Continuities and Change in Greek political culture: 
PASOK’s modernization paradigm 1996-2004

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ABSTRACT
Throughout the 90s, PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), in common with the other European social democratic parties, has advocated a revisionist approach towards socialism and has placed the 'modernization' of the Greek society high on its political agenda. By focusing on the characteristics of PASOK’s transformation, this paper aims to exemplify the repercussion of this development on its political discourse i.e. the modernization paradigm (ekschronismos).

Key questions will be addressed: What is the significance of ‘modernization’ as a political discourse? What is its empirical documentation and how its methodological use will help us to study and to decipher the role of this political ideology in conjunction with PASOK’s new character, ideological agenda, social base.

The material composing the analysis of this paper derives from empirical research on the speeches delivered and interviews given by the Prime Minister Kostas Simitis and other members of the ‘modernizers group’ and by articles and texts which have been published in the daily press, periodicals and books.

INTRODUCTION
The discussion about the ideology, role and organization of political parties is continuous and classic. The scope and intensity of the challenges currently faced in Western European political parties is exceptionally great, threatening the viability of the manner in which they have traditionally operated and causing them to seek new behaviors and strategies. Ideologies and issues adopted by political parties are of central importance in this new epoch of conversion. Citizens’ preferences do not enter into political decision-making process directly, but are selected and aggregated by political parties into policy packages. The mediating role of the parties refers to this process of segregation and conversion of citizens’ preferences into binding decisions. The two central criteria in democratic theory are thus the responsiveness of parties to citizens’ preferences, and the accountability of parties in government to their pre-electoral pledges. However, the functions which democratic theory accords to political parties in respect of ideologies and issues are both more numerous and at times conflicting (Volkens and Klingemann, 2002, pp. 143-146).

Ideological distances between parties are pivotal to cleavage theory, which diagnosed a ‘freezing’ of major conflict lines after the extension of suffrage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Here, parties are primarily seen as differing in terms of ideologies based upon major and enduring conflicts. Ideologies in this sense represent the core identities of parties and provide blueprints of alternative solutions for current problems of societies. Thus, the party remains the basic component of modern representative society, the necessary entity for political representation and the crucial component that binds together citizens and political power in the quest for political interaction and active participation in the political sphere. The transformation of the character of parties today in the field of ideas, programs, initiatives, messages, symbols and political rhetoric constitutes an expression of societal change.
The shift from the industrial to the post-industrial society and the consequences of modernity in social, economic, political and particularly ideological sphere are paradigmatic in the way that we have to reinvent conceptual and methodological tools to study the changes that are taking place in the institutional and ideological realm of the parties. Moreover, in the Greek case we can add extra reasons that characterize that institutional makeover that is taking place especially in the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium: accession to European Monetary Union (EMU) (the so called European Project) as landmark, the completion of 31 years from the establishment of the Third Greek Republic (Metapolitefsi) in 1974 and also the wide societal demand for the need to modernize and enhance the political culture further are paradigmatic signs of this transformative spirit in Greece. At the beginning of the new millennium Greece stands poised between tradition and modernity, with some institutions, such as the Orthodox Church, rooted in the past, and others, such as the European Union, tugging toward the future. Greece is striving to modernize its economy, culture, party system as it confronts the aftermath of the cold war and the demands of European Union membership.

This paper, consequently, will try to decode and analyze the political discourse of the ‘modernization project’ (eksychronismos) of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) that started when Kostas Simitis was elected as the new party leader, after Papandreou’s death in June 1996, up until March 2004’s electoral victory of New Democracy Party (Nea Democratia). Under Simitis, PASOK presented a renewed image and managed to win the 1996 and subsequently the 2000 elections thus marking the end of millennium and the beginning of the twenty-first century with continuity in government. (Lyrintzis & Nikolakopoulos, 1999). As a result, the new physiognomy of PASOK’s ideology can be analyzed in the following method: between its resolutely catch-all programmatic/ideological profile (the modernization paradigm) the interclassist structure of its organization and electorate and between its ‘programmatic minimalism’ and its ‘electoral maximalism’. I propose that because it is based on this schema, the ‘modernized identity’ of PASOK is not merely conjectural in character.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As mentioned above, with reference to the Greek case, there are special issues that one should account for when analyzing transitions and changes in the party system structures. Issues like the EMU accession as a benchmark for the new era, the need for the ‘Europeanization’ of the party system, the completion of 31 years after the political changeover (Metapolitefsi), the recent confirmation, through elections, of the two party system (i.e. dikommatiko systima), existing since 1977, and also the wide realization of the need for novel, more innovative things in political life which could mobilize the interest in politics and show its critical role in the outcome of vital issues. Greece, together with other countries, had to face a New World as soon as communism collapsed and the bipolar system ended. Citizens, parties, leaders were called to orient themselves in a new political and ideological horizon, based on their experiences and their course in history.
After the fall of the Military Dictatorship in 1974, this prowess of political parties, in combination with the absence of any other agencies with similar capacities, confirmed them as key actors in the strategy to the transition to democracy.

Since its foundation in 1974, PASOK was a party with strong cross-class electoral support, much more so than the socialist parties of central and northern Europe (Moschonas, 2001). PASOK began to mobilize using a radical third world rhetoric after the collapse of the Greek junta in 1974 that combined anti-imperialist populist and a few left-libertarian themes, including some demands of the peace and women’s movements (Clogg, 1987, p.122; Lyrintzis, 1989). When the party performed not so good according to its expectations in the 1974 elections, its leader Andreas Papandreou toned down its rhetoric and ousted several of his radical followers but did little to change the party's basic message (Spourdalakis, 1988, pp.135-9). The more important of the two communist parties, the Greek Communist Party-exterior (KKE-exterior), never represented a serious threat to Papandreou's emerging party because it was incapable of strategic innovation (Spourdalakis, 1988, pp.200-208). In the late 1970s when PASOK had established itself as the key competitor to the bourgeois governing party, New Democracy, and had wiped out other competitors, Papandreou veered to the center and won a parliamentary majority in 1981 after a period of deficit spending, winning another election, and overcoming resistance from the party's own ranks, PASOK was able to embark on a strict austerity policy. Although financial and patronage scandals weakened the party, it still retained enough popular support to give its bourgeois competitor only the thinnest of winning margins after three consecutive national elections between June 1989 and April 1990. Just as in other Mediterranean countries (Spanish Socialist Party-PSOE, Portuguese Socialists-PSP), PASOK's strategic flexibility was built on a centralist system of personal leadership, buttressed by a growing patronage system in the public sector, a recipe for decline also in other socialist parties (Spourdalakis, 1988, pp. 150-159). Papandreou, as party leader could not only anoint and fire members of his central committee (Clogg 1987, p.130), but also avoid holding frequent party conventions (Featherstone 1990, p.187), subduing the labour unions when they rebelled against austerity policy (Featherstone 1990, p.194), and subjecting the party organization to the government apparatus (Lyrintzis 1989; p.44). By the 1980s, the bulk of PASOK members were public employees and; party functionaries (Papadopoulos 1989, p.64). Papandreou ran a system of bureaucratic clientelism (Featherstone 1990, p.101) that tolerated no factional divisions employed the party purely as an electoral machine.

In its electoral history PASOK received a high level of support from the farmers and among the traditional petit bourgeois class, two classes that are particularly strong in Greece and often hostile towards the left in other European countries. But, during the 80s, and particularly after 1984 PASOK’s catch all character weakened. The vote became more class based. From 1981-1993, the structure of the party was of a catch-all nature that enjoyed heavy support within the lower classes. The elections of 1996 were a turning point as far as the sociological profile of the PASOK electorate and its political discourse was concerned. It increased its impact in the middle and upper classes, particularly among those with higher education and the business strata (Moschonas, 2001 and Lyrintzis, 1998). Its new political doctrine ‘modernization’ was presented as a very important characteristic of the new PASOK.
The election (January 1996) of Kostas Simitis, leader of the ‘modernizing wing’ of PASOK, as prime minister by the parliamentary caucus (in place of the seriously ill Papandreou), was the starting point for the overturning of internal party relations. It led to the election of Simitis as president of the party 4th Congress (July 1996), after Papandreou’s death. The intense and passionate but democratic confrontation over succession between the ‘modernizing’ and ‘traditional’ factions during the 4th congress symbolically ‘liberated’ the organization from its past. The ‘epoch of modernization’ (eksychronismos) and the age of Simitis mark a shift in the organizational and ideological tradition of PASOK. The end of the cult of leadership, the recognition of internal dissent and the logic of the majority and of the minority within party lines, shape the new organizational culture of the party. The party’s executive bodies function more collectively. The same applies to the governmental level, for the cabinet and the various collective, governmental organs, the role of which in a system of ‘prime minister-centrism’ has obviously been strengthened (Moschonas, 2002, pp. 357-358). With the election of Simitis the Greek socialists managed to convince society that they alone and not the conservative forces were the reliable expression of ‘modernization’ in the country. Modernization in Greece, as in other countries of southeastern Europe (Sassoon, 1998, p.140), is conceived as the reduction of the distance that separated the country from the, more developed societies of the European Union. After 1996, accession to the euro zone becomes a major goal of the nation upon whose realization the prestige of the country and its national pride depended. The governments of Andreas Papandreou (1993-1995) and of Simitis (from 1996) managed to significantly reduce the high rate of inflation (from 13.7 per cent on 1993 to 4.1 per cent in 2000), to restrict public deficit (103.9 in 2000), to enlarge the GNP (from -1 in 1993 to 4.1 in 2000). With regard to foreign policy, during 1999-2000, it took significant initiatives towards the smoothing out of relations with Turkey. Nevertheless, unemployment reached record levels (11.2 in 2004 as opposed to 8.6 in 1993) and PASOK came into conflict with social groups that formerly constituted its natural social base (farmers, pensioners, workers) mainly with its policy towards changes in the welfare and educational policies. The victory of PASOK in the elections of September 1996 contributed to the stabilization of the new power bloc of the party and the motto of modernization (eksychronismos) appeals as the new ideological drive of PASOK.

THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF PASOK’S MODERNIZATION DISCOURSE

Despite the fact that the concept for modernization of the political system –but also of the Greek society as a whole- is ‘artistically’ spread within the political rhetoric throughout the period following the political changeover (Metapolitefsi), modernization is openly expressed as a request in the inside of a homonymous, active and par excellence political ideology only after the general elections in 1996. PASOK’s modernization policy, constructed around Greek membership in the European Union and programmatic and political priorities, inspired by the neo-liberal paradigm, strengthened its influence among higher social strata and an important section of capital, as well as intellectuals traditionally distrustful of Papandreou’s ‘populist and ‘demagogic’ discourse. (Lyrintzis 1987 & 1993, Fouskas, 1996). Thus,
Simitis’ ‘new PASOK’ has gradually become the party of the ‘contentment society’ (Moschonas, 2002, pp.167-168), while retaining a significant influence among disadvantaged sections of the population (the so called ‘non-privileged’ group; this term was a neologism created by Andreas Papandreou to describe its electoral base in the 1980s and distinguished it from the bourgeois ‘privileged’ social base of New Democracy party), even if it is significantly reduced. On the basis of this demand for political modernization, it appears also that not only the re-election of PASOK in government was effective (elections 2000), but also the initiation of the cognate attempt to renew the features and the party’s political program. Henceforth, the demand for political modernization is used not only as a discourse structure in the pre-election speech for PASOK, but mainly as a legitimizing reference of the state policy itself. But, despite the eight year tenure in office (1996-2004) and the frequent use of the term political modernization, its contents remain of dual meaning and on sight vague. Moreover, another methodological position which is vital for this analysis is the definition and maybe the elucidation not of the term political modernization itself, but of the contents that this term has acquired during its defined ideological use.

The bibliography of the 1960s, 1970s forms a primary source of notional delimitation for the modernization discourse. Even in that case, it is possible to say that the discovery of the notion of political modernization being created inside an expressly theoretical-sociological framework and that this notion is orientated to an equally clear area of reference: the underdeveloped societies. The fundamental distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ is meaningful only as differentiation between the ‘developed’ and the ‘underdeveloped’. The ideological use of the term political modernization today orientates and channels its legitimized reference to the political systems of the developed societies and this is how the strategic distinction between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ interests these societies and especially their political systems. So, in the broader framework of a cold war ideology, if the demand for political modernization coincides with the ‘outreaching the West’, then in the framework of a post-cold war ideology, the demand for political modernization corresponds to and is signaled by the demand of the ‘overcoming’ of the so-called industrial society and the transition to the ‘information-global society’. So, the ideological use of the term ‘modernization’ and, in particular, ‘political modernization’ is distinct and differentiated.

Even though the above argument marks a discontinuity or some kind of sectioning in the ideological uses of the term ‘political modernization’, the function of any political discourse remains always the same as long as its main aim is its appearance under a united form. This aim, in turn, can be break down in the following objectives which constitutes the main arguments of the modernization schema:

(1) Re-formulation and re-definition of the general interest.
(2) Political mobilization of social forces
(3) Re-definition of the major social and political cleavages.

More specifically, as far as it concerns the first objective, the ideology of political modernization is called to rejoin different social interests under one hierarchical form in such a way that the hierarchical relationship appears and is anticipated as if it was the general interest of society (Gravaris, 2002). By adopting the Gramscian terminology, we could support the argument that this objective corresponds to the
'hegemonic function' of the political ideology of modernization. Under these presuppositions, one can consider the two remaining objectives as two separate levels of the first one. More specifically, the political mobilization of the social forces represents this hierarchical relationship of the various social interests as far it concerns the possible or probable ways of their participation in the political system, whereas the re-definition of the major socio-political cleavages represents this hierarchical relationship on its comparison to the ‘rival’- and for this reason they are regarded as pathogenic- hierarchical relationships. So, the ideology of the political modernization is identical to any other political ideology regarding its form. However, this is not the case, if the extension turns to the contents of the ideology of political modernization. In addition, the examination of these contents sheds light on the particular character of this ideology. The contents of the discourse of political modernization are initially presented as joint-statements of the term and crop up during the use of the request for political modernization (Gravaris, 2002). We are talking about partial and on sight self-contained references to aspects of society and also to essential aspects of the political system, which operate in the form of legitimized references. Such legitimizing references are observed during the conjunction of the demand for political modernization with phrases like ‘Information-Global Society’, ‘Civil Society’, ‘deepening of democratic structures’ ‘Governance’, ‘New Public Management’ and especially the use of the term ‘Centre-Left’ and its renewing meaning in the discourse schema, all parts of rhetoric commonly used and presented in the speeches delivered by the ‘modernizers’ group and prime minister Simitis. The alterations of PASOK’s political rhetoric during the period in question (1996-2004) are various and determinative of its need/effort to create a new ideological-programmatic formula which attempts to synthesize and combine three basic thematic configurations: The first, which originates within the classical socialist tradition, is oriented towards development and the traditional values and goals of the left, including social equality, social justice the strengthening of the welfare state and the increase in employment. The second is inspired by the neo-liberal (priority to the market, currency stabilization, reform of the public sector, a rigorous discourse that encourages sacrifice). The third is inspired by the agenda of cultural liberalism and post-materialism (human rights discourse) . The ‘modernizers’ attempt to correlate this new ideology with the ‘hard cell’ of the political system -i.e the state and state-society relations. Henceforth, the legitimizing reference which arises from the use of the term ‘Centre-Left’ attempts to correlate the ideology of modernization with the new political discourse that was adopted by most social democratic parties in Europe inspired by Antony Giddens project ‘the third way’ as a means of rethinking socialism. After coming to power 1997, New Labour Party with Tony Blair as its leader, embarked on an ambitious course of political reform and modernization. While maintaining a commitment to the values of social justice and solidarity, the government sought to engage with the realities of the new global order. It recognized that the old politics was out of line with the challenges of the new era. Like more than a dozen other European governments, New Labour wanted to move beyond the traditional political categories of left and right and embark on a new brand of centre-left politics. Because this approach tried to avoid customary political divides, it is often referred to as third way politics. There are six main dimensions to third way politics (Giddens, 1998, pp. 11-28):
1 Reconstruction of government: Active government is required to meet the needs of a rapidly changing world, yet government should not be exclusively associated with top-down bureaucracies and national policies. Dynamic forms of management and administration, such as those sometimes found in the business sector, can work with government in defending and revitalizing the public sphere.

2. The cultivating of civil society: Government and the market alone are not enough to solve the many challenges in late modern societies. Civil society - the realm outside the state and market - must be strengthened and joined up with government and business. Voluntary groups, families and civic associations can play vital roles in addressing community issues from crime to education.

3. Reconstruction of the economy: The third way envisages a new mixed economy characterized by a balance between government regulation and deregulation. It rejects the neoliberal view that deregulation is the only way to ensure freedom and growth.

4. Reform of the welfare state: While it is essential to protect the vulnerable through the provision of effective welfare services, the welfare state must be reformed in order to become more efficient. Third way politics looks towards a 'society of care' while acknowledging that old forms of welfare were often unsuccessful in reducing inequalities, and controlled, rather than empowered, the poor.

5 Ecological modernization: Third way politics rejects the view that environmental protection and economic growth are incompatible. There are many ways that a commitment to defending the environment can generate jobs and stimulate economic development.

6. Reform of the global system: In an era of globalization, third way politics looks to new forms of global governance. Transnational associations can lead to democracy above the level of the nation-state and can allow greater governance of the volatile international economy.

Third way politics emerged against the backdrop of a double political crisis. The revolutions of 1989 revealed that socialism was not a viable approach to economic organization, yet the unchecked enthusiasm for the free market favoured by neo-liberal conservatives was also flawed. The modernizing agenda of third way politics adopted in Britain and elsewhere was an attempt to respond creatively to the forces of globalization. It sought to harness the energy behind these transformations to revitalize the workings of government and democracy. This idea of finding a third way in politics, however, has been widely criticized. Many Conservatives see the new politics as largely empty of content, political posturing rather than a policy program with real bite. Some on the more traditional left, on the other hand, believe that the third way does too little to deal with problems of inequality and insecurity. They believe that ‘Old Labour’ is still superior to the new
version. Giddens ‘Third Way’ agenda, posits new ideological ways for social democratic parties to be achieved not by abandoning core positions of social democracy, but by adding issues not included in the traditional left-right divide. A renewed social democracy has to be left of centre, because social justice and emancipatory politics remain at its core.

The new post 1996- PASOK tried to incorporate most of the above principles in its agenda. It is characteristic the speech that Simitis gave in the conference for the Progressive Governance for the XXI Century in Berlin, were in June 2000 the heads of 14-reform-minded social democratic governments met in Berlin at the invitation of Federal Chancellor Schröder, to share experiences in rethinking socialism and discussing about Third Way Politics and Progressive Governance for the new millennium. (See the summit resolution in Gerhard Schroder (ed.) Progressive Governance for the XXI Century. Contributions to the Berlin Conference). Third way politics was part of PASOK’s modernization project and one of the key issues for the ‘modernizers group’ was the effort to try to re-define the traditional left-right divide which has always been perceived as the main dividing line in Greek Politics.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES: RE-DEFINING TRADITIONAL POLITICAL CLEAVAGES -LEFT AND RIGHT-

The use of the term ‘Centre-Left’ is paradigmatic in the ideological core of the modernization paradigm. Following the Left-Right divide (which have always been perceived as the main dividing lines in Greek politics) one may obtain a first view of the Greek party system. This view may be superficial and misleading to the extent that these labels are used by the political actors and the parties for self identification and the construction of political identities. Yet the use of these labels over a period of three decades and the variations in emphasis and meaning provide a first account of the development of Greek party politics (Lyrintzis, 2005). PASOK ideological shift from classical socialism to modernized social democracy can be understood via this methodological concept.

In the Greek political system of the post-war era until the end of the 1980s, the competition between the political forces, the practices of the political parties and the political behaviour of the citizens was over-defined by the major political cleavage ‘Right –Anti-Right’. Despite its simplistic character the segregation ‘Right-Anti-Right’ echoed typical traits of the Greek political life, like the Civil War, the post-civil war political system with its usual deviations from the rules of parliamentary system, the seven-year dictatorship (1967–1974) and the demand for a functional rehabilitation of a ‘fair’ and ‘democratic state’ with the elevation to the government of the winners of the Second World War who, at the same time, were the losers of the Civil War (Moschonas, 2000 pp.159-179 and Demertzis, 2000 pp.40-65) So, in the divisional scheme of ‘Right-Anti-Right’ there exists the demand for democratization of the Greek political system with the participation of all those who had been excluded by the structures and the operation of the post-civil war state. This demand appeared to be satisfied during ‘Allagi (Change)’ (Allagi was a motto that signified a whole era, the 1980s and was used by Andreas Papandreou to denote the transition from the old corrupted regime to the new, democratic political environment that he had envisaged) period in 1981, with the rise of PASOK to government, which is what the government called upon for the representation of these excluded forces. (Lyrintzis,
Democratization, however, was limited to the guarantee of the form of the fair state and to the smooth operation of parliamentary system, without expanding at the same time to the reforming of the structures of the state policy, inherited intact by the post-civil war political system. On the contrary, the practice of PASOK’s governments during the 1980s clearly showed the use of such state policy structures to achieve and realize its own, this time, targets.

The introduction of the term ‘Centre-Left’ as a political and ideological compass for PASOK from 1996, aims firstly to weaken and secondly to neutralize the major cleavage of ‘Right-Anti-Right’ as a ‘traditional’ trend and to shift the ideological pendulum in a new modern scale of reference.

A first differentiation in the ideological function of the two cleavages, the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ one, is that the ‘Right-Anti/Right’ divide, aimed at the mobilization of the party voters and the legitimation of PASOK’s rhetoric, irrespective of its governmental practice, while the divide ‘Centre-Left vs. Centre-Right’ aims primarily at the legitimation of the governmental choices of PASOK and secondly at the mobilization of its voters.

The two new elements that the term ‘Centre-Left’ brings to the ideology of political modernization are the following: first its self-definition as a post-cold war ideology and second, the semantic identification of the first synthetic ‘Centre-’ with the famous ‘New Social Centre-Neue Mitte’. The term was created by the Third Way thinkers (Giddens, Hombach, Beck) as a new class orientated paradigm for the renewed social democratic project of the 21st century. They argue that the ‘centre’ should not be regarded as empty of substance. Rather, they are talking of the alliances that social democrats can weave from the threads of lifestyle diversity. Traditional as well as novel political problems need to be thought about in this way. The concept of the Neue Mitte developed by Schröder (leader of the SPD party in Germany and chancellor since 1998), is of course, partly an electoral label aimed at eliciting a positive response from the mass media and increasing the reach of the SPD within the middle classes. But it also reflects the conviction that fresh ways of approaching deep-rooted political dilemmas had to be found once in government. One reason for this derives from the continuing demise of the politics of class. The traditional working class, defined in terms of attitude and political orientation, is now thought to represent less than five per cent of the German public (Meyer, 2001, pp.50-67). Working class communities with uniform political preferences have been replaced over the course of recent decades by large number of political groupings, none of which exhibits an automatic tendency to support social democratic policies (Meyer, 2001, pp.70-88). Both the working class and the middle class are now made of a range of socio-cultural groups with very different attitudes to life, work and politics. They are now classified as ‘materialists’, ‘post materialist’, ‘post-modernists’. It is widely thought that members of these new social groupings are liable to move between different parties depending on their political image and performance. In order to obtain more than forty per cent of the popular vote the SPD had to perform the political somersaults necessary to bind together a number of these different political groupings. In contrast, it is thought that other parties face a much less fragmented core vote like the post-1996 PASOK.
The self-definition of the ideological domain of reference of the term ‘Centre-Left’ as a post-cold war term contains the significant reasons why the cleavage ‘Right-Anti/Right’ is rejected as ‘traditional’ by Simitis and the ‘modernizers’. The first of these reasons lies on the fact that the end of the post-cold war era is exclusively defined by the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and is thus internalized by the ideology of political modernization as a self-explained loss of the left or the old socialist ideology and policy. The second reason, which is a result of the first, lies on the fact that this same collapse leaves the ‘Right-Anti/Right’ cleavage without a meaning, and this is because the latter is conceived primarily by the events and the developments of the post-civil war period in Greece, which in turn is defined by the political and ideological expediences of the Cold War period. Within this framework, the semantic meaning of the second synthetic ‘-left’ is weakened in favour of the first synthetic ‘Centre-’.

This ‘legitimatization deficit’ that characterizes the use of the term ‘Centre-Left’ in the context of modernization ideology becomes more evident, if the use of this term is approached regarding its correlation with the party organization structure. If there existed a ‘traditional’ form of party organization that coincided with the ‘mass-party’ type and which corresponded to the ‘traditional’ heretical cleavage ‘Right-Anti/Right’, then a ‘modern’ type of party corresponds to the modern political cleavage of ‘Centre Left-Centre Right’, which tends to coincide with the types of the ‘network-party’ or the ‘cartel-party’ model. This equivalence implies two different forms of mobilization of the social forces. In this way, the mobilization of social forces for the ‘mass-party’ within the party organization is intense and dense. In spite of the oligarchic structure in which this massive participation is being finally crystallized, the operation of the mass-party requires the active participation of the citizens/party members in the political life. The cleavage ‘Right-Anti / Right’ and its cognate form of the mass-party type shows the need for the continuous mobilization of the party base, but also for the presence of such a type of party organization which would have primary functions to educate and appoint political executives, who would have initially been tested as party executives.

On the contrary, the party form of organization coinciding that of the party-network, is of a horizontal organization form without a broad party base. The latter is mobilized occasionally and only in a ceremonial manner (party conventions, pre-election manifestations). Allocated executives or organizations outside the party mechanism here perform the ceremonies that were organized and the roles played by the party basis in the case of the mass-party type. The latter is limited to top executives, while its relation with the citizens/voters are mediated by opinion poll companies, advertising offices, spin doctors and mass media. The participation of the citizens in the organization of the party is no longer required for the choice of political executives, as the latter are selected from a network, which is reachable for all the range of the party’s potential. The disregard to the ‘Right – Anti / Right’ cleavage as ‘traditional’ and its following distancing from the organizational form of the mass-party type, was attempted by the ideology of political modernization through the criticism that political modernization exerted on populism as a practice lacking clarity and defined targets and bypassing the institutions in the name of the people. However, even in this case, the exerted criticism was consumed in the forms rather than the essence of populism.
Finally, under the prism of the time distance that has been covered, popular radicalism which characterized PASOK from approximately the middle 1970s until the end of the 1980s was a distorted recognition of political rights, which had been limited with respect to their power by the governments of the ‘Right’ until that time. The limit and the truth in popular radicalism lies on the absence of mobilization of the social forces that had interests involved in the democratic modernization of the political system. On the other hand, the priorities inside PASOK’s ideology of political modernization seem to have been reversed, despite the fact that the political result is identical. So, even though the primary target is the modernization of the political system, this attempt shows that there is need of not only the mobilization of these social forces that would gain from the democratic modernization, but also of all the social forces, in general. This remains one of the basic elements that require substantiation and further interpretation that exceeds the limits of this paper.

PASOK can be described as an interesting paradigm one can use in order to assess Greece’s political culture and party system change. Ideological transformations and alternations can be identified in its socio-political profile, being a party of many faces from classical ‘centrist’ to classical ‘social democratic’ and so on. Populist components can be found in its historical past [(i.e the oversimplification of the domestic social ground, ‘the people’ against the ‘oligarchy’, the defensive nationalism the ‘people’ and the ‘nation’ threatened by ‘foreign’ powers the demagogy, the all-powerful ‘plebiscite’ leadership of Andreas Papandreou around which the organization and electoral supply of the party was built (Moschonas, 1999)]. At the same time PASOK was a modern party that contributed significantly to the institutional and cultural modernization of Greece. (Moschonas, 1999).

IN CONCLUSION

PASOK’s political discourse has reinvented and flourished with euphemisms many times if one studies its history. One apparent example is the phrase ‘socialism with human face’ that contributed to its affiliation with the social strata. In the version of socialism, the ‘human face’ referred to the faith of PASOK of the 1980s, to the political pluralism of parliamentary democracy and the personal freedoms that were connected to it. In the case of modernization, the ‘human face’ was used as a declaration for the social sensitivity of the government for the effects that the stabilization policy (EMU) may have on the poor classes of the population.

Another element, which differentiates the ‘modernized’ PASOK from the one of the past, is the area of its social (base) reference. The concept of ‘the people’ as a subject for history is lost or re-invented too. The ‘nation’ now takes the place of the ‘people’. An elucidating example of the new ideology is the characterization of the policy regarding the accession to the EMU, as a national policy. Taking into account this perspective, the mutual recessions and the social compromises are considered as conditions for the salvage of the nation, rather than the people. Of course, we should note that the meaning of ‘the people’ has no clearer social substance than the one of ‘the nation’. However, it is unquestionable that the social segregations were self-obvious in the ‘old’ PASOK, which identified itself with only one part of the people, namely the non-privileged one. In the ‘modernizers’ political rhetoric such social divisions and references are rare. An additional element that characterizes PASOK today is its internal organizational reform. The aim of this attempt is the breaking of the old party structure, which was orientated towards the state power and its benefits.
This structure was organized in such a way that the easy communication between the party and the government power was guaranteed; this structure was responsible for the nepotism phenomena of the 1980s that were heavy criticized by the new party leadership (Simitis).

According to the ‘modernizers’ within PASOK, the modernization of the country requires the reform of the party itself and its transition into a ‘new’ modern party. The ‘modernization period’ proved a turning point in PASOK’s course; it marks a shift from the socialist-populist period to one characterized by the pragmatism, a managerial discourse and a technocratic approach all packed in a project for the modernization, rationalization and Europeanization of the Greek society and economy (Lyrintzis, 2005). The PASOK governments under Simitis, accomplished the main task which was the stabilization of the economy according to Maastricht criteria and the entry of the country in the European Monetary System. This effort was successful as also was the next target concerning Cyprus’ entry in the EU (Lyrintzis, 2005). But in contrast ‘modernization’ project was in fact defined in a negative rather than a positive manner. Modernization was opposed to the old populist practices as well as to the conservative block represented by the New Democracy (Nea Democratia) party. On the positive side it was identified with progress and PASOK was presented as the champion of the ‘progressive’ forces in Greek society. However, irrespective of the objections one may have with the evolutionary connotations of ‘modernization’ and its identification with progress, the fact is that it was not translated into concrete policies in major areas of public life. The areas of education and health provide good examples where contested reforms were introduced only to be later modified and partly implemented. (Lyrintzis, 2005).

The electoral result in 2004, the end of PASOK’s ‘reign’ and the electoral victory of New Democracy party (Nea Democratia) signals the start of a new project for further re-definition and modernization of its political ideology under the auspices of its new party leader, George Papandreou, the son of the founder of the movement Andreas Papandreou. The emergence of the idea of ‘associative democracy’ introduced by George Papandreou creates a new typology that is open for analysis and interpretation. Consequently, as Moschonas argues assessing PASOK political ideology, the dominance of radicalism gave way to the ‘national populism’ of the 1980s and the domination of European pragmatisms and modernization after 1993, and primarily in 1996, under Simitis leadership. PASOK has been a party of many faces -often giving the impression of a political chameleon -something that denotes its strong and dynamic identity. (Moschonas, 2002). The constant anxiety and agony in today’s party system in Greece especially in the identity struggle maybe constitutes the need for a new type of party to emerge.
REFERENCES


NOTES

1. One way of defining modernity or modernization is to see it in association with social processes and arrangements that were institutionalized on a large scale in Western Europe after the English Industrial and French Revolutions. These entailed unprecedented social mobilization as the various exiting pre-industrial localisms were weakened or destroyed and the majority of people brought into the more encompassing arenas of the national market and the nation state. The terms modernity and modernization are not used in this paper in the Parsonian, neo-evolutionist sense (i.e., not in terms of structural functional differentiation on the way from simple/primitive to complex societies). But rather, they are used as historically oriented sociologists [R. Bendix, B. Moore] or sociologically-orientated historians [E. Hobsbawm] have used them in trying to identify the qualitative differences between industrial and pre-industrial societies. See R. Bendix, Nation building and Citizenship. New York: Action Books, 1970.

2. In this paper political culture is considered to be the complex set of orientations and discourses that actors use while trying to make sense of, to account for, or to legitimize/delegitimize prevailing political arrangements. See Mouzelis N. Sociological theory: What went wrong? Diagnosis and Remedies. London 1995. pp. 50-8.

3. During the initial phases of the period following the political changeover (Metapolitefsi), the demand for modernization was escorted and covered by co-ordinate requests like the one for the joining of the EEC and later, the request for “Allagi- Change”. In the middle of the 1980s and within the framework of the splitting of the KKE Esoterikou (Inland) and the formation of the EAR, the demand for modernization is placed in relation to the pre-election rhetoric of the reformative Left. The question remaining for further investigation is how much the political use of the “modernization demand” played an important role during the democratic consolidation period. See R. Gunther-N. Diamantouros-H.J.Puhle [eds], The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, John Hopkins Uni. Press, Baltimore, 1995.

“traditional” on the one hand and the “modern” on the other form of political culture that dominates Greece since its formation as an independent state (cultural dualism).


9 A. Georgiadou, “From the party of the entrenched members to the network-party. Aspects of the organizational reform of the political parties in late-modernity”. Science and Society, autumn 2000 - spring 2001, issue 5-6μ, pp. 203-235, where the relevant bibliography is presented and examined.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

At present, I am concluding my PhD thesis at the University of Athens, Faculty of Law, Department of Political Science and Public Administration and my research topic is concerned with the Institutions and Political Culture in the ’90s in Greece with special reference to PASOK’s modernization process from 1996-2004. I followed my MPhil, MSc and Diploma in Political Sociology and Methods of Social Research at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Before that I did my first degree BA (Hons) on Sociology and Political Studies at the University of London. In 2005 I obtain a fellowship grant (2005-2008) for my PhD as Junior Researcher at the National Centre of Social Research (EKKE /NSCR) under the auspices of the “Reinforcement Programme of Human Research Manpower” (PENED 2003/ 3rd Community Support Programme) with the title “Political Action and Behaviour in the new European framework; elections, political parties and interest groups in modern Greece». During the academic year 2005-2006 I have lectured in the course of “Comparative Politics”- by Prof. Ch. Lyrantzis, in the NKUoA. My research interests focus on Contemporary Greek Politics; Contemporary Greek Public Policy; Economic & Monetary Union; European Union Politics; Cultural Change and Democracy; Global Civil Society; Processes of Europeanization. From 2007 I have obtain a Marshall Memorial Fellowship (European Memorial fellow) from the German Marshall Fund of the United States.