ABSTRACT:

With the turn of the 21st century there was an increase in the introduction of frameworks regarding the EU impact on protracted ethnic conflicts. While most of them acknowledge, directly or indirectly, the existence and importance of a high degree of securitization, the impact of the latter is not necessarily examined to the full potential. Indeed, securitization and its role in conflict environments is under-explored as a theory. What is argued in this paper is that there exists a possibility that certain institutionalized routines could potentially institutionalize (perhaps even inadvertently) securitizing acts. If this hypothesis holds, then there could be significant effect on the timing of securitizing acts, the actor and the audience and, more importantly, on the processes that render securitizing acts successful. The institutionalization of securitizing acts is an issue that the Copenhagen School has not touched upon, despite the potential effect it could have on the theory, especially the Speech Act and the development/emergence and perpetuation of the acts. I conclude that the abovementioned theoretical ‘amendments’ on securitization should be incorporate in the EU-conflict resolution frameworks (e.g. Diez et al. 2008) in order for the latter to provide us with a more clear explanation how the EU could influence protracted ethnic conflicts like the one in Cyprus.
Introduction

The EU impact on ethnic conflicts, such as the one in Cyprus, received relatively very little academic attention before the turn of the 21st century both on an empirical and much less on a theoretical level. Since then, however, numerous studies have emerged that offer theoretical insights and frameworks on the EU’s actual or potential impact (e.g. Brewin 2000; Hill 2001; Cowles et al. 2001; Diez et al. 2002, 2006, 2008, Tocci 2004, 2007; Christou 2004) as well as more empirical observations (e.g., for Cyprus, Nugent 2000; Loizides 2002, 2007; Diez 2002; Tocci 2003; Theophanous 2004, 2006; Demetriou 2004; 2005). While the aforementioned, and other, studies contribute significantly to our theoretical and empirical understanding of the EU’s impact on ethnic conflict cases, there are still noteworthy limitations that need to be addressed. The most prominent approaches (e.g. the four pathways, Diez et al. 2008) offer a theoretical understanding of how the EU could have an impact on conflict cases, but they still do not explore fully the necessary conditions and processes that could either hinder or aid the EU towards its goal. More specifically, while in many of those studies the existence of securitization is acknowledged its impact and is not necessarily examined to the full potential. Indeed, securitization and its role in conflict environments is under-explored as a theory.

Recognizing these ‘gaps’, this paper focuses on theoretical recommendations for improvements on the securitization theory, which would subsequently help the development of more coherent EU-conflict resolution frameworks.

The issues that are routinized and institutionalized and more specifically the way through which routines are institutionalized and then securitized is either taken for granted, or is under-utilized and in some cases it is even ignored, leading, subsequently, to sub-optimal understandings of both the conflict as well as of the impact of conflict resolution efforts of third parties such as the EU. With this in mind, it is one thing to acknowledge that there is securitization and that it affects the conflict (e.g. Diez et al. 2008, Demetriou 2004) and another to understand how securitization is developed and sustained. One of the central arguments this paper wishes to make is that the aforementioned processes, namely the institutionalization of routines on hand and securitization on the other, should be much more closely linked than they currently are in the literature, not least because they exert a significant influence on the development of each other. While this argument is not Cyprus-specific, it is certainly Cyprus-applicable. In this paper the connection of these two processes is done more on a theoretical than an empirical level and the Cyprus conflict is simply used as an example to demonstrate the validity of the hypothesis as well as the potential benefits that such a theoretical approach could have.

The process of securitization and the institutionalization of routines involve numerous variables, each with its own weight. One of the heaviest ones is identity. Even though most of the EU-conflict resolution frameworks acknowledge the significance of identities (as many times the goal is to transform them from antagonistic to compatible), the way they are handled is rather oversimplified. More specifically, when studying the EU impact on conflicts, the internal ‘sub-identity’ differences and power struggles within each conflicting side are almost never examined vis-à-vis the processes (e.g.
routinization, institutionalization and securitization) through which identities could be sustained or developed/transformed.

Paper Structure and Basic Definitions

The first part of this paper presents a brief analysis of the ethnic conflict literature with particular emphasis on characteristics of such conflicts; characteristics that could be of particular importance when analyzing the emergence as well as the perpetuation of securitizing acts. The second part consists of an overview of the most prominent frameworks and theories on the EU’s approach to conflict resolution. The focus of that part is not on Cyprus per se, but rather on the scholarly views of the potential EU impact on conflicts such as the one in Cyprus. Next is a literature review on routinization and a more detailed analysis of securitization, followed by the conclusion.

Before proceeding to the first part of this paper, it would be useful to briefly define two key terms that are used throughout the thesis, namely conflict and securitization. Following the Diez et al. definition (2008: 6), I define conflict as the incompatibility of subject positions, where the subject positions refer to antagonistic and mutually exclusive identities and/or to irreconcilable interests. Whether the irreconcilable interests exist because of incompatible identities or if it is the other way around (i.e. that the incompatible identities exist because of incompatible interests) may vary from case to case. My view is that in ethnonational conflicts (such as the one in Cyprus) there is usually an environment that incorporates both “kinds” of incompatibilities, where one feeds of each other. It must be noted that in this definition, the presence of violence is not a necessary element for conflict to exist. Especially in the post-cold war period there is a tendency to classify conflicts based on their characteristics (for example ‘ethnopolitical conflicts’, ‘communal conflicts’, ‘protracted social conflicts’ and ‘identity-based conflicts’ (Rothman 2001: 290). The focus here is on intractable and deep-rooted conflicts, the characteristic of which I analyze in the next section.

Securitization is a term coined by the Copenhagen School scholars and is the process through which non-politicized issues become politicized (i.e. subject of political debate) and then securitized (i.e. actors persuade their audience that a specific issue is a security and existential threat to them). One of the most notable contributions of the Copenhagen School is the fact the theory deviates from ‘strict’ sense of security studies where there was only one referent object (i.e. the state). According to the School, securitization could occur in a number of sectors, namely political, military, societal, economic and environmental, with each one having specific referent objects (e.g. identity, sovereignty, etc). This is what Wæver calls ‘Dialectics of Security’ (1996: 109). As Diez (2003) notes, some of the problematic effects of securitization are ‘ a) the construction or reaffirmation of exclusive and antagonistic identities; b) the legitimization of violence against the

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1 It must be noted that I am not arguing that there are no studies on how or rather why identities are sustained/changed in conflict cases. For Cyprus specifically, there are numerous studies on how identities are sustained and but most of them are done from an anthropological and sociological perspective (see for instance Papadakis 2006; Peristianis 2006). But even in those cases, the role of securitization and, to a certain degree, routinization is also understudied. What I argue is that such anthropological analyses should receive more attention in the EU-conflict literature, especially when there is a discourse of identity reconstruction (e.g. constructive pathway, Diez et al. 2006, 2008, Tocci 2007).
‘other’; c) the effective removal of this issue from normal political debate.’ It is precisely because of these effects that securitization should receive particular attention when studying conflict cases, and more specifically ethnonational conflict cases where identities occupy a very central role.

How, when and why individuals or groups of individuals choose to present certain issues (be it social, economic, political, military or environmental), as existential threats to the survival of one or the other side, is not a Cyprus specific problem, but it is certainly Cyprus applicable, and (should be) very relevant when examining the EU impact on conflict cases such as the one in Cyprus. On this account what I argue is that while a number of scholars emphasize the importance of securitization in conflict environments such as the one in Cyprus, the factors that generate and sustain it, as well as the precise impact securitization has on conflicts per se and on the EU resolution efforts, are under-examined. For Cyprus specifically, while it is generally accepted that there exists a significant degree of securitization (e.g. Demetriou 2004a, 2004b, Diez et al. 2006, 2008), and that it is, indeed, part of the problem, there is no in-depth examination of the relationship between securitization and the EU’s ability to have a positive (or even inadvertent negative) impact on the Cyprus conflict. Moreover, there is no real examination of which issues (i.e. sectors) are securitized the most, by whom and when. More importantly, however, it is not examined in depth (if at all) why and when securitizing acts seem to be so effective in Cyprus.

More importantly, however, examining who securitizes issues and when presupposes that securitization is subject to conscious decisions of specific elite; this is indeed in the heart of securitization theory. What I argue is that there is also the possibility that certain institutionalized routines could potentially institutionalize (perhaps even inadvertently) securitizing acts. If this hypothesis holds, then there could be significant effect on the timing of securitizing acts, the actor and the audience and, more importantly, on the process that renders an act successful. The institutionalization of securitization is an issue that the Copenhagen School has not yet touched upon.

**Ethnic, Intractable and Deep-rooted Conflicts**

As Rothman points out there are several kinds of conflicts (especially in the post-cold war period), -e.g. ‘ethnopolitical conflicts’, ‘communal conflicts’, ‘protracted social conflicts’ and ‘identity-based conflicts’ (2001: 290)- each with its own characteristics. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the kinds of conflicts and the methods used to resolve them. Suffice to say that there is not always a clear distinction between them and that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive; indeed, protracted social conflicts could also be, or rather they are most likely to be, identity conflicts as well. The focus here is on the ‘protracted social conflicts’, a term coined by Azar (1983), which describes disputes that are ongoing and seemingly irresolvable; disputes like the one in Cyprus. The central unit of analysis in such conflicts is the identity group, which could be defined, *inter alia*, in ethnic, religious or racial terms, and their source lies not in economic or power disputes, but rather in the denial of fundamental human needs such as security, distinct identity and social recognition of identity (Azar 1990). It is not surprising, therefore, that ethnic conflicts are more likely to be caused by collective fears of the
future rather than from ‘ancient hatreds’, intergroup differences or economic-induced reasons (Lake and Rothchild 1996: 41), as collective fears usually revolve around fundamental issues (e.g. threat of identity) that influence to the very core the majority or people in an ethnic society. Similarly, Burton (1979, 1987) used the term ‘deep rooted conflict’ to describe conflicts that are not based on negotiable interests or positions but on non-negotiable and non-compromising needs, making them distinct from disputes that deal with tangible and negotiable interests. Those conflicts, therefore, are about ontological human needs and not about actual differences or misperceptions about objective interests.

The collective fear is subject to the fear of ontological security, or security of the self, which is directly related to identity security and the fear of social (de-)recognition. Ontological security refers not to the security of the body, but to the security of the self and to the subjective sense of who one is (Mitzen 2006: 344, see also Wendt 1999: chap. 3). Thus, any actions (or inactions) that threaten the ontological security of an individual or a community, also pose, in essence, a danger to that individual’s/community’s identity as they threaten to change its subjective sense of who s/he is and thus his/her identity.

In summary, such deep-rooted social conflicts to be considered intractable they must ‘meet’ certain conditions. More specifically, they have to be: (a) protracted for at least one generation; (b) irreconcilable interests (parties’ goals are seen as diametrically opposite); (c) violent (though not necessarily constantly – i.e. there could be just instances of violence); (d) of zero-sum nature (any gain of the ‘other’ is ‘my’ loss); (e) total (issue of survival/existence); (f) central (members of society are constantly preoccupied by it) and (g) the parties involved have an interest in the continuation of the conflict (i.e. the already economic, military and psychological investments in the conflict impede the resolution efforts) (Bar-Tal 1998: 23-4, 2000: 353). Moreover, such conflicts, which essentially have at their core discourses of identity, ‘operate on the basis of a self/other dichotomy, where the other is the opposite conflict party, which is portrayed as an existential threat to the ‘self’ (Diez 2003).’

One of the major characteristics of such conflicts is that the discrepancies in interests, needs and values between the conflicting parties are intensified by historical antagonism as well as cultural differences. This leads to (even more) intense ethnocentrism and mistrust, which, when combined with the (unavoidable and natural) human deficiencies in cognitive functioning, there is ineffective communication and interaction between the conflicting sides (Fisher 1997: 6-7). Once conflicts escalate to such a degree, there is resistance to de-escalation and resolution, not least because of solidified mechanisms ‘such as commitments to past actions and structural changes that support coercive strategies’ (ibid: 7). In other words, the ‘structure’ of deep-rooted intractable conflicts generates specific conflict norms and routines, which then help sustain the conflict to irresolvable levels.

It is worth noting that the conflict in Cyprus, which is, essentially, an identity conflict, or ‘ethnonational’ according to Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz (2006: 5), with elements of ‘obsessive ethnic nationalism, one sided constructions of history focusing solely on periods or incidents of conflict, and the inability to see certain commonalities (Papadakis 2006: 68)’, fits the description of intractable, protracted, deep-rooted conflicts. Indeed it
fits the description so well, that it is no coincidence that numerous scholars for intractable deep-rooted conflicts (e.g. Ronald Fisher, John W. Burton and Edward Azar) used Cyprus as one of their main case studies.

This section focused primarily on the characteristics of ethnic conflict and less on the resolution frameworks. Even though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze in depth conflict resolution methods, it is worth noting that there are numerous scholars who have studied extensively the different approaches, with Fisher’s (1997, 2005) Interactive Conflict Resolution frameworks, Rothman’s and Olson’s (2001) ARIA framework (Antagonism, Resonance, Invention, Action), Fisher’s (1989) and Kriesberg’s (1998) models for de-escalation of conflict, Rothman and Olson’s (2001) three ‘manifestations’, namely the recourse based negotiations, the interest based bargaining and the identity based conflict resolution, and Pearson’s (2001) conflict process dimensions (i.e. grassroots versus elite and identity versus instrumental nature of negotiations), being just some of the major contributions in the field.

**Deep-rooted Intractable Conflicts and Securitization**

What should be specifically noted is that securitization, even if not explicitly stated, has a key position in the structure of deep-rooted intractable social conflicts. Indeed, the very important chicken-and-egg-like question arises on whether securitization is what causes the perpetuation of such conflicts, or whether the structure of those conflicts leads to more (successful) securitizing acts. The fact that in such conflicts it is the identity, social recognition and the survival of the ‘self’ that is at stake, creates a fertile environment for the successful development of securitizing acts (i.e. construction of existential threats). Similarly, the intense mistrust, the resistance to de-escalation, the inefficient communication, the zero-sum mentality and the unyielding commitments of past actions, (i.e. issues that characterize social deep-rooted conflicts such as the one in Cyprus), also contribute towards the creation of a securitizing system, which in its turn supports the perpetuation of the conflict. There is in other words a circular relationship between securitization and specific social and cognitive factors (i.e. norms, beliefs and ideas as well as routines) that are usually found in conflict environments. These factors influence both the routinization and the institutionalization of processes and issues, which in their turn influence both the frequency as well as the success rate of (de)securitizing acts.

More specifically what I argue is that the institutionalization of certain norms and beliefs, in regards to who the ‘other’ is and on how ‘our’ side should negotiate with the ‘other’, creates specific routines (i.e. processes on how to handle issues) that not only open the path for successful securitizing acts, but also many times create an environment where there is expectation for securitization. Indeed, many times the perception of how ‘well-fit’ an elite is to negotiate the ‘national problem’ may depend on his securitizing routines. Part of this hypothesis is that the public actually expects such securitizing acts in order to feel more secure that its elite (especially negotiators) is truly trying to minimize their fears/threats. Such expectations, however, hinder any potential efforts for desecuritizing acts on behalf of the elite. In other words, the power-struggle between the elite within each conflict side (which is necessary to convince the public of their unyielding will to fight for them) ‘forces’ them to follow the established routines that essentially support securitization in an effort not to be considered inapt as negotiators. With this in mind, the
process of securitization should be reconsidered for conflict cases. More specifically, it must be questioned whether ‘existential threats’ can emerge only after speech acts, or whether they could also ‘evolve’ from established routines and thus become so institutionalized that are essentially ‘ever-present’.

*Identities, Framing and Securitization*

While the essence of such conflicts is usually found in the discourses of (antagonistic) identities, this is not readily obvious either during the negotiations or in the ‘official’ positions of the conflicting sides. This could be attributed to at least two major reasons: The first is the fact that issues related to identities are usually neither tangible nor measurable, and thus not obvious.

The second has to do with framing of issues and is thus, unavoidably, linked to securitization. Accusing the ‘other’ of jeopardizing your identity requires particularly careful phrasing. On one hand such claims are difficult to prove, and on the other they are not necessarily prudent and beneficial, especially during conflict resolution negotiations. Such serious accusations (regardless of their potential truthfulness) will most likely aggravate the ‘other’ and, at the same time, cost the ‘accusing side’ ‘points’ in the eyes of the international mediators who try to resolve the conflict. Subsequently, many of these identity-related fears are hidden behind tangible and measurable issues during resolution negotiations. For example, while the number of Turkish settlers that will remain in Cyprus in case of a solution is one of the most vital subjects during the negotiations, the Greek Cypriot negotiators many times present it as a legal issue and not as a societal threat (i.e. that a vast number of settlers will ‘Turkify’ the island and threaten the Greek-Cypriot identity). The same, however, does not apply for other elite who are not sitting at the negotiating table. Many of them go far beyond the legalistic aspect of the issue and securitize the issue as an existential societal threat (e.g. Turkification/Hellenicization of the community), while at the same time accuse their own negotiators of not being tough enough (i.e. not securitizing the issues enough).

Framing, or rather lack of framing, creates an additional issue related to securitization, namely, the timing of securitizing acts. This problem revolves around the hypothesis on whether securitizing acts could be more successful if the securitized-to-be issues are internalized and perceived as threats (but not necessarily existential) first and then are securitized. A parallel second hypothesis questions whether the success of securitizing acts is even subject to the speech act or if highly internalized threats are essentially securitized successfully by ‘themselves’. Therefore, issues that are framed on a regular basis and through multiple paths (e.g. elite, media, education, family, etc) could potentially increase significantly the success rate of securitizing acts relative to those issues (i.e. referent objects) and could even allow for securitization to take place in ways other than the speech act.

**EU and Conflict Resolution**

One of the chief goals of the European Union is both conflict prevention and conflict resolution, especially in its own neighborhood. This section summarizes the main EU-conflict resolution literature, using primarily the Diez et al. (2006, 2008) four pathways,
as their work explicitly examines the European integration impact on Cyprus and other similar border conflicts. While in the existing literature there are numerous useful insights on how the EU could have an impact on conflicts, there are still some notable gaps that could be filled through the study of routinization and securitization. One of the EU aims is, after all, the desecuritization of conflict-ridden environments until the problems are resolved.

Hill identifies three dimensions of EU and conflict: conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution (2001: 330). The three dimensions are essentially three inter-dependent stages in the sense that for conflict management (2nd dimension) to take place, it means that conflict prevention (1st dimension) failed, and, similarly, if conflict resolution (3rd dimension) actions are required, it means that the conflict management was insufficient. Even though the focus is on the latter, it is still worth noting briefly the first two. In the first dimension, the EU’s aim is to prevent violence from breaking out, making this goal, almost by definition, a long-term process, even though urgent and short-term interventions may be necessary from time to time (ibid). The major mechanism for violence prevention around the EU borders is usually the lure of membership, as candidate governments use the possibility of membership as a tool to resist their own nationalists (ibid: 323-5). Clearly, this first dimension is not relevant for intractable conflicts (i.e. like the Cyprus conflict) since, by definition, if a conflict is intractable it means that conflict has not been prevented. In the second dimension the aim is to prevent escalation once conflict has already begun and it usually requires short-term [and decisive] interventions (ibid: 330). This dimension, even though it does not exclude intractable conflicts, it is more related to conflicts where violence is more imminent (with Cyprus not being (currently) one of those conflicts). Finally, the last dimension, which is a medium-term process, is used if the first two fail, and deals with the re-establishment of peace (ibid). If conflict is, as defined above, the incompatibility of subject positions, then peace should not be defined exclusively as the creation of non-violent environments, but also as the creation of environments where more compatible identities and subject positions exist. Consequently, the latter dimension, conflict resolution, aims, essentially, at transforming the incompatible positions into more compatible ones. As Diez (2003) notes, European integration could play a role in this transformation ‘by providing an institutional and symbolic framework that supports the articulation of multiple identities (in a multi-level / poly-centric system of governance)’.

Third party intervention, including the EU, is most likely to have a successful impact if the conflict reached a ‘hurting stalemate’ in the sense that the stalemate has too much cost for both sides, and when neither party foresees a likely victory (Zartman 1989). This is when a conflict is considered to be ‘ripe’ enough for resolution efforts to have a significant effect. A conflict is considered to be ‘ripe’ when both sides understand that they cannot achieve unilaterally their aims and when they begin ‘to feel uncomfortable in the costly dead-end situation (ibid: 286)’. In ‘non-ripe’ cases, where the stalemate is not yet hurting, and where one or both sides feel they can achieve their aims unilaterally, each or both sides will view the opportunity cost of a solution (i.e. the sacrifices/compromises that each side has to make) as too high. Consequently, the prospects of resolution will diminish and third party mediation is less likely to be successful. The same outcome will occur (i.e. no solution and failed mediation) if one or
both sides consider the status quo to be better than any proposed solution. In such cases what we will likely see is the securitization of the proposed solution plans (or parts of it). This seems to have been the case with the Annan Plan as far as Greek Cypriots were concerned.

Regardless of the conflict ‘ripeness’, however, the EU could help towards conflict resolution in essentially two broad ways: the first way is with the use of direct foreign policy towards third states and the second is through membership or more precisely the lure of membership; the focus is on the latter. In the first case, the EU uses ‘mainstream’ diplomatic means to convince parties to resolve a conflict (e.g. pressure for adoption of minority rights policies or in more extreme cases recognition of break-away regions). Moreover, the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) provides the EU, theoretically at least, with additional tools to handle neighborhood problems. In addition, the EU could also use other, ‘stricter’, approaches such as economic sanctions to apply pressure to one or both sides involved in a conflict to resolve their problems. However, the fact that the Union’s institutional capacity is rather limited prevents it from being efficient and many times effective.

The second and most effective way is through membership or rather the prospect of membership. There are several mechanisms the EU uses to achieve its goals, the majority of which are related to enlargement and integration. Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006; 2008) propose perhaps the most comprehensive framework with four pathways, namely the compulsory, enabling, connective and constructive pathway, through which the EU could potentially (i.e. not all pathways work for all cases) influence border conflicts. These pathways are both direct and indirect and target the elite as well as the society (i.e. general public). The pathways, therefore, are essentially two-dimensional: the target could either be the policy / political leadership or the society, and the EU’s approach could be either actor-driven or structural. It must be noted that other similar classifications of how the EU could have an impact on conflicts. One notable example is Tocci (2007) who proposes three mechanisms, namely conditionality, social learning and passive enforcement. All three of them, however, do not deviate significantly from the Diez et al. four pathways, as the logic behind them is very similar. Precisely because the Diez et al. is comprehensive part of this section will be dedicated to a more detailed analysis on this framework so as to demonstrate, inter alia, the potential limitations of the literature.

The compulsory pathway (which is similar to Tocci’s (2007) conditionality) is actor-driven and the EU uses it when its aim is to influence policy changes through the use of carrot and stick (i.e. granting or withholding a reward, which is usually EU membership). This pathway works only if candidate state wishes to join the EU, and it works because of the power asymmetry between the latter and the former. There exists, therefore, a ‘power of attraction’, which is used to pressure candidates to change (Christou 2004). This mechanism, however, is both short-term and, essentially, effective only during the
candidacy period since there is no longer leverage on the candidate once the ‘carrot’-membership is given. Cyprus was not an exception.2

The enabling impact is more indirect. Through this pathway the EU provides the elite (but not necessarily just politicians, but rather any individuals who have the power to persuade a significant audience) with a reference point allowing thus the latter to legitimize conflict-diminishing policies (Diez et al. 2006: 572). A similar argument is made by Hill who argues that ‘governments [will be] able to resist their own nationalists by constraints of EU membership (2001: 315)’. But, as Diez et al. argue, while the EU is central to the discourse, not all elite will be using the ‘EU-card’ in a positive way. In other words, there is the possibility that the elite could also use the EU for nationalistic purposes (EUBorderConf: 2006). Why this is the case is not thoroughly examined by the authors. One rather obvious reason is the possibility that certain elites are nationalists and thus use the EU as a weapon to shift the balance of power to their side. A less obvious possibility has to do with non-nationalist elite who still, however, use the EU-card to harden their positions. Such behavior could be attributed to the fear of political cost they will occur during the internal power struggles. Similar to the argument made earlier, certain expectations are so deeply internalized that any deviation from them carries significant political cost. For example, the non-use of the EU as leverage to pressure Turkey for concessions would be considered by Greek Cypriot public as a sign of weakness. Moreover, when the EU is viewed (by public and/or elite) as the only ‘weapon’ in one’s arsenal, things become even more complicated as the expectation of EU-as-leverage is routinized in the media and the public sphere in general, and the securitized by the opposition but also the public itself! More specifically, when the prominent view held is that it is the EU-way or complete failure (i.e. the EU is reversely securitized – not as a threat but as the only way forward), there are extremely few options for elite not to use the Union as a negotiating tool.

The EU uses the connective impact to target societies directly, mainly through financial support for common activities (Diez et al. 2006: 573). The idea is that, through them, the two antagonistic communities will first be brought together and then they will begin to understand and tolerate each other. The aim of this bottom-up approach is to change the ‘ordinary’ people’s understanding about the ‘other’. As this approach targets only a small number of individuals, to be truly successful it has to either influence key society players that would be able to transfer this ‘new understanding’ to a bigger part of the society, or influence directly a significant percentage of the population (which is however beyond the scope of the pathway). Unsurprisingly perhaps not many ‘key people’ participate in such events, not least because of the social pressure they will face. Therefore, we need to understand more clearly if, how, and to what degree, participation in such events hurts the image of any individuals or groups that ‘dare to violate the norms and associate with the other’. This issue is, again, related to the issue of power struggles as any image-

2 This mechanism (pathway) could theoretically work even after a state’s accession as, (in theory) the EU could ‘throw out’ form the Union a member state. In reality, however, it is very unlikely that the EU would use the threat of expulsion for non-dramatic reasons. For example, even if the EU believes that the Republic of Cyprus’s efforts towards a resolution are insufficient, it is very unlikely that it would use the threat of expulsion to apply pressure. This could have been the case if, for example, the Republic was repeatedly engaged in the violation of minority rights (i.e. something more dramatic).
damage could bring an elite, a political party (or an organization such as a newspaper) to a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis their competitors. It is indicative that during the 2004 Annan Plan period in Cyprus, organizers and participants to any bi-communal events/projects were accused (in the press usually) of receiving money from the Anglo-Americans, connoting, of course, that they were traitors. In other words, such activities and more specifically participants in such activities, were securitized and many times presented as an existential threat to one or the other community’s identity.

Lastly, the constructive impact is the most indirect of the four and aims at transforming the underlying identities of the parties involved (Diez et al. 2006: 574). According to Diez et al. (2006, 2008), the idea is that the EU could foster the creation of new discursive frameworks through which identities in the conflict region will be ‘re-expressed’ in a way that would foster desecuritization, which, in its turn lead to the reduction of incompatibilities and eventually resolution. More specifically, what the authors argue is that EU-induced institutional frameworks could, through socialization, lead to a change of national identities, ‘or even to a convergence of national identities with an emerging European identity, in which the very subject positions are redefined (Diez et al. 2008: 23), or ultimately, even reach the level where identities are completely de-ethnicized (Tocci 2004: 135). Tocci calls such processes social learning, as the change would come through societal contact and dialogue (2007: 15). The idea is that there will be a change of the perceived interests through the internalization of EU norms. According to Tocci, the approach could be either top-down which takes place when domestic agents (that changed because of their frequent contact with the EU) promote change by persuading other agents to alter their interests, or bottom up, which takes place when ‘ordinary’ non-state individuals convince the elite to change their policies (ibid).

Neither Diez et al. nor Tocci have examined in great depth the social processes (through which identities and subject positions will be transformed) can be truly effective. Even though it is not explicitly stated, they take for granted that if European norms (and thus Europeanization) do not come in conflict with the existing routines, change will be easier. Risse et al. (2001) argue that domestic transformation is a question of ‘good fit’ between the domestic and European norms. The better the fit, the less opposition, and thus more chances for transformation. If there is no misfit it means that the domestic norms require no change and there is no conflict with the existing routines, creating thus no ontological insecurity. If on the other hand there is misfit, then the Europeanization process will create tensions, as it will challenge the existing domestic routines. One of the most important questions that remain unanswered is whether the change occurs at the very moment of contradiction with the existing norms (and routines). If this is indeed the case, then is it correct to talk about a constructive process? How is the point of conflict determined though? What I argue is that while it is possible to engage in transformation processes even when there is a misfit with ‘ordinary’ routines, those processes start becoming ineffective when they are in conflict with routines that maintain ontological security, and even more when those routines (or issues) are diachronically securitized. The problem with deep-rooted intractable conflicts is that it is unavoidable to avoid conflict with such ontological security-maintaining routines.
Wendt argues that identities, which are many times taken as ‘given’, are, in fact, a ‘process’ that has simply been sufficiently stabilized by internal and external structures that it appears given (Wendt 1999: 340, emphasis in original). This is an important argument, especially for conflict cases, as it is one thing to argue that there are two given identities that need to be transformed or re-expressed, and a different one to understand that these identities are in fact ongoing processes that make those identities seem given. Does it make a difference if identities are given or appear to be given (as the bottom line is the same, identities need to be ‘re-expressed’)? The answer is yes, as identities are subject to specific processes that need to be identified and if necessary be interrupted and changed. This is particularly important for conflict cases such as the one in Cyprus, as such processes are not just deeply routinized, but are also highly securitized, preventing therefore any easy interruptions and changes and consequently identity transformations.

It must be noted that Diez et al. (2008), when talking about identity transformation (i.e. Constructive Pathway), acknowledge the existence of such processes when they argue that the articulation of identities is done through the articulation of securitizing acts. However, the lack of more profound empirical observations in their work does not allow us to understand either how exactly securitizing acts hinder identity transformation, or the relationship between the institutionalization of routinized securitizing acts and the perpetuation of antagonistic identities.

**Routinization and its impact on conflict environments**

Wendt argues the starting point of any interaction between two parties is the actors’ representation of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, as it is from there that one can determine who they are (themselves and the others), what they want and how they will behave (1999: 332). From that point onwards, the interaction between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ that follows will not only form the identities and interests of each party, but will also sustain them. If two sides repeatedly engage in practices (i.e. routines) that ignore the other’s needs, they will essentially ‘create and internalize shared knowledge that they are enemies’ (ibid). This would create the perception that the ‘other’ has been (and will be) diachronically the enemy whose interests have always been (and will always be) diametrically different from ‘my’ interests. Identities and interests, obviously, do not simply exist and have specific characteristics that seem unchangeable. It is through interaction, therefore, that identities and interests are reinforced and appear to be ‘fixed’ or static. Similarly, there cannot be a change of identities and subject positions if there is not a change in interactions that define them.

The problem is that once identities are created, they cannot be easily transformed. This is, of course, a problem only if those identities and subject positions are in conflict with other identities (i.e. states, communities, individuals). This difficulty in transformation exists because actors take the social system for granted and because they prefer to maintain stable identities (Wendt 1992: 411), even if those stable identities are in conflict with one another. The problem with Wendt’s argument is that we can only explain how identities and interests are maintained but it is very difficult to explain how transformation could take place. As I argue later both securitization and desecuritization could be the first step towards identity transformation.
Repeated interaction is, essentially, a form of routinized behavior and in conflict-ridden regions there are numerous kinds of routines; some are used to maintain identities, others are used to keep the feeling of justice for ‘our’ cause and the sense of ‘victimhood’ and then there are those that are used to keep the sense of security. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive; indeed, to a great extent they overlap.

As already mentioned protracted deep-rooted conflicts are, to a great degree, identity conflicts (Rothman 2001). Especially in such conflicts (but not exclusively) the states or communities involved do not just seek physical security, but also ontological (Mitzen 2006: 342; see also Wendt 1999: ch. 3). Ontological security is the need of individuals to feel secure ‘in who they are, as identities or selves’ (Mitzen 2006: 342). The continuation of ontological security is subject to routines (Mitzen 2006) because routinization regulates social life and protects us from the anxiety of the unknown and the chaos of the unexpected (Giddens 1991: 26). The study of ontological security-seeking offer us insights on two very important problems: on one hand it offers us a ‘structural explanation for the apparent rationality of conflicts among security-seekers […] in intractable conflicts’ and on the other it helps us ‘address the ending of such conflicts’ (Mitzen 2006: 343).

What makes routinization interesting in conflict environments is that some routines that may be perpetuating a conflict (i.e. hinder resolution) may still be sought after precisely because they protect us from the uncertainty of change. As a result states (and people) could get attached to the conflict because it provides them not with physical security but with ontological (Mitzen 2006: 343). In other words, a conflict may be perpetuated on purpose so as to fulfill identity needs, since any ‘interruption’ of, or resolution to, the conflict could lead to the disruption of certain routines and subsequently to ontological insecurity. The problem with this attachment to such routines is that it reaches a degree where states become unwilling to learn their way out (ibid: 354). The unwillingness to learn is of utmost importance in protracted conflicts (e.g. Cyprus, and Palestine-Israel) because on one hand it hinders any resolution efforts from third parties (or between the two involved parties) and on the other, as time goes by ‘unwillingness’ to learn could become ‘inability’ to learn, where each side is incapable of even looking at the potential that a different path from the one they hold could be more beneficial.

Learning and thus transformation is associated with how rigidly or flexibly routines are repeated/held; the rigidly repeated routines are associated with more difficulty in learning (and transforming) and the reverse for reflectively held routines (ibid: 343). To learn (and transform) some form of healthy basic trust is required. Actors that have this kind of trust are less likely to treat routines as ends themselves (i.e. they are not rigidly held). The opposite happens with individuals who have a rigid basic trust; those are the ones who are unable to distance themselves from their routines (ibid: 351). In addition, the more aware actors are of those routines, the more difficult it is for them to abandon them as it causes them great anxiety. As a result, those with rigid basic trust cannot respond to dissonant information and could, thus, act in irrational ways’ (ibid). This is similar to Jervis’ (2006) argument about motivated biases; biases that could force decision-makers to act irrationally.
The essence of the argument above is that it is not unlikely that people or groups may prefer conflict over cooperation, because they feel that it is only through the conflict (and the associated routines) that they know ‘who they are’, and because any disruption creates anxiety and insecurity (Mitzen 206: 348-9). In identity conflicts, where many times the proposed solution is the creation of a more collective identity that would also increase cooperation could potentially create anxiety, as it would disrupt the existing of routines that maintain the distinct identities. More specifically, the formation of a collective identity that would incorporate the other and the creation of an environment of interdependence (and cooperation), is constrained by the fear of exploitation (Wendt 1999: 348) and the threat it poses to the ‘autonomy of their identity’. Subsequently, cooperation can take place only when states overcome the fear of exploitation (ibid). As I argue later, this one of the major fears that is securitized in conflict environments. The loss of identity autonomy in ethnonational conflicts is perhaps the major securitized ‘referent object’ and the most institutionalized routines are the ones that maintain this referent object safe. The most obvious example in the case of Cyprus, is the internal struggles and debates for the change of history books, the debate over the entrance to the state university with GCE exams, and of course, the issue of the settlers and the de-hellenicization and turkification of the island.

A conflictual relationship with a ‘significant other’ may be necessary, therefore, in order for ‘us’ to maintain ‘our’ identity. Wendt developed this idea first when he talked about identity formation and how states need the ‘Other’ to play the role of the enemy in order to help them define who ‘they’ are (1999: 274). Similarly, Campbell (1992), using the United States as an example, also argues that states depend on a ‘discourse of danger’, which is generated and/or overstated by elite in order to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and thus justify the existence of their state. The significant ‘other’, as Wendt notes, enacts, in our heads, a specific role identity (1999: 227). The role-identities are essentially ‘the meanings that actors attribute to themselves when seeing themselves as an object, from the perspective of the other’ (ibid: 335). Discarding a particular set role-identities (e.g. Arabs-Israelis or Greek-Turkish Cypriots) is not an easy task, especially if the intimacy level between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ is high (ibid: 328). The institutionalization of routines that are responsible for the internalization those role-identities essentially determine the level of difficulty for discarding them or transforming them into something less antagonistic. When referring to the ‘other’ we are not referring to specific individuals but rather to a group (e.g. state, community, etc), and for our purpose here a collective identity. What must be noted is that these collective identities are relationship specific (ibid: 337). This means that one cannot determine the relationship Z will have with X based on the relationship of X has with Y. With this in mind, assuming that because the EU influenced successfully one conflict environment (e.g. Greco-Turkish), that it will do the same for another (e.g. Greek-Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot – Turkey) could potentially be problematic.

While Mitzen’s routinization work is undoubtedly useful, it is incomplete as it stops short of explaining how routines are created and how they could potentially change. This is not surprisingly as her focus is on the repetition and endurance of the very interaction that makes routines possible to sustain. As mentioned, Wendt’s (1999) work (on which Mitzen’s work is partly based) does not have an answer to this problem either; indeed it
still suffers from the same problem. Wendt argues that it is based on the representation of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ that a situation is defined, but he is unable to explain how those representations (and thus the situation) is constructed. Securitization and desecuritization could complement Wendt’s framework. As Coskun points out, ‘enmity will tend to foster securitization, and amity will tend to foster desecuritization’ (2008: 94).

An additional problem has to do with the possibility of multiple facets and the idea that the self as well as the significant other could have more than one facet. As Wendt argues there are multiple identities within each actor, and each one may point towards a different direction creating thus uncertainty on how to act (1999: 230). Wendt also argues that ‘there is no way to predict a priori how internal identity conflicts will be resolved’, but we can assume that it will be resolved based on the hierarchy of identities that person holds (1999: 230). While I agree with Wendt, I would also argue that the hierarchy of those identities depends to a significant degree on how rigidly some of his routines are held. This could be particularly true for cases where an actor is part (or a follower) of a political party and identifies himself as such. If, therefore, he repeatedly follows his party’s line for years unquestionably (i.e. rigidity holds a routine), then it is more likely that, that particular identity will prevail over any other.

Mitzen neglected entirely the identification of the (possible) ‘multiple selfs’ of social agents; i.e. that each self has many facets (e.g. Greek Cypriot and leftists). If there are indeed multiple facets, then there is a need to examine which facet of the self is rigidly defended and which facet is reflexively defended and when. What I argue is that each facet is influenced by social norms and personal beliefs. Incorporating in the routinization framework the functions of beliefs (e.g. Jervis 2006) and how individuals are influenced by their belief systems could clarify further when some actors rigidly hold some routines but are more reflective on others. Such work, however, requires significant empirical observation, as it will vary from case to case.

Similar to the problem above is that Mitzen’s assumes that in conflict environments it is states, and consequently the entire population, that get attached to the conflict. In reality, however, some parts of the society may be more attached than others. The question, therefore, is whether those parts of society are in a position to influence the remaining society into becoming attached to those routines as well. This is where securitization comes in the picture, as it is through this process that the ‘convincing’ takes place. It must be noted that in highly politicized environments such as Cyprus, political parties are in a position to exert significant influence on the public and more specifically on their followers. Therefore, if one of the major parties is attached to such conflict perpetuating routines, there are implications on the issues that could be securitized. Such securitizing acts, however, could create internal tensions as those acts could be against the government’s or the other elites’ (i.e. who negotiate the resolution to the conflict) will. Obviously, the stronger the opposition party, the bigger the internal struggles will be.

While frameworks such as Mitzen’s or Diez et al.’s provide us with a general theoretical background there is still a need for further empirical observations. Few, if any, would doubt that deep-rooted ethnic conflicts, such as the one in Cyprus, have a series of established routines that perpetuate the conflict on purpose and could hinder to a great degree (especially) the Constructive pathway and the transformation of identities. Yet,
the precise role of specific conflict-perpetuating routines is not examined in depth. For
example, we do not know what kind of routines there are (i.e. in which sectors – e.g.
social, economic, political, etc), who is behind their creation and maintenance (e.g.
political elite, media leaders, etc) and how they are perpetuated (e.g. media, public
speeches, official discourse such as education material, etc). Subsequently, any such
additional empirical analysis could, indeed, be beneficial, as it would go one step
‘deeper’ and offer more explanatory power to the framework.

Securitization and its role in conflict resolution

Overview of the Securitization Framework

Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde define securitization as a ‘more extreme version of
politicization’ (1998: 23), where politicization is seen as a function of security.
Securitization is, therefore, ‘the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of
the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics
(ibid.’) An issue, therefore, is dramatized and presented as an existential threat to core
values and/or assets of human collectivities, and as such it gains priority (ibid: 5). In
other words, ‘to “securitize” an issue not previously deemed to be a security issue was to
challenge society to promote it higher in its scale of values and to commit greater
resources to resolving the related problems (Sheehan 2005: 52)’; and if a significant part
of the society is ‘convinced’ then the securitizing act is deemed to be successful. As the
argument goes, if these (created) threats are not dealt with immediately, then everything
else will become irrelevant (Wæver 1996: 104), which means that such situations cannot
be handled any longer by normal politics and thus extraordinary measures are required. It
is at this point that the securitizing actor claims the right to break free of normal rules (i.e.
normal politics) (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998) and use any extraordinary measures
s/he deems necessary, acquiring at the same time ‘abnormal’ authority and influence.

In sum, securitization theory could be separated into the triology of (i) speech act, (ii)
the securitizing actor and (iii) the audience (Stritzel 2007). The speech act is the first step of
the process, where the claim (i.e. speech act) frames something as an existential threat for
a specific referent object (e.g. society, economy, etc). Security therefore is no longer
treated as an objective condition but rather as the outcome of a social process which
means that ‘the social construction of security issues (who or what is being secured, and
from what) is analyzed by examining the ‘securitizing’ speech-acts’ through which
threats become represented and recognized’ (Williams 2003: 513). The securitizing actor
is the individual who makes the claim and requests ‘acceptance’ for the use of
extraordinary measures. This brings us to the third part, which is the audience. A
securitizing act is successful when a significant audience is convinced of the claim(s)’
validity (i.e. that an issue is an existential threat for a specific referent object). Audience
‘acceptance’ strengthens the securitizing actor and allows her to handle the issue outside
the realm of normal politics using extraordinary measures.

In an attempt to make the theory more coherent and applicable to the real world, the
Copenhagen School introduced three ‘felicity conditions’ necessary for a speech act, and
thus securitization, to be successful. In summary these are the form of the speech act; the
social capital of the enunciator (i.e. securitizing actor); and the conditions historically
associated with a threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 31-3; 2000: 252-3; Wæver 2003: 15). These
facilitating conditions are indeed useful for the theory (albeit not sufficient according to some critics) as they clarify better when a securitizing act could have more chances of being successful.

One of the most notable contributions of the Copenhagen School is its deviation from the ‘strict’ sense of security studies where there is only one referent object (i.e. the state). According to the School, securitization could occur in a number of sectors, namely political, military, societal, economic and environmental, with each one having specific referent objects, such as identity and sovereignty. Security problems may not be (and usually are not) limited to one specific sector, and as the argument goes, ‘actors think about economics, politics and other areas but judge their main security problems across the board (ibid: 168).’ This ‘across the board’ thinking, could also explain how one could determine the effects of securitization, since to measure the effects of one securitization move in one sector (i.e. economics), one should examine the chain reactions on other sectors (i.e. political and societal) (ibid: 26).

Securitization scholars ‘do not ask whether a certain issue is in and of itself a ‘threat’, but focus on the questions of when and under what conditions who securitises what issue’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 71). Using this logic, security, becomes, therefore, what actors make of it (ibid: 48), and securitization becomes the process of constructing a shared understanding of what should be considered a security issue and an existential threat (Sheehan 2005: 62). Subsequently, what is studied in this field is the practice that turns an issue into a security issue and not the issue per se. As Wæver (1995) argues ‘[w]ith the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. These are what Austin (1975) calls ‘performative’ utterances. By saying it something is done […] [T]he word ‘security’ is the act (Wæver 1995: 55).’

Securitization is a conscious political choice made by the ruling elite, in order to ‘break free of rules’ and suspend normal politics (Williams 2003: 518). This happens because the articulation of a security threat does not just describe an environment but also creates a reality, which asks for exceptionality (i.e. use of extraordinary measures). Therefore, securitization relies primarily on the speech act philosophy because the very articulation of security becomes a crucial form of security action on its own (thus security, or insecurity for that matter, is not necessarily an objective condition). As Williams argues, ‘security’ is treated not as an objective condition, but as the outcome of a specific social process and the social construction of security issues (who or what is being secured, and from what) is analyzed by examining the ‘securitizing’ speech acts through which threats become represented and recognized (2003: 513).’ In other words, the declaration or framing (i.e. representation) of a security threat is the first step, but alone it does not guarantee an outcome (i.e. the right to use extraordinary measures) as there first needs to be a sufficient impact on a significant audience (i.e. recognition) who would be willing to accept the suggested threat as a real threat and tolerate the outcome (i.e. extraordinary measures). There are two interrelated issues to be noted here: the first has to do with the Copenhagen School’s view that securitization as an intersubjective process and the other has to do with issue of ‘recognition’ of threats. Both issues lead to criticism of the theory. More specifically, securitization theory fails to take into consideration adequately the
social ‘sphere’ (Stritzel 2007, McDonald 2008). As Stritzel notes, the Copenhagen School has a more static approach, which does not ‘capture the relational dynamics of the social and political process of generating meaning (2007: 367, emphasis in original)’. In other words, the theory as it is does not explore how the (social) situation could influence both the actors or the speech acts. Using Stritzel words again, ‘an actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant. It is their embeddedness in social relations of meaning and power that constitutes both actors and speech acts (2007:367)’.

The theory is considered to be intersubjective because the securitizing acts are between the securitizing actor, who performs the speech act, and the significant audience that will decide the success or failure of the act. Therefore, the representation and recognition of any (proposed) threat is ‘‘negotiated’ between an actor and the relevant audience’, with the latter being the final decision-makers on whether the threat is accepted or not (Stritzel 207: 363). However, ‘negotiation’ and ‘intersubjectivity’, in general, indicate some form of a social process. But if this is indeed the case, then this process goes contra to the Copenhagen School’s argument that ‘it is the utterance it self that is the act (Buzan et al. 1998: 26)’ and that by saying ‘security’ something is done. In other words, as Stritzel argues, the creation of a threat cannot be both a process (i.e. intersubjective) and ‘just an utterance’ (2007: 364). Anything that is subject to intersubjective processes (e.g. norms) takes time to become accepted and established. Therefore, any outcome that occurs immediately after a simple ‘utterance’ cannot be part of an intersubjective process.

This is indeed a very important issue, as on one hand the Copenhagen School argues that securitization is a social process (i.e. social construction of a security threat), while on the other hand they place most of the emphasis on the actual utterance of the security threat. There seems to be validity in both arguments. The ‘utterance’ is indeed the first and most important step towards a securitizing act, but what follows is a social, intersubjective, process through which the threat is ‘negotiated’ between the ‘securitzer’ (i.e. enunciator) and the securitizees (i.e. audience). It is through that process that the social construction of a security threat develops. It is, afterall, through the securitizing process that the referent objects are given particular identities and thus meaning! Such a view of the theory also responds to another criticism that ‘accuses’ the theory of not examining the processes through which the security referent objects are given meaning (MacDonald 2008: 571).

Stritzel’s arguments open then door for a series of other related potential criticism. Since securitization is an intersubjective social process then should we expect to see the institutionalization of outcomes or issues? If issues do indeed become institutionalized as security issues and as existential threats, it would mean that (a) they will be around for a long time, and (b) they could develop into threats without extraordinary moments of intervention (Bigo 2002). I tend to agree with the notion that if security issues are around for a long time and become institutionalized, they could develop into threats ‘by themselves’ (i.e. without extraordinary moments of intervention). However, the institutionalization of issues does not necessarily mean that security threats are always imminent. Therefore, the need for extraordinary measures may still be invoked if and when a threat is deemed to be imminent. Subsequently, I see the issue of
institutionalization more as an opportunity to complement the speech act notion (and securitization).

I believe that an even more beneficial argument could be made for theory, namely that the success or failure of speech acts could actually be subject to the level of institutionalization of the securitized issues. It is at this point that the role of routines comes into the picture.

What I argue specifically is that if a specific routine is institutionalized deeply enough to maintain ontological security, then the threat of disruption could be securitized very easily as the intersubjective process between the enunciator and the audience will be rather short. In other words, it will not take long to convince a significant audience that something is an existential threat, if that something will disrupt their routines and challenges their beliefs and norms. If on the other hand, the speech act does not challenge long-held beliefs/ideas (i.e. the threat does not seem to be plausible or probable) or institutionalized routines, then the ‘negotiation’ between the enunciator and the audience will most likely take longer and the outcome of the securitizing act could go either way. There are, therefore, cases that a simple utterance, as the Copenhagen School argues, could ‘do something’ immediately. This, however, is not always the case and to determine when such possibilities exist one must take the ‘social sphere’ into consideration.

The success or failure of a securitizing act also depends to a great degree on the enunciator’s position vis-à-vis the audience (or parts of the audience), an issue that brings us to the second of the two interrelated subjects mentioned earlier, namely that of ‘recognition’. One of the limitations of securitization theory (especially in regards to its applicability in real life cases) is the ‘blurred’ actor-audience relationship. In an effort to resolve this problem and define more clearly the conditions under which securitization works, the Copenhagen School introduced, as mentioned, three facilitating conditions one being that of the enunciator’s ‘social capital’ (Waever 2000: 252-3). The social capital of the enunciator is indeed very important, but as a facilitating condition is insufficient. While the securitizing actor may enjoy significant social capital it does not mean that she will have a universal impact on the entire audience. What is not explored, therefore, is the ‘identity compatibility’ between the securitizing actor and the audience. What I argue is that how able the elite will be to convince the public (i.e. successfully securitize an issue) and how willing the audience will be to accept the proposed threat may depend on how compatible the elite-audience identities are and how much opposition they face from other domestic actors with significant social capital. A leftist elite, for example, will be in a position to exert more influence on leftists (and leftists will be more prone to be influenced by a leftist leader) than on right wing audience.

Moreover, the securitizing actor could have enormous social capital (e.g. could be the President), but may not have the equivalent influence on the public. This could be attributed to a number of reasons, the most important of which is internal power struggles. The domestic opposition may engage in counter-securitizing actions (i.e. question the validity of the threat) for domestic political reasons. Overall, consensus at an elite level will help securitization be successful whereas if there are internal struggles (say within the government or from the main opposition), the success of any securitizing
act is not guaranteed regardless of the enunciator’s social capital. This issue is many times not taken into consideration by third party observers of a conflict, as they are usually only able to see the ‘final expressions’ of the two conflicting sides missing, however, the international tensions. But as Moravscik (1998) argues, states (or communities for that matter) are not unitary internally. Indeed, there are internal political contentions among domestic political actors and it is only after internal struggles that the state becomes unitary externally. Similarly, the view that both sides in a conflict appear to have a single ‘national’ line or securitize some specific issues (but not others), is just half the picture. The other half is the process within each community, through which a line of argument was chosen and the specific issue was securitized but not the other.

The routinization and institutionalization of specific positions from elite and the internalization of those positions from the audience are factors that could contribute towards the improvement of securitization theory on this aspect. In conflict areas with highly politicized environments there are usually deeply established positions held by more than one actor with significant social capital. This also means that there is more than one ‘significant audience’ (i.e. loyal party/elite followers) to be convinced. Both the elite as well as the audience that follows them, have their own (and often opposing) institutionalized routines and internalized beliefs. As a result, for domestic power struggle reasons but also for ideological ones, it is not unlikely to see both securitizing and counter-securitizing acts. Therefore, unless the securitizing actor ‘introduces’ a threat that involves all audiences, then she should expect opposition both from the other elite but also from the parts of the audience.

Besides the actor-audience relationship, an additional issue that should receive more attention is that of ‘recognition’ of threats (i.e. the acceptance of securitized issues). It is this ‘recognition’ that creates the meaning that those threats carry. As Wendt argues, the meaning one gives to objects and actors, depends on his understanding of the situation (1999: 330). ‘If men define situations [or threats for that matter] as real, they are real in their consequences (ibid.)’ Balzacq points towards this direction as he argues that the success or failure of the securitizer to persuade a significant audience is based, inter alia, on the latter’s point of reference (i.e. what it knows about the world) (2005: 173). More specifically, Balzacq argues that securitization could be better understood not as the ‘conventional procedure’ of the speech act (which depends on the full prevalence of the ‘felicity conditions’ to work), but as ‘a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psychocultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to their attention (2005: 172)’. I have already discussed about the importance of the disposition of the audience and the actor’s power. The focus here is on the strategic practices. When securitization is seen this way (i.e. as strategic practices), then, according to Balzacq, the social context is incorporated. As a result it moves beyond the ‘conventional procedure’ of the speech act and the securitizing actors (have to) engage in a struggle to convince the audience. Strategic practices, however, connote (long-term) conscious decisions on behalf of the elite, or, in other words, the creation of routines that could be in time institutionalized.
Part of the strategic practice is the way issues are framed. It is not just the content of the speech act (i.e. what is being secured) that matters, but also the way the issue at hand is framed and how much the words (and/or images) resonate within the existing culture and how much they support/oppose existing norms. More specifically, words and images that are ‘highly salient in the culture’ (i.e. they are understandable, memorable and emotionally charged) are considered to have more cultural resonance and thus have a greater potential for influence (Entman 2004: 6). The resonance of both words and images is also subject to how routinely they are used, by whom and how much they are opposed. It is not surprisingly though that certain elite chooses to repeat the same positions until their audience internalizes them. Such internalization will allow the elite to safeguard more easily their positions by securitizing any potential threats.

**Securitization and the European Union**

Wæver argues that the EU helps influence the orientation of states and helps them desecuritize conflicts (2000: 262). Higashino (2004) makes a more general argument about the EU processes of enlargement and securitization, arguing that EU enlargement is in essence a repetition of security moves that aim, however, towards desecuritization. EU integration itself has become the most obvious example where securitizing moves could lead towards desecuritization (ibid: 350). This is because the fear and threat of European fragmentation has led to securitization moves, which they, however, led to a more desecuritized environment (Buzan and Weaver 2003: 353-6). As Coskun notes, in Buzan’s and Wæver’s theory, securitized issues can be managed or transformed and notes that there is a distinction between the management of securitized issues and desecuritization (2008: 99). In the EU enlargement case the securitized issues were not just managed or transformed; they were desecuritized and while the environment remains desecuritized it is highly unlikely that there will be any conflicts. In conflict environments the aim should be the same: desecuritization and not simply management of the securitized issues.

The EU’s approaches (i.e. Diez et al. 2008 pathways) aim at resolving conflicts in the Union’s neighborhood. The idea is to desecuritize the environment sufficiently that would ‘permit’ the EU conflict resolution mechanisms to become effective. In practice, however, what the EU seems to be doing, as a first step at least, is to manage the securitized issues and then lead them towards desecuritization. Unlike the case of continental Europe, where securitization led to desecuritization, the deeply securitized environment hinders those EU resolution efforts. Moreover, after World War II the environment in continental Europe was very ‘ripe’ which allowed for the possibility to securitize the past in order to desecuritize the issues and subsequently the area. Unfortunately this the same ‘ripeness’ does not exist in many of the EU’s neighborhood areas (e.g. Cyprus), which means that it is unlikely that the environment can be desecuritized (or positively securitized) as it was the case in heart of Europe.

**Conclusion**

This paper tried to explain how routines, especially the deeply institutionalized ones, could help improve the securitization theory. Particular attention was given to the argument that securitization does not take sufficiently into consideration the ‘social sphere’ and argued that if it did, it would become a much more comprehensive theory for
the security studies, as it would, *inter alia*, be in a position to explain better its role in conflict environments. Similarly, in this paper I tried to highlight one of the problems of routinization frameworks, namely that they explain why routines perpetuate but fail to explain either how routines are created or transformed. Securitization and desecuritization could contribute towards this limitation. This paper being a work in progress did not elaborate on this issue. To be in a position to construct a solid theoretical explanation for this claim requires further empirical work.

Securitization is central in understanding both the perpetuation of ethnic (identity) conflicts such as the one in Cyprus, as well as why the EU is not, so far at least, in a position to have the wanted effects (i.e. resolution). Acknowledging that securitization is a problem towards resolution is not sufficient. There must be a much clearer understanding on how and why the environment continues to be (re)securitized. Towards this goal one must examine the established routines not only between the conflict parties, but also the routines that exist within each side.
References


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