A Theory of Nation-Building
Assimilation and Its Alternatives in Southeastern Europe

Abstract
Under what conditions does a state target a non-core group with group-specific assimilationist measures instead of accommodating it? When does it choose to physically remove the non-core group, by exchange, deportation, or killing? In this paper, I develop a theory that accounts for the variation in nation-building policies. I also test it against alternative explanations such as cultural distance arguments, modernization theory, and the homeland factor. I propose that the content of non-core groups’ rival claims together with the host states’ foreign policy goals are the most important explanatory variables in understanding nation-building policies. My test has been conducted on a dataset compiled on all politically relevant non-core groups in post-WWI Southeastern Europe. My results show that non-core groups living in states that pursue expansionist foreign policy goals are more likely to be excluded than targeted with assimilation. Furthermore, seeking no territorial changes and living in urban centers increase the likelihood of accommodation for a non-core group. When a non-core group is larger than one percent of the total population, however, it is more likely to be targeted with exclusionist or assimilationist policies rather than be accommodated. Prominent alternative explanations cannot account for the observed variation in nation-building policies. For example, non-core groups that are perceived as revisionist by ruling political elites will be targeted with exclusionist policies when they are living in revisionist states and are not primarily urban irrespectively of their cultural distance from the core group or the existence of an external national homeland. Non-core groups whose cultural distinctiveness is not linked to a political identity are more likely to be targeted with assimilationist policies even when they have both a different language and religion from the core group.

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Introduction

Ruling political elites of modern nation-states have followed a wide range of policies to achieve national integration. Non-core groups have been targeted violently, deported, exchanged, and granted autonomy, while still other groups have experienced strong assimilation pressures. What accounts for the variation in nation-building strategies towards different non-core groups by the same government? What accounts for the variation in nation-building policies towards similar groups in different countries? Under what conditions does a state target a non-core group with group-specific assimilation measures instead of following nation-wide acculturation policies, granting it minority rights, or physically removing it by exchange, deportation or killing?

Many arguments have been proposed to explain aspects of this variation ranging from ethnic hatreds, racism, and ethnic dominance, to purely instrumental rationality or strictly military security ones. Most of these theories, however, focus on explaining only the most violent state strategies: extermination, deportation, and secession.¹ They neglect the less violent ones. As Stevan Pavlowitch notes, “There is a fascination with victims: the massacre of populations is more interesting than their daily lives.” (2000: 147). My argument accounts for both violent and non-violent strategies towards non-core groups.

An additional problem in the literature is the assumption that nation-building policies affect all non-core groups more or less equally; thus having little to say about the variation in state-planned nation-building policies. In reality national integration can be achieved in many ways ranging from supra-nationalist federalism to ethnic cleansing.

Exploring the variation in nation-building policies across space and over-time allows me to relax this assumption and push our understanding of these processes forward.

Despite the voluminous literature on more or less successful national integration histories, there is no theory that accounts for this variation in state policies towards non-core groups. To be sure, different paths to national-integration have been proposed. The modernization theorists have emphasized the importance of economic transformations such as industrialization and urbanization for identity change and suggested that national integration is more or less a by-product of these processes (Deutsch 1965, Gellner 1983). But these theories never specify who pursues these policies. As Anthony Smith put it, in this set of theories “the role of the state is simply to act as a handmaid of history, whose goal is a world of large-scale nation-states or regions.” (1986: 232).

Later generations of social scientists provided microfoundations to the various modernization theories (Hechter 1975, Laitin 1995 and 1998). However, these studies also embraced the unplanned character of nationalist assimilation strategies posited by the modernization theorists. Their work, inspired by methodological individualism, provided microfoundations focusing on the calculations individuals make with respect to identity choices (Laitin 1998). However, state policies range from assimilationist to

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3 Moreover, in the cases where assimilation strategies were pursued the content of the various policies followed and the extent of their implementation varied. Assimilation campaigns include one or a combination of the following policies: linguistic and educational reforms, affirmative action policies (facilitating social mobility), marriage laws, name-changing campaigns (both of people and of places), religious conversion, population displacement (segregation, dispersion, mingling), census manipulation, propaganda, violent persecution of elites that resist assimilation, and so forth. The variation in the strategies of assimilation will be influenced by the type of difference as well as issues such as spatial distribution, group size, and organizational structure. I pursue this research question elsewhere.
4 Populations adapt to the hegemonic constitutive story in order to secure upward social mobility. According to this theory we should not observe any group specific assimilation strategies since people will gradually integrate (just the basic incentive structure is enough). This theory ignores
exclusionist ones and individual level decisions are always structured by these contexts. Thus, without a theory that accounts for variation in state-planned policies towards non-core groups we cannot have a complete theory of nation-building. Overall, the “supply side” of nation-building is under-theorized.

I propose a theory that accounts for the nation-building choices of ruling political elites towards non-core groups. I identify the nature of non-core groups’ rival claims together with the host states’ foreign policy goals as key explanatory variables in understanding nation-building policies. Core group elites will pursue group-specific nation-building policies only if a non-core group is mobilized by a revisionist claim from a neighboring country or a local national movement. The policies will be assimilationist when the group is residing in a country that does not seek to change the status quo and exclusionist when it the host state has revisionist foreign policy goals. Within this subset of cases, cleansing becomes more likely in war-time when the stakes are high, the time horizon short, and the international attention low. If the non-core group has no competing claim at all, then the core group will follow nation-wide assimilation policies. The only situation where the ruling political elites will accommodate a non-core group is when it is mobilized by a status quo claim.

My argument is applicable to cases that satisfy the following scope conditions: 1. Regions where there is geopolitical competition for territorial control among both Great Powers and regional states, 2. there is a ruling core group in the country and part of the population has not been assimilated yet (i.e. there are non-core groups). 3. The boundaries of the state are fixed in the period for which I predict state strategies the politics involved in the process. For example, sometimes individuals are not even given the option to assimilate while others they are given incentives to do so.
boundary changes overtime are part of my explanation both through strategic considerations and by affecting important variables). 4. Finally, I assume that nation-builders represent a specific “national type” and want to directly rule the population. I should also emphasize here that the choice of a state policy (e.g. group-specific assimilation) is analytically distinct from its success or failure (i.e. if the policy actually succeeded in assimilating the targeted group or not).

I test my theory of nation-building against alternative explanations on a dataset I have compiled on all non-core groups in post-WWI Southeastern Europe. From this first empirical analysis I find that non-core groups that are perceived as revisionist by ruling political elites will be targeted with exclusionist policies with a mean probability of .76 when they are living in revisionist states, they are not primarily urban and they are culturally distant from the core group. Varying the degree of cultural distance does not change the mean probability of exclusion, although it broadens the confidence interval. Moreover, having a homeland does not really have an effect on the mean probability of exclusion. Non-core groups living in states that pursue revisionist foreign policy goals are more likely to be excluded than assimilated. Consistent with my theory, a non-core group whose cultural distinctiveness is not linked to a political identity has a .52 mean probability of being targeted with assimilationist policies even when it has a different language and religion from the core group, something that contradicts “cultural distance” arguments. To be sure, having a different religion than the core group increases the likelihood of being targeted with exclusionist rather than with assimilationist policies.

Southeastern Europe is the neutral term which I decided to use as an alternative to politically/culturally loaded and anachronistic terms such as “the Balkans” and “Turkey-in-Europe,” respectively. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Todorova 1997, Glenny 2001: xxi-xxvi, Mazower 2001.
However, this is not surprising finding in the Balkans. Furthermore, seeking no territorial changes and living in urban centers increase the likelihood of accommodation for a non-core group. Finally, groups that are larger than one percent (1%) of the total population are more likely to be targeted with exclusionist or assimilationist policies rather than be accommodated. This analysis is obviously a snapshot and will be complemented with more cross-sections as well as in-depth case studies. These results are derived from the situation in Southeastern Europe immediately after WWI. It remains to be seen how generalizable these finding are overtime and across space.

The primary reason to study and understand the logic of nation-building strategies towards non-core groups is the empirical observation that minorities have been—and still are—used as a pretext for nations to fight expansionary wars or to destabilize neighboring countries (Woodwell 2004). Both interstate and intrastate wars have been instigated by minority politics. For example, Russia used the pretence of protecting the rights of the Orthodox Christian millet to intervene in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, while the politics surrounding the Serb minority in Austria-Hungary spurred WWI. Similarly, the political unification of the German Volk residing outside of Germany’s borders has been cited as the main principle that Hitler advanced to justify the initiation of what would end up being WWII. More recently, the military intervention of Turkey in Cyprus has been justified on the basis of the protection of co-ethnics outside of Turkish territory; and the protracted bloody conflict in Ireland has been justified on the basis of a conflict between the Catholic minority in the North and the Protestant minority in the Republic of Ireland.

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6 Another theory is that the Franz Ferdinand’s assassins wanted to prevent the reorganization of the Habsburg Empire on a trialist basis (a plan to include the Slavs in the Dual Monarchy in order to check the Hungarians), which would severely undermine Serbian aspirations in Bosnia and Croatia (Sowards 1996).
The above cases and many more, serve as examples of the explosive consequences of minority politics for the economic and political stability of societies around the world. Today, more than twenty million Russian-speakers live in the newly formed post-Soviet republics, around a million Turks live in Bulgaria, at least two million ethnic Albanians live outside of Albania proper in Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, more than one million and a half Hungarians live in Romania, a little less than a million ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, and there are still significant numbers of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia. Moreover, millions of Roma are dispersed around the European continent. The fate of these, and many other peoples with similar status, as well as their host states depends very much on the nation-building policies that the latter will follow.

From a policy perspective, understanding the logic of state-planned nation-building might help the decision makers of the international community devise incentives to prevent ethnic cleansing, encourage viable conditions for accommodation, or even foster national integration. One might argue that the era of nation-building and assimilation has reached its limits (Young 1993) and that the time where citizenship is not connected to ethnicity is –or should be- near (Kymlicka 1995). It could be the case that there is a threshold of economic development and military power after which a state becomes immune to nationalist ideology. However, the euphoria of the early 1990s with regards to the prospects of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism was seriously challenged by political realities around the world. And while it is true that most of the civil wars and mass killings did not take place in the West, I hold that continuous
immigration movements, increasing protectionist tendencies in the global markets, and inefficient international institutions can reverse the situation even in the West. Nevertheless, I do believe that the processes I am analyzing are more relevant for what is known as the ‘developing world’; especially for the states and peoples where borders were drawn without almost any consideration of ethnocultural boundaries.

Besides the methodological justifications for studying Southeastern Europe after WWI, I hold that the international balance of power today approximates the situation of the interwar years. Moreover, many of today’s so called developing countries are experiencing analogous challenges with those faced by the Balkan states a few decades ago: incomplete nation- and state-building; weak political institutions unable to deal with the increasing political participation; unconsolidated democracy; religiously, linguistically, and culturally heterogeneous populations; people accustomed to a world of corporate privileges; and, economic ‘backwardness’.

I organize this paper in seven sections. In the first, I describe the relevant actors and present the range of possible strategies that a nationalizing state might pursue. Next I present my theory of nation-building. In the third section, I discuss the existing literature on the topic and derive testable hypotheses for the variation in the treatment of non-core groups by nationalizing states. Next, I present my research design strategy and justify my case selection. In the fifth section, I describe the data and the operationalization of all the relevant variables. In the next section, I present the results from my statistical analysis. I conclude with a discussion of the data problems that I faced and my strategies for solving them in subsequent chapters.
I. Actors and Nation-building Policies

a. The core group and its elites

Naturally, in order to speak of non-core groups we first have to define the “core group” (Hollingshead 1952: 685). For example, in the case of the USA in the 1960s, Milton Gordon identified the core culture as “the middle-class cultural patterns of, largely, white Protestant, Anglo-Saxon origins” (1964: 72). Thus, my project focuses on cases where there is a clear “national type” that is being more or less actively propagated within their territorial borders (Deutsch 1965). Indicators of “core culture” crystallization include standardization of language, a national historiography that reaches a high degree of consensus among the core group members, an official (or state-favored) religion, some form of phenotypic stereotype (a combination of physical attributes).

I distinguish between the “core group” as a demographic majority that shares a common national type (e.g. common language, religion, certain phenotypical characteristics, a shared culture), from the “core group” as the ruling political elite that

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7 Several questions arise: Can one get assimilated in a national community that lacks a “national type”? How does this type emerge and change? Does it matter if it includes physical characteristics or not? How does a set of norms, meanings, and cultural models become the leading one? Does the nature of the period of the incubation (conquest, civil war) have an effect on state-building or national integration? More empirically speaking what accounts for where and when powerful pre-national communities sustain the salience of their identity and pay loyalty to local leaders rather than the state? I address some of these questions in the theory section.

8 As Banac put it: “In principle, though a single language may be shared by two or more nations, a single nation cannot be multilingual. […] The exceptions to this principle are most often a result of centuries of assimilation (as in the Irish case), of unique historical circumstances (the Swiss example), or of colonial experience.” (1984: 22-23).

9 Clearly there are cases where a nation is split between two (or more) religions but they are the exception in Balkan history. Albania and Yugoslavia are the only cases and for a short period of time since both became Communist following WWII; thus weakening the intensity of the religious cleavage.

10 There is no restriction about which markers are the most important ones (e.g. race, religion, language, etc.). An interesting research question is if some kinds of markers are more powerful in achieving national integration than others and why? In my cases there is no important variation along these lines.
claims to represent this demographic majority. The ruling elites of the core group determine the constitutive story of the nation in such a way so that it has (or can easily construct) a significant demographic core group base and at the same time ensures the legitimacy of their hegemony over any competitors. It is in this sense that the economic consequences enter the picture. Being a member of the nation allows one to be a part of a specific status group which is less threatened by the instabilities of economic change. The exclusion of outsiders (those not fitting the criteria of the national type) is essential for the existence of the status group and sometimes even for its economic well-being.

When I refer to the “core group” as an agent in my theory I mean the ruling political organization that has the military and administrative capacity to enforce its decisions within the internationally recognized borders of the state. This ruling organization is not necessarily coinciding with the economically dominant class or the intellectuals of the state.11

I use the term “core group” rather than “nationalizing state” (Brubaker 1996: 63-66) for a variety of reasons. First, in order to avoid contradictions; for example, a nationalizing state accommodating a national minority is a contradiction. This is not a problem when using the term “core group” since it can act as a nationalizing state towards one non-core group but not another. Second, since I am interested in understanding group-specific nation-building policies I cannot use a term that implies a specific set of policies and has a state-level focus.

b. The non-core group and its elites

11 For a distinction between ruling and political classes, see Aron (1966: 204) and Weber (1968: I, 56).
Any aggregation of individuals that is different in a politically salient way (linguistic, religious, physical, ideological) from the national type of the core group of a society at T₀, I call it a “non-core group”. The non-core group members might or might not be citizens of the state but are certainly not considered members of the nation before they are targeted with assimilation policies.¹²

There is wide variation in the types of non-core groups across space and time. This variation is a function of the content of the national constitutive myth (Smith 2001) of each country and the relevant attributes of the groups that reside within it. Thus a non-core group could be an ethnic or tribal group, a religious or linguistic minority, a racial minority, or even a cultural or ideological group.

In the literature the term “minority” is commonly used to refer to “a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members –being nationals of the State- possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language”.¹³

I refrain from using the term minority for a variety of reasons. First, the “non-core group” category is broader than that of a “minority” since it includes aggregations of people that are conscious of their difference from the dominant national type without necessarily being mobilized around this difference. Second, the term “minority” is usually used to refer to “numerically inferior” groups while the term “non-core group”

¹² There are cases where a non-core group is targeted with group-specific assimilationist policies the core group members deny to recognize them as ethnoculturally similar. However, in my dissertation I am not focusing on the outcomes of state policies.

¹³ Capotorti’s definition of a minority quoted in Clogg 2002: xii.
does not imply anything about size. Third, the term “non-core group” allows us to view even stereotypical members of the demographic core group as targets of assimilation by the core group elites. In other words, a “minority” is a special type of a “non-core group” and a “national minority” is “a non-core group mobilized by a revisionist claim”.

c. The dependent variable: Nation-Building Strategies

For each country under study, I identify all the politically relevant non-core groups at T₀. At the higher level of analysis I am using the policies pursued towards non-core groups as an indicator capturing the intentions of the nationalizing state.

“Assimilationist policies”, refer to educational, cultural, occupational, marital, demographic, and political state policies aiming at the adoption of core-group culture and way of life by the non-assimilated group.¹⁴ These policies usually target directly a specific group (or part of a specific group) but might be presented under the guise of an impartial law. For the purposes of this paper, I include under this category “nation-wide assimilation” policies that aim at the acquisition of certain traits such as language, dress, behavioral patterns by the whole population. The ultimate goal of such policies is national integration. These are policies differ from group-specific ones because they do not target any group in particular but might end up disproportionately affecting a specific group (or part of a specific group). The goal of assimilationist policies is to secure the loyalty of an individual or a community by “conquering” her belief system and guaranteeing her obedience to your rule.

¹⁴ In the future, I intend to explain the variation in type and intensity of group-specific assimilation policies across groups and overtime.
“Exclusionist policies”, refer to policies that aim at the national homogeneity of particular areas within the country. Policies under this category include population exchange, deportation, internal displacement, or even mass killing.

“Accommodation”, refers to situations where the differences of a non-core group are more or less perpetuated by the institutional structure. The non-core group is allowed to have certain separate institutions such as schools, churches, cultural associations and so forth. The state here requires just a minimum of political loyalty to the central state institutions and obedience to general laws. However, the fact that difference is accepted and perpetuated does not mean that the non-core group does not face discrimination both by state institutions and by individual core group members.

II. A Theory of Nation-Building

In this section I develop a theory of state-planned nation-building strategies. Nation-building entails a parallel process where the ruling political elites maintain and reinforce differences with ‘nations’ in surrounding states and eliminate differences within their own boundaries. Although people have been conscious of national or ethnic differences for many centuries, with the advent of modernity this consciousness became intertwined with the political program of self determination. By the mid 19th century, the cultivation of nationalistic sentiments became an important part of statesmen’s repertoire to establish legitimate order and secure the loyalty of the population within the borders of states in Western Europe. National leaders and their associates tried various policies to manage and/or manipulate the identities of the population within their territorial borders.

15 Banac’s definition captures this well: “nationalism should only indicate an ideology, a comprehensive, modern world view, distinguished by its all-inclusive penetration of national consciousness into every going pursuit. […] The old national consciousness was not necessarily concerned with specific cultural or political goals.” (1984: 27).
First, I describe a set of building block concepts; second, I provide causal mechanisms that link host state and non-core group characteristics to nation-building strategies. Then, I derive several test implications from my theory.

**Modern States and loyalty: The origins of rival claims to non-core group loyalty**

Following Weber, I define the “state” as the organization that has the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force and extraction within a clearly bounded territory (1946: 83). I begin from the premise that the ultimate political goal of the ruling political elite of every modern state is to master the loyalty of its population and remain sovereign. A government is considered legitimate when it enjoys the consent of the citizens. Legitimate rule enhances the taxing abilities of a state, facilitates conscription to the army, fosters compliance to the laws, and prevents separatist movements. Troubles ensue when a section of the population does not consider the government legitimate.

This challenge to state legitimacy can take many forms. The actual form it takes in different epochs depends on the *nature* of the state organization. In the modern era most states have converged on the ‘national state’ model and popular rule (Tilly 1992: 2-3). At the turn of the 18th century, a gradual transformation of *territorial* sovereignty into *popular* sovereignty began. Empires could -and did- rule over masses of aliens for centuries but in the modern nation-state system alien rule became unacceptable. Popular sovereignty implied that the members of the “nation” should rule the state. Thus

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16 Established by the Peace of Westphalia (i.e. the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück which ended both the Thirty Years and the Eighty Years Wars in 1648).

17 The 1789 French revolution is the landmark for this shift.

18 Other scholars have labelled this transition differently; for example, Banac talks about a distinction between “historical rights on a territory” and “national right of self-determination” (1984).
it followed that one could become a *separatist* in such a state by either refusing to be part of the nation or by claiming to be part of another one!

Before entering a discussion about the origins of revisionist claims made by non-core group representatives, we need to stress that the existence of a culturally distinct group does not necessarily involve a competing claim to the political loyalty of this population. Cultural distinctiveness is politically irrelevant unless there is a *group-formation process* to turn it into a social identity. As Hechter puts it “one can only identify with a given group when such a group actually exists.” (2000: 97). This begs the question, When is a non-core group less likely to have a politically salient social identity? Nomadic groups, groups that are territorially dispersed, or small isolated communities are not likely to have any *political* identity linked to their cultural, linguistic, religious, or other distinctiveness. Moreover, research findings in social psychology indicate that individuals from such non-core groups are likely to quickly assimilate into a “higher status” group in order to maximize their self-esteem (Hechter 2000: 99). As a result, over time many of these groups have been adsorbed by neighboring larger groups. On the contrary, groups that are large, sedentary and territorially concentrated are more likely to build local institutions and link their cultural, linguistic, religious or other distinctiveness to a political identity.

In general, we can distinguish between those non-core groups that are mobilized by a rival claim and those that are not. In my framework, non-core groups that are not mobilized by any rival claim should be targeted with assimilationist policies such as mass schooling, political rights, welfare benefits, and military conscription (*Hypothesis 1*).\(^\text{19}\)

\(^{19}\) To be sure, the ruling political elites might maintain the difference of a non-core group without a rival claim when the cost of assimilating it is very high. Such cases include groups with an
Non-core group loyalty and revisionist claims

I have already argued that large, sedentary non-core groups that are territorially concentrated are likely to link their distinctiveness to a political identity. However, this political identity of the non-core group could be more or less threatening for the host state. For the purposes of this paper, I single out challenges to a state’s sovereignty as the most important ones. I refer to a non-core group as revisionist when it aims at boundary changes and as status quo otherwise.

But under what conditions does a non-core group turn to be revisionist? Revisionist claims are usually the result of external intervention by a Great Power or a neighboring country that wants to weaken the host state (top-bottom) and less often of an independent local national movement (bottom-up). In the case of Great Powers, different justifications can be proposed for intervention ranging from a common marker (e.g. the Russian empire claimed that it was assisting its co-religionist in the Balkans) to an international norm, such as ‘human rights’. Neighboring countries might attempt to find populations that either share a marker with their own core group or in some cases they might organize propaganda teams across the border with the aim of forging a common national consciousness. In other words, a state has to act in order to “become” an external national homeland. Finally, a revisionist claim can emerge from a non-core group that has developed a local national movement in reaction to centralization of authority or some other political or economic grievance. Expectedly ‘revisionist alliances’ are likely to form between Great Powers, neighboring states, and aggrieved nationally conscious non-core groups against the host state.

entropy resistant marker (Gellner 1983) or groups whose economic skills are linked to their identity (Laitin 1995).
Undoubtedly, Great Powers and states around the world do not select randomly which non-core groups to target. Non-core groups in geopolitically important areas have a higher probability of being targeted with agitational campaigns. Moreover, non-core groups residing in weak host states that cannot effectively fend off such interference and crash revisionist networks are also good candidates. On the whole, Great Powers and neighboring states are more likely to target non-core groups that are in the periphery of the host state since they are usually harder to control and less integrated, thus rendering them easier targets.

Conversely, a non-core group is less likely to be mobilized by a revisionist claim if it is residing in a geopolitically unimportant area or far from the borders. The category of status quo non-core groups includes also communities of strategic regional allies. The cultural distinctiveness of such non-core groups is likely to be accommodated by the host state (*Hypothesis 2*).²⁰

*Revisionist claims, Revisionist States, and nation-building policies*

Non-core groups mobilized by revisionist claims are perceived as security threats by the ruling political elites of states and receive immediate attention. Nation-building is not considered complete until there are no such groups in a nation-state. In such cases, the ruling political elites have to make decisions with respect to these threatening groups. In this decision making process, the core group members that are not part of the ruling political elites are only indirectly influencing decisions, even in democratic settings. This

²⁰ Following the above logic, we should not observe a strategy of instigating revisionist propaganda by either Great Powers or neighbouring states towards nationally integrated states, comprised solely by literate nationally conscious citizens. In such cases they are more likely to pursue either ideological penetration (e.g. communism, fascism, etc.) or direct interstate war.
is because such decisions are usually made behind closed doors on behalf of the ‘nation’ but without its direct approval.\textsuperscript{21}

The ruling political elites will pursue group-specific nation-building policies anticipating a future fifth column situation. The policies towards non-core groups mobilized by revisionist claims will vary mainly according to the foreign policy goals of the host state. These goals in turn are determined by the geopolitical situation and the ethno-demographic landscape surrounding the host state.

The ruling political elites of a state are likely to be motivated by revisionist goals if it has a significant number of co-ethnics in the near abroad. Irredentism is a prominent sub-category of revisionism, and becomes a foreign policy goal when the state has recently lost territory and/or has ‘unredeemed co-ethnics’. Then again, revisionism can be the result of a pure expansionist desire, which might be instigated either by population growth or military strength and technological innovations. The motivations behind expansionism could be strategic ones such as access to sea, expropriation of resources, more defensible borders. It follows that the host state is likely to be revisionist when its ‘co-ethnics’ reside in a geopolitically important territory and are part of a non-allied state. Finally, a host state can become more assertive in its revisionist claims when it gets the approval and backing of one or more of the Great Powers.

When the host state has revisionist foreign policy goals then its ruling political elites are likely to pursue exclusionist policies towards revisionist non-core groups (\textit{Hypothesis 3}).\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21} Nevertheless, there is an important way that core group members matter in the process. They account for much of the confusion on the ground. Their prejudice, discrimination, and desire for revenge might derail the policy pursued by the ruling political elite. Such ‘noise’ is hard to anticipate by the nation-builders.
Conversely, I refer to a host state as status quo when it does not seek border changes. A state tends to pursue such a foreign policy once it has accomplished a territorial expansion or a massive population exchange. The logic here is that both of these events would have significantly decrease the number of ‘unredeemed co-ethnics’. At the same time a territorial expansion usually comes with more non-core groups that are or could potentially become revisionist. When the host state wants to preserve the status quo in the international system then it is more likely to pursue intense assimilation policies towards revisionist non-core groups within its borders (Hypothesis 4).23

Summary of Hypotheses
H1: A non-core group whose distinctiveness is not linked to a political identity should be targeted with assimilation policies such as mass schooling, political rights, welfare benefits, and military conscription.

H2: A non-core group mobilized by a status quo claim should be accommodated by having, for example, their own schools and churches and maintaining their differences from the core group.

H3: A non-core group mobilized by a revisionist rival claim residing in a state pursuing a revisionist foreign policy should be targeted with exclusionist policies, such as population exchange, deportation, or killing.

H4: A non-core group mobilized by a revisionist rival claim residing in a state that is interested in preserving the status quo should be targeted with assimilation policies, policies that aim at the eradication of differences with the core group.

--Figure 1--

Overall, a few more general implications stand out. Thinking about this process in a more dynamic way two things merit our attention: first, a large revisionist group once cleansed will ‘become’ small and maybe stop being revisionist. Such a change would

22 Within this subset of cases, cleansing becomes more likely in war-time when the stakes are high, the time horizon short, and the international attention low.
23 Within this category of intense assimilation there is important variation in policies. I intend to explore this variation in the future.
lead to a policy change from exclusion to accommodation. second, a revisionist host state once engaged in exclusionary policies might end up receiving many of its ‘unredeemed co-ethnics’ through population exchanges or refugee waves and thus seize being revisionist. Both of these processes might move state policies from exclusion to assimilation (Testable implication 1).

Demographic dynamics over time are also crucial in the choice of nation-building strategies. A rapid population growth of a non-core group combined with low fertility of the core group might trigger a shift from accommodation to intense group-specific assimilation policies (Testable implication 2). The logic being that a larger group is more likely to be targeted with revisionist claims by Great Powers or ‘external homelands’.

Neighborhood effects seem to be really important in nation-building policies. A state surrounded by status quo states should be less likely to pursue assimilationist or exclusionist policies and more likely to adopt accommodation (Testable implication 3). The logic here is that such a state is less likely to have revisionist non-core groups within its territory.

Assimilationist campaigns towards revisionist non-core groups should be fairly rare since the latter, anticipating exclusionist policies by the host state, are likely to flee – especially during wartime. If a part of such a group remains, it will most likely be accommodated since its members will be perceived as status quo supporters (Testable implication 4).

III. Existing Explanations

Taking the theories of nationalism, state-building, political development, and ethnic politics together, I derive several hypotheses for why a state would choose to assimilate
some non-core groups and accommodate or exclude others. I group them into two broad categories: A. Theories that treat national identities as exogenous to politics and economics; B. Theories that treat identities as endogenous to politics and economics.

First, there are explanations that take group boundaries as exogenous. There are at least four variations of these. Both members of the non-core group and the core group may not want to contaminate their respective races with foreign blood or outside cultural influences; thus assimilation is out of the question (*Primordialism/Racism*). In case the dominant group used to be dominated by the non-core group then the relations will be conflict ridden and we should observe no assimilation attempts (*Status Reversal/Ethnic antipathy*, see Horowitz 1985). Research in social psychology provides a mechanism for this hypothesis, namely that individuals seek to maximize their self-esteem and a positive social identity (usually at the expense of an ‘other’) is one way of reaching the desired goal (Hechter 2000: 99). Ernest Gellner (1983) links ethnicity with social class in his theory. According to Gellner’s theory, when a certain non-core group is significantly different from the core group (on a salient cleavage dimension) and at the same time over-represented either at the top or the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy then assimilation is unlikely (*Entropy resistant markers*). Pushing the logic further we should not expect assimilation attempts towards non-core groups with ethnic markers that are so resistant to assimilation. Finally, Myron Weiner highlighted the importance irredentist claims for political development (1971). According to Weiner, when the host state is faced with serious irredentist demands then it grows suspicious of the loyalty of the ‘unredeemed’ ethnic minority and is more likely to “accelerate programs to ‘nationalize’ schoolchildren, to press the minority to learn the majority language and in various ways
to demand expressions of identification and loyalty by the minority toward the national government” (1971: 674).

Second, there are theories that emphasize the important impact of economic development, industrialization and urbanization on nation-building. These theories treat national identities as endogenous to political and economic dynamics. The most prominent theory in the USA is the Melting Pot theory according to which both members of the non-core group and the core group choose assimilation for material reasons, thus assimilation is a by product of economic development that does not require much state intervention. There are however at least four theories that fall under this category. Since assimilation is a by product of the processes related with modernization the state is not likely to pursue any group-specific policies unless a group is not affected by this modernization process. Pushing this logic further we should observe assimilation policies targeting non-core groups that are isolated and untouched by modernization. (Modernization Theory)

Michael Hechter opposes the view that modernization and centralization will necessarily lead to national assimilation of the periphery. In his Internal Colonialism (1975) Hechter argues that when the cultural division of labor that exists is beneficial to the core group then there is less of an incentive to assimilate the non-core groups. We should only observe selective cooptation. Hechter also points out that when a group is subject to a “hierarchical cultural division of labour” and it is territorially concentrated then that group is more likely to develop a local nationalist movement (2000: 106). Thus we should not observe assimilation attempts towards such groups especially when they are territorially concentrated since their assimilation would be too costly.
Structural conditions may generate incentives for the core group to assimilate a non-core group. If a non-core group does not have an external national homeland then it is more likely to be targeted for assimilation (Homeland factor, see Brubaker 1996: 66-67). Besides the “Homeland factor,” the number of non-core groups in a country as well as their percentage with respect to the total population might be another structural factor that matters for nation-building. There may be a threshold of ethnic diversity (e.g. 40% being members of a non-core group) in the country after which the dominant group stops considering assimilation policies and turns to various policies of accommodation or consociationalism.
Existing Hypotheses and Testable implications

A. National Identities as Exogenous to Politics & Economics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H1. Primordialism/Racism (Group level hypothesis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only non-core groups that fit the criteria of nationhood should be targeted with assimilation policies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H2. Ethnic antipathy/Status reversal (Group level hypothesis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The core group should not target the previously advantaged group(s) with assimilationist measures. Assimilation policies should be pursued only towards other disadvantaged groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H3. ‘Entropy resistant’ markers (Group level hypothesis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i: Non-core groups that do not differ from the core group in a hereditarily transmittable manner will be targeted with assimilationist policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii: Non-core groups with a distinct hereditary trait but a random social distribution should be targeted for assimilation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H4. Irredentism (Group level hypothesis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. When a state faces an irredentist demand by a neighboring state then it will accelerate assimilation policies towards the ‘unredeemed’ non-core group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. National Identities as Endogenous to Politics & Economics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H5. Modernization/Urbanization (Group level hypothesis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-core groups in rural and isolated areas should be targeted with assimilation strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H6. “Internal Colonialism” (Group level hypothesis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When the cultural division of labor in society is beneficial for the core group there should be no assimilation attempts. Instead we should observe selective cooptation of individuals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H7. The Homeland factor (Group level hypothesis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-core groups with an external homeland should not be targeted for assimilation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H8. Ethnic diversity (State level hypothesis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries where non-core groups make up more than 40% of the total population should not pursue assimilationist policies. (The more fragmented the “non-core group category” is the more likely assimilationist policies become).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. Research Design

My universe of cases includes all non-assimilated groups that reside within the recognized boundaries of national states. The assumption here is that the nation-state is
ruled by a hegemonic group that aims at securing the political loyalty of the population of the country among other things.\textsuperscript{24}

Selecting a region

In order to control for many of the macro-historical and geopolitical factors that affect the politics of nationalization I focus on one region, Southeastern Europe. In particular, I am focusing on the parts of Southeastern Europe that were part of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{25} Studying one region allows me to make some credible assumptions about actors’ preferences, increases my analytical leverage, and protects me from selection bias that mars most research on nation-building. What makes this region a laboratory for the study of nation-building is that the wide set of common \textit{initial conditions} coexists with a linguistically, religiously and culturally \textit{heterogeneous} population.\textsuperscript{26}

Moreover, this set of cases is a crucial test for some of the most prominent explanations in the literature. The Balkan states have been narrated as stereotypical cases of ethnic hatreds and intergroup enmity. The term “Balkanization” is still being used by journalists and academics to indicate chaotic situations. All in all, the Balkan Peninsula is typically considered as the most turbulent and blindly nationalistic part of Europe (Pavlowitch 2000); thus it should be harder to discern a \textit{logic} in nation-building strategies

\textsuperscript{24} To be sure, there are many cases where the core group is not the majority of the population. In such circumstances, the dominant group might be obliged to form ‘winning coalitions’ with other groups or follow some kind of a consociational constitution (see Lijphart 1968 and 1977).

\textsuperscript{25} Specifically, I include in the analysis any part of Southeastern Europe that was a part of the Ottoman Empire for more than two centuries.

\textsuperscript{26} I elaborate on this point later in this paper. Briefly, the point is that unlike many other empires or large states, the Ottoman Empires does not engage in assimilation or religious conversion campaigns in a systematic or massive scale. Thus when the “age of nationalism” comes at its door there are myriads of differences that have survived Ottoman rule and can potentially be politicized.
here than anywhere else. Finding a pattern would both rehabilitate the region’s reputation and add to our knowledge.

Prior to the early 1800s the region was under the Ottoman Empire for almost three centuries. All of these territories had a more or less shared legacy of the pre-national era. The local ruling classes of the Balkan peoples were crashed or incorporated to the Ottoman system, thus the local population was “left leaderless, anonymous, and silent” (Stavrianos 1958: 96). They were all predominantly agricultural societies that lived in a world of corporate privileges for religious groups rather than individual rights. Stavrianos summarizes this background well:

The typical Ottoman subject thought of himself primarily as a member of a guild if he lived in a city or as a member of a village community if he lived in the countryside. If he had any feeling of a broader allegiance, it was likely to be of a religious rather than of a political character. It was likely to be directed to his millet rather than to his empire. (1957: 338).

More importantly, all of the Balkan states achieved independence in the years between 1830 and 1923, in other words during the “age of nationalism”. This particular timing is crucial for the purposes of testing my argument since a main assumption is that the ruling political elites representing the demographic core group aim at national integration.
These nation-states achieved national self-rule through secession from the Ottoman Empire and, at least initially, all had unredeemed co-ethnics outside of their borders (see Map 2). Mazower captures this reality well:

All states could point to ‘unredeemed’ brethren or historic lands which lay outside the boundaries apportioned them by the Powers: Romanians in Hungarian Transylvania, Serbs in Habsburg Croatia and Ottoman lands; Bulgarians in the lands of the San Stefano state they had been cheated of; Greeks –in thrall to the ‘Great Idea’ of a new Byzantine Empire-redeeming Hellenism across the Ottoman Empire from Crete to the Black Sea. Popular irredentism mobilized public opinion, financed cross-border incursions by bands of irregulars, and often forced unwilling Balkan monarchs into rash adventures against the advice or wishes of the Powers (2000: 101-102).

--Map 2 here--

Selecting a period

The six independent nation states I focus on (Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Turkey) were all engaged in the “Eastern Question,” namely the Great Powers’ competition for spheres of influence, instigated by the gradual disintegration of

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28 The Powers involved include: Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Imperial Germany, and Russia.
the Ottoman Empire. Pavlowitch describes well the international context within which
the Balkan states emerged:

Their foreign policies usually went no further than looking for, or resisting,
a Power patron. They were encouraged and manipulated. Their size, shape,
stage of growth, even their existence in final analysis was regulated by the
Powers in the hope of gaining influence. Yet they also exploited the
mutual jealousies of the Powers, and thus enjoyed some freedom of action.
Imperialism contained so many internal contradictions, and was weakened
by such rivalries, that it did not result before the First World War in
renewed subjugation of the Balkans. (2000: 144)

The joint production of both the Balkan states and many of their main policy
initiatives is an undisputed fact in Balkan historiography. However, some scholars tend to
exaggerate the external involvement and underestimate the agency of the various national
governments completely. Jankoviä is a case in point:

The Eastern Question was as eternal as the conflict between the Great
Powers over their interests in these areas, as eternal as the expansionist
aspirations and international relations and conflicts based on them. These
aspirations caused problems everywhere or kept them simmering to serve
as pretexts for intervention or bargaining for compromises and divisions of
Finally, it is important to note that the system which resulted from WWI was obliging only the small nations and the defeated Great Powers to respect ethnic, religious and racial minority rights. Nevertheless, the League of Nations changed the incentive structure for both minorities and nation-states. For example, revisionist states were trying to use the League of Nations in order to avoid the assimilation of their co-ethnics abroad and destabilize neighboring countries (Divani 1995: 36). States that were satisfied with the status-quo were trying to preserve it and assimilate all of the minorities within their territory before the revisionist powers could undermine this process or attempt to alter the borders.

V. Data and Operationalization

Nation-building strategies

My dependent variable, nation-building strategies, can take three different values. When the ruling political elite accommodates the non-core group I assign the value “0”, when it pursues assimilationist policies I assign the value “1”, and finally when it adopts exclusionist measures I assign the value “2”. To be sure, there are cases where a part of a group is targeted with assimilation policies while the majority is excluded and vice versa.

To address this problem I introduce a threshold of 80%. I hold that this is high enough of a threshold to err on the safe side. Thus, if a country targets with assimilation policies 81% of a non-core group and with exclusionary policies 19% I infer that the main goal of the government was assimilation. Reversely, if 19% was targeted for assimilation and 81% was excluded then I infer that the goal was not to assimilate this
non-core group. At the lower level of analysis, I code my dependent variable through the relevant legislation and confidential reports of governmental officials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation-building Strategies</td>
<td>Coded as “0” if the non-core group is accommodated, “1” if it is targeted with assimilationist policies, and “3” if it pursues exclusionist ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Coded as “1” if the non-core group had a different language, “0” otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Coded as “1” if the non-core group had a different religious organization, “0” otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Religion</td>
<td>Coded as “1” if the non-core group had a different world religion than the core group, “0” otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance index</td>
<td>Coded as “1” if the non-core group had a different language and world religion, “0” otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Coded as “1” if the non-core group was primarily urban, “0” otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival Claim</td>
<td>Coded as “1” if the non-core group’s cultural distinctiveness was linked to a political identity, “0” otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisionist Group</td>
<td>Coded as “1” if the non-core group was mobilized by a revisionist claim, “0” otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisionist State</td>
<td>Coded as “1” if the host state had revisionist foreign policy goals, “0” otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>Coded as “1” if the non-core group had an external homeland, “0” otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group size</td>
<td>Coded as “1” if the non-core group was larger than one percent (1%) of the total population, “0” otherwise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 For a discussion of census data, see Appendix: “Numbers game” and selection effects.
30 The coding of these variables is based on archival research and secondary sources listed in the special sections of my bibliography.
VI. Analysis

The pattern of nation-building policies over time

Studying nation-building policies in the 19th century one observes that many rural populations are completely ignored irrespectively of their ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural background. Assimilationist policies are almost entirely linked to state centralization and modernization. Wherever and whenever these processes occur in the Balkans national integration takes place. Group-specific nation-building strategies, however, are largely absent in most of the 19th century Balkan history. Assimilation was mainly an unintended consequence of migration to the urban centers and schooling. In this manner people of “low cultures” assimilated into “high cultures” and enjoyed upward social mobility (Gellner 1983).

In the case of Ottoman Europe, the choice between different high cultures was more or less overdetermined by religious affiliation. Thus for a Vlach from Pindos mountains or a Slavophone from the plains of Macedonia, both members of the Rum millet by virtue of their Christian Orthodox faith, the “high culture” was Greek. Accommodation was based solely on religious not national basis. Towards the end of the 19th century -and especially after 1878 Russo-Turkish war- competing national programs emerge and the stage is set for the enactment of a series of nation-building strategies in the whole peninsula.

Especially during the late 19th century, amidst an intense Great Power competition, assimilationist policies were primarily focused on contested borderland areas. The most common strategy was the establishment of schools (Vouri 1992), the control of churches, and the organization of armed bands which would ultimately imprint the ‘correct’
national consciousness in the hearts and minds of the local population (Dakin 1966, Perry 1988, Gounaris 1996, Livanios 1999, Aarbakke 2003). Urban centers and groups of the dominant Muslim faith were largely left out of this competition. Moreover, exclusionist policies could only be used selectively on individuals since the control of the territories was still under the Ottomans.

Only in the early 20th century and especially after WWI, when a new balance of power emerged in Europe together with new borders in its Southeastern corner, do we observe a drastic intensification of nation-building policies within states (Gounaris 1994, Karakasidou 1997, Michailidis 1998 and 2003, Carabott 1997). After the Balkan Wars and WWI, the various national programs had already crystallized and internal nation-building intensified. Overall, forty six percent (46%) of the non-core groups in my analysis were accommodated; while around forty percent (40%) were targeted with assimilationist policies. Only fourteen percent (14%) was targeted with exclusionist policies. This set of statistics is impressive given the lack of such state policies before the turn of the 19th century.

--Graph 1 & Table 1--

Descriptive Statistics

Turning to my independent variables, it is worth noting that eighty one percent (81%) of the groups in my analysis spoke a different language and half (54%) had a different religion from the core group. Sixty percent (60%) of the non-core groups that I study were larger than one percent of the country’s total population. A little less than half of them were primarily urban (44%) and had an external homeland (39%). Finally, one third
of the non-core groups were motivated by revisionist claims (31%) while four out of the six states in my study were pursuing a revisionist foreign policy in 1918.

From the cross-tabulations below we observe some striking facts that merit further research. I will discuss each table individually and then turn to the analysis of the multinomial regression results.

### Language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Different</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost thirty percent of the non-core groups that had a different language from the core group of their host state were targeted with assimilationist policies. To be sure groups with a different language were more often excluded or accommodated, but the fact that thirty percent of them were targeted with assimilation policies undermines cultural distance arguments. Not surprisingly, non-core groups that shared a common language with the core group were more often targeted with assimilationist policies than accommodation or exclusion.

### Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Different</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Groups that had the same religion with the core group were more often targeted with assimilationist policies than with accommodation or exclusion. More than 50% of the groups that had the same religion with the core group of their host state were targeted with assimilationist policies. Importantly, twenty five percent of the non-core groups with a different religion were also targeted with assimilationist policies. This is really surprising for the Balkans where religion is a very salient marker.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Different</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conducting a cross-tabulation with “world religion,” rather than religious denomination, as the breakdown category we see that only four non-core groups from a different world religion were targeted with assimilationist policies; accommodation of such groups is much more often the chosen policy.

Importantly, among the non-core groups that share the same world religion with the core group, there were more non-core groups targeted with exclusionist policies than the ones that did not. This empirical record directly contradicts cultural distance arguments.
Most non-core groups in my analysis did not have an external national homeland. The ones that did were usually accommodated. But also a significant number of the ones that did not have a homeland were also accommodated. Thus, we cannot say that there is a clear homeland on the choice of accommodation. Moreover, there were nine (9) non-core groups that had a homeland but were nevertheless targeted with assimilationist policies. The homeland argument circulating in the literature would be hard pressed to explain these patterns.

Groups that were not primarily urban were more often targeted with assimilation and exclusion. This empirical pattern is consistent with the logic of my argument with respect to non-core groups that live in peripheries of a host state. The latter are more likely to be or become revisionist, thus the ruling political elites target them with
assimilationist policies, when the state has status quo foreign policy goals, and with exclusionist policies, when these goals are revisionist. Accommodation was preferred for groups that were primarily urban. This could be due to the fact that such groups are easier to control and at the same time more visible to the diplomats of the international community. In such a context, not respecting the international treaties for minority protection is challenging.

### Non-core group revisionist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-core groups that were seeking border changes were more often targeted with exclusionist policies than groups which did not. Status quo non-core groups were targeted equally with assimilationist policies or accommodation, but very rarely with exclusion. Moreover, we should keep in mind that all groups that have ‘no rival claim’ are included in the category of ‘status quo’ groups. This probably explains the numerous cases of assimilation.

### Group larger than 1%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, non-core groups larger than one percent of a country’s population were more often targeted with assimilation than the smaller ones were. Small groups were more often accommodated. Also, exclusion was a preferred policy towards non-core groups larger than 1% than for smaller groups. This pattern is consistent with the security logic that underlies my argument. Smaller groups are not a threat thus they can be accommodated. Larger groups have to be either excluded or assimilated.

*Explaining Variation in Nation-building policies*

Given the case selection and the regional character of the data a few of the alternative hypotheses are controlled for or are easily falsified. Thus, for example, there is very little variation in the understandings of nationhood and the modernization levels across the states included in my analysis. More contested is the degree to which we can assume that most of these Balkan states were all ruled by a majority core-group. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes could be seen as an ethnically diverse country since the Serbs in 1918 were not more than thirty eight percent (38%) of the total population. Nevertheless, if one takes the regimes discourse for granted then Serbo-Croats constituted an absolute majority with sixty three percent (63%) of the total population (Banac 1984:58). Albania also could be considered as an “ethnically” diverse state since its core group was comprised of Albanian speaker of Muslim, Christian Orthodox and Catholic faiths. Nevertheless, most scholars use language as the most important marker and suggest that the core group was seventy eight (78%) percent of the total population. With these minor caveats, we can assert that all of the countries in the analysis had a core group that was more than 60% of the total population.
Beyond the common historical legacies and geopolitical context there was a great deal of heterogeneity within the Balkans that I am trying to capture in the dataset I have compiled. Using this dataset we are in a position to test a few group-level hypotheses such as: the impact of cultural distance (measuring differences in language and religion), the effect of having an external homeland or not, the importance of being an urban group as opposed to a rural or a nomadic one, and the impact of group size.\footnote{For a correlation table of the explanatory variables, see Table 2.} Furthermore, I have coded every non-core group’s level of mobilization, political goals, and degree of loyalty to the government. These codings are not necessarily capturing the realities on the ground; rather they are more attuned to the perceptions of the ruling political elites of each state.

The results from the multinomial logit regression are confirmatory of my intuitions.\footnote{A fundamental assumption underlying the multinomial logit is the Independence of irrelevant alternatives (Hausman & McFadden 1984; Ray 1973). In my case this means that I assume the following: If assimilationist policies are preferred to accommodation with respect to a non-core group, then introducing the alternative strategy of exclusion will not make accommodation preferred to assimilationist policies.} Groups that are perceived as revisionist by ruling political elites are more likely to be excluded than targeted with accommodation. Moreover, non-core groups living in states that pursue revisionist policies are more likely to be excluded than assimilated. Whether a non-core group has an external homeland or not does not have any statistically significant impact on nation-building choices. A non-core group that resides primarily in urban centers is more likely to be accommodated than targeted with exclusionist policies.

--Table 3--
Turning to demographic and cultural characteristics, we observe that having a different language gives us no indication about nation-building policies. This contradicts the primordialist argument that culturally distant groups are more likely to be excluded or accommodated. To be sure, having a different religion than the core group increases the likelihood of being targeted with exclusionist rather than with assimilationist policies. However, this is not surprising finding in the Balkans. The way to adjudicate the question of cultural distance is to find out whether groups are accommodated for reasons that are consistent with my argument or based on cultural distance. I pursue this line of research in following chapters. Finally, groups that are larger than one percent (1%) of the total population are more likely to be targeted with exclusionist or assimilationist policies rather than be accommodated.

Simulations

Interpreting results just by looking at regression coefficients and standard errors is often tedious and not very enlightening (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). To present my findings in a more straightforward way I employ Clarify, a program developed by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2003) that uses stochastic simulation techniques to help researchers interpret statistical results. It works in three steps: first, estimating the model; then setting the desired values of the independent variables; and third, computing the probabilities of each outcome.

A relatively large revisionist non-core group living in a state pursuing a revisionist foreign policy faces a mean probability of .76 of being targeted with exclusionist policies, given that it is not primarily urban, it has a homeland, and is
culturally distant from the core group (Simulation A). In case the non-core group has no homeland, then the probability of being excluded decreases by only .03 (Simulation B); this negligible change indicates a low explanatory power that the homeland variable has independently.

--Table 4--

With all the variables at their minimum value we get a mean probability of .9 that assimilation will be the preferred strategy (Simulation C). This is consistent with the logic of the argument. It describes a non-core group that is smaller than one percent of the total population, its cultural distinctiveness is not linked to a political identity, it is either rural or nomadic, and it shares language and religion with the core group. Such a group is not a likely target of a Great power or a neighboring state that wants to undermine the host state and is equally unlikely to develop a local national movement. It will be targeted with assimilationist policies.

Setting ‘group size’ at its maximum we get a slight increase of the mean probability of assimilationist policies to .93 from .91 (Simulation D). ‘Group size’ is not as important when the distinctiveness of the non-core group is not linked to a political identity, although it does increase the incentive of the host state to pursue assimilation. Complicating the situation by setting ‘language’ to its maximum we find that assimilationist policies are still preferred but the mean probability falls to .75 (Simulation E). Although this is a significant change, this finding provides evidence against the cultural distance arguments. Setting both ‘religion’ as well as ‘language’ as different from the core group does not overthrow the effect of the other variables; assimilationist policies are still preferred with a mean probability of .52 (Simulation F).
Accommodation is the preferred strategy for non-core groups that are mobilized by a status quo rival claim, reside primarily in urban centers and are smaller than one percent of the total population with a mean probability of .91 (Simulation I). If the non-core group is larger than one percent of the total population then accommodation becomes less likely, but still has a mean probability of .77 (Simulation H). Importantly for my theory, whether a non-core group with the above characteristics resides in a revisionist or status quo state does not affect the probability of accommodation. This finding supports further my theoretical expectation that whether a state is revisionist or not should matter only with respect to revisionist non-core groups.
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Map 1. Minorities in the Balkans in the late 20th century

Dérens (2003), Available at: http://mondediplo.com/2003/08/04Derens
Map 2. Revisionist Claims in the Balkans in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century

Figure 1. Group Claims, Foreign Policy Goals & Nation-Building

Non-core group

- Rival claim
  - Status quo
    - Host State: Accommodation
    - State Choice: Assimilation
  - Revisionist
    - Revisionist
    - Status Quo
      - Host State: Exclusion
      - State Choice: Assimilation
- No Rival claim
  - Status quo
    - Host State: Accommodation
    - State Choice: Assimilation
Graph 1. Nation-Building Policies in Southeastern Europe after WWI

“0” Accommodation, “1” Assimilation, “2” Exclusion

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

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Table 3. Multinomial Logit Estimates for Nation-building Strategies in Post WWI Balkans

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Results are coefficients,\(^{33}\) Bold and Italics signify statistical significance.

Number of Obs. 86
LR Chi-Squared (22) 49.45
Prob>Chi-Sq. 0.000
Pseudo R-Sq. 0.29

\(^{33}\) They actually signify the log ratio between the Probability of Accommodation/Probability of Exclusion in the first column and the log ratio between the Probability of Assimilation/Probability of Exclusion in the second column. For example looking at whether a non-core group is revisionist or status quo we find that a one unit change decreases the log ratio of the Pr(accommodation)/Pr(exclusion) by 2.5.
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