The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy
A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations

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1. Introduction

This paper is part of my ongoing PhD thesis which investigates the effects of EU membership on Greek foreign policy. The central question is: To what extent has Greek foreign policy been Europeanised by operating for so many years within an EU institutional environment?

In Greece as elsewhere, the term Europeanisation is a source of conceptual confusion. In the field of foreign policy we can distinguish at least four different ways in which the term has been employed. First, Europeanisation is used to describe a process through which Greece has been transformed from an awkward partner that consistently deviated from EU consensus on foreign policy issues to an “orthodox” member-state and champion of European integration\(^1\). From this perspective the Europeanisation is a process of convergence to a European mainstream. Second Europeanisation is understood in terms of “diplomatic lever”\(^2\). In this context particular emphasis has been given to the “bargaining power and negotiating effectiveness” entailed by Greece’s participation in EU policy-making and its ability to use EU instruments in the pursuit of national goals\(^3\). Third Europeanisation is used to depict the influence of EU membership on what is commonly called the “domestic sources” of foreign policy. From this perspective the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy is considered to be part of a wider trend of modernisation of the Greek economy, society and politics, which is triggered and/or upheld by EU membership\(^4\). Finally Europeanisation is seen as a process of adaptation of Greek foreign policy structures and processes to EU standards. In this respect the focus is on the influence of EU membership on the constitutional and administrative structures, the thematic agenda and the policy styles\(^5\).


From the above discussion it emerges that whereas the influence of EU membership on Greek foreign policy has been widely studied, little effort has been made to advance a coherent theoretical framework that is able to grasp the different aspects of EU impact. In this paper I attempt to fill this gap by introducing a theoretical model which is based on three pillars.

The first is a discursive/constructivist understanding of foreign policy, which portrays to take hold of the fact that national interests, and the resulting foreign policy objectives and means, are not given but socially constructed. For this purpose I introduce the concept of foreign policy discourse which is understood as a set of statements that provide the rationale for foreign policy action by establishing a particular understanding of national interests and identifying connection between means and objectives in order to achieve those interests. Accordingly, foreign policy change is understood in terms of adjustment, transformation or replacement of the dominant foreign policy discourse.

The second pillar is the identification of four “pathways” of Europeanisation. More precisely I argue that at the substantive level (i.e. content of foreign policy discourse) Europeanisation may occur either through the setting up of policies which force member states to adapt (pathway 1) or through the spread of policy paradigms and norms of appropriate foreign policy behaviour which provide member states with a different understanding of their interests (pathway 2). At the procedural level (i.e. policy-making structures and processes) Europeanisation may entail the adjustment of domestic institutions to the requirements of EU membership (pathway 3) or the socialisation of national officials to the procedural norms which guide policy making within the EU (pathway 4). This procedural Europeanisation may of course affect indirectly the substance of foreign policy.

The third building block is the specification of five mediating conditions of EU impact: the salience of the issue area; the institutional capacity for reform, which depends on the autonomy of the executive leadership, the presence of veto points and the institutional/bureaucratic culture; the active engagement of change agents at the

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6 On the notion of pathway see euborderconf.bham.ac.uk. My model has been inspired from the conceptual framework used in the context of this project, which studies the European Union’s impact on the transformation of border conflicts. However, the pathways and mediating conditions I identify are different.
domestic level; the timing of the European input; and finally the parallel evolutions in world politics including the target area.

The utility of this model is illustrated through an examination of Greek-Turkish relations during a 20 years period which spans from the restoration of democracy till the present. Based on an extensive review of secondary literature and primary sources I will show that Greek foreign policy towards Turkey has undergone a substantial change since the second half of the 1990s, which however falls short of challenging the basic understandings upon which it has been built. I will therefore argue that this shift can best be described in terms of a transformation of the dominant foreign policy discourse. I will also advance some tentative arguments concerning the extent to which this transformation can be attributed to EU membership as well as the conditions that have facilitated or hampered this process of Europeanisation.

In the next section I elaborate my conceptual framework. In the third section I present a historical overview which seeks to identify patterns of continuity and change in Greek foreign policy. The third section deals with the pathways and conditions of Europeanisation. The concluding sections summarises the findings

2. Conceptual framework

2.1. Foreign policy discourse

The study of foreign policy, like the study of international relations more generally has been marked by a vigorous debate between the rationalist and reflectivist traditions.

According to the former, foreign policy should be seen as a purposeful activity which involves the formulation of a set of objectives to be achieved and the employment of the necessary means/capabilities for achieving them from the part of an independent international actor (most notably governments representing a state), which is directed towards the external environment in this actor operates7. From this perspective foreign policy change involves a redefinition of objectives and means and

it can be represented as a continuum at the one end of which we have limited adjustment in means and at the other a reorientation in the international role and activities of the state. It follows that the role of the foreign policy analyst is to discover the reasons that prompt states to redirect their foreign policies. These might include material factors that lie in the states’ external and internal environment, such as the distribution of capabilities or the constellation of interests of domestic constituencies or alternatively change might be related with factors which are found within the decision making-process, with particular emphasis being given to the perceptions of individual policy-makers and the bureaucratic processes of decision making.

The reflectivist tradition sees foreign policy as a discursive activity that constructs the self and the other. Reflectivists portray that the world does not exist independently of the meaning we make of it and that this meaning is constituted through discourse. Discourse is understood in post-structuralist terms as inherently “ambiguous, incomplete and contingent systems of meaning”, which produce identities, in the sense that “they operationalise a regime of truth while excluding other possible modes of identity”. From this perspective the analysis of foreign policy should be concerned not with the way policy-makers decide on a mixture of objectives and means but with the way national identities are constituted through and represented in foreign policies.

The central problem which rationalist approaches face is that they do not take into account the role of ideational factors in the shaping of national interests. National

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interests are usually posited on the basis of brave assumptions about the rationality of policy-makers and their ability to respond to external and internal stimuli. Even those scholars who attempted to investigate the influence of decision makers beliefs in foreign policy outcomes subscribe to an individualistic understanding of ideas which underestimates the social structure within which these beliefs are embedded\textsuperscript{14}. Another problem with rationalism is that it often ends up with a materialist/idealist dichotomy following which foreign policy change may occur either from material interests or from ideological factors\textsuperscript{15}. On the other hand, reflectivists by virtue of their focus on social constitution are well positioned to account for the “sources” of ideas however their neglect of causal theorising prevents them from studying the impact of those ideas on foreign policy outcomes\textsuperscript{16}.

My approach seeks to integrate the reflectivist and rationalist tradition under a discursive constructivist understanding of foreign policy. More precisely, together with reflectivists I argue that interests cannot be given apart from socially constituted ideas, and together with rationalists I argue that this focus on social constitution should not prevent us from studying the causal effect ideas have on foreign policy. The intellectual background for the bridging of the two traditions is provided by a school of thought, which is commonly known as Social Constructivism. Social constructivists are united in their conviction that the environment in which states operate is social as well as material and that this setting can provide them with an understanding of their interests\textsuperscript{17} but they differ as to the social content of our world. Some refer to systemic culture\textsuperscript{18} others to international norms\textsuperscript{19}, others to national identities\textsuperscript{20}.

\textsuperscript{17} Checkel, J. (1998): “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”; in \textit{World Politics}, 50, p.325
In an attempt to integrate these different elements I introduce the concept of foreign policy discourse which I define as a set of statements that provide the rationale for foreign policy action by establishing a particular understanding of national interests and identifying connections between means and objectives in order to achieve those interests. A foreign policy discourse does not come out of thin air. It is based on a particular representation of the world which reflects dominant perceptions of the self and the other. The concept of policy discourse so defined comes close to what Hall calls a policy paradigm that is “a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goal of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing”\textsuperscript{21}. However the use of the term discourse has the advantage of directing our attention away from an abstract mental construction (i.e. ideas) towards something that can be directly observed (i.e.statements)\textsuperscript{22}. This methodological issue is a reflection of a more substantive difference between the two concepts. By focusing on shared ideas, the concept of policy paradigm still conceives of meaning in individualistic terms. Within the discursive/constructivist perspective that I propose meaning is intersubjective and in part linguistic\textsuperscript{23}. This transition from ideas to discourse allows us to transcend the conventional understanding of the policy-making process as an arena where different actors, holding different beliefs interpret options and compete to influence the final decision, towards an understanding of the policy-making process as a discursive space where different discourses compete for adherents\textsuperscript{24}.

At a specific point in time a particular policy discourse will acquire dominance and will therefore provide the framework of foreign policy action\textsuperscript{25}. The possibility of change in this model resides in the capacity of alternative policy discourses to challenge the dominant discourse. More precisely I argue that it is possible to identify three levels of change:

\textsuperscript{25} On the concept of dominant discourse see Wæver, O. (1998): op. cit.
• Adjustment, which involves a limited change in the means used, but which leaves the dominant policy discourse intact.
• Transformation, which involves a substantial change in the means used (including the introduction of new means and strategies)
• Replacement, which involves the abandonment of the dominant policy discourse in favour of a new policy discourse (including the identification of new objectives)

2.2. Pathways and conditions of Europeanisation

The concept of Europeanisation has taken various meanings throughout modern history ranging from an anthropological debate on the emergence of a European culture to a sociological enquiry into the diffusion of cultural norms and patterns of behaviour\textsuperscript{26}. For the purpose of this study Europeanisation is understood as a process through which European integration influences the foreign policies of member states. Thus Europeanisation is strictly speaking EU-sation.

According to Diez et al.\textsuperscript{27} it is possible to identify four understandings of Europeanisation: Policy Europeanisation, which studies the influence of European integration on member-states’ public policies, including policy actors, policy problems, policy instruments and policy styles\textsuperscript{28}. Political Europeanisation, which examines the influence of European integration on political actors such as executives, public administrations, political parties, parliaments, interest groups and subnational governments\textsuperscript{29}. Societal Europeanisation which operates at a rather more fundamental level that the other two and can be defined as a process of change in the construction of intersubjective meanings and common understandings within the context of European integration\textsuperscript{30}. Discursive Europeanisation, which focus on public discourses

\textsuperscript{29} See the collective Hix, S. & Goetz, K. (2000): Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political systems, (London, Frank Cass)
and analyses the extent to which references to the EU are made in public claims and how this has changed over time\textsuperscript{31}.

Research on Europeanisation has initially adopted a top-down approach following which European integration triggers a process of change, the outcome of which will depend on a number of mediating factors to be found in the domestic environment of states. In the field of public policy for instance it has been argued that Europeanisation emanates from an adaptational pressure, the magnitude of which depends on the degree of compatibility (goodness of fit) between domestic and EU arrangements\textsuperscript{32}. The problem with these to-down approaches is that they do not take into account that domestic change may not involve an adaptational pressure, but instead emerge from the fact that EU decisions challenge domestic equilibriua and therefore may alter the opportunity structures of domestic actors\textsuperscript{33}, or from the fact domestic reformers may use the “need of adaptation” to EU requirements as an excuse to promote change\textsuperscript{34}. Accordingly recent research has adopted a bottom up approach which starts from a domestic system of interaction and examines how the EU provides a change in any of the components of the domestic system of interaction\textsuperscript{35}.

The Europeanisation of national foreign policies is strictly speaking falling to the category of policy Europeanisation. However in the constructivist understanding that this study employs it is difficult to isolate the policy and the societal dimension, since both of them are interrelated. In order to depict the different facets of EU impact on foreign policies it is therefore necessary to develop a genuine model.

My model is based on the identification four pathways which can be categorised along two dimensions. The first dimension distinguishes between the sources of EU impact, in particular whether it emanates from the setting up of a particular policy or

\textsuperscript{34} Kallestrup, M. (2002): “Europeanisation as Discourse: Domestic Policy Legitimisation Through the Articulation of the Need for Adaptation”; in Public Policy and Administration, Vol. 17, No 2, pp. 110-124
\textsuperscript{35} Radaelli, C. (2004): “Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?” in European Integration on-line Papers; Vol. 8, No. 16, \url{http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm}
institutional arrangement, or whether it involves the development and diffusion of ideas of appropriate policies and diplomatic practices. The second dimension concerns the level of EU impact, in particular whether it touches upon the substance of foreign policy (i.e. foreign policy discourse) or the foreign policy-making process. The latter is related to the former, since a change in the process through which foreign policy is formulated is likely to affect its substance, but the link here is indirect. More precisely:

The first pathway which I shall call substantive/regulative emerges when the EU prescribes (or intends to prescribe) a specific policy for member states to follow. In this case change is the result of an adaptational pressure (real or anticipated) provoked by the incompatibility between domestic and European arrangements. The dynamics of change will therefore involve coercion, and compliance with EU requirements will depend on an instrumental calculation of costs and benefits. The adaptational pressure will be stronger in those policy areas where member-states have relinquished a great amount of competencies to supranational institutions (i.e. EC external relations) because on the one hand they will have less power to influence decisions and on the other hand commitments will be legally binding. However, the literature reveals that even in areas of intergovernmental co-operation the lack of legally binding agreements did not always entail a lack of enforcement. In any event change should normally be absorbed within the existing policy discourse.

The second pathway which I shall call substantive/constitutive is activated when policy philosophies and norms of appropriate foreign policy behaviour which are first established at the EU level are diffused to member states. Following Manners it is possible to identify five basic norms: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights. In contrast with the previous pathway change is not triggered by an adaptational pressure and does not involve coercion. It comes through persuasion and it is likely to involve a transformation of the dominant discourse. Ultimately this


pathway may lead to a substantial change in national identities which in turn may bring a replacement of the dominant discourse from an alternative discourse. The third pathway which I shall call procedural/regulative emerges when participation in the EU requires an institutional restructuring in member states. This will normally involve an expansion in size and finances of foreign ministries and diplomatic services as well as an increase in the number of missions and accreditations both in the EU and third countries, in order to deal with a growing workload and an expanded agenda. Some empirical studies have also identified that foreign ministries have been able to exercise central strategic political control because they have been entrusted with the work of co-ordinating EU affairs. At the same time the nature of EU policy-making has allowed other ministries to develop their own external relations and conduct their own foreign policies, thus challenging the role of foreign ministries as gatekeepers. On the whole this pathway involves a change in the opportunity structures of domestic actors. As a result of this alteration in opportunity structures, previously marginalised discourses might be strengthened.

The fourth pathway which I shall call procedural/constitutive focuses on the socialisation of national policy-makers to the formal and informal procedural norms that guide interaction among member-states. Within the CFSP/EPC framework these procedural norms include the habit of regular consultation, the responsibility to keep shared information confidential, a commitment to engage in genuine efforts for compromise rather than seeking loopholes to block unpleasant decisions and the right to keep issues considered essential for national security outside the scope of the EU. The existence of these norms is said to have influenced the way member-states conduct foreign policy within the EU towards a more co-operative style which enabled them to overcome power politics and reach common position that transcended the lowest common denominator. Co-operation may also be facilitated

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40 For an argument along these lines on the case of Spain see Torreblanca, J. (2001): “Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanisation of Spanish Foreign Policy”; Arena Working Papers, 26
by the frequency of interactions which can influences the self perceptions of national officials and create a sense of we-feeling\textsuperscript{46}.

It is important to note that the distinction between sources of EU impact is an analytical not an ontological one. By this I mean that what matters is not so much the way EU is involved (direct policy, norms of appropriate behaviour) but how EU involvement is seen at the domestic level. The internalisation of informal norms might involve rhetorical action and coercion\textsuperscript{47}. In the same vain, as the second generation of Europeanisation has shown, compliance with EU policies might be used as an argument in the domestic political debate by actors who favour change. Moreover at a specific point in time different perceptions of the EU might coexist. It is therefore possible that the same EU action will be interpreted differently from different actors, and that the regulative and constitutive pathways are simultaneously at work\textsuperscript{48}.

The empirical research has revealed that responses to Europeanisation have been highly idiosyncratic and that the likelihood of adjustment depends on a number of mediating factors. Based on the existing literature I have identified five such factors. The first is the institutional capacity for reform, which is a function of the existence or not of veto players who oppose change in the domestic arena, the capacity of the executive leadership and the institutional/bureaucratic culture. The hypothesis is that EU membership is likely to make a difference in conditions of intermediate capacity because in cases of low capacity change will be resisted and in cases of high capacity change is likely to be promoted irrespectively from the EU\textsuperscript{49}. The second facilitating condition is the mobilisation at the domestic and international arena of change agents who are able to persuade others\textsuperscript{50}. The third factor is the timing of the European input, in particular whether it precedes, follows or coincides


\textsuperscript{48} Methodologically this means that in order to have constitutive effects the EU must be seen as part of the self in the foreign policy discourse. On the contrary when the EU is seen as an external actor the regulative pathway is at work.


with domestic processes of transformation\textsuperscript{51}. The fourth factor is the salience of the policy area. The expectation here is that when an issue is considered of high priority adaptation will be more difficult. Finally one has to take into account parallel evolutions in the external environment of the state. In this respect it is important to examine systemic changes, the role of other actors as well as changes in the target area\textsuperscript{52}.

3. The evolution of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey

3.1. A “threat from the east”

For much of the Cold War Greece and Turkey have maintained reasonably good relations and, notwithstanding the escalation of bi-communal conflict in Cyprus and the diplomatic tension created over the situation of the Greek minority in Turkey during the 1960s, a Greek-Turkish war was “unconceivable”\textsuperscript{53}. This period of relative stability came to an end in 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied 37% of its northern territory in response to the overthrow of the islands’ elected government by a Greek-Cypriot nationalist group whose declared objective was to achieve the unification (enosis) of Cyprus with Greece. Although these events did not lead to an outright war they nevertheless resulted to the deepening of existing divisions through the forced displacement of 160,000 Greek Cypriots and 40,000 Turkish Cypriots to and from the southern part of the island and the creation of two ethnically homogeneous zones. This in turn had a negative impact on the bilateral relations of their respective homeland. In parallel with the deterioration of the situation in Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations since 1974 have been marked by the gradual emergence of bilateral differences over the control of the Aegean, including the responsibility for air traffic control in the Athens FIR, the extent of the Greek territorial waters and national airspace and the delimitation of the continental self of the Greek islands,


\textsuperscript{52} Vaquer i Fanes, J. (2001): “Europeanisation and Foreign Policy”; \textit{Working Paper No 21, Observatori de Política Exterior}, IUEE, UAB, Barcelona

which brought the two countries to the brink of war in 1976, when Turkey dispatched the survey ship Sismik in contested waters. Relations between Greece and Turkey soured further by allegations over the mistreatment of the Turkish speaking Muslim minority in Western Thrace.

The Turkish invasion in Cyprus and the proliferation of differences in the Aegean has generated a consensus among Greek foreign policy-makers and public opinion that Turkey pursues a revisionist foreign policy which aims to alter the status quo and therefore it represents a threat for Greece's national security. After the end of the Cold War this threat perception has been exacerbated by the belief that Turkey could profit from the collapse of the Soviet Union and become a regional hegemon through the creation of an Islamic Arc extending from Central Asia to the Balkans.

The idea of Turkish threat flourished because it resonated well with dominant societal perceptions of Greekness. More precisely Greek national identity has been founded on the postulation that the Greek nation has a unified history which starts from the Ancient Greece (Classical and Hellenistic era) and, passing through Byzantium and the Ottoman era, gets to the establishment of the modern Greek state which is the homeland for all the linguistic groups and peoples that had been incorporated into the Greek nation throughout the centuries. The idea that the

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55 The Muslim minority of Thrace is composed of three constituencies (according to their self-designation): Pomaks, Roms and Turks. However the Greek state has find it difficult to accept the self-designation of parts of this minority as Turks. See Tsitselikis, (2004): "How Far Have EU Policies Affected Minority Issues in Greece and Turkey?"; Paper presented at the EUBorderConf conference in Istanbul, November 2004


58 This storyline was elaborated by the Greek historians Constantinos Paparigopoulos, and Spiridon Zabelios and became the official ideology of the newly established state. This perception of Greekness prevailed because it amalgamated successfully the two main competing ideologies of the pre-Revolutionary era. The first, which was represented by the Bourgeoisie and some intellectuals perceived the inhabitants as “descendants” of ancient Greeks, identified positively with the West, subscribed to the principles of enlightenment and advocated the establishment of a independent modern nation/state. The second, which was represented by ecclesiastical circles and the aristocracy, linked Greekness with the Byzantium and Orthodoxy and perceived the creation of westernised Greek state as alien to Greece’s eastern tradition. Instead it supported the establishment of a Christian Empire, with the Greeks as the ruling class. See Veremis, T. & Koliopoulos, J. (2003): "The Evolving Content of the Greek Nation"; in Couloumbis, T., Kariotis, T. & Bellou, F. (2003): *Greece in the Twentieth Century* (London, Frank Cass)
Greeks are inheritors of the Ancient Greek and Byzantine civilisations renders the Ottoman Empire and its successor Turkey as apparent and unfriendly “Other”. In contrast with Greeks, who are the founders of democracy and who led the ground of modern civilisation, the Turks are portrayed as inherently aggressive, barbaric, totalitarian and as envying Greece’s glorious past. Turkey’s irredentism since 1974 is therefore not accidental but a constant feature because it is deeply embedded in the nature of the Turkish people.

Beyond this dominant nationalist discourse it is possible to identify three other interrelated streams of thought which further fuel threat perceptions vis-à-vis Turkey: The first is based on the idea of an irreconcilable rift between the Greek-Orthodox and Western civilisations. According to the proponents of this discourse the problem is not the nature of Turkish people per se, but the fact that catholic and protestant Western countries, which constantly conspire to destroy the Greece nation, prompt and support Turkish irredentism. The second has its roots in classical “geopolitical” thinking and portrays that Turkey, driven by rapid population growth and industrialisation, is in search of “vital space”, and that the ageing and shrinking Greece is the obvious available slot. The third is influenced by the “Realist” approach to international relations and sees Turkey’s expansionary policies as a reflection of the struggle for power which is the driving force in international politics.

In short, since 1974 the Greek foreign policy discourse has been dominated by the perception of an imminent and existential threat from the east. This threat perception has demonstrated a remarkable stability. Turkey’s revisionism has never been doubted. What has been debated however was the way Greece should respond to this threat is. It is to this issue that I turn in the next section.

3.2. The Greek strategy

Greece’s response to the Turkish threat was based on three pillars: the maintenance of an adequate military balance with Turkey, in order to dissuade it from attacking Greek

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59 For a critical presentation of this thought see Heraclides, A. (2001): *Greece and the Threat from the East*; (Athens, Polis)
territory (internal balancing), the rallying of international support in order to enhance Greece’s diplomatic leverage (external balancing), and the evocation of international law as the basis for a viable settlement of outstanding issues. This strategy was initiated by Karamanlis, in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and provided the general framework within which Greece’s foreign policy towards Turkey has evolved. I shall examine each of the three pillars in turn.

**Internal balancing**

At the time of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, it was widely believed that Greece’s deterrence ability had been compromised by its adherence to NATO’s strategic plans. When NATO rebuffed the Greek government’s requests to intervene politically and militarily to force Turkey to retreat its army from Cyprus, a consensus emerged that Greece should develop an autonomous security policy, drawing upon its own resources and focusing on the protection of the long Greek coastline\(^63\). In this context Greece adopted a series of intensive armament programmes, with particular emphasis on the Aegean islands, which were heavily militarised. It is indicative that since 1974 and throughout the 1980s, Greece’s defence expenditure represented consistently more than 6% of its GDP\(^64\).

The credibility of the Greek deterrence strategy was also considered of primary importance. In this context it was argued that Greece should not only possess adequate military capabilities but that it should also demonstrate the will and intention to use those capabilities if necessary\(^65\). In this context Greece tried to delimit red lines, the transgression of which could provoke a war between the two countries. The following statement from Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou is indicative:

“In order to avoid misunderstanding, it should be known to friends and foes alike that in case of an attack or invasion against the Greek-Cypriot positions, Greece will not stay out. I have warned that this is a *casus belli*”\(^66\).

\(^{65}\) Platias, A. (1991): op. cit. p. 100
Greece’s efforts to increase the credibility of its deterrence did not remain at the level of declarations but also entailed a dynamic reaction in cases where national sovereignty was “doubted”. For instance when Sismik was sent for the second time for exploration within the contested continental self in 1987, Greece initially responded with a massive mobilisation of its army which led to the escalation of the crisis. In addition since 1974 Greek military aircrafts has engaged regularly in “virtual” battles with Turkish ones in response to the alleged violation of Greek national airspace by the latter.

In 1993, Greece announced the adoption of an Integrated Defence Doctrine, which seemed to elevate the military component of its policy towards Turkey to a higher plateau. This new doctrine provided that in the event of a Turkish attack in Cyprus, Greece would come to its defence, if necessary by launching an all-out war against Turkey. According to its proponents the extension of the Greek deterrence strategy to Cyprus and, most importantly, the possibility of an asymmetrical response (which would involve the shifting of location or nature of reaction into terrain better suited to the application of Greece's strengths) would redress the imbalance created by Cyprus' geographical location. The publication of the Common Defence Doctrine generated enthusiasm in the Greek public opinion and media. The perception was that after years of passive reactions Greece was at least regaining the initiative. Critics, who noted that the publication of the doctrine added little to the existing “secret” contingency planning, and who resented the inherent contradiction between Greece’s claims of defending the status quo and the pursuing of “aggressive” policies were silenced.

Since the mid-1990s we observe a growing concern over the “deteriorating military balance” between Greece and Turkey. Several strategic analysts were pointing out that Greece’s qualitative supremacy, which had until then

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67 As part of the implementation of the Common Defence Doctrine Greece and Cyprus undertook some common armament programmes and engaged in several joint military exercises. The most significant incident was the purchase of Russian anti-aircraft missiles (S-300), which generated tension between Turkey and Greece.


counterbalanced the quantitative and geographical advantages of Turkey, was challenged by the rapid modernisation of the Turkish army. Moreover, it was argued that Greece would be unable to redress this balance without a substantial increase in its public expenditure, which would undermine the economic stabilisation programme which was under way as part of the country’s effort to be admitted to the EMU. In this context some analysts argued that it was necessary for Greece to redirect its efforts towards the mutual reduction of tension through the establishment of a “limited security regime”. In contrast with the “inflexible” strategies of the 1980s and early 1990s, which focused on the credibility of deterrence through intensive armaments, red-lines and asymmetrical escalation this doctrine suggested the adoption of moderate stance during period of crisis and the establishment of Confident Building Measures in order to avoid an accidental war. This new thinking was put to a test in 1996 when the countries came close to to war over the sovereignty of two Islets in the Eastern Aegean. Although Greece initially pursued the path of escalation, it quickly turned to diplomacy by engaging in intensive negotiations in order to prevent an all out war. After several days the crisis was diffused with US mediation, amid widespread criticism from the opposition parties and public opinion.

Greece’s response to the Imia crisis is of course not a sufficient condition to infer a change in Greece’s defence doctrine. After all, “prudence” had also prevailed in the past. However whereas the justification then was that Turkey had pulled back because of Greece’s “firm-but flexible” response, the main argument in this case was that through its moderate stance Greece had avoided a trap set by Turkey:

“Greece managed to deter the Turkish plans. The deterioration of the Imia incident to an all out conflict, which was Turkey’s intention, would harm Greek

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interests… Turkey’s attempt to engage Greece in a widespread conflict and a general discussion failed. Turkey is now in the defensive”.74

The existence of a new strategic thinking can also be inferred by the fact that issues that could have easily escalated into serious crises in the past, such as the outbreak of airspace violations in July 2003, were relatively easily contained by elites as “disagreements”.75 It is important to note, that although this new thinking envisages a mutual reduction of armaments in the long run it does not imply an immediate reduction of defence spending. Even the devoted advocates of the new doctrine argue that maintaining adequate military capabilities in the short term is necessary:

“It is imperative that during the first stages of rapprochement the maintenance of an adequate balance of power should remain the ultimate axiom… this will elevate the costs of armed conflict at very high levels and will reinforce the seeking for peaceful solutions”.76

This explains the fact that a few months after the Imia crisis Greece announced a very ambitious re-armament program and that calls for substantial cuts on military expenditure have been met with suspicion.77

External balancing

The external balancing of Turkey had two dimensions. First Greece sought to establish closer relations with the Balkan countries, which had until then been considered as the primary threat to Greece’s security in order to reduce the possibility of multi-front conflicts. Second Greece sought support for its positions in the context of the international organisations to which it participated in order to create favourable conditions for a peaceful resolution of the disputes in the Aegean and Cyprus.

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74 Speech of Costas Simitis (Prime Minister – Leader of PASOK); in in Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (6 May 1996), p. 6963
77 An analysis of Parliamentary Debates reveals that the only political party which has consistently called for a reduction in defense expenditure is the Coalition of Progressive Left (liberal left-wing).
With respect to the first dimension, Greece signed with Bulgaria a Declaration of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Co-operation and renounced the state of war with Albania, which had persisted for more than 40 years. At the multilateral level Greece made some timid attempts to promote co-operation, especially in “low politics” issues. The end of the Cold War and the breakout of Yugoslavia interrupted these “positive” developments. Amid widespread fear concerning the emergence of an Islamic Arc, Greece sided openly with Orthodox Serbia thus generating hostility from virtually all the countries in the region. However, since 1995 Greece has renewed its attempt to restore its relations with its northern neighbours by adopting a more equidistant approach and actively promoting regional co-operation.

With respect to the second dimension, the apparent unwillingness of NATO to intervene in favour of Greece generated the need to look for an alternative “security provider”. In this context the conservative government of New Democracy applied for membership to the EC. Although the EC fell short from being a military alliance it was perceived as a system of political solidarity, which would make Turkey think twice before attacking Greek territory\(^78\). After accession Greek policy makers became aware that the EC could also serve as a diplomatic lever against Turkey. In this context, Greece adopted a policy of conditionality, which consisted in linking any progress in EU-Turkish relations with a modification of the Turkish stance in Aegean and Cyprus\(^79\). As part of this policy Greece blocked the provision of financial aid under the fourth financial protocol, which was part of the EU-Turkey Association Agreement and when Turkey was granted a special 10 million ECU assistance it protested by resorting to the European Court of Justice\(^80\). In addition Greece has succeeded on many occasions to include references to the Cyprus problem in joint statements and declarations issued by the Council and the European Parliament. Finally, when Turkey filled an application to become member of the EU, Greece expressed its outright objection to such a prospect.

During the 1990s we observe a gradual relaxation of Greece’s conditionality policy. More precisely in 1992, Greece lifted the veto over the activation of the Fourth


Financial Protocol, in return for EU support over the Macedonian issue. In 1995 it allowed the establishment of a customs union between the EU and Turkey in exchange of a commitment that Cyprus would start accession negotiations. A more significant change occurred in 1997 when Greece expressed for the first time its support for Turkey’s eventual membership in the EU, provided that Turkey would fulfil certain criteria. This shift was consolidated two years later, during the European Council of Helsinki, when Greece gave its consent to the elevation of Turkey to the status of a candidate country, and secured an acknowledgment that a resolution of the Cyprus issue would not be a prerequisite for the accession of the country to the EU.

Since then Greece has consistently hold a position in favour of Turkey’s European perspective, often outmanoeuvring other more reluctant EU member states.  

The shift in Greece’s conditionality policy coincided with a growing concern, over its effectiveness. As Yannas notes this policy was based on an understanding that by using all means available as an EU member (in particular the power of veto) Greece could increase the costs of Turkey’s policies and therefore lend it to rethink its position. From this perspective EU memberships constituted a “comparative advantage” that Greece should handle very carefully and exchange it only with firm commitments from the Turkish side. Ultimately the permanent exclusion of Turkey was considered beneficial to the extent that Greece would be able to maintain this comparative advantage. However, it soon became apparent that this policy had not prevented Turkey from establishing closer relations with the EU and that it had instead lead to increased disaffection towards Greece. In this context several analysts argued that Greece should redirect its focus from the imposition of conditional sanctions (i.e. threatening to block EU-Turkish relations unless Turkey conceded fully to Greek demands) to the offering of conditional rewards (i.e. agreeing to a piecemeal improvement in EU-Turkish relations provided that Turkey

81 It is characteristic in this respect that Greece was among those states who supported Turkey’s unsuccessful attempt to start accession negotiations during the European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002.
demonstrates a more accommodating stance)\textsuperscript{85}. According to this strategy Greece’s objective should not be to exclude Turkey but on the contrary to engage it in a long term process of economic and political reform, which would eventually lead to the adoption of EU principles and the abandonment of its revisionist behaviour. From this perspective the resolution of Greek Turkish disputes was not a prerequisite but part of the wider process of Europeanisation of Turkey which would start once a realistic prospect of EU membership was established. According to its proponents the potential losses in terms of diplomatic leverage entailed by the renunciation of veto would be compensated by the fact that Turkey’s conformity and co-operation would become subject not only to Greek supervision but to an institutionalised EU monitoring mechanism\textsuperscript{86}. This thinking was reflected in the speeches of Prime Minister Costas Simitis and the Foreign Minister George Papandreou at the Greek Parliament in the immediate aftermath of the Helsinki European Council:

“We did not want a virtual Turkish candidacy. We wanted a real and substantive candidacy. A candidacy which entails rights and duties emanating from the criteria that apply for any other country… The rules of the game are clear and identical for every country. There is only one way for those who have differences: peaceful resolution and recourse to the International Court of Justice… The accession process will gradually construct links that transgress existing borders… it will lead to an extended relationship… it will consolidate peaceful coexistence and it will diminish or even abolish aggressive policies… references to co-operation and friendship are not merely wishful thinking, they have been made possible”\textsuperscript{87}.

“From the moment that candidacy status is accorded there will be a framework for the monitoring of Turkey, just like for any other country… this is a European system… we do not refer to Greece, France, Germany and the special relationship

\textsuperscript{85} The terms conditional sanctions and conditional rewards have been initiated by Theodorsw Couloumbis. See Couloumbis, T. & Ifandis, P. (2003): “Transforming the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Choices and Structural Constraints – a Realist Approach”; in Tsakonas, P. (ed.) \textit{contemporary Greek Foreign Policy}; (Athens, sideris) – in Greec, p. 103

\textsuperscript{86} See for example Tsakonas, P. (2003): “Communautarising the Enemy: Greek Balance Strategy and Greek Turkish Relations”; in Tsakonas, P. \textit{Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy}, (Athens, Sideris)

\textsuperscript{87} Speech of Costas Simitis (Prime Minister – Leader of PASOK); in in Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (15 December, 1999), pp. 2362-2364,
that these might have with Turkey… It is a European system, committed to the decisions of the European Council… it will not be Greece that will ask for controls… our partners will be even more demanding that we are\textsuperscript{88}.

\textit{Bilateral diplomacy}

Since 1974 the official Greek position has been that the only difference between the two countries concerned the delimitation of the continental self, for which the only acceptable solution was a referral to the International Court of Justice. However in the late 1970s the conservative government of New Democracy made a timid attempt to reach a peaceful settlement of the dispute over the continental self through the institutionalisation of a dialogue that comprised some political elements\textsuperscript{89}. After the coming into government of PASOK, however, Greece hardened its position by refusing to engage in any kind of negotiations with Turkey and insisting on the legal nature of the disputes. The absence of any substantial dialogue was maintained until 1988, when the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece met in Davos and agreed to set up two comities in order to discuss the bilateral differences between the two countries. The so called “Davos process” established the principle of "no war" and also led to the signing of a memorandum from the foreign ministers of the two countries, by which they agreed to elaborate a number of Confidence Building Measures in the Aegean concerning the conduct of military exercises. However, this process of rapprochement was short lived and an initiative to revive it in the early 1990s remained at the level of declarations and failed to produce any substantial results\textsuperscript{90}

The rationale behind Greece’s legalistic and uncompromising stance was that Greece did not demand anything from Turkey and therefore should not engage in negotiations over unilateral Turkish demands, because by definition it would be a net looser. In this context even effort to engage in informal dialogue with Turkey was ruled out as “appeasement” that would further fuel Turkey’s expansionism.

\textsuperscript{88} Speech of George Papandreou (Minister of Foreign Affairs –PASOK); in in \textit{Journal of Parliamentary Debates}, (15 December, 1999), p. 2396

\textsuperscript{89} In this context the Greece and Turkey signed the Berne declaration in 1976, by which they agreed to refrain from unilateral actions regarding the Aegean continental self. This was followed by meetings of the Prime Ministers of the two countries in Washington and Montreaux were the possibility of a non-aggression pact was discussed. See Clogg, R. (1991):“Greek - Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period”; in Constas, D. \textit{The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences}, (London, MacMillan),

\textsuperscript{90} Botsiou, K. (2001): op. cit. p. 177
The legalistic/uncompromising approach has been reinforced by the fact that Greek diplomacy was dominated by the perception for the existence of national rights which were not subject to negotiation\textsuperscript{91}. In the Greek foreign policy discourse national rights were used as a substitute for what is commonly called vital national interests but with the additional qualification that they were considered as part of Greece’s heritage, not the outcome of rational calculations, and therefore they should be protected at all costs and irrespectively of the possible repercussions this may had in other areas.

Greece’s reluctance to compromise seems also to have been nurtured by the absence of stable policy making structures. By this I do not mean that formal policy making structures do not exist. As Ioakimidis notes the problem is not so much the lack of formal structures but the culture of “proceduralism” entrenched within the foreign policy establishment, which induce diplomats to faithfully implement the decisions taken by the political leadership and prevent them from contributing to the formulation of foreign policy goals\textsuperscript{92}. The absence of a functioning institutional framework led to the dominance of personalities in the policy-making process which in turn is said to contribute to the adoption of maximalistic and irrational foreign policy goals, because the criterion is the maximisation of the electoral appeal of the personality concerned\textsuperscript{93}.

Over recent years Greece has adopted a relatively more relaxed attitude towards bilateral negotiations. This is particularly evident in low politics issues, where numerous agreements have been signed between the two countries since 1999. In high politics issues we can observe a vigorous attempt to establish Confidence Building Measures. In 1997 the Prime Minister Simitis met his Turkish counterpart at the margins of a NATO conference in Madrid and agreed to issue a joint declaration where they committed their countries to certain principles of good neighbourhood that could, if implemented, create the conditions for peaceful coexistence until a final resolution of bilateral disputes has been reached\textsuperscript{94}. Greece has also agreed to the

\textsuperscript{93} ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Moustakis, F. (2003): The Greek Turkish Relationship and NATO, (London, Frank Cass), p. 51
appointment of a committee of experts to discuss the substantive issues that separate the two countries. The appointment of this committee as well as the fact that the Simitis government has accepted that the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction on issues other than the continental self is an indication that Greece has moved slightly from its previous position. On the whole however, very limited progress has been made towards the reaching of final settlement solution.

3.3. Continuity or change?

On the basis of the above discussion I argue that it is possible to identify four sub-periods. The first starts from the return of democratic rule and finishes with the coming into government of PASOK in 1981. The second spans from 1981 to 1989 and covers the two consecutives periods of PASOK government. The third extends from 1989 until the end of 1995 (replacement of Papandreou from Costas Simitis). The fourth refers to the Simitis era. The irredentist tensions of Turkey and the imperative to respond to the existential Turkish threat are not questioned in any of the sub-periods. What has evolved however is the mixture of military, diplomatic and legal means Greece used in order to respond to this threat. The changes during the first three sub-periods have been reduced to limited adjustment in the means used: adequate and credible military deterrence through heavy armaments, use of the EU as a diplomatic leverage and exclusion of Turkey, denial of bilateral dialogue (apart from short lived attempts). During the last sub-period however we observe a more substantial change: a relaxation of Greece’s conditionality policy and a more positive attitude towards Turkey’s European perspective, a more open approach to bilateral dialogue (especially in low politics issues) and an effort to diminish the tensions in the Aegean through the establishment of confidence building measures.

Whether these elements point to a radical change in the Greek foreign discourse is subject to debate. For some these changes signify the replacement of the traditional logic of geo-politics with a geo-economic logic\(^95\). Others however see these moves as a clever diplomatic trick intended to move Greece away from isolation. Knowing that

\(^{95}\) Kavakas, D. (2001): *Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy*, (Ashgate, Aldershot)
other EU member states were very reluctant towards Turkey’s accession, Greece had no reason to serve as a scapegoat and provide a convenient excuse.\footnote{The idea that Greece was not the real obstacle in EU-Turkish relations is widespread in the literature. See for example Georgiades, H. (2000): “Greece and the EU-Turkish Relationship”; in Mitsos, A. & Mossialos, E. (eds) Contemporary Greece and Europe, (Ashgate, Aldershot); Grigoriadis, I. (2003): “The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations”; Paper presented at the 1st PhD Symposium on Modern Greece (London, 21 June)}

The evidence I have gathered so far provide support for both explanations. On the one hand references to Turkey’s Europeanisation suggest that Turkey is not the monolithic and barbaric state depicted in the nationalist discourses, but a complex society and therefore an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations is possible. In the same vain the fact that the possibility of finding mutually beneficial solutions is envisaged indicates that Greek policy-makers might have “moved away from the traditional way of thinking in zero sum games”.\footnote{Papandreou, G. (2000): “Revision of Greek Foreign Policy”; Western Policy Centre} One the other hand it is difficult to defy the fact that Greek perceptions with respect to Turkey’s responsibility for the existing imbroglio have remained relatively unchanged. According to most Greeks – even those who support the current rapprochement it is Turkey (not Greece) that has to modify its behaviour. From this perspective one might agree with Oguzlu that Greece continues to view EU-Turkish relations from an instrumental rather than ideational perspective.\footnote{Oguzlu, T. (2004): “How Encouraging is the Latest Turkish-Greek Reconciliation Process?”; in Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 94}

Caution is also heralded by the fact that the new policy has generated widespread criticism. This is particularly evident with respect to the Helsinki decision, when the leader of the official opposition accused the government for ceding too much in order to achieve too little:

“Accession to the EC has been the greater achievement of our country after WWII… the capabilities which have been offered to us must be protected…the relinquishment of veto diminishes considerably the capacity of Greece to use EU membership in order to exercise pressure on Turkey to follow the principles of peaceful coexistence”\footnote{Speech of Costas Caramanlis (Leader of New Democracy); in Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (15 December, 1999), p. 2379}.
In the same vain when Mr Simitis defended his “cautious” approach at the Imia crisis, he received a furious answer from most opposition parties:

“It is a myth that we have to chose between retreat and conflict… it is a myth that accommodation generates international support… it is a myth that Greece is not powerful enough… the policy we advocate does not necessarily entail the use of military means… however it is important that the right messages are sent… whenever we are provoked our reaction must be quick, integral and comprehensive”\textsuperscript{100}.

“Determination from our part, clear delimitation of our nonnegotiable position is the best guarantee that Turkey will not be tempted… that it will not get the wrong message that next time we will retreat again… we should not give the impression that everything is subject to negotiation… we don’t close any issue with Turkey… because the existing balance of power does not permit a favourable solution for us”\textsuperscript{101}.

On the whole the evidence suggests that there is a substantial change in Greek foreign policy which however falls short to be indicative of a replacement of the dominant foreign policy discourse. I believe that the shift epitomised by the Helsinki decision can be depicted as a transformational change because it entails new strategies (i.e. prudence rather than escalation in time of crises, engagement rather than exclusion with respect to Turley’s EU membership, negotiation in terms of national interests not national rights) but does not challenge the overall objectives of Greek foreign policy. At the very least one could argue that a “dual logic” of overcoming Greece’s isolationism and transforming the nature of the Greek-Turkish conflict might be at work\textsuperscript{102}.

\textsuperscript{100} Speech of Costas Caramanlis (Leader of New Democracy); in \textit{Journal of Parliamentary Debates}, (6 November 1997), p. 1250
\textsuperscript{101} Speech of Dimitris Tsovolas (Leader of Democratic and Social Movement); in \textit{Journal of Parliamentary Debates}, (6 November 1997), p. 1255
4. The pathways and conditions of Europeanisation

4.1. The substantive dimension

Pathway 1

As pointed out in the second section the substantive/regulative effects of EU membership emerge from the existence of an incompatibility between domestic and EU policies which obliges member states to adapt or incur the costs of non-compliance. In the case of Greece the existence of such an incompatibility can easily be established especially after the return of civilian rule in Turkey in 1983. Whereas Greece demanded from the EU to put pressure on Turkey to modify its behaviour, if necessary by freezing EU-Turkish relations, the EU considered the establishment of close contacts with Turkey as a priority and resented the possibility of a stalemate because of the Greek-Turkish dispute. The question is to what extent Greece has been constrained by EU requirements.

Whereas the rule of unanimity allowed Greece to maintain its position during the 1980s, the gradual relaxation of conditionality policy in the 1990s reveals the limits of Greece’s capacity to defy EU consensus. More precisely Greece’s conditionality policy seems to have been restricted by its limited bargaining power inside the Community which necessitated the concentration of diplomatic efforts on one issue at a time. Initially Greece had to release the Fourth Financial Protocol in exchange of EU support over the Macedonian issue. Afterwards the willingness to achieve progress in Cyprus’ membership prospects led to a step by step improvement in EU-Turkish relations in the 1990s.

There is little doubt that cost benefit calculations have been paramount in the Greek foreign policy discourse during the 1990s. However, it would be misleading to infer that EU membership has simply restrained Greece. More precisely, it is doubtful that the Helsinki decision could have been justified to the Greek public only on the

basis of the disassociation of Cyprus’ accession from a final settlement of the conflict, not least because of the vagueness of the relevant clause in the Presidency Conclusions which allowed for many interpretations. As noted above the shift from conditional sanctions to conditional rewards was also based on an understanding that the conditionality policy was leading to the isolation of Greece within the EU. This is clearly a utilitarian argument, but it includes a substantial change in the way cost and benefits are perceived, since isolation was not thought as a cost in the 1980s.

Interestingly the EU is also thought to have restrained Greece’s foreign policy during the pre-accession period. According to Couloumbis and Yannas Greece refrained from retaliating the Cyprus invasion partly because of the awareness that the perception of protracted Greek-Turkish conflict could jeopardise Greece’s membership prospects. A similar argument has been advanced by Arvanitopoulos with respect to the 1976 crisis on the continental self and the decision of Karamanlis to play down the military solution and refer the issue to the International Court of Justice. In the same vain Pridham perceives the relatively open stance of Greece towards bilateral dialogue during the late 1970s as a tactical move to persuade reluctant EC member states over Greece’s intentions.

These arguments merit further investigation. For the EU to have an influence it is important to establish that an incompatibility existed and that Greece would have behaved differently in the absence of EU pressure. Therefore one should established that the EU wanted to avoid a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey; that Greece was indeed thinking to engage in armed confrontation with Turkey; and finally that Greece was prevented from doing so because of the prospect of EU membership. None of the three propositions (apart perhaps from the first) can be substantiated by reasonably solid documentary evidence at this stage of my research.

In contrast with the previous pathway, the substantive/constitutive pathway of EU membership does not involve coercion but a voluntary adoption of policy philosophies and norms of appropriate behaviour and ultimately a transformation of national identities. In the case of Greece the review of the literature reveals several ideational effects.

For instance it has been argued that the promotion of bilateral co-operation in low politics, which is an essential element of the current Greek-Turkish rapprochement, builds largely on the EU model of functional integration as a means of conflict resolution. According to Marias the implicit assumption behind this approach is that co-operation in low politics issues and the resulting growth in interdependence between the two countries will upgrade their common interests and will gradually lead to greater understanding in high politics issues.108 Along similar lines Heraclides109 posits that the increased level of co-operation in low politics will make it more difficult for political leaders to adopt intransigent approaches towards the settlement of political differences.

The argument that the EU acted as a paradigm for Greek policy-makers is appealing. But there are certain qualifiers which diminish its plausibility. In the first place the slow progress towards the settlement of political difference reinstates the longstanding scepticism over the possibility of spill-over from low politics to high politics.110 Moreover whereas it is true that functional integration helped France and Germany to achieve stable peace it would be mistaken to make direct analogies with the Greece Turkish conflict. Unlike Greece and Turkey, France and Germany had just emerged from a catastrophic war and they were facing a common threat from the Soviet Union which obliged them to put their differences aside. From a more general perspective it could be argued that economic co-operation and increased societal transactions can consolidate peace but taken alone they cannot lead to conflict resolution. This is possible only through a political settlement which will create the

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110 See Rosamond, B. (2000): Theories of European Integration, (Basingstoke, Palgrave), pp. 75-81
conditions of minimum trust that allow co-operation to flourish\textsuperscript{111}. Indeed, it appears that the Prime Minister Costas Simitis agreed with this judgement:

“We want a step by step bilateral rapprochement which should include a renunciation of the threat of war, respect of international law and acknowledgment of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice from Turkey as step 1, mutual referral of the continental self issue to the International Court of Justice as step 2, and the promotion of co-operation in areas of mutual interests as step 3\textsuperscript{112}.

A more convincing argument is that EU membership has familiarised Greek policy-makers with modern forms of conflict prevention, which until recently found little positive response in Greece\textsuperscript{113}. This might explain the turn to confidence building and restraint inherent in the new defence doctrine.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the substantive/constitutive dimension of Europeanisation has to do with the long term impact of EU membership on Greek national identity and political culture. It is generally agreed that one of the building blocks of Greek identity is an ambivalent relations towards the West. From this perspective it could be argued that EU membership provided an answer to the perennial question of where Greece belongs\textsuperscript{114}. This in turn could be said to have important implications for Greece’s policy towards Turkey. According to Rumelili the liminal position in which Greece had been found during the 1980s and for much of the 1990s prompted it to pursue exclusionary policies in order to underscore its differences with Turkey (and concomitantly the differences between Turkey and Europe) in order to reaffirm its Europeaness\textsuperscript{115}. In other words the fact that Greece was depicted as an awkward European in the community-building discourse of the EU, generated the need for Greece to present Turkey as a non-European as a way to

\textsuperscript{112} Speech of Costas Simitis, (Prime Minister – Leader of PASOK); in in Journal of Parliamentary Debates, (6November, 1997)
\textsuperscript{113} Axt, H-J (1997): op. cit.
\textsuperscript{115} Rumelilli, B. (2003): “Liminality and Perpetuation of conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU”; in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 213-248
validate its Europeaness. The policy of engagement which depicts Turkey as “possible but inadequate European” could thus be seen as a reflection of Greece’s more secure position in the late 1990s\textsuperscript{116}.

It is important to note that the focus on EU’s ideational influence does not preclude that material incentives such as the need to ensure progress in Cyprus’ accession, have also been at work. As pointed out in the theoretical section regulative and constitutive effects might be simultaneously at work.

4.2. The procedural dimension

Pathway 3

Participation in the EU has led to several administrative and institutional reforms. At the inter-ministerial level it has affected the hierarchy between ministries. More precisely the responsibility to co-ordinate EU affairs fell with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) which therefore acquired power and prestige at the expense of the Ministry of Co-ordination (later to become Ministry of National Economy), which had traditionally dominated the administration\textsuperscript{117}. The role of co-ordinator has enabled the MFA to act like a gate keeper, but at the same time the nature of EU policy-making has enabled domestic ministries and civil society actors to acquire some autonomy and develop their own direct contacts in Brussels\textsuperscript{118}. Finally it is noteworthy that no role was provided for the Greek Parliament, which has been virtually excluded from EU affairs\textsuperscript{119}.

What does this amount with respect to Greece’s foreign policy towards Turkey is not clear. Given the highly political and conflictual nature of Greek-Turkish relations the direct involvement of domestic ministries and civil society actors has been relatively low. It therefore appears that EU’s influence in the opportunity structures of domestic actors is mostly related with the long term promotion of

\textsuperscript{116} Rumelili, B. (2003): “Liminality and Perpetuation of conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU”; in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 213-248


\textsuperscript{118} ibid.

\textsuperscript{119} ibid.
democratisation and civil society in Greece as a result of EU membership. The recent insurgence of contacts between the civil societies of Greece and Turkey could be seen as a result of this indirect influence of EU membership.\textsuperscript{120}

The MFA has also undergone a substantial internal reform as a result of EU membership. Under the current structure which was established in 1998 the DGC, which is headed by the General Secretary for European Affairs is responsible for issues falling within pillars 1 (EC) and 3 (JHA), whereas DGA, which is headed by the General Secretary for Political Affairs is responsible for issues falling within pillar 2 (CFSP). According to Kavakas this division of labour has created several problems of co-ordination in cases where issues of the second pillar are discussed within the other two pillars.\textsuperscript{121}

With respect to Greek-Turkish relations one should expect these problems to be even more acute because of the distinction accorded to “national issues” (relations with Cyprus, Turkey, Balkans), which are dealt with by three autonomous units headed by a Deputy Secretary supervised directly by the Deputy Minister whereas all other directorates are under the control of the Alternate Minister. For instance when EU-Turkish economic relations are at stake it is possible to have three units (DGC 1: European External Relations, DG A11: CFSP and DG A4: Greece-Turkey) under three different Deputy Secretaries, two General Secretaries and two Ministers claiming competence. The usual practice is that national issues are dealt by the personnel of DG A4. However this seems to create a further complication because these officials might not be very familiar with EU processes and this in turn may lead to a lack of comprehension of the Greek argument by other member-states.\textsuperscript{122}

Finally it could be argued that certain of the new bodies created within the MFA have been inspired by the EU. For instance the newly established Centre of Analysis and Planning can be said to imitate the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit established by the Treaty of Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{123} As noted above however the formal institutional arrangements in Greece do not always provide an accurate picture of

\textsuperscript{120} Rumelili, B. (2004): “The European Union’s Impact on the Greek Turkish Conflict”; \textit{EU/BorderConf Working Paper Series}, No. 6, p. 17

\textsuperscript{121} See Kavakas, D. (2001): \textit{Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy}, (Ashgate, Aldershot)

\textsuperscript{122} Kavakas, D. (2001): \textit{Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy}, (Ashgate, Aldershot)

reality. Accordingly it is unclear what the implications of the creation of this unit for Greek-Turkish relations are.

**Pathway 4**

The socialising effects from Greece’s participation in the EU policy-making process are very important. As shown above during the 1980s Greece adopted a very suspicious stance towards bilateral dialogue with Turkey. This inflexibility was also manifested within the EU, where Greece consistently appealed to community solidarity in order to convince other member-states to support its position, while refusing to change its policies in order to accommodate the interests of its partners. As Kouveliotis notes, “the perception was that Greece used the EPC/CFSP and the EC frameworks mainly for satisfying its national interests, or when that was not possible, for stopping unpleasant developments imposed by its partners instead of using them as stages and platforms for adapting its foreign policy to the integration and the Europeanisation logic”

By taking part in the EU policy-making process Greek officials and politicians have been familiarised with the EU’s procedural norms. This in turn had an important influence in the way they pursued national interests. Apart from the habit of informing other member-states before adopting a position two other areas appear to be of primary importance with respect to Greek-Turkish relations. First, as the relaxation of the conditionality policy demonstrates Greece has since the beginning of the 1990s been more willing to engage in package deals. It may be that Greece was giving its consent under intense EU pressure, but one cannot fail to notice that such trade-offs would probably been considered unacceptable from most of those who had been in charge of Greece’s foreign policy in the early 1980s. Second, Greece has made a great effort to overcome its isolation by seeking coalitions and presenting its positions in terms of European interests. Thus in the Luxemburg European Council Greece carefully avoided to object openly to Turkish European perspective, but insisted on the establishment of a set of standard criteria, which Turkey had to fulfil in order to open accession negotiations. In so doing it found support among other member-states for its sensible behaviour and avoided the accusation that the road the normalisation

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of EU-Turkish relations passed through Athens\textsuperscript{125}. In Helsinki Greece went a step further by avoiding any special reference to the Greek-Turkish conflict and inserting a general clause on border disputes, which was referring to all applicant states.

In addition it appears that the EU’s procedural norms have been disseminated in Greece’s bilateral relations. For instance when the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismael Cem sent a letter to his Greek counterpart George Papandreou in the wake of the Ocalan debacle requesting that the two countries reach an understanding on international terrorism, the latter suggested to widen the agenda of dialogue and carefully placed the issue of dialogue in the framework of EU’s co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs. The Greek strategy of widening the agenda and multilaterising the issue could be said to have been inspired by the style of co-operation existing within the EU\textsuperscript{126}. At a more abstract level it could be argued that to the extend that Greece seems more willing to negotiate with Turkey, this might be related with the legitimisation of the notion of compromise resulting from participation in the EU policy-making.

4.3. The conditions of EU impact

In the second section I have argued that the likelihood of successful Europeanisation will depend on five mediating factors: the salience of the issue area, the institutional capacity for reform, the active engagement of change agents at the domestic level, the timing of the European input and evolutions in world politics including the target area. With respect to the first of these factors one would need to compare different issue area in which different priority is accorded in order to reach a conclusion. A tentative argument which emerges intuitively but also appears in the literature is that the high priority given to relations with Turkey has made the process of Europeanisation difficult\textsuperscript{127}.

With respect to the second factor, it should be noted that foreign policy objectives have rarely been endorsed by an entire government and that foreign policy

constitutes a constant source of disagreement in all political parties\textsuperscript{128}. However, in most cases the executive leadership has been strong enough in order to bring dissidents in line with governmental policies.

Mess and Costas Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou, who ruled the country from 1974 until 1989, were charismatic personalities and enjoyed large parliamentary majorities. Consequently their political authority was undisputed. This enabled Karamanlis to push forward his policy of containment towards Turkey and ignore those who wanted an immediate response to the Cyprus invasion. In the same vain, Papandreou could swing with relative ease from the hard-line policy of non-dialogue in the early 1980s to the Davos rapprochement in 1987, before his deteriorating health and his alleged implication in financial scandals striped him of much of his power\textsuperscript{129}.

Costas Mistotakis became prime minister after a period of political instability which had brought three consecutive elections, and two coalition governments in one year. Although he was a senior political figure Mitsotakis did not originate from the rank and file of the conservative party. Most importantly, although he had won a landslide victory in terms of votes, he enjoyed a parliamentary majority of only two seats because of the highly proportional electoral law. This gave to virtually every parliamentarian the possibility to veto the government’s policy. In 1993 Mitsotakis was compelled to call a general election, when his ex-foreign minister Antonis Samaras, who had defected and formed his own party because of his disagreement over the Macedonian issue, urged the New Democracy MPs who were under his influence to withdraw their support for the government. Eventually, Mitsotakis, who had attempted according to certain observes\textsuperscript{130} to insert some seeds of pragmatism in Greece’s foreign policy during his term in office lost the election and was replaced in New Democracy’s leadership from the hard-liner Miltiadis Evert. Although Mitsotakis did not loose power because of his policy towards Turkey, his political weakness may partly explain the failure to revive the Davos process.


\textsuperscript{129} It has been argued that this deterioration of Papandreous political authority was one of the primary reasons for the collapse of the Davos process. See for example Pridham, G. (1991): “Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement”; in Constas, D. (ed.) \textit{The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences}, (London, MacMillan), p. 83

During his third term in office (October 1993 to December 1995) Papandreou was less powerful than in the past but still the undisputed leader of PASOK, until he was replaced by Mr. Simitis for health reasons. Mr Simitis was not as charismatic as his predecessor, but his large parliamentary majority gave him the possibility to resist pressures from hardliners and pursue a relatively moderate foreign policy towards Turkey. It should be noted however that his ability to impose changes has somehow been restricted by his low appeal to the traditionalist fraction of PASOK which despised his modernising agenda. This induced him to some tactical compromises especially during the early years of his government\textsuperscript{131}.

The capacity of the executive leadership to push forward reforms has been constrained by the church and the media. Although none of these institutions has an institutionalised role in foreign policy-making they were able to act as quasi-veto points on certain issues, because of the influence they exercise in Greek public opinion. The role of the media has been very prominent after the liberalisation of private broadcasting in the early 1990s, which marked their emancipation from the political leadership and transformed them from mere transmitters of the governmental line to active agents of foreign policy\textsuperscript{132}. In the field of Greek Turkish relations this has been particularly evident in times of increased tension. For instance it has been argued that the Simitis government initially tried to downgrade the crisis at Imia, but was pushed to escalation under intense pressure from the press which treated the issue as matter of national prestige\textsuperscript{133}. With respect to the Church, the coming into leadership of Archbishop Christodoulos in 1998, signified a shift to a Greek Orthodox fundamentalist and anti-Western rhetoric, which appeals to the public\textsuperscript{134}. The Archbishop successfully mobilised popular support twice on domestic politics issues\textsuperscript{135} and although until this time he has avoided a direct confrontation with the government in foreign policy issues his potential and readiness to do so cannot be underestimated.


\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{134} Kavakas, D. (2001): \textit{Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy}, (Ashgate, Aldershot)

\textsuperscript{135} Once over a governmental decision to scrap religion from the elements included in identity cards, and the second over the nomination of a liberal/leftist candidate from the conservative party. In the first case he did not manage to reverse the governmental decision but in the second case he is said to have influenced the outcome, since the conservative party lost, even though it was the net favourite.
On the whole the evidence suggests that when during periods of intermediate institutional capacity for reform (1993 until today) Europeanisation has been more evident than during periods of very strong (1974-1989) or very weak (1989-1993) executive leadership. This finding conforms with the expectation set out in the theoretical section.

The recent Greek-Turkish rapprochement is said to have been facilitated by the emergence since the early 1990s of a small constituency of academics, journalists and political activists which have been very influential in shaping governmental policy during the second half of the 1990s and in legitimising these policies to the wider public.136 This constituency is not homogeneous. It includes enthusiastic liberals who portray that democratisation, economic development, increased interdependence and (first and foremost) European integration can change the nature of the Greek Turkish relations as well as moderate realists, who recent the extensive focus on military balancing which deprives Greece from using its soft power more effectively, but at the same time are rather pessimistic over Turkey’s transformative potential. The members of this constituency are united in their belief that Greece has been hampered by the existence of an “underdog culture”137 which is parochial, clientelist, statist and advocate the need for modernisation of the Greek economy, society and politics along the liberal ideas of enlightenment. In the field of foreign policy the “modernisers” advocate the replacement of the outdated “Hellenocentric” approach, which emphasise national interest with a “Eurocentric” approach138.

Moreover, it appears that the timing has also been an important facilitating factor for the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. At the macro level, one cannot fail to notice that the shift in Greece’s policy towards Turkey coincided with the quest for EMU membership and the consolidation of a consensus over Greece’s international orientation. Although these can be said to results of EU membership they also set the structural condition within which Europeanisation occurs. This reminds us of the fact that Europeanisation studies are not easily amenable to the

dependent/independent variable analysis as Featherstone has rightfully pointed out. One could also argue that the coming into power of Costas Simitis signified a generational change. At the micro level, there is little doubt that the earthquakes that hit Istanbul and Athens in the August and September 1999 created an unprecedented climate of solidarity on which domestic reformers sized upon to promote their agenda.

Finally with respect to the external dimension, there is a consensus in the literature that notwithstanding the early speculation concerning Turkey’s expanding role, the end of the Cold War had only a minor impact on Greek Turkish relations, which seem to have developed their own independent logic since 1974. In the same vein the role of the US has been confined mainly to the diffusion of tension during periods of crisis. Interestingly it appears that the recent shift in Greece’s foreign policy has been facilitated mainly by evolutions in European politics, such as the coming of a Social Democratic government in Germany, which created a positive prospect for Turkey’s accession.

5. Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to provide a theoretically informed account on the impact of EU membership on Greece’s foreign policy towards Turkey. My analysis has been based on a discursive understanding of foreign policy which depicts foreign policy change in terms of adjustment, transformation or replacement of a dominant foreign policy discourse which provides the rationale for foreign policy action, and the identification of four pathways and five mediating conditions of EU impact.

I have demonstrated that the Greek foreign policy discourse has been dominated by a perception that Turkey represents an imminent existential threat for Greece’s national security. This threat perception has been nurtured by four interrelated streams

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142 Tsakonas, P. (2003): “Communautarising the Enemy: Greek Balance Strategy and Greek Turkish Relations”; in Tsakonas, P. Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy, (Athens, Sideris)
of thought, which are well ingrained in Greek national identity. Greece’s response to this threat has been based on a mixture of military, diplomatic and legal instruments. The evidence suggest that the threat perception and the overall strategy have not changed, during the period studied. However, the mixture of instruments has evolved over time. I have identified four sub-period and concluded that during the first three periods we observe only limited adjustment in the mixture of means used but not in the way these means are connected with the declared objectives. By contrast the last period signals a more important change in the use of means, which however does not challenge the overall foreign policy discourse. One could therefore speak of a transformational change.

With respect to the substantive dimension of Europeanisation, Greece has been constantly under pressure to change its stance with respect to Turkey’s European perspective. The pressure has intensified in the 1990s and this, together with the fact that Greece’s attention was diverted to other issues (FYROM, accession on Cyprus, EMU) might partly explain the gradual relaxation of Greece’s conditionality policy during that period. However, the existence of adaptational pressure alone does not suffice to explain the important shift in Greece’s policy, exemplified by the Helsinki decision to give candidacy status to Turkey without previous resolution of the Greek-Turkish disputes. In order to account for this change one can evoke two arguments which point to Europeanisation through the second pathway. First, that the EU model of functional integration has been disseminated to Greek foreign policy-makers who expected that co-operation in low politics issues would eventually transform the nature of the Greek Turkish conflict and lead to the creation of a community of stable peace in the region. Second, that EU membership has solved Greece’s identity problem by providing an answer to the perennial question of where Greece belongs, and in so doing it has facilitated the adoption of a policy of inclusion towards Turkey because it is not necessary for Greece to differentiate itself from the non-European Turkey in order to re-affirm its Europeaness. I have argued that the first argument is appealing but highlighted certain qualifiers which diminish its plausibility. With respect to the second argument, there is evidence that a transformation of Greece’s national identity is taking place. It is important to note however, that the evocation of the regulative and constitutive effects of EU membership refers to an analytical and not an ontological distinction, since the same EU input might be interpreted by different people in different ways.
With respect to the procedural dimension there has been a considerable administrative restructuring as a result of EU membership. At the inter-ministerial level the findings conform to studies undertaken in other countries: centrifugal and centripetal forces coexist and whereas the foreign ministry as co-ordinator is able to exercise some central control it has also lost its monopoly on representing the state. Moreover, subnational actors had more opportunities to be involved in foreign policy. What this had amounted to in practice however is unclear. I have also noted a partial Europeanisation of the internal structure of the MFA, which however excludes the so-called national issues, and this is said to create co-ordination problems. Arguably the most significant procedural effects of EU membership concern the socialisation of national officials to the EU procedural norms. Greece is now trying to behave like any other EU member-state. It consults with its partners, seeks coalitions and evokes national interests only when this is necessary. The days where the Greek Prime Minister was ready to block EU decisions by overriding the consent given a few hours earlier by his Foreign Minister seem to be definitely gone.

The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey in the second half of the 1990s seems to have been facilitated by the fact that the executive leadership has enjoyed relative (but not absolute) autonomy. The contribution of intellectuals, activists and other change agents in the formulation and legitimization of the new policies carried forward by Costas Simitis was also central. However, the Europeanisation process has been compromised by the awkward role of two powerful constituencies, the media and the Church. Finally, the process of Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy coincided with a wider process of modernisation of the Greek economy, society and politics as well as with systemic changes, especially at the EU level.
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