National Role and Foreign Policy: A Descriptive Study of Greek Elites’ Perceptions towards Turkey
(November 2014)
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1. Introduction

For the past 6 years Greece is experiencing one of the deepest financial crises that any country has ever witnessed during times of peace. Since 2008, when Greece’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) recorded negative increase rates and until the end of 2013, Greece’s GDP lost approximately 24% of its value, amounting to 161 billion euro compared to 211 billion euro in 2007. Greece’s crisis-stricken economy has returned to growth following six years of recession only in 2014, marking an end to one of the steepest and longest economic contractions in post-war European history. The gross domestic product in the third quarter of 2014 rose 1.7% from a year earlier.

1 This study is the result of a generous National Bank of Greece research funding awarded to the two authors by the Hellenic Observatory of the London School of Economics and Political Science (Research Tender 3-NBG3-2013). We would like to thank the HO people for their trust. We are particularly indebted to them as we are to numerous people. First of all to KAPA RESEARCH and its Director General Tassos Georgiadis for their support in setting up the electronic questionnaire and data bank; a support that in reality amounts to a generous sponsoring. Evaggelos Venizelos, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Dimitrios Avramopoulos, (then) Minister of Defence have been very helpful in granting their consent necessary for the staff to participate in the research. The help of Tassos Chatzivasileiou, Sofia Efraimoglou, Fotini Giannouli, Panayiotis Gkartzonikas, George Kalpadakis, Dimitris Keridis, George Koukoudakis, Panayiotis Koutsoumbelis, Dimitris Maziotis, Vasiliki Michopoulou, Ioannis Parisis, Evaggelos Sekeris and Nikos Votsios has been instrumental. Our most sincere thanks.

2 Whatever the failings of this study, they would have been far greater without the invaluable help of Dr. Andreas Kotelis, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Zirve University in Gaziantep. We were really blessed to have him as our research assistant. His contribution cannot be underestimated by any standard. He is not responsible, though, for any shortcomings. These are on our shoulders alone.

3 ELSTAT, as cited in Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE), Report on the Greek Economy, Second Quarter 2014.

4 The figures were better than expectations—making Greece one of the fastest-growing economies in the Eurozone—and confirm that a promised recovery is now under way. Economists had forecast between 1% and 1.4% growth compared with a year ago. On a seasonally adjusted basis, Greece’s GDP rose 0.7% quarter-on-quarter. See The Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/greek-economy-grows-for-first-time-in-six-years-1415962022.
Greece’s economy has registered significant setbacks in most of the important economic indicators including those of industrial production and domestic consumption. Undoubtedly, the heaviest blow came from the uncontrollable decline of the job market, which led to an unemployment rate of 27.1% at the end of the second quarter of 2013. The first noteworthy reduction came during the third quarter of 2014. Though down from its peak, it remains at a staggering 25.9% of the workforce.\(^5\) Unemployment rates are especially high among youth, with a 59% unemployment rate for people between the ages of 15 and 24.\(^6\)

The unprecedented scale of the Greek economic crisis influenced the Greek state and society alike to a great degree. The crisis monopolised the public discussion and political debates, while at the same time imposed significant changes to the way of living and habits, which altogether constituted the Greek way of life. Furthermore, the fact that the crisis has gone on for a considerable amount of time, has amounted to the creation of a psychological burden to most of the Greek population. For instance, in the OECD’s ‘Better Life Index’ 2013 survey the scores for Greece averaged only 1.2 on a 0 to 10 scale on the life satisfaction indicator, ranking Greece only third from bottom, ahead of Portugal and Hungary, among all OECD countries.\(^7\)

This research study deals with the repercussions of the Greek economic crisis as well, but with a focus on foreign policy, rather than society. Specifically, the main focus is to examine whether the Greek elites have re-evaluated their conceptions regarding the goals, limitations and prospects of Greek foreign policy, as well as their overall perception regarding the post-crisis Greek state’s position among its neighbours and the international community in general. As such, our goal is to analyse and provide an in-depth understanding of Greek elites' views and perceptions of Greece’s position in the world amidst the financial crisis that has crippled the country’s resources, and how these conceptions are

\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Hellenic Statistical Authority, (ELSTAT), Labour Force Survey, 2\(^{nd}\) Quarter 2013.
related to Greece’s relations with Turkey post-2009. In the case of Greek-Turkish relations, the aim is to provide a clear description of ‘threats’ and opportunities presented by Turkey, a country that is generally perceived as the most important to Greek foreign policy. The overall aim is twofold: First to clarify the national role conceptions of the Greek political elite and second to assess the power of the national role conceptions variable to explain whether the financial crisis has been instrumental in affecting perceptions towards Turkey as opposed to larger structural forces. The context revolves around Greece’s downgraded status and prestige and Turkey’s regional emergence and new geopolitical confidence. As a whole, these factors combine to impact upon developing perceptions.

It should be noted that this is the first research project to investigate the national role perceptions of political elites in Greece in a systematic way. The research is based on several assumptions about the foreign policy process and the actors involved in it. First, we take the view that various international and domestic factors have an impact on a government’s foreign policy behaviour and these influences are channelled through a group of foreign policy elite who identify, decide and enact or as in some cases (business and media elites) influence indirectly foreign policy actions. Although research has demonstrated the value of approaching foreign policy as a decision-making process that emphasises the significance of elite perceptions of external and institutional constraints (see below), this has not been the case for Greek foreign policy.

Since the early 2000s (when the process of Greek-Turkish rapprochement began), published works focus mainly on macro-level analysis, trying to explain the trajectory of Greek-Turkish relations from a structural perspective. Most of these works focus more on explaining the conditions of the conflicting relations (Çarkoglu and Rubin 2005, Aydın and Ifantis 2004, Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008, Ker-Lindsay 2007, Keridis and Triantaphyllou 2001). Tsakonas (2010) does appear attentive to issues of change at the micro political level but the examination of original empirical evidence follows a different research methodology. Also it was completed before Greece sunk into the crisis. People working in the
fields of social anthropology, sociology and social psychology employ micro-level analysis (Vathakou 2010, Rumelili 2004, Theodossopoulos 2007, Anastasakis et al 2009). These endeavours offer quite detailed information about specific peace initiatives, and refer to the positive shift in perceptions of the ‘other’ in Greece and Turkey. But they also fail to engage in the study of perceptions in a systematic way. Millas (most recently 2009) has done that but his work focuses on the images of the ‘other’ through the study of literature, history books, etc.

We proceed in two parts. After discussing the conceptual framework employed, we present our findings and analyse the basic assumptions.

2. National Role Conceptions

Structural explanations of state behaviour gained prominence during the Cold War period and for decades overshadowed deductive approaches to international politics. The end of the Cold War, however, has, once more, challenged the explanatory power of a structural theory of international relations, especially regarding the limitations of realist theories to make predictions in particular as far as foreign policy is concerned (Barkin 2009). Although Kenneth Waltz has been clear that Structural Realism is a theory of international politics and not of foreign policy, by the end of the 1990s, even some realist scholars thought that forces below the system’s level were contributing to the shaping of foreign policy outcomes (on these neoclassical realist approaches, see Rose 1998). At the same time, constructivist approaches to international politics further highlighted the importance of agency, identity and perceptions in international politics (See, for instance, Wendt 1992). According to Kolodziej (2005:261):

Constructivists claim to explain or at least provide provisional evidence to show how political actors –you, me, states, political parties, international organizations, et al.– acquire their
identities and, more pointedly, how these identities generate the material and non-material interests of those actors.

The debate on where the focus of international relations theorists should lie is anything but new. In his seminal book *Man, State and War* published in 1959, Kenneth Waltz identified the state system as the main variable driving international conflict. His assumptions were contested by Singer who in a review of Waltz’s book suggested that ‘that the key variable is not actually the system itself, but the way in which that system is perceived, evaluated, and responded to by the decision makers in the several and separate states’ (Singer 1960: 461), although he acknowledged the eloquence of Waltz’s arguments and the importance that the state system might have.

Together with constructivist ideas, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theories also followed a deductive approach to the study of international politics by looking into the foreign policy makers and elites, treating them both as the dependent (what affects policy-makers and elite actions) and the independent (how policy-makers and elites affect foreign policy outcomes) variables. Hence, FPA theory identified a point of theoretical intersection where different levels of analysis could be integrated in a meaningful fashion (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1962: 74, 85), and especially, the simultaneous play of the game of domestic politics and that of international politics (Putnam 1988).

In sum, FPA has contributed significantly to our understanding of what influences foreign policy decision making and the actors that are part of the decision making process. It is these factors that Hudson (2005) calls ‘explanans’, include the most noteworthy hallmarks of FPA.\(^8\) Based on this long tradition of FPA theory, the current research makes several assumptions about the foreign policy process and the actors involved in it. On the one hand, we line up with the view that various international and domestic factors have an impact on a government’s foreign policy behaviour; hence, a

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\(^8\) According to Hudson those hallmarks are: 1) Multifactorial; 2) Multilevel; 3) Multi/interdisciplinary; 4) Integrative; 5) Agent oriented; and 6) Actor specific. According to the author, ‘[T]he explanans of FPA are those factors that influence foreign policy decision making and foreign policy decision makers.’ (p.2)
state’s foreign policies are susceptible to change according to the given domestic and international considerations that policy-makers face. On the other hand, we assume that these influences are channelled through a group of foreign policy elite who identify, decide and enact or as in the cases of business and media elites, influence indirectly foreign policy actions.

3. Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis

The assumption that political, media and business elites are capable of influencing foreign policy outcomes begs for further analysis. If elites have the capacity to shape foreign policy, then the most urgent question is what shapes elites’ expectation, ambitions and interests. Scholars who study foreign policy have provided a number of answers; however, role theory is one of the most delicate explanations. The concept of ‘role’ is not endemic to the field of international relations. On the contrary, it was first used by sociologists to describe how individuals ascribe specific assumptions and values during their interactions with others (Harnish, Frank and Maull 2011). However, the most systematic effort to use role theory in foreign policy analysis was done by Holsti, who used the term national role conceptions in order to describe:

The policymakers’ own definitions of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems (Holsti 1970: 245-246).

In his eloquent study, Holsti looked at statements made by top policy-makers in 71 different states from January 1965 to December 1967. His analysis identified 17 basic national role conceptions, and a number of other role conceptions that were unique for some states. These role conceptions reflected ‘the degree of passivity or activity in foreign policy that the role conceptions seem to imply’ (Holsti 1970: 260).
Holsti’s study became, for several reasons, a point of reference for the study of foreign policy and national role conceptions in particular. Firstly, his work constituted the first effort to study national role conceptions systematically, and resulted in the creation of a coherent typology that could be used to the study of foreign policy. Secondly, it addressed the specific inadequacies of prior efforts to assign specific roles to states. Those efforts had introduced some basic role categories (e.g. Morgenthau’s threefold distinction between policies of the status quo, imperialism, and policies of prestige); they were, however, very broad and, hence, unable to connect a specific type of state to a specific diplomatic behaviour (Holsti 1970: 250). Holsti’s typology on the other hand, was far more effective in connecting foreign policy decisions to one or more national role conceptions. Finally, Holsti’s took the Waltzian ‘first image’ of analysis into consideration by including the foreign-policy makers as the basis to understand each state’s national role conceptions.

Despite being a landmark study for future role theory literature, Holsti’s work was criticised by several scholars on methodological and analytical grounds. Shih (1988), for example, argues that Holsti’s typology is logically imperfect, as it fails to describe the richness of human cultures, and ineffective as it does not employ deductive categorisation. Holsti’s typology was also criticised on the basis that the role categories were heavily influenced by the Cold War. Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996) observed that new national role conceptions such as ‘global system collaborator’ and ‘global leader’ which were not included in Holsti’s typology can also fit in the post-Cold War international system.\(^9\)

Similarly, Wish (1980) points out two major limitations of Holsti’s approach. On the one hand, she highlights the fact that Holsti connects national role conceptions only to a state’s international evolvement or participation. Indeed, Holsti has constructed his typology in such a way so that different roles suggest a state’s different levels of involvement in international politics (activity-passivity scale), beginning with ‘bastion of revolution – liberator’ as the one with the highest participation, and ending

\(^9\) It should be noted, however, that Holsti’s typology included ‘subsystem collaborator’ and ‘subsystem leader’ roles.
with ‘protectee’ as the one with the lowest participation levels. Furthermore, Wish (1980) correctly indicates that Holsti does not provide a systematic way of measuring participation or involvement in the international system.

As an alternative, Wish suggested a different typology, which tries to include much more diverse foreign policy decisions, not necessarily related to international participation. Her research resulted in a typology that includes 13 different national role conceptions; each grouped under 3 different categories titled as status, motivational orientation and issue or substantive problem area. Wish’s typology can be considered as an improvement compared to Holsti’s as it was able to capture a wider range of foreign policy perceptions. Furthermore, the division of national conceptions into separate groups provided information about why some states choose to adopt some specific roles and not others.

Hymans (2006) developed a more compact typology. Drawing on the previous work of social psychologists who identified solidarity and status as the two primary dimensions of social comparison, Hymans built his typology on a two dimensional model including a) the solidarity dimension, which includes the ‘oppositional’ and the ‘sportsmanlike’ national role conceptions and b) the status dimension, which includes the ‘nationalist’ and the ‘subaltern’ national role conceptions.

4. Criticism of role theory

The different typologies discussed above were aiming to contribute to a better understanding of what the main national role conceptions were and which roles connect to which foreign policy behaviours. The scholars that proposed them were not critical of role theory as Holsti presented it as a whole. On the contrary, they accepted the main premises of the theory; they were merely suggesting ways to improve it. Nonetheless, not all scholars were so receptive. Many raised significant concerns regarding some of the main assumptions of role theory and its application to foreign policy analysis.
Even a decade since Holsti’s publication, several scholars considered role theory to be more a perspective than a single overarching theory (see, for instance, Magid 1980).

Not surprisingly the first major objection was based on whether we can apply to the study of foreign policy analysis a theory that was developed in a completely different field in order to study different phenomena. This inter-field theory compatibility issue becomes even more urgent when the theory in question was used to study phenomena on a different level of analysis. This issue was discussed in detail by Backman (1970) who was overall optimistic that role theory as psychologists and social psychologists use it can also be used in the study of international politics. He, thus, illustrated with examples how scholars can use role theory in order to organise and make sense of what they already know.

Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) address another shortcoming of role theory, which is in a way related to our research as well. Cantir and Kaarbo identified that the main response to the different level of analysis problem, which was discussed above, was for scholars to investigate the national role conceptions of foreign policy elites. The main reason that role theorists focused on elites in order to study national role perceptions, was that role theory was firstly developed by sociologists and psychologists in order to understand the behaviour of individuals. As individuals comprise elites, then the theory applies better to them than it would to a different level of analysis, such as the state.

However, Candir and Kaarbo point out that scholars have failed to provide convincing evidence that would show that foreign policy elites influence foreign policy outcomes, or in other words, ‘why foreign policy elites can stand for the entire country with regard to its role conceptions’ (Candir and Kaarbo 2012: 6). In essence, Candir and Kaarbo’s problematique focuses on the lack of information concerning whether elites are the only vehicle for shaping the foreign policy behaviour of the state, and if they are not, then how elites gather support from the society they represent in order to impose the role conceptions on a national level.
In response, role theorists have highlighted two different aspects of national role conceptions (Adigbuo 2007; Chafez, Abramson and Grillot 1996; Candir and Kaarbo 2012). Firstly, they follow a constructivist approach to suggest that identities and role conceptions in a given state are socially constructed and hence they constitute social phenomena that can be shared among individuals. According to Wendt, a state’s interests are defined by how it sees itself in relation to other states, by creating social identities at both domestic and systemic levels of analysis. Furthermore:

*A*ctors normally have multiple social identities that vary in salience...Social identities have both individual and social structural properties, being at once cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine ‘who I am/we are’ in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations. (Wendt 1994: 385)

Secondly, role theorists suggest that even if these identities are not shared between the elites and society, it is the elites that make the decisions, and, as such, they are limited in their selection of roles, to those that would be acceptable by their constituents. This explanation is heavily based on Putnam’s ideas who suggested that national political leaders play simultaneously a game on two fronts, one internationally with other national political leaders, and one domestically where they have to explain their actions to society, the parliament, their constituencies and the like.10 (Putnam 1988: 434)

5. Explaining roles and role theory

The extensive use of role theory in foreign policy analysis sometimes creates confusion among scholars as to what exactly a role is, how national role conceptions (NRCs) are created; who are the main carriers of these NRCs; etc. It is therefore imperative to provide a more coherent theoretical background of role theory, as well as, to adopt a working definition for the term, which will guide us throughout our

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10 The discussion on how foreign policy decisions are made is one of the most hotly debated topics in FPA, and cannot be analysed in depth in this paper. For an elaborate discussion on this issue see, for instance, Hermann, 2001.
study (for a discussion on the terminology and the conceptual language of role theory see also Thies 2010). Next to Holsti’s understanding of roles mentioned above, a clear-cut definition of national role conceptions reads as follows:

*NRCs are domestically shared views and understanding regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the international arena. They are products of history, memory and socialization. They may be contested, but often endure.* (Krotz 2002: 6)

Krotz’s definition, in contrast to Holsti’s normative understanding, draws attention to the social construction of national role conceptions, seeing them as the outcome of a national collective identity formulated by a state’s history, memories and socialisation process. A different approach is taken by Hymans (2006) who defines national role conceptions\(^\text{11}\) as:

*An individual’s understanding of the state’s identity – his or her sense of what the nation naturally stands for and how high it naturally stands in comparison to other in the international arena.* (Hymans 2006: 18).

Hymans’ definition draws attention on the individual, meaning the political leader as the main carrier of the national role conceptions, although he accepts that a leader has also been influenced by a form of social identity which in turn can evolve and change by a social context shaped by intellectual and identity entrepreneurs. (Hymans 2006: 19) In addition, and in contrast to Krotz, Hymans introduces the idea of capabilities to the study of roles (which are part of his status dimension discussed above), suggesting that material capabilities of states also shape national role conceptions.

Krotz’s and Hyman’s definitions are fine examples of the two different schools of thought that divide role theorists on the basis of what shapes national role conceptions. Harnish (2011: 7; 2012: 48) makes a distinction between American scholars who highlight the importance of material or cognitive qualities as the determining factors shaping national roles, and European scholars who apply a constructivist approach that stresses the importance of social interaction in which roles provide ‘reasons

\(^{11}\) It should be noted that Hymans uses the term national identity conception (NIC).
for action’. However, despite this basic distinction, it is also important to point out regardless of the domestic factors (capabilities and identities) that shape national role conceptions, all scholars studying role theory agree that national role conceptions are also shaped in response to the expectations of others (Thies 2010).

Apart from the aforementioned distinctions regarding national role conceptions and the forces that shape them, some scholars contributed to the role theory literature by trying to provide further clarifications on what a role is, and what are different types of roles. In this regard, Le Prestre (1997) suggested that the term ‘role’ in the literature is used to describe six different things. In their simplest form, these are a contribution or a function of a state; the influence or impact; expected behaviour based on certain rules; a course of action; policy decisions; and, finally, rank.

Similarly, Elgstrom and Smith (2006) created a four-way distinction of roles including the following (also see Bengtsson and Elgstrom 2012: 94):

I. Role expectation: meaning those expectations that others prescribe to a party, which is in turn expected to act according to that role;

II. Role conception: meaning those expectations that the role-beholder expresses toward itself;

III. Role performance: whether or not foreign policy behaviour fits the characteristic patterns of a specific role; and

IV. Role set: meaning the predominant school of thought in a foreign policy given a number of roles.

6. The use of role theory in the study of foreign policy
As an analytical tool, role theory incorporates a number of significant advantages as far as the study of international politics is concerned. It offers a number of typologies that scholars can use in order to group, and make sense, of diverse foreign policy behaviours. Furthermore, since it assigns specific behaviours to specific national role conceptions, role theory is capable to make predictions regarding the foreign policy options of states that ascribe to one or more roles. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that role theory has been used by a number of scholars in foreign policy analysis.

In general, scholars who choose role theory as the major tool of their analysis do so in order to overcome insufficiencies of other theories to explain choices made by foreign policy decision-makers. Chafez, Abramson and Grillot (1996), for instance, attempt to illustrate how prevailing theories in international relations, such as neorealism and liberalism, fail to explain nuclear proliferation when one looks at the case of post-Cold War Ukraine and Belarus. According to them, for instance, materialist determinism as a realist variant would suggest that only states incapable of developing nuclear arsenals on their own should comply with non-proliferation. However, this is not always the case. Thus, role theory is promoted as a more convincing explanation.

Chafez, Abramson and Grillot’s work constitutes a typical example of a study regarding the use of role theory in the relevant literature. The default research methodology for role theorists is the case study. Case studies are used for theory building as each of them brings forth new empirical evidence of how role theory provides a much more plausible explanation regarding the foreign policy decisions and behaviours of states.

Oppermann (2012), for instance, argued that the shift in German foreign policy, especially as far as the European financial crisis and the NATO mission is Libya are concerned, can best be explained by the shift in the national role perceptions of the decision makers, coupled by a progressively stimulating domestic environment. Similarly, Catalinac (2007) studied two diverse foreign policy behaviours of Japan, one in response to the 1991 Gulf War, and one in the 2003 war against Iraq. Her conclusions
suggested that the different Japanese responses were attributed to a change in Japanese national role conceptions, particularly the decline of the pacifist and pragmatic multilateralist identities, which were superseded by a centrist role identity.

A second breed of case studies aimed at connecting role theory with other theories relevant to the analysis of foreign policy. For example, an effort to connect role theory with diplomacy was made by Shih (1988), who suggested that role theory offers insights for the better understanding of Chinese diplomacy by clarifying its psychological function; explaining the difficult relations between China and other countries; illustrating why abrupt changes in Chinese diplomacy occurred; and finally, by providing a new perspective on the connection between Chinese diplomacy and the expectations of Chinese leaders regarding how the world should be. Similarly, Thies demonstrates how role theory can be utilised in order to unite ‘theoretical treatments of state socialisation in IR with more practical applications in FPA’ (2012: 25). Thies depicts the socialisation process as a ‘game’ where a state adopts a role while it enters a system without prior knowledge of the system’s whereabouts. For his analysis, Thies uses the roles ascribed and achieved by Israel soon after its emergence as an independent state (1948 to 1956).

7. Methodological considerations

Our research study will follow the usual pattern of studies that examine role perceptions and adopt a case study research approach. In general, case studies offer to the researcher the ability to examine a phenomenon in depth and, hence, it is the preferred research methodology. Several scholars have pointed out the weaknesses of case study research, mainly as far as the possibility of generalisation to a greater number of cases is concerned (on this debate and a defence of case study research see Flyvbjerg 2006). Nevertheless, the importance of case studies, especially in the field of international
relations and its subfields, has not only been highlighted by many scholars; in fact, case studies been used extensively as a research approach.

In the previous sections we already discussed the prevalence of case studies as the default research approach among scholars who study role theory. However, another important similarity should be pointed out. The data collection method is always the same, and it involves content analysis and coding of statements made by high-ranking officials. Holsti, for instance, says that for his research he used only statements from the highest-level policy-makers, meaning presidents, prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs. Exceptionally, ambassador-level official speeches and statements were used, but only in those cases that they clearly reflected the views of the top leadership (Holsti 1970: 256). In total, for a set of 71 countries Holsti analysed 972 sources that indicated 17 role conceptions.

A similar approach is taken by Wish, who also focuses on the top level of foreign policy-makers. Wish uses the statements of 29 elites from 17 different states, who were either heads of state or top foreign policy-makers (Wish 1980: 536). Holstí’s and Wish’s work present such commonalities mainly because they shared the belief that in order for a researcher to understand national role perceptions, he has to look at the top policy-making level. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that both scholars faced limitations imposed by their research design. As they were studying a large number of states it would have been much more difficult for them to look at and assess the statements of lower ranking policy-makers as well.

A look at more recent case studies can provide a better understanding on how scholars collect their data in the study of national role conceptions. In a study examining Turkish foreign policy, Aras and Gorener only looked at statements made by the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, and the country’s foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu (Aras and Gorener 2010). A slightly different approach is followed by Bengtsson and Elgstrom (2012) who investigate the European Union’s (EU) roles as an international actor by examining two different cases of EU interactions with other states. Although the
data collection method is not clear in their study, references are made to the Commission President, other EU Commissioners, the Commission as a body, as well as official EU documents. A similar approach is followed by Catalinac who does not limit her sample to top policy-makers but, instead, she investigates statements made in the Upper and Lower Houses of the Japanese Diet by all politicians belonging to any of the political parties (Catalinac 2007: 79-80). Regarding Japan’s participation in the 2003 Iraq war, Miyagi (2009) also took into consideration the role of other actors such as media and business elites. Furthermore, a number of case studies on national role perceptions make evaluations on which roles a state has adopted by looking more at the foreign policy outcomes and the historical construction of state identity, than the official statements made by the top policy-makers (see for instance Adigbuo 2007; Oppermann 2012).

Unlike the common practice in the field we decided to follow a different path for data collection. Instead of gathering statements that reveal the national role conceptions of Greek elites, we chose to carry out a structured questionnaire survey using the summated rating (or Likert) scale (Appendix 1) with representative members of the foreign policy, military, academic, business, and media elite in Greece. There are several reasons why we chose this strategy. To begin with, given our target group it would be difficult to find a different source of information. Apart from the media elites, foreign policy and business elites might not be as vocal, and hence, it would be unlikely to find public statements that would be indicative of a national role perception. Also, very early in the course of the research it became clear that people were very unwilling to be interviewed. That left us with the alternative of structured interviews or surveys. A survey emerged as the best option. The aim, then, was to collect information in standardised form from groups of people. The features of such a design typically include selection of

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12 The electronic questionnaire and data bank (http://fs.kaparesearch.com/nsurvey.aspx?surveyid=92afbd4ba2749de9c08dee1f14a30de) were set up by Kapa Research SA. Kapa Research operates in the fields of market research, public opinion surveys, election polls, radio audience measurement, press readership, call-center management, and provides services in the fields of strategic consulting, human resource development, regional development, and project management, to both private and public sector clients. For over two decades, Kapa Research is one of the leading companies in the fields of market research, strategic communications and operational planning in Greece and Southeast Europe (see www.kaparesearch.com).
samples of individuals from known populations; collection of relatively small amount of data in standardised form from each individual; it does not require control over events and the focus is on current affairs (Robson 1993: 41-43). Also, surveys of this kind are well suited to descriptive studies where data can be used to explore aspects of a situation, or to seek to uncover generalised attitudes and opinions. Finally, a survey is often the main approach in this kind of research, especially when people tend to demonstrate a high degree of inaccessibility or non-availability or unwillingness to cooperate with the study (Robson 1993: 50). Furthermore, through the questionnaire we constructed, it would be possible to explore the current national role perceptions of the elites. This is an urgent issue to our study considering that, on the one hand, the Greek crisis only begun in 2008, and, on the other hand, its huge repercussions on the state’s capacity to fulfil its main objectives became evident after 2011, and they continue deepening as time passes. Finally, we strongly believe that the quality of the information that we have collected through the questionnaire has been better than data we would be able to gather via other means.

Another peculiarity of our research is that it focuses on elites rather than the top foreign policy-makers, as it is usually the case in the study of national role perceptions. Our aim is not to claim that foreign policy elites directly shape or influence the making of foreign policy. In that sense, we do not challenge Candir and Kaarbo’s critique on role theory (Candir and Kaarbo 2012). Nonetheless, as we also examine if the national role conceptions that are shared by elites is reflected in the Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey, our study includes some assumptions on whether foreign policy elites are able to influence national foreign policy.

8. Description and basic information on the survey
The main goal of the current study is to explore the views of the Greek elites on Greek foreign policy roles since the start of the economic crisis, and especially vis-à-vis Turkey. We defined as elites six different categories of people, namely businessmen, diplomats, politicians, military officers, journalists, and academics. In addition, these generic categories were further operationalised as follows:

- Businessmen to include members of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises;
- Journalists to include diplomatic correspondents, senior editors, commentators in major Athens dailies, TV and radio stations, as well as, news websites;
- Diplomats to include directorate heads, deputy heads and senior Embassy staff;
- Military officers to include officers ranking brigadier general and higher as well as retired senior officers;
- Politicians to include members of the Permanent National Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee and European Affairs Committee of the Hellenic Parliament; and
- Academics to include IR and politics faculty members.

According to Baehr (1980: 226-7), politicians, diplomats and military staff could be considered to constitute the ‘formal foreign policy elite’, in the sense that their professional standing leads them to be participants in the foreign policy-making process. The rest could be considered as ‘informal foreign policy elite’ and is of a profoundly heterogeneous nature. Here we have people who deal with foreign policy indirectly, or what Almond (1960: 239) called ‘policy and opinion elite’ or ‘the articulate policy-bearing stratum of the population which gives structure to the public and which provides the effective means of access to the various groupings’ (as cited in Baehr, 1980: 227).

We then proceeded with a purposive sampling procedure, which was sent to 522 individuals. The questionnaire which was web-based and constructed in a way that would protect the anonymity of the respondents was sent to the sample, while the whole process took place during the period of 1 May to 30 October 2014. The overall response rate to the questionnaire was 41.95% (219 respondents out of 522 sent questionnaires). Although the response rate might sound low, it is actually considerably higher
than the mean response rate when referring to e-mail surveys (see Sheehan 2001). Coupled with the fact that this study employs a purposive sampling, the response rate should be considered more than satisfying. The response rates, as well the sent questionnaires per elite group are detailed in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite group</th>
<th>Questionnaires sent</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Response rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomats</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>41.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.1. Presentation of results

The questionnaire (Appendices 1 & 2) includes 29 close-ended questions, covering three different topics. The first part of the questionnaire tries to discover how Greek elites perceive Greece's position in the world, and especially the country's power to influence regional developments or/and global politics. The second group of questions focuses on Turkey, and particularly examines the
perceptions of Greek elites regarding Turkey’s foreign policy, its internal affairs and its role in world politics. Finally, the third set of questions addresses the issue of Greek-Turkish relations, and more notably the issue of how Greek elites perceive the current level of relations between the two countries, and how, and to what degree, the current relationship has been influenced by the ongoing economic crisis in Greece. In the following paragraphs we will examine, question by question, the respondents' answers to the questionnaire.

The first question (Figure 1) refers to whether respondents agree, and to what degree, with the view that Greece is a small state in world politics. 57.1% of the respondents replied that they ‘totally agree’ or ‘rather agree’ (20.1% and 37% respectively), while 27.4% replied that they ‘totally disagree’ or ‘rather disagree’ with this statement (9.6% and 17.8% respectively). 15.5% of the respondents suggested that they ‘neither agree, nor disagree’. Looking at the different groups of respondents separately, we can clearly observe that academics and journalists tend to agree much more than any other group of respondents with the view that Greece is a small nation, with the percentages of ‘totally agree’ and ‘rather agree’ combined amounts to around 70% for both groups. On the contrary, Greek politicians and military officers were the two groups that were not in accord the most with the premise of the statement, with both groups’ ‘totally disagree’ and ‘rather disagree’ answers reaching around 44%.

The next question (Figure 2) aimed at exploring the respondents’ perceptions as to whether Greek foreign policy can influence international politics. Positive responses, represented by ‘yes’ and ‘rather yes’, amounted for the 59.8% of the answers, while negative responses (‘no’ and ‘rather no’) gathered a combined 39.8%. These results suggest that the majority of the Greek elites perceive that the Greek state possesses the capabilities and the resources necessary for playing an effective role in world politics. Looking into the results group by group, we can identify that the group which agrees the most is the one made up of politicians whose positive answers surpassed 80%. However, it should be noted that the positive responses of politicians and military officers were also considerably high (76% and 66.7%
respectively). Businessmen were the only group whose negative replies were more than their positive responses (60% compared to 40%).

The next two questions (Figure 3 and Figure 4) intended to provide a clearer understanding of the first two questions, by discovering in what ways Greece could influence world politics. In other words, we tried to explore which of Greece's qualities were perceived by the Greek elites as the country's biggest assets in the international arena. Specifically, we focused on two different aspects: political culture and alliances. Hence, the third question asked whether Greece could influence international politics through the quality of its ideas and its commitment to the principles of International Law. The respondents tended to agree with the above proposition, with an overwhelming majority answering that they ‘totally agree’ or that they ‘rather agree’ (27.5% and 45.8% respectively). On the contrary, only 14.5% disagreed. Again, the groups that supported the proposition the most were the diplomats and the politicians, whose positive responses amounted to around 90% (90.5% and 89.5% respectively).

The fourth question, which as has already been indicated focused on Greece's alliances and international participation, asked whether Greece's influence is possible through the country's EU and NATO memberships. Positive responses are quite high, reaching 82.4%. It is also impressive to note that the positive responses of the diplomats and the academics surpassed the 90% threshold (95.2% and 90.3% respectively). It is also of note that the diplomats and the businessmen score 0% for the combined ‘totally disagree’ and ‘rather disagree’ answers, while 5 out of the 6 respondents' groups completely ignored the ‘totally disagree’ option.

The next question (Figure 5) investigated the respondents' perceptions as to whether Greece is responding to its obligations deriving from her membership in international organisations such as the UN, NATO, and the EU irrespective of what other countries might do. It is important to stress that this question includes a question of values. As keeping up with one’s obligations is considered the norm or
the right thing to do, answering that Greece is abiding by its obligations suggests a positive understanding of the country’s behaviour in the international arena. The results suggest that, indeed, Greek elites have a positive image of the Greek state as a functional unit of the international system. ‘Totally agree’ and ‘rather agree’ answers amounted overall to close to 70% (25.6% and 43.8% respectively), while, on the contrary, the ‘totally disagree’ and ‘rather disagree’ options were chosen only by 17.3% of the respondents. Once again, the most positive answers came from the group of the diplomats, with almost 85% positive, and 0% negative answers.

The question that follows (Figure 6) focused on the degree Greek foreign policy is concerned with global issues, such as the situation in Afghanistan, Syria, sub-Saharan Africa, etc. according to the respondents’ opinion. The results indicate that the general perception among the respondents is that Greece's foreign policy is rather indifferent to those global issues, as almost 70% chose to answer ‘some’ or ‘minimally/not at all’. It is also quite interesting to point out that only 0.5% answered ‘very much’, while the only group which considered this answer was that of the business elites.

The seventh question (Figure 7) can also be considered as a follow up to the previous one, as it asks from the respondents whether they think that Greek citizens desire a more active foreign policy, which would not limit itself to the usual foreign policy concerns, such as Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus issue, or the name dispute with FYR Macedonia. The answers suggest that there is a tendency towards uncertainty, as the majority of the respondents answered ‘rather yes’ (31.5%) and ‘rather no’ (40.2%). The same is also true when each of the elite groups was examined separately. However, it should be highlighted that politicians, military officers, and, to a lesser degree, businessmen, show a stronger tendency towards the ‘yes’ and the ‘rather yes’ categories compared to the other three groups.

The last question (Figure 8) from the group of questions referring to Greece's foreign policy and its overall position in world politics, aimed at exploring the respondents’ assessment as to whether Greece's strategy to assume regional leadership, a role pursued by successive Greek governments
before the beginning of the crisis, has remained unchanged since the start of financial crisis. The specific question asked whether the influence and the prestige of Greece have been undermined by the economic crisis. It is vital to point out that the answers to this question vary greatly among the different groups of respondents, more than any other question that we have analysed so far. It is not that there is a disagreement on whether there is a change in Greek foreign policy due to the crisis. It is rather a variation in determining how big this impact has been. The majority of the diplomats (65.4%) and politicians (52%), for example, advocate that Greece's international role conception has been 'somewhat' influenced; however, only a minority suggests it was influenced 'too much' or 'much'. Academicians (71.7%), military officers (71.1%), journalists (65%) and businessmen (63.3%) on the other hand suggested that the economic crisis has had a considerable ('too much' and 'much') impact on the country's influence and prestige.

Moving on to the set of questions relating to Turkey and Turkey's foreign and domestic policies (Figure 9), we asked the respondents whether they agree with the assumption that Turkey is a strategic partner of the United States (US). Overall results show that there is a trend towards agreement rather than disagreement with the above statement. Particularly, 68.5% of the respondents said that they 'totally agree' or that they 'rather agree' that Turkey is indeed a strategic partner of the US (24.2% and 44.3% respectively), while 8.7% 'rather disagree' and only 1.4% 'totally disagree' (more than a fifth of the respondents replied that they neither agree nor disagree). Looking into each of the respondents' groups separately, we would argue that the answers are quite homogenous, at least in that the positive replies ('agree' and 'totally agree') amount to more than 60% of the answers across the groups.

As with the previous question, the 10th question (Figure 10) tried to explore whether the European Union is a strategic partner of Turkey. The results are quite contrasted when compared to those of the previous question. Overall the 'totally agree' answer only scores 5.5%, while 'rather agree' is the most popular response gathering a total of 41.1% across the groups. An analysis among the
different groups of respondents suggests significant differences, especially between the academics, who answered more positively than any other group, and the diplomats, who at a rate of 69.2% ‘rather disagree’ with the idea that EU and Turkey form a strategic alliance. It is also interesting to note that none of the diplomats who participated in the research ‘totally agree’ that EU-Turkey relations suggest a strategic partnership.

The next question (Figure 11) dealt with a topic that has caused heated political debates in Greece over the course of past decades. Specifically the respondents were asked to provide their input on whether Turkey should join the European Union or not. The results are quite interesting as they highlight significant variations among the different elite groups. Military officers constitute the group that is, to put it mildly, the least enthusiastic over such a prospect. 28.9% of them ‘rather disagree’ with Turkey joining the European Union, while a staggering 55.6% ‘totally disagree’. The other group that stands out is the one made up of academics, as more than half suggest that they ‘totally agree’ or ‘probably agree’ (20.8% and 34% respectively) with a European future for Turkey.

The following question (Figure 12) focuses on Turkish domestic politics and asks whether the respondents agree with the opinion that the economic growth in Turkey over the past decade could lead to the strengthening of its democratisation process. Overall results are rather inconclusive, with close to a third of the respondents stating that they ‘rather agree’ (34.2%) and a bit less than a third that they ‘rather disagree’ (29.7%). It should also be pointed out, that some 20.7% of the respondents ‘neither agree, nor disagree’. Looking at each group separately, the groups that are more optimistic that economic growth will lead to the greater democratisation of Turkey are the academics (11.3 ‘totally agree’ and 39.6% ‘rather agree’) and the businessmen (10% ‘totally agree’ and 56.7% ‘rather agree’). In contrast, the least optimistic groups are the diplomats (3.8% ‘totally disagree’ and 57.5% ‘rather disagree’) and the military elite (20% ‘totally disagree’ and 37.8% ‘rather disagree’).
The next couple of questions (Figure 13 and Figure 14) asked the respondents whether they believe Turkish foreign policy has changed under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and whether this change, if any, should be attributed to the religious views of the Turkish leader. The results confirm that indeed there is a perceived change in Turkish foreign policy, as the majority of the respondents answered positively (37% ‘yes’ and 30, 6% ‘rather yes’). Conversely, only about a third of the respondents replied negatively (16% ‘no’ and 16% ‘rather no’). A separate look into the responses of each group shows that most affirmative answers to this question were provided by the academics, with an overall of 88.6% for the ‘yes’ and ‘rather yes’ categories, while the group that was more reluctant to accept a change in Turkish foreign policy were the military elites (20% ‘yes’ and 22.2% ‘rather yes’).

Moving on to the reasons of this change, many of the respondents (42.6%) rather agree that the religious background and ideas of the Turkish Prime Minister,\(^\text{13}\) could account for the shift in Turkish foreign policy.

The next question (Figure 15) concerns another issue that has sparked a lot of discussion in Greece. Indeed, the ‘Davutoglu Doctrine’, as it is presented in Ahmet Davutoglu’s book *Strategic Depth* (Stratejik Derinlik), has caused a lot of debate, both at the political and academic levels, within Greece over the true meaning and the real aspirations and ambitions of Turkish foreign policy.\(^\text{14}\) Hence, the answers we offered the respondents covered the most common understanding of the Davutoglu Doctrine, as they were formed by those debates in Greece. The answers to this question show considerable homogeneity across the elite groups, with 66.7% of the overall responses suggesting that Davutoglu's ideas imply that the main goal of Turkish foreign policy is the creation of a Turkish sphere of influence. The highest support for this interpretation is given by the diplomats (76.9%) and the academics (73.6%). The second most popular answer (16%) was that the ultimate goal of the Davutoglu

\(^{13}\) Recep Tayyip Erdogan was prime minister of Turkey between 2003 and 2014. He became the president of the country on 28 August 2014.

\(^{14}\) Ahmet Davutoglu is since 28 August 2014 the prime minister of Turkey. He served as the country’s foreign minister between 2009 and 2014.
Doctrine is the revival of the Ottoman Empire, while only one out of ten respondents (9.6%) opted for the more moderate interpretation that the goal of Davutoglu's policy is to create a condition of zero problems with the country's neighbours.

The 16th question (Figure 16) seeks the respondents' assessment on whether they would agree that Turkey is distancing itself from the West and is getting closer to the Muslim world instead. The results suggest that, overall, the respondents agree with this statement as the majority (51.6%) replied that they ‘rather agree’. The group that agreed the most was the one comprised of diplomats, as nine out of 10, either ‘totally agree’ or ‘rather agree’ (3.8% and 84.6% respectively). It should also be highlighted that close to half of the academics (43.4%) ‘neither agree, nor disagree’, making this question the one where this particular group of respondents found to the greatest difficulty to take a clear position.

The next question (Figure 17) regards Turkey's role as a bridge between East and West, and specifically whether Turkey can play this role efficiently. Interestingly, the affirmative responses (‘totally agree’ and ‘rather agree’) are, overall, equal to the negative answers (‘totally disagree’ and ‘rather disagree’), with both amounting to 39.2%, while a bit more of a fifth of the respondents (21.5%) said that they ‘neither agree, nor disagree’. The group that values the most Turkey’s capabilities of becoming a bridge between East and West are the academics (54.7% positive answers), while the diplomats, at a 69.2% rate, were the ones that disagreed the most with the aforementioned statement. Considerable disagreement was also stated by the military officers, whose numbers are 15.6% ‘totally disagree’, and 44.4% ‘rather disagree’.

Having focused on the general framework and orientation of Turkey's domestic and foreign policies, with the next two questions we examined how Greek elites perceive specific Turkish foreign policy actions, which are not, however, directly connected to Greece. The first of the two questions (Figure 18) refers to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 of 2010 on the imposition of
sanctions against Iran, which Turkey did not vote. Here the respondents were asked whether they perceived this action positively or negatively. Negative responses (39.3%) outnumber the positive ones (21.4%). However, a considerable number of respondents suggested that they perceive Turkey’s stance as ‘neither as positive, nor negative’ (33.8%), alluding to the fact that Greek elites, are highly indifferent to Turkey’s relations with the rest of the world as long as they think that Turkey’s policies don’t have a direct impact upon Greek interests and concerns. The second question (Figure 19) asked the respondents to state their agreement or disagreement with Turkey’s strategy regarding the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations. Once again, the ‘neither agree, nor disagree’ answer is the most popular one (41.6%), especially among diplomats (69.2%) and politicians (60%). On the contrary, it is quite striking that only 1.8% of the respondents said that they ‘totally agree’ with Turkey’s strategy (4 of the 6 groups completely ignored this option), while the ‘rather agree’ option was also low with 13.7%.

The 20th question (Figure 20) opens the third part of the questionnaire -- the one related to Greek-Turkish relations. The first thing that we asked the respondents was if they approve of the rapprochement strategy that Greece has employed since 1999. Interestingly, the results show that there is high agreement to the rapprochement process, at least in most of the surveyed elite groups. Overall, the ‘totally agree’ and ‘rather agree’ answers amount to 63.5% (24.7% and 38.8% respectively). On the other hand, only about a quarter of the respondents disagreed (11.9% ‘totally disagree’ and 13.7% ‘rather disagree’). The highest agreement is observed among the academics (81.1%), with the politicians second (76%), and the diplomats third (73%). The group comprising of military officers answered this question differently with more of them disagreeing rather than agreeing (31.1% ‘totally disagree’ and 28.9% rather disagree’).

The following question (Figure 21) asked the respondents to ‘identify’ the state of current relations between Greece and Turkey. Most respondents (47%) replied that they would describe the relations between the two states as ‘neither good, nor bad’. This trend is also spread evenly across the
groups, except for the academics, whose majority (50.9%) described the current state of affairs as ‘rather good’. Regarding this question, it is also important to note is that most respondents, refrained from characterising Greek-Turkish relations either as good (5.9%, mostly from the group of academics) or as bad (2.7%).

The next question (Figure 22) dealt with Greece’s choice since 1999 to support Turkey’s efforts to become a full member of the European Union, and asked the respondents if they concur with this choice. The responses are quite dispersed, signifying a lack of a dominant view among the elites on whether this long held and strategic Greek national policy is in the country’s interest or not. A quarter of the respondents (25.1%) ‘totally agree’ while another quarter (26.5%) ‘Rather agree’. Once again the academics tended to agree the most (39.6% ‘totally agree’ and 32.1% ‘rather agree’), while the military officers tended to answer negatively (31.1% ‘totally disagree’ and 28.9% ‘rather disagree’).

The next question (Figure 23) gave quite interesting results, while managing to limit the differences across the surveyed groups. The question posed was whether Greece could trust Turkey. The overall number of respondents who agreed that Greece can trust Turkey was quite low. Only 1.8% of the respondents ‘totally agree’ and another 9.6% ‘rather agree’. Another interesting fact is that in four of the six groups, no respondents replied that they ‘totally agree’ with the question’s premise. Consequently, there is consensus among the elites that Greece should not trust Turkey. Military officers came on top, with more than nine out of ten saying that Turkey is not to be trusted (71.1% ‘totally disagree’ and 22.2% ‘rather disagree). Also this group completely ignored both the ‘totally agree’ and the ‘rather agree’ options. Diplomats, politicians and journalists were also quite negative on the trust issue.

The following question (Figure 24) asked the respondents’ assessment on whether Turkey’s economic growth is beneficial to Greece or not. Compared to the previous question there were markedly more positive answers, however, the overall results imply that there are still some
reservations, probably attributable to trust issues. Specifically, the ones who agreed with the question’s premise amounted to 398% of the respondents (7.8% ‘totally agree’ and 32% ‘rather agree’). It is noteworthy that this was one of the few times that the journalists (62.5%) and the businessmen (56.7%) were actually more positive in comparison to the academics.

Following up on the same topic, the 25th question (Figure 25) directly asked the respondents if Turkey’s economic development constitutes a threat for Greece. The results show that there is indeed a threat perception due to the rapid economic growth in Turkey. This perception is prevalent, in particular, among the military elites (24.4% ‘totally agree’ and 51.1% ‘rather agree’), as well as among the politicians (12% ‘totally agree’ and 32% ‘rather agree’). The threat perception ranks much lower among the academics, the businessmen and the journalists.

Continuing on the issue of threat, the next question (Figure 26), asked whether the respondents agree or disagree that the Turkish investments in Greece are a threat to Greek national interests, and, hence they should be obstructed. Overall, the results suggest that most of the respondents disagreed with such an option (27.9% ‘totally disagree’ and 33.3% ‘rather disagree’). This is also the case when the elites groups are examined separately, except for the military officers who, on majority, agree with such a scenario (22.2% ‘totally agree’ and 40% ‘rather agree’).

Question 27 (Figure 27) brought up the Cyprus question and asked how important the resolution of the Cyprus problem is for the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations. Results clearly show that there is a consensus among Greek elites that the Cyprus question is a big obstacle to the development of closer relations between Greece and Turkey. Overall, 44.3% of the respondents suggested that the resolution of the Cyprus question is ‘extremely important’, and another 26.9% answered that it is ‘very important’. In addition, 21% characterised it as ‘rather important’. The relevance of Cyprus for the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations is particularly valued by the politicians (64% ‘extremely important’), followed by the diplomats (53.8% ‘extremely important’).
The next question (Figure 28) asked how probable the respondents consider a crisis between Greece and Turkey during the next five years. The ‘extreme’ answers -- ‘extremely likely’ and ‘improbable’ scored quite low (4.6% and 6.4% respectively). Other than that it seems that most of the respondents consider an upcoming crisis ‘ rather improbable’ (40.6%), yet there are several who still think that the two countries might still find themselves entangled in a crisis (30.1% ‘ likely’ ). The most pessimistic group regarding such a development is that of the military elites (the ‘ extremely likely’, ‘ very likely’ and ‘ likely’ answers total 71.2%), while the most optimistic are the academics (the ‘ extremely likely’, ‘ very likely’ and ‘ likely’ answers total 39.6%) 

The following four questions aim at exploring which of the issues that are at the epicentre of Greek-Turkish relations could be the cause of a future crisis. The first question (Figure 29) which focuses on the Aegean issues (delimitation, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, etc.) seems to attract a number of responses. Given the fact that the Aegean Sea has been in the past the arena from which Greek-Turkish crises have sprung (e.g. 1987, 1996); the high concentration of responses should not come as a surprise. The most interesting result comes from the politicians whose ‘very’ and ‘a lot’ responses accumulate to a total of 100%. In addition, the percentage of military officers, who consider the Aegean issues as the cause of a future crisis, is also high (92.3% ‘very’ and ‘a lot’ answers combined).

The second question in this group (Figure 30) addresses the issue of Thrace as a possible cause of a future crisis. The answers suggest that there is a much less smaller concern that Thrace could be the cause of a new crisis between the two countries. Overall, only 5.8% of the respondents suggested that Thrace could be ‘very’ important for the start of another crisis, while another 26.2% suggested that the issue could be ‘ a lot’ relevant. The only group which, in its majority, considers likely that Thrace could cause a crisis between Greece and Turkey is that of the politicians (55.5% ‘very’ and ‘a lot’ answers combined).
The Cyprus issue was tackled with the next question (Figure 31). Quite surprisingly, the respondents overall, do not consider the Cyprus question as an issue that can lead to crisis between Greece and Turkey. Only 3.9% of the respondents answered that developments in Cyprus can be ‘very’ influential to the creation of a crisis. This option was actually wildly unpopular across groups (for example, 0% of military officers and businessmen selected it). Given the developments in Cyprus over the last couple of years, with the decision by the Republic of Cyprus to proceed with its exploration for natural resources in the seabed of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the harsh responses from Ankara, we would have assumed that the respondents would have been more expectant of a crisis related to the Cyprus issue.

Lastly, we asked the respondents to tell us whether they believe that an internal crisis in Turkey could be a cause of a future Greek-Turkish crisis (Figure 32). This question is connected to a popular belief among the Greek public at large that whenever Turkish leaders want to distract their public opinion away from domestic problems they create an artificial crisis with Greece. The results confirm that such an idea is quite popular among the Greek elites. According to the responses, an internal crisis in Turkey is considered as the second most powerful cause of a future crisis between the two countries (68.9% ‘very’ and ‘a lot’ answers combined). The highest percentage comes from the politicians, while the lowest from the academics.

The final question (Figure 33) asked the respondents to indicate which of the four aforementioned issues is, in their opinion, the most likely to cause a future crisis between Greece and Turkey. By far the most popular answer is what we term as the Aegean issues (59.4%). The second most popular answer is a Turkish internal crisis, while both Cyprus and Thrace follow with less than 10% (4.6% and 6.8% respectively). This question was answered in a very similar fashion by all elite groups; however, it is worth mentioning that the Cyprus issue did not receive any answers from military officers and journalists alike.
9. Main assumptions

The presentation of the results in the previous pages already provides a first glance of the main concerns, assessments and ideas of the Greek elites on a number of issues. However, further analysis is necessary in order to make more sense of the available data. In the text that follows, we present the main assumptions of the current research organised around two major axes: by subject and by elite group.

9.1. Assumptions based on subject by subject analysis

As previously mentioned, the questionnaire is organised in such a way so that it covers three different subjects. The first subject regards Greece's role in the international arena, its influence on the system and issues of Greek foreign policy. Our main goal was to examine the elite's perceptions as to the main roles Greece's foreign policy currently assumes, or what types of roles it could assume in the future.

The first major assumption stemming from the analysis of the data is that the Greek elites trust that the country has both the potential and the qualities necessary to influence global politics. Indeed, the answers in the three questions related to Greece's capability to influence international affairs (questions 2, 3 and 4) were quite positive. The respondents suggested that Greece is capable of influencing international politics at a rate of 60%, while when they asked whether the Greek state can impact the international order via the quality of its ideas and its dedication to International Law, the percentage of positive answers was even higher, reaching 73.3%. Similarly, Greece's EU and NATO memberships were also highly valued as a tool for influencing global affairs.

Another important assumption is that the Greek elites share a strong conviction that Greece constitutes a ‘positive’ unit of the international system, in the sense that it abides to its international
commitments and defends and promotes International Law. This conviction has quite salient implications regarding the conception of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. If the conception of the self is positive, then it implies that one of the state’s roles is, or should be, a model or paragon for other states to imitate. More importantly though it means that the state is not a ‘troublemaker’ and, hence, if regional problems arise, then these are caused by the ‘other’. ¹⁵

What might at first glance seem to contradict the aforementioned assumptions is that in some of the questions the respondents confirmed their belief, at least in the majority, that Greece is a small nation, that it has lost part of its prestige since the start of the economic crisis, that the country’s foreign policy does not address global issues, and, finally, that Greek citizens do not necessarily want a more active foreign policy orientation. However, we strongly believe that there is no contradiction. It is rather a statement of belief that Greece can influence the international system, by focusing more towards its immediate environment than to areas outside its space vital to its national interests. It is furthermore, a proclamation of confidence that Greece can be much more influential than its size implies or what its material capabilities currently are.

Moving on to the second set of questions that address Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, we can say that, overall, the answers mainly indicate the lack of trust and the perception of threat coming from the Turkish state. These two convictions derive especially from the changes in Turkish foreign policy, and the country’s strong economic growth during the past decade.

On the issue of alliances, it is important to note that the results confirm the elites’ belief that the US-Turkey partnership is a very relevant and strong one (68.5% of the respondents ‘totally agree’ or ‘rather agree’ that the relationship constitutes a strategic partnership). The results are in line with the popular belief in Greece that Turkey receives a lot of support from the US as far as bilateral issues are

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¹⁵ For a sophisticated discussion see Wendt 1999, especially ch. 5.
On the contrary, EU-Turkey relations are valued much less, as significantly fewer respondents agreed it that they constitute a strategic partnership, while almost half disagreed. These results reflect the developments in relations between the European Union and Turkey during the course of the past few years, with declining support for membership among the Turkish public, and less enthusiastic pursuit of the fulfilment of accession criteria by the Turkish government. Finally, there also seems to be a strong inclination, among the respondents, towards the assumption that Turkey is distancing itself from the West and is getting closer to the East.

Several points can be made regarding Turkey’s domestic affairs and their influence on Turkish foreign policy. The two most critical questions asked deal with two different types of changes -- one regarding democratisation and another regarding foreign policy. To be more specific, the question about democratisation does not directly ask if Turkey has been democratised. It rather aims at exploring whether or not the Greek elites believe that economic growth can lead to further democratisation. The most important assumption is that the Greek elites seem, on the one hand, reluctant to accept the changes regarding the democratisation of the Turkish state, while, on the other hand, confident that the changes have indeed been realised when the questions concern Turkish foreign policy. Hence, the answers are distributed evenly on the positive to negative spectrum (41.5% and 37.9% respectively) regarding the capability of Turkey to democratisate itself, while a fifth of the respondents ‘neither agree, nor disagree’. With regard to foreign policy changes, the answers are overwhelmingly in the affirmative with an overall rate of 67.6%. In addition, there is high consent among the elites that the changes in Turkish foreign policy can be attributed to the religious views of Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The aforementioned results make more sense when coupled with the other questions concerning Turkish foreign policy. We can thus construct a three piece puzzle. Firstly, it can be inferred by the responses that the overwhelming majority of the Greek elites think that the ‘Davutoglu Doctrine’

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16 On this see Ifantis 1996; Couloumbis and Iatrides 1980.
is designed for Turkey expand its sphere of influence. Secondly, Turkey has distanced itself from the West and it looks to the East. Thirdly, the changes in Turkish foreign policy can be attributed to the religious views of the Turkish President. Based on the responses to these three questions, it can be assumed that the Greek elites see Turkey as a state whose main foreign policy aspirations have shifted, and its primary goal is to acquire a leading role in the Arab Middle East and beyond by seeking to establish itself as a source of regional geopolitical influence on the basis of a common Islamic cultural element. Such a hypothesis might have significant implications for Greece, especially on the perception of threat, and the understanding of Greek-Turkish relations as a whole.

Finally, as it was previously pointed out, the Greek elites are quite indifferent when they are asked to comment on Turkish foreign policy decisions or strategies in relation to Israel and Afghanistan. The argument that can be made in this case is that the Greek elites do not see a correlation between the future course of Greek-Turkish relations and Turkey's relations with its neighbours to the East, or other third countries. We would expect that the results would show higher levels of interest, especially for Israel, whose relations with the Republic of Cyprus and Greece have been significantly upgraded during the past years; however, this was not the case.

Moving on to the last set of questions, the one with reference to Greek-Turkish relations, the results are even more interesting, offering an assessment over Greek long-held foreign policy strategies, as well useful insights for the future of Greek-Turkish relations. The first question about the post-1999 rapprochement strategy reveals that Greek elites, en masse, have accepted the strategy and they consider it as correct. This is the first time that hard data is available supporting this landmark change in Greece's foreign policy towards Turkey, which has in times been characterised as one of appeasement, concessionary, or even as an act of treason by the patriotic and nationalistic circles in Greece.

The support for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement process somewhat abates when the question regarding the European Union enters the equation. Given that a significant step for the start of the 1999
rapprochement process was Greece's decision to lift its veto for the commencement of Turkey's accession negotiations, it is surprising that Greece's continued support for Turkey's EU accession process does not gather the same consensus from the respondents, as it did for the previous question. Nevertheless, overall support still amounts to over half of the respondents, so we can assume that the elites expect more pressure to be placed on Turkey to meet its obligations, rather than aspiring for the cancellation of the process altogether.

The data deriving from the questions that explore trust issues are also extremely revealing and noteworthy. Looking at the results, the undeniable assumption is that the Greek elites strongly agree that Turkey is not to be trusted. Of course, trust issues are extremely common in international affairs, let alone between two states that have been involved in an intractable conflict for decades. Nonetheless, the fact that the Greek elites think Greece cannot trust Turkey, in high percentages, across elite groups is rather surprising, especially given the more moderate assessment of the relations between the two countries in the previous questions.

Additionally, the answers to the question concerning trust are contradictory when compared to the answers to questions addressing the perception of threat from Turkey. Undeniably, the perception of threat is much lower than one would assume by looking at the trust levels. Specifically, significantly fewer respondents considered Turkish economic development as a threat to Greek interests, than the ones who did not. Also, close to 40% of the respondents actually suggested that Turkey’s economic development is not contradictory to Greek interests. In a similar question on whether Turkish investments in Greece constitute a threat to Greek interests, and hence, they should be blocked, more than 60% of the respondents suggested that they ‘completely disagree’ or ‘rather disagree’. Lastly, related to the threat concerns, it is important to note that low threat perceptions are also implied by the fact that, to a large degree, a crisis with Turkey is generally not considered very likely in the next five years (as of October 2014).
Finally, special mention should be made to the Cyprus issue. The fact that the vast majority (more than 70%) of the elites consider the Cyprus problem a prerequisite for the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, shows a strong attachment to the roots of the conflict, as historically Cyprus has been the catalyst for Greek-Turkish crises, on many occasions (1955, 1959-60, 1974, etc.). The answers also provide an idea on where the Greek elites think that Greek foreign policy and the decision-making elites should focus if the goal is to normalise relations with Turkey. Any such attempt cannot but take the Cyprus issue under consideration.

9.2. Assumptions based on divisions among elite groups

A brief look at the data is enough to uncover one of the most important findings of the research study. Greek elite groups have a high degree of internal homogeneity, but they present significant differences between each other. Indeed, a look into the results suggest that there is a tendency for agreement among each group, which is strong and consistent enough to allow us to provide a vague description of each group’s main objectives and strategies in general, as well as, its perceptions regarding Greece, Turkey and their relationship. What follows is a concise description of each of the six elite groups.

9.2.1. Diplomats

By and large, the diplomatic elites are one of the groups that assess Greece’s role and capabilities in the international arena quite highly. Diplomats tend to answer in the affirmative the questions concerned with Greece’s competence and effectiveness; they also value highly the constructive role Greece can play via its membership in international organisations. Likewise, there are several questions that we do not find any diplomat disagreeing (rather or totally) with when the same
questions are posed. It also important to note that the group was rather divided on the question regarding whether Greece is a ‘small’ nation, but the respondents tended to agree that Greece’s role as a regional leader has been compromised by the economic crisis.

As far as Turkey is concerned, the diplomats were more negative than positive on a number of issues. For example, they were very reluctant to assume that a process of Turkish democratisation is possible; they were also quite suspicious as to the meaning of the ‘Davutoglu Doctrine’. Furthermore, the diplomats were more negative than positive on whether Turkey should join the European Union; while they valued quite highly Turkey’s relations with the US, they were not quite supportive of its relations with the EU.

With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, the diplomats’ answers showed remarkable consistency. The majority considers the rapprochement process as the right strategy; however, the group is split on whether Greece should steadily support Turkey’s accession to the EU. Most of the diplomats also agree that the relations between the two countries are ‘neither good nor bad’, while none described the relations between the two countries as bad. It should also be mentioned that the diplomats are one of the groups which consider that Greece should not trust Turkey.

9.2.2. Military officers

Most would probably expect that the military officers would be one of the most negatively predisposed groups towards Turkey among the elites, and, as the data show, these expectations were met. Indeed, the military elites were quite homogenous as a group and very consistent in their positive responses when Greece was concerned, while very negative when Turkey came into the equation. As in the case of the diplomats, the military officers showed an affirmative perception regarding Greece’s capabilities in influencing the international arena; its enhanced role despite its small size; its positive
attitude vis-à-vis International Law and its commitments; and the strength it derives from its participation to international organisations.

Turkey, on the other hand, is perceived by the majority of the military officers as a complicated and untrustworthy neighbour. One of the most notable responses is the 55% rate of total disagreement on whether Turkey should join the European Union, while only around 13% (the lowest among all groups) suggested that they ‘totally agree’ or ‘rather agree’ that EU-Turkey relations constitute a strategic partnership. Regarding Turkey, the question that seems to have divided the group the most is whether its foreign policy under Recep Tayyip Erdogan has changed, as all four options (excluding the ‘I don't know/I don’t answer’ option), received, more or less, a quarter of the answers of the group.

With regard to the questions on Greek-Turkish relations, the military officers behave like outliers when compared to other groups. For example, they are the only group that disagrees, on majority, with the rapprochement strategy Greece adopted after 1999. The same applies when the group is asked whether Greece should support Turkey’s EU accession efforts. In addition, a vast 71.1% of the group ‘totally disagree’ with the statement that Greece should trust Turkey, while most suggested that Turkey’s economic growth is not beneficial to Greece.

9.2.3. Politicians

Perhaps the most difficult group to predict, together with the journalists, is the one comprised of politicians. This is because, on the one hand, different ideological backgrounds give room for different perceptions and interpretations of conflict; and, on the other hand, Greek political parties have in the past reached a general agreement on the main foreign policy orientation and prerogatives of the country (if not in theory, at least in practice). The general assumption for this group is that it showed a
vague uniformity, at least in its response to most questions. It was quite moderate vis-à-vis Turkey, as well as with regard to Greek-Turkish relations.

To begin with, the political elites gave quite diverse responses in the first two questions which dealt with Greece being a small state and its ability to impact on international politics respectively. Nonetheless, in the questions that followed, the political elites demonstrated strong support to the notion that Greece can influence with its quality of ideas, its adherence to International Law, and its international alliances, while they also strongly agreed that Greece meets its obligations stemming from its participation in various international organisations. It is also worth pointing out that all the political elites answered that Greece’s regional leadership role was compromised (in varying degrees) by the economic crisis.

With regard to Turkey, the answers related to Turkey’s European future, its democratisation and its foreign policy, significantly varied, highlighting important divergences of political orientation among the political elites. Nevertheless, however, it is quite clear that most Greek political elites do not welcome the idea of Turkey joining the EU, while they also showed remarkable homogeneity in their understanding of the ‘Davutoglu Doctrine’.

With reference to relations between Greece and Turkey, the responses of the political elites are very similar to those given by the diplomats. On the trust issue, the politicians strongly disagree that Greece should trust its neighbour, while the threat perception stemming from Turkey is deemed as moderate. It is important to note that most politicians agree with Turkey’s accession to the EU, although a significant minority (36%) disagrees. Finally, the political elites differed in their assessments as to whether a crisis between the two countries is to be expected in the near future, although they tend to agree that should one occur, it will be due to reasons related differences regarding the Aegean Sea.

9.2.4. Journalists
The journalists make up the least coherent group as they show considerable variation in several of their responses, although in some instances they tend to agree strongly. Regarding Greece's role, the media elites have the highest positive consensus rate, regarding the perception of Greece as a small state. On the other hand, this group has the least positive responses on whether Greece can influence international politics. In the questions that ensue (questions 3-5), the media elites consistently provide the least positive answers, suggesting a high reservation with the notion that Greece can influence global affairs, either through alliances, or its quality of ideas.

As far as Turkey is concerned, the media elites do not diverge much from the other focus groups. They are quite divided on the topic of Turkey's EU accession, as well as on most of the questions regarding Turkey's domestic politics and its foreign policy orientation. For instance, 44% agree and 30% disagree with whether Turkey's economic growth can accelerate its democratisation process; while 47.5% agree and 47.5% disagree with the notion that Turkey can become a bridge between East and West.

Regarding Greek-Turkish relations, the journalists strongly support the rapprochement process; with their answers being similar to all other groups (neither good, nor bad) when they are asked to characterise current level of relations between Greece and Turkey. The media elites represent the second group (after that of the academic elites) to support Turkey's accession process; however, they are extremely reluctant to suggest that Greece should trust Turkey. It should also be pointed out that the threat perception is quite low, compared to the rest of the groups, as are the expectations for a crisis between the two states within the next five years. If such an event were to occur, the media elites consider the Aegean to be the most likely focal point of the crisis.

9.2.5. Businessmen
The improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey over the course of the last 15 years has generally benefited the Greek business community through the overall enhancement of economic cooperation and trade between the two countries (see, for instance, Tsarouhas, 2009; Kutlay, 2008). As such we would expect that the business elites would be among the groups that support the further rapprochement between the two countries and that would, probably, be more positive towards Turkey.

Before discussing the aforementioned issues, we should point out that most Greek businesspersons have a very positive view regarding Greece’s capabilities to efficiently and positively contribute to international politics. For example, more than 85% agree that Greece can influence international affairs through the quality of its ideas and its commitment to International Law. Another 85% agrees that Greece can do so through its dual memberships in the EU and NATO. These answers suggest the strong belief of the Greek business community that the country can be a key player in the international arena despite its small size.

When it comes to Turkey, much as the other elite focus groups, the business elites are reluctant to suggest that Greece should trust Turkey. However, they don't perceive Turkey as a threat, and, furthermore, they support the notion that the economic development of Turkey could benefit Greece. On the important issue of Turkey’s accession to the European Union that would have a catalytic role on Greek-Turkish trade, the businessmen quite unexpectedly, appear, to oppose such a development with some 53.4% suggesting that they ‘totally disagree’ or ‘rather disagree’.

With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, the business elites basically concur that the rapprochement process is the correct strategy for Greece, even though their 60% support rate is actually the second lowest after that of the military elites. It is important to note that Turkish direct investments in Greece are not considered to be a threat by the Greek business community. As a group, they consider
a possible Greek-Turkish crisis rather unlikely; while they see an Aegean dispute as the most likely cause should one actually take place.

9.2.6. Academics

The results suggest that the Greek academic elites represent a very distinct group with considerable differences of opinion vis-à-vis the other focus groups, as well as significant in-group coherence. The group was, by far, the most positive towards Turkey and Greek-Turkish affairs, in clear contrast to the responses of the military elites. Like most other groups in the first part of the questionnaire, the academics also valued highly Greece’s potential; in spite of its small size. The academic elites suggested that Greece gains much gravitas through her participation in international organisations, and they tend to agree, even though less so than the other groups, that the country abides by the obligations deriving from her participation in these organisations.

With regard to Turkey, the academic elites agree more than any other group that Turkey should join the European Union; in this context, it is also the only group that garners more than a 50% response rate for the ‘totally agree’ and ‘rather agree’ options. Also, this elite group agrees the most with the notion of the changing nature of Turkey’s foreign policy change under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. When asked about the ‘Davutoglu Doctrine’, almost three out of four academics consider it as an effort to create a sphere of influence for Turkey; at the same time, 17%, the highest among the elite groups, perceives it as a ‘zero problem with neighbours’ policy.

The group of academic elites is the one that values the most the improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. The academics agree with the rapprochement strategy (81.1%), and they describe the current state of affairs between the two countries way as positive. Furthermore, close to three out four (71.7%) suggest that Greece should continue to support Turkey’s EU bid. Finally, this elite group considers an
upcoming crisis as a least likely development; however, if such an event were to occur, as in the case of the other groups, a dispute linked to the Aegean is indicated to be the most likely cause.

10. Final remarks

The data presented here offers some insight into the thinking and mind-set of Greek foreign policy elites towards Turkey as well as Greece’s standing in the world today.

In summarising the results of this inquiry, the following should be noted. First, the responses to the questions regarding to Greece's position in the global system, reveal the conviction by the elites that Greece plays, or should play, a more important and active role in the international arena. Most of the respondents agreed that Greece is a small nation, but with a disproportionally high capability to influence international affairs effectively. Following Holsti’s (1970) framework, we can assume, based on the responses, that there are a number of roles that can be attributed to Greece. The role of Regional Leader is definitely the first and most important one. This role perception is actually consistent with the country’s older foreign policy orientation. Example, in the sense of offering a positive example for other states can be another role, as most respondents suggested that Greece’s commitment to International Law and quality of ideas could influence international politics. Overall, Greek elites share a strong conviction that Greece constitutes a ‘positive’ unit of the international system, in the sense that it abides to its international commitments and defends and promotes International Law.

Second, on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy the survey results indicate a strong distrust and a deeply embedded perception of threat, which seems to be the result of a profound foreign policy activism, strong economic growth and elevated prestige of Turkey at a time when Greece was suffering a major international setback. Moreover, although US-Turkish relations have been deteriorating the belief in Greece is that they remain strong and strategic in nature. As someone would expect, the EU-
Turkey relations are seen as weak. Finally, there also seems to be a strong inclination, among the respondents, towards the assumption that Turkey is distancing itself from the West and is reorienting itself towards the wider Middle East region.

Third, on the democratisation issue of Turkey, Greek elites seem, on the one hand, reluctant to accept the changes regarding democratisation, and, on the other hand, confident that the changes have indeed been realised when the questions concern Turkish foreign policy. In addition, there is high consent that changes in Turkish foreign policy can be attributed to the religious views of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. At the same time, there is a profound indifference with regard to Turkey’s strategies in the wider Middle East. Contrary to expectations because of the upgraded relations with Israel (and) as a result of the breakdown of relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv, the results recorded quite low levels of interest.

Fourth, on the micro-level of Greek-Turkish relations, Greek elites have been quite positive in their treatment of the post-1999 rapprochement strategy, although a continued support for Turkey's EU accession process does not enjoy the same consensus from the respondents. This has most probably to do with the lack of trust that registers strong numbers. The culture of conflict and competition seems hard to break. Interestingly, though, the growth of Turkish economic power is not considered as threatening. Lastly, related to the threat concerns, it is important to note that low threat perceptions are also implied by the fact that, in large, a crisis with Turkey is generally not considered very likely in the next five years.

Finally, special mention should be made to the Cyprus issue. A vast majority of the respondents consider the Cyprus problem a fundamental prerequisite for the normalisations of the bilateral relations.
Many of the conclusions of this study should be enriched with more in-depth findings. A second follow-up phase of this study aims at collecting data by conducting in-depth interviews with leading members of every group.
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Appendix 1

The Questionnaire in its original format in Greek as sent to the respondents

1) Από πολλούς εκφράζεται η άποψη «Η Ελλάδα είναι ένα 'μικρό' έθνος στη διεθνή πολιτική». Εσείς συμφωνείτε ή διαφωνείτε με την άποψη αυτή και σε ποιο βαθμό;

Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως
ΣΤ) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

2) Πιστεύετε ότι η Ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική μπορεί να επηρεάσει τη διεθνή πολιτική;

Α) Ναι
Β) Μάλλον ναι
Γ) Μάλλον όχι
Δ) Όχι
Ε) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

Από τις παρακάτω φράσεις ποια αντιπροσωπεύει περισσότερο τις απόψεις σας, σε ποιο βαθμό συμφωνείτε ή διαφωνείτε με κάθε μια από αυτές τις φράσεις:

3) Η Ελλάδα αν και είναι μικρό έθνος μπορεί να επηρεάσει τη διεθνή πολιτική με την ποιότητα των ιδεών της και την προσήλωσή της στο διεθνές δίκαιο.

Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως
ΣΤ) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

4) Η Ελλάδα αν και είναι μικρό έθνος μπορεί να επηρεάσει τη διεθνή πολιτική επειδή είναι μέλος της ΕΕ και του NATO.

Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως
ΣΤ) ΔΓ/ΔΑ
5) «Σε αντίθεση με πολλές άλλες χώρες, η Ελλάδα ανταποκρίνεται στις διεθνείς της υποχρεώσεις που απορρέουν από τη συμμετοχή της στον ΟΗΕ, το ΝΑΤΟ, την ΕΕ». Συμφωνείτε ή διαφωνείτε με αυτή την άποψη;

A) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος  
B) Μάλλον συμφωνώ  
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ  
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ  
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως  
ΣΤ) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

6) Σε ποιο βαθμό πιστεύετε ότι απασχολούν την ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική παγκόσμια προβλήματα (Αφγανιστάν, Συρία, Υποσαχάρια Αφρική κλπ);

A) Πάρα πολύ  
B) Πολύ  
Γ) Αρκετά  
Δ) Λίγο  
Ε) Ελάχιστα ως καθόλου  
ΣΤ) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

7) Κατά τη γνώμη σας, επιθυμούν οι Έλληνες πολίτες μια ενεργητική εξωτερική πολιτική που να μην περιορίζεται στα «συνήθη» ζητήματα (Ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις, Κυπριακό, Σκοπιανό κλπ);

A) Ναι  
B) Μάλλον ναι  
Γ) Μάλλον όχι  
Δ) Όχι  
Ε) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

8) Πριν την οικονομική κρίση οι Ελληνικές κυβερνήσεις προώθησαν μια στρατηγική «περιφερειακής ηγεσίας» (regional leadership). Έχει μειωθεί και πόσο το κύρος και η επιρροή της χώρας εξαιτίας της οικονομικής κρίσης μετά το 2010;

A) Πάρα πολύ  
B) Πολύ  
Γ) Αρκετά  
Δ) Λίγο  
Ε) Ελάχιστα ως καθόλου  
ΣΤ) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

Σε ποιο βαθμό συμφωνείτε ή διαφωνείτε με κάθε μια από τις παρακάτω απόψεις για την εξωτερική πολιτική της Τουρκίας;

9) Η Τουρκία είναι στρατηγικός εταίρος των ΗΠΑ

A) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος  
B) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

10) Η Τουρκία είναι στρατηγικός εταίρος της ΕΕ
Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

11) Η Τουρκία πρέπει να ενταχθεί στην ΕΕ
Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

12) Η οικονομική ανάπτυξη της Τουρκίας την τελευταία δεκαετία μπορεί να ενισχύσει την διαδικασία εκδημοκρατισμού της. Εσείς συμφωνείτε ή διαφωνείτε με την άποψη αυτή?
Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

13) Κατά την εκτίμησή σας, έχει αλλάξει η τουρκική εξωτερική πολιτική υπό τον R.T. Erdogan;
Α) Ναι
Β) Μάλλον ναι
Γ) Μάλλον όχι
Δ) Όχι
Ε) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

14) Θεωρείτε ότι αυτή η αλλαγή οφείλεται στις θρησκευτικές πεποιθήσεις του τούρκου Πρωθυπουργού και της κυβέρνησης του ΑΚΡ;
Α) Ναι
Β) Μάλλον ναι
Γ) Μάλλον όχι
Δ) Όχι
Ε) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

15) Κατά την άποψή σας, το «Δόγμα Νταβούτογλου» σημαίνει:
Α) Μηδενικά προβλήματα με τους γείτονες της Τουρκίας
Β) Η Τουρκία επιχειρεί να δημιουργήσει μία σφαίρα επιρροής
Γ) Αναβίωση της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας
Δ) Δεν γνωρίζω/δεν απαντώ

Σε ποιο βαθμό συμφωνείτε ή διαφωνείτε με κάθε μια από τις παρακάτω απόψεις για τη θέση της Τουρκίας ανάμεσα στη Δύση και το μουσουλμανικό κόσμο.

16) Η Τουρκία απομακρύνεται από τη Δύση και στρέφεται προς το Μουσουλμανικό κόσμο
Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

17) Η Τουρκία μπορεί να λειτουργήσει ως γέφυρα μεταξύ της Δύσης και του Μουσουλμανικού κόσμου
Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

18) Η Τουρκία ως μέλος του Συμβουλίου Ασφαλείας του ΟΗΕ ψήφισε κατά της επιβολής κυρώσεων εναντίον του Ιράν. Εσείς πώς κρίνετε την στάση αυτή της Τουρκίας;
Α) Θετικά
Β) Μάλλον θετικά
Γ) Ούτε θετικά ούτε αρνητικά
Δ) Μάλλον αρνητικά
Ε) Αρνητικά
ΣΤ) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

19) Οι σχέσεις της Τουρκίας με το Ισραήλ τα τελευταία χρόνια επιδεινώνονται. Συμφωνείτε με αυτή τη στρατηγική της Τουρκίας;
Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως
ΣΤ) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

20) Συμφωνείτε με την στρατηγική προσέγγισης με την Τουρκία που εφαρμόζει από το 1999 η Ελλάδα;

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Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

21) Θα χαρακτηρίζατε τις σημερινές σχέσεις Ελλάδας-Τουρκίας ως:

Α) Καλές
Β) Μάλλον καλές
Γ) Ούτε καλές ούτε κακές
Δ) Μάλλον κακές
Ε) Κακές
ΣΤ) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

Σε ποιο βαθμό συμφωνείτε ή διαφωνείτε με τις παρακάτω απόψεις για τις σχέσεις Ελλάδας – Τουρκίας.

22) Η Ελλάδα πρέπει να υποστηρίζει σταθερά την ένταξη της Τουρκίας στην ΕΕ

Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

23) Η Ελλάδα μπορεί να εμπιστευτεί την Τουρκία

Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

24) Η μεγάλη οικονομική ανάπτυξη της Τουρκίας είναι προς το συμφέρον της Ελλάδας

Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

25) Η μεγάλη οικονομική ανάπτυξη της Τουρκίας αποτελεί απειλή για την Ελλάδα

Α) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος
Β) Μάλλον συμφωνώ
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως
26) Οι Τουρκικές άμεσες επενδύσεις στη Ελλάδα (πχ. Τουρισμός) είναι απειλή για τα ελληνικά εθνικά συμφέροντα και θα πρέπει να εμποδιστούν

A) Είμαι απόλυτα σύμφωνος  
B) Μάλλον συμφωνώ  
Γ) Ούτε συμφωνώ ούτε διαφωνώ  
Δ) Μάλλον διαφωνώ  
Ε) Διαφωνώ απολύτως

27) Κατά τη γνώμη σας, πόσο σημαντική είναι η επίλυση του Κυπριακού για τη βελτίωση των ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων;

A) Πάρα πολύ σημαντική  
B) Πολύ σημαντική  
Γ) Αρκετά σημαντική  
Δ) Λίγο ως ελάχιστα σημαντική  
Ε) Καθόλου σημαντική

28) Πόσο πιθανό θεωρείτε ένα θερμό επεισόδιο μεταξύ Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας την επόμενη πενταετία;

Α) Βέβαιο  
Β) Πολύ πιθανό  
Γ) Πιθανό  
Δ) Λίγο πιθανό  
Ε) Απίθανο  
ΣΤ) ΔΓ/ΔΑ

29) Σε ποιο βαθμό μπορεί να επηρεάσει κάθε ένα από τα παρακάτω στην εκδήλωση θερμού επεισώδιου μεταξύ Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας.

Αιγαίο (οριοθέτηση, ΑΟΖ, ενέργεια κλπ)

Α) Πολύ  
Β) Αρκετά  
Γ) Όχι και τόσο  
Δ) Καθόλου

Θράκη

Α) Πολύ  
Β) Αρκετά  
Γ) Όχι και τόσο  
Δ) Καθόλου

Κύπρος
Α) Πολύ
B) Αρκετά
Γ) Όχι και τόσο
Δ) Καθόλου

Εσωτερική κρίση στην Τουρκία

Α) Πολύ
B) Αρκετά
Γ) Όχι και τόσο
Δ) Καθόλου

Και ποιο θα ήταν κατά τη γνώμη σας η πιθανότερη αιτία για ένα θερμό επεισόδιο; (επιλέξτε μόνο μία)

Α) Αιγαίο (οριοθέτηση, ΑΟΖ, ενέργεια, κτλ)
B) Θράκη
Γ) Κύπρος
Δ) Εσωτερική κρίση στην Τουρκία

Appendix 2
The Questionnaire translated into English for the purposes of this study

1. Many express the view that ‘Greece is a ‘small’ nation in international politics’ Do you agree or disagree with this view and to what degree?
A) Totally agree
B) Rather agree
C) Neither agree, nor disagree
D) Rather disagree
E) Totally disagree
F) Don’t know/no opinion

2. Do you believe that Greek foreign policy can influence international politics?
A) Yes
B) Rather yes
C) Rather no
D) No
E) Don’t know/no opinion
Which of the following statements represents your views the best, and to what degree do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

3. Even though Greece is a small nation, it can influence international politics with the quality of its ideas and its commitment to International Law
   A) Totally agree
   B) Rather agree
   C) Neither agree, nor disagree
   D) Rather disagree
   E) Totally disagree
   F) Don’t know/no opinion

4. Even though Greece is a small nation, it can influence international politics because it is a member of the European Union and NATO
   A) Totally agree
   B) Rather agree
   C) Neither agree, nor disagree
   D) Rather disagree
   E) Totally disagree
   F) Don’t know/no opinion

5. ‘In contrast to other countries, Greece meets the international obligations deriving from its participation in the UN, NATO and the EU’. Do you agree or disagree with this view?
   A) Totally agree
   B) Rather agree
   C) Neither agree, nor disagree
   D) Rather disagree
   E) Totally disagree
   F) Don’t know/no opinion

6. To what degree do you believe that global concerns (Afghanistan, Syria, sub-Saharan Africa, etc.) concern Greek foreign policy?
   A) Too much
   B) Much
   C) Somewhat
   D) A little
   E) Minimally/not at all
   F) Don’t know/no opinion

7. In your opinion, do the Greek citizens aspire for a more active foreign policy that is not limited to the ‘usual’ foreign policy issues? (Greek-Turkish relations, Cyprus issue, the name issue with FYR Macedonia, etc.)
   A) Yes
B) Rather yes
C) Rather no
D) No
E) Don’t know/no opinion

8. Before the financial crisis, Greek governments promoted a ‘regional leadership’ strategy. Has the prestige and the influence of the country been influenced due to the economic crisis and what degree?
A) Too much
B) Much
C) Some
D) A little
E) Minimally/not at all
F) Don’t know/no opinion

To what degree do you agree or disagree with each of the following perspectives on the foreign policy of Turkey?

9. Turkey is a strategic partner of the US
   A) Totally agree
   B) Rather agree
   C) Neither agree, nor disagree
   D) Rather disagree
   E) Totally disagree

10. Turkey is a strategic partner of the EU
    A) Totally agree
    B) Rather agree
    C) Neither agree, nor disagree
    D) Rather disagree
    E) Totally disagree

11. Turkey should join the EU
    A) Totally agree
    B) Rather agree
    C) Neither agree, nor disagree
    D) Rather disagree
    E) Totally disagree

12. Turkey’s economic development in the last decade can strengthen its democratisation process. Do you agree or disagree with this view?
    A) Totally agree
    B) Rather agree
    C) Neither agree, nor disagree
    D) Rather disagree
13. In your opinion, has Turkish foreign policy changed under R.T. Erdogan?
A) Yes
B) Rather yes
C) Rather no
D) No
E) Don’t know/no opinion

14. Do you think that this change is due to the Turkish Prime Minister’s and the AKP government’s religious views?
A) Yes
B) Rather yes
C) Rather no
D) No
E) Don’t know/no opinion

15. In your opinion, the ‘Davutoglu Doctrine’ means?
A) Zero problems with Turkey’s neighbours
B) Turkey tries to create a sphere of influence
C) Revival of the Ottoman Empire
D) Don’t know/no opinion

To what degree do you agree or disagree with each of the following perspectives on Turkey’s position between the West and the Muslim world?

16. Turkey distances itself from the East and moves towards the Muslim world
A) Totally agree
B) Rather agree
C) Neither agree, nor disagree
D) Rather disagree
E) Totally disagree

17. Turkey can become a bridge between the West and the Muslim world
A) Totally agree
B) Rather agree
C) Neither agree, nor disagree
D) Rather disagree
E) Totally disagree

18. As a member of the UN Security Council Turkey voted against imposition of sanctions on Iran. How do you judge Turkey’s stance?
A) Positively
B) Rather positively
C) Neither positively, nor negatively
D) Rather negatively
E) Totally negatively
F) Don’t know/no opinion

19. Over the last few years, Turkey’s relations with Israel are worsening. Do you agree with Turkey’s strategy?
A) Totally agree
B) Rather agree
C) Neither agree, nor disagree
D) Rather disagree
E) Totally disagree
F) Don’t know/no opinion

20. Do you agree with the rapprochement strategy Greece is implementing towards Turkey since 1999?
A) Totally agree
B) Rather agree
C) Neither agree, nor disagree
D) Rather disagree
E) Totally disagree

21. How would you characterise current state of Greek-Turkish relations?
A) Good
B) Rather good
C) Neither good, nor bad
D) Rather bad
E) Bad
F) Don’t know/no opinion

To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following views on Greek-Turkish relations?

22. Greece should continue steadily supporting Turkey’s accession to the EU?
A) Totally agree
B) Rather agree
C) Neither agree, nor disagree
D) Rather disagree
E) Totally disagree

23. Greece can trust Turkey
A) Totally agree
B) Rather agree
C) Neither agree, nor disagree
D) Rather disagree
E) Totally disagree

24. Turkey’s vast economic growth is in Greece’s interest
A) Totally agree
B) Rather agree
C) Neither agree, nor disagree
D) Rather disagree
E) Totally disagree

25. Turkey’s vast economic growth constitutes a threat for Greece
A) Totally agree
B) Rather agree
C) Neither agree, nor disagree
D) Rather disagree
E) Totally disagree

26. Turkish direct investments to Greece (e.g. tourism) are a threat to Greek national interests and should be prevented
A) Totally agree
B) Rather agree
C) Neither agree, nor disagree
D) Rather disagree
E) Totally disagree

27. In your opinion, how important is the resolution of the Cyprus issue for the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations?
A) Extremely important
B) Very important
C) Rather important
D) Little or not at all important
E) Not at all important

28. How likely do you consider a crisis between Greece and Turkey within the next five years?
A) Extremely likely
B) Very likely
C) Likely
D) Rather improbable
E) Improbable
F) Don’t know/no opinion
To what degree could each of the following issues impact on the development of a ‘hot’ crisis between Greece and Turkey?

29. Aegean (Delimitation, EEZ, energy, etc.)
   A) Very
   B) A lot
   C) Not so much
   D) Not at all

30. Thrace
   A) Very
   B) A lot
   C) Not so much
   D) Not at all

31. Cyprus
   A) Very
   B) A lot
   C) Not so much
   D) Not at all

32. An Internal crisis in Turkey
   A) Very
   B) A lot
   C) Not so much
   D) Not at all

33. In your opinion, which of the following is the most likely cause for a ‘hot’ crisis? (please select only one option)
   A) Aegean (Delimitation, EEZ, energy, etc.)
   B) Thrace
   C) Cyprus
   D) An internal crisis in Turkey
FIGURE 1: Many express the view that Greece is a ‘small’ nation in international politics. Do you agree or disagree with this view and to what degree?
FIGURE 2: Do you believe that Greek foreign policy can influence international politics?
FIGURE 3: to what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement? ‘Even though Greece is a small nation, it can influence international politics with the quality of its ideas and its commitment to International Law’
FIGURE 4: to what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
‘Even though Greece is a small nation, it can influence international politics because it is a member of the European Union and NATO’
FIGURE 5: ‘In contrast to other countries, Greece meets the international obligations deriving from its participation in the UN, NATO and the EU’. Do you agree or disagree with this view?
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FIGURE 14: Do you think that this change is due to the Turkish PM’s religious views?
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- Don't know/no opinion
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Don't know/no opinion
- Totally negatively
- Rather negatively
- Neither positively, nor negatively
- Rather positively
- Positively
FIGURE 19: Over the last few years Turkey’s relations with Israel are worsening. Do you agree with Turkey’s strategy?
FIGURE 20: Do you agree with the rapprochement strategy Greece is implementing towards Turkey since 1999?
FIGURE 21: How would you characterise current state of Greek-Turkish relations?
**FIGURE 22:** To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following view on Greek-Turkish relations?: ‘Greece should continue steadily supporting Turkey’s accession to the EU’
FIGURE 23: To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following view on Greek-Turkish relations?: ‘Greece can trust Turkey’
FIGURE 24: To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following view on Greek-Turkish relations?: ‘Turkey’s vast economic growth is in Greece’s interest’
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FIGURE 26: To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following view on Greek-Turkish relations?: ‘Turkish direct investments to Greece (e.g. tourism) are a threat to Greek national interests and should be prevented’
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FIGURE 28: How likely do you consider a crisis between Greece and Turkey within the next five years?
FIGURE 29: To what degree could the following issue impact on the development of a ‘hot’ crisis between Greece and Turkey: ‘Aegean (Delimitation, EEZ, energy etc)’
FIGURE 30: To what degree could the following issue impact on the development of a ‘hot’ crisis between Greece and Turkey?: ‘Thrace’
FIGURE 31: To what degree could the following issue impact on the development of a ‘hot’ crisis between Greece and Turkey?: ‘Cyprus’
FIGURE 32: To what degree could the following issue impact on the development of a ‘hot’ crisis between Greece and Turkey?: ‘An internal crisis in Turkey’
FIGURE 33: In your opinion, which of the following is the most likely cause for a ‘hot’ crisis? (please select only one opinion)

- An internal crisis in Turkey
- Cyprus
- Thrace
- Aegean (Delimitation, EEZ, energy etc)