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Changing social cleavages and the formation of electoral behavior in Greece of the late “Metapolitefsis” (1996 – 2007).

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The notion of social cleavages is a fundamental aspect of contemporary political science. Scholars, since the 1980s, have engaged themselves in the process of interpreting what a social cleavage is, and consequently how social cleavages influence electoral behavior, patterns of party organization, and above all party systems. This paper, shortly analyzes the concept of social cleavages, based on the elaboration of the theories that emerged for their interpretation. Hence, it seeks to incorporate the essence of interpreting social cleavages in the in-depth examination of the Greek political system, its inner social divisions and the analogous electoral behavior of the Greek citizens. In other words, this paper, intends to examine a connection between the indisputable social reforms and the ongoing nature of Greece’s social divisions, in a theoretical, as well as, in a tangible framework.

The evolution of social cleavages that characterize Greece from the era of the early ‘Metapolitefsis’ up to the mid 1990s and the subsequent changes in the voting behavior of Greece’s electorate are the fundamental axes that concern this paper.

What follows is a brief analysis of the concept of social cleavages and the transitional trajectory from patterns of stability to patterns of change. Right after the theoretical analysis of social cleavages, what follows is an overview of Greece’s special political characteristics and mainly the four parliamentary parties that constitute the country’s predominant political forces. Finally, the last section of this paper is dedicated to the methodological tools and the suggested scientific methods that are going to be used for the adequate completion of the PhD thesis.

**Social Cleavages: decline or concealed persistence of traditional cleavage structure importance? From patterns of persistence to change?**

The concept of social cleavages was introduced in 1967 by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in their renowned scientific article: «Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments”. Since then, the concept of cleavages acquired essential salience for the world of political science. «The notion of a cleavage implies much more than a mere division, more even than an outright conflict» (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2006: 264). For Lipset and Rokkan, a cleavage contains three tangible connotations: «First, a cleavage involves a social division

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1 The term ‘Metapolitefsis’ denotes the contemporary era of Greece’s history, since the demise of the military coup in 1974 up to nowadays.
that separates people who can be distinguished from one another by key social structural characteristics. Second, the groups involved in the division must be conscious of their collective identity and must be willing to act on this basis. Third, a cleavage must be expressed in organizational terms» (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2006: 264-265). Apart from the above characteristics that constitute a cleavage, Lipset and Rokkan introduced four basic types of traditional cleavages: i) The Centre - Periphery cleavage, ii) the Rural - Urban cleavage, iii) the Church - State cleavage, and iv) finally the Class, Workers - Owners, cleavage. It needs to be mentioned that the notion ‘traditional’, clarifies the most essential, historically speaking, trend of formulating the patterns of electoral behavior. Since the 1920s and the establishment of the massive suffrage, until the post war era, and especially until the end of the 1960s, the traditional social cleavages indisputably characterize the majority of the Western democracies, setting thus the rules of the electoral game.

The plethora of massive social, economical and subsequently political changes that took place in the post war decades from the 1960s and onwards in the majorities of the Western European democracies, led to the emergence of academics arguments that illustrated the declining salience of the traditional social cleavages. Therefore in 1984, R. Inglehart was the first who noticed and argued for the ongoing, changing structures of the social cleavages. Hence, in his article «the changing structure of political cleavages in Western Society», Inglehart asserted that «there are evidences of a diffusive essential change from material to post material needs among the world of the progressive industrial societies» (Inglehart, 1984: 27, in Dalton et al).

Hanspeter Kriesi recognizes the emergence of moral – value cleavages, implying however, at the same time, that this change does not necessarily means the end of structured politics and social divisions. On the contrary, Kriesi asserts that the new cleavages have emerged from the political heritage of the traditional ones (Kriesi, 1998:165). The decline of the traditional cleavages importance and the parallel emergence of new value – moral cleavages, are strongly interconnected with the emergence of a ‘new middle class’, «that constitutes the major population fragment in the Western European democracies» (Kriesi, 1998: 168). In a similar post – materialist vain, Dalton argues for the emergence of a new more modern and more politically sophisticated electorate that holds an enhanced individual economic status, and has access, particularly through television, to a huge amount of information regarding politics. Consequently, this more educated and with a higher quality of life electorate, acts more as an individual, rather than on a collective and sub cultural basis. «Hence, the old politics, based on a massive scale on the class cleavage, are being replaced by some new politics, based on a whole of social cleavages» (Dalton et al, 1984: 21).

In a more neutral stance between ‘stability’, on the one hand, and ‘change’, on the other hand, Franklin expresses an alternative point of view. He acknowledges that «from 1970s

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2 It proved to be the most important, as it signified the political systems of Europe, from the 1920s and the establishment of massive suffrage, since the modern era (Marks, Wilson, 2000: 173).
3 The term individual can be in turns be reflected here as a ‘process of individualization of the voters’ (Sjoblom), or as ‘a process of αστικοποίησης of the voters’ (Lipset, Mair).
4 Meaning the social cleavage Workers – Owners.
and onwards, change became the normal pattern in many countries» (Franklin et al, 1992: 7). However, he conceives the nature of the changes occurred in a different way from that of the proponents of post-materialism. For Franklin, social change should not be arbitrarily connected with political change, «in a sense that electoral volatility, which seems to be only bloc volatility» (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2006) and the change in voting behavior does not necessarily mean the emergence of new cleavages. It rather means that the traditional cleavages had become less relevant to partisanship, and the massive decline in their importance is indissolubly associated with the wide ‘decolorization’ of the citizens’ ideology.

However, the arguments for the potential stability, persistence of traditional social structure, in the contemporary Western European polities, still remain inadequate, as they neglect the significant social changes that took place in a worldwide level since the 1970s. The emergence of a new middle class, the ‘embourgeoisement’ of the blue collars (Sjoblom, Kriesi), the advent of the T.V. and the evolution of the mass media, created, more or less, mental shifts in the social structures of the Western contemporary democracies. These changes profoundly shape the electoral behavior and the idiosyncrasy of the voters, which increasingly started to act more and more as individuals, neglecting their collective identity (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2006: 284). The working class, started to adopt middle – class lifestyles, or even in some cases a bourgeois lifestyle. The insurance of material needs, remained the first priority for all social classes, and at the same time post- materialist, moral, value needs, required a steadily increased salience.

Putting it all together, in the context of the theoretical dialog, on the one hand the advocates of the traditional cleavage structure’s persistence neglected the emergence of new social strata and their post-materialist needs. On the other hand, post – materialists neglect the fact, that ‘value cleavages’ can only be conceived as extensions, and not potential substitutes of the traditional-materialist cleavages. Moreover, post-materialism, perceives traditional cleavages only as materialist, socio-economic or demographic. On the contrary, Bartolini and Mair, acknowledge the existence of ideological and cultural factors within them. «By treating a cleavage such as class, as being primarily socio-economic or demographic – such a perspective neglects the fact that ideological or cultural factors, lie at the very root of any definition of self-awareness» (Bartolini, Mair, 2000: 214). Therefore, «the imputed opposition between ‘value’ cleavages, on the one hand and economic cleavages on the other obscures more than it reveals» (Bartolini, Mair, 2000: 214). The societal and political divisions that are incorporated in the concept of traditional cleavages are intrinsic with the very nature of our political world. Hence, traditional cleavages would probably never be fundamentally substituted by new value or ethical types of cleavages. Even though, the changing nature of our societies, would in certain cases provoke the emergence of new value cleavages that might acquire considerable importance. «We can see that contemporary Western European politics is characterized at least as much by continuity, as it is by change» (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2006: 296).
Theories of social cleavages and party response to them within in Greece:

Greece’s distinct political spectrum seems a scientifically intriguing case for conducting a research regarding the existing social cleavages. The intriguing case lies to the articulation of the traditional cleavages’ very nature within the Greek context, as well as, to the apparent decline in their salience and the constantaneous emergence of new ones. Moreover, the texture of the new emerged cleavages could not be totally collated with the emergence of value, post materialistic cleavages, since the mid 1990s. This paper intends to contemplate the characteristics and features of the pre – ‘Metapolitefsis‘ existing social divisions of the Greek society, the examination of a potential degradation of their importance and the subsequent emergence of new social divisions from 1996 to 2007. Hence, what needs to be initially determined is what exactly started to forfeit its importance, before examining what actually emerged to take its place or complement its declined persistence. Additionally, what need to be illustrated are the main reasons that led this research proposal to decide on the era 1996-2007 for the examination of the transition from stability to change hypothesis.

The special features of the traditional social cleavages in Greece:

On sight, Greece holds a lifelong tradition of democratic regimes, as the concept of parliamentary democracy has been dialectically formulated in the Western world. This is to say, that Greece’s polity has been historically embedded under the liberal principals of the French revolution, as well as, by the class stratification that took place under the industrialization process of the early 20th century. However, Greece’s class stratification earned a distinct dimension compared to the other Western democracies, due to the country’s poor industrial production. Since the collapse of the military junta in 1974 and the establishment of democracy, the majority of the Greek citizens were poor, uneducated farmers, and only a small proportion of Greece’s total population, mostly dwellers of large cities, could be conceived as typical proletariats. Correspondingly, only a small proportion of large cities dwellers could be conceived as bourgeois strata, not only economically, but also socially speaking. Therefore, the increased salience of the agricultural production, a process that is geographically connected far away from large cities and the poor country’s industrial performance induces the unification of two traditional cleavages: The Rural – Urban cleavage and the Workers – Owners cleavage.

The existence of the Greek Orthodox Church designates another abnormality of Greece, compared to the Western European democracies and the way in which Catholicism signifies their polities. One the one hand, Orthodoxy is a cognate and familiar religious dogma with Catholicism, but on the other hand, it always influenced and still influences the Greek polity

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5 Taking into account all the possible explanations that the term ‘traditional’ acquires in Greece. Namely, this term does not imply the co identity of Greece’s traditional cleavages with the respective ones that emerged in the Western Democracies and in the analogous literature. On the contrary, the social cleavages that signify Greece’s polity posses a concrete, visible distinctiveness.
with an unseen way. Up to nowadays, Greece is official a secular state, but because «the Greek Church was a priori constituted within the country’s political environment, it exists a certain typical context in which the Church’s relations with the official political authority are being conducted» (Georgiadou in Lyrintzis, Nikolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 1996: 247). Thus, the Greek Church, sometimes acquires an essential political role, by influencing the beliefs of the believers, or by drilling straightforward pressures to the political system. However, «a religious cleavage was never established in Greece, nor do the Greek political parties hold a mere religious provenience» (Georgiadou in Lyrintzis, Nikolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 1996: 275). Yet, this fact does not presupposes, the potential political power that the Greek Orthodox Church holds, acknowledging that it forces the political parties to formulate their ideological manifesto by taking into account the de facto prevalence of Orthodoxy in the Greek society. The massive impression of the Orthodox dogma in the Greek society, in some cases it even overshadows the social division Centre – Periphery, by replacing the national characteristics of minorities with the corresponding religious ones. For example, to some certain dwellers of Eastern Trace, called as the Pomakoi - Pomacs, the term ‘Muslims’, as a definitional term, is attended imminently, prevailing essentially to the more valid ethnical orientation of this minority. Thus, the party political protagonists of the Greek polity, always attended to conclude to their high level party personnel, persons who preserved excellent relations with the Greek Church and therefore functioned as links with the political pursuits of the Orthodoxy. It is neither arbitrary, nor accidental that the Greek Communist Party, since it’s initially era of a stiff and inflexible Marxism, sustains an ideology that appreciates

6 One of the characteristic features of Greek Orthodoxy in its lifelong presence, has been its meant and at the same time its unmeant effort to penetrate Greece’s political system. Since the foundation of the Greek state, up to nowadays, contemporary Greece constitutes a clear paradigm of continuing encountering relations between the Church and the polity. «In the era of Metapolitefsis, there is a certain absence of a concrete way in which each political party behaved against the Greek Church and it’s proclaims» (Georgiadou in Lyrintzis, Nikolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 1996: 247,248).

7 The relation is binary, as during the era from 1974 to 2000, the relation between the political parties and the Greek Church is moreover perplexed due to the party’s traditional strategies of concealing it’s pursues and their political actions with features that are widely socially accepted or at least difficult to be questioned. Since 1989, PASOK and the New Democracy usually appealed to the citizen’s strong religious attachments, especially when addressing issues that arose in the Balkan Peninsula. However, it needs to be mentioned that «despite the preferential, institutional and ideological consolidation of the Orthodox Church in the Greek society, the Church did not manage to build a durable, tangible and mere religious communication with the Greek society, in order to control the field of its dogmatic impact» (Georgiadou in Lyrintzis, Nikolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 1996: 253).

8 For Greece is a country immiscibly Orthodox (98% of Greece’s population declare themselves as Christian Orthodox believers). The institution of the Greek Church is nowadays widely accepted, and is considered to be, based on the results of all public opinion surveys, as the institution with the wider entrustment and influence (Vernardakis in VPRC, 2002: 29). «The indicator of religiousness ranges Greece in the second position of the European Union, anteceding from Portugal and preceding from Italy and Spain, countries with very powerful Catholic Churches» (Georgiadou, Nikolakopoulos, 2000).

9 In the wider prefecture of Trace there were a historical mixture of nations, and in particular Greeks and Turks. What especially characterizes the distinctiveness of this population is the fact that due to the 1930 Lausanne treaty between Greece and Turkey, the Turks dwellers of Trace, as well as, the Greek dwellers of Constantinople were not included in the treaty’s population exchange obligation. Therefore, in eastern Trace there still exists a plethora of Turkish origin citizens named as Pomakoi. Additionally, the perception of a religious minority, more than an ethnic minority is a favorable concept among the Greek citizens.
Greece’s religious customs, and consequently does not disputes, under any circumstances, the very essence of Christian Orthodoxy.

The international environment commends change:

It is more than obvious that «the changes that marked Greece’s international environment prevail in the Greek political scene with a significant time lag» (Loulis, 1996: 545). The country’s economic undergrowth since the post war era, and the geostrategic exceptionalities of the Balkans, provoked a severe time lag in the transitions from protocapitalism to state capitalism and finally to neo - Liberalism\(^{10}\), with the notion of the ‘institutionally open’ European market, as it was conceptualized in 1986 by the Single European Act (SEA) and was implemented by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. «In general terms, Greece showed a diminished capability of comprehending the changes that occurred on its Western European economic and social environment since the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s » (Voulgaris, 2005: 281). While Greece, was struggling to set the foundation of the economic, political and social development, its progressive European allies, had already undergone their ‘silent revolution’ of transforming Liberalism to neo - Liberalism, as well as, a series of other consequent social reforms that profoundly changed their societies: a) The evolution of the working class to more economically well – off and more educated middle class and b) transition from the concept of collective identity to the sense of individual consumers (Kitschelt, 1994: 34). This indisputable time lag is the main reason why this paper suggests that the era 1996 -2007 should be the appropriate era for addressing the hypothetical questions of transitioning from patterns of stability to patterns of social and electoral change, as the reforms that signified the Western democracies of the late 1970s and early 1980s, finally make its presence felt in the Greek society. Additionally, the chronicle interval 1996 – 2007, ensures the adequate context, for examining the establishment of these reforms and the corresponding social cleavages, or their provisional nature that might potentially mean the return to the traditional\(^{11}\) social cleavages embankments.

The 1980s: The foundation towards change.

In the early Third Hellenic Democracy era, the confrontation of political parties is being conducted under the ideological and political Left/Right axis. However, this does not signify the existence of class, religious, or minority social cleavages in the Greek society. The formulation of Greece’s party system and the profile of the systemic parties, were not designated by class stratification, cultural or demographic social divisions. «In the post – military coup democratic Greece, as well as, in the era right after the completion of the civil

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\(^{10}\) «Since the 1980s in the progressed Europe the hegemony of the principals of neo – liberalism and neo – conservativism with nibs Thacherism in Britain and Reganism in the United States, prevailed» (Voulgaris, 2007: 281).

\(^{11}\) Taking into account all the possible explanations that the term ‘traditional’ acquires in Greece. Namely, this term does not imply the co identity of Greece’s traditional cleavages with the respective ones that emerged in the Western Democracies and in the analogous literature. On the contrary, the social cleavages that signify Greece’s polity posses a concrete, visible distinctiveness.
war until the military coup, a mere class vote\textsuperscript{12}, or a clear religious cleavages was never established» (Voulgaris, 2007: 51). Although, the comparative quantitative surveys, illustrate that during the 1980s in Greece, the citizens ideological self-definition\textsuperscript{13}, as well as the parties self-positioning on the Left/Right scale, constituted the basic key for interpreting the citizen’s electoral preferences (Nikolakopoulos in Featherstone, 2007: 69-95). The stabilization of democracy, in combination with the pelting international and domestic incidents\textsuperscript{14}, steadily led to the demission of the Left/Right division and to the emergence of new social and electoral cleavages.

The year of 1985 is a turning point in the history of contemporary Greece. The multidimensional reforms that took place were related to the character and the ethics of the persistent patterns of party competition, to the general process of the decision – making process as it was established and to the wider political culture and the attitudes that shaped the public opinion (Voulgaris, 2007: 259, 260). At the same time, since 1985, the declining trajectory of political participation and the steady loosening of party’s ideology began.

The 1990s: The change is visible.

The beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century last decade induces in a concrete framework a number of fundamental economic, political and social reforms. The massive outburst of the television, overwhelmed every single household, and in 1989 the first private TV channels were founded. The press steadily emancipated itself from vindicating each and every government and more and more private newspapers were founded. Hence, the nature of political communication steadily began to change. In addition, the numbers of annual growth were amplified, as well as, the annual individual income. The more well – off and more educated Greeks, were obviously entering in a new epoch. Since the beginning of the 1990s we can experience in Greece the economic, political and therefore social changes that signified the Western European democracies during the 1980s. At the same time, the country, receives a number of economic immigrants from eastern European and ex- soviet countries and becomes for the first time in its history a country that receives immigrants (Lyrintzis in Featherstone: 2007, 61). In addition, the Greek citizens steadily loose their interest about politics, and thus political competition becomes more colorless. The party competition is being obsessed by an apolitical and ‘resilient’ harangue, which begets individualism and alienation. Until the end of the 1990s, both PASOK and New Democracy, Greece’s governing

\textsuperscript{12} Neither the New Democracy, nor PASOK, nor even the Greek Communist Party acquired a massive consolidated influence from a certain social class or minority, so as to be considered as the representatives of this segment.

\textsuperscript{13} Undoubtedly, the ideological and political self – definition of being ‘Right’, ‘Centrist’, ‘Left’, consists a complex incidental entity in which the social, value, economical and other aspects have been conserved as amagalm. In other words, the confrontations in the field of production and distributing goods, in the habitation of authority, the whole of the confrontational societal instances, were not articulated in a class, or wider cultural massive confrontation, but rather in a political – ideological. It is then explicit that in Greece of the early ‘Metapolitefsis’ we cannot speak of a class vote, as not only the country’s social articulation, but also the electoral base of the parties does not authorize it (Voulgaris, 2005: 52).

\textsuperscript{14} The signing of the Single European Act (SEA) 1985 that set the goal of Europe’s free market and the election of Michael Gorbachev in the leadership of the Soviet CCCP is some of the most important international incidents of the 1980s, setting new economical and political datum.
parties, have developed a moderate, ‘administrative’ and minimalistic profile, which reflects the actual convergence between the two parties. The year of 1996, constitutes a milestone, for changing ultimately the nature of a completely polarized party competition norm. «Pragmatism and the prevalence of economy rather than politics, the more flexible, the more adjustable and the more renewable individualized social contracts, the accession in a clear theory of rational acting overshadowed the preexisting divisions, and above all the Left / Right division (Vernardakis in VPRC, 2002: 129). «The Greek political system, found itself in front of a profound change. In front of the gradual transformation of its main contemporary division Left / Right to the value division Conservation / Progress, and from there to the cultural division Modernization / Anti-modernization. This cultural division cuts horizontally, all the political configurations, without neglecting any political force» (Beck, 1996: 132).

New, debutante needs arose for the Greek society close to the end of the 20th century, and the dominance of the traditional cleavage structure, as they have been formulated in Greece, steadily become to change.

Conclusively:

The multidimensional economical, political and social reforms that took place in Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, became visible in Greece in the last decade of the 20th century. Hence, this paper, acknowledges that since the mid 1990s, when the plethora of the worldwide and domestic changes have been assimilated into the Greek society, the adequate chronicle era for the examination of the decline or even the substitution of the traditional cleavage structure15 by newly emerged ones16, is presented. From this point of view, Greece could be perceived as an ideal context of implementing the dialog of prevalence or replacement, temporary or permanent, of the traditional cleavages due to an ongoing, contemporary existing momentum.

Finally, one evenly important factor that would constitute a distinct field of study is the Greek political parties themselves. In this paper, as well as in this thesis, the parties that will be discussed are the four main electoral protagonists of the Greek political system, namely the ‘New Democracy’, The ‘Panhellenic Socialist Movement – PASOK’, the ‘Greek Communist Party – KKE’ and the ‘KKE – Interior’, ‘Hellenic Left – E.AR’, or finally ‘Synaspismos’. In the parliamentary elections that took place since 1990 up to nowadays17, apart from some few marginal cases, these four parties were the only that managed to preserve representatives in the Greek parliament.

The Greek political parties:

The New Democracy - ND:

The New Democracy, the organic party of the conservative parataxis, was founded on 28 September 1974 with the personal protestation of its natural leader Constantinos

15 For example the non-class, but rather political and ideological Right / Left division.
16 For example the value division ‘Conservation / Progress’ and the ethical division ‘Catharsis / Corruption’.
Karamanlis. One of Karamanlis main principals goals was to ensure that New Democracy had nothing to do with the pre- dictatorship Greek Right, and therefore New Democracy presented itself as the great liberal party, attached to the goal of stabilizing the country’s democratic institutions and assuring Greece’s accession to the European Community. From the foundational declaration of the New Democracy, there is a conscious and appreciable absence of terms such as ‘Conservative’ or ‘Right wing party’. Therefore, the party officers and its leaders consistently denied being characterized by concrete ideological terms, since the establishment of the New Democracy up to nowadays.

Thus, from its foundation, New Democracy is a party without exceptionally thorough ideological manifestations, without ideological competitors and additionally the natural follower of a cohesive parataxis. In an organizational level, and especially during the first years of its existence, New Democracy was not essentially organized as a mass party. On the contrary, it was rather based on the radiant personality of its celebrated officers. «From the point of political values and institutions, New Democracy emphatically intended to highlight itself, as the main liberal parataxis, which electorally covers the Centre of the political spectrum and the historical statements of a ‘Centrist Liberalism’. The aim was the establishment of an anti-dictatorship national force that would transcend not only the ideological and political profile, but also the historical and political sphere of the pre-junta Greek Right» (Voulgaris, 2007: 61). For the New Democracy, anticommunism, the predominant ideological feature of the pre-junta right, belayed being a premier feature, and Karamanlis replaced it, by introducing the notion of ‘Radical Liberalism’ 18 as the party’s ideological platform (Alexakis, 2001: 146). However, the loose, ideological synthesis of New Democracy, and the dramatic electoral successes of PASOK 19 in the 1980s, led to the incorporation of wider elements of a stiff anti-Democratic Right into a more massive parataxis, which from the standpoint of party competition should retain a close connection with the Centre of the political spectrum. Therefore, within New Democracy, a plethora of different political trends can be traced, all of them covering the Right wing spectrum. Populist Right politicians, Liberalists, neo-Liberalists, Conservatives, even pro - Military and pro – Dictatorship followers 20, can be traced under the platform of the New Democracy. There are members of the party with certain pro – kingship opinions, and others with special affiliation with the Greek Church and far – Right groups. For all these distinct terms, a key

18 The term ‘Radical Liberalism’ was mainly used as an ideological benchmark without being translated into definite liberal politics (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2008: 54).
19 The electoral wins of PASOK on 1981 and 1985 provoked trends of vindictive and polarized conflicts between the New Democracy and the governing party. Under, Averof’s leadership, the New Democracy was again perceived as the party of the pre-dictatorship national Right that confronted PASOK as a radical Left party that denounces individual property. This trend facilitated the emergence of far - Right elements within the New democracy, such as the party’s youth organization the ‘Centaurs’, which endorsed the party’s political profile (Voulgaris, 2007:245).
20 Although, there are not enough evidences and scientific data for the political stance of the modest Greek Right – wing citizens towards the dictatorship, during the years of the military coup, we know from later periodical quantitative surveys of political culture and electoral behavior, which were conducted for the National Centre of Social Surveys (EKKE) in 1985, that a significant part of New democracy’s electoral base had positive or tolerable stance towards the 1967-1974 dictatorship, a fact that implies that ND’s leadership felt the need of a clear cut with its past in a more intensive way from the larger fragment of its base (EKKE, 1988: Maurokordatos and Nikolakopoulos).
feature that more or less unites all the distinct ideological streams of the party is the Greek Orthodoxy\textsuperscript{21}. «In New Democracy, a party of the Centre – Right, namely the conservative political sphere, which is actually deprived from solid ideological principles, Orthodoxy found a priori a field of massive popular appeal» (Georgiadou in Lyrintzis, Nikolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 1996: 275). Thus, acknowledging, the fact that in Greece does not essentially exist a religious social cleavage and that within the European Parliament, New Democracy, finds ideological allies among the parties that constitute the European People’s Party and not among the Christian Democratic Parties, we can assert that the party bases its existence and its undisputable electoral appeal to other social cleavages. Since the 1980s, New Democracy, under the vehicle of Radical Liberalism was the party that ideologically embraced the great economic objectives of the upper social classes, as well as the aspirations of the traditional middle-class strata. Although, throughout its own electoral successes and losses, and due to the ongoing evolut ional Greek society, New Democracy steadily transformed into a catch-all\textsuperscript{22} party that appealed to the whole society, independently of the social stratification. «At the end of the 1990s, it was more than obvious that the neoliberal ideas were not attractive anymore, and the party intended to combine Liberalism\textsuperscript{23} with a more social profile» (Alexakis, 2001: 170). Eventually, under the leadership of Kostas Karamanlis\textsuperscript{24}, was made clear that the party intended in a more organized manner, to present itself as a contemporary modest version, of a renewed Centre – Right force. The changed structure of the Greek society, forced the vanguard of New Democracy to adopt a more cohesive party synthesis, based even more in a Centre – Right profile\textsuperscript{25}, denouncing the extreme political options. These change, excluded some far –Right elements from the party, and weakened all the connections, officials and unofficial, with nationalists and extremists. As a matter of fact this explains Karamanlis intentions for the stabilization of the party’s ideological equilibrium that took place with the obliteration of Georgios Karatzaferis and other officials of New Democracy, and led to the subsequent emergence of the far – Right party of LA.OS\textsuperscript{26}. It is worth to be mentioned that since 1996 and the modernizational turn of PASOK’s leadership, as well as, the return of New Democracy in power on 2004, an apparent confusion in the traditional electoral base of both parties was provoked. This is to say, that the social strata that were harmed economically from the politics of PASOK and were led to the social margins, founded electoral shelter under New Democracy, even if the Centre-Right party was ideologically in accordance with the politics of PASOK. Hence, New Democracy, was forced to adopt, critical stances against the modernizational intention as a whole. Therefore, the Centre – Right party, within the

\textsuperscript{21} According to data from the Eurobarometer, the religious beliefs, as well as, the frequency of visiting the Church remains high for the majority of New Democracy’s voters, even at the end of the 1990s. From its voters, the 52% (1989) denote as religious, while the 60% present forcible weekly attendance to the Church and the 52% present modest weekly attendance to the Church (Georgiadou, 1997: 276 footnote 66).

\textsuperscript{22} Gary Marks adds the term ‘Post – Authoritarian’ to the term ‘Catch – All’ for New Democracy (2000: 456).

\textsuperscript{23} Concerning privatization and the restrained role of the state.

\textsuperscript{24} Was elected New Democracy’s president on 1997.

\textsuperscript{25} Following the more or less Right turn of the Greek electorate. A product of pragmatism and not a concrete, determined ideological framework (Loulis, 1996: 559, 560).

\textsuperscript{26} LA.OS – Popular Orthodox Alert.
trajectory of a paradox but absolutely real party competition, returned to power by relying on: a) the bourgeois strata and the upper, economically speaking classes, namely its old traditional electoral base, but also b) on the poor popular strata that was left without political representation by the shift of PASOK’s political decisions (Vernardakis, 2002: 29).

**The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement:**

The Panhellenic Socialist Movement was founded on 3 September 1974 and came to power on 18 October 1981. At this party have historically been attached several ideological connotations for the characterization of its profile: centrist, populist, socialist – radical, modernized. But PASOK’s interpretative adventure lays on the fact that PASOK eventually consisted of all these distinct ideological trends and learned to survive by acknowledging the controversies that coexisted.

On the declaration of its foundation\(^{27}\), PASOK presented itself as a Radical Socialist movement that set as an ultimate political goal the establishment of an autonomous socialist economy. In contrast, with the pro-Soviet, communist Greek Left, PASOK communicated with the Greek electorate in more convincing way. Throughout its political harangue, PASOK established a new version of the old rupture, between the Right forces on the one hand, and on the anti-Right forces on the other hand (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 50). During the 1980s, the leadership of the party followed the strategic option of polarized political confrontation, exploiting the divisional line between the Right forces and the so-called Democratic, Progressive forces\(^{28}\), setting as a teleological end the political representation of the latter. Therefore PASOK posited itself, as the legal representative of the Progressive, Democratic forces, between on the one hand, the authoritarian Right, and on the other hand, the utopian, non-democratic Left forces. However, since its establishment the connections of the party with the ideological connotations of socialism and the worldwide Left were apparently loose. These ideological vagueness of PASOK, attended certain political expediencies that ultimately altered the party’s political intentions (Voulgaris, 2007: 70). During its first period in power, PASOK substantially grounded its existence on the class cleavage, on the order of how this cleavage emerged in Greece, holding a popular profile and defending the needs of the non-privileged Greeks, especially the farmers and the workers.

\(^{27}\) It needs to be mentioned that, the appeal to this declaration of foundation of the party, became an exit strategy, especially in some troublesome occasions during PASOK’s life.

\(^{28}\) As it can be proved by the empirical research of this era, almost the half of the Communist Left electoral base perceived PASOK in a positive way. The most catalyzing factor was the relatively common ideological synthesis, in the level of the electoral base of the two anti-Right forces political forces, which illustrate as their main ideological axis the negative stance towards the United States, the representatives of the capital, as well as their experience from the post-civil war state of the Right (Nikolakopoulos in Featherstone, 2007: 75-76).
However, since its first electoral success on 1981\textsuperscript{29}, PASOK’s radicalism was steadily declined and the party avoided confronting with issues, especially regarding external relations, on which it primarily possessed a clear stance, such as the accession of Greece to the European Community and the relations of the country with NATO (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 50 - 51). It transformed to a catch – all party, penetrating with ease and efficiency into the electoral body of the Centre – Right parataxis (Georgiadou, 1996: 275). The obscurity of its political beliefs concealed the way PASOK governed Greece, and the Right / Anti-right dilemma remained the unifying argument of PASOK’s governance. Thus, PASOK’s effort to orientate itself continued to be met, under the concept of a legitimate representation of the anti – Right forces. The party’s even more decorated class orientation, became even more anti – Right, constraining suffocatingly the circle of the privileged Greeks that PASOK was fighting against. «Hence, the suspenseful and controversial effort of self – definition as a Left force, found recourse in the anti – Right parataxis» (Voulgaris, 2005: 88). Since the 1980s, the social base of PASOK corresponds to the social base of the mass European parties of the Left, with all the necessaries reconciliations to the Greek polity: middle - class city dwellers, public servants, farmers, freelancers; Strata that were drew away in a in depth transformation, as they discovered around them potentials of social mobility and therefore participated in massive political procedures (Voulgaris, 2007: 279). This picture is indispensable for conceptualizing the patterns of social disintegration that the electoral base of PASOK is going to experience since 1985 and to a greater scale since the 1990s. Even after its second consequent electoral win in 1985\textsuperscript{30}, PASOK continued to trace down its ideological identification through orientating its major political opponent, - the New Democracy - as the ‘Right’. PASOK proved to be extremely attentive and pragmatist with its principal provision, namely, the stabilization of its solid and concrete organizational and electoral base. This venture was actualized throughout the implementation of a populist strategy that was designed in order to tranquilize the electorate and ensure a strong attachment of PASOK’s voters with the party (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 51).

A cornerstone point for the evolution of PASOK, was the change in the party’s relation with the Greek society. With the exception of 1989 -1993, PASOK was in power for almost two consequent decades, as the New democracy only achieved to overthrown it for the interval 1989 - 1993. While the first period (1981 – 1989) is characterized as populist, the second one, 1993-2004, is perceived as the effort to modernize\textsuperscript{31} the Greek society. Since 1992, under the evolution of the European Union, PASOK abandons, in some cases superficially, but in others in an essential way, populism, abandons its typical class orientated perspective of the Greek society, and embraces a new ideologically loose political manifesto that

\textsuperscript{29} The first electoral success of PASOK «operated as an initial collision to the external reality and denoted the initiation of a corrective trajectory which did not occur under abrupt, open and justified turns, but under two parallel and interconnected procedures. The first was the inner- party clearance and the second was the conscious and contemplated loose transition of the nibs in the party’s political manifesto (Voulgaris, 2007: 83).

\textsuperscript{30} PASOK drew voters from the Left and especially from the Greek Communist Party, from youth voters, the lower social strata and the women.

\textsuperscript{31} On the contrary with populism, the modernization procedure did not have as a goal the mollification of the society, but rather the rationalization and the development of the Greek society, despite the potential political cost (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 56).
includes all the existing social classes as potential voters. In addition, PASOK adjusts its political manifestations, in order to create an adequate coherence with the new reality, a shift that more or less mend the end of anti–Right politics. Therefore, an adoption of a distinct strain and ethical political struggle was followed in an effort to fundamentally renew the party. Since the mid 1990s it is obvious that the new modest and more pragmatist approach that the government of PASOK followed, especially in the field of its economic policies, was literally uncompromising with the polarization caused by the Right / anti–Right division32 (Spourdalakis, 1998: 41). «Under the Kostas Simitis leadership, PASOK managed to succeed in the 1996 and 200013 elections, marking to end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century» (Lyrintzis, Nikolopoulos, 1999). The greater reforms within the Greek society are strongly connected with eras of PASOK’s administration34, especially during the 8th year technocratic administration of Kostas Simitis, from 1996 to 2004. In this 8th year period of Greece’s governance, an apparent societal injunction of modernizing the country emerged, following the modules of the Western European democracies, as well as, the challenges of the European Union. The economic policy, the external relations, the frontal confrontations with the Greek Orthodox Church, the accessions to the European Monetary Union (EMU), the pro-European stance of Greece towards Turkey’s accession to the Union as it was illustrated in Helsinki, are significant factors that highlighted and the same time orientated this effort. Additionally, this modernizational effort was farther enhanced with the intention of PASOK to correlate all the other political actors, namely the New Democracy and the Left forces as mere reactional and regressive powers. The analysis of the results of 1996 elections35, illustrate that «the social classes in which PASOK presented the most significant losses of its power are those which were always considered to be represented by the old PASOK» (Marantzidis, Zafiropoulos in Katsoulis, 2002: 306). Thus, «a transparent trend of PASOK’s electoral alienation from the working class and a transformational trajectory from a party of class orientation to an outright catch

32 While the latter division has never extinguished from PASOK’s rhetoric, the central axis that replaced it, became the modernization, since Kostas Simitis took on the leadership of the movement (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 51).

33 In the electoral procedures of 1996 and 2000 «the modernizational PASOK managed to prevail among the salaried of the public sector and of the private sector, as well as, among the numerous strata of freelancers, namely among social strata that refer to its old social base. It managed, however, to increase its influence among the middle social strata and especially among those who exploited during the last years from the evolutionary politics and additionally among the upper social classes (employers, commercial and industrial capital, upper executive enterprises). On the contrary, its shrinkage among the farmers strata, among the employees of the public sector – one of the electoral bartizans of the past – among the unemployed, among the poor, non – active population of the country (pensioners of the public and private sector, pensioners of traditional occupational groups, housekeeper) was impressive (Vernardakis, 2002: 29)

34 Especially due to the open to shifts party officers, as well as, to the solid effort for a wider modernization of the country.

35 «i) PASOK essentially increases its powers on the urban areas and the country’s large cities, Athens and Thessaloniki. […] ii) PASOK presents a contained decline (3-4%) in the middle – class, petit bourgeois neighborhoods of Athens and Thessaloniki. […] iii) The same party, on the contrary, presents a dramatic decline in the lower class neighborhoods, a decline of 8-12% not only in Athens, but also in Thessaloniki» (Marantzidis, Zafiropoulos in Katsoulis, 2002: 305).
– all party, can be noticed» (Marantzidis, Zafiropoulos in Katsoulis, 2002: 307). The party steadily reappointed its stance towards the class social cleavage. The notion that «society is being penetrated from a number of multilevel antitheses and therefore the dipole Workers – Owners is even more distant» (Marantzidis, Zafiropoulos in Katsoulis, 2002: 312) illustrate the catch –all identity of PASOK and at the same time, implies the emergence of new social cleavage. In the shifts of PASOK’s ideological manifestos since 1996 and onwards we can ascertain, not only a) the new apprehension regarding the country’s social stratification and the b) characteristics of a new social dialog, but also c) the intense presence of ethics, a trend connected to the practical political reasons and the post – materialist influences that are exercised on the new Social Democracy (Marantzidis, Zafiropoulos in Katsoulis, 2002: 311, 316).

Nowadays, since the seriate electoral wins of 2004 and 2007, PASOK is still in a process of change, unbrokenly connected with the fluidity of the masses. The modernization of the Greek society was used as a general and vague plan, which provided a new political profile, indispensable for the mobilization of the disappointed with the socialist – populist rhetoric voters. However, since 2004 the election of George Papandreou in the leadership of PASOK, a new political dialog was introduced, shifting the emphasis from modernization to participational democracy, to the society of citizens, to multiculturalism and above all in the research of a new party organizational pattern.

The Greek Left:

The ideological bloc of the Left is parliamentary represented by the Greek Communist Party and the Coalition of the Radical Left and progress – or Synaspismos. «The Communist parties of the country abandoned illegality since the collapse of the military coup delectating increasing prestige and honor because of their anti-dictatorship political stance. They were the parties of the heroes and of all those who gave the fight against the military coup with self – abnegation» (Voulgaris, 2007: 104). Hence, especially during the first years of the ‘Metapolitefsis’, the parties of the Greek Left attempted to orientate themselves within the margins of a diligent democratic regime.

The Greek Communist Party – KKE:

The Greek Communist party, up to now is one of the few communist parties that did not alter its ideology and its daily practices, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Representing the more revolutionary dimension of the Greek parliament, KKE remains a typical Marxist – Leninist party that seeks the revolutionary implementation of communism. Intrinsic to the essence of its existence, even after the transition from illegality to legalization, ensured forcible relations with the CCCP and the Soviet Union. Organizationally, the concept of the catch – all party is reflected from the loosening of party’s members obligations and the non – massive participation in the procedure of decision making. «The process and the criteria of joining PASOK as a member are being simplified and we can even assert they forfeit any ideological sense, with the essence that any ideological accordance between the candidate member and the party that wants to join, lacks.

The Pro – Soviet stance of the KKE, influenced indissolubly all the aspects of its political practices. From example, the election of Gorbachev in USSR leadership in 1985 led the party’s central
special social conditions of the Greek society, in which KKE emerged, shape some paradox ideas and practices of the party. The absence, for example, of composed industrial units in Greece, and the subsequent lack of typical proletariats, turned KKE to the ideological embrace of the farmers, combining thus in a great scale the Workers – Owners and Urban – Rural social cleavages. Additionally, due to the deeply rooted Christian Orthodox attachment of the Greek society and the uncompromising with this fact ideological platform of dialectical materialism, KKE even if officially denounces any metaphysical idea, does not persists in the condemnation of the Christian Orthodox dogma\textsuperscript{38} for the working class that it defends. In a similar vein, KKE highlights the national character of its distinct communism, embracing the cultural exceptionalities, the folklore habits and customs of the Greek nation. As KKE, describes itself as a patriotic communist party.

The Greek Communist Party follows a stable policy, which is turned against Globalization and Europe, a strategy that could be described as ‘Nationalist Populism’ (Lyrintzis in Featherstone, 2007: 65). Up to nowadays, it remains the fundamental representative of the traditional communist Left in Greece. KKE represents and at the same time arrogates the conceptions, the stereotypes, the world views, which are historically embedded to the political and cultural subculture of the Greek society and are connected with the communist Left (Voulgaris, 2007: 109). In addition, KKE holds a quite offensive stance towards the other parties of the Greek left. Since the end of the 1980s, the party developed an offensive rhetoric against all the parliamentary political parties that possessed pro-working class sentiments, by appealing electoral and capitalist plans for the disorientation and the exploitation of the masses. Due to its own heavy historical legacy, in the field of the Left forces in Greece, it seems quite easy for the Greek Communist party to effectively use the catchword “There is only one party for the Greek working class”, something that indicated the characterization of the KKE – Interior as a reformist party and the conceptualization of PASOK as a faddish reformist party\textsuperscript{39}.

During the 1980s, the KKE neither joined the anti-Right campaign that PASOK had proclaimed, nor preferred a polarized confrontation against the New Democracy. On the contrary, KKE, perceived New Democracy with conditions of a contemporary social enemy. As the party archives assert, «the problem for a Marxist – Leninist party is not to demand the change of political conveyor, rather the class dominance that sustains it». Nevertheless, in an electoral level, since the 1980s and especially since 1985, KKE sought to penetrate in committee to thoughts for a potential ideological dischargemnt in a theoretical way and in the effort of electorally detaining PASOK with the creation of the ‘Coalition of the Left and Progress’. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Greek Communist Party denounced Gorbachev’s reformism and retracted to the ideological embankments of Stalinism.\textsuperscript{38}

It needs to be mentioned that the non-straightforward condemnation of the Greek Orthodox Christianity is a political choice of accordance with the unready for such a denouncement Greece’s working class, and under any circumstances it does not implies mild or even friendly relations between the KKE and the Greek Orthodox Church. Besides the Greek Communist Party was always obviously pro-secularization, demanding the split of the Greek Church from the Greek state (Georgiadou in Lyrintzis, Sotiropoulos, Nikolakopoulos, 1996).

\textsuperscript{38} «PASOK represents a faddish reformist party. Faddish from the standpoint of its social base, its origin, its structure, its politics and in general from a series of idiosyncrasies of the Greek reality» [KKE 1992, 11th conference, documents (14-19/12/1982)].
PASOK’s electoral base. The party experienced its electoral decline in the large cities, the working class neighborhoods\footnote{For example the areas ‘Mantamado’, ‘Georgianoi’, ‘Geraneia’, are known for their pro – KKE electoral orientation as ‘the three little Moscows’ (Marantzidis, 1997).} and the lower economic social strata. Consequently, since 1985, apart from the already negative ascertainties for PASOK, KKE initiated a straightforward assault to the governing party, in order to enhance its own electoral percentages and to escape from its electoral dead end. «KKE abandoned the anti - Right orientation\footnote{A typical example of abandoning the anti – Right orientation was the municipality elections on October 1986. «The party broke the tradition of an ‘anti-Right solidarity’, usually appeared on the second round of the elections and called its voters to vote freely and not on the basis of an anti – Right option» (Voulgaris, 2007: 322). In addition, the peak of its anti – PASOK effusion was its participation on the coalition with the New Democracy in the 1989 government.} and started to hold equivalent distances not only from the New Democracy, but also from PASOK, which establishment on the progressive parataxis was no longer considered as grounded (Voulgaris, 2007: 271). KKE remains close knitted in a stiff electoral base, without the ability to attract potential voters from a wider social spectrum. During the 1990s, and shortly after KKE’s ideological reorganization since USSR’s demise, the party remains an original representative of Stalinist Marxism. The emergence of a new middle-class, the increase in the Greeks educational level, the new trends of the electoral body, such as the massive rejection of the world of politics as a whole, are interpreted by the Greek Communist Party as evolutionary phases of capitalism, according to party’s linear dialectical analysis. Within this framework, the ‘Party of the Revolution’ remains a vivid part of the Greek political scene, and KKE’s main goal still remains the revolutionary overthrow of this regime.

The KKE Interior – Synaspismos:

The emergence of the Eurocommunist Left since 1968 and the massive non parliamentary organizations, apart from the special Hellenic exceptionalities, was included in the great upheavals that took place in the communist movement during the 1960s, as well as to the special political and cultural shifts of the western democracies during the same era (Voulgaris, 2005: 99). Since the mid 1960s a form of an anti-Soviet communism\footnote{Eurocommunism, Maoism, ‘Third – world communism by Fidel Castro and Ernesto Guevara and the increased salience of Trotskyism are some of the most renowned versions of the anti – Soviet communism.} has emerged and a plethora of European parties’ intended or even instinctively searched the path of renewal for their communist movement. In a theoretical framework these are the reasons for the emergence of the KKE – Interior, a party that stemmed out of the Greek Communist Party in 1968 and consisted the long afterwards uterus of the ‘Hellenic Left Party – E.AR’, of the ‘Coalition of the Left and Progress’ and finally of ‘Synaspismos’. The first essential concern of KKE – Interior was its ideological and practical division from the KKE. Although, the evolutions that took place during the 1980s, the stabilization of democracy, and the social and electoral emergence of PASOK, posited KKE- interior, in of between two different but essentially intrinsic political poles. On the Right, dominated the governing PASOK with its radical and populist profile and on the Left prevailed the stiff, pro-Soviet KKE. Hence, the KKE – interior was established in the political scene of Greece, surviving
politically and mainly ideologically as another version of the communist Left and as an everlasting challenge for the KKE and for PASOK.

KKE- interior’s discontent with PASOK’s governmental services and the party’s reaction to the blackmailing character of the electoral dilemma Right / anti-Right led to the steady evolution of an anti-PASOK sentiment among the party’s core followers. «Its slight penetration into the traditional Left sphere and the obstacle of its potential electoral expansion due to the emergence of a new socialist conveyor, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, led to the establishment of the KKE – interior as a party with officials that hold a massive influence on the sphere of intellectuals, of educated people and of the youth. The party, therefore, became a sensual indicator of ideological – value fermentations and shifts, providing ideas and politics without being able to reap the fruits of these actions» (Voulgaris, 2007: 118). Moreover, KKE – interior stabilized its sophisticated profile by criticizing the dogmatic communism of KKE as well as, the totalitarian regimes of the existing Soviet socialism, while it legalized Greece’s accession in the European Union.

KKE - interior from the first period of the PASOK’s governance believed that it could play the role of PASOK to the Greek society, of course following different policies. But, the notion that PASOK came out of nowhere and exploited the ideas of the Left in order to get in power, intruded KKE – interior to the extent that PASOK was seen as the major enemy, and a strong anti – PASOK feeling has eventually emerged for the majority of KKE - Interior followers. Regarding the New Democracy, KKE – interior, from its foundation, expurgated that it comprehends ND’s renewal and distinctiveness comparing to the pre- dictatorship Greek Right. Thus, it hesitated more, concerning two distinct political options: Straightforward confrontation or confection of some sort of an open dialog with PASOK and KKE, despite an obligated critique.

Ultimately, the decay of PASOK’s governmental trajectory, especially since its second electoral success on 1985, and synchronously the election of Gorbachev as USSR leader, led the KKE – Interior to a strategic concept of convergence with the KKE. The renaming of the party to ‘Elliniki Aristera’ – E.AR (“Hellenic Left) was the first pretended but also essential step for the Coalition of the two Greek communist parties; a fact that eventually took place on the elections of 1989, under the organizational vehicle of the ‘Coalition of the Left and Progress’. However, the demise of the Soviet Union and the vast international evolutions, led the core of the orthodox KKE to its ideological backing – out and its regression to the embankments of Stalinist Marxism. These events provoked the end of the united Coalition, on December 1991. All those who remained to the united Coalition, not only politicians that came from the E.AR, but also, politicians that came from the KKE preserved the name Coalition – Synaspismos, for a party that progressed in a political mixture of Left reformist ideas, with intervening and reformative logic regarding capitalism and the ways in which it should be overthrown or reformed and a plethora of post – materialist ideas, such as its ecological sensitivity.

As a whole, Synaspismos, accuses Soviet communism and even the revolutionary logic of KKE, adopting a pro – European, but at the same time Eurosceptical manifesto, with new value interests, such as ecology, women’s rights, social minorities rights and immigrants. It
holds a certain anti-Clerical stance and asks for a clear secularization of the Greek state, asking the division of the state and the Church in Greece. Nowadays, its electoral performance is absolutely a matter of urban areas and its voters come from the higher educated social strata (Vernardakis, 2002: 35).

Undoubtedly, in a proposal, based on ideas of diffusive nature, that could be potentially interpreted in many ways, such as social cleavages, the luminous and evident orientation of the hypothesis the aim and the context of the research, as well as, the necessary methodological tools that are needed for the useful and valid conduction of concrete conclusions.
Subject, Aim, Content:

The suggested doctoral thesis will consist of **three parts**:

i) **In the first part** (Literature Review) I will analyze on a theoretical level the theories of political cleavages. The aim of this first part is to ascertain and state valid conclusions with regard to the opposing theories of the traditional political cleavages and the value-based post-materialistic cleavages. This literature review and analysis will be mainly based on academic articles and books in English, French, Spanish and Greek.

ii) **In the second part** (Case Studies – Empirical Findings) the aim is to examine and analyze political cleavages, either traditional or potential newly emerging ones, which have marked the Greek society during 1996 –2007 and consequently shaped the electoral behaviour of Greek citizens. The successful completion of this second part requires a clear methodology and specific quantitative and qualitative data which will be analyzed in detail further on in the methodology chapter.

iii) Finally, the **third part** (Discussion) of this suggested thesis is the scientifically and methodologically valid combination of the above two parts: that is, the application of the theoretical conclusions on the corresponding conclusions of empirical study findings. In this framework, the aim of this thesis is to examine the political cleavages in the late changeover Greece, 1996 – 2007.

In conclusion, the substantial scientific contribution of this thesis consists of the following:

1. The study of the social cleavages theory and the examination of the retention of traditional political cleavages or the emergence of new cleavages with different patterns.

2. The methodological innovation of qualitative analysis in secondary statistical, political and electoral data for the period 1996 – 2007. This option allows us to approach the dynamic change existing in the arrangement of the Greek political parties’ social foundation in the 21st century. At the same time, the 1996 – 2007 decade offers a time background to examine the establishment or not of the said changes.

3. The study of voting social coordinates, which allows the framing of critical assumptions, regarding the changing electoral behavior in the social basis of post changeover political parties. The trend of change is already seen in the 1996 elections, emerging more intensely in the elections of 2000 and seemingly establishing itself in the electoral procedures of 2004 and 2007.
Methodology:

The suggested thesis will be based more on secondary and less on primary research. In particular, the first part of the doctoral thesis will be based almost entirely on the international scientific literature, and the second part will be based both on literature research and the analysis – evaluation of already existing social and political research. The literature review regarding the second part of the suggestion, deals with the volumes of polls, political and social surveys and electoral analyses which have been conducted and published by several companies of social and political research in the country and regard the 1996 – 2007 decade. At the same time, in addition to the published material, most of the private public opinion companies, the EKKE (National Center of Social Research) and the Institute of Social Politics (INKPO\textsuperscript{43}) possess an extremely significant statistic data, useful in the compilation of suggested thesis’ second chapter. It is fortunate that throughout the suggested – for the reasons presented above – decade of 1996 – 2007, there has been significant development on a private level for the companies of political and social research.

The National Center of Social Research:

The data provide by EKKE, which are absolutely necessary for this doctoral thesis in order to research the political cleavages of the Greek society during 1996 – 2007, are included in the “Political Standards and Political Behaviour Research” which is part of the Social Data and Indicators Archive. In particular, out of the three volumes of these periodical researches which have been issued, the suggested doctoral thesis requires the data of the volume with publication manager Mr. Panagiotis Kafetzis, titled “Political Standards and Political Behavior Research (November 1989 and April 1990)” to study and examine the change prerequisites noticed in the decade examined. In addition, even more significant is the use of the periodical report titled “Comparative National Elections Programme - CNEP (September, October 1996 and February, March 2004)”, since the research’s aim is focused on the forms of political information and the way it is acquired, the attitudes towards democracy and the basic value directions which are at the same time a medium for electoral motivation. Also, critical secondary data for the implementation of the current suggestion are the results of political standards and political behavior 1985 – 1988 – 1996 research. Either way, as we have also stated above, the secondary data are a basic source of information to examine the political cleavages in the 1996 – 2007 decade. Finally, from EKKE’s Social Data Bank as well as from the record of the Council of European Social Science Data Archives (CESSDA), we can use the information of the secondary process and management of socioeconomic data and indexes website and in particular the research theme units titled: i) forms of social conflicts in Post Changeover Greece (1974, 1994 KSyME), ii) Politics and Political Institutions (PPI) and iii) National Elites. The said website serves the needs of the research community and at the same time is the country’s main infrastructure for secondary analysis of socioeconomic data.

\textsuperscript{43} In particular the use of Social Indicators.
The Private sector – Companies of political and social research:

The changes of the party and political system of the Third Hellenic Democracy from the beginning of the 90s, have led to the amplification of the role and importance of polls in Greece as well. “A trademark in this process are the parliamentary elections of 1996, both for the establishment of pre-election polls and the establishment of exit polls in the private television networks and public television” (Mavris, 2002: 3). Thus, polls, their publication in the country’s press and the politicians’ willingness to harmonize themselves with newer, more scientific terms of political competition, led to the performance of various political researches under the scientific supervision of ESOMAR/AGMORC. Hence, in addition to the EKKE, private organizations were massively established, particularly with the onset of the 21st century, assuming the periodic performance of public opinion research. From an initial research and contact with the companies mentioned next, we present the most significant statistical material / archive of data required to examine the phenomenon of social political cleavages in the 1996 – 2007 decade. For the 1996 – 2000 period, particularly important are the regular monthly researches – time series of company M.R.B., one of the few to have performed a methodic temporal research during the early period of the Simitis government. Also, for the period 1996 – 2004 a significant database is provided by the social and political research of company Kapa Research. Established in 1990, the company offers a rich database of its research archives. From 2000 to 2004, the political and social research is much more extensive than in previous years, along with the number of companies performing it. A special interest is seen in the time-series of company VPRC and in particular the publications of data of the company’s most important political and social research in an effort to establish a scientific level of theoretical discussion and discourse. From 2002 to 2004 also important are the data emerging from the subscribers’ quarterly political – social research of Pan-Hellenic and wide coverage ‘Metron’ Forum by company Metron Analysis.

Finally, complementarily we may add as useful methodology tools to complete the research, interviews with the suitable persons: politicians, experienced executives of political parties, academics, sociologists, political scientists and researchers of large poll companies. In addition to personal interviews, group discussions with institutional persons from the Greek state may provide useful empirical conclusions.


45 In addition, the archives of political parties, their official documents, political programmes, political lectures of their executives in the parliament and statements in the press, articles or books they write on occasion with specific political issues, are increasingly important to examine the considered transition from traditional to new political cleavages of different nature.
By way of epilogue:

Examining the nature of political cleavages in modern Greece, on the level of research for the establishment or not of the new political cleavages and the produced electoral behavior of the changing Greek society during 1996 – 2007, are issues with intense and current scientific interest. Hence, this paper, acknowledges that since the mid 1990s, when the plethora of the worldwide and domestic changes have been assimilated into the Greek society, the adequate chronicle era for the examination of the decline or even the substitution of the traditional cleavage structure by newly emerged ones, is presented. From this point of view, Greece could be perceived as an ideal context of implementing the dialog of prevalence or replacement, temporary or permanent, of the traditional cleavages due to an ongoing, contemporary existing momentum.

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