DECLINING RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY IN GREECE
An empirical test of secularization theory

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ABSTRACT  This study examines an ignored aspect of secularization in an overlooked case: declining religious authority within the context of Greek state religion. It adopts the nuanced expectation that secularization will follow a distinctive pattern within an idiosyncratic case such as Greece. This pattern is not observable in declining trends of religious commitment, doctrinal orthodoxy or membership rates, but in the waning Church control over popular acceptance of the ‘Greek Orthodox’ frame. The empirical part is based on research concerning the dimensionality of institutional confidence, and employs exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of European Values Study data. Results demonstrate that a large part of the Greek Orthodox constituency perceives a ‘high wall’ of separation between religion and the state. Implications are discussed regarding the plausibility of the neosecularization paradigm.

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Introduction

A comprehensive definition of secularization and its historical manifestations remains an ongoing debate (see Dobbelaere 2002). The straw-man version of the theory, promoted mainly by critics, plainly expects that societal modernization will herald the decay of religious attendance, belief and membership (examples in Stark and Finke 2000; Greeley 2003). Empirically, this expectation normally rests on comparative examinations of trends in the main components of religiosity: believing, behaving and belonging (Halman and Pettersson 1999; Kohut and Stokes 2006). By focusing on micro-level indicators of religiosity, researchers have concluded that the phenomena posited by secularization research are not taking place in countries like the US, which exhibits a high degree of religiosity despite advanced modernity (e.g. Marty and Appleby 1991). For the above approach, such irregularities signify the failure of secularization theory to explain the fate of religion in modern society.

In the same vein, Greece is often presented as one of the most devout nations in the Western world. More than 95% of the population claims membership to the Orthodox Church; healthy majorities of the citizenry also believe in God and in other articles of faith; finally, even church attendance, which is not generally considered as a marker of religiosity in the Greek case, has been on the rise recently (Halman 2001; Georgiadou and Nikolakopoulos 2001). Based on the narrow secularization framework, these robust rates of individual piety are often interpreted as assurances that religious decline is irrelevant for Greece (cf. Halman and Draulans 2006).

Such studies rarely delve deeper into an investigation of how economic development and sociopolitical progress affect not the level but the qualitative character of religious commitment. According to less simplistic interpretations of secularization theory, the role of religion in modern society is not a question that can be addressed through aggregated descriptions of individual religiosity. In this view, modern religion faces the prospect of ‘transformation’ (Yamane 1997: 110) rather than eventual disappearance; what we should witness empirically is qualitative change and not inevitable religious decline – at least not as the first step in the process. Although this qualitative transformation has been identified in many different symptoms, the two main reviewers of the more sophisticated paradigm (Tschannen 1991; Yamane 1997) agree on a definition of

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1 Church attendance is a common indicator of religiosity in cross-national research, and will be mentioned as such in the review of the general literature. However, this measure will not be treated as a valid criterion of religiosity for the case under study. In the context of a state religion, especially one based on the Eastern Orthodox dogma, commitment is not necessarily sustained through church ceremonies, but is mainly expressed in a host of civic functions (for details see Stavrakakis 2002).
secularization as follows: the shrinking authority of religious institutions at the societal, organizational and individual levels.

The present paper focuses on declining religious influence at the individual level. In line with theoretical (e.g. Chaves 1994) and limited empirical research on the American case (Kleiman et al. 1996; Hoffmann 1998), my argument adopts the aforementioned view that relatively high levels of commitment, defined as ritual attendance, doctrinal orthodoxy, religious values, and church membership are not meaningful as tests of the secularization thesis. The analysis I propose however departs from recent empirical investigations of declining religious authority in two ways. First, the case under examination is Greece, a country considered resistant to secularization, in which state and church have not yet been legally separated. This approach provides a more stringent test of the theory, by assessing its plausibility in a critical case. A decrease in religious authority is least likely to appear in a context where state, nation and church have been historically and culturally merged. Second, the research question is evaluated through a direct empirical test, which has been largely ignored in secularization research: the dimensionality in institutional trust (originally in Lipset and Schneider 1987). The hypothesis proposed asks whether a large segment of the religious population perceives state and church as separate institutional spheres. Results indicate that this symptom, expected by many sociologists of religion, is present in the Greek case.

The paper continues with a review of the neosecularization thesis, followed by an examination of the exceptional role of religion in Greece. The institutional confidence literature is introduced next, which serves as the building block for the empirical analysis. The argument then turns to devising a test adjusted to the characteristics of the Greek case. The subsequent part discusses data and methods used in the study. Factor analytic results are presented last, followed by their implications for theory and methodology.

Secularization and religious authority

Non-reductionist perspectives of secularization theory suggest that declining levels of church membership, attendance, and belief are not necessarily an aspect of modernity’s impact on religion. The neosecularization paradigm identifies a complicated process of multidimensional religious transformation (for related definitions see Tschannen 1991; Yamane 1997; Dobbelaere 2002). This revised perspective expects processes such as industrialization, urbanization, increasing affluence and educational attainment to affect religion at three interrelated levels: the
societal (Berger 1967; Luckmann 1967; Wilson 1976; Martin 1978), the organizational (Berger 1967; Luckmann 1967), and the individual level (Luckmann 1967; Wilson 1976).

The pivotal process in this narrative is societal-level change, which refers to the separation of the religious sphere from other public institutions. Specifically, the progression of modernity is expected to lead to the emergence of diverse institutions, with specialized personnel and structures, dealing with the diverse social needs of an enlarged community (Martin 1978: 69). In his own terminology, Luckmann mentions the following process: ‘[t]he more “complex” a society, the more likely it is to develop distinct institutions supporting objectivity and social validity of the sacred cosmos’ (1967: 63). Once institutions like education, the military and government have been separated from the ‘sacred canopy’ (Berger 1967), they can begin to seek legitimacy from sources other than God, and to function according to non-metaphysical criteria: science, rationality, productivity and profit. The religious sphere eventually becomes another institutional domain, without a predominant grip over other public spheres. Differentiation then can be interpreted as the first act in the distancing of social institutions from religious control, with repercussions for the church and the individual alike.

The most celebrated and debated example in this sort of analysis, the proverbial American case, will help elaborate on the multidimensional definition of religious change. In the narrow account of secularization, the US is an abnormal example where societal modernization coexists with high levels of religious commitment (e.g. Norris and Inglehart 2004). The neosecularization approach attempts to accommodate this anomaly by arguing that American religion is characterized by the following: first, religion has no authority over education, government and other institutional areas (societal secularization); second, the church becomes itself rationalized as an organization in order to survive (organizational or internal secularization); finally, the church is unable to control the everyday lives and actions of congregants as evident in phenomena like denominational switching, religious exogamy and doctrinal syncretism (the micro level).

It is noteworthy that non-reductionist versions of secularization theory do not necessarily predict the eventual demise of religious belief, membership and practice at the micro level, at least not as the first signs of religious decay (Luckmann 1967; Yamane 1997). Individuals are still expected to attend religious services, believe in God, Heaven and Hell, and consider themselves as church members. This however happens in parallel to and independently of their participation in other spheres of social life, where they follow the respective secular norms. In a nutshell, ‘secularization is best understood not as the decline of religion, but as the declining scope of religious authority’ (Chaves 1994: 750).
Declining religious authority under a state religion

The present analysis deviates from existing research by focusing on a ‘least likely’ case (see crucial case-studies in Eckstein 1975). One would expect that a Greek trial should fail to sustain claims of declining religious authority. The *sui generis* nature of the public and vocal Greek Orthodox Church has become an academic cliché in the social sciences and one of the celebrated cases in secularization theory.\(^2\) If approached through a social identity theoretical perspective (e.g. Tajfel 1981), religion in the Greek case remains strong and vibrant compared to most European nations, due to the role of the Christian Orthodox identity in maintaining a clear demarcation between a small in-group and negatively stereotyped out-groups. By not simply serving theological and spiritual needs, Greek Orthodoxy facilitates positive in-group (Greeks) distinction against a host of out-groups, ranging from ‘the Turks’ in particular, to Muslims or foreigners in general.

The above mirrors the close link between religion, national identity and the state (Mavrogordatos 2003). Religious identity served as a marker of national identity when Greek nationalism emerged within the Ottoman Empire (Martin 1978). Once a state mechanism was in place, which almost coincides with the Greek Church separating from the patriarchate of Constantinople in 1833, Orthodox identity continued to provide a criterion of togetherness amidst external threats to the newly created, endangered country (see among others Frazee 1969; Mouzelis 1978; Kokosalakis 1987). This setting appears to be the source of the enduring power of the Greek Church to withstand the pressure of modernity: Orthodox religious identity serves purposes that reinforce national identity and exceed metaphysical salvation, therefore becoming relatively immune to the impact of urbanization, rational explanation of natural phenomena, and increased social and physical mobility.

In the post-WWII and particularly in the post-1974 period (end of military rule), Greece experienced the fruits of democratic stability, economic and educational attainment, and participation in transnational governmental structures (see for example contributions in Constas and Stavrou 1995). If interpreted within the narrow version of secularization theory, the combination of the above has not yet initiated a prominent religious decline, at least when tracking levels of attendance, belief and membership (e.g. Halman and Draulans 2006). Yet, the revised paradigm presented above expects a latent transformation of the role of religion in Greek society, one not directly observable when using the conventional criteria of religiosity. While Greek

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\(^2\) For instance, the government secretary responsible for Greek education is head of the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs, while the opening sentence of the Greek Constitution evokes a strictly defined ‘Holy and Conssubstantial and Indivisible Trinity’ and not some theologically abstract image of God.
religiosity statistics follow a movement akin to that of trendless fluctuation, the role of the church in the society and polity may not have remained unaffected. Religious change could be taking place in Greek society, hampering the church’s ability to enforce the core of its canonical beliefs: the ‘Greek Orthodoxy’ equivalence.

Specifically, the brief description of the proximity between nation-state and church suggests an ‘official model’ (Luckmann 1967: 72), a hegemonic discourse upheld by the Orthodox religious elite as a national ideal (see the writings of the head of the Orthodox Church in Greece, Archbishop of Athens Christodoulos 1999). In this model, state and church are depicted as a homogenous, undivided whole. A recent incident in Greek politics provides a fitting portrayal of the content of this official discourse. In the spring of 2000 the Greek government, formed by the socialist party (PASOK), decided to introduce new identity cards, which excluded the inscription of religious affiliation and other sensitive personal data (find a detailed narrative in Molokotos-Liederman 2003). The church, headed by freshly designated Archbishop Christodoulos, an ‘aggressive and demagogic’ leader with leanings to the political Right (Mavrogordatos 2003: 122-3), reacted vociferously by realizing two mass rallies in the two largest cities of the country and a wide collection of signatures for the state to retain religious data on identity cards. In Luckmann’s discussion of institutional differentiation, this clerical backlash corresponds to: ‘a situation of complete identity between the church, sacred cosmos and the hierarchy of meaning in the world view…this situation conforms to what seems to be an implicit theological ideal’ (1967: 79).

Hypotheses

The normative, official position provides a means to operationalize the church’s ability to maintain/enforce public acceptance of the equation Church=State. Failure to do so would serve as an indication that the church is losing its clout over what the Orthodox congregation believes. This question can be empirically evaluated by turning to the institutional confidence literature. Declining trust in the institutions of civil society and representative government has become an endemic phenomenon for most contemporary democracies (see collected essays by Nye et al. 1997). Unconnected to the secularization thesis, a great deal of research has been concerned with cross-national levels of declining institutional confidence and their less clear-cut causal roots, ranging from social-capital explanations to poor institutional performance (for a concise review of possible causes see Newton and Norris 2000). The purpose is to answer why publics have lost faith in the mechanisms of liberal democracy and society.
Drawing on Chaves’ thesis of declining authority, some sociologists of religion have used the above research to examine the volatility of public confidence in religious leaders and institutions (e.g. Kleiman et al. 1996; Hoffmann 1998). These studies interpret decreasing levels of public trust as evidence of vanishing religious authority. As mentioned in the introduction, the present study does not replicate this type of analysis for a variety of reasons. The first is related to Greece and the fact that usable longitudinal data series on public confidence are absent. Accordingly, trends cannot be explicitly established. Second, research needs to expand and directly examine how trust in the church performs with respect to other institutions. Third and most important, levels of confidence are an inadequate measure of religious authority. They are heavily subject to short-term influences, such as personal charisma of religious leaders or incidents like clergy-related scandals, which contribute to trivial fluctuations in public confidence (cf. the impact of performance on confidence fluctuation in Anderson and Tverdova 2003).

In an endeavor to curtail these problems, I focus on the question of dimensionality in institutional confidence (Lipset and Schneider 1987; Doring 1992; Cook and Gronke 2001). This section of the literature moves beyond the volatility of surface trends, and asks how people categorize their evaluations of institutions. As factor analytic techniques indicate, citizens do not react to social and political institutions on a one-to-one basis, but instead tend to direct their confidence towards distinct groupings of institutions. Such groupings or dimensions can include political vs. economic institutions, government vs. market vs. authority institutions, or public vs. private institutions (Eisenstadt 1995; Mishler and Rose 1997; Newton and Norris 2000). In short, when two institutions are located on the same dimension, trust in one (e.g. the Parliament) ‘moves’ with trust in another (parties).

This body of scholarship offers a more accurate evaluation of what lies at the heart of secularization, i.e. the weakening capacity of organized religion to define individual belief systems. In this manner, the official model of the Greek Orthodox Church can be operationalized as a single dimension in civic confidence, where church and state institutions are evaluated in tandem. The failure of the official model is defined as a separate evaluation of church compared to state institutions. In doing so, this study proposes a direct test of the neosecularization thesis, one that gauges the power of a state religion to enforce the internalization of its official worldview.

There are two ways to evaluate this expectation. First, in the presence of relevant longitudinal data, research should observe the erosion of the Church=State equation for Greek Christians across extended time intervals. The absence of such data series points to a different line of inquiry. In this alternative, weakening church ability to maintain the official model is not
expected to be homogenous across the congregation. The hypothesized decline of church authority should be observed first among that part of the congregation more open to the influence of modernity (H1: the declining-authority model); in contrast, those resistant to societal advance should continue to perceive state and church as united (H2: the official model) (see the ideal-typical distinction between a progressive and a traditionalist bloc in Greek culture in Diamandouros 2000; Constas and Stavrou 1995; cf. the American culture-wars thesis in Hunter 1991). 3 In sum, modernists should be relatively resistant to the official position, i.e. less likely to reflect the Greek-Orthodox schema. Conversely, traditionalists will be more prone to maintain perceptions of church and state interdependence.

Data and measurement

The data used to assess the above expectation were collected in 1999/2000 by the European Values Study project (EVS). 4 Alternative longitudinal surveys were available, yet the decision for the EVS was taken on the basis of item quality. While Eurobarometer and European Social Survey (ESS) data contain Greek cross-sections across time, both series suffer from a major drawback. Due to the use of factor analysis, neither dataset includes questions suitable for such an analysis. Eurobarometer questions on institutional trust offer a dichotomous response set (trust/do not trust), incompatible with present purposes. ESS data provide an inadequate number of items to support an assessment of dimensionality (only five items administered, with two additional items on supranational organizations). Furthermore, there is no ESS indicator measuring trust in the church.

To maintain analytic parsimony, the modernist group is defined as respondents with infrequent church attendance. Although there is a scarcity of research on the Greek case, a multivariate analysis of various predictors of church attendance (not presented) reveals that infrequent church-goers are more likely to be younger, belong to higher-income brackets, and have a more liberal political outlook, all indicators also associated with openness to societal change (see the value-shift thesis in Inglehart 1997: 237-8). So, the same characteristics that serve as markers of sensitivity to modernity also appear to function as explanations of frequency of church

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3 The two groups will henceforth be referred to as modernists and traditionalists. The analysis remains agnostic as to the detailed mechanism that produces the divergence between the two groups. This could be related to ongoing exposure to different cues or to authoritarian/libertarian predispositions formed in pre-adult socialization. Instead emphasis is placed on observing the empirical product of such processes, namely declining religious authority.

4 Datasets were made available by the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, University of Cologne. Of course, I hold sole responsibility for their analysis and interpretation. Results from supplementary analyses mentioned throughout the text are available from the author.
attendance. For this reason, irregular attendance will serve here as a summary measure that defines the modernist subsample.5

In what remains an essentially arbitrary decision, the sample is stratified into two groups, representing modernists and traditionalists. The former make up the critical constituency, where the main hypothesis should find confirmation (H1: declining church authority). These are defined as individuals attending church only on special holidays or less frequently. This category contains 406 cases. The traditionalist group is defined as those attending religious services every month or more frequently, and contains 332 individuals. In an attempt to minimize noise, both subsamples only include respondents that self-identify as members of the Orthodox Church, and find religion to be very or rather important in life. This option has a number of advantages. First, it filters out convinced atheists, who are by definition expected to differentiate between institutions of the state and the Orthodox Church. Second, it excludes non-Orthodox respondents, a subpopulation of arguably little relevance to a study of the authority of the Orthodox Church. Third, investigation is restricted to the population that still finds religion salient in everyday life. This provides a more demanding test of the declining religious authority expectation, since the demise is hypothesized to take place within populations that still profess a degree of religiosity. Last, a largely comparable subsample size is achieved in the two groups, increasing confidence in factor analysis estimates.

Methods

Religious authority - defined as church ability to enforce the official model - is tested with two factor analytic methods (Kim and Mueller 1978). The investigation uses ten four-point scales, also employed by Newton and Norris (2000), which are almost invariably asked across countries in the World and European Values Study projects. This should allow replication of the present analysis across diverse regions, especially in non-western nations where state religions are more prominent (Fox and Sandler 2005). Using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), I first attempt to establish the existence of dimensionality in institutional confidence and its different expressions for modernists and traditionalists. Rotation is non-orthogonal (principal components with oblique rotation, permitting factor correlations), since dimensions of trust are generally expected to be related (Mishler and Rose 1997: 432). In other words, the score of an individual on one factor should tell us something about her score on another. Although not reported, EFA with orthogonal rotation

5 As already implied in the introduction (cf. Stavrakakis 2002), church attendance is only used here as a proxy for an elusive personal characteristic (sensitivity to societal progress), and not as a criterion of religiosity.
(varimax) was conducted as a preliminary step: items with high loadings on more than one factors indicated the need for oblique rotation.

However, EFA estimates are essentially atheoretical, and can prove unstable due to sampling variation. When a more rigorous test is conducted, loadings below 0.5, factors with two items or less, or factors slightly above an eigenvalue of 1.0 can sometimes prove trivial. Here I opt for a more thorough investigation of the hypothesized phenomenon (declining religious authority) by evaluating alternative models of confidence structures. This validation uses Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and compares the relative fit of the declining-authority model (H1) against the official model (H2) within the modernist group. EFA was conducted with SPSS 14.0, and CFA with AMOS 6.0.6

Results

In Table 1, factor loadings reveal that modernists perceive the institutional landscape in a way that diverges from the official tenet of the Greek-Orthodox faith. Following common practice, only factors with eigenvalues above 1.0 have been retained as substantial. As expected in H1, the discourse of state-church identification is evidently absent in this case, with most political and social institutions loading on the first factor, which however excludes the church. Organized religion loads on a separate dimension, accompanied by the two order/authority institutions, i.e. the police and the armed forces (the police item cross-loads). This separate factor seems to stand for institutions closely related to the 1967-1974 experience of military rule and social conservatism.

[Tables 1 & 2 about here]

To underline the uniqueness of this finding, Table 2 presents the EFA solution of the confidence questions for the traditionalist subsample. Although a single factor result is not supported, the dominant factor contains the church and all state institutions, and appears to reflect the official ideal of a state religion (H2). The existence of a second dimension is not surprising, especially since the residual factor only contains the press and organized labour; both institutions are mostly independent from the state, and do not bear any religious connotations, with limited exceptions in the case of the press.

6 Standard goodness-of-fit indexes for structural equation modeling include (Arbuckle, 2005): the chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio, in which values less than 5.0 are desirable (or 3.0 for stricter evaluations); Bentler’s comparative fit index (CFI), which accounts for small sample sizes and should be greater than .90 (or .95 for stricter evaluations); finally, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), which controls for model complexity and should be lower than .08 (or .05 for more conservative evaluations).
Next, CFA is used to evaluate the robustness of the results in Table 1. The purpose is not to present individual item loadings, but to check the fit of alternative dimensional structures to the observed covariance matrix. The models in competition are based on the solutions in Tables 1 and 2: i) a structure positing that the solution in Table 1 is indeed the best fitting model (H1); and ii) a structure suggesting that modernists perceive institutions in the same way as traditionalists do in Table 2 (H2). The police item in model H1 and the education item in model H2 were left to cross-load on the two factors, as indicated by results in Tables 1 and 2 (see details and references for this common but contested practice in Kline 1998).

Table 3 presents the comparative fit of the two hypotheses within the modernist constituency. The assessment illustrates that the EFA solution which implies a separate evaluation of church and state (H1, first row) fits the observed data matrix better than the official model (H2). The fact that the two models share an equal degree of complexity (33 degrees of freedom) provides further confidence in these estimates, since more complex specifications tend to obtain a better fit to the data. Although models do not achieve a perfect fit, the dimensional structure hypothesized by H1 is clearly the most acceptable expectation. These findings support the conclusion that the modernist group, even if arbitrarily defined, perceives state and organized religion as parts of different institutional networks, contrary to the state-religious reality and discourse.

[Table 3 about here]

In pursuing this route, this paper provided a preliminary indication of how the main expectation of neosecularization theory can emerge in societies with a state endorsed church. Results from exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses showed that for the traditionalist part of the religious population (Table 2), the dominant institutional dimension explicitly places church and state functions in the same sphere. In contrast, for the modernist segment of the Greek Orthodox population (Table 1), the prevailing institutional dimension contains only political and social institutions, clearly excluding organized religion.

7 Constructing the best-fitting model lies beyond the scope of this paper. My intention is to compare the relative validity of two competing hypotheses. Yet, fit indices could be further improved with the use of a version of the Lagrangian multiplier statistic (not presented), which examines whether additional paths can produce a superior model (Bollen 1989; Kline 1998). These proposed modifications can serve to examine whether the declining-authority model can be further improved by relating the church item to other state institutions (a disconfirmation of H1). Modification indices however provide no indication that the church question shares much in common with the predominant factor in the modernist group or with any item loading on this factor, which combines government and other civic institutions (Table 1). For the reason of parsimony, I chose not to present respecified models, yet these have been estimated and return a superior fit to the ones currently discussed. Still, H1 remains the model to be preferred.
Conclusion

The findings in this paper indicate that the ability of the Greek state religion to impose its official worldview on the entire congregation is not as entrenched as is often assumed. What makes the decline all the more interesting is its emergence in an unexpected national environment, where organized religion traditionally claims a role over or alongside the secular sphere. This point provides powerful support for the revised secularization approach. It also poses a more serious and perhaps more irreversible threat to the church, compared to oscillating trends in believing, behaving and belonging. The tentative conclusion, pending on successful replication of the present analysis, can be summarized as follows: despite the Orthodox Church’s domination of Greek society and polity, we witness a ‘deviant’ belief system on state-church relations that is constructed outside church control. In this system, top-down definitions of faith are substituted by secular criteria in defining how citizens perceive religious institutions.

In terms of methodology, the same results show that reliance on surface measures of religiosity as indicators of secularization hide more than they reveal. Starting with the proverbial example of the American outlier in the sociology of religion, this study has argued that high national scores in church membership and doctrinal orthodoxy can coexist with processes that debilitate the religious factor in society and politics. Furthermore, the dimensional structures of institutional confidence tested indicate that ‘one size doesn’t it all’ in the relevant literature. In other words, the usual application of a unique structure – for instance, public vs. private institutions - across countries with distinct historical and political backgrounds can hinder our understanding of how different population segments within national borders react to the institutional landscape.

Finally, future research in the same direction should be able to use longitudinal data to establish whether these results become intensified with the course of time. It will be vital to document whether a more accommodationist religious leadership than the current one will affect public reactions to organized religion in a different manner. It could be the case that the conservative biography of the current Archbishop is partly responsible for the confidence structure of the modernist subsample. Additionally, further study can uncover the exact mechanism that creates the divergence between the two religious constituencies. Lastly, crossnational comparisons with other state religions can establish whether systematic patterns exist, or whether the Greek case remains idiosyncratic, a combination of equally forceful traditionalist and progressive trends.
REFERENCES


### Table 1: Institutional dimensions for modernists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Unions</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil services</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education system</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major companies</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice system</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Church</strong></td>
<td>.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td></td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Eigenvalue           | 3.73  | 1.25  |
| Variance explained (%) | 37.31 | 12.50 |
| Component correlation | .28   |       |

\[N = 406\]

Source: EVS 1999/2000

*Note: Pattern matrix. Only loadings of .40 or above presented.*

### Table 2: Institutional dimensions for traditionalists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td></td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Church</strong></td>
<td><strong>.66</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice system</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Police</td>
<td>.54</td>
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<td>Civil services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education system</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major companies</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Eigenvalue           | 3.80  | 1.09  |
| Variance explained (%) | 37.99 | 10.88 |
| Component correlation | .40   |       |

\[N = 332\]

Source: EVS 1999/2000

*Note: Pattern matrix. Only loadings of .40 or above presented.*
Table 3: Declining religious authority vs. the official model among modernists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Fit measures</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>df</td>
<td>$\chi^2 / df$</td>
<td>CFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declining authority (H1: church-state separation)</td>
<td>89.332</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2.707</td>
<td>.939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official model (H2: church-state unity)</td>
<td>105.874</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.208</td>
<td>.921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EVS 1999/2000

Note. Relative fit remains insensitive to alternative specifications, for example when items are not allowed to cross-load on factors (the police item in model H1 and the education item in model H2).