Title: Exploring the Sources of Greek Foreign Policy Towards the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

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Exploring the Sources of Greek Foreign Policy
Towards the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

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This paper seeks to investigate and analyze the external and domestic sources of Greek Foreign Policy towards the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), especially the period between 1991 and 1995. It argues that a solely Realist approach is inadequate to fully explain the Greek decision-making calculus in withholding formal recognition of the young state under the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’. It views this Realist balance of power explanation as complementary, and it proposes, instead a composite Liberal theory of International Relations perspective that considers domestic preference formation and variation, the social-psychological dynamics behind them, and their impact on foreign policy formulation between states. After an initial brief historical review of the modern history of Balkan nationalisms in the ‘Macedonian Question’, the paper focuses on the post-1991 case of the dispute between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over its official name and state symbols. Then, a general theoretical section briefly discusses Realist, Constructivist and Liberal theories of foreign policy and applies these main theoretical propositions to the facts of the period examined, with emphasis on the ideational domestic sources influencing decision-making both for the Greek and FYROM governments. The paper argues that regardless of external factors, no Greek government could have possibly adopted an accommodating initial stance towards FYROM (and vice versa) without risking both immediate and long-term dire domestic political consequences. Finally, to explain why the overwhelming percentage of the Greek population held such an uncompromising position—and its variation—the study employs a social psychology theory that emphasizes the importance of group status. This approach strives to illuminate the nature and persistence of domestic public opinion in Greece, as well as its impact on Greek foreign policy towards FYROM, in support of a multi-causal, primarily Liberal theory of Foreign Policy.

The highly publicized recent diplomatic efforts to deal with the outstanding issue of the name dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have brought this seemingly esoteric-to-outsiders matter back into the spotlight. After a long campaign of denying any use of the term ‘Macedonia’ to avoid confusion with its northern prefecture with the same name, the Greek government is showing signs of compromise. During this current round of negotiations (Spring 2005), the FYR of Macedonia remains insistent on using the formal name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ while, amidst mixed poll results, Greece has declared its willingness to accept UN special negotiator Mathew Nimetz’s proposed term ‘Republika Makedonija-Skopje.’ This latest barrage of diplomatic activity focuses one’s attention to the issue of the external and domestic sources of foreign policy determinants in both countries, especially Greece.

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Specifically, one of the re-emerging questions involves the reasons that may have prevented past Greek governments from accepting solutions to the dispute deemed better than the ones currently on the table. Stemming from this puzzle, this paper looks at international relations’ theories, to investigate the external and domestic sources of foreign policy, and expands on the social-psychological dynamics of the domestic politics involved to explain one dimension of them.

The study unfolds in five parts. Part I offers a brief historical review of the ‘Macedonian Question’, while Part II provides a detailed account of the dispute between Greece and the FYR of Macedonia, with emphasis on the 1991-5 period. Part III briefly discusses and evaluates International Relation theories and Part IV applies these theoretical approaches to the Greek-FYROM case, arguing for the explanatory prowess of a composite Liberal theory of Foreign Policy. Part V offers an explanation of the nature and variation of ideational public preferences. It employs literature from Social Psychology (Tajfel and Turner’s theories of Social Categorization and Social Identity) and ethnic conflict (Horowitz) to provide an explanation for the dynamics behind group-level political preferences and action both for Greeks and FYR Macedonians, regarding the conflict over the disputed state symbols and name. This approach emphasizes the importance of social-psychological motives and relative group status in the Liberal-Ideational theory of domestic preference formation and its impact on the making of foreign policy. Finally, the paper concludes with a synopsis of the external and domestic factors affecting Greek foreign policy towards FYROM and a brief discussion on the application of the theoretical model to the recent developments in the dispute.

PART I: A Short History of the ‘Macedonian Question’.

As a geographical area covering 25000 sq. km in the heart of the Balkan peninsula, Macedonia is a region spread between northern Greece (51%-Aegean), South-Western Bulgaria (10% Pirin) and what used to be the People's Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Vardar). During Antiquity, Macedonia was part of the Hellenic world, and foundation of Alexander the Great’s vast empire. Later it passed on to Roman possession and subsequently transferred to the Eastern part of the Empire (Byzantium). Slavs settled in the
Balkans and into Macedonia around the 6th c. AD. Between the 9th and 12th century, Macedonia was dominated by the Bulgarians, who still claim that modern day Slavic-speaking inhabitants of Macedonia are of Bulgarian ethnic descent and speak a Bulgarian dialect. From the 12th to the 14th century, Macedonia became the centre for the medieval kingdom of Serbia. The Middle Ages witnessed the Byzantines, Bulgarians and Serbs clashing intermittently over its territories, until all three were crushed by the advance of the Ottoman Turks. Macedonia fell in 1371 and remained under Turkish rule for more than five hundred years.

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of nationalism in the 19th century made the fate of Macedonia a matter of controversy, both for the nationalist projects of expanding neighbouring states and for the competing and overlapping ethnic affinities of the local population. In 1878, as a result of a Russo-Turkish war, the whole of Macedonia was awarded to Bulgaria. This transfer of ownership was immediately revoked by the Great Powers which restored the territory back to an ailing Ottoman Empire, but has since been seen by historians as one of the prime Bulgarian geo-political goals. The ethnically mixed resident population endured the competing and often violent intentions of the outside claimants, as well as the destructive practices of its own nationalists. In 1893 the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO) was founded, opposing the partition of Macedonia and advocating the idea of autonomy. Soon a rival sentiment in favour of incorporation into Bulgaria gave rise in 1895 to an external Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, based in Sofia. Both groups clashed with Greek and Serb irregular bands and the Ottoman army, during the violent period known as the ‘Macedonian Struggle’ (1897-1908) which provoked the deployment of the first modern International Police Force. Despite their differences, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and even Albanians joined forces to expel the Ottomans from the region during the Balkan wars of 1912-13. As a result, Macedonia was partitioned, mainly between Greece and Serbia, the smaller Pirin region going to Bulgaria. After a period of occupation by Bulgaria during World War I, the Serb part (Vardar) became part of the new Yugoslav kingdom in 1918, and Serbian was made the official language. As a reaction to harsh centralizing practices of Belgrade-which administered Vardar as South Serbia-Slavic Macedonian autonomists turned to Bolshevik Communist ideology, the only proponent of a unitary, nationally distinct Macedonia.
1934 Stalin was the first to proclaim Macedonians as a distinct nation. During World War II, Yugoslav Communists under Tito pledged to create a united Macedonia (Egei, Vardar and Pirin) as part of a future Communist Federation of Balkan People. Allying itself with the Axis powers, Bulgaria again occupied Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia, but after defeat in 1945 it reluctantly complied with Yugoslav Communist grand plans for the Balkans. Both Yugoslav and Bulgarian communists interfered in the Greek civil war (1944-49) on the Greek communist side, which eventually found itself fighting for a united Communist Macedonia. The defeat of Greek Communists and the deterioration of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations after the Tito-Stalin rift in 1948 (which nullified the secret agreement between the two for Pirin’s eventual incorporation into Yugoslavia) left the project for a distinct and unitary Macedonian nation solely on Yugoslav hands. Tito’s regime began to consolidate a distinct Macedonian identity, partly as a counter to pro-Bulgarian sentiments. An official national language was introduced, a history tracing Yugoslav Macedonian roots all the way back to Alexander was written and, official Yugoslav state atheism notwithstanding, the republic was even vested with its own national church (1967). Despite this vast project of national identity-building, a large Albanian minority and a smaller Turkish and Gypsy ones maintained their own identities, languages and cultural traditions. At the same time, Cold War politics and the delicate balances surrounding non-aligned Yugoslavia ensured that the construction of a Yugoslav-Macedonian national identity went on uninterrupted, despite the somewhat muted Bulgarian and Greek protests. The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia grew strong enough to survive even its nation-building architect’s death (Tito-1980) and the gradual demise of its political incubator (Yugoslavia) during the 80’s.

PART II: The dispute between FYR of Macedonia and Greece from 1991 onwards.

With the withering away of the old political structure in late 1990, the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia held its first multiparty elections. Within a year (September 1991) it became an

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* The “People’s Republic of Macedonia” was established by Tito in 1944 as a constituent part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The goal of Macedonian unification was clearly stated in the manifesto of the Macedonian Partizan Organization (ASNOM): “In view of the centuries-old ideals of the people of Macedonia, the first Macedonian national council proclaims to the entire world its just and resolute aspiration for the unification of the whole Macedonian people on the principle based on the right to self-determination. This would put an end to the oppression of the people of Macedonia in all its parts and would provide conditions for genuine solidarity and peace among the Balkan peoples”.

† The electoral results confirmed a fragile political balance. The main nationalist party, calling itself VMRO (Democratic Party for National Unity) gained a plurality; ex-communists came second, but managed to form a coalition government supported by two new
independent state, inheriting the Republic’s borders and an ethnically diverse population body of 2 million (65% Slavs, 21% Albanians, 4.8% Turks, 2.7% Gypsies and 2.2% Serbs). It was the only former republic to be spared of blood and violence during separation, but profound and immediate domestic and international dangers threatened to make its future extremely precarious.

Domestically, it faced the problem of a territorially concentrated ethnic Albanian minority, and its demands for formal recognition as a nationality with extensive autonomy rights. It also faced a dire economic situation as a result of a naturally poor economy, almost non-existent infrastructure and the flaring war in Yugoslavia. Internationally, in the eyes of many regional players, the collapse of the Yugoslav federation turned the Balkan clock at least back to 1945 (if not 1912-13) putting the issue high on their agenda. Besides a politically unstable Albania with an unpredictable foreign policy towards its ethnic minorities abroad (its national assembly had already recognized Albanian Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state) adjacent to the ethnically Albanian western part of the country, the new state bordered the unfriendly rump Yugoslavia (which withheld recognition until 2001, prompting the deployment of UNPROFOR peacekeepers in 1992 along the border with Kosovo), and an unreliable Bulgaria (among the first to recognize the new state but only as a people-not a nation-claiming it belonged to the Bulgarian cultural space). A final neighbour was Greece, which, despite widely believed not to have any real claims (e.g. territory, or national minorities) raised grave obstacles in the early years of the young state’s existence.

The following section chronicles the dispute between Greece and FYR of Macedonia over the latter’s official name and state symbols, with emphasis on the 1991-5 phase. For a conceptually clearer narrative of this period it adopts the nomenclature of the stages of a foreign policy crisis.

Onset

Soon after independence (September 8, 1991), the government of formerly Yugoslav Macedonia drafted a constitution and actively sought international recognition, critical for its admission the international organizations (UN, IMF, OSCE, etc.) that could substitute for

ethnic Albanian parties. The presidency remained in the skilful hands of veteran Yugoslav politician Kiro Gligorov.

† By the end of the year foreign trade was down by 60%, a third of the workforce was unemployed and the inflation figure was at 86% per month—a mind-blowing annual (1992) consumer price percentage change of 1,691%. (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Annual report/FYR of Macedonia).

the old Yugoslav protective umbrella and provide security, legitimacy and economic assistance. The conditions under which the new state sought this acceptance were deemed unacceptable for Greece, which actively tried to prevent any such international recognition.

More specifically, the very name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ could be seen as suggestive of territorial pretensions against Greek Aegean Macedonia. The Macedonian Struggle, the Balkan wars, the bitter civil war with its territorial implications, the post-war Macedonian nation-building with what was seen as the falsification of ancient Greek history, were all considered serious issues for many Greeks. The nationalist platform of unification of all parts, under which many parties had run during the 1990 former Yugoslav-Macedonian elections (including the VMRO, whose name was reminiscent of a sinister past) was cause for further alarm. During that campaign, maps showing a unified Macedonia with the Aegean part incorporated into Republika Makedonska circulated widely, and politicians, especially from the VMRO toyed with irredentist ideas. More cause for Greek suspicion came from the constitution (some parts of which alluded to territorial re-unification†), and later by the adoption of the same gold “Vergina” star—the ancient emblem of Alexander’s Macedonian dynasty found on Greek soil and widely regarded as a significant part of Greek cultural and historical heritage-on the new state’s flag.

The conservative Nea Democratia party in power enjoyed a razor-thin 152 seat-majority in the 300-seat Greek parliament and found itself possessing minimal political capital for flexibility towards such a sensitive and publicly followed issue. It also found itself internally divided, a rift showcased by the difference of style and substance between the

* During a 1991 interview, its leader, Ljupce Georgijevski stated that “Some 250,000 Macedonians live in Greece, and 51% of Macedonia's territory lies there. A United Macedonia has long been the dream of Macedonians. It was the goal of our struggle in World War II. We want to achieve this unity peacefully, within the unification process in Europe, when borders become insignificant.”

† The opening paragraph of the Constitution of Macedonia read: “Taking as the points of departure the historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom as well as the creation of their own state, and particularly the traditions of statehood and legacy of the Krusevo Republic and the historic decisions of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the People's Liberation of Macedonia [ASNOM], together with the constitutional and legal continuity of the Macedonian state as a sovereign republic within Federal Yugoslavia [...], the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia adopts...” Particularly disturbing for Greece was the reference to the ASNOM decisions [see ASNOM Manifesto footnote] that specifically proclaimed the aspiration for Macedonian unification and liberation from oppression. Moreover, there were two more alarming points, in Articles 3 and 49, respectively.

Article 3 stated: “The territory of the Republic of Macedonia is indivisible and inviolable. The existing borders of the Republic of Macedonia are inviolable. The borders of the Republic of Macedonia may be changed only in accordance with the constitution.”

Article 49 stated: “The Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighboring parties, as well as the Macedonian expatriates, assists their cultural development and promotes links with them. The Republic cares for the cultural, economic and social rights of the citizens of the Republic abroad.”

Of the above paragraphs, the third clause of Article 3 (territorial changes allowable in tandem with constitution) and the first of Article 49 (care and assistance of Macedonians of neighboring countries) appeared particularly inflammatory for their irredentist overtones.
popular hard-line foreign minister, Antonis Samaras, and the more moderate and pragmatic Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis. The former’s dismissal from his post in April 1992 for displaying a nationalist hard line deepened that division which a little over a year later would bring down the latter’s government. But for the time being, the conservative Greek government moved to deny recognition to its new neighbour under such official name and national symbols. One measure adopted was the temporary month-long apparent ban of petrol imports from the Greek port of Salonica. Overall, this tactic produced moderate results in inducing the new state only to make some amendments in its constitution.

However, during EU summits throughout 1992, Greece succeeded in the passing of unanimous EU decisions not to proceed with recognition under any name bearing the term ‘Macedonia’. By the end of the year, only Turkey, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Russia, the Philippines and Lithuania did so. Even when the Greek government displayed some flexibility and consented to the United Nations admitting the new state in the spring of 1993, it was under the peculiar name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) and without a flag. Despite these initial diplomatic ‘successes’, time was not on Greece’s side, as any prolonged dispute over FYROM’s status risked further destabilizing the region and, in light of the greater picture in the Balkans, Greek intransigence was not tolerated by NATO and EU allies for long.

The Greek government also faced internal pressure for the quick and favourable resolution of the dispute. It would not be an exaggeration to state that during that period, the Greek public went on a state of mass nationalist hysteria over the Macedonian issue. The Greek “Vergina Star” emblem began appearing everywhere from coins and stamps to airport logos. Salonica’s ‘Mikra’ airport was renamed ‘Makedonia’ and unprecedented million

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* The stance had been agreed during the Ministers’ council in late 1992 and the extraordinary council of parliamentary political leaders in April 1992.

† The following amendments to the Constitution of ‘Република Македонска’ came into force on the day they were promulgated, on Jan. 6, 1992:

Amendment I: 1. The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial pretensions towards any neighboring state. 2. The borders of the Republic of Macedonia can only be changed with the constitution and on the principle of free will, as well as in accordance with generally accepted international norms. 3. Clause 1. of this Amendment is an Addendum to Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. Clause 2. replaces paragraph 2 of the same article.

Amendment II: 1. In the exercise of this concern the republic will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states on their internal affairs. 2. This Amendment is an Addendum to Paragraph 1 or Article 49 of the Constitution of Macedonia.

These amendments did not completely remove Greek fears. Suspicion and doubt remained in what was meant by territorial change in accordance with Constitution, free will and “generally accepted international norms.” Also, if not interfering in other states’ affairs, how would FYROM exercise its concern over brethren (a controversial issue for Greece and Bulgaria) abroad?

‡ Nicolaidis, quoting Woodward in the introduction of The Greek Paradox, Allison, G. T. and Nicolaidis, K. (eds.)
people-strong rallies took place in both Athens and Salonica to protest, the theft of names, symbols and history of Greece.\textsuperscript{32} Given domestic sentiments, any attempts from the Greek government to compromise could be perceived as national treason. Similarly, any compromise from the FYR Macedonian side could constitute national suicide, since the symbols of the new state were used to promote a sense of a distinct, positive, unifying national identity or at least preserve a fragile ethnic balance; their abolition could help precipitate the opposite effects. The name dispute was monitored closely by the ethnic Albanian minority that would prefer a neutral geographical term in its quest to achieve national and linguistic parity with the Slav majority.\textsuperscript{33} At the other end of the political spectrum, hard-line Slav-Macedonian nationalists dismissed even minor government concessions in the constitution. In April 1993, the ruling coalition narrowly escaped a VMRO no-confidence motion, gaining 62 out of 120 votes.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, domestic political considerations forced a maximalist posture for FYROM’s government. Greek diplomacy suffered a similar hard-line turn when disagreement within the Conservative Party on how to deal with the deteriorating course of events brought down the government. Samaras and close to a dozen conservative MPs resigned the party’s parliamentary ranks to protest the handling of the Macedonian issue and the privatization of the telecommunications sector, formed a new party, \textit{Politiki Anoexi} (POLAN), and brought down the government. The subsequent October 10, 1993 elections gave the Socialist party PASOK 47\% and 170 seats, \textit{Nea Democratia} 39\% and 111 seats, and POLAN 5\% and 10 seats. Acting on an election promise, the once and again premier Andreas Papandreou threatened FYROM with closure of their common border and soon after withdrew from bilateral talks. The small state remained defiant, especially in the light of recognition by EU members (like France, Germany, Italy, the UK) breaking from common policy (December ‘93) and the prospects of a \textit{fait accompli} against Greece.

Escalation
The final blow to Greek diplomacy came with FYROM’s recognition by the United States on February 3, 1994,\textsuperscript{35} followed by Australia and the news that IMF and the World Bank were extending it stabilizing credits (weakening the Greek negotiating position).\textsuperscript{36} While not unanimous within PASOK government’s ranks, its response was swift and resolute. On February 16, 1994 Greece imposed a total economic embargo against FYROM.\textsuperscript{37} Specifically
the government in Athens denied access to the port of Salonica for any commercial activity, except for humanitarian supplies, closed its consulate in Skopje, prohibited the import of FYR Macedonian goods and, under huge domestic pressure, extended the blockade to all customs points. Already in a bad shape, FYROM’s economy was sent into a nosedive, while domestic social and inter-ethnic tensions increased.

International reaction was not favourable to Greek actions. The EU Commission threatened and eventually took legal action against Greece at the European Court of Justice and individual countries expressed their concern. Meanwhile, while both adversaries declared they welcome dialogue to end the dispute—UN mediator Cyrus Vance initiated diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation—domestic political considerations ensured that a resolution would not be forthcoming quickly. Both Greece and FYROM had scheduled municipal and general elections respectively, for the fall of 1994 and none of the governments wanted to appear backing down or giving in to the other side.

Especially in FYR Macedonia, domestic politics prevented President Gligorov’s coalition government from conciliatory action for fear of losing support to nationalist opposition. Moreover, the Constitution required two-thirds majority vote in parliament for any change to it or the flag, and the moderate forces did not possess it. At the same time, the embargo kept eroding the economy at a cost of US$70 million per month, increasing manifold transportation costs for rerouted trade and forcing the closing of most heavy industries. By official estimates, unemployment reached 40% and inflation skyrocketed to 70%, where it was stabilized only by a range of severe monetary and fiscal policies with potentially explosive implications for rising social and ethnic discontent. These were trying times for FYROM but some diplomatic and financial support kept trickling down to enable its government to refuse to move on the dispute. The EU provided small scale funding, the US continued to signal its support, and the IMF prepared a stand-by loan. As the stalemate continued, a diplomatic phoney war of sorts ensued.

During the fall of 1994, political developments in both countries pushed towards a resolution of the crisis. The results of a long-promised census during the summer tallied

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39 Assessment by Michel Noel, World Bank division chief.
40 Greece was accused of violating common EU trade policy laws, and invoked political reasons in its defense. In mid-1994, the EU Court rejected the request for an interim injunction to force Greece to lift the embargo; the case was dropped altogether after the 1995 interim accord.
ethnic Albanians at 22.9%, just short of the required 25% for qualifying as a ‘constituent nation’ status—a disappointing result disputed by many Albanians that promised to accelerate the radicalization of FYROM domestic politics.⁴⁴ The general elections, boycotted in the second round by the ultra-nationalist VMRO, gave a sweeping victory to the ruling coalition, and enough seats to enact changes to the constitution and national symbols. President Gligorov was re-elected president with 77%, and acquired fresh political capital.⁴⁵ In Greece, opposition gains were partially interpreted as the voters’ disapproval for the hard-line stance of the government, and hinted at some public fatigue after a period of intense display of patriotic sentiments.⁴⁶

Developments in the international scene also pressed for a settlement. The situation in Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia was deteriorating rapidly, and NATO—the executive hand most poised to actively intervene—welcome one less regional trouble spot. The US intensified its efforts in 1995 through carrot-and-stick diplomacy, rigorously pushing for some resolution. All these factors led to the resumption of unofficial negotiations in New York over the flag, constitution and name disputes. The escalation of the crisis in Krajna and Bosnia may have also provided an accelerant for the two sides themselves to seek some resolution in their dispute.

De-escalation
On September 13, 1995 in New York the two states concluded an interim accord that settled the matters of the flag and the constitution.⁴⁷ FYR Macedonia agreed to cease to use in any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag, and replaced the 16-point gold Vergina star with an 8-point yellow sun. It also pledged to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Greece. Finally, it made clarifying statements as to the peaceful and international law-abiding nature of its constitution.⁴⁸ In turn Greece recognized FYROM’s independence under the provisional name. It lifted the 19-month economic embargo, ended its veto on its neighbour’s applications to join international organizations, and pledged peaceful regional co-operation and friendship.⁴⁹ The more thorny issue of the name was left to be dealt with in the future, and since it was invested with so much importance for FYROM and Greece, both sides appeared aware of the fact that it could take quite some time to resolve.
Impact

The newly established friendly relation between the two states allowed for economic and military cooperation and enough bilateral peace of mind to turn their focus to more substantial problems. But, times after the interim accord proved more trying for FYR Macedonia than Greece.

Greece’s general gradual policy re-orientation (personified by the PASOK government’s new Prime Minister Costas Simitis, who succeeded the deceased Papandreou) ended its diplomatic isolation, and allowed for its political rehabilitation in the EU and a smoother course-and treatment in the negotiations-for joining the European Monetary Union. More importantly, Greece gradually reclaimed its role as a factor of stability in the Balkans, and directed its diplomatic attention to outstanding issues with Turkey that promised significant fluctuation in intensity in the years that followed (e.g. see the Aegean Seabed Imia/Kardak islet crisis in early 1996, the Cyprus SS-300 missiles deployment crisis, 1998, the Ocalan arrest in 1999, the withdrawal of objections to Turkish EU membership (Helsinki, 2001), and the road to Greek-Cypriot EU ascension in 2004). The name dispute lingered on, and time seems to have worked against Greece. Common referral to FYROM as ‘Macedonia’ by many countries and international news organizations has lead to a de facto acceptance of its legitimacy, and numerous countries (more recently, the United States, to help prop up FYROM government’s chances of defeating a potentially destabilizing ethnic referendum) have officially recognized it as the ‘Republic of Macedonia’. Domestic critics point that Greece’s current willingness to accept negotiating terms worse than the proposals put forth to it in 1992, and FYROM government’s intractability on the issue amount to a significant diplomatic failure.

Indeed, the current FYROM government estimates it can prevail on the name issue. Despite registering initial dissatisfaction about the reached compromise the interim agreement was eventually recognized as very beneficial for FYROM’s economy, international legitimacy and sense of security. FYR Macedonia purchased valuable time in the name dispute towards de facto international acceptance, and had more freedom to concentrate on brewing domestic ethnic unrest. In early 2001 it came perilously close to ethnic civil war between the

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* Synopsis of recent political history compiled from BBC on line, Economist Intelligence Unit-Country Profiles, Macedonian (Greek) News Agency. Also, selected International Crisis Group reports (2004-5) on Kosovo and FYR Macedonia: ICG Europe Reports No 155, 161 (Kosovo), Europe Briefing/Skopje/Brussels, 3 August 2004, Europe Briefing No 37/25 February 2005 (Macedonia).
† This was one of the theories explaining the assassination attempt against Gligorov in October 1995.
government and ethnic Albanian irregulars, following the spill-over effects of the nearby war in Kosovo. The war-averting Ohrid peace agreement stipulated the surrender of Albanian weapons in return for greater recognition and autonomy, while NATO soldiers deployed to police the accord. Later that year, in an effort to forestall ethnic Albanian alienation and radicalization, constitutional changes gave the Albanian minority more rights, as did a census in the following years that certified their status as a national minority. In late 2004 another crisis was averted when a hard-line Slav-Macedonian opposition-driven referendum failed to reverse new municipal restructuring laws creating municipalities with Albanian majorities in local affairs.

The persistent tense ethnic situation between Slav and ethnic Albanian Macedonians further complicates the name dispute. Ethnic Albanians continue to proclaim their nationalism and fly Albanian flags over some municipalities and universities and the leader of one of the two ethnic Albanian parties recently stated that “the name of FYROM must reflect the post-Ochrid character of the state.” At the same time, the state’s economic performance remains poor, with high unemployment rates and rampant corruption. These signs, together with domestic political fragility—like the resignation (late 2004) of Prime Minister Kostof, after citing obstruction in the government’s work by the Albanian ally of the government, and accusing it of promoting its own Albanian agenda--hint that FYR Macedonia’s future may still not be entirely secure. More so, given the yet unknown fate of the great catalyst for the domestic ethnic stability of the country and the region—Kosovo’s final status. Under such volatile domestic and near abroad conditions, the current leadership of FYROM appears adamant in its unwillingness to negotiate the name issue with Greece.

PART III: International Relations Theories and Foreign Policy-Making

On a theoretical level, how do International Relations approaches to foreign policy formation account for the intensity and duration of the dispute between Greece and FYR of Macedonia—especially Greece’s strategically costly intransigence? The usual suspects

* With demands ranging from requests for greater rights to outright independence, some in the 25% strong ethnic Albanian minority took up arms, and only active EU and NATO mediation together with rigorous government overtures (that invited the two ethnic Albanian parties to participate in the government) halted the descend into war.
are Realism and its variants (to which I would include Institutionalism), Constructivist strands and Liberalism. Before applying them to the specific case study, this section presents a synopsis of these schools of thought, and their ontological and epistemological strengths and weaknesses in explaining foreign policy behavior of states in general.

**Realism(s)**

For ‘structural’ Realism (Waltz, 1979), the distribution of capabilities (power) within a system is the key variable in explaining state behavior. States are considered the most important actors in IR, and they are seen as rational, unitary actors trying to maximize their power (‘offensive’ Realism-Mearsheimer, 2001), or security (‘defensive’ Realism-Posen, Walt, 1987) in order to protect their interests amidst an anarchic international system. More recent strands (‘neo-classical’ Realism-Zakaria, 1998, Snyder, Chistensen) posit that states (their governments) seek instead to maximize utility and that systemic variables are filtered through domestic variables. The notion of balance of power (Waltz), threats (Walt) or interests (Schweller, 1998) to avoid the dominance of the system by a single state is a central tenet of Realist theory.\(^{53}\) It is associated with another basic tenet of Realism-the security dilemma (state A’s defensive preparations increase insecurity in state B and threaten to disrupt the balance of power or threat, which induces B to increase its own security for fear of being dominated, which, in turn, may trigger a downward spiral of action-reaction).

The variants of Realist school of thought (power vs. interests, or unitary state vs. government, relative vs. absolute gains) have exposed it to a series of academic debates and to accusations it is a degenerative scientific research program (Vasquez, 1997) pointing that it is unable without serious mutations of its basic principles to explain political change and complexity, especially of the post-Cold War era. The most serious critique leveled against Realism(s) is that it continues to treat the state mostly as a black box, [and when it does not-e.g. Zakaria-then it is not Realism, as Legro and Moravcsik (1999) argue] and, that its pure unit-level explanations cannot account for different behavior of similar states or, for different behavior of the same state over time.

Institutionalism (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Haggard and Simmons, 1987) also accepts most of Realism’s core assumptions (states as primary actors, rationalist and self-interest). Hence, while it introduces the variable of institutions as affecting power,
interest and knowledge and as a means to reduce transaction costs and improve the information environment, making regime formation and cooperation possible, it suffers from the same class of criticism directed against Realism-the state as a unitary actor.

**Constructivism**

One effort to unlock the black box of the state is by the latest theoretical framework in the field of International Relations. Constructivism’s ‘neo-classical’ (Hass, 1990; Finnemore, 1996) and ‘naturalistic’ (Wendt, 1992, 1999) strands [as opposed to the post-positivist, deconstructionist ‘post-modern’/’critical’ one (Walker, 1993) that lies outside the realm of duplicable scientific research] move away from materialist theories into an ideational ontology.⁶ They assert that human interaction is shaped not simply by material, but also by ideational factors, the most important of which are widely shared inter-subjective beliefs not reducible to individuals, which result in the construction of interests and identities of the actors (2001 Katzenstein, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink). Social context (ideas and norms) gives meaning to material structure (Checkel, 1998) and there exists a process of mutual interaction and construction (a difficult concept to operationalize) between agents and structures, thus, attempting to open up the black box of identity formation and interests.⁷ Wendt’s systemic Constructivism emphasizes the impact of the international environment, whereas scholars like Katzenstein and Risse-Kappen focus on local/domestic influences, and on identity as a domestic attribute arising from national ideologies of collective distinctiveness which, in turn, shape state policy.⁸ This strand of Constructivism closely approximates a Liberalism of the impact of domestic preferences, but is not yet fully developed, especially in explaining their variation between, or origins within states. Overall, Constructivism offers a framework of operation of social interactions during which agents and structure are mutually constituted, but not

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⁷ One note of distinction here between IR and Comparative Politics Constructivists, pointed out by Finnemore (1996): IR theorists argue that identity is a matter of construction and not of individual choice, whereas Comparativists argue that actors have a choice in shaping their identities even as they appear natural to them]. Still, the concept of identity is [insufficiently] not [clarified] enough [by Constructivists.]

⁸ A recent article offers more promise in exploring domestic Constructivism, in the context of institutional change in the EU: “...Members of the political elite make choices on European political integration on the basis of their identities [...] and political elites engaged in political competition adjust their stance [...] to what they perceive are the preferences of their potential voters. [...] ‘political elites try to promote ideas (including identity constructions) with an eye on gaining power or remaining in government.’[...] Political elites are constrained by public opinion, but the latter is malleable to the discourses propagated by the former...”
a theory to explain how or why groups and agents’ preferences and nature of structures arise and vary.*

Descending the level of analysis ladder, two further candidates for explaining foreign policy behavior on a group, or individual level are bureaucratic politics and the political psychology of leaders. The bureaucratic politics’ approach may have opened up a new avenue of understanding foreign policy decision-making on a sub-state level (Allison, 1971/1999; Rhodes, 1994) but suffers from the disadvantage of being too static (e.g. it cannot account for dramatic change) and from the same constrains of organizational theory from which it derives its main premises. Political Psychology’s focus on perceptions and misperception (Jervis, 1976/1985), groupthink (Janis, 1972) and cognitive biases (Vertzberger, 1990) has also provided new insights on the decision-making process of leaders and elites, but fails to account for the interests of groups larger than the immediate circle of leadership.

Liberalism

For the most comprehensive, encompassing and nuanced theory of a state’s foreign policy behavior, this study argues one must turn to Liberalism. The core assumptions of Liberal theory [meticulously articulated by Moravcsik (1997)] are (i) the primacy of social actors (individuals as well as private groups), (ii) the nature of states not as actors but as political institutions representing subsets of domestic society and defining state preferences based on societal interests (the ‘functional differentiation’ of states), and (iii) the configuration of independent state preferences as the determinant of state behavior. Liberalism comes in three variants, depending on the impact of domestic factors on state behavior: ‘Republican’ (the Democratic Peace thesis of the impact of domestic representation-e.g. Russett, 1993; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1997), ‘Commercial’ (the impact of individuals’ transactional gains or losses-e.g. Keohane and Milner, 1996), and Ideational (the impact of collective social values). The ideational variant of Liberalism which is of interest in this study views the configuration of domestic social identities and values as a basic determinant of state preferences.†

* In the critiques against Constructivism one can add in its disproportional causal emphasis on structure as opposed to agency, and rejection of methodological individualism.

† The degree of importance for social/national identities and values is illustrated by the massive expense of political capital by successive Greek governments expend so much political capital on such a symbolic issue.
(the economy), the commitment of individuals or groups to particular political institutions (the regime), and the scope of the nation (the polity). This premise (endogeneity of ideational preferences) is similar to liberal Constructivism, but in addition, Liberalism adds a dynamic element by proposing the degree of cooperation or conflict between the two states is variable according to the degree of compatibility on national preferences between these societal forces. Critics have accused Liberalism of reductionism, or conversely of being too broad. Still, a broad liberal theory of varied preferences understanding state foreign policy as a function of societal context, and introducing domestic conflict as a determinant of sub-optimal policy outcomes allows for greater explanatory power. Liberal theorists best unpack the black box of the hitherto unitary state actor, and convincingly argue that definition of preferences and their variability precedes any fight (Realism), bargain (Institutionalism) or debate (Constructivism).

PART IV: IR Theory Application to Foreign Policies over the Macedonian name dispute

Realist theories would explain Greece’s hostile foreign policy towards FYR of Macedonia in terms of a threat to material resources (potential irredentism and threat against Aegean Macedonian territory). Nevertheless, despite some obvious signs of irredentist propaganda early in the political life of FYROM (especially by the VMRO party), the overwhelming military disparity between EU and NATO member Greece and the extremely poor, ill-equipped neighbor to its North West quickly dispels such arguments, even if such ultra-nationalist tendencies prevailed politically in FYROM. Turned on its head, the fact of FYR Macedonia’s structural, military and political weakness could classify it as a weak or failing state, from which irregular and/or criminal forces could pour into Greece, posing a different kind of security threat. More plausible as an argument, still, such an assessment would call for Greece’s concerted efforts to stabilize the new state (going beyond its guarantees, bulwark against repeated proposals by Milosevic to carve FYROM up, and economic assistance to allow for and support its admission to international security and financial organizations on a permanent basis). Another argument in support of a Realist diagnosis and prescription of foreign policy is the question of a changing regional balance of power. While FYROM by itself could not
pose a threat, it was perceived as contributing another piece to the mosaic of the changing configuration of unfriendly neighbours. Turkey was among the first two states recognizing ‘Macedonia’ in early 1992, and prominent politicians like Samaras (his plans for an Orthodox alliance against a perceived Islamic threat in the Balkans) and Papandreou (“…Greece must not betray Serbia […] its defeat would deprive Greece of a natural ally upgrading the role of Turkey and the West in the Balkans”) voiced such beliefs, widely publicized and occasionally sensationalized in the Greek Press at the time.\(^5\) Still, this argument also poses the question of whether befriending instead of alienating the new state (and forcing it into the arms of Greek regional adversaries) wouldn’t serve Greece’s geo-strategic balance of power objectives better, given the largely-shared affinity of the orthodox religion between the two states, and the utility of FYROM as a buffer against a potential Southward spread of the Yugoslav wars. Moreover, such a perspective is problematic, given the negative impact of Greek foreign policy on a greater balance of power level-that of the European Union, where Greece found itself isolated because of its increasingly intransigent policy (especially after the 1994 embargo and the Commission’s legal case against it).

Realism is successful in offering a plausible explanation for the external involvement of the US as a mediator, and its exerted pressure aimed at stabilizing one flank of the Balkan war theater. Also, some merit is deserved for a Realpolitik calculation of Greece’s settling the FYROM dispute to concentrate on more pressing issues. But these reasons do not explain why the Greek government accepted only an Interim Accord that excluded settlement over the name.\(^*\) Equally important, Realist approaches fall short of fully explaining Greece’s foreign policy (and FYROM’s, for that matter) because they fail to account for the non-monolithic character of the state and the impact of internal economic, political and social changes in public preferences and elite policies.\(^†\)

Institutionalism offers a less convincing explanation of Greece’s foreign policy towards FYROM. Initially Greece sought and received the support of the EU for its foreign policy...
positions, but a year into the dispute individual members deviated from a common course agreed during the summer 1992 Portugal EU summit, and as the diplomatic tide turned against Greece it found itself in opposition (eventually litigious) with other EU members and the European Commission. Institutional norms, rules and rising costs in the form of penalties did not prohibit or deter Greece from pursuing its own policy regarding the name dispute.

On the subject of international norms and culture, as far as interstate interactions are concerned, Systemic Constructivist explanations suffer from the above type of criticism, as well as from the lack of a theory of agency to explain systemic social construction of foreign policy. While it could address the deficit of Realism in accounting for the disproportional sense of security threat that FYROM posed to Greece (with emphasis in the social rather than material relationships between them) Far more promising in its explanatory power is the domestic (or Liberal) Constructivist premise of Greek government policy towards FYROM as one influenced by domestic social groups’ identities and values. Attention to the impact of domestic preferences is important, and in that respect domestic Constructivism is almost interchangeable with Ideational Liberalism’s emphasis on the social ‘embeddedness’ (to use Ruggie’s term) of regimes, and on the prominent role of elements of social identity in preference formation. As Moravcsik notes, ideational Liberalism is agnostic to the origins of social identities and whether they reflect material or ideational factors, or both. The difference between them is that the Constructivist approach does not go as far enough as to offer a theory that could explain the variation and intensity of the Greek public’s collective preferences, or their emergence in the first place. In contrast, Liberalism proposes a theory-- the foreign policies in the relations between two states are determined by the degree of compatibility or lack thereof in social preferences over fundamentally collective goods, like the FYROM state symbols and names.

Bureaucratic politics and the study of leaders offer an insight into the dynamics of individual decision-making in the Greek-FYROM dispute, but do not account for dynamics beyond the individual or small group level of analysis. Another deficit in a leadership psychological explanation is the case fact that, while the styles and personalities Mitsotakis and Simitis were indeed more pragmatic and moderate (therefore
more prone to accommodation) than Andreas Papandreou’s more ideologically-driven leadership, still the interim agreement with FYROM was signed by the latter’s government before Simitis came to power.∗

On the whole, this study finds the republican (domestic power politics) and ideational (domestic preferences for national values and their political impact) variants of Liberal theory of IR most convincing in explaining Greek and FYR Macedonian foreign policies. Republican Liberalism accounts for the ways in which domestic institutions translate social and economic preferences into official policies, and examines the strategies which political groups, administrators, bureaucrats and societal groups employ to win office in liberal democracies. Whereas it is mostly associated with the normative and institutional strains of the ‘Democratic Peace’ thesis, the general argument can be employed to explain suboptimal policy outcomes by way of domestic conflict related to democratic governance power politics. In other words, domestic political constrains, like electoral considerations or parliamentary majorities and balances can constrain governments’ policy options. This is amply evident in the case of the name dispute, both with Greece and FYROM, where Domestic political considerations (parliamentary majorities, electoral calculations and public opinion) played a major part in the foreign policy calculus. Mitsotakis’ marginal parliamentary majority proscribed much maneuverability in negotiations regarding the name-as not all of his MP’s, especially those from the prefecture of Macedonia would accept it-and eventually led to the demise of his government. A similarly precarious balance of power in the FYR Macedonian parliament prevented-or, as some may argue, shielded-Gligorov from any generous overture to Greece at least until the 1994 elections.†

While domestic power politics arguably played a significant part in shaping the parameters of Mitsotakis government’s foreign policy and precipitated its fall, its electoral defeat in the subsequent elections indicates the role and influence of the public preferences (in favor of a more hard line political platform). After a 47% of the popular vote in 1990 (versus 39% of PASOK), these percentages were virtually reversed in the

∗ Papandreou’s leadership style could offer at least a commentary on his uncompromising stance and embargo (or his ailing health and the resulting circumscribed investment in his personal foreign diplomacy). For a discussion on Prime Ministerial leadership styles and personality see forthcoming article by Steinberg, B. in Political Psychology 26 (4), October 2005.
† However, a comfortable majority margin alone does not explain Papandreou government’s continuing and even hardening an already uncompromising stance, given its 170 MP’s in the 1993 parliament.
results of 1993 (with the 5% received by POL.AN overwhelmingly due to support by disaffected Nea Democratia voters).\textsuperscript{57} Adding up the numbers, both in parliament and among the public, points to bipartisan, widespread support for a harder line in Greek foreign policy against FYROM. It derived from a mobilized, overzealous Greek public, persistently unyielding over Macedonia-related aspects of its values (like the name ‘Macedonia’ and symbols like the Vergina star). Scholars and politicians alike agree that strong public sentiments over symbolic issues of national identity played a constraining role in the negotiating positions available between the decision-makers of the two sides. For example, Couloumbis points that “unfortunately the leaders [of both countries] were oversensitive to domestic considerations and rejected compromises put forward by Pinheiro, Vance and others.”\textsuperscript{58} During a recent interview, current FYROM Prime Minister Crvenkovski’s insists that “this matter [of the name] is important for the national identity of my country […] some in my country might take a pro-Greek position, but I would like to know who-regardless of their rank-could announce something like that to the people.”\textsuperscript{59} Zachariadis argues that

“…any hint by the Greek government that it could accept a designation including the term ‘Macedonia’ was bound to be viewed domestically as a capitulation”, “…Greek public opinion served as a constrain limiting the PM’s room for diplomatic maneuvering” and that “while Mitsotakis fired Samaras, perhaps out of deference to public opinion he maintained Samaras’ uncompromising position.”\textsuperscript{60}

At the same time it must also be noted that such domestic preferences were themselves prone to exploitation and inflammation, especially by populist political elites and their opportunistic or nationalist demagogy (like Samaras in 1992 and Papandreou in 1993), and a sensationalist press and mass media (certainly the case with many Greek newspapers in early 1990’s).\textsuperscript{*} National policies and official propaganda (like the Mitsotakis government campaign to promote a political message of the ‘Greekness’ of Macedonian heritage, under the guise of tourist posters and National Organization of Tourism brochures) also served to fuel (or further solidify) such preferences. Thus, domestic preferences in Greece over national symbols provided a fertile ground for the formulation of respectively uncompromising foreign policy positions, by constraining or

\textsuperscript{*} During a recent interview with two seasoned members of the Greek diplomatic service, an unfavorable view of the Greek press’s continuing role in sensationalizing the issue, keeping the public roused and obstructing the chances of a compromise was strongly expressed to the author. Consequently, there was a prevailing sense of pessimism in their assessment of Greece’s current (2005) chances for a ‘successful’ resolution.
empowering political actors. The same can be said for the domestic sources of FYROM’s foreign policy positions, with the resulting foreign policies in the two countries yielding a configuration of opposite views, diplomatic intransigence and protracted conflict.

To recapitalize, the composite argument for a republican-ideational Liberal theory explaining the foreign policy of Greece and FYR of Macedonia is as follows:

1. Domestic power politics and societal preferences (reflected in public opinion) are important in influencing and constraining foreign policy.

2. Social preferences can be ideational as well as material, pertaining to national values, symbols and identity.

3. The degree of compatibility between comparative domestic preferences (reflected in respective foreign policies) determines the relationship (and its variability) between states. Greece and FYROM domestic preferences on symbolic values of national identity had been diametrically opposed for most of the dispute’s duration.

PART V: Social-Psychological Group Dynamics

The above argument raises the question of foundations, intensity and duration for such social preferences. Why do agents and groups’ interests and ideational preferences form and how do they change? While public opinions can certainly be malleable to produce spikes in poll results, political demagoguery or a sensationalist press rarely cater to thin air; instead they tap on existing beliefs. A fundamental core of beliefs within the Greek public that favored the support of an uncompromising stance (as well as a worldwide Greek Diaspora which displayed patriotic fervor and intensive lobbying efforts in support of Greek positions) was evident since the early stages of the dispute.

The final part of this study argues that an explanation on the origin, nature, intensity and variability of ideational domestic preferences can be sought in Social-Psychological theories of group status and self-worth. Indeed, descriptions of public mood and related domestic preferences frequently employ or allude to psychological explanations. Gavrilis quotes Rizopoulos in support of the claim that,

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1 Checkel has suggested in passim that this may be possible through learning, symbolic interactions theories, or self-categorization, but have not pursued an investigation of any of these mechanisms. Due to space constraints, the present study addresses only the social-psychological dimension. For a theory on the micro-foundations of self-categorization involving cognitive mechanisms and parallels between knowledge storage and processing in the human brain and data classification in Artificial Intelligence, see Kotsovilis, S. ‘National Identity and Ethnic Strife: Social-Psychological and Cognitive Dimensions in the Macedonian Conflict’ (MA Thesis, Department of Political Science, McGill University, 2000).

1 For a liberal discussion of the effect of ethnic ties abroad on domestic policies relating to ethnic conflict, see Saideman (2001).
“…PASOK’s [1993] rhetoric arguably served a domestic purpose: Papandreou’s confrontational diplomacy had a certain therapeutic effect on the national psyche, as the general public came to believe that Greece’s sovereignty was being restored after 150 years of Great Power bullying…”

Writing on Greek-Turkish relations, Keridis also presents a psychological angle. Consider the complex interplay between Greek identity self-perception and group status in the following quote:

“Occasionally, the country appears to suffer from a certain siege mentality epitomized best in what former President of the Republic Christos Sartzetakis called the ‘brotherless friendless Greek nation’. This siege mentality makes Greeks defensive and oversensitive. This over-sensitivity is significant to the degree that it fuels the potential to exaggerate risks and turn them into threats. The resolute face-off of such threats becomes a national interest and priority. Official policy loses the initiative and the necessary perspective to evaluate risks calmly. It becomes reactive and is driven by impulses, volatile public opinion and demagoguery. Populist politicians and a polemical media in pursuit of sensationalist stories are ready to assume the worse and pick up insignificant ‘provocations’ to reinforce Greek’s reactionary defensiveness. Many Greeks exhibit an arrogance based on a perceived ‘historical superiority’ that bestows a status-bearing classical heritage and all its cultural capital on contemporary Greeks and often demonizes neighboring Turks as ‘uncivilized Asians. This arrogance is strangely coupled with a victimization mentality that often leads to historical nihilism in which Greeks are no longer the subjects but only the mere objects of history.”

This superiority, he notes further, conflates contemporary interests with ‘historical’ rights and makes a flexible foreign policy less appealing to the public. As far as the display of group status elements of superiority and insecurity constraining foreign policy, Keridis might as well have been writing about Greece and the FYROM dispute.

A theory that addresses aspects of group status is Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979; 1986). It assumes that “individuals are motivated to achieve a positive social identity, defined as that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from the knowledge of their membership in a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to this membership.” Such a desire induces individuals to engage in social comparisons between in-groups and out-groups, with the ultimate aim to achieve both a positive and distinct position. In SIT, the knowledge that one belongs to certain groups and the value attached to group membership in positive and negative terms, represents the individual’s social identity. The two essential features of this theory are that group membership is viewed from the subjective perception of the individual
(categorization), and that the value-laden nature of group membership is highlighted and given importance.

This approach extends to the inter-group level, proposing that individuals are motivated to belong to positively evaluated groups. Tajfel believes that social identity can be understood as ‘an intervening causal mechanism in situations of change, whether this change is observed, anticipated, feared or aspired.’

His identification of such situations involves three categories:

(I) the badly defined or marginal situation of a group which presents the individuals involved with difficulties of defining themselves in a social system;
(II) the groups, socially defined and conceptually accepted as 'superior' in some important respects at a time, when their position is threatened either by occurring/impeding change or by a conflict of values inherent in their superiority;
(III) the groups socially defined and conceptually accepted as inferior in some important respects at a time, when - for whatever reasons - either (a) members of the group have engaged in a shared 'prise de conscience' of the illegitimacy of their inferior status or (b) they have become aware of the feasibility of working towards alternatives to the existing situation, or (c) a combinations of both (a) and (b).

His definition of groups as 'superior' or 'inferior' is based in terms of psychological correlates of a number of interacting dimensions of social differentiation, such as discrepancies between groups in social status, power, domination, etc.

Tajfel stresses that superior groups (II) may feel insecure about their identity, since 'the dynamic state of the social environment is such that makes a secure social identity an empirical impossibility, even for groups with unquestioned 'superiority'. The group can utilize social identity to gain and preserve a kind of (at least) psychological distinctiveness, that is inexorably linked to its superior status. ‘This can be only if the social conditions of distinctiveness are carefully perpetuated together with the signs and symbols of distinctive status, without which the attitudes of complete consensus about 'superior' distinctiveness are in danger of disintegrating. When the group is threatened, therefore, it can proceed with the intensification of existing distinctions, together with the creation and use of new conditions that will enable it to preserve and enhance its psychological distinctiveness.’

According to Tajfel, such an example is the creation [or protection] of a variety of distinctive symbols. Greece fits this category extremely well, when the distinctiveness of the highly valued Macedonian aspects of it national identity were threatened by FYROM.
That is because FYROM fits the descriptive diagnosis both for groups that have difficulty in defining themselves (I) and ‘inferior’ ones (III). The unpleasant social situations in which such groups may find themselves can prompt action either towards leaving (social mobility) or staying in the group and always involve group identity as a tool. Conditions that favor remaining in one’s group include (a) any form of caste system, (b) any other differentiation system which for whatever reasons makes moving difficult, (c) a strong conflict of values (inherent in leaving one's group), like loyalty versus personal advantages or gains, and (d) fear of powerful sanctions for moving to another group.  

Given these different conditions, the social identity of the inferior group can express themselves in social behaviour'. For Tajfel, these ways of social behavior involve:

(a) becoming, through action and reinterpretation of group characteristics more like the superior group
(b) reinterpreting existing inferior characteristics of the group, so that they do not appear as inferior but acquire a positive valued distinctiveness from the superior group
(c) creating, through social action and/or diffusion of 'new ideologies', new group characteristics which have a positive valued distinctiveness from the superior group.

Solution (a) is a blueprint for the group’s cultural and psychological assimilation. The group will strive to become more like a superior group and may eventually be absorbed on incorporated to it. Tajfel indicates that groups may try this approach first. Solutions (b) and (c) however, imply that the group will pursue differentiation and create a distinct, positively valued identity. These solutions are structurally similar, involving creation and recreation of in-group characteristics and vesting them with a positively valued distinctiveness. With respect to solutions (b) and (c), it is obvious that they prescribe the creation and recreation of old and new group characteristics which can, when compared with out-group ones, give a positive value of self-esteem, pride and distinctiveness that achieve an adequate form of social identity for the inferior group.*

The newly created characteristics need to be positively evaluated by the inter-group members (absolute value), and the in-group evaluation has to be accepted by out-groups (these characteristics must acquire a relative positive value).  

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* Tajfel cites the nationalisms of nineteenth century European states as an example of solution (c). Discussing this phenomenon in ‘Nationalism, Liberalism and Progress: The Rise and Decline of Nationalism’, Ernst Haas echoes such a view: ‘...a nation is a socially mobilized body of individuals who believe themselves united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them from outsiders and who strive to maintain and create their own state.’
These two stages are very important, as Tajfel points out, for they present more complications for both in-group (the inferior) and out-group(s) (superior(s)). The new characteristics may consist of ‘attributes that are already highly valued by both, or, more groups, and which the inferior group was previously deemed not to posses.’ What ensues is social competition, and the debate focuses on whether others ‘will acknowledge the new image, separate but equal or superior.’ Or, the new characteristics may not be consensually valued at all. In this case, the question becomes whether others ‘acknowledge the new image different but equal or superior.’ The problem, thus, consists of either the re-evaluation of a group on attributes commonly valued, or the acknowledgment by others through re-evaluation of the attributes.

The battle for acceptance by others of new forms of inter-group comparisons is a battle for legitimacy and vice versa. As long as these forms are not accepted, new characteristics (or old re-evaluated ones) cannot be fully adequate in their function of building a new social identity. At the same time, Tajfel writes, ‘there can be many instances where the superior group, for the sake of its own distinct identity cannot accept any of the forms of change discussed earlier.’

To this observation one can insert the additional difficulty that arises from negotiating or contesting elements of identity, which are by nature intractable or non-negotiable (e.g. group emblems). The only conclusion that can be made at this point of conflict between cooperative social identities and their legitimacy is that a marked discrimination in inter-group behaviour.

Donald Horowitz's psycho-cultural approach to ethnic conflict (1985) demonstrates the application of social identity theory to an ethnic level. Horowitz identifies situations that induce groups to turn to their identities for solutions. More specifically:

“...an ethnic group fragmented into subgroups that threaten to overtake the larger group identity might react by reinforcing elements of common culture and common ancestry, suppressing for example differences in dialect or stressing a descent from a single ancestor.”

On the other hand, “a group that found itself losing its distinctive identity by absorption into another ethnic group might respond by emphasizing it cultural uniqueness, selectively recalling ancient glories, resuscitating all that distinguishes group members from others destroying all that links them to others.”

As in Tajfel's described situations, threat is associated with change. Horowitz's focus however is directed at how the group under 'danger' survives, by staying together. Social
mobility of the ethnic type is usually not a convenient option. Horowitz points towards the clear demarcation of ethnic boundaries, which the ethnic groups can achieve by striving towards group differentiation through manipulation of the group's identity and the positive value that this distinctiveness brings to the group. In general, such cultural tools involving history, myth, symbols, past glories, language and religion can infuse the group identity with a new or revived cultural content that can serve as to more clearly demarcate the lines between groups. These tools, as Horowitz points, must also help allocate prestige which will help the ethnic group boost its self-esteem. Horowitz states that ‘insecure, declining or rising groups frequently lay claim to a favorable distribution of prestige, that can help their self-esteem and increase the forces that bind them together.’ It is the stage where the group has to approve of the new characteristics shaped by the ‘tools’ and feel good about claiming them. The invocation of symbols is an example of a claim of a favorable distribution of prestige. The value of an identity, and furthermore the allocation of prestige, are interconnected with social recognition. Groups have to differentiate themselves to acquire a unique identity but need to attach to it a positive value that can be obtained only through interaction and comparison with other groups. Indeed, a brief look at the nature of ethnicity reveals its interactive, transactional character. Creation and maintenance of an ethnic identity consists of two stages: Internally, members define themselves and then signal this self-definition to out-groups. Although conceptualized initially as internal, this stage is ‘necessarily transactional and social because it presupposes an audience and an externally derived framework of meaning’. In external definition, members are defined by others; it is an ‘other-directed’ process. ‘At its most consensual level, there is the validation of others’ internal definitions of themselves; at its most antagonistic, there may be the imposition by a set of members upon another of a putative name and characterization which can affect in significant ways the social experience of the categorized.’ These transactions can cause serious conflict. Hence, in simple terms, SIT posits that the positive self-value of individuals is connected to group membership. Membership in a prestigious, ‘superior’ group enhances this positive value, whereas belonging to a marginalized, ‘inferior’ one decreases it. A distinct or differentiated group status is central to this premise.
Therefore, marginalization or inferiority can be a result of social tumult or flux. If social mobility is available during such periods, individuals may try to escape disadvantaged groups and join (assimilate into) privileged ones. If not, they may try to increase the value of their membership by improving and distinguishing the status of the group they belong to. A status of a group can be improved by reinventing old characteristics, or adopting new ‘positive’ ones that are associated with social prestige. This theory also applies to Ethnic identity and ethnic prestige. Positively-valued ideational elements of ethnic identity (e.g. the history of a glorious past, or distinctive symbols) enhance the value of self-esteem for its members. Groups that possess such prestigious traits emphasize and safeguard their exclusivity (differentiation) to maintain its positive value. This is so, especially against attempts for their appropriation by other groups, which, during periods of ethnic turmoil, may seek to enhance their own group status to avoid disintegration, fragmentation, assimilation.

Social Identity Theory, FYR Macedonian state-building and the dispute with Greece

1945 marked the birth of Macedonia (the ASNOM manifesto serving as the birth certificate) within Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. After Pirin and Egei parts escaped his reach, Tito's political project for Vardar became the differentiation of Macedonian identity which unfolded with its nation-building process. In post-world war II Yugoslav Macedonia’s case, characteristics of language, religion, history, symbols etc. were either created or reinvented precisely to promote this distinctiveness.

Horowitz's commentary on--among other tools--the manipulation of language as a basis for group identity presents a very similar theoretical description of the events that took place in Yugoslav Macedonia after 1948. Another significant action taken by Tito himself was the creation of an independent Macedonian church to vest the nation with its own religious institution. Horowitz writes ‘…for many groups, religion is not a matter of faith, but a given, an integral part of their identity, and for some an inextricable component of their sense of peoplehood.” Further example was the rewriting and retelling of history of the land associated with glorious characters. Horowitz describes such incidents as the allocation of prestige by the invocation of symbols. Indeed,
Yugoslav-championed Yugoslav Macedonia was vested with many tools to construct a national identity loaded with prestige and positive value.

The next stop in this nation-building process was positive in-group evaluation and out-group acceptance for the new reconstructed identity to acquire some social value. Vestige with positive national characteristics and a non-pluralistic regime where dissent was not tolerable meant Macedonian identity was accepted easily inside the republic and the Yugoslav confederation. Further, international recognition and legitimacy awarded to Yugoslavia, implied the tacit acceptance of its Macedonian Yugoslav Republic as part of the whole package.

As soon as the two elements responsible for the cohesion of ex-Yugoslavia --Tito and the communist ideology-- eclipsed, Yugoslav Macedonians saw the system that had provided them with legitimacy and security disappear, its place taken by anarchy and disorder created by the virulent ethnic nationalism that filled the ideological vacuum. Amidst this state of flux, Yugoslav Macedonia found itself in an increasingly difficult position. Yugoslavia's collapse removed the structure upon which its legitimacy and protection rested. The young nation had in developed its identity for only fifty years and mostly through Yugoslavia's means of reference, patronage and active help that controlled, contained and compromised threats to it. The now Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was left alone and its status was challenged both domestically and internationally. The conditions specified by Horowitz directly apply to FYR Macedonia’s situation in the early 1990's, for the new state was threatened both by fragmentation into subgroups (Albanians, Serbs, pro-Bulgarians) and by absorption into another group (Bulgaria, rump Yugoslavia, and partially Albania). Under such conditions, the only potential solution for enhancing FYR Macedonian chance for survival was the re-establishment and re-assertion of a distinct, positively-valued identity its inhabitants would be proud to bear. As in the recent Yugoslav past, FYR Macedonia turned to the familiar pattern of differentiation. The national identity of FYR Macedonians was infused with characteristics enhancing its positive value, and certifying its distinctiveness and legitimacy. Specifically, a clearly distinct identity with positive valued characteristics
would challenge any foreign claims and increase internal cohesion (make in-group membership more attractive). *

The process—or pattern—of creation and recreation of identity characteristics encompassed action is described by Horowitz: Reinforcement of elements of common culture and ancestry, suppressing differences and stressing commonalities was promoted, with added emphasis on a unique cultural and historical character, and was aimed to create and aspired identity to bring in-group members closer, while designed, at the same time, to distance them from out-groups.

Newly created ones included the state symbols—the official name (‘Republic of Macedonia’), the flag (red with a sixteen point star), and the liberal constitution. Old characteristics, like the uniqueness of ‘Macedonian’ language or the glorious Macedonian history were kept, but stressed to enhance the positive value of their identity. Sometimes, interaction between the new and old was also meant to have the same effect. For example, justification for the adoption of the sixteen-point star on the flag could be found in that it was an emblem of Alexander the Great, and therefore, symbolized the ancient Macedonian glory—allocation of prestige to the group, thus an increase of its positive view of the self.

Again, these categorization changes had to be positively evaluated by in-groups and accepted by out-groups, so that their value and legitimacy could be further established. Designed to downplay the intra-group differences and to stress similarities (as described by Horowitz) the new identity was welcomed by most (except Albanians, whose ethnic self-categorization remained different). However, out-group acceptance proved difficult.

The demise of Yugoslavia revived its neighbors old fears mixed with new objections; consequently many aspects of Macedonian self-aspired identity were denied.

In the case of Greece, although it did not deny the FYR Macedonians right to nationhood per se, it raised serious objections regarding the ownership of symbols. Greece maintained its exclusive rights over the emblem of the Vergina star (by virtue of their Hellenic Macedonian history dating back to Alexander) and over the actual name Macedonia, (the official name of the Aegean part)—Greek national identity traits

* Observing a Slavic Macedonian Diaspora rally in Toronto, in 1993, the author was intrigued by the centerpiece of the procession: a large 2x2 meters painted map incorporating the three parts of Macedonia under a single entity, with the inscription ‘ГОРД СУМ ШТО СУМ МАКЕДОНЕЦ’ (‘Proud [emphasis added] to be Macedonian’).
challenged by FYROM claims. These claims raised fears of irredentist aspirations against Greek-Macedonian territory. Moreover, their attempted appropriation was perceived as cultural property theft, infringing on the positive value derived for Greek identity by the prestige and exclusivity of national traits, like symbols, history, etc. Given this set of cultural and strategic fears, and the chimera of a ‘secure identity’, the Greek public’s reaction to FYROM fit that of a ‘superior’ group’s to threat and change. As Tajfel’s model predicts, the Greek public was alarmed and reacted acutely to the name and symbols issue with displays of intensification of existing identity distinctions that served to simultaneously deny them to the competitor and maintain their exclusivity. Hence, the public’s preference for intransigence over the name and symbols, and its reflection in the constraints faced by Greek governments in negotiating the dispute.

CONCLUSION

This paper explored the nature and sources of Greek foreign policy towards the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the post-1991 era. Foreign Policy formation required multi-causal explanations. Realism offers a partial explanation (Realpolitik calculations and external-3rd party intervention) but the primary explanation is the effect of domestic factors, supported by a composite Liberal theory (domestic power politics and group social/ideational preferences). The ideational component of this theory virtually overlaps with Liberal (or ‘soft’) Constructivist approaches of endogenous social construction, save for the dynamic element of their temporal and spatial (inter-group comparison) variation. Domestic preference variance remains in the domain of Liberal Theory.

A mechanism explaining the persistence of domestic preferences for prestigious symbols and an uncompromising stance with respect to their negotiation for both Greece and FYR Macedonia is offered by a modified Social/Ethnic Identity Theory. The argument proposes that the threat or the prospect of change induce social or ethnic groups—of either superior or inferior status—to act in conjunction with their social/ethnic identities. At times of social flux or ethnic turmoil, superior groups’ members attempt to safeguard and fortify their superior ‘feel-good’ status by making their distinctiveness more clear;

* Only recently, constructivists have pursued this domestic aspect of Katzenstein’s 1996 edited volume further (see Koenig-Archibugi article referred to earlier in the paper). But a mechanism of how agents’ interests vary is largely absent.
members of an inferior one may either try to leave their group, or stay and try to increase the worth of their identity. This can be achieved either by trying to become more like a superior group, or by trying to differentiate and create a distinct social identity by recreating and creating group characteristics that have positive value. For the individuals in such a group to gain a positive self-esteem, these characteristics have to be accepted both by in-groups and out-groups. Out-group acceptance of these new attributes (validation of this new ethnic identity) may lead to competition over them, ethnic tensions and inter-group hostility. The reflection of such uncompromising public preferences when it comes to prestigious, positively-valued ethnic symbols in the foreign policies of both Greece and FYR Macedonia provide a good application of this model.

A final word about IR theories and their explanatory power vis a vis the variability of foreign policy and endurance of public preferences over time. Can this multi-causal mixture of foreign policy formation-and the Social Identity Theory-account for the recent diplomatic overture by the Greek government to accept a possible compromise over the name? Again, external considerations offer a partial response: they can explain the urgency with which powers like the EU and the US would like to see and press for a settlement before the Pandora Box of the Kosovo final status discussions opens later this year; Greece and FYROM possibly engage in similar calculations for security reasons.

Another involves a more secure regional environment after the recent Greco-Turkish rapprochement that has quelled Greek fears of strategic isolation and encirclement. But then, why insist on a composite, instead of giving it up completely? Finally, there is third Realist consideration: the possibility of the recent Greek overture being a merely tactical one, to gain a diplomatic and negotiating advantage.

Do domestic considerations’ explanations fare better? Having come to power in the 2004 elections, the Nea Democratia government enjoys a 165-seat majority over the 117 seats of the official opposition, PASOK (their total vote share was 45.4 and 4.5 % respectively).† While not a debilitating, compromise-prohibitve one (like 1990-3), the government’s majority is still slightly smaller than that of intransigent PASOK in 1993. If

† However, the potential of regional ethnic instability involving neighbouring ethnic Albanians could conversely present a deterrent for FYROM against negotiating away a distinct and distinctive supra-ethnic official state name (despite the increasingly de facto ethnic identification of only the Slavic population of FYROM as ‘Macedonians’).

† By that time, POL.AN had disappeared from the political scene, many of its members reabsorbed back into Nea Democratia’s ranks. Gavrilis credits its failure to Samaras’ lack of charisma, and its competing against highly institutionalized parties with more coherent electoral platforms.
similar comfort margins can yield diametrically opposed policies, then parliamentary minority power play may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for determining foreign policy. On the other hand, changes in public opinion may shed more light over this recent foreign policy variation. Despite spikes related to events like the U.S.’s recognition in the fall of 2004 of FYROM under the ‘Republic of Macedonia’ name, more recent polls in Greece (late 2004, early 2005) register an overall change in the public mood. While there still is more opposition (56%) to a compromise solution of a compound name than for (41%), it has decreased from 1993’s 72% high. Moreover, only 30% of respondents favour mass protest rallies (with 68% against)—a far cry from a decade’s ago million people-strong rallies.*

These results bring us to final question of how foreign policies change and the part played by public preference variation. In the case of FYR Macedonia, the national character and unity of the state (as far as the accommodation between ethnic Albanians and Slavs is concerned) is still unresolved, and the lingering uncertainty over the status of nearby Kosovo indicates the persistent importance of prestigious, inclusive state symbols, especially for the Slav part of the population and the government. This persistence is reflected in the continued uncompromising foreign policy stance of the current FYROM government towards Greece (especially, following a cascade of international recognitions under the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’).

In the case of Greece, polls indicate that Greek public opinion has softened and that domestic preferences have changed. This is reflected by the fewer constraints in the government’s foreign policy course in the dispute. What accounts for this shift in public preferences over FYROM? One answer is the combination of the public’s fatigue (to a long, ongoing dispute), over-saturation and shortened attention span (vis a vis more dramatic Balkan developments and Greek foreign policy priorities) as well as resignation (to the widespread international de facto recognition of FYROM as ‘Republic of Macedonia’). Another reason is the lessened sense of danger, or flux in the region’s affairs that has diminished a sense of insecurity and threat mentality. While still volatile,

* Poll conducted by ‘Opinion’ (MPA, 10/11/04). It is interesting to note a Greek diplomat’s hypothesis during a recent interview with the author, that, while still registering lower opposition than in the ‘90’s, if some of these Greece-wide poll results were disaggregated by location, the net change would be somewhat smaller for inhabitants of the prefecture of Macedonia. While such data must certainly exist, lack of space in this paper and time to receive formal responses from poll companies in Greece has prevented the pursuit of this avenue. If true, and depending on the variation, this could mean deeper domestic variation of preferences, with Realist concerns about territorial integrity continuing to play a greater part in Northern Greek component of Greek public opinion.
the current situation in the former Yugoslav region is incomparable to the multiple points of war, instability and tragedy of ten years ago, and some rapprochement with Turkey has helped in this assessment.

Finally, the softening of public stance may have to do with the emergence of other sources or events enhancing Greek national prestige, sense of distinction of feeling good and more secure. The firmly entrenched European Union course has poured in billions of euros in subsidies enhancing overall quality of life and resolutely answering the once pressing existentialist public question of where Greece belonged culturally. Further, the successful staging of the 2004 Olympics and even the (seemingly trivial as far as foreign policy formulation is concerned) improbable Greek national soccer squad win of the European national championship earlier that same year have brought world wide positive publicity for Greece, bolstering the prestige of Greek group identity. Developments like these may have enhanced Greek feelings of self-esteem enough for it not to be singularly dependent on the outcome of the diplomatic dispute with FYROM. A fitting epilogue to this thesis is provided by a recent Washington Post article on Greece:

“Angst swirls unobstructed through most of the global village. Yet a modern Diogenes would not need to go far if he were to set out to find a happy man. [...] the Greek prime minister has the nerve to be cheerful, optimistic and even soothing about Turkey, the Balkans, Greek-American relations and other subjects that have provoked verbal thunderbolts and mass marches in Athens in the past. On a checklist of difficult topics, Karamanlis provides an implicit description of the one thing a political leader must know above all: the mood of his people toward the world and toward themselves. His message is more powerful for not being put in so many words: Greeks feel pretty good about themselves these days, especially in comparison with their Balkan neighbors, European countries to their north and west, and Muslim nations to their east and south.”

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* E.U. budgetary support over a decade helped them nearly double their gross domestic product and raise per capita GDP (about $20,000 last year). The E.U. subsidies helped finance the successful 2004 Olympics, which also lifted national morale. Hoagland, J. The Washington Post, May 26, 2005.

† In terms of the Olympic Games, while material calculations for boosting tourism and building infrastructure are important, one cannot overlook the group psychological dimension of prestige in the repeated bidding to host an extravagantly expensive world event like the Summer Olympic Games (the two-week fete came at an estimated cost of US $10 billion).
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