Perception of the facts about the coup in Cyprus (15th of July 1974) in the Cyprus daily press

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1. Introduction

The aim of our research was to study the way the coup was presented in the daily press, to identify evidence of ideology in the media and then draw conclusions from the found evidence about the Cypriot media landscape and the Cyprus society of that period. For the purpose of our research, three Cypriot newspapers, representative of the print media in the period around the coup, were chosen: the independent *Phileleftheros*, the left-winger *Charavgi* and the nationalistic *Machi*. These newspapers were analysed using the Content Analysis research method. The Content Analysis was carried out on two levels, an implicit and an explicit level.

Our research is important for two reasons: firstly, up to now, there has been no similar effort made in Cyprus to systematically evaluate the content and form of the modern Cypriot media. The results of our research are of special interest because the time period covered was critical in shaping the historical background of Cyprus. Secondly, because of its relevance to social science: Cyprus is a relatively small and secluded society and during 1974 daily newspapers were the most significant media channel to influence and reflect the public opinion. Due to these circumstances it is possible, by analysing its daily press, to gain insights into the Cypriot society itself.

We began our research by defining and elucidating the methodology of Content Analysis and the way it was concretely applied in this research. Thus, because newspapers were examined on their ideological background according to the political and historical facts, we provide a short overview of the relevant historical-political facts in Cyprus since 1960 until 1974. We continued with the concrete cases of our analysis and the verification of the hypothesis in both periods, before and after the coup. Finally, we summarised and presented the final results of the research.

2. Methodology: Content Analysis

We applied Content Analysis methodology to our research.¹ Content Analysis is a standard methodology used in social sciences on the subject of communication. It employs sets of formalized procedures for making valid inferences from a text sample. To conduct a Content Analysis, the text must be coded into controllable categories, which are then examined by

¹ The Content Analysis can be applied in the journalism and communication research as well as in other branches of the Social science. (Pürer 1998: 177).
quantifying and analyzing the presence of patterns, particular vocabulary and concepts (Mayring 2003: 50). Inferences are then made about the messages within the texts, the writer, the audience, and even the culture and times they were written in. In our research, we focused on the communicator and on the intentions of the newspapers and attempted to draw a picture of Cypriot society at the time.

2.1. Approach

As mentioned, we aimed to evaluate the attitude of the Cypriot Press before, during and after the coup in 1974. We examined the categorized newspaper articles for evidence of political and/or ideological views. We would then investigate the possible reasons for the biased reporting and to what level, explicit or implicit, it was created.

An important criterion for the identification of explicit one-sided coverage was to distinguish among the different genres of articles. For example, an article can be written objectively and be purely informative or it can be written expressing an opinion. Factual journalistic genres are "messages" and "reports", where a "message" doesn’t develop a topic to such a level of detail as a report, which relies on more extensive information. The genres "reportage", "editorial" and "commentary" are classified as opinion genres. If a text is formally composed as a "report", nevertheless it includes the opinion of the author, then, we refer to it as a "reportage". "Editorials" are articles where the points of view of the newspaper are clearly known. They use a persuasive language and are found on the first page of a newspaper. The newspaper editorial staff report what they perceive to be the most important and newsworthy subjects through this genre. "Commentaries" are articles, which purposely demonstrate the personal opinions of a journalist or the editor.

There are two additional journalistic genres which can be classified as either persuasive or objective after textual analysis. "Documentations" contain original material only, which has not been adapted for journalistic purposes (Schönbach 1977: 48). These can be verbatim, speeches, interviews, documents and texts from press conferences. Another genre, which can not be defined without a textual analysis, is the "press commentary". A "press commentary" consists of citations from other media, selected to give an overview on currently covered topics.

Determining the genre of an article however, is not adequate evidence of one-sided reporting. The genre of an article and its content, which are not allowed to be contradictory, are often not compatible. Formal reporting articles can not have a persuasive content. Crucial
for this case is the principal of "Partition of information and opinion"² (Erbring 1994: 82). An offence against this principal through explicit blending of information and opinion can be verified through a semantic analysis of the language of the article. Schönbach considers the blending of information and opinion to be the manipulation of formal pure informative articles through the use of statements, which maintain evaluation of facts, phenomena or persons (Schönbach 1977: 26).

According to the structural semantic analysis, terms (Schulte-Sasse und Werner 1977: 63) and statements (Salamun 1981: 27) can not be studied alone, but in relation to one another. One-sided reporting can be identified by searching through the articles for formulations, which bring out ideologies. Topitsch defines formulations, which avoid every kind of logical and empirical criticism and create ideologies, as "Leerformeln" (Topitsch 1960: 233-263). "Leerformeln" appear in the form of Tautology, Zirkelargumenten (circle arguments) or contradictions and accomplish their effect by producing imprecisely defined predication, airiness, ambiguity and by clamming absoluteness (Schmidt 1972: 7). In addition to "Leerformeln" for the identification of one-sided coverage, statements can also be considered, which have the function of expressing emotions, as well as terms and statements which aim to conceal a fact and euphemisms (Salamun 1981: 27).

Apart from the explicit level of one-sided coverage, there is also an implicit level. According to Schönbach, subject matter selection within the coverage (if a subject matter appears more often in the coverage than another one) can effect an implicit blending of information and opinion (Schönbach 1977: 9). Schönbach realized also that the format of an article can result in implicit accent of a topic and simultaneously of an ideological or political principal (Schönbach 1977: 26). In order to prove an implicit one-sided coverage we must evaluate the frequency of specific topics and study the kinds of format features used in the articles, like size, placement, colours, use of pictures and wideness of the headings, for each topic.

3. Political - Historical context

It is important to outline a realistic picture of the historical events which occurred between 1960 and 1974. On 16.08.1960, Cyprus became an independent country according to

² The American Society of Newspaper Editors made in 1923 the “Partition of News and Opinion” to its principal (Greuner 1962: 179).
the Agreements of Zurich and London. After many negotiations between representatives of NATO, the USA, England, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, a result was obtained during a conference in Zurich (05.02.1959 - 11.02.1959) which would shape the future of Cyprus. During the subsequent conference in London (17.02.1959 - 19.02.1959), the foreign minister of Greece, Averoff, and of Turkey, Zorlu, together with Makarios and the leader of the Turks-Cypriots, Dr. Kütschük, signed a treaty for the foundation of the Cyprus Republic (Tzermias 1991: 141). Not only was the constitution\(^3\) of Cyprus signed, but also the Agreements of Guarantee and Alliance between England, Greece and Turkey.

In November 1963 the President of the Republic, Makarios, proposed thirteen amendments\(^4\) to facilitate the functioning of the state. As a result the Turkish community responded with rebellion; the Turkish Cypriot ministers withdrew from the Government and the Turkish civil servants ceased attending their offices, in protest to the proposed changes to the constitution. Intercommunal violence was on the rise and the Turkish Cypriots withdrew into enclaves (Tzermias 1991: 303). In March 1964 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of an international peace-keeping force to control the violence on the island (O’Malley und Craig 2001: 103).

The international community pulled together once again to help solve the crisis in Cyprus; Greece, Turkey, England and the USA began talks to find a new solution to the increasing problems in Cyprus. Makarios initially attempted to initiate the Enosis policy, which involved unifying Cyprus with Greece. However, he soon realised that this was not the appropriate solution as a unification with Greece was only possible with a simultaneous division of the island into a Greek- and Turkish parts (Τζερμιάς 2000: 476) and Makarios was not willing to risk the unity of the island. Despite the multitude of proposed solutions, the interested countries did not come up with a solution to the problems in Cyprus.

In April 1967 a coup was staged in Greece by the military Junta under the guidance of Colonel Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos and his regime wished for the union of Cyprus to Greece (Tzermias 1991: 382). However Makarios, who did not believe Papadopoulos’ theory was possible, continued advocating for an independent Cyprus. Makarios and his policy won

\(^3\) About the constitution of Cyprus: Χατζηβασιλείου, 1998.

\(^4\) About the amendments of Makarios: Τζερμιάς (2000: 469).
the next president elections of 1968 against the supporter of Enosis Eudokas with 95% of the votes (Tzermias 1991: 392).

In August 1971, officer Grivas\(^5\) arrived in Cyprus and began secret, underground campaigns against the government of Makarios. For his purposes, he formed a pro-Enosis underground organization called EOKA B. Grivas demanded new elections without a candidature of Makarios (Tzermias 1991: 413). Makarios rejected this demand and as a reaction EOKA B by the end of 1972 started terrorist acts against his government (Tzermias 1991: 414). The next regularly scheduled elections in 1973 would have given Grivas und the EOKA B an opportunity to legally come to power in Cyprus. Nevertheless EOKA B chose to continue its terrorist activities und not take part in the elections. Once again Makarios, who was supported by the parties AKEL, EDEK\(^6\) und Enieon, won the election, which took place on 08.02.1973. There were no rival candidates.

In November 1973 Papadopoulos was overthrown by Dimitrios Ioannidis, the head of the military police. General Phedon Gizikis took over as the figurehead president of Greece. The Ioannidis regime adopted an aggressive line towards President Makarios, a move that buoyed up the nationalists of EOKA B. The cooperation between the EOKA B and the Greek Junta became more intensive after the death of Grivas on 28.01.1974. The Greek Junta in collaboration with EOKA B managed to take control over the national guard of Cyprus. On the 2\(^{nd}\) of July 1974 Makarios sent a letter to Gizikis, accusing the junta of plotting against him and the government of Cyprus. He demanded the withdrawal of the remaining 650 Greek officers assigned to the National Guard of Cyprus (Τζερμάς 2000: 479). After thirteen days the Greek-led national guard of Cyprus overthrew President Makarios. Nicos Sampson, a representative of the Cypriot parliament during that period in Cyprus, accepted the presidency role offered to him by the Greek officers. Makarios managed to escape and he was transported by the British first to Malta and then to London. On the 18\(^{th}\) of July he went to the USA and on the 19\(^{th}\) of July he addressed the Security Council in New York. In his speech he accused the Greek Junta for organising the coup in Cyprus and for supporting the EOKA B (Tzermias 1991: 448f).

5 Grivas was the leader of the armed straggle of EOKA (national Organisation of Cypriot struggles), which began in 1950 in order to achieve the union to Greece (Tzermias 1991: 59).

6 ΕΔΕΚ (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωση Κύπρου).
Under the pretence of helping the Turk Cypriots and preventing the union of Cyprus to Greece after the coup of the Greek junta, the Turkish army invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974. The Turkish invasion was described by the Turkish government as a "peace-keeping operation." Turkey referred to the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 in order to legitimate the invasion. The Turkish government ignored the fact that an intervention of the Guarantee Powers was only possible if all negotiations between the three Guarantee Powers had previously collapsed.

Three days after the Turkish invasion, the Greek junta collapsed in Athens and Sampson resigned. Kliridis, the President of the Cyprus Parliament at that time, deputized for president Makarios until his comeback and governed in accordance with the constitution. The two Geneva conferences\(^9\) (25.07.-30.07.1974 und 08.08.-14.08.1974), which took place between Britain, Greece, Turkey, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot were unproductive. Although order was restored, Turkey proceeded with the invasion.

On 14 August the Turkish army carried out a second assault. After the second invasion, the Turkish army occupied 36.4 % of Cypriot territory. Cyprus has been divided since 1974. President Makarios returned to Cyprus on 07.12.1974 and resumed the presidency.


Content Analysis has developed over the years in many directions. The method of the Content Analysis applied in this work can be divided in three steps. In the first step the texts for research are collected and the categories are formed. The second step involves encoding of the categories and after that examination and evaluation of the encoded data.

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7 "In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to representations of measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions" (Draft Treaty of Guarantee between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus, in Cyprus, Gmnd. 1093).

8 "In so far as common concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty" (Draft Treaty of Guarantee between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus, in Cyprus, Gmnd. 1093).

9 About the conferences : Ψυχάρης, 1976
Conclusions and generalizations are drawn by supporting the results from the encoding process with background knowledge (Schulz 2003: 58).

4.1. Hypotheses

Hypotheses on the coverage in the newspapers before the coup

1. Machi covers the political views of Makarios’ one-sided and negative. Due to the fact that Machi is a right-wing newspaper, we expected it to criticize the measures of president Makarios against the Greek Junta and try to conceal the activities of the Junta and EOKA B.

2. Charavgi favours the policies of Makarios’ government. The measures of the government are directed against the right-wing EOKA B and the military junta in Greece. From the official newspaper of the Cypriot right-wing party AKEL we expect a one-sided, even polemical coverage.

3. Although Phileleftheros was generally considered to be an independent and objective newspaper, we hypothesised it would project a political point of view.

Hypotheses on the coverage in the newspapers after the coup

1. Machi suppresses the interrelationship between the coup and the Turkish invasion in its coverage, supports the provisional government and ignores the government of Makarios. Due to the role of Nicos Sampson during the coup we do not expect Machi to identify the coup as the initiator of the invasion or to support the return of president Makarios.

2. Charavgi blames the Greek Junta and EOKA B for the result of the Turkish invasion and supports the return of President Makarios.

3. Phileleftheros’ coverage is diplomatic and reserved with respect to the coup and the return of president Makarios.
4.1.1. Verification of the hypothesis on the coverage in the newspapers before the coup.

In the first period, 06.07.1974-14.07.1974 we examined 24 editions; each newspaper had eight editions.\textsuperscript{10} Altogether we identified and examined 228 relevant articles.\textsuperscript{11} 24\% (56) of the articles belonged to the left-winger Charavgi, 31\% (70) to the independent Phileleftheros and 45\% (102) to the right-winger Machi.

Verification of the first hypothesis – The coverage in Machi.

The coverage in Machi is implicit as well as explicit one-sided right-wing. A typical characteristic of Machi’s coverage is its use of implicit blending of information and opinion. This occurs mainly through the repression of issues which were disadvantageous to right-wing policy and also through the systematical concealment and belittlement of facts which showed that the integrity of the Makarios government was threatened by the activities of the right-wing forces. Machi achieved this effect, by using small articles on specific topics in its last page. In this way Machi tried to convince its readers of an objective and extensive coverage, which in fact, did not exist.

The one-sided thematic selection in Machi’s coverage in support of a right-wing political position could be verified with the frequency analysis.\textsuperscript{12} Machi significationally repressed the issue of cooperation between the EOKA B and the Junta. The assumption of Makarios’ government, that right-wing forces were a threat to the republic, was systematically undermined. A more exact analysis of the text content showed that Machi often reported excessively on the arrests of neutral citizens. The aim of this tactic was to leave the impression, that the government alienated the people with its own policy and to shift the responsibility on to the government for subversive activities. In addition, Machi also selected and presented primarily the reactions of political personalities, organisations and citizens who discountenanced the withdrawal of the Greek Officers.

\textsuperscript{10} 1974 didn’t issue daily-newspapers on Mondays.

\textsuperscript{11} The newspaper of the examined period had a specific structure. The political coverage was located in the first and last pages of the newspapers.

\textsuperscript{12} According to Ritsert the frequency analysis is a methodology with which the ”accumulation of text elements can be identified with the help of the categories of an analytical scheme” (Ritsert 1972: 17).
In addition to the thematic selection Machi achieved an implicit blending of information and opinion by often using specific kinds of articles and by purposefully placing the articles on the first or last page. Machi reported on the measures of the government against the EOKA B and other individuals and also on the reactions to these measures with many small articles. Such a coverage prevented access to the real facts. (Busche-Baumann 1994: 147). This effect was especially obvious in the edition of Machi on 10.07.1974: five articles on the arrests of individuals by government forces. All of them dealt with the same subject and they only registered the names of the affected people. The arrests were dealt with as incoherent cases, and the "dissipation" into five articles appeared as justifiable. In this way Machi suggested an extensive coverage while in reality giving only little real information.

The placing of the articles is also relevant for the selectivity of the coverage. The editor’s choice of topic for the first page was their estimation of what was important at the time (Busche-Baumann 1994: 155). These articles arrest the attention of the readers. Despite the fact that the government measures for the safety of the integrity of the republic and the reactions on these measures were the most discussed political topics on the island, the majority of these articles were published on the last pages.

The secondary literature about the Cypriot Press, describes Machi as the newspaper which usually uses many creative features, such as colours, balks and frames13. The editions of Machi we examined however, surprisingly did not affirm this image of Machi. The coded articles did not overuse pictures and other creative features.

Our initial impression of Machi was that it didn’t show an explicit one-sided coverage. Machi contained more information-stressed articles than opinion-stressed articles compared to the other two newspapers. However, our impression of the newspaper required revision after examining the distribution of topics into the different kinds of articles. Most reports and messages referred to the measures of the government against EOKA B and individuals. This newspaper achieved an implicit belittlement effect through the suggestion of an objective, extensive coverage, which was de facto one-sided right-wing. Machi dealt however with the topics "cooperation of EOKA B and Junta" and "reactions on measures" in an explicit one-sided manner. The few articles, which concerned these topics, were documentations and editorials, which voiced the policy of Machi.

13 Notes form an interview with Dimitris Papadimitris held on 09.09.2003 in Nicosia.
The deeper semantic analysis validated the already acquired lopsidedness of the coverage. Although, initially, 12% of the articles were formal and information-stressed, after semantic analysis, 30% of the articles turned out to be content and opinion-stressed. All of them presented the Makarios government measures in a negative light. Although Machi contained predominantly information-stressed articles, 18% of them offended the principle of partition of opinion and information by manipulating the language as follows:

Firstly: In the coverage of Machi the security of the island was put on the same level as the attendance of the Greek officers in Cyprus. This exemplifies the article "Why shall the people pay?" 14 from the 11.07.1974 edition. In this article the editors of Machi claimed that only Turkey should be considered a threat to Cyprus. The government’s argument, for the withdrawal of Greek officers, was suppressed.

Secondly: The image of the Greek Junta was positively displayed, by presenting Greece as the “national Cradle” of Cyprus. Machi published articles with titles like „Greece answers“(06.07.1974) and "Athens invited Makarios" (10.07.1974). In both of the articles, Machi supported the Greek Dictators on the same level as Greece.

Thirdly: Machi repeatedly reported on the abuse of prisoners by government forces. At that point, the editors of Machi confined themselves only to the statements of the prisoners and did not review the facts in detail. 15.

Verification of the second hypothesis – The coverage in Charavgi.

The coverage in Charavgi is to great extend explicitly one-sided. 54% of its coded articles showed by use of persuasive language that the editorial staff favoured the measures of Makarios' government. Some of these articles could only be identified as opinion-stressed after a deeper semantic analysis. Charavgi exhibits also implicit one-sided coverage, though not as much Machi. Charavgi extensively stressed the topic "cooperation between Junta and EOKA B" in order to legitimate the measures of the government.

14 “Τούτο θα σημαίνει ότι δεν θα είμεθα εις θέσιν να διαθέτουμε την αναγκαίαν στρατιωτικήν άμυντικήν ισχύν εν ειδεί κλοπού περί των θυλάκων της Τουρκικής αρπακτικής ανταρσίας, ώστε να ματαιώσουμε την επεκτατικήν της βουλιάν [...] Διότι απαξ και αναχωρήσουν οι εξ Ελλάδος αξιωματικοί, τότε δεν θα παραμείνη παρά ο καταπληκτικός περιορισμένος δυσψήφιος αριθμός των Κυπρίων αξιωματικών" (Μάχη 11.07.1974, p.1).

15 Compare the editorial "Suspect for 4 murders" (Μάχη 13.07.1974, p. 1.)
At first site the coverage in *Charavgi* left an objective impression. After classification of the formal journalistic genres, 48% of the coded articles were identified as information-stressed and only 24% as opinion-stressed. 28% of the coded articles couldn’t be identified directly, because they belonged to the genres documentaries and other press releases. The deeper semantic analysis of all the information-stressed and not yet classified articles revealed that 30% of them explicitly blended information and opinion. Hence 54% of the coded articles from *Charavgi* had to be reclassified as opinion-stressed, rendering the coverage in *Charavgi* in total not very objective.

The analysis, which was conducted topic by topic to identify any explicit blending of information and opinion, showed that *Charavgi* reported on the topic "cooperation between Junta and EOKA B" almost exclusively in opinion-stressed articles. The importance of this topic for the coverage in *Charavgi* is stressed also by the fact that five out of seven editorials dealt with it.

Independently from thematically supporting Makarios' government, the editorial staff of *Charavgi* also used formulations that intended to create sympathy for Makarios' policy among the readership. We illustrate this instance with the following three examples:

Firstly: *Charavgi* criticised the Greek Junta. The coverage in *Charavgi* repeatedly emphasized that the leaders of the Greek Junta did not come to power by democratic elections but abused their military power in order to tyrannize the Greek people. The Greek Junta was characterized as "dictatorial regime", "military government" or "dictatorial government". Being aware of the cultural relatedness the Greek Cypriot population felt toward Greece, the editorial staff of *Charavgi* tried to distinguish between the Greek nation and the Greek Junta. For example on 10.07.1974 *Charavgi* published an article with the headline "The real Greece" (*Χαραυγή* 10.07.1974, p. 1), in which Greek politicians were introduced who were not involved with the dictators in any way and supported the Makarios' government.

Secondly: *Charavgi* also used the popularity of president Makarios, in order to defend his policy. Makarios was described as a national Hero, who headed the fight against the dictators of Greece all on his own. This is the complete contrary to the coverage in *Machi*,

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16 Compare the article "The folk supports Makarios’ measures" (*Χαραυγή* 09.07.1974, p. 1) and "Makarios submits to the regime of Athens: 'Give orders for liquidation of the terrorist EOKA B' " (*Χαραυγή* 09.07.1974, p. 1)
where he was presented as the trouble maker in the relationship between Cyprus and Greece. On 07.07.1974 the editorial staff of Charavgi published a commentary with the title "Cyprus’ NO" on its last page. In this commentary Makarios was described as the brave leader of the Cypriot people, who because of his personal integrity dared to oppose the dictators of Greece.

Thirdly: The editorial staff of Charavgi used the same argument as the government of Makarios itself to legitimize its decisions. Charavgi accented that the Turkish government would not tolerate any coup by any pro Greek forces in Cyprus (Χαραυγή 09.07.1974, S. 6.).

The implicit one-sided coverage in Charavgi could be verified through frequency analysis. In comparison to the other two newspapers the coverage in Charavgi engaged significantly more on the topic of a connection between the Greek Junta and EOKA B. In detail Charavgi published articles dealing directly with a supposed cooperation between the Greek Junta and EOKA B as well as on the government's measures against Junta and EOKA B, which tackled the topic indirectly. Consistent to its left-wing orientation Charavgi referred to the cooperation as a conspiracy that threatened democracy in Cyprus, by this legitimizing all the measures of the government for the security of the Republic of Cyprus. The coverage in Charavgi lacks any kind of criticism of these measures.

Further analysis of the creative features of the articles on that topic and their positioning in the editions of Charavgi supported the above result of an implicitly one-sided coverage. On average Charavgi published longer articles with wider headings than the other two newspapers on the topic of the connection. Also the majority of the articles on the cooperation were placed in the first pages of the Charavgi, while articles, which reported on the measures of the government, played a complementary role on the last pages. These articles typically portrayed facts, which should prove to the readership that Junta and EOKA B were both acting against the Cyprus government.

**Verification of the third hypothesis – The coverage in Phileleftheros.**

Officially Phileleftheros was independent from any political position. Surprisingly analysis of its coded articles revealed that its coverage was not objective, as could be expected, but explicitly one-sided. The editorial staff of Phileleftheros supported the policy of

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17 "Athens – Nicosia: the crisis rises" (Μάχη 06.07.1974, p. 1.).
Makarios. The rules of the information-stressed journalistic genres were often broken by formulations, which praised Makarios’ policy and himself.

Similar to the results on Charavgi, the classification of the coded articles in the coverage in Phileleftheros showed that its editorial staff primarily used information-stressed genres. The information-stressed articles amount to 49% and the opinion-stressed articles to 12% of the entire coded coverage. The rest of the articles could not be classified by formal analysis. Further semantic analysis however revealed that only 37% of the coded articles truly were information-stressed. The remaining formally information-stressed articles contained formulations which expressed an evaluation. The coverage of Phileleftheros supported the policy of the government of Makarios very obviously. 59% of the coded articles valued the measures of the government as positive, only 4% were negative. It is remarkable that 53% of the positive articles in the coverage of Phileleftheros broke the rule of the partition of information and opinion, but only 23% of the positive articles were also formally opinion-stressed.

Strikingly Phileleftheros published more documentations compared to Charavgi. Documentations typically indirectly convey political messages. A more direct annotation of the events in Cyprus did not fit to the image of the Phileleftheros as an independent newspaper. These results are in line with the conclusion, that not only an external person can use the media to exploit it for the transportation of a political position, but also the editorial staff can use political and ideological statements of external persons to propagate the political position of its editorial staff (Blömbaum 1992: 152).

Analysis of the language in the coverage in Phileleftheros showed that it supported the policy of the government especially by using absolute judgments. Similar to Charavgi the coverage in Phileleftheros cited two arguments to justify its political orientation:

Firstly: Makarios was presented as the charismatic leader, who chose the right policy for the security of the island. For example, in the last page of the edition of Phileleftheros on 13.07.1974 a press commentary was issued with title: "Leading Figure of the Greek nation is Makarios, writes the foreign press." This article was composed of extracts out of the American newspaper The Christian Science Monitor and the German Spiegel, where the policy of Makarios was praised.

Secondly: in contrary to the praise of Makarios the leaders of Greece were presented in a negative way as the "Military regime" or the "Source of the evil". In order to denounce the Junta the Phileleftheros published critical citations of persons, associations and parties, which
were also demonstrated in the titles of the respective articles to attract more attention. For example on 09.07.1974 the Phileleftheros on page 8 issued two articles with titles "The regime of Athens bears the responsibility, declare Greek politicians", and, "Parties and associations demand an end of the lawlessness from the state".

Even if Phileleftheros accounted for a predominantly explicit one-sided coverage, it to a minor degree also blended implicit information and opinion. As already mentioned Phileleftheros emphasised the complex of topics "Junta - EOKA B". Within this complex the issue "Measures against the Greek Junta" was dominant. On this issue Phileleftheros published predominantly positive reviews of third persons on the measures of the government. This proves implicit one-sided coverage.

The analysis of the creative features in the coverage of Phileleftheros didn’t result in any major insights. The articles were on average longer than those of Machi and shorter than those of Charavgi. The same applies for the average width of the headings. The coded articles were evenly distributed between the first and the last pages.

4.1.2. Verification of the hypothesis on the coverage after the coup

For the second period of analysis we selected 27 editions for examination, nine from each newspaper. 694 articles were identified as relevant according to the categories and coded. 35% (250) of the coded articles belong to Charavgi, 31% (212) to Phileleftheros and 33% (232) to Machi. The examination of the newspapers in this period was aimed to bring out, how the press coverage dealt with the perpetrators of the coup, with the government of Makarios and if a connection between coup and invasion was made.

In order to ascertain, whether the newspapers connected coup and invasion, it was necessary to code all articles dealing with the invasion and its consequences. Due to the fact that only very few articles referred to the coup, the analysis of these articles focused on the content and not on any creative features.

Verification of the first Hypothesis – The coverage in Machi

After the coup the editors of Machi remained faithful to their right-wing position. Typical for the coverage of Machi is an implicit blending of information and opinion by suppressing the coup thematically. Simultaneously there were also cases of explicit blending of information and opinion identified in the coverage of Machi.

The frequency analysis of the coded articles in the second period showed that Machi almost didn’t mention the coup at all (less than 1% of the coded articles), although it had
almost the same number of articles on the Turkish invasion as can be found in the coverage of Charavgi and Phileleftheros. Machi avoided pointedly to making the question of the responsibility for the invasion a subject of discussion. The Greek Junta and president Makarios were also less mentioned in the coverage of Machi than in any of the other two newspapers. It is remarkable that all three newspapers didn’t report any further on EOKA B, once the coup was over.

The small number of articles on the coup in the coverage of Machi made Content Analysis difficult. However it was possible on the basis of two articles, to prove the explicit blending of information and opinion; these are the only articles that directly mentioned Nicos Sampson. In the article "Critical Moments for our folk. The twelve days of the Cyprus Crisis" the editors of Machi wrote: "23.7.1974, the president of the republic Mr. Sampson resigned, as the new president of the republic will be sworn the former president of the parliament, Mr. Kliridis" (Μάχη 02.08.1974, p. 3). In this way dated Machi the "outbreak of the crisis" on the day of the invasion, and not on the day of the coup. The second article was a short message on the return of Sampson from Greece to Cyprus after the coup. Once more Sampson was presented as the legitimate president of Cyprus between 15.07.1974 and 23.07.1974. Machi accused the Greek Junta of being responsible for the situation in Cyprus and annotated the collapse of the Junta by writing "Democracy is being restored in Greece" (Μάχη 03.08.1974, p. 3).

Another important indicator for the right-wing orientation of the coverage of Machi was its attitude towards Makarios. Machi suppressed the fact that Makarios was overthrown illegally on 15.07.1974. Machi’s editors pointed out that Makarios’ return to the political spectrum of Cyprus was not desirable on their part and supported the provisional president Kliridis as the new official president of the state instead. Makarios was declared the former president of Cyprus. As an example the documentation "The speech of the former president" can be mentioned (Μάχη 04.08.1974, S.5).

**Verification of the second hypothesis – The coverage in Charavgi**

In the second examined period Charavgi explicitly held the view of its party. Implicit one-sided coverage was only observed to a minor degree. The editorial staff of Charavgi openly pleaded for a return of president Makarios and identified the coup as the cause of the tragedy of the island. Simultaneously the editors of Charavgi in view of the Turkish invasion stated, that they would encourage the unity of the folk on the island in order to support stability. Therefore Charavgi also supported the provisional president Kliridis in its coverage
and remained moderate in demanding justice for the accomplices of the Greek Junta in Cyprus.

It was possible to identify an important thematic difference between the coverage in Charavgi and Machi with the help of thematic frequency analysis. The coup was not the daily headline topic in Charavgi’s coverage; still it appeared more frequently in its coverage than in the Machi’s. Compared to the other newspapers, the coup accounted for about 11% of entirety of Charavgi’s coded articles. This rate is considerably higher than the one of Phileleftheros (6%) and of Machi (1%), a fact that illustrates the indirect blending of information and opinion in the coverage of Charavgi. Also the results of the thematic frequency analysis further confirm that Charavgi’s account of the events was one-sided. The Greek Junta was mentioned very often, while the partial "responsibility of EOKA B for the coup", was completely missing. Against the background of the ongoing Turkish invasion, Charavgi stopped any reporting on the role of EOKA B, in order not to fuel any disunity in the Cypriot population. The examination of the thematic criterion "Presentation of Glafkos Kliridis and of the provisional government" didn’t show any implicit blending of information and opinion. On the contrary Charavgi reported often and positive on him and his government.

In the coverage of Charavgi an explicit blending of information and opinion is more predominating. The editors of Charavgi openly showed a negative attitude towards the coup of 15.07.1974. On the one hand they condemned the coup as a break of the constitution of the republic; on the other hand they showed that the coup was the cause of the Turkish invasion. Nevertheless Charavgi didn’t explicitly name the leaders of the coup. As an example, on 03.08.1974 (p. 1) Charavgi wrote: "Since the 15. July experiences the Cypriot folk the most tragic moments of its long-time history. [...] Definitely there are a few persons, who are responsible for this disaster and they are known to everybody. [...] We are quiet only because Cyprus is still in flames, which threat to burn down everything and everybody. [...]"

The comments in the articles of Charavgi on the Greek junta were very straight. In his article P. Petritis judged: "In its collapse the fascistic Junta dragged along an agonising and suffering Cyprus to the ruins." (Χαραυγή 11.08.1974, p. 1). Further we could identify the attempt of Charavgi to support the unity of the Cypriot folk. On 03.08.1974 the editors of Charavgi announced, that they would refrain from any direct accusations against persons involved in the coup, in order not to add fuel to the flames.

Another example for the explicit one-sided coverage of Charavgi was provided in the reports on Makarios and Kliridis. In contrast to Machi, Charavgi differentiated strict between
the two main political figures of Cyprus, also in the period after the coup. Makarios was further on denominated as the president-elect of Cyprus. Characteristic for this were the editorials of the edition on 08.08.1974: "The president Makarios announces and accuses" (Χαραυγή 08.08.1974, p.1). In contrast Kliridis was presented as deputy of the government only.

**Verification of the third hypothesis- The coverage in Phileleftheros**

The examination of the coverage of Phileleftheros in the second period didn’t lead to a clear picture as in the case of Machi and Charavgi. This has its reason in the fact that Phileleftheros didn’t support any political position but regarded itself as independent. Especially the coverage on Makarios and Kliridis stayed consciously neutral. In this Phileleftheros did not report objectively, its editors rather tried to not take a position by publishing many documentaries and interviews.

No implicit blending of information and opinion could be identified. The thematic frequency analysis of the different issues didn’t show any one-sided thematic selection. Phileleftheros was actually very careful in this point. The coup occurred in its coverage with a total of 6% of the coded material more often than in the coverage of Machi, but less often than in Charavgi’s coverage.

A further analysis of the coded articles showed that the coup was only mentioned in the coverage of Phileleftheros, but not discussed. Also the coup was only limitedly linked to the invasion. The linking mainly happened through documentations. An example for this case is the documentation of Phileleftheros on 09.08.1974 "MAKARIOS: Some states knew in advance about the coup in Cyprus". This article was an interview with Makarios in which he elucidated the coherences between coup and invasion: "[...] the coup of the Greek Junta and its accomplices in Cyprus was a national betrayal. It ended as a national disaster for Cyprus and gave the chance to Turkey for an aggression" (Φιλελεύθερος 09.08.1974, p. 4.) This conscious use of documentations for an indirect transportation of opinions was already ascertained in the first examined period in the coverage of Phileleftheros. The editors published statements of politicians and of other persons in order to avoid publishing own commentary. In the commentaries Phileleftheros remained neutral: "Let us shake hands with each other" (Φιλελεύθερος 02.08.1974, p. 1), was the title of the commentary in the first page of the first edition of Phileleftheros after the coup. In spite of the common motif of reconciliation in both newspapers, Charavgi and Phileleftheros, Phileleftheros dealt with the crisis in Cyprus in a different way: while Charavgi’s editors tried to elucidate the background
of the crisis, the editors of *Phileleftheros* let “others” speak for them (through documentations).

The coverage of *Phileleftheros* was interesting concerning the person of Makarios. While in the first period, before the coup, *Phileleftheros* supported Makarios, in the second period *Phileleftheros* behaved neutral. Makarios was presented in the coverage as the "archbishop"\(^{18}\) or "president"\(^{19}\) of Cyprus, sometimes also only with his name. In 81% of the articles of *Phileleftheros* in which Kliridis was mentioned, he was called as the president of Cyprus. The newspaper obviously didn’t intend to present Makarios in a negative way. It seems that the editors of *Phileleftheros* wanted to remain noncommittal, until the domestic affairs were clarified in Cyprus.

5. Conclusions

The results of the Content Analysis combined with the historical and sociocultural background lead to the following insights in the press coverage of that period in Cyprus:

In spite of the independence of Cyprus in 1960 the domestic political situation grew more acute until 1974. Many Greek Cypriots were still attracted by the dream of Enosis. The radical nationalists regarded Makarios, who signed the independence treaty of Cyprus, as a traitor; however the majority of the Greek Cypriots supported his policy.\(^{20}\) The analysis of the newspapers clearly demonstrates that this division into supporters and opposers found its manifestation in the press also, especially after Makarios demanded the withdrawal of the Greek Officers from Cyprus in his letter on 02.07.1974.

On the brink of the coup not only the radical right-wing newspapers (*Ethniki*, *Mesimvrini*, *Patris*) opposed to Makarios and his politics, but also the less radical newspapers, like *Machi*, \(^{21}\) showed a negative attitude. Simultaneously left-wing and independent newspapers like *Charavgi* and *Phileleftheros* defined their position as on Makarios' side.

\(^{18}\) Compare the article "Our chances" (*Φιλελεύθερος* 04.08.1974, p.3)

\(^{19}\) Compare the article "The statements of Mr. Kliridis about the come-back of the president Makarios in Cyprus." (*Φιλελεύθερος* 07.08.1974, p.4)

\(^{20}\) Makarios won the relevant president elections of 1973 with an overwhelming majority.

\(^{21}\) *Machi* supported the enosis but was not ab initio against Makarios.
This division of the press cannot always be directly observed in its coverage. Both sides (supporters as well as opposers) used different ways of blending information and opinion. The editorial staff of Charavgi and Phileleftheros favoured an explicit one-sided coverage; they made no secret of their political orientation. Charavgi applied for this purpose often formal opinion-stressed articles, like commentary or leading articles while Phileleftheros issued much political, one-sided documentation. On the contrary the editorial staff of Machi mostly implicitly supported the opponents of the Republic of Cyprus. This implicit support was achieved by systematically highlighting isolated aspects of incidents, while omitting any background information that could lead to undesirable interpretations. Typical for the coverage of Machi were many brief and thematically narrowed down articles.

After Makarios was overthrown and replaced by Nicos Sampson 15.07.1974 the newspapers stopped publishing at first, due to the censorship. Only the national broadcast RIK, which was also under the control of the Greek Junta and EOKA B, officially stayed on air. Through their radio program the rebels announced on 15.07.1974 between 08:00 and 09:00 their victory: "The national guard intervened in order to solve the problematical situation. [...]. Makarios is dead". In a last act Makarios, who had managed to escape, denied his death through a private radio transmitter in Pafos, before fleeing abroad. From this point on the illegal government of Nicos Sampson controlled the media. The press remained object to censorship. Due to these circumstances, a Content Analysis of the press coverage of that period wouldn’t have been particularly meaningful. Hence we restricted ourselves to a mere qualitative examination of the few newspaper editions available.

Due to censorship the editorial staff of not right-wing newspapers refused to continue publishing any newspapers at all. On 19.07.1974 and 20.07.1974 only Agon, Ethniki and Machi appeared in print. The few editions, which were available, illustrate the dramatic change of the situation in Cyprus after the coup. The newspapers were supporting the coup employing propagandistic instruments. Machi’s leading article on 19.07.1974 had the following title: "The Government of national salvation guides the people back to cultural unity. The corrupt old regime is overthrown and finished." Agon and Ethniki also praised the rebels. Ethniki wrote: "After the liberating intervention of the military, the tyrant had to flee. The relief of the people is effusive." The obtainable editions of Machi set an example of the changes in the coverage during the governance of Nicos Sampson. His supporters in the press

22 Unfortunately not all the editions of that period exist in the Press archive of Cyprus any more.
openly deviated from the truth, deliberately omitted information and made up events. For example on 20.07.1974 Machi wrote: "The ambition of the new government. Peaceful solution for the Cyprus problem.", or: "The military youth placed Sampson in the place of the president of Cyprus. Waldheim\textsuperscript{23} greeted Makarios because he approves with him." It is noticeable that, after Sampson took over the leadership, he didn’t openly bring forward the topic of Enosis. On the contrary he emphasized that the status quo of the island would remain unchanged\textsuperscript{24} and his aim was only to whisk away Makarios, the tyrant.

Another aspect of deliberate disinformation concerned the Turkish reactions on the coup. The preparations of the invasion were not mentioned in the coverage of the newspapers. The journey of the Turkish Prime Minister Boulent Etzevit to Britain, which aimed to convince the British to allow Turkey a military basis on the island, was not mentioned. Also the Turkish conditions for a prevention of an imminent invasion were kept secret. One of these conditions was the resignation of Sampson (Stern 1978: 151). On 20.07.1974, the day the Turkish military was deployed for the invasion; Machi once more assured its readership: "It is impossible for Turkey to intervene in Cyprus. Turkey’s resources are limited." Sampson resigned three days later, on 23.07.1974.

After Sampson’s resignation, the censorship was officially abolished, but due to the exceptional circumstances that resulted from the ongoing Turkish invasion, the first free newspapers did not regularly appear in print until after the invasion came to a halt on 01.08.1974. Only Phileleftheros wrote on 05.08.1974 (p.1) that the owners of the newspapers made an agreement with the provisional president Kliridis to obtain a consulting role as far as it concerned the political coverage of the newspapers. However Content Analysis of the editions of that period provided no indications for any active censorship of the political content in the newspapers.

The examination of the editions of the newspapers directly after the coup (02.07 - 11.07.1974) did not reveal the same schemata as the periods before. Had the Cypriot press been divided into two parties, it now showed three political directions. Charavgi remained

\textsuperscript{23} Kurt Waldheim was the secretary general of UNO between 1972 -1982.

\textsuperscript{24} "Mr. Minister announced that the foreign policy of Cyprus will not change […] Mr. Dimitriou [Minister of the foreign affairs in the coup regime] repeated that the new Cypriot government will not promote the issue of Enosis, but will aim for a common solution to the Cyprus problem with the Turkish Cypriot 'friends', like he called them" (Machi 20.07.1974, p.1)
faithful to the policy of its party, though more explicit through the publication of more opinion-stressed articles. The editorial staff of Charavgi characterized the coup as the obvious cause of the Turkish invasion and pled for the return of President Makarios. In its edition of 01.08.1974 (p.4) Charavgi published the article: "Chronic of the tragedy of Cyprus“, which aimed to fill all the gaps in the information which had been caused by the censorship. Only the names of the people who were responsible for the tragedy were primarily omitted. The message that Charavgi sent to its public was “postponed is not abandoned”. Under the circumstances Charavgi tried to avoid provoking a new civil war with its coverage. Instead of that Charavgi supported the provisional government of Kliridis and the unity of Cyprus.

Phileleftheros also attempted not to add fuel to the flames during the period of the invasion. The difference however was that Phileleftheros did not mention the coup as often as Charavgi in its coverage. Consequently Phileleftheros avoid showing any connection between the coup and the invasion. Typical for hesitant attitude of Phileleftheros was also the obviously reduced support for Makarios. The editors of Phileleftheros awaited the stabilization of the domestic affairs.

Machi had been an open propaganda instrument during the governance of Samson. After the Invasion it reverted to its old implicit method of propaganda. In the coverage of Machi coup and invasion remained disconnected, other embarrassing Situations of the period 15.7.1974 - 23.07.1974, were omitted. It was also impossible for Machi to admit the mistakes of its owner during the coup. Sampson did never notify his failure publicly. The continuation in the editing policy of Machi and the continued refusal to accept the overthrown President as the legal president proved that the nationalists, even after their coup failed, were not willing to admit the failure and injustice of their own actions.

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