EOKA and Enosis in 1955-59: 
Motive and Aspiration Reconsidered

Andreas Karyos

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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to explore the essential political aim of the leadership and the active members of the armed organization EOKA. Consequently, special consideration is taken of what EOKA fought for, as revealed in the leaflets and other written material circulated by the subversive movement. In addition, we trace the movement’s goals as they were later defined in response to successive British suggestions and ‘plans’ - from the Makarios-Harding negotiations through to the Zurich/London Agreements. It must be underlined, though, that this project does not intend any full analysis of each plan, which would entail a constitutional history of Cyprus during the four-year revolt. It is only demonstrated how each formula failed to meet the insurgent organization’s aspirations. Finally, we explore the reasons why the leadership of EOKA eventually accepted a settlement based on an independent Cyprus, which was critically different from the original desire of the movement for union of Cyprus with Greece - enosis. The underground correspondence of EOKA’s leadership at a top level (that is, the communication of Grivas with the Greek leadership and Makarios) is vital at this point.

Keywords: EOKA struggle, Enosis, Union of Cyprus with Greece, Cypriot History, Cyprus Question in the 1950’s, Cyprus Revolt, Cyprus Emergency, Armed enosis movement, Insurgency, Conflict

1 PhD Candidate at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London. The title of his Thesis is “EOKA, 1955-59: A Study of the Military Aspects of the Cyprus Revolt”.
1. Introduction

One of the most significant periods of the Cyprus Question is the years from 1955-1959, when the long-lasting polarization between the British and the Greek-Cypriots reached its peak and was transformed into an armed confrontation. In particular as for the Greek-Cypriot side, EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston - The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), a subversive organization was formed in order to carry out an armed struggle against the British security machinery in the island. The conflict ended in 1959 with the Zurich/London Agreements which terminated the British rule in the island and a new state in August 1960 was established, the Republic of Cyprus. However, during the post-independence years, contested views emerged in Cyprus as to the true character and aims of the ‘EOKA struggle’, which shaped the Greek-Cypriot political culture for the years ahead. The Greek-Cypriot politicians attempted to strengthen their political foothold against the opposition of hardcore enosis supporters, by connecting the goal of independence with the aims of the insurgency during 1955-1959. Therefore, neologisms emerged during the last thirty years in the official Greek-language historiography, invariably presented as the incontrovertible historical ‘truth’, although acting on political expediency: the EOKA struggle has therefore been described as a rebellion for independence, in spite of the fact that the latter goal never existed amongst its initial aspirations. Simultaneously, the same implicit version appeared in the official or unofficial literature in relation with the four-year physical struggle in Cyprus, where the terms ‘enosis’ and ‘the enosisist struggle of EOKA’ were replaced by ‘liberty’ and ‘the liberation struggle of EOKA’, respectively.

2. What did EOKA fight for?

2.1 The focus on the political plane

Let us start by exploring the ultimate political goal of the irregular warfare of EOKA. Before proceeding into more detailed aspects of EOKA’s ambitions, it would be beneficial to specify what the insurgent movement did not seek. The organization expressed a demand for freedom and self-determination which focused exclusively on the political plane, without any references to a fundamental change of the social and economic status of Cyprus. A proclamation circulated by EOKA in 1958 offers us a typical example of this notion: ‘We have declared many times that we are conducting...’

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neither a factional, nor a class struggle, but one for liberty. We are not interested in a clash of ideology. Our concern is for everyone to be patriots...and to join their forces with ours in order to expel the ruler...For this reason, we have made a call to all the Greek-Cypriots, without exceptions, and all the pure patriots from the cities and the rural areas responded, especially the workers and the farmers. Another leaflet, which bore the signature of the military leader, Dighenis, and EOKA, is also characteristic: ‘When I raised the flag of our national movement, I called everyone in the arena, without any exceptions due to social or political beliefs. The struggle was common to all and the right of everybody’.

In the same way, EOKA’s focus exclusively on the political goals of liberty and self-determination was also fully appreciated by groups within the Cypriot Left. The latter distanced themselves from the official leadership of AKEL after the party’s verbal attacks on EOKA’s efforts in April 1955 and thus supported the armed enosis movement, under the label of OAP (Organosi Aristeron Patrioton – Organization of Patriot Lefts), later renamed to OAE (Organosi Aristeron Ethnicofronon – Organization of Nationalist Lefts). An undated pamphlet of OAE indicated its support to the rebels’ aims stating that ‘EOKA and PEKA repeatedly emphasized that they have no ideological-fractional orientations, but only national. Let’s organize our LEFT NATIONAL FRONT and, together with PEKA and EOKA, steel the strength of the Cypriot people’. A second, undated publication is even more indicative: ‘Brothers, EOKA repeatedly stated that it is solely a military Organization whose purpose is to expel the ruler. On the other hand Makarios’ line proved to be the right, fighting and progressive one. It is not the ideal time for socio-political differences. Those who agree that the struggle for self-determination must be uncompromising and that people is justified to resort to violence when necessary, those who agree that an appear-to-be-monomorphic leadership benefits the struggle, those who take an oath that they will not sleep if they don’t gain self-determination, let’s rally round the organization of nationalist lefts. We were prompted to leftism by our love for humanity itself as well as for its liberty. In a fight for such an achievement every sacrifice is of minor importance’.

EOKA’s dedicated focus on political goals is not surprising when considering that the organization emerged from a conservative social context (the Cypriot Right and the Church) which was favourably inclined towards the West and did not aim at the formation of a different social model or the detachment of Cyprus from the Western

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5 Cited in Σπύρος Παπαγεωργίου, ΑΚΕΛ το άλλο ΚΚΕ (Λευκωσία: Επιφανίου, 2004), σ.326 [Spyros Papageorgiou, AKEL the other KKE (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 2004), p.326]
6 Read more on OAP and OAE in Φώτης Παπαφώτης, ΠραξικόπηµαίΕισβολή: Η κατάθεσή µου στην Επιτροπή φακέλλου της Κύπρου (Λεµεσός: ΝΕΓΚΡΕΣΚΟ, 2008), σσ.132'133 [Photis Papaphotis, Coup d’Etat-Invasion: My testimony to the Committee for the Records of the Cyprus Affair (Limassol: NEGRESKO, 2008), pp.132-133]
7 Initials stand for Politiiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos – Political Committee of the Cypriot Struggle. PEKA was created in 1956 by Grivas/Dighenis and was considered by EOKA as its political wing. It was consisted of respectable personalities of the local societies, concentrating amongst others on the promotion EOKA’s activities to the Cypriot people, the cultivation of courage and spirit of resistance, the confrontation of the British propaganda and the implementation of the Passive Resistance.
8 See the entire pamphlet in Papaphotis, Coup d’Etat-Invasion, pp.136-137
9 Ibid, p.140
block. Similarly, the organization desired the maintenance of the island within the Western world, although attached to Greece rather than Britain (both countries being members of NATO). By all means, this did not rule out social and economic reform once national freedom was attained. Nevertheless, the dominant forces for change in Cyprus did not carry the same social and material implications which sometimes prevailed in the general region, as, for example, with the linkage between Nasserism and land reform in Egypt. In the same way, there was no resemblance between the social orientations of EOKA and such insurrections as the FLN in Algeria or the Viet Minh in Indochina. We should remember, though, that the four-year physical insurrection in Cyprus did throw up occasions where the leadership of EOKA appeared to have shown an anti-Western attitude. One instance was Colonel George Grivas’ suggestion in early 1958 (after the UN resolution once again did not meet the desires of the Greek-Cypriot people) that Greek foreign policy should orient ‘courageously towards the East; towards the reborn Arab World and Africa, and not…the rottenness of the ungrateful West and the USA’. A second occasion came in September 1958 when Archbishop Makarios for tactical purposes (to press the Western block to adopt friendlier views towards the Greek side) recommended to the government of Karamanlis that Greece should come out of NATO. Yet, such views reflected rather disappointment because of the Western alliance’s stand against the Cyprus matter, or even tactic maneuvers to assist Greek diplomacy; they did not emanate from ideological origins and choices. In sum, Hatzivassiliou locates EOKA a significant singularity in comparison with other post-war anti-colonial struggles. The Cypriot movement was, he argues, introduced by its supporters as a political revolution: ‘political’, because it sought change of the international status of the island but not reformation of its socio-economic system (at least not at a drastic extent); ‘revolution’, because it pursued a radical overthrowing of the ruling regime and its replacement by another – in the case of Cyprus, the overthrow of the colonial regime and its replacement by the Greek state sovereignty.

2.2 The aspirational level

However, the question remains: What did the cadres of EOKA fight for? An examination of the publications and pamphlets of the underground movement during the revolt throws light on this issue. It is a fact that the first leaflet circulated by

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12 Hatzivassiliou, ‘The Cypriot’, p.51
13 Ibid
EOKA on 1 April 1955 stated that the organization undertook the initiative for a struggle that would lead to ‘throwing off the chains of the British rule’ and consequently to the liberation of Cyprus. Nevertheless, this should not guide us to the conclusion that the ‘liberation of Cyprus’ was the sole objective of the subversive movement; in many leaflets it was made clear that EOKA aimed at the complete satisfaction of the desires of the Greek-Cypriot people for liberty and self-determination. Still, one might argue that from the moment that self-determination entered the frame, independence was at least a possibility. There is also a psychological angle to be considered: to a younger Greek-Cypriot generation (of the later 1940s and early 1950s), aware of movements elsewhere in the world, and all too conscious of being ruled over by foreigners, the prospect of bringing British rule to an end was probably just as real than the more ‘platonic’ ideal of union with Greece. Therefore, it is important to understand how the cadres of the underground Cypriot movement interpreted ‘self-determination’. A first indication emanates from a proclamation by the movement, dated 1 April 1956 (the first anniversary since the beginning of the rebellion), which stated the absolute conviction that the day would not be long ‘when the soldiers of Harding will leave, saluting the blue and white Greek flag which will stream in the free winds of Cyprus’. The records of a meeting of historians on the EOKA struggle held in Nicosia on 15 October 2005 (with the participation of EOKA veterans) are more specific about the meaning of ‘self-determination’ amongst the active members of the revolutionary organization. These interpretations insist that the implementation of self-determination to Cyprus would lead eventually to national completion and incorporation of the island to the Greek mainland. For instance, Thassos Sophocleous (former section-leader of EOKA and President of the Union of EOKA Fighters-1955-59) considered that after the British would be driven out, the right of full self-determination would be exercised, leaving the Greek-Cypriots to choose their desired future, which was union with Greece. Finally, Lucis Avgoustidis (former EOKA fighter, retired Army officer) offered a slightly different interpretation stating that the EOKA struggle aimed at the first stage at the liberation of Cyprus and only eventually at enosis, thus viewing ‘independence’ as an interim towards the inclusion of Cyprus into the Greek state.

Nonetheless, EOKA did not use publicly the term ‘enosis’ but instead, it replaced it in its political rhetoric with the principle of self-determination. The tactical thinking of EOKA in order to make acceptable to global opinion what the latter might perceive as a nineteenth-century-style irredentism (the inclusion of an island with a large Greek majority to the Greek regime), oriented to promote the demand for enosis indirectly,

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15 Papageorgiou, Record of the underground documents, pp.61-62
16 See the several proclamations of EOKA, covering the period 1955-1959 in Ibid, pp.64,66,100-102, 104-106, 119, 120-121
17 Ibid, p.64
18 Find the records of the convention in Πενήντα χρόνια µετά τον Απελευθερωτικό Αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ-Μια ιστορική αποτίµηση, (Λευκωσία: Υπουργείο Παιδείας και Πολιτισµού & Συµβούλιο Ιστορικής Μνήµης Αγώνα ΕΟΚΑ 1955-1959) [Fifty Years after the Liberation Struggle of EOKA-A historical evaluation, (Nicosia: Ministry of Education and Culture & Council for the Historical Memory of the Struggle of EOKA 1955-1959)]
19 Ibid, pp.214-215
20 Ibid, p.215
21 Ibid, p.219
by projecting in its public phraseology the right of self-determination (the right of the inhabitants of the colony to choose on their own their political and national desiderata, which was enosis). One can not but identify in this approach the similar (although not identical), both ‘idealistic’ and ‘legalistic’, strategy of Savvas Loizidis, member of the Revolutionary Committee, and of Alexis Kyrou. Although it is not in the objectives of the present project to offer a full analysis of the views of these two persons on solutions to the Cyprus Question, we will simply point out that Kyrou considered the presentation of the Cyprus case to the UN not as a territorial claim on behalf of Greece against the British Empire, but as matter of self-determination of the Cypriot people. This would function as the lever to exercise such a moral pressure to the British side that would assist Greek’s leverage over a future Anglo-Hellenic negotiation, leading to the achievement of enosis. On the other hand, Loizidis offered a theoretical justification as to why it was essential to put the Cyprus Problem in an international frame, by referring to the principle of self-determination as ‘international law in effect’ (although ‘principle’ is one thing, and ‘international law in effect’ another. The United Nations was definitely not an ‘international law court of the public opinion’ as many personalities of the Greek camp believed).

2.3 The response to British constitutional suggestions

In exploring the adherence of EOKA to the objective of self-determination/enosis, it was not observed only at an aspirational level. It was also revealed by the negative response of its leadership to the ‘plans’ that were proposed for a settlement to the Cyprus matter (while the insurgency was still going on) because these did not lead to genuine self-determination/enosis. The first instance which manifested EOKA’s desire for union of Cyprus with Greece was the Harding-Makarios talks. During

22 The idea for an armed struggle against the British authorities in Cyprus was evolved around 1951 by a group of Cypriots in Athens who possessed political influence in Greek public affairs. This group was expanded by the participation of conservative intellectuals from the Greek mainland, with a significant social status in the life of early post-war Athens. At the head of the Revolutionary Committee that was formed in order to oversee the initiatives of its members was the Archbishop of Cyprus, Makarios III. It was this group of personalities which after appreciating Colonel Grivas’ qualifications, appointed him as the military leader to prepare and carry out the armed revolt in Cyprus. This Revolutionary Committee commenced during summer 1952 its organizational groundwork under the presidency of Archbishop Makarios, but a notable date in its development was 7 March 1953 when the twelve men who formed the Committee took an oath to support enosis unto death similar to the secret societies of the nineteenth century.

23 Kyrou was the Greek Permanent Representative to the UN (although of Cypriot ancestry) and from February 1954 Director-General of the Greek Foreign Ministry. He played a key role in the formulation of the policy of the Papagos’ government to internationalize the Cyprus matter in 1954, even overshadowing Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos.

24 It is noteworthy that Kyrou considered a negotiation between Britain and Greece as the only convenient manner to settle the problem between the two allied countries.


26 Quoted in Hatzivassiliou, Strategies of the Cyprus Struggle, p.117; See also Σάββας Λοϊζίδης, Άτυχη Κύπρος (Αθήνα: Μπεργαδή, 1980), σσ.52-55, 76-77, 85-86 [Savvas Loizidis, Unfortunate Cyprus (Athens: Bergadi, 1980), pp.52-55, 76-77, 85-86]

27 Find a more detailed analysis on the beliefs of Kyrou and Loizidis in Hatzivassiliou, Strategies of the Cyprus Struggle, pp.113-118
October 1955-February 1956, Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus Field-Marshall Sir John Harding had a series of meetings to discuss the future of the colony. These negotiations were so crucial that some scholars regard them as a lost opportunity since the British formula contained an indirect recognition of the right of self-determination and in the interim a wide measure of self-government. Towards the end of the talks, Makarios (whose capacity for negotiating on behalf of all the Greek-Cypriots was fully accepted by EOKA) came close to accepting a compromise, which was essentially not about self-determination but about self-government, and leaving self-determination for a later stage. In fact, Makarios had a meeting with Grivas on 28 January 1956 in order to decide whether the Greek-Cypriot side would come to such a settlement. During this meeting, the Archbishop argued that they should accept the British formula as he considered that it would advance their effort for self-determination; they would require, though, specific guarantees as to the ‘wide measure of self-government’. The principal guarantee required was for Makarios an explicit acceptance that in a restored Legislative Assembly there would be a Greek elected majority. Despite his initial reservations, Grivas reluctantly agreed to this, adding a significant condition in an amnesty for all EOKA fighters (such a demand indeed would be raised again by Dighenis during the preparatory stage of the London/Zurich Agreements). In the next day he announced to his guerrilla group based on Kykko Monastery area that the Archbishop was to reach to agreement with the Governor and moreover, for the first time he allowed himself to take photos with his men. The Colonel even gave a general order to all his subordinates for a two-week lull in the activities of EOKA in order to give fresh talks a change.

As for the rest EOKA fighters, including also those being detained by the British authorities, they became aware of the content of meetings from the vernacular press. The vast majority of them state that they did not follow in detail the course of the talks not as much as because of the insufficient information reaching them, but primarily because they felt like soldiers whose chief focus was on the military aspects of the rebellion. They all underline absolute confidence that the handlings of their leadership (both Makarios and Grivas) would succeed in achieving a solution resulting in enosis either directly or after a definite time, and thus they would obey to any political resolution of their superiors. In accordance with their testimonies, infinitesimal opinions within the bosom of the organization were recorded at that time in favour of the British proposals, whereas the decision of their leadership (after the impasse of the talks) to continue fighting on in order to pursue self-determination,
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found them in clear majority. But eventually, one of the reasons (amongst others) for the rejection of the British proposal by Makarios was that despite the removal of Whitehall from its previous adamant stand (that the principle of self-determination was not applicable to Cyprus), the formula it offered was still too complex and did not amount to a cast-iron guarantee that the colonial power would follow a policy of eventual self-determination to the island via constitutional developments. According to Makarios, the British suggestion did not even provide the Greek-Cypriot people with such guarantees ‘to secure the capability for a democratic governing of the Island up to the stage for the application of the principle of self-determination, which did not stop for a moment to constitute the sole and ultimate goal’.

A second example of EOKA’s devotion to the object of self-determination/enosis can be found in its response to the next constitutional offer for a settlement after the British deported in March 1956 Makarios to the Seychelles (with the ‘Operation Airborne’). The distinguished jurist Lord Radcliffe, after being appointed as Constitutional Commissioner to come up with a solution, submitted his recommendations in November 1956 to the British Conservative government for a draft self-governing constitution. The ‘Radcliffe Report’ (or the ‘Radcliffe Plan’ as is referred in the Greek-language literature) made no mention of self-determination; on the contrary it concerned a system of diarchy, which was limited self-government, and was distinguished by the distribution of powers between the British Administration (essentially the Governor) and a restored Cypriot Legislative assembly. The assumption of the report was continuing British sovereignty, allowing the colonial government to function regardless of the opposition of elected representatives. According to the suggested arrangement, the colonial government would be able to interfere in the educational system, whilst internal security would remain under the authority of the Governor of Cyprus. In addition, there would not be established a genuine parliamentary government as its members would be appointed by the Governor of Cyprus, who could relieve them from their duties and replace them. Not only that but also, the decrees by the Governor would prevail over those of the colonial legislation, whereas the Governor would be the sole responsible to decide whether his actions were compatible with his competences (from a Greek point of view, this could mean that granting the Cypriot Legislative assembly with any power

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35 Makarios felt that he could not meet the British side on three major issues: an elected majority in a restored Legislative Assembly, the control of internal security and the matter of the amnesty.

36 For a sophisticated analysis on the Harding-Makarios negotiations see primarily the book of Hatzivassiliou about the constitutional aspect of the Cyprus Question: Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus, pp.76-83; See also Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955-59 (Minnesotans: University of Minnesota, 1997), pp.47-58; Νίκος Κρανιδιώτης, Οι διαπραγµατεύσεις Μακαρίου Χαρτιγκ 1955-1956 (Athen: Olkos, 1987)

37 Find the full text of the official statement by the Archbishop in the press conference after the negotiations, dated on 6 March 1956 in Ibid, pp.88-91

38 A complete discussion on the ‘Radcliffe Report’ is out of the agenda of the present analysis. A full analysis of the recommendations by Lord Radcliffe can be found in Ρόµπερτ Φ Χόλλαν, Η Βρεττανία και ο Κυπριακός Αγώνας, 1954-59 (Athen: Ποταµός, 1999), σσ.286-288 [Robert F Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-59 (Athens: Potamos, 1999), pp.286-288]; Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus, pp.86-90
could be revoked at any time). As it is understood, the Radcliffe proposals neither contained sufficient provisions for the right of self-determination for the Greek-Cypriots nor they provided genuine internal autonomy (the two pillars of Makarios’ line during his talks with Harding). Thus, not surprisingly, EOKA came out in opposition to Radcliffe’s recommendations and as soon as Colonel Grivas was informed of their substance, he wrote to Angelos Vlachos, the Consul-General of Greece in Cyprus, that it was not in his “intentions to accept such a Constitution that does not correspond to the line of Makarios... Two years of bloody struggle can not be crowned with a pseudo-constitution.”

Another occasion which reveals that the ultimate ambition of EOKA was self-determination/enosis is the third British constitutional offer over Cyprus’ sovereignty. On 19 June 1958, the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, made his proposal to the Greek side for an arrangement on the island’s constitutional future. This became known as the ‘Macmillan Plan’. In this plan, which a Greek historian described as ‘apotheosis of the influence of the international factors to the matter of the internal regime of Cyprus’, the element of ‘partnership’ was dominant in every aspect: it proposed the maintenance of the British rule in the island for seven years, while Greece and Turkey would appoint representatives to the colonial government to collaborate with the Governor for the administration of Cyprus. The Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots would remain British citizens as well as acquire also the citizenship of their motherlands. Furthermore, they would decide their own communal affairs based on the principal of ‘maximum communal autonomy’ and thus there would be established two houses of representatives (a Greek-Cypriot and a Turkish-Cypriot one). The Greek side saw in the substance of the proposal a partitionist dynamic and to use the words of a Greek diplomat ‘the Plan typically did not provide partition, but it did, in reality establish it’. More precisely, the provision that the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus would be also citizens of Greece and Turkey, respectively, automatically meant that these two countries had the right to interfere in order to protect their subjects in the island, as much as the British rule would continue. Similarly, the possible change of the international status of the colony with the withdrawal of Britain after the seven-year period would mean for the two motherlands a direct right of intervention (and a possible war between Greece and Turkey). It worth mentioning that the Macmillan proposal seemed extortionate for the Greek camp (which up to this point demanded self-determination) primarily because it was so devised by Britain as to bring Greece to choose between two ‘evils’: preservation of the British sovereignty over Cyprus or partition after seven years. EOKA was not slow to word its objection to the new British formula and phrase once again its will for self-determination. Actually, Makarios (who had been released from...
exile and resided in Athens because he was not allowed by the British to return to Cyprus) rejected the plan as inadmissible and stated that he was ready to discuss on the basis for a transitional period of self-governing.\(^{47}\) Dighenis circulated a pamphlet notifying that ‘The Greek people do not ask for pseudo-constitutions. Our claim is ONE... SELF-DETERMINATION’.\(^{48}\) Simultaneously, on 25 June 1958 he underlined in a letter of his to Anthimus, Bishop of Kitium and Locum Tenens, that ‘no other solution is acceptable apart from such that will lead to self-determination’.\(^{49}\) After all, the same demand was expressed in many of the leaflets that EOKA circulated publicly and addressed to the new Governor, ever since Sir Hough Foot arrived to Cyprus on 3 December 1957.\(^{50}\)

3. Makarios, Grivas and the Zurich/London settlement

3.1 Makarios and independent Cyprus

Moving on to the termination of the physical insurgency in Cyprus, this was reached with the negotiations in Zurich (between Greece and Turkey) during 5-11 February 1959 and the agreement at the London Conference in 17-19 February 1959 (between Britain, Greece and Turkey).\(^{51}\) These Agreements formed the basis of the constitution of the Cyprus Republic:\(^{52}\) both enosis and partition were blocked; instead, these established an independent island republic, including an element of communal autonomy. Nevertheless, both Makarios and Grivas, despite their previous rejections of three British constitutional offers on the grounds that they did not contain assurances of self-determination, finally accepted a compromise based on independence.\(^{53}\) To a skeptical reader, their action would seem an oxymoron thus it is imperative to explore their change of attitude. As for Makarios, he accepted ‘independence’ because he understood, however reluctantly, the grim implications of the Macmillan formula. Nothing brought out the starkness of these impositions than their unfolding application by Britain and Turkey (and against the will of Greece) and above all the arrival of the Turkish representative in Nicosia. In the face of the ‘partitionist Macmillan Plan’, the Archbishop signified to Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza (the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs) in early September 1958, during a private conversation, that he was willing to accept independence as a solution rather than face the defeat which the implementation of the Macmillan Plan would involve.\(^{54}\)

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\(^{47}\) See the letter of Makarios to Vlachos, dated on 17 June 1958, quoted in Ibid, p.436; Compare with Averoff-Tossizza, Lost, Vol.II, p.52

\(^{48}\) Quoted in Grivas, Memoirs, p.261

\(^{49}\) See the letter of Grivas to Anthimus dated on 25 June 1958. Quoted in Ibid

\(^{50}\) See the various EOKA publications in Papageorgiou, Record of the underground documents, pp.100-106, 119-120

\(^{51}\) In fact, the physical harassment of the British Security Forces by EOKA essentially terminated in December 1958, when the organization declared a ‘truce’, in order to assist the carrying out of negotiations for a solution.

\(^{52}\) A full analysis on the Zurich and London Agreements can be found in Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus, pp.111-131; Averoff-Tossizza, Lost, Vol.II, pp.183-243

\(^{53}\) It is interesting to note that there were manifested EOKA fighters who expressed openly their disagreement with Makarios’ change of line in favour of independence, but at the end all state that they felt obliged to comply with the decision of the leadership in order to avoid the possibility of a civil war. See for instance interview with Thassos Sophocleous in Nicosia on 17/11/2008

Consequently, he had welcomed in token of good will the idea of an independent Cyprus during an interview to the British Labour MP Barbara Castle on 24 September 1958 and finally, after the talks in Zurich and London in February 1959, he signed the agreed settlement. There has been a debate in the Greek-Cypriot post-independence political culture whether Archbishop Makarios accepted the Agreements, despite the fact that he disagreed, because the Greek government ‘trapped’ him, did not inform him adequately and confronted him with a fait accompli. Such allegations were made by the Archbishop himself and his supporters several times after the signing of the Zurich/London arrangement. However, sophisticated archival research has shown that the Greek government kept Makarios informed at every turn on the views and initiatives of the Greek diplomacy both during the discussions at the UN (in late November-early December 1958) as well as during the talks in Zurich and London, and asked for his opinion four times. The entire procedure was conducted by the Greek government of Karamanlis (acting on behalf of the Greek-Cypriots) and not by Makarios in person, but still the Greek diplomats fulfilled this acting on the Archbishop’s advice. The allegation that Makarios disagreed with the Zurich/London arrangement does not hold water also when taking into consideration that the Archbishop’s reservations did not regard the essence of the Agreements as a whole, but only some aspects. Indeed, during the conference in London, the British chairman (and Foreign Secretary) Selwyn Lloyd interpreted at one point Makarios’ concerns as seeking to undermine the very foundations already agreed between the three governments. Yet, the supreme hierarch of the Cyprus Church protested about the ‘misunderstanding’, clearing up that he did not reject the Zurich Agreement and that his objections were related to certain points of the future Constitution, which made the functioning of the governmental machinery impossible. Moreover, it is interesting to note that Makarios wrote to the government of Constantine Karamanlis (published in the press on 12 February 1959) to thank him for the whole assistance to reach an agreement during the negotiations in Zurich and London.

3.2 Grivas and the formula for independence

On the other hand, it is necessary to have a closer look also at Colonel Grivas’ stand against the Zurich and London Agreements. As stated earlier in this paper, Dighenis’ attitude of rejecting three British constitutional proposals because they did not include genuine self-determination, and finally consenting the Zurich/London arrangement (based about independence), seems contradictory and thus needs further tracing. In


58 Ibid, p.66

addition, as the analysis shifted to the diplomatic plane, Grivas’ stand was dealt in the historical writing obliquely and therefore it must be researched more deeply. A third reason why Dighenis’ position must be given special attention is because of the tension surrounding the Colonel’s response (two years after the end of the insurrection, Grivas stated in his memoirs that he was misled and not informed fully about the contents of the Zurich and London conferences). The next segment will note a necessary succession of letters, which will prove beneficial in reconstructing Dighenis’ position on the settlement of the Cyprus Question in February 1959: When the military leader of EOKA was acquainted by Makarios about his willingness to accept independence as a solution, he expressed his reservations concerning this type of arrangement. Moreover, he believed that this proposal would be the beginning for further concessions. It is obvious that up to this time period, Grivas was indeed not open to suggestions of a prospective settlement beyond an exclusive preoccupation with enosis.

As soon as the Turkish government approached the Greek side for discussions on the basis of independence in late December 1958, the Greek Foreign Minister informed (although not in details) Dighenis on 27 December 1958 about the general frame as well as the course of the negotiations. In his reply, the Colonel appeared reserved. However, he did not disagree in an explicit manner. He advised the Greek government to seek ‘A solution that would meet the desires of the Greek-Cypriots...A solution clear and not hermaphrodite...That would secure peace...and that would not enclose thorns in the flesh’. The Foreign Minister of Greece communicated with Grivas again on 11 January 1959, letting him know that the governments of Greece and Turkey had made progress regarding Cyprus’ future. He pointed out (still not giving many details) that there was an understanding in matters such as the solution of independence, the participation of Turkish-Cypriots in the administration (although the Greek-Cypriot participation would be dominant) and the maintenance of British sovereign bases on the island. The military leader of EOKA once more did not clarify his views, but asked the Greek diplomat to continue keeping him informed on the talks. It was clear that the Colonel desired to learn as much as possible for the negotiations and then make up his mind. Critics of Grivas might argue that he simply had no intention of actually taking responsibility for a real political decision hemmed in by the growing constraints. However, there are reasons to believe that the Colonel had, indeed, sense of responsibility for a decisive response when the time for a solution reached. To take an instance, particularly during that time, the military leader

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60 Grivas, Memoirs, pp.386, 390.
61 See the correspondence between Makarios and Grivas on 28 and 29 September 1958 cited in Ibid, pp.304-305
62 More specifically, Grivas stated several times in his communication with Averoff that he preferred rather to be killed while fighting than accepting any type of compromise. Quoted in Averoff-Tossizza, Lost, Vol.II, p.77
64 Letter of Grivas to Averoff on 29 December 1958. Quoted in Ibid, pp.17-19; Compare with Grivas, Memoirs, p.338
of EOKA was very disappointed with Makarios’ decision not to include any personalities appointed by the organization in the advisory body (drawn wide from Greek-Cypriot parties, including the Left) that the Archbishop called to accompany him to London to sign of the Agreements (if this Greek-Cypriot ‘assembly’ approved them). Obviously, Dighenis did want EOKA to express its opinion through its representatives as soon as the Archbishop would inform them in London for the substance of the imminent arrangement. After all, this is what he wrote to the Bishop of Kitium a couple of months earlier: ‘It comes to my mind, at this moment, how would be possible for the voice of the fighting Greek-Cypriot people to be heard and represented in future negotiations, which would take place with the Ethnarch [Makarios], provided that representatives of the Cypriot people would also be necessary to participate … In such a conference, the real voice of the fighters must be heard’. Even more revealing is another letter of Grivas to Anthimus, Bishop of Kitium, a bit later, where the Colonel asks for coordination between the politicians and EOKA because ‘I [Grivas] also have responsibilities and perhaps even more than any other against the Cypriot People, from whom for four years I ask to offer only sacrifice and blood. Tomorrow, very reasonably, they will ask me: Where do you lead us? Why all these sacrifices?’.

Averoff sent another letter to Dighenis on 5 February 1959 (immediately before his departure for the conference between Greece and Turkey in Zurich), but, as the Colonel himself admits in his account, he had already acquired a more clear view about the procedure of the talks due to a letter of Azinas dated on 23 December 1958. In his letter, Azinas gave a brief but significant account regarding the initial proposals of each part as well as the final approach: creation of an independent state, withdrawal of the British rule, participation of the Turkish-Cypriots in the administration machinery in proportion with their population number.

On 13 February 1959, two days after the end of the Zurich negotiation, Dighenis received a letter by Makarios, which provided him with the context of what was agreed in the city of Switzerland and primarily about the future range of participation

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67 Actually, the Archbishop invited persons who were related, one way or another with EOKA, such as Glaftkos Clerides (lawyer) and Vassos Lyssarides (doctor). Tassos Papadopoulos (lawyer), then member of EOKA’s subsidiary organization PEKA, was also called by Makarios to accompany him to London. These persons, despite being related with EOKA, they were not appointed by the organization itself to represent it. For instance, Grivas states that neither Papadopoulos was appointed by him nor he was given any instructions by the Colonel with regards to the Agreements. Moreover, Papadopoulos himself made clear to all the Greek-Cypriot representatives gathered in London that he did not speak on behalf of EOKA and that the views he expressed corresponded only his personal thoughts. See letter of Papadopoulos to Grivas on 26 February 1959, quoted in Papageorgiou, *The Crucial Documents*, p.136; Read further on this matter in Grivas, *Memoirs*, p.381; Papageorgiou, *From Zurich*, Vol.I, pp.63-64


71 Azinas was instructed by Averoff to write this letter to Grivas in order to the military leader of EOKA obtain a concentrated informing about the understanding between the governments of Greece and Turkey. See Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost*, Vol.II, p.195; Compare with Azinas, *50 Years*, Vol.II, p.766


73 Letter of Makarios to Grivas received on 13 February 1959. Quoted in Ibid, p.377; Compare with Papageorgiou, *The Crucial Documents*, pp.70-71
of the two communities of Cyprus in the Government as well as the future deployment of 600 Turkish soldiers in the island.  

In the interim, the Colonel had already answered to the Bishop of Kitium that in order not to give the impression to the British side that the Greeks had achieved a better settlement than the Macmillan Plan, EOKA would not state anything about the Archbishop’s acceptance of the Zurich resolution. He also added that he could not consent to the stationing of Turkish troops under any capacity. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy to observe that the simultaneous issuing of a general order to the fighting wing of the organization giving directions for strict discipline was interpreted (although not correctly) by the Greek Foreign Minister, Averoff, rather as assent of Dighenis to the initiatives of both the Greek government and Archbishop Makarios.

The government of Constantine Karamanlis, in an effort to quieten the Colonel’s opposition to any future presence of Turkish Army forces to Cyprus, gave him more details about this particular part of the settlement just a day before the London Conference (which was to start its sessions on 17 February 1959). Furthermore, the General Consul of Greece to Cyprus, Phrydas, asked Dighenis to declare for Archbishop Makarios’ acceptance of the Zurich Agreement. But once again, the military leader of EOKA maintained his view against any future stationing of Turkish soldiers and preferred not to make any public statement before becoming aware of the precise text of the Agreement.

The signing of the London Agreement between Britain, Greece and Turkey was the main topic of the next letter of Anthimus, Bishop of Kitium, to Grivas on 21 February 1959. In this letter, the Colonel was informed that Britain was to preserve its military bases in the island (Anthimus attempted to calm him down in advance on this), an issue which Dighenis later criticized strongly in his memoir account. Moreover, Makarios wrote a letter to Grivas, describing the general context of the London settlement, citing its main points as well as underlying the positive ones. At the end, the Archbishop did not omit to congratulate the Colonel for his courage and

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74 Makarios did not sent Grivas the exact documents of the Agreement, an action for which the military leader of EOKA expressed his complains in his memoirs, claiming that he was not properly informed with regards to the Zurich Agreement. See Grivas, Memoirs, pp.377-378
75 Anthimus, Bishop of Kitium, had requested from Grivas to express EOKA’s sympathy for the initiative of Makarios to accept the Zurich Agreement. Find the letter of Anthimus to Grivas received on 12 February 1959 in Ibid, p.375; Compare with Papageorgiou, The Crucial Documents, pp.68-69
76 See the letter of Grivas to Anthimus dated on 13 February 1959. Cited in Ibid, pp.69-70; Compare with Grivas, Memoirs, p.376
77 Ibid
79 Averoff-Tossizza, Lost, Vol.II, p.196
80 Note of Phrydas to Grivas dated on 16 February 1959. Cited in Ibid, pp.77-79; Compare with Grivas, Memoirs, p.383
82 Letter of Grivas to Phrydas dated on 19 February 1959. Cited in Ibid, p.82; Compare with Grivas, Memoirs, p.385
84 Grivas, Memoirs, pp.386, 390
Alongside with the previous two letters, Dighenis was the receiver of a long letter by Averoff. The Greek Foreign Minister was more explanatory about the Greek rationale behind the settlement and the advantages of the Agreements for both the Greek and the Greek-Cypriot sides. The Greek diplomat also mentioned that he did not provide Dighenis with the exact documents of the arrangement as these would be announced in the press.

In his reply to Averoff, the military leader of EOKA stated once again that he had serious objections about the Zurich/London Agreements, but he would not stand against the decisions of the political leadership because this would divide not only the Greek-Cypriots but also the entire Greek nation. However, one significant issue remained, for which the Colonel demanded complete satisfaction: general amnesty and acceptable conditions for any EOKA member, even for those held by the British Security Forces (such a demand by Grivas was previously expressed during the negotiations in February 1956. A strong sense of responsibility to his fighters is discernible). Had this condition not been respected, Grivas stated that he would continue fighting. The same demand was also expressed to the Greek General Consul of Greece to Cyprus when the latter posted him on 23 February 1959 various extracts of the Agreements and asked for Dighenis’ views regarding the matter of amnesty.

After being satisfied on this point, Dighenis circulated a pamphlet on 9 March 1959, announcing the cessation of EOKA’s revolutionary activities, calling the Greek-Cypriot people for concord and unity as well as to rally round Archbishop Makarios. Moreover, he issued a general order to the EOKA combatants on 13 March 1959, ending the irregular warfare and explaining the reasons that forced him to accept the achieved by the Greek political leadership settlement. Finally, Dighenis expressed the same day in two other publications his gratitude to ‘The brave fighters of EOKA’ and especially to ‘The robust youths of EOKA’.

At this point, we must make a number of observations regarding Grivas’ final consent to the Zurich/London Agreements. First of all, it is notable that all the primary material we have on the Colonel’s attitude during this crucial phase derives from the memoirs of principally Grivas himself and Andreas Azinas, two documentary editions

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86 The Greek Foreign Minister also commented on the future stationing of 650 Turkish officers and soldiers, a point of the Agreements to which Grivas was against. See letter of Averoff to Grivas received on 21 February 1959. Cited in Ibid, pp.101-105; Compare with Grivas, *Memoirs*, pp.388-390
88 Letter of Grivas to Phrydas dated on 23 February 1959. Cited in Grivas, *Memoirs*, p.398. Grivas complained in his memoirs that the documents which the Greek government provided him with were incomplete and that these related with the British Sovereign bases were absent. See Ibid, p.398
89 The intense negotiations which followed between the Greek and the British side about the details of an amnesty will be not traced in here.
90 Quoted in Papageorgiou, *Record of the underground documents*, pp.141-142; Compare with Grivas, *Memoirs*, p.403
91 Cited in Ibid, pp.404-405
92 Ibid, p.405
93 Ibid; Compare with Papageorgiou, *Record of the underground documents*, pp.142-143
by Spyros Papageorgiou\textsuperscript{94} as well as the account of Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza on the Cyprus matter during the 1950’s, whilst there is a complete absence of private papers on behalf of Archbishop Makarios.\textsuperscript{95} Also interesting is the fact that, during the three-month preparation stage (leading to the Agreements), Grivas exchanged views principally with Averoff (the Greek Foreign Minister), Phrydas (the Greek General Consul to Cyprus) and Anthimus (Bishop of Kitium) but not directly with Archbishop Makarios (apart from three times).\textsuperscript{96} This raises a question about the Makarios-Grivas relationship at that time, but unfortunately the absence of any relative material does not allow us to make any further assumptions. Nevertheless, all the previous description of Dighenis’ communication with the main personalities who handled the Cyprus Question on behalf of the Greek side provides us with a solid basis to reach conclusions. Colonel Grivas, despite the reservations he expressed in his letters during the preceding period of the Zurich/London settlement, neither was distinctly against nor distanced himself publicly from the initiatives of the Greek leadership at any phase of the process. In particular, his reservations regarded not the general substance of ‘independence’ as a solution to the Cyprus matter, but issues of military nature such as the stationing of Turkish troops in the island, the extent of the British Sovereign bases, the conditions of EOKA’s disarmament as well as the future legal status of the members of the subversive organization.

When dealing with the attitude of Dighenis during the last three months of the revolt, his objections to the Agreements can be best comprehended from the point of view of a person who, as Averoff commented, ‘For four years had staked his head and those of his followers, had shed blood, had surmounted severe difficulties for one solution... It would be reasonable not to accept a compromising solution which would suddenly emerge and would be so different from the one he had been fighting for years’.\textsuperscript{97} We must also take into account the state of his health: the military leader of EOKA was isolated in his hideout in Limassol, living under pressing conditions (being underground), with Makarios not communicating often, while at the same time he understood that in the face of a prospect solution he had to weigh and respect the sacrifices of the Greek-Cypriot people for enosis, before reaching to a decision.

As previously commented, Grivas, despite his reactions, at the end consented to the Hellenic-British-Turkish arrangement about Cyprus. He reached this decision because of two principal reasons: the first one was related to his fear that had he decided to continue the struggle, he would fight not only against the British but also against the Greek government and Makarisos. This would inevitably lead to a Greek-Cypriot civil war.\textsuperscript{98} The second factor which influenced the Colonel’s action not to move against

\textsuperscript{94} Papageorgiou, \textit{The Crucial Documents}; Ibid, \textit{Record of the underground documents}

\textsuperscript{95} The former President of the Cyprus Republic, Tassos Papadopoulos, informed in October 2005 the President of the Council for the Historical Memory of the EOKA Struggle (CHMES), Claire Angelidou, that Archbishop Makarios kept his Private Papers in the Archbishopric, which were unfortunately destroyed during the heating events of July 1974. See the relevant testimony in \textit{Fifty Years}, p.221

\textsuperscript{96} The Archbishop wrote to Grivas about the negotiating procedure only three times: on 3 February 1959, when the approach between Greece and Turkey was in the making; on 13 February 1959, after the end of the Zurich Conference; on 20 February 1959, after the signing of the London Agreement.

\textsuperscript{97} Averoff-Tossizza, \textit{Lost}, Vol.II, p.194

\textsuperscript{98} Grivas, \textit{Memoirs}, pp.401-402; See about this view by Grivas also the personal testimony of Vias Livadas, an EOKA fighter, in \textit{Βίας Λειβάδας, Πορεία προς την Αμμόχωστο}, (Λευκωσία: Γκοβόστης, 2001), σ.319 [Vias Livadas, \textit{March to Famagusta} (Nicosia: Govostis, 2001), p.319]
the political compromise of Zurich and London was of more decisive nature. Grivas’, and by extension EOKA’s position during the course of the rebellion was always connected with the help offered (either materialistic, either by promoting the movement’s aim and activities publicly) by Makarios and the Greek official leadership. In this regard, EOKA could not continue fighting on without their crucial support and consequently the military leader of the organization would have no other choice but to be dragged by the initiatives of the Greek government and Makarios when time came for the latter to accept a compromise settlement. As a British historian acutely commented ‘The decision facing EOKA’s leader was not whether to lay down his arms and go back to the ‘Motherland’, but the manner in which he did so’.99

4. Conclusion

In this paper we have examined the ultimate goal which the armed enosis movement pursued since the beginning of the revolt in Cyprus. This was the termination of British rule and the incorporation of the island into the Greek motherland. Yet the revolutionary organization EOKA did not include in its rhetoric the term ‘union’ in order to express its claim, as this referred historically to a previous generation of European national movements which contributed to the end of the continental multinational empires. Instead, it demanded the application of the principle of ‘self-determination’ because it believed that such a term was more familiar, contemporary and therefore acceptable in the international forums. The word ‘self-determination’ appeared continually within the publications of EOKA during the four-year physical struggle; but the settlement of the Cyprus Question in 1959 with the Zurich/London Agreement and the establishment of a self-standing Cypriot state does not disguise the genuine commitment of the movement to its ultimate political ambition nor it leads us conclude that it simply paid lip-service to self-determination under the banner of enosis as a popular rallying cry: The leadership of EOKA, both Makarios and Grivas, rejected three plans proposed by the British side because these did not regard immediate enosis or at least constitutional developments that would lead to eventual self-determination after a definite time-period. Makarios oriented towards seeking a compromise such ‘independence’ only after the British Conservative government introduced the Macmillan Plan into Cyprus, without any involvement of the Greek side. Nevertheless, the Archbishop signed the Agreements willingly, without being misled or ‘trapped’ by the Greek leadership. On the other hand, the military leader of EOKA was more cautious about the agreed settlement, but the reservations he expressed regarded military matters and not the general philosophy of the Zurich/London arrangement. Despite his own beliefs, he was obliged to consent to the signed Agreements not only because he desired to avoid the possibility for a civil war within the Greek-Cypriot community, but also because EOKA would be dispossessed of any assistance by the Greek leadership as well as Makarios. Had Dighenis decided to continue fighting, this primarily meant no international projection of the organization’s political desiderata. Consequently, it would result in the demotion of the Cyprus case from an international problem to a local uprising where the ratio of power would become fatal for the Greek-Cypriot side.

99 Holland, Britain, p.559
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**Articles**