (B.43) and (B.44), and \(a_0\) from (B.31). We replace
the system of (B.29), (B.30), (B.33), (B.34), (B.38) and (B.42) by the equivalent system of (B.29),
(B.30), (B.38), (B.42),
\[
\psi b_1 (r + \kappa + b_2 + s^2 q_{11}) = 1 + s^2 \gamma_1 (\bar{q}_{11} - q_{11}) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}, \tag{B.45}
\]
\[
\psi \left[ (r + b_2) b_2 + b_1 s^2 q_{12} \right] - r \alpha \psi b_1 s^2 \gamma_1 \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} = r (\alpha + \bar{\alpha}) \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + s^2 \gamma_1 (\bar{q}_{12} - q_{12}) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}. \tag{B.46}
\]

For \( s = 0 \), (B.29), (B.30), (B.38), (B.42), (B.45) and (B.46) become
\[
(r + \kappa) \gamma_1 + b_1 \gamma_2 = 0, \tag{B.47}
\]
\[
(r + b_2) \gamma_2 = -r \bar{\alpha} f, \tag{B.48}
\]
\[
\dot{Q} \mathcal{R}_1^0 + \mathcal{R}_1'^0 Q - \mathcal{R}_0^0 = 0, \tag{B.49}
\]
\[
Q \mathcal{R}_1^0 + \mathcal{R}_1'^0 Q - \mathcal{R}_0^0 = 0, \tag{B.50}
\]
\[
\psi b_1 (r + \kappa + b_2) = 1, \tag{B.51}
\]
\[
\psi (r + b_2) b_2 = r (\alpha + \bar{\alpha}) f \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}, \tag{B.52}
\]
respectively, where
\[
\mathcal{R}_1^0 = \mathcal{R}_1'^0 = \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{r}{2} + \kappa & 0 \\
\frac{r}{2} + b_2 & \frac{r}{2} + b_2
\end{pmatrix},
\]
\[
\mathcal{R}_0^0 = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & r \bar{\alpha} \lambda \\
r \bar{\alpha} \lambda & r^2 \bar{\alpha}^2 f \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}
\end{pmatrix},
\]
\[
\mathcal{R}_0^0 = \begin{pmatrix}
-r \alpha \psi b_1^2 & -r \alpha \psi b_1 (r + \kappa + 2b_2) \\
-r \alpha \psi b_1 (r + \kappa + 2b_2) & r^2 \bar{\alpha}^2 f \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} - r \alpha \psi b_2 (2r + 3b_2)
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

Eq. (B.52) is quadratic and has a unique positive solution \( b_2 \).\(^{26}\) Given \( b_2 \), \( b_1 \) is determined uniquely from (B.51), \( \gamma_2 \) from (B.48), \( \gamma_1 \) from (B.47), \( Q \) from (B.49) (which is linear in \( Q \)), and \( Q \) from (B.50) (which is linear in \( Q \)). We denote this solution by \((b_1^0, b_2^0, \gamma_1^0, \gamma_2^0, Q_0^0, Q_0^0)\).

\(^{26}\)The positive solution is the relevant one. Indeed, since the negative solution satisfies \( r + 2b_2 < 0 \), (B.49) implies that \( \bar{q}_{22} < 0 \). Therefore, the manager’s certainty equivalent would converge to \(-\infty\) at the rate \( y_t^2 \) when \( |y_t| \) goes to \( \infty \) and \( C_t \) is held constant. The manager can, however, achieve higher certainty equivalent by not investing in the active fund.

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To show that the system of \((B.29), (B.30), (B.38), (B.42), (B.45)\) and \((B.46)\) has a solution for small \(s\), we apply the implicit function theorem. We move all terms in each equation to the left-hand side, and stack all left-hand sides into a vector \(F\), in the order \((B.46), (B.45), (B.30), (B.29), (B.38), (B.42)\). Treated as a function of \((b_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, Q, Q, s)\), \(F\) is continuously differentiable around the point \(A \equiv (b_1^0, b_2^0, \gamma_1^0, \gamma_2^0, Q^0, Q^0, 0)\) and is equal to zero at \(A\). To show that the Jacobian matrix of \(F\) with respect to \((b_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, Q, Q)\) has non-zero determinant at \(A\), we note that \(F\) has a triangular structure for \(s = 0\): \(F_1\) depends only on \(b_2\), \(F_2\) only on \((b_1, b_2)\), \(F_3\) only on \((b_2, \gamma_2)\), \(F_4\) only on \((b_1, \gamma_1, \gamma_2)\), \(F_5\) only on \((b_1, b_2, Q)\), and \(F_6\) only on \((b_1, b_2, Q)\). Therefore, the Jacobian matrix of \(F\) has non-zero determinant at \(A\) if the derivatives of \(F_1\) with respect to \(b_2\), \(F_2\) with respect to \(b_1\), \(F_3\) with respect to \(\gamma_2\), and \(F_4\) with respect to \(\gamma_1\) are non-zero, and the Jacobian matrices of \(F_5\) with respect to \(Q\) and \(F_6\) with respect to \(Q\) have non-zero determinants. These results follow from \((B.47)-(B.52)\) and the positivity of \((b_1^0, b_2^0)\). Therefore, the implicit function theorem applies, and the system of \((B.29), (B.30), (B.38), (B.42), (B.45)\) and \((B.46)\) has a solution for small \(s\). This solution is unique in a neighborhood of \((b_1^0, b_2^0, \gamma_1^0, \gamma_2^0, Q^0, Q^0)\), which corresponds to the unique equilibrium for \(s = 0\). Since \(b_1^0 > 0\), \(b_2^0 > 0\), \(\gamma_1^0 > 0\), \(\gamma_2^0 < 0\), continuity implies that \(b_1 > 0\), \(b_2 > 0\), \(\gamma_1 > 0\), \(\gamma_2 < 0\) for small \(s\).

**Proof of Corollary 4.1:** Stocks’ expected returns are

\[
E_t(dR_t) = (r a_0 + a_1^R C_t + a_2^R y_t - \kappa a_1 \bar{C} + b_0 a_2) dt
\]

\[
= \left\{ \frac{r a \bar{x} f}{\alpha + \bar{x}} \eta \Sigma \theta' \Sigma \eta' + \left[ \gamma_1^R C_t + \gamma_2^R y_t + r \bar{x} \left( f + \frac{s^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) - \gamma_1 s^2 \bar{q}_1 \right] \Sigma p'_f \right\} dt
\]

\[
= \left[ \frac{r a \alpha \eta \Sigma \theta'}{\alpha + \bar{x} \eta \Sigma \eta'} (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a'_1) \eta' + \Lambda_t (f \Sigma + s^2 a_1 a'_1) p'_f \right] dt,
\]

where

\[
\gamma_1^R \equiv (r + \kappa) \gamma_1 + b_1 \gamma_2,
\]

\[
\gamma_2^R \equiv (r + b_2) \gamma_2.
\]

The first step in \((B.53)\) follows from \((B.1)\), the second from \((4.7)\) and \((B.31)\), and the third from \((4.7)\) and \((4.8)\). Eq. \((B.53)\) is equivalent to \((3.21)\) because of \((3.5)\).

Eq. \((B.29)\) implies that \(\gamma_1^R\) has the opposite sign of \(\gamma_1 \bar{q}_{11}\). For small \(s\), \(\gamma_1 > 0\) and \(\bar{q}_{11}\) has the
same sign as its value $\bar{q}^0_{i1}$ for $s = 0$. Eq. (B.49) implies that

$$
\bar{q}^0_{i1} = -\frac{2b^0_{11}q^0_{22}}{r + 2\kappa}
$$

$$
= -\frac{2\bar{b}^0_{11}}{(r + 2\kappa)(r + \kappa + b^0_2)} \left( r\bar{\alpha} - b^0_{11} \right),
$$

$$
= -\frac{2r\bar{\alpha}b^0_1}{(r + 2\kappa)(r + \kappa + b^0_2)} \left[ \lambda - \frac{r\bar{\alpha}b^0_1f\Delta}{(r + 2b^0_2\eta\Sigma\eta')} \right],
$$

$$
= -\frac{2r\bar{\alpha}b^0_1}{(r + 2\kappa)(r + \kappa + b^0_2)} \left[ \lambda - \frac{r\bar{\alpha}f\Delta}{\psi(r + \kappa + b^0_2)(r + 2b^0_2\eta\Sigma\eta')} \right], \quad (B.54)
$$

where the last step follows from (B.51). Using (B.52), we find

$$
\psi(r + \kappa + b^0_2)(r + 2b^0_2) = 2r(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})f\Delta\eta\Sigma\eta' + \psi[(r + 2\kappa)b^0_2 + r(r + \kappa)]
$$

$$
= 2r(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})f\Delta\eta\Sigma\eta' + \psi\left[ r + (r + 2\kappa)\sqrt{1 + \frac{4(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})f\Delta}{r\psi\eta\Sigma\eta'}} \right]. \quad (B.55)
$$

Eqs. (B.54) and (B.55) imply that $\bar{q}^0_{i1}$ is positive if (4.9) holds, and is negative otherwise. Therefore, for small $s$, $\gamma^R_1$ is negative if (4.9) holds, and is positive otherwise. Moreover, $\gamma^R_2 < 0$ since $b_2 > 0$ and $\gamma_2 < 0$.

**Proof of Corollary 4.2:** Using (B.1) and proceeding as in the derivation of (A.56), we find

$$
\text{Cov}_t(dR_t, dR'_t) = \text{Cov}_t \left[ -sa_1 dB^C_t, \left( a^R_1 C_t + a^R_2 y_t \right)' dt \right]
$$

$$
= -s\gamma_1 \text{Cov}_t \left( dB^C_t, \gamma^R_1 C_t + \gamma^R_2 y_t \right) \Sigma p_j p_f \Sigma dt, \quad (B.56)
$$

where the last step follows from (4.7). Using the dynamics (2.3) and (4.2), we can express $(C_t, y_t)$ as a function of their time $t$ values and the Brownian shocks $dB^C_u$ for $u \in [t, t']$. The covariance (B.56) depends only on how the Brownian shock $dB^C_t$ impacts $(C_t, y_t)$. (See the proof of Corollary 3.6.) To compute this impact, we solve the “impulse-response” dynamics

$$
dC_t = -\kappa Ct dt,
$$

$$
dy_t = -(b_1 C_t + b_2 y_t) dt,
$$

with the initial conditions

$$
C_t = sdB^C_t,
$$

$$
y_t = 0.
$$
The solution to these dynamics is
\[ C_t' = e^{-\kappa(t'-t)}sdB_t^C, \tag{B.57} \]
\[ y_t' = -\frac{b_1 e^{-\kappa(t'-t)} - e^{-b_2(t'-t)}}{b_2 - \kappa}sdB_t^C, \tag{B.58} \]
and the implied dynamics of expected return are
\[
\frac{E(dx_t')}{dt} = \left\{ \gamma_1^Re^{-\kappa(t'-t)} - \gamma_2^R \frac{b_1 e^{-\kappa(t'-t)} - e^{-b_2(t'-t)}}{b_2 - \kappa} \right\} s\Sigma_p' dB_t^C. \tag{B.59}
\]
Eqs. (B.58) and (B.59) are used to plot the solid and dashed lines, respectively, in Figure 1.

Substituting (B.57) and (B.58) into (B.56), we find (4.11) with
\[ \chi_1 \equiv s^2 \gamma_1 \left( \frac{b_1 \gamma_2^R}{b_2 - \kappa} - \gamma_1^R \right) = s^2 (r + \kappa) \gamma_1 \left( \frac{b_1 \gamma_2}{b_2 - \kappa} - \gamma_1 \right), \tag{B.60} \]
\[ \chi_2 \equiv -\frac{s^2 b_1 \gamma_1 \gamma_2^R}{b_2 - \kappa} = -\frac{s^2 (r + b_2) b_1 \gamma_1 \gamma_2}{b_2 - \kappa}. \tag{B.61} \]
The function \( \chi(u) \equiv \chi_1 e^{-\kappa u} + \chi_2 e^{-b_2 u} \) can change sign only once, is equal to \(-s^2 \gamma_1 \gamma_1^R \) when \( u = 0 \), and has the sign of \( \chi_1 \) if \( b_2 > \kappa \) and of \( \chi_2 \) if \( b_2 < \kappa \) when \( u \) goes to \( \infty \). For small \( s \), \( \gamma_1^R \) is negative if (4.9) holds, and is positive otherwise. The opposite is true for \( \chi(0) \) since \( \gamma_1 > 0 \). Since, in addition, \( b_1 > 0 \), \( b_2 > 0 \) and \( \gamma_2 < 0 \), (B.60) and (B.61) imply that \( \chi_1 < 0 \) if \( b_2 > \kappa \) and \( \chi_2 < 0 \) if \( b_2 < \kappa \). Therefore, there exists a threshold \( \hat{u} \geq 0 \), which is positive if (4.9) holds and is zero otherwise, such that \( \chi(u) > 0 \) for \( 0 < u < \hat{u} \) and \( \chi(u) < 0 \) for \( u > \hat{u} \).

\section*{C Asymmetric Information}

\textbf{Proof of Proposition 5.1:} We use Theorem 10.3 of Liptser and Shiryaev (LS 2000). The investor learns about \( C_t \), which follows the process (2.3). She observes the following information:

- The net dividends of the true market portfolio \( \theta D_t - C_t dt \). This corresponds to the process \( \xi_{1t} \equiv \theta D_t - \int_0^t C_s ds \).
- The dividends of the index fund \( \eta D_t \). This corresponds to the process \( \xi_{2t} \equiv \eta D_t \).
• The price of the true market portfolio $\theta S_t$. Given the conjecture (5.1) for stock prices, this is equivalent to observing the process $\xi_{3t} \equiv \theta(S_t + a_1 \hat{C}_t + a_3 y_t)$.

• The price of the index portfolio $\eta S_t$. This is equivalent to observing the process $\xi_{4t} \equiv \eta(S_t + a_1 \hat{C}_t + a_3 y_t)$.

The dynamics of $\xi_{1t}$ are

$$d\xi_{1t} = \theta(F_t dt + \sigma dB_t^D) - C_t dt$$

$$= \left[(r + \kappa)\theta a_0 - \frac{\kappa \theta F}{r} + (r + \kappa)\theta a_2 C_t - C_t\right] dt + \theta \sigma dB_t^D$$

$$= \left[(r + \kappa)\theta a_0 - \frac{\kappa \theta F}{r} + (r + \kappa)\xi_{3t} - \left(1 - \frac{(r + \kappa)\gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}\right)\xi_{3t}\right] dt + \theta \sigma dB_t^D,$$  \hspace{1cm} (C.1)

where the first step follows from (2.5), the second from (5.1), and the third from (5.2). Likewise, the dynamics of $\xi_{2t}$ are

$$d\xi_{2t} = \left[(r + \kappa)\eta a_0 - \frac{\kappa \eta F}{r} + (r + \kappa)\xi_{4t}\right] dt + \eta \sigma dB_t^D.$$ \hspace{1cm} (C.2)

The dynamics of $\xi_{3t}$ are

$$d\xi_{3t} = d\left\{\theta \left[\frac{F}{r} + \frac{F_t - F}{r + \kappa} - (a_0 + a_2 C_t)\right]\right\}$$

$$= \theta \left[\frac{\kappa (F - F_t) dt + \phi \sigma dB_t^F}{r + \kappa} - a_2 \left[\kappa (C - C_t) dt + \sigma dB_t^C\right]\right]$$

$$= \kappa \left[\theta \left(\frac{F}{r} - a_0 - a_2 \hat{C}\right) - \xi_{3t}\right] dt + \frac{\phi \theta \sigma dB_t^F}{r + \kappa} - s \theta a_2 dB_t^C$$

$$= \kappa \left(\frac{\theta F}{r} - \theta a_0 - \frac{\gamma_2 \Delta \hat{C}}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} - \xi_{3t}\right) dt + \frac{\phi \theta \sigma dB_t^F}{r + \kappa} - s \gamma_2 \Delta dB_t^C,$$ \hspace{1cm} (C.3)

where the first step follows from (5.1), the second from (2.6) and (2.3), and the fourth from (5.2). Likewise, the dynamics of $\xi_{4t}$ are

$$d\xi_{4t} = \kappa \left(\frac{\eta F}{r} - \eta a_0 - \xi_{4t}\right) dt + \frac{\phi \eta \sigma dB_t^F}{r + \kappa}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (C.4)

The dynamics (2.3) and (C.1)-(C.4) map into the dynamics (10.62) and (10.63) of LS by setting

$$\theta_t \equiv C_t, \xi_t \equiv (\xi_{1t}, \xi_{2t}, \xi_{3t}, \xi_{4t}), W_{1t} \equiv \left(\frac{B_t^D}{B_t^F}\right), W_{2t} \equiv B_t^C, a_0(t) \equiv \kappa \hat{C}, a_1(t) \equiv -\kappa, a_2(t) \equiv 0, \text{ and } a_3(t) \equiv \eta \Sigma \eta'.$$
\[ b_1(t) \equiv 0, \ b_2(t) \equiv s, \ \gamma_t \equiv R, \]

\[
A_0(t) \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
(r + \kappa)\theta_0 - \frac{s\theta}{r} \\
(r + \kappa)\eta_0 - \frac{s\eta}{r} \\
\kappa \left( \frac{\theta}{r} - \theta_0 - \frac{\gamma_2 \Delta C}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \\
\kappa \left( \frac{\eta}{r} - \eta_0 \right)
\end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
A_1(t) \equiv -\begin{pmatrix}
1 - \frac{(r + \kappa)\gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \\
0 \\
0 \\
0
\end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
A_2(t) \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & r + \kappa & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & r + \kappa \\
0 & 0 & -\kappa & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & -\kappa
\end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
B_1(t) \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
\theta_0 & 0 & 0 \\
\eta_0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \phi \theta & r + \kappa \\
0 & \phi \eta & r + \kappa
\end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
B_2(t) \equiv -\begin{pmatrix}
0 \\
0 \\
\frac{s \gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \\
0
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

The quantities \((b \circ b)(t)\), \((b \circ B)(t)\), and \((B \circ B)(t)\), defined in LS (10.80) are

\[
(b \circ b)(t) = s^2,
\]

\[
(b \circ B)(t) = -\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & \frac{s \gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} & 0
\end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
(B \circ B)(t) = \begin{pmatrix}
\theta \Sigma \theta' & \eta \Sigma \theta' & 0 & 0 \\
\eta \Sigma \theta' & \eta \Sigma \eta' & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \frac{\phi^2 \theta \Sigma \theta'}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta^2}{(\eta \Sigma \eta')^2} & \frac{\phi^2 \eta \Sigma \theta'}{(r + \kappa)^2} \\
0 & 0 & \frac{\phi^2 \eta \Sigma \theta'}{(r + \kappa)^2} & \frac{\phi^2 \eta \Sigma \eta'}{(r + \kappa)^2}
\end{pmatrix}.
\]
Theorem 10.3 of LS (first subequation of (10.81)) implies that
\[ d\hat{C}_t = \kappa (\bar{C} - \hat{C}_t) dt - \beta_1 \left\{ d\xi_{1t} - \left[ (r + \kappa)\theta a_0 - \frac{\kappa \theta F}{r} + (r + \kappa)\xi_{3t} \right] \frac{(r + \kappa)\gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma} \right\} dt \]
\[ - \frac{\eta \Sigma \theta'}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \left\{ d\xi_{2t} - \left[ (r + \kappa)\eta a_0 - \frac{\kappa \eta F}{r} + (r + \kappa)\xi_{4t} \right] \right\} \]
\[ - \beta_2 \left\{ d\xi_{3t} - \kappa \left( \frac{\theta F}{r} - \theta a_0 - \frac{\gamma_2 \Delta \bar{C}}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} - \xi_{3t} \right) \right\} \]
\[ - \frac{\eta \Sigma \theta'}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \left\{ d\xi_{4t} - \kappa \left( \frac{\eta F}{r} - \eta a_0 - \xi_{4t} \right) \right\} \]  \hspace{1cm} (C.5)

Eq. (5.4) follows from (C.5) by noting that the term in \( dt \) after each \( d\xi_{it} \), \( i = 1, 2, 3, 4 \), is \( E_t (d\xi_{it}) \).

In subsequent proofs we use a different form of (5.4), where we replace each \( d\xi_{it} \), \( i = 1, 2, 3, 4 \), by its value in (C.1)-(C.4):
\[ d\hat{C}_t = \kappa (\bar{C} - \hat{C}_t) dt - \beta_1 \left\{ p_f \sigma dB_t^D - \left( 1 - \frac{(r + \kappa)\gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) (C_t - \hat{C}_t) dt \right\} - \beta_2 \left( \frac{\phi p_f \sigma dB_t^F}{r + \kappa} - \frac{s \gamma_2 \Delta dB_t^C}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right). \]
\hspace{1cm} (C.6)

Eq. (5.7) follows from Theorem 10.3 of LS (second subequation of (10.81)).

**Proof of Proposition 5.2:** Eqs. (2.3), (2.5), (2.6), (5.1)-(5.3) and (C.6) imply that the vector of returns is
\[ dR_t = \left\{ ra_0 + \left( \gamma_1^R \hat{C}_t + \gamma_2^R C_t + \gamma_3^R y_t - \kappa (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) \bar{C} - b_0 \gamma_3 \right) \Sigma p_f' \right\} dt + \left( \sigma + \beta_1 \gamma_1 \Sigma p_f' p_f \sigma \right) dB_t^D \]
\[ + \frac{\phi}{r + \kappa} \left( \sigma + \beta_2 \gamma_1 \Sigma p_f' p_f \sigma \right) dB_t^F - s \gamma_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \Sigma p_f' dB_t^C, \]
\hspace{1cm} (C.7)

where
\[ \gamma_1^R \equiv (r + \kappa + \rho) \gamma_1 + b_1 \gamma_3, \]
\[ \gamma_2^R \equiv (r + \kappa) \gamma_2 - \rho \gamma_1, \]
\[ \gamma_3^R \equiv (r + b_2) \gamma_3, \]
and
\[ \rho \equiv \beta_1 \left( 1 - \frac{(r + \kappa)\gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right). \]  \hspace{1cm} (C.8)
Eqs. (2.3), (3.3), (5.3), (C.6) and (C.7) imply that
\[
d \left( r\bar{\alpha}W_t + \bar{q}_0 + (\bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, \bar{q}_3)X_t + \frac{1}{2}X_t'QX_t \right)
\]
\[= Gdt + \left[ r\bar{\alpha}\dot{z}_t (\sigma + \beta_1\gamma\Sigma p'_f p_f \sigma) - \beta_1\bar{f}_1(X_t)p_f \sigma \right] dB_t^D
\]
\[+ \frac{\phi}{r + \kappa} \left[ r\bar{\alpha}\dot{z}_t (\sigma + \beta_2\gamma\Sigma p'_f p_f \sigma) - \beta_2\bar{f}_1(X_t)p_f \sigma \right] dB_t^F
\]
\[- s \left[ r\bar{\alpha}\gamma_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2\gamma_1\Delta}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} \right) \dot{z}_t \Sigma p_f' - \frac{\beta_2\gamma_2\Delta\bar{f}_1(X_t)}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} - \bar{f}_2(X_t) \right] dB_t^C ,
\]
(E.9)

where
\[
G \equiv r\bar{\alpha} \left( rW_t + \dot{z}_t \left\{ x_0 + \left[ \gamma_1^R\bar{C}_t + \gamma_2^R\bar{C}_t + \gamma_3^R\bar{y}_t - \kappa (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)\bar{C} - b_0\gamma_3 \right] \Sigma p_f' \right\} + (\lambda\bar{C}_t + B)\bar{y}_t - \bar{c}_t \right)
\]
\[+ \bar{f}_1(X_t) \left[ \kappa (\bar{C} - \bar{C}_t) + \rho (\bar{C}_t - \bar{C}_t) \right] + \bar{f}_2(X_t)\kappa (\bar{C} - \bar{C}_t) + \bar{f}_3(X_t)\bar{v}_t
\]
\[+ \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{\beta_1^2}{\bar{r}} + \frac{\phi^2\beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2\beta_2^2\gamma_3^2\Delta}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} \right] \Delta q_{11} \frac{\eta\Sigma'\eta'}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} + \frac{s^2\beta_2\gamma_2\Delta q_{12}}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} + \frac{1}{2}s^2 q_{22},
\]
\[
\bar{f}_1(X_t) \equiv \bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_{11}\bar{C}_t + \bar{q}_{12}\bar{C}_t + \bar{q}_{13}\bar{y}_t,
\]
\[
\bar{f}_2(X_t) \equiv \bar{q}_2 + \bar{q}_{12}\bar{C}_t + \bar{q}_{22}\bar{C}_t + \bar{q}_{23}\bar{y}_t,
\]
\[
\bar{f}_3(X_t) \equiv \bar{q}_3 + \bar{q}_{13}\bar{C}_t + \bar{q}_{23}\bar{C}_t + \bar{q}_{33}\bar{y}_t.
\]

Eqs. (5.9) and (C.9) imply that
\[
\mathcal{D}V = - V \left\{ G - \frac{1}{2}(r\bar{\alpha})^2 f\dot{z}_t\Sigma'z_t \right\}
\]
\[\quad - \frac{1}{2}\beta_1 \left[ r\bar{\alpha}\gamma_1\dot{z}_t\Sigma p'_f - \bar{f}_1(X_t) \right] \left[ r\bar{\alpha} \left( 2 + \frac{\beta_1\gamma_1\Delta}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} \right) \dot{z}_t \Sigma p_f' - \frac{\beta_1\Delta\bar{f}_1(X_t)}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} \right]
\]
\[\quad - \frac{\phi^2\beta_2}{(r + \kappa)^2} \left[ r\bar{\alpha}\gamma_1\dot{z}_t\Sigma p'_f - \bar{f}_1(X_t) \right] \left[ r\bar{\alpha} \left( 2 + \frac{\beta_2\gamma_1\Delta}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} \right) \dot{z}_t \Sigma p_f' - \frac{\beta_2\Delta\bar{f}_1(X_t)}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} \right]
\]
\[\quad - \frac{1}{s^2} \left[ r\bar{\alpha}\gamma_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2\gamma_1\Delta}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} \right) \dot{z}_t \Sigma p_f' - \frac{\beta_2\gamma_2\Delta\bar{f}_1(X_t)}{\eta\Sigma'\eta'} - \bar{f}_2(X_t) \right]^2 \} .
\]
(C.10)

Substituting (C.10) into (3.8), we can write the first-order conditions with respect to \( \bar{c}_t \) and \( \dot{z}_t \) as (A.3) and
\[
\bar{h}(X_t) = r\bar{\alpha}(f\Sigma + k\Sigma p'_f \Sigma)z_t',
\]
(C.11)
respectively, where
\[
\hat{h}(X_t) \equiv r a_0 + \left[ \gamma_1^R \hat{C}_t + \gamma_2^R C_t + \gamma_3^R y_t - \kappa(\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) \hat{C} - b_0 \gamma_3 + k_1 \hat{f}_1(X_t) + k_2 \hat{f}_2(X_t) \right] \Sigma p_t,
\]
(C.12)
\[
k \equiv \beta_1 \gamma_1 \left( 2 + \frac{\beta_1 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) + \phi^2 \beta_2 \gamma_1 (r + \kappa)^2 \left( 2 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) + s^2 \beta_2 \gamma_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right)^2,
\]
(C.13)
\[
k_1 \equiv \beta_1 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_1 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) + \phi^2 \beta_2 \eta (r + \kappa)^2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) + s^2 \beta_2 \gamma_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right),
\]
(C.14)
\[
k_2 \equiv s^2 \gamma_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right).
\]
(C.15)

Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we find the following counterpart of (A.10):
\[
\frac{1}{2} \hat{h}(X_t) (f \Sigma + k \Sigma p_t \rho \Sigma)^{-1} \hat{h}(X_t) + r \hat{a}(\lambda C_t + B) y_t - r \left[ \hat{q}_0 + (\hat{q}_1, \hat{q}_2, \hat{q}_3) X_t + \frac{1}{2} \hat{X}_t \hat{Q} \hat{X}_t \right]
\]
\[
+ \hat{f}_1(X_t) \left[ \kappa(\hat{C} - \hat{C}_t) + \rho(C_t - \hat{C}_t) \right] + \hat{f}_2(X_t) \kappa(\hat{C} - C_t) + \hat{f}_3(X_t) v_t
\]
\[
+ \frac{1}{2} \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] \hat{q}_1 \hat{X}_t + \frac{s^2 \beta_2 \gamma_2 \Delta \hat{q}_1}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + \frac{1}{2} s^2 \hat{q}_2 + \hat{\beta} - r + r \log(r)
\]
\[
- \frac{1}{2} \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} \right] \Delta \hat{f}_1(X_t)^2 + \frac{1}{2} s^2 \left[ \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_2 \hat{f}_1(X_t)}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + \hat{f}_2(X_t) \right]^2 = 0.
\]

Eq. (C.16) is quadratic in \(\hat{X}_t\). Identifying quadratic, linear and constant terms yields ten scalar equations in \((\hat{q}_0, \hat{q}_1, \hat{q}_2, \hat{q}_3, \hat{Q})\). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition 5.4 (see (C.40)-(C.43)).

Proof of Proposition 5.3: Dynamics under the investor’s filtration can be deduced from those under the manager’s by replacing \(C_t\) by the investor’s expectation \(\hat{C}_t\). Eq. (C.6) implies that the dynamics of \(\hat{C}_t\) are
\[
d\hat{C}_t = \kappa(\hat{C} - \hat{C}_t) dt - \beta_1 \rho \sigma dB^D_t - \beta_2 \left( \frac{\rho p_t \sigma dB^F_t}{r + \kappa} - \frac{s \gamma_2 \Delta dB^C_t}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right),
\]
(C.17)
where \( \hat{B}_D \) is a Brownian motion under the investor’s filtration. Eq. (C.7) implies that the net-of-cost return of the active fund is

\[
\begin{align*}
    z_t dR_t - C_t dt &= z_t \left\{ ra_0 + \left[ (g_1^R + g_2^R) \hat{C}_t + g_3^R y_t - \kappa (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) \hat{C} - b_0 \gamma_3 \right] \Sigma p_f' \right\} dt - \hat{C}_t dt \\
    &+ z_t \left( \sigma + \beta_1 \gamma_1 \Sigma p_f' p_f' \right) d\hat{B}_t^D + z_t \frac{\phi}{r + \kappa} \left( \sigma + \beta_2 \gamma_1 \Sigma p_f' p_f' \right) dB_t^F - s \gamma_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) z_t \Sigma p_f' dB_t^C,
\end{align*}
\]

(C.18)

and the return of the index fund is

\[
\begin{align*}
    \eta dR_t &= \eta \left\{ ra_0 + \left[ (g_1^R + g_2^R) \hat{C}_t + g_3^R y_t - \kappa (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) \hat{C} - b_0 \gamma_3 \right] \Sigma p_f' \right\} dt \\
    &+ \eta \left( \sigma + \beta_1 \gamma_1 \Sigma p_f' p_f' \right) d\hat{B}_t^D + \eta \frac{\phi}{r + \kappa} \left( \sigma + \beta_2 \gamma_1 \Sigma p_f' p_f' \right) dB_t^F - s \gamma_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \eta \Sigma p_f' dB_t^C.
\end{align*}
\]

(C.19)

Suppose that the investor optimizes over \((c_t, x_t)\) but follows the control \(v_t\) given by (5.3). Eqs. (4.4), (5.3), (C.17), (C.18) and (C.19) imply that

\[
\begin{align*}
    d \left( r \alpha W_t + q_0 + (q_1, q_2) X_t + \frac{1}{2} X_t^t Q X_t \right) &= G dt + \left[ r \alpha (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) \left( \sigma + \beta_1 \gamma_1 \Sigma p_f' p_f' \right) - \beta_1 f_1 (X_t) p_f' \right] d\hat{B}_t^D \\
    &+ \frac{\phi}{r + \kappa} \left[ r \alpha (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) \left( \sigma + \beta_2 \gamma_1 \Sigma p_f' p_f' \right) - \beta_2 f_1 (X_t) p_f' \right] dB_t^F \\
    &- s \left[ r \tilde{\alpha} \gamma_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) \Sigma p_f' - \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_2 \Delta f_1 (X_t)}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] dB_t^C,
\end{align*}
\]

(C.20)

where

\[
G = r \alpha \left[ r W_t + (x_t \eta + y_t z_t) \left\{ ra_0 + \left[ (g_1^R + g_2^R) \hat{C}_t + g_3^R y_t - \kappa (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) \hat{C} - b_0 \gamma_3 \right] \Sigma p_f' \right\} - y_t \hat{C}_t \\
- \frac{\psi v_t^2}{2} - c_t \right] + f_1 (X_t) \kappa (\tilde{C} - \hat{C}_t) + f_2 (X_t) v_t + \frac{1}{2} \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] \Delta q_{11} \eta \Sigma \eta',
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
    f_1 (X_t) &= q_1 + q_{11} \hat{C}_t + q_{12} y_t, \\
    f_2 (X_t) &= q_2 + q_{12} \hat{C}_t + q_{22} y_t.
\end{align*}
\]

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Eqs. (4.5) and (C.20) imply that
\[
\mathcal{D}V = - V \left\{ G - \frac{1}{2}(r\alpha)^2 f(x_t \eta + y_t \zeta_t) \Sigma(x_t \eta + y_t \zeta_t)' \right. \\
- \frac{1}{2} \beta_1 \left[ r\alpha \gamma_1(x_t \eta + y_t \zeta_t) \Sigma p_f' - f_1(X_t) \right] \left[ \frac{r\alpha}{2} + \frac{\beta_1 \Phi_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] (x_t \eta + y_t \zeta_t) \Sigma p_f' - \frac{\beta_1 \Phi_1 f_1(X_t)}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \\
- \frac{1}{2} \beta_2 \left[ r\alpha \gamma_1(x_t \eta + y_t \zeta_t) \Sigma p_f' - f_1(X_t) \right] \left[ \frac{r\alpha}{2} + \frac{\beta_2 \Phi_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] (x_t \eta + y_t \zeta_t) \Sigma p_f' - \frac{\beta_2 \Phi_1 f_1(X_t)}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \\
- \frac{1}{2} \beta_1 \left[ r\alpha \gamma_1(x_t \eta + y_t \zeta_t) \Sigma p_f' - f_1(X_t) \right] \left[ \frac{r\alpha}{2} + \frac{\beta_2 \Phi_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] (x_t \eta + y_t \zeta_t) \Sigma p_f' - \frac{\beta_2 \Phi_1 f_1(X_t)}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right\}.
\]

(C.21)

Substituting (C.21) into (4.6), we can write the first-order conditions with respect to \( c_t \) and \( x_t \) as (A.13) and
\[
\eta h(X_t) = r\alpha \Phi_1 \Psi(X_t) \Phi_0 \Sigma p_f' (x_t \eta + y_t \zeta_t)',
\]
respectively, where
\[
h(X_t) \equiv r\alpha \Phi_1 \Psi(X_t) \Phi_0 \Sigma p_f' (x_t \eta + y_t \zeta_t).
\]

Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 4.2, we find the following counterpart of (B.14):
\[
\begin{aligned}
&\gamma_1 \theta h(X_t) - \frac{1}{2}(r\alpha)^2 q_t \Phi_2 (f(X_t) \Phi_0 \Sigma p_f' p_f \Sigma) \Phi_0' + \frac{\eta h(X_t) - r\alpha \Phi_1 \Psi(X_t) \Phi_0 \Sigma p_f'}{2 f_\psi \Sigma \eta'} - r\alpha \Phi_1 \Psi(X_t) - \frac{1}{2} r\alpha \psi v_t^2 \\
&\quad - r \left[ q_0 + (q_1, q_2) X_t + \frac{1}{2} X_t' Q X_t \right] + f_1(X_t) \kappa (\psi - \psi) + f_2(X_t) v_t \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{\Phi_1}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] \frac{\Delta [q_1 - f_1(X_t)^2]}{2 f_\psi \Sigma \eta'} + \beta - r + r \log(r) = 0.
\end{aligned}
\]

(C.24)

Since \( v_t \) in (4.2) is linear in \( X_t \), (C.24) is quadratic in \( X_t \). Identifying quadratic, linear and constant terms yields six scalar equations in \((q_0, q_1, q_2, Q)\). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition 5.4 (see (C.44)-(C.46)).

We next study optimization over \( v_t \), using the same perturbation argument as in the proof of Proposition 4.2. The counterparts of (B.19) and (B.20) are
\[
\theta \left[ h(X_t) - r\alpha \Phi_1 \Psi(X_t) \Phi_0 \Sigma p_f' \right] - \psi'(X_t) = r\alpha \Phi_1 \Psi(X_t) \Phi_0 \Sigma p_f' p_f \Sigma [x_t (1 - y_t) \eta + y_t \theta] + \psi \psi'(X_t),
\]

(C.25)

\[
\theta \left[ h(X_t) - r\alpha \Phi_1 \Psi(X_t) \Phi_0 \Sigma p_f' \right] - \psi'(X_t) = r\alpha \Phi_1 \Psi(X_t) \Phi_0 \Sigma p_f' p_f \Sigma \left[ y_t \theta + \frac{\eta h(X_t) - r\alpha \Phi_1 \Psi(X_t) \Phi_0 \Sigma p_f'}{r\alpha \Phi_1 \Psi(X_t) \Phi_0 \Sigma \eta'} \right]' + \psi \psi'(X_t),
\]

(C.26)
respectively, where
\[
h_t(X_t) \equiv (r + b_2)v_t + b_1\kappa(C - \hat{C}_t) - b_1 \left[ \beta_0^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_0^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \gamma'} \right] \frac{\Delta f_t(X_t)}{\eta \Sigma \gamma'}.\]

Eq. (C.26) is linear in \(X_t\). Identifying linear and constant terms, yields three scalar equations in \((b_0, b_1, b_2)\). We defer the derivation of these equations until the proof of Proposition 5.4 (see (C.36)-(C.38)).

Proof of Proposition 5.4: We first impose market clearing and derive the constants \((a_0, b_0, b_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3)\) as functions of \((\bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, \bar{q}_3, \bar{Q}, q_1, q_2, Q)\). Setting \(z_t = \theta - x_t\eta\) and \(\bar{y}_t = 1 - y_t\), we can write (C.11) and (C.22) as
\[
\tilde{h}(\bar{X}_t) = \bar{r} \bar{\alpha} f(\bar{f} + k\Sigma p_f' p_f)(1 - y_t)(\theta - x_t\eta)',
\]
\[
\eta h(X_t) = \bar{r} \bar{\alpha} \eta f(\bar{f} + k\Sigma p_f' p_f) [x_t(1 - y_t)\eta + y_t\theta]',
\]
respectively. Premultiplying (C.27) by \(\eta\), dividing by \(\bar{r} \bar{\alpha}\), and adding to (C.28) divided by \(\bar{r} \bar{\alpha}\), we find
\[
\eta \left[ \frac{h(X_t)}{\bar{r} \bar{\alpha}} + \frac{\tilde{h}(\bar{X}_t)}{\bar{r} \bar{\alpha}} \right] = \eta f(\bar{f} + k\Sigma p_f' p_f)\theta'.
\]
Eq. (C.29) is linear in \((\bar{C}_t, C_t, y_t)\). The terms in \(\bar{C}_t, C_t\) and \(y_t\) are zero because \(\eta \Sigma p_f' = 0\). Identifying constant terms, we find (A.29). Substituting (A.29) into (C.28), we find (A.30).

Substituting (A.30) into (C.27), we find
\[
\tilde{h}(\bar{X}_t) = \bar{r} \bar{\alpha} f(\bar{f} + k\Sigma p_f' p_f) \left[ \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \frac{\eta \Sigma \theta'}{\eta \Sigma \gamma'} \eta + (1 - y_t) p_f \right]'.
\]
Eq. (C.30) is linear in \(\bar{X}_t\). Identifying terms in \(\bar{C}_t, C_t\) and \(y_t\), we find
\begin{align*}
(r + \kappa + \rho)\gamma_1 + b_1 \gamma_3 + k_1 \bar{q}_{11} + k_2 \bar{q}_{12} &= 0, \quad (C.31) \\
(r + \kappa)\gamma_2 - \rho \gamma_1 + k_1 \bar{q}_{12} + k_2 \bar{q}_{22} &= 0, \quad (C.32) \\
(r + b_2)\gamma_3 + k_1 \bar{q}_{13} + k_2 \bar{q}_{23} &= -r \bar{\alpha} \left( f + \frac{k\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \gamma'} \right), \quad (C.33)
\end{align*}
respectively. Identifying constant terms, we find
\[
a_0 = \frac{\alpha \bar{\alpha} f}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \frac{\eta \Sigma \theta'}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha} \eta \Sigma \gamma'} \Sigma p_f' + \left[ \frac{\kappa (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) \bar{C} + b_0 \gamma_3 - k_1 \bar{q}_1 - k_2 \bar{q}_2}{r} \right] \frac{\Delta f_t(X_t)}{\eta \Sigma \gamma'} \Sigma p_f'. \quad (C.34)
\]
Using (A.30), we can write (C.26) as
\[ \theta h(X_t) - r \alpha \psi b_1 k_1 \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} y_t - \dot{C}_t = r \alpha \theta (f \Sigma + k \Sigma' p'_f \Sigma) \left( \frac{\bar{\alpha}}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} - \frac{\eta \Sigma' \theta'}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \eta + y_p f \right) + \psi h_\phi (X_t) \]
\[ \Rightarrow \theta h(X_t) - r \alpha \psi b_1 k_1 \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} y_t - \dot{C}_t = \frac{r \alpha \bar{\alpha} f}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha}} \left( \frac{\eta \Sigma' \theta'}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right)^2 + r \alpha \left( f + \frac{k \Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} y_t + \psi h_\phi (X_t). \]

(C.35)

Eq. (C.35) is linear in (\dot{C}_t, y_t). Identifying terms in \dot{C}_t and y_t, and using (5.3), we find
\[ [(r + \kappa) (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) + b_1 \gamma_3 + k_1 q_{11}] \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} - 1 \]
\[ = -\psi b_1 \left\{ r + \kappa + b_2 + \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right] \frac{\Delta q_{11}}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right\}, \]  
\]

(C.36)

\[ [(r + b_2) \gamma_3 + (q_{12} - r \alpha \psi b_1) k_1] \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \]
\[ = r \alpha \left( f + \frac{k \Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} - \psi \left\{ (r + b_2) b_2 + b_1 \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right] \frac{\Delta q_{12}}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right\}, \]  

(C.37)

respectively. Identifying constant terms, and using (5.3) and (C.34), we find
\[ \left[ k_1 (q_1 - \bar{q}_1) - k_2 \bar{q}_2 + r \bar{\alpha} \left( f + \frac{k \Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right) \right] \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \]
\[ = \psi \left\{ (r + b_2) b_0 + b_1 \kappa C - b_1 \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right] \frac{\Delta q_{11}}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right\}. \]  

(C.38)

The system of equations characterizing equilibrium is as follows. The endogenous variables are \((a_0, b_0, b_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3, \beta_1, \beta_2, T, q_1, q_2, q_3, \bar{Q}, q_1, q_2, Q)\). (As in Propositions 3.3 and 4.3, we can drop \((\bar{q}_0, q_0)\).) The equations linking them are (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.34), (C.36)-(C.38), the nine equations derived from (C.16) by identifying linear and quadratic terms, and the five equations derived from (C.24) by identifying linear and quadratic terms. We next simplify the latter two sets of equations, using implications of market clearing.

Using (C.30), we find
\[ \frac{1}{2} \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} (f \Sigma + k \Sigma' p'_f \Sigma)^{-1} \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \frac{1}{2} \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \eta' \Sigma' \eta \]
\[ = \frac{\delta^2 \alpha^2 \bar{\alpha} f (\eta \Sigma' \theta')^2}{2 (\alpha + \bar{\alpha})^2 \eta' \Sigma' \eta} + \frac{1}{2} r^2 \bar{\alpha}^2 (1 - y_t)^2 \left( f + \frac{k \Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta' \Sigma' \eta}. \]  

(C.39)

We next substitute (C.39) into (C.16), and identify terms. Quadratic terms yield the algebraic Riccati equation
\[ \bar{Q} \bar{R}_2 \bar{Q} + \bar{Q} \bar{R}_1 + \bar{R}_1' \bar{Q} - \bar{R}_0 = 0, \]  

(C.40)
where

\[
\bar{R}_2 \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
\beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2 \gamma^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} & \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \\
\frac{s^2 \beta_2 \gamma^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} & 0
\end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
\bar{R}_1 \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{r}{2} + \kappa + \rho & -\rho & 0 \\
0 & \frac{r}{2} + \kappa & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \frac{r}{2} + b_2
\end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
\bar{R}_0 \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & r \alpha \lambda \\
0 & r \alpha \lambda & r^2 \alpha^2 \left( f + \frac{k \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

Terms in \( \bar{C}_t, C_t \) and \( \eta_t \) yield

\[
(r + \kappa) \bar{q}_1 + b_1 \bar{q}_3 + \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} \right] \frac{\Delta q_1 \bar{q}_{11}}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + s^2 \left( \frac{\beta_2 \gamma^2 \Delta q_1}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + \bar{q}_2 \right) \frac{\Delta q_1 \bar{q}_{11}}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + q_{12} \),
\]

\[
- \kappa \bar{C}(\bar{q}_{11} + \bar{q}_{12}) - b_0 \bar{q}_{13} = 0,
\]

\[
(r + \kappa) \bar{q}_2 - \rho \bar{q}_1 + \left[ \beta_2^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} \right] \frac{\Delta q_1 \bar{q}_{12}}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + s^2 \left( \frac{\beta_2 \gamma^2 \Delta q_1}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + \bar{q}_2 \right) \frac{\Delta q_1 \bar{q}_{12}}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + q_{22} \),
\]

\[
- \kappa \bar{C}(\bar{q}_{12} + \bar{q}_{22}) - b_0 \bar{q}_{23} = 0,
\]

\[
(r + b_2) \bar{q}_3 + \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} \right] \frac{\Delta q_1 \bar{q}_{13}}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + s^2 \left( \frac{\beta_2 \gamma^2 \Delta q_1}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + \bar{q}_2 \right) \frac{\Delta q_1 \bar{q}_{13}}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + q_{23} \),
\]

\[
+ r^2 \alpha^2 \left( f + \frac{k \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} - r \alpha B - \kappa \bar{C}(\bar{q}_{13} + \bar{q}_{23}) - b_0 \bar{q}_{33} = 0,
\]

respectively. Using (A.30), we can write (C.28) as (B.41). Using (5.3), (B.41) and (C.35), we find that the equation derived from (C.24) by identifying quadratic terms is

\[
QR_2 Q + QR_1 + R'_1 Q - R_0 = 0,
\]

where

\[
R_2 \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
\beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2 \gamma^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} & \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \\
\frac{s^2 \beta_2 \gamma^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} & 0
\end{pmatrix},
\]

\[
R_1 \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{r}{2} + \kappa & r \alpha \lambda b_1 \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2 \gamma^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \\
\frac{r}{2} + b_2
\end{pmatrix}.
\]
\[
\mathcal{R}_0 \equiv \left( \begin{array}{cc}
-r\alpha\psi b_1^2 & -r\alpha\psi b_1(r + \kappa + 2b_2) \\
r\alpha\psi b_1(r + \kappa + 2b_2) & r^2\alpha^2 f + \frac{k\Delta}{\eta\Sigma\eta'} + 2r^2\alpha^2 \psi b_1 k_1 \frac{\Delta}{\eta\Sigma\eta'} - r\alpha\psi b_2(2r + 3b_2)
\end{array} \right),
\]

and the equations derived by identifying terms \( \tilde{C}_t \) and \( y_t \) are

\[ (r + \kappa)q_1 + b_1 q_2 + \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] \frac{\Delta q_1 q_1}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} - \kappa C q_1 - b_0 q_1 - r \alpha \psi b_0 = 0, \tag{C.45} \]

\[ (r + b_2)q_2 + \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] \frac{\Delta (q_1 + r \alpha \psi b_1) q_1}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} - \kappa C q_2 - b_0 q_2 = 0, \tag{C.46} \]

respectively.

Solving for equilibrium amounts to solving the system of (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.34), (C.36)-(C.38), (C.40)-(C.43), (C.44)-(C.46) in the unknowns \((a_0, b_0, b_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3, \beta_1, \beta_2, T, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, \bar{q}_3, \bar{Q}, q_1, q_2, Q)\). This reduces to solving the system of (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.33), (C.36), (C.37), (C.40), (C.44) in the unknowns \((b_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3, \beta_1, \beta_2, T, \bar{Q}, Q)\): given \((b_1, b_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3, \beta_1, \beta_2, T, \bar{Q}, Q)\), \((b_0, \bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2, \bar{q}_3, q_1, q_2)\) can be determined from the linear system of (C.38), (C.41)-(C.43), (C.45), (C.46), and \(a_0\) from (C.34). We replace the system of (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.33), (C.36), (C.37), (C.40), (C.44) by the equivalent system of (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.33), (C.40), (C.44),

\[
\psi b_1 \left\{ r + \kappa + b_2 + \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] \frac{\Delta q_1}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right\}
= 1 + [k_1 (\bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2) + k_2 (\bar{q}_2 + \bar{q}_2)] - k_1 q_1, \tag{C.47} \]

\[
\psi \left\{ (r + b_2) b_1 + b_1 \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r + \kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right] \frac{\Delta q_2}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right\} - r \alpha \psi b_1 k_1 \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}
= r(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})(f + \frac{k\Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} + (k_1 \bar{q}_1 + k_2 \bar{q}_2 - k_1 q_1) - k_1 q_1). \tag{C.48} \]

For \( s = 0 \), the unique non-negative solution of (5.7) is \( T = 0 \). Eqs. (5.5), (5.6), (C.8) and (C.13)-(C.15) imply that \( \beta_1 = \beta_2 = \rho = k = k_1 = k_2 = 0 \). Eqs. (C.31)-(C.33), (C.40), (C.44), (C.47) and (C.48) become

\[ (r + \kappa)\gamma_1 + b_1 \gamma_3 = 0, \tag{C.49} \]

\[ (r + \kappa)\gamma_2 = 0, \tag{C.50} \]

\[ (r + b_2)\gamma_3 = -r \bar{\alpha} f, \tag{C.51} \]
(B.49), (B.50), (B.51) and (B.52), respectively, where
\[
\mathcal{R}_1^0 \equiv \begin{pmatrix} \frac{r}{2} + \kappa & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{r}{2} + \kappa & 0 \\ b_1 & 0 & \frac{r}{2} + b_2 \end{pmatrix},
\]
\[
\mathcal{R}_0 \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & r\alpha \lambda \\ 0 & r\alpha \lambda & r^2 \alpha^2 f\left(\frac{\Delta}{\eta^2}\right) \end{pmatrix},
\]
and \((\mathcal{R}_1^0, \mathcal{R}_0^0)\) are as under symmetric information (Proposition 4.3). Given the unique positive solution \(b_2^0\) of (B.52), \((b_1^0, \gamma_3, \gamma_1, \tilde{Q}, Q)\) are determined uniquely from (B.51), (C.51), (C.49), (B.49) and (B.50), respectively, and (C.50) implies that \(\gamma_2 = 0\). We denote the solution for \(s = 0\) by \((b_1^0, b_2^0, \gamma_1^0, \gamma_3^0, \hat{Q}, Q^0)\). The variables \((b_1^0, b_2^0, \gamma_1^0, \gamma_3^0, Q^0)\) coincide with \((b_1^0, b_2^0, \gamma_1^0, \gamma_2^0, Q^0)\) under symmetric information. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 4.3, we can apply the implicit function theorem and show that the system of (5.5)-(5.7), (C.31)-(C.33), (C.40), (C.44), (C.47), (C.48) has a solution for small \(s\). Moreover, this solution is unique in a neighborhood of \((\tilde{b}_1^0, b_2^0, \gamma_1^0, \gamma_3^0, \beta_1^0, \beta_2^0, T^0, \hat{Q}, Q^0)\), which corresponds to the unique equilibrium for \(s = 0\). Since \(\beta_1^0 > 0, \tilde{b}_2^0 > 0, \gamma_1^0 > 0, \gamma_3^0 < 0\), continuity implies that \(b_1 > 0, b_2 > 0, \gamma_1 > 0, \gamma_3 < 0\) for small \(s\). Since \(\gamma_2^0 = 0\), continuity does not establish the sign of \(\gamma_2\) for small \(s\), so we need to study the asymptotic behavior of the solution. Eqs. (5.7), (5.5) and (5.6) imply that
\[
T = \frac{s^2}{2\kappa} + o(s^2), \quad (C.52)
\]
\[
\beta_1 = \frac{\eta \Delta \eta'}{2\kappa \Delta} s^2 + o(s^2) \equiv \beta_1^0 s^2 + o(s^2), \quad (C.53)
\]
\[
\beta_2 = o(s^2), \quad (C.54)
\]
respectively, where \(\frac{o(s^2)}{s^2}\) converges to zero when \(s\) goes to zero. Eqs. (C.8) and (C.13)-(C.15) imply that
\[
\rho = \beta_1^0 s^2 + o(s^2), \quad (C.55)
\]
\[
k = 2\beta_1^0 \gamma_3^0 s^2 + o(s^2), \quad (C.56)
\]
\[
k_1 = \beta_1^0 s^2 + o(s^2), \quad (C.57)
\]
\[
k_2 = o(s^2), \quad (C.58)
\]
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respectively, and (C.40) implies that

\[
\hat{Q}^0 = \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{2\sigma^2 \bar{\gamma} b_1 \gamma f \Delta}{(r+2\kappa)(r+\kappa+b_2^0)(r+2b_2^0)\eta \Sigma'} & \frac{\bar{r} \bar{a} \beta \gamma f \Delta}{(r+2\kappa)(r+\kappa+b_2^0)} & \frac{\bar{r} \bar{a} \lambda \gamma f \Delta}{(r+2\kappa)(r+2b_2^0)\eta \Sigma'} \\
\frac{\bar{r} \bar{a} \beta \gamma f \Delta}{(r+\kappa+b_2^0)(r+2b_2^0)\eta \Sigma'} & \frac{\bar{r} \bar{a} \lambda \gamma f \Delta}{r+\kappa+b_2^0} & \frac{\bar{r} \bar{a} \lambda \gamma f \Delta}{r+2b_2^0} \\
\frac{\bar{r} \bar{a} \lambda \gamma f \Delta}{r+\kappa+b_2^0} & \frac{\bar{r} \bar{a} \lambda \gamma f \Delta}{r+\kappa+b_2^0} & \frac{\bar{r} \bar{a} \lambda \gamma f \Delta}{r+2b_2^0}
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

Eqs. (C.32), (C.55), (C.57), (C.58) and (C.59) imply that

\[\gamma_2 = \beta_1 \left[ \gamma_1^0 + \frac{\bar{r} \bar{a} \beta \gamma f \Delta}{(r+2\kappa)(r+\kappa+b_2^0)} \right] s^2 + o(s^2).\]

Therefore, \(\gamma_2 > 0\) if \(\lambda \geq 0\).

**Proof of Corollary 5.1:** Eq. (C.7) implies that the covariance matrix of stock returns is

\[
\text{Cov}(dR_t, dR'_t) = (\sigma + \beta_1 \gamma_1 \Sigma p'_f p_f \sigma) (\sigma + \beta_1 \gamma_1 \Sigma p'_f p_f \sigma)^\prime
\]

\[+ \frac{\phi^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} \left( \sigma + \beta_2 \gamma_1 \Sigma p'_f p_f \sigma \right) \left( \sigma + \beta_2 \gamma_1 \Sigma p'_f p_f \sigma \right)^\prime
\]

\[+ s^2 \beta_2^2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} \right)^2 \Sigma p'_f p_f \Sigma,
\]

which is equal to (5.10) because of (C.13). Eqs. (3.20) (which is also valid under gradual adjustment) and (5.10) imply that the proportionality coefficient between the non-fundamental covariance matrices under asymmetric and symmetric information is larger than one if \(k > s^2 \gamma_1^2 \text{sym}\), where \(\gamma_1 \text{sym}\) denotes the value of \(\gamma_1\) under symmetric information. Rearranging (C.13), we find

\[k = 2 \left\{ \beta_1 + \beta_2 \left[ \frac{\phi^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} \right] \right\} \gamma_1 + s^2 \gamma_2 + \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} \right] \frac{\gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma'}.
\]

Rearranging (5.6), we find

\[\beta_2 \left[ \frac{\phi^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} \right] = s^2 \gamma_2,
\]

and rearranging (5.7), we find

\[T^2 \left[ 1 - (r+k) \frac{\gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} \right] \frac{\eta \Sigma'}{\Delta} + \frac{s^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} = s^2 - 2\kappa T
\]

\[\Rightarrow \left[ \beta_1^2 + \frac{\phi^2 \beta_2^2}{(r+\kappa)^2} + \frac{s^2 \beta_2^2 \gamma_1^2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} \right] \frac{\Delta}{\eta \Sigma'} = s^2 - 2\kappa T,
\]

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where the second step follows from (5.5) and (5.6). Substituting (C.61) and (C.62) into (C.60), we find
\[ k = 2\beta_1 \gamma_1 + s^2(\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)^2 - 2\kappa T \gamma_1^2 \]
\[ = s^2(\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)^2 + 2T \gamma_1 \left[ \frac{\eta \Sigma \eta'}{\Delta} - \kappa \gamma_1 - (r + \kappa) \gamma_2 \right], \quad (C.63) \]
where the second step follows from (5.5).

Eqs. (C.52), (C.63) and \( \gamma_0^2 = 0 \) imply that for small \( s \),
\[ k = s^2(\gamma_0^2)^2 + s^2 \gamma_0^2 \left( \frac{\eta \Sigma \eta'}{\Delta} - \kappa \gamma_0 \right) + o(s^2). \quad (C.64) \]

The variables \((b_0^1, b_0^2)\) are identical under symmetric and asymmetric information. Moreover, (B.47), (B.48), (C.49) and (C.51) imply that the same is true for \( \gamma_0^1 \). Therefore, \( k > s^2 \gamma_1^2 \text{sym} \) for small \( s \) if
\[ \frac{\eta \Sigma \eta'}{\Delta} - \kappa \gamma_0 > 0 \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow \eta \Sigma \eta' \left[ 1 - \frac{\kappa \gamma_0 b_0^0}{(r + \kappa)(\alpha + \bar{\alpha})(r + \kappa + b_0^1)} \right] > 0, \quad (C.65) \]
where the second step follows from (C.49) and (C.51), and the third from (B.51) and (B.52). Since \( b_0^2 > 0 \), (C.65) holds. \[\blacksquare\]

**Proof of Corollary 5.2:** Stocks’ expected returns are
\[ E_t(dR_t) = \left\{ ra_o + \left[ \gamma_1^R \hat{C}_t + \gamma_2^R C_t + \gamma_3^R y_t - \kappa (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) \hat{C} - b_0 y_3 \right] \Sigma p_j' \right\} dt \]
\[ = \left\{ \frac{r \alpha \bar{\alpha} f \eta \Sigma \theta'}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha} \eta \Sigma \eta'} \Sigma \eta' + \left[ \gamma_1^R \hat{C}_t + \gamma_2^R C_t + \gamma_3^R y_t + r \bar{\alpha} \left( f + \frac{k \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) - k_1 \bar{q}_1 - k_2 \bar{q}_2 \right] \Sigma p_j' \right\} dt \]
\[ = \left[ \frac{r \alpha \bar{\alpha} \eta \Sigma \theta'}{\alpha + \bar{\alpha} \eta \Sigma \eta'} \left( f \Sigma + k \Sigma p_j' p_j \Sigma \right) \eta' + \Lambda_t \left( f \Sigma + k \Sigma p_j' p_j \Sigma \right) p_j' \right] dt, \quad (C.66) \]
where the first step follows from (C.7), the second from (C.34), and the third from (5.11). Eq. (C.66) is equivalent to (3.21) because of (5.10).

Eqs. (C.31) and (C.32) imply that \( \gamma_1^R \) and \( \gamma_2^R \) have the opposite sign of \( k_1 \bar{q}_{11} + k_2 \bar{q}_{12} \) and \( k_1 \bar{q}_{12} + k_2 \bar{q}_{22} \), respectively. Eqs. (C.57) and (C.58) imply that for small \( s \), the latter variables have
the same sign as \( q_{11}^0 \) and \( q_{12}^0 \), respectively. Since \( b_1^0 > 0 \) and \( b_2^0 > 0 \), (C.59) implies that \( q_{11}^0 > 0 \) and \( q_{12}^0 \) has the same sign as \(-\lambda\). Therefore, for small \( s \), \( \gamma_1^R < 0 \) and \( \gamma_2^R \) has the same sign as \( \lambda \). Moreover, \( \gamma_3^R < 0 \) since \( b_2 > 0 \) and \( \gamma_3 < 0 \).

**Proof of Corollary 5.3:** Using (C.7) and proceeding as in the derivation of (A.56), we find

\[
\text{Cov}_t(dD_t, dR_t') = \sigma \text{Cov}_t\left(dB_t^D, \gamma_1^R \hat{C}_t' + \gamma_2^R C_t' + \gamma_3^R y_t'\right) p_f \Sigma dt, \tag{C.67}
\]

\[
\text{Cov}_t(dF_t, dR_t') = \phi \sigma \text{Cov}_t\left(dB_t^F, \gamma_1^R \hat{C}_t' + \gamma_2^R C_t' + \gamma_3^R y_t'\right) p_f \Sigma dt. \tag{C.68}
\]

The covariances (C.67) and (C.68) depend only on how the Brownian shocks \( dB_t^D \) and \( dB_t^F \), respectively, impact \( (\hat{C}_t', C_t', y_t') \). To compute the impact of these shocks, as well as of \( dB_t^C \) for the next corollary, we solve the impulse-response dynamics

\[
dC_t = -\kappa C_t dt,
\]

\[
d\hat{C}_t = \left[-\kappa \hat{C}_t + \rho(C_t - \hat{C}_t)\right] dt,
\]

\[
dy_t = -\left(b_1 \hat{C}_t + b_2 y_t\right) dt,
\]

with the initial conditions

\[
C_t = sdB_t^C, \quad \hat{C}_t = -\beta_1 p_f \sigma dB_t^D - \beta_2 \left(\phi p_f \sigma dB_t^F - \frac{s \gamma_2 \Delta dB_t^C}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}\right), \quad y_t = 0.
\]

The solution to these dynamics is (B.57),

\[
\hat{C}_t' = e^{-\kappa(t' - t)} sdB_t^C - e^{-(\kappa + \rho)(t' - t)} \left[\beta_1 p_f \sigma dB_t^D + \frac{\phi \beta_2 p_f \sigma dB_t^F}{r + \kappa} + s \left(1 - \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}\right) dB_t^C\right], \tag{C.69}
\]

\[
y_t' = -\frac{b_1}{b_2 - \kappa} \left[e^{-\kappa(t' - t)} - e^{-b_2(t' - t)}\right] sdB_t^C
+ \frac{b_1}{b_2 - \kappa - \rho} \left[e^{-(\kappa + \rho)(t' - t)} - e^{-b_2(t' - t)}\right] \left[\beta_1 p_f \sigma dB_t^D + \frac{\phi \beta_2 p_f \sigma dB_t^F}{r + \kappa} + s \left(1 - \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_2 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'}\right) dB_t^C\right]. \tag{C.70}
\]
Substituting (B.57), (C.69) and (C.70) into (C.67) and (C.68), and using the mutual independence of \((dB^D_t, dB^F_t, dB^C_t)\), we find (5.12) with
\[
\chi_1^D = \beta_1 \left( \frac{b_1 \gamma_3}{b_2 - \kappa - \rho} - \gamma_1^R \right) = (r + \kappa + \rho) \beta_1 \left( \frac{b_1 \gamma_3}{b_2 - \kappa - \rho} - \gamma_1 \right),
\]
(C.71)
\[
\chi_2^D = - \frac{b_1 \beta_1 \gamma_3}{b_2 - \kappa - \rho} = - \frac{(r + b_2) b_1 \beta_1 \gamma_3}{b_2 - \kappa - \rho}.
\]
(C.72)

The function \(\chi^D(u) = \chi_1^D e^{-(\kappa + \rho)u} + \chi_2^D e^{-bu} \) can change sign only once, is equal to \(-\beta_1 \gamma_1^R\) when \(u = 0\), and has the sign of \(\chi_1\) if \(b_2 > \kappa + \rho\) and of \(\chi_2\) if \(b_2 < \kappa + \rho\) when \(u\) goes to \(\infty\). For small \(s\), \(\chi(0) > 0\) since \(\gamma_1^R < 0\). Since, in addition, \(b_1 > 0\), \(b_2 > 0\), \(\gamma_1 > 0\), \(\gamma_3 < 0\) and \(\rho > 0\), (C.71) and (C.72) imply that \(\chi_1 < 0\) if \(b_2 > \kappa + \rho\) and \(\chi_2 < 0\) if \(b_2 < \kappa + \rho\). Therefore, there exists a threshold \(\hat{u}^D > 0\) such that \(\chi(u) > 0\) for \(0 < u < \hat{u}^D\) and \(\chi(u) < 0\) for \(u > \hat{u}^D\).

**Proof of Corollary 5.4:** Using (C.7) and proceeding as in the derivation of (A.56), we find
\[
\text{Cov}(dR_t, dR'_t) = (\sigma + \beta_1 \gamma_1 \Sigma p' f \sigma) \text{Cov}_t \left( dB^D_t, \gamma_1^R \dot{C}_t + \gamma_2^R C_t + \gamma_3^R y_t \right) p_f \Sigma dt
\]
\[
+ \frac{\phi}{r + \kappa} (\sigma + \beta_2 \gamma_1 \Sigma p' f \sigma) \text{Cov}_t \left( dB^F_t, \gamma_1^R \dot{C}_t + \gamma_2^R C_t + \gamma_3^R y_t \right) p_f \Sigma dt
\]
\[
- s \gamma_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \text{Cov}_t \left( dB^C_t, \gamma_1^R \dot{C}_t + \gamma_2^R C_t + \gamma_3^R y_t \right) \Sigma p' f \Sigma dt.
\]
(C.73)

Substituting (B.57), (C.69) and (C.70) into (C.73), and using (5.6) and the mutual independence of \((dB^D_t, dB^F_t, dB^C_t)\), we find (5.13) with
\[
\chi_1 \equiv \chi_1^D \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_1 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right),
\]
(C.74)
\[
\chi_2 \equiv s^2 \gamma_2 \left( \frac{b_1 \gamma_3}{b_2 - \kappa} - \gamma_1^R - \gamma_2^R \right) \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right)
\]
\[
= s^2 (r + \kappa) \gamma_2 \left( \frac{b_1 \gamma_3}{b_2 - \kappa} - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2 \right) \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right),
\]
(C.75)
\[
\chi_3 \equiv - b_1 \gamma_3 \left[ \frac{\beta_1}{b_2 - \kappa - \rho} \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_1 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) + s^2 \gamma_2 \frac{\Delta}{b_2 - \kappa} \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \right]
\]
\[
= -(r + b_2) b_1 \gamma_3 \left[ \frac{\beta_1}{b_2 - \kappa - \rho} \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_1 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) + s^2 \gamma_2 \frac{\Delta}{b_2 - \kappa} \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \right].
\]
(C.76)
The function \( \chi(u) \equiv \chi_1 e^{-(\kappa + \rho)u} + \chi_2 e^{-\kappa u} + \chi_3 e^{-b_2 u} \) has the same sign as \( \tilde{\chi}(u) \equiv \chi_1 e^{-\rho u} + \chi_2 + \chi_3 e^{-(b_2 - \kappa)u} \). The latter function is equal to

\[-\beta_1 \gamma_1 R \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_1 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) - s^2 \gamma_2 (\gamma_1 R + \gamma_2 R) \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right)\]

when \( u = 0 \), and has the sign of \( \chi_2 \) if \( b_2 > \kappa \) and \( \rho > 0 \) and of \( \chi_3 \) if \( b_2 < \kappa \) and \( \rho > 0 \) when \( u \) goes to \( \infty \). Moreover, its derivative \( \tilde{\chi}'(u) = -\chi_1 \rho e^{-\rho u} - \chi_3 (b_2 - \kappa) e^{-(b_2 - \kappa)u} \) is equal to

\[-\chi_1 \rho - \chi_3 (b_2 - \kappa) = \beta_1 (\rho \gamma_1 R + b_1 \gamma_3 R) \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_1 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) + s^2 b_1 \gamma_2 \gamma_3 R \left( 1 + \frac{\beta_2 \gamma_1 \Delta}{\eta \Sigma \eta'} \right) \]  

(C.77)

when \( u = 0 \). For small \( s \), \( \chi(0) > 0 \) since \( \gamma_1 R < 0 \) and \( s^2 \gamma_2 / \beta_1 = o(1) \). Since, in addition, \( b_1 > 0 \), \( b_2 > 0 \), \( \gamma_1 > 0 \), \( \gamma_2 > 0 \), \( \gamma_3 < 0 \), \( \gamma_3 R < 0 \) and \( \rho > 0 \), (C.75) and (C.76) imply that \( \chi_2 < 0 \) if \( b_2 > \kappa \) and \( \chi_3 < 0 \) if \( b_2 < \kappa \), and (C.77) implies that \( \tilde{\chi}'(0) < 0 \). Since \( \tilde{\chi}'(u) \) can change sign only once, it is either negative or negative and then positive. Therefore, \( \tilde{\chi}(u) \) is positive and then negative. The same is true for \( \chi(u) \), which means that there exists a threshold \( \hat{u} > 0 \) such that \( \chi(u) > 0 \) for \( 0 < u < \hat{u} \) and \( \chi(u) < 0 \) for \( u > \hat{u} \).
References


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