

# **State Crisis and Civil Consciousness in Greece**

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# State Crisis and Civil Consciousness in Greece

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and Maria Xenitidou<sup>†</sup>

## ABSTRACT

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This is a sociological study of the self in modern Greece. Based upon a pilot study of social and political attitudes in Greece today, the study probes the sources of the moral self and of the internalized cosmological and ontological principles in Greece today, the types of social action they encourage, and the perception of the self, of civil society, and the type of the state they shape. The preliminary findings suggest that the Greek civil society is shaped by a distinct ‘civil religion’ that constitutes the cultural background of Greek secular life. This civil religion is strongly influenced by the Orthodox theology and religious practices that have decisively affected the various crystallizations of the four networks of social power (political, ideological, economic, and military) that constitute the Greek society in its various institutional formations.

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# State Crisis and Civil Consciousness in Greece

## 1. Introduction

To explore the causes of the deep socio-economic crisis in Greece today, we need to examine the interaction of deep cultural historical structures with historical processes and contingencies in the framework of the social division of labor and the networks of social power (Alexander and Colomy, 1991). Adopting a phenomenological perspective we assume that the self is not prior to morality but, instead, that the self is “constituted in and through the taking of moral stances” (Calhoun, 1991); that these moral stances, or moral frameworks, are informed by and derive from ultimate values, of historically developed “constitutive goods” or “hypergoods” (Taylor, 1989) that they emerge out of, and they are embedded in cosmological and ontological principles (Eisenstadt, 1995); that these civilizational principles inform methodical-ethical ways of life through rationalization processes that can be analyzed using the Weberian types of rationality (Kalberg, 1980); and, last, that the constitutive elements of the cultural system can be extracted by quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis, thus allowing us to reconstruct at least some of the symbolic patterns (Alexander and Smith, 1993) that reflect these hypergoods in social action and structure.

The basic working hypothesis of the study is that, not unlike the American civil religion (Bellah, 1967; Marangudakis, 2010), Greek civil religion, that is, the secular political framework of sacred and profane, good and evil, and of the moral community and its boundaries are deeply affected by church religion,

that is by Orthodox theology and religious practices that have permeated political mentality, irrespective of ideological and party identification and have become the deep cultural substratum of Greek civil life. In this paper, and due to limited space, we will concentrate on some critical elements of the Orthodox religion that finds expression in civil religion in Greece today.

## **2. Eastern Orthodox Religion and Greek Religiosity**

In contrast to the Protestant and Catholic rationalization processes that were developed throughout their history, in the East the strong presence of indigenous mystical traditions, among other factors, produced “apophatic”<sup>1</sup> theology, the doctrine of “deification by Grace”, and later on during the fourteenth century, the final version of the doctrine of the in-reach divine “energies” (next to out-of-reach divine “essence”) that reinforced the belief in the constant presence of God in materiality and the ability of the mystic to be united by God – the latter being the theological basis of a widespread spiritual exercise of mystical union with God amongst monastic communities called “hesichasm” (Ἡσυχασμός). In a nutshell, the Eastern theology considered as the means to approach God neither rational contemplation nor organization of routine life under a supreme political authority, but the process of “emptying” (κένωσις) of the self from personal or social certainties making room to receive the divine “energies” (ενέργειες) and thus to achieve “deification” (θέωσις) by the Grace of God (Weber, 1978:558).

Second, organizationally, no strict bureaucratic hierarchy exists in Orthodoxy; instead each bishop is fully in charge of his diocese exercising his authority in an *ad hoc* fashion, with local churches and monasteries enjoying a considerable

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<sup>1</sup> It asserts that God is beyond rational comprehension and thus He can be approached only by contemplation and mystical experience.

degree of administrative autonomy; bureaucracy and legalism are only minimally exercised. Bureaucratic centralization of the Western kind was not possible in part due to this apophatic theology that in effect allows for two equally autonomous sources of grace and thus of legitimation: the institutional grace of the bishopric church and the charismatic grace of the monastic monk.

In such a framework of social structures, the Eastern self, always in Weberian terms, could be neither rational nor methodical, as both the institutional and the charismatic sources of the Orthodox cosmological and the ontological principles, and the hypergoods they produce, are either primarily heteronomous or/and outworldly oriented. On the one hand, the *institutional* sources underline the “piecemeal evaluation” of personal actions, “implicit faith”, and “ardent devotion to the Church and its rituals”;<sup>2</sup> as these hypergoods could not cultivating a methodical self, and are fed by external sources of morality, they inhibit the development of a morally systematized life-method. The *charismatic* sources, on the other hand, underline a life of Godly “complacency” and “idleness”. The hypergood they produce is to grasp the unified meaning of the world by emptying the self from all daily concerns and in-worldly activities. In this framework, the salvationist good is not a proactive quality of action (a conscious dispensation of the divine will) but an inner condition of contemplation.

Furthermore, the selective affinity between social action and the hypergoods these two sources of Orthodox morality produce, or encourage, do not coincide but in fact produce a very peculiar combination (ibid. 190-191). The hypergood

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<sup>2</sup> The piecemeal evaluation of morality is shown in the importance the Eastern Church pays to biographies of saints as *various* standards of ethical behavior. Particular individuals should follow the example of particular saints according to the case or the issue. For a review of the irrational-mystical aspects of the Eastern Church see V. Makrides (2005), 179-210.

the institutional Church produces is best met in conditions of routine social life whereas it encourages the “humble acceptance of the given social organization”; in contrast, the hypergood the charismatic source of morality, that is, the mystical monk, produces, is best met in moments of social crisis whereas his unworldly mystical habitus turns to millenarian-revolutionary habitus. This habitus is irrational in that “it despises any rational arrangement” giving priority to the feeling of godly love: “In that case his revolutionary preaching to the world will be chiliastically irrational, scorning every thought of a rational order in the world. He will regard the absoluteness of his universal acosmistic feeling of love as completely adequate for himself, and indeed regard this feeling as the only one acceptable to his god as the foundation for a mystically renewed community among men, because this feeling alone derives from a divine source” (ibid. 550).

This divine, undifferentiated and uncompromised love which is achieved by emptying the self from its social selfhood, defines the ontological premises of the Orthodox worldview and delineates the Christian community as well as its internal distribution of power, the legitimation of its social action, and the boundaries of social trust: “The core of the mystical concept of the oriental Christian church was a firm conviction that Christian brotherly love, when sufficiently strong and pure, must necessarily lead to *unity in all things*, even in dogmatic beliefs. In other words, men who sufficiently love each other, in the Johannine sense of mystical love, will also *think alike* and, because of the very irrationality of their common feeling, *act in a solidary fashion* which is pleasing to God. Because of this concept, the Eastern church could dispense with an infallibly rational authority in matters of doctrine” (ibid. 551, emphasis added).



This is closely related to the Eastern theological belief that the individual does not constitute an “instrument” (as in the ascetic orientation of action) but a “vessel” of God. The difference between the two modes of social action is that while the “instrument” perspective assumes and acknowledges the social division of labor and thus the specified and differentiated individual, the “vessel” perspective recognizes the abstract individual who is inspired by the Grace of God. What matters in this perspective is not the mundane individual but the transcendental individual. Thus, social action is not a process by which the world becomes rational by rational action in the framework of the modern division of labor, but a process by which the feeling of mystical knowledge is activated by an undifferentiated *community of the righteous*: “The illumination consists essentially in a unique quality of feeling or, more concretely, in the felt emotional unity of knowledge and volitional mood which provides the mystic with decisive assurance of his religious state of grace” (ibid. 546). In this framework of undifferentiated love and mystical union, social action is not a rational process of organized social interest striving for tangible objectives, but an explosion of emotions toward achieving a hypergood in an absolute way and in a single, even violent, stroke that chiliasm implies. Lack of specified economic or political rational ethics means lack of rational social action or activist ethics. In effect, the inbuilt tensions of the social division of labor are left meaningless, in a state of cultural disorientation.

Next to the ontological premises of the Eastern Church stand the cosmological principles, i.e., the delineation of time, space, and the meaning of the material world. Central to the understanding of the cosmos is the concept of “functional time” which constitutes the crucial concept that dissociates the Eastern from both Protestant and Catholic theological cosmologies. “Functional time” fuses timeless God with the temporal material universe, humanity, and the self. As

God is pure actuality, i.e., there is no past and no future for Him, His presence in the life of the individual, according to the ontological process of “deification” (see above), fuses past, present and future time in a “now” that transcends the “heavy yokes of worldly time and space” (Popovitz, 2012) The use of present-time in the incantation denotes not a dramatic philological exaggeration but the actual unfolding of the event in real present time. This is made possible by the fact that the divine time is a constant and perpetual “now”. Thus takes place the spiritual “extension” (επέκτασις) and “present-ation” (παροντοποίησις) of the event to allow each and every generation of the faithful to participate equally to the unfolding of the divine plan.

The principle of the cosmological and the ontological premises of the Eastern church is that the community of the faithful can actually experience the eternal truths, the eternal hypergoods of the afterlife in present time and space by transcending, partially by its own effort, its own habitus. Even though there is a sharp dissimilarity between the material and the immaterial cosmos, the Eastern Church insists on the constant “communication” of the two domains by divine *energies*. In practice, this imperative is experienced by the faithful through a distinct process of religious transmission that focuses on the construction of the religious services and the veneration of the icons.

The Icons in Eastern devotion do not constitute “signs”, mere instruments of catechism or representations of past events or persons, as are in Western theology, but objects which are related *ontologically* to the spiritual beings their depict. Quite literally speaking, icons are windows which allow the beholder to see and sense a reality that lies beyond this world, the transcendental domain itself (Freedberg 1989: 45). These “windows” to the transcendental realm do not stand in passivity in front of the beholder. Instead

in the context of the Eastern theology they are alive, and so they are perceived by the faithful: they have rich “biographical dimensions” and “social life” that is enriched by the legend that surrounds their creation, discovery, and/or location and relocations, by the passage of time and their miracles. They constitute living objects that are contextualized in the life of the believers through “internal” and “external” narratives (Banks 2001, in Hanganu *ibid.*: 48) referring accordingly to “the story that the image communicates” and the “social context that produced the image and the social relations within which the image is embedded at any moment of viewing” (Hanganu quoting Banks 2001, 50). Agency and personhood are deeply affected by such a relationship as the “source of being” lies neither completely inside the individual nor in its collectivist self; it does not cultivate the inner-self of a self-contained individual, as is the case of the Western model, as it does not cultivate the collective “distributed personhood”, as is the case in various non-Western cultures. Instead, it cultivates a bi-polar personhood that shifts between the immanent and the transcendental and so are his/hers internalized ethics and code-orientations. The inner conversation of the individual takes place vis-à-vis the icon rather than the inner-self, thus forming a self-reflection made of imagistic autobiographical impressions rather than an inner “valid canon” of methodical life. This process certainly develops specific code-orientations but not a specific substantive rationality; the process remains uncompleted.

### **3. Religiosity and Civility in Greece**

This emotive mode of religiosity was transferred into the Greek secular public domain, becoming the mode of perceiving civility, not only by elective affinity, but as an intentional cultural strategy of forging a modern Greek political identity. This took place through the deliberate identification of the Orthodox

believer with the Greek citizen not only externally, but as a personal, deep, existential experience. The individual who experiences the Christian-Orthodox truth, by definition experiences the condition of citizenship. This is a crucial identification; it meant

“[N]o clear distinction between the concepts and the relative perception of a human being, an individual, a citizen, a Greek, and a faithful, as there is no clear distinction between the rights of man, the individual, the citizen and the faithful. Thus, it becomes clear from this point of view, that the attribute of the faithful and of the indigenous person constitute the main and primary features of the Greek from which all rights proceed” (Paparizos, 2000: 97-98)

This is much more than a manipulation of the Church by the State or of the State by the Church, whereas the state is consolidated by the ardent support of the Church, or that Church’s hegemony is guaranteed by State paternalism. It constitutes the definite infiltration of the public, secular, domain by religious imagism: Citizenship is not something which is realized through the involvement of the person in public affairs, through his/her involvement in horizontal voluntary organizations, through civil acts that turn abstract notions of morality material and visible, but through the experience of worship and acts of faith; citizenship *becomes* an emotive experience.

The “nation” and the “Church” become identical: the nation becomes a sacred entity that is perceived in transcendental terms similar to the religious ones. The regime, its functions, its wars are not to be questioned but revered in a fashion similar to the fundamental rituals and theology of the Church: faith, suffering, resurrection, redemption, salvation. These are not exceptional developments in the framework of the construction of modern states and state ideologies; they took place everywhere in Europe and beyond during the last

two centuries. Yet, in a country with no middle class, and no civil tradition, their effects were overwhelming. They absorbed and neutralized any notion of civility based on individual propensities and creativity.

Karamouzis, in a brilliant article of reviewing the literature of the effects of the Eastern Church on Greek citizenship concludes that anything national by definition became sacred and inviolable and vice-versa: the good Christian *is* the virtuous citizen, but, crucially, we would add, *not* vice-versa. Religious behavior is an efficient verification of ethical civility:

We should not forget that the religious subbed of the modern Greek society throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century constituted a significant parameter in the identification of the Greek citizen; the result of this could have produced more permanent consequences in the consciousness of the modern Greek compared with a secular national-political identity free of religious overlays. In this way, a peculiar type of citizen was established, a citizen who ought to comprehend his/her political presence in the modern Greek society through a set of rules which were legitimized only through religious duties which defined the virtuous citizen” (Karamouzis, 2009: 92-3)

True as it is that the Church allied with the most traditional, reactionary in fact, parts of the political spectrum, and true as it also is that this alliance crumbled after 1981, the mode of being a citizen through the religious *experience* has not really being questioned, or even more important, has not being replaced by another hegemonic discourse. Indeed, there are individuals or social groups that experiencing citizenship through voluntarist action, but the basic argument of the religious spirit of emotive collectivism is still alive: the undifferentiated “people” who deep in their heart experience the communal spirit in public

ceremonies in acts of emotional heightens incarnate the essence of citizenship.<sup>3</sup>

This analysis of Orthodox religion and religiosity suggests that the cultural substratum of Greek civil religion today should be strongly collectivist, emotive, imagistic, as well as suspicious of bureaucratic institutionalism, formalities, and methodical 'rationality' (in Weberian terms). Following Eisenstadt's structuration scheme, this cultural substratum should have permeated and affected the social division of labor as 'ground-rules', that is, specific ways of dealing with the indeterminacies of the social division of labor. Thus, while the responses of the participants in the research would be different, they should all comply to the aforementioned principles of Greek civil religion.

#### **4. The Research**

How could the aforementioned political tendencies and cultural predispositions manifest themselves in an empirical study? We could hardly expect individual perceptions to correspond squarely with an analytic diagnosis that reduces a complex and turbulent situation to personal reflections and quantified preferences, especially so in the framework of an original pilot study with no previous equivalent to depend upon. Thus, the questionnaire was constructed as a probing device to inspect the significance of some of the theoretical arguments, cultural interpretations, and historical contingencies that we consider as important in making sense of the social condition in Greece. Equally probing was the nature of the questions that were asked in the interviews in an effort to identify patterns of reasoning amongst the interviewees.

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<sup>3</sup> The presence of this fusion of civility and religiosity made itself visible during the ID cards crisis in 2000 when millions of Greeks demonstrated against the political decision to remove the recordation of the citizens' religious affiliation from the ID cards.

Together, they constitute the methodology foundation for a more focused and more specific research which will be able to target significant issues that until now were virtually a terra incognita to sociological research.

#### 4.1 The Quantitative Findings

##### **THE SURVEY'S DESIGN**

The questionnaire, consisting of 60 closed type questions and statements, was filled in by a selected sample of the General Greek Population during the period January-April 2012. A number of 49 qualified postgraduate students were employed as enumerators. The questionnaires were completed during interviews of the enumerators with the selected sample.

A quota sampling method was employed and a total of 857 persons were finally selected. The sample was distributed proportionately not only to the population of the regions, but to the gender and age of the population as well. The quota controls were derived from the Population Census of 2001. As the sampling units were spread in all the regions of Greece, the statistical population of the survey was the general population. Representativeness in the quota sampling is not ensured in the degree that the random sampling does, but the former is easier to organize. Additionally, random procedure needs exact and proper sampling frames which are not available in Greece. Furthermore, geographical procedure, as an alternative, was not possible to be financed in the frame of the present survey. Finally, quota controls reduce variability and thus the bias within the quota groups, in selecting individuals, is unlikely to be serious (Hoinville et al, 1983). The quality of the enumerators is a crucial factor for the success of the whole procedure. The success of the

statistical analysis that is presented in the next section verifies the absence of considerable bias in the sample.

As a sample of 1000 questionnaires was decided during the survey's design, a Non Response Rate of 14.3 % appeared a percentage which is quite low. Although the valid questionnaires were 857, non response varied among particular items with some "sensitive" ones presenting lower responses. The income for instance presents a N.R.R of 16%. In general the data gathered are of quite good quality considering available resources.

Females constitute 57 % of the total sample and Males 43 %. Mean age was  $33.64 \pm 0.896$  years old and the median age is 31 years old. Median should be used to present the average age instead of mean, as the 'age' variable does not follow the normal distribution.

The basic elements of the above information about survey' statistics are summarized in the table 1.

**TABLE 1: Basic information about survey's design**

|                                       |                            |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Sampling Population                   | General Population         |
| Sampling frame                        | Population Census of 2001* |
| Sampling method                       | Quota sampling             |
| Valid sampling unites                 | 857                        |
| Non response rate                     | 14.3 %                     |
| Data Collection method                | Interview                  |
| Gender Distribution % (males/females) | 43/57                      |
| Mean age                              | $33.64 \pm 0.896$          |
| Median age                            | 31                         |

\* Just as quota controls



Following the field work a number of checks were applied to the questionnaires to improve their quality.

## **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

Factor and Clusters analysis are used as the main statistical methods.

First a Factor Analysis was applied on the variables of the Triandis' test (Table 2) which distinguishes amongst four types of social behavior: (a) horizontal individualism (HI) which stands for expressing individuality without a competitive attitude to others; (b) vertical individualism (VI) which corresponds to aggressive individualism and competitive stand towards to the others; (c) horizontal collectivism (HC) which stands for voluntary collaboration amongst people aware of their individuality; and (d) vertical collectivism (VC) which stands for a more traditional acceptance of group priority irrespective of personal preferences. The findings show that the more important behavioral patterns found amongst Greeks are the collectivist ones with Horizontal Collectivism coming first, followed by the more conservative, Vertical Collectivism. Individualism on the other hand is the least important in our sample, with Horizontal Individualism being the third most important behavioral pattern, while Vertical Individualism, the 'cut-throat' version of it, being the least important of all four. In order to ensure the indigenous correlations, the statistical measure Kaiser-Mayer Olkin (K.M.O.) was used, which indicates the data suitability, the existence of adequate endogenous correlations and the adequacy of the sample, ranging in 0.801. At the same time, Bartlett's Test Sphericity=3236.618, df=105, p=0.00 verifying the possibility of variable correlation, by using factor analysis.

**TABLE 2: Rotated Factor Matrix<sup>a</sup> on the variables of the Triantis Test**

|   | Factor |       |       |       |
|---|--------|-------|-------|-------|
|   | 1      | 2     | 3     | 4     |
| 18_2. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others                              | ,077   | ,094  | ,702  | ,050  |
| 18_3. I often do "my own thing"   | ,079   | ,033  | ,515  | ,193  |
| 18_4. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me                    | ,210   | ,201  | ,603  | ,018  |
| 18_5. It is important that I do my job better than others                                     | ,126   | ,239  | ,442  | ,461  |
| 18_6. Winning is everything   | -,102  | ,005  | ,092  | ,647  |
| 18_7. Competition is the law of nature  | ,111   | ,133  | ,255  | ,430  |
| 18_8. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused                      | -,225  | -,039 | -,018 | ,606  |
| 18_9. If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud  | ,603   | ,158  | ,183  | -,073 |
| 18_10. The well-being of my coworkers is important to me                                      | ,632   | ,099  | ,078  | -,034 |
| 18_11. To me, pleasure is spending time with others   | ,688   | ,156  | ,122  | ,036  |
| 18_12. I feel good when I cooperate with others   | ,676   | ,172  | ,082  | -,153 |
| 18_13. Parents and children must stay together as much as possible                            | ,031   | ,377  | ,039  | ,119  |
| 18_14. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want     | ,226   | ,802  | ,161  | -,043 |
| 18_15. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required           | ,285   | ,711  | ,224  | -,009 |
| 18_16. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups                   | ,289   | ,323  | ,042  | -,006 |
| Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.<br>Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. |        |       |       |       |

Note: a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

The second test is original and was developed to test the Ramfos (2011) thesis, that is the presence (and thus of absence) of the ideal type of Western citizen (the open, reflective, and responsible self) vis-à-vis the “entrenched self” that crystallizes the moral self of the closed society, and assumingly of the Greek political/social attitudes (Table 3). In effect, the responses to this group of questions identify particular discourses concerning a series of civic and civil issues and for this reason we consider it as a group that tests *civil consciousness*. The results of the factor analysis (table 2) indicate that there are particular selective affinities amongst these items, suggesting five ideal-types of discourses that indicate particular moral hypergoods: the “phobic” (F1), the “righteous” (F2), the “populist” (F3), the “egoist” (F4), and the “leveling” (F5).

**TABLE 3: Rotated Factor Matrix on the variables of civil consciousness test**

| Rotated Component Matrix <sup>a</sup>   |           |       |       |       |       |
|---|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|   | Component |       |       |       |       |
|   | 1         | 2     | 3     | 4     | 5     |
| 20_9. The foreigners are jealous and conspire against us  | ,799      | -,052 | ,090  | ,085  | -,012 |
| 20_16. The foreigners impose a threat to our national identity  | ,788      | ,083  | ,137  | -,052 | ,010  |
| 20_15. I believe in the miraculous intervention of God in the world   | ,571      | ,248  | ,149  | -,135 | ,135  |
| 20_4. The role of the politicians is to adhere to my demands  | ,412      | -,108 | ,213  | ,240  | ,114  |
| 20_8. At the end of the day I am responsible for what happens to me   | ,091      | ,646  | -,214 | ,096  | -,033 |
| 20_2. Physical violence by no means belongs to social life  | ,002      | ,599  | -,003 | -,217 | ,090  |
| 20_7. If I consider something to be right I support it irrespective of the consequences                       | -,111     | ,565  | ,105  | ,466  | ,026  |
| 20_6. I sense the world more with my feelings rather than my intellect  | ,115      | ,508  | ,326  | ,103  | ,006  |
| 20_14. When the people truly get the power, it would be a matter of time to solve the most important problems | ,164      | ,112  | ,682  | ,151  | ,154  |

| Rotated Component Matrix <sup>a</sup>   |           |       |       |       |       |
|---|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|   | Component |       |       |       |       |
|   | 1         | 2     | 3     | 4     | 5     |
| 20_13. I feel that my life is controlled by dark networks   | ,204      | -,074 | ,645  | -,041 | -,109 |
| 20_17. In general I trust my fellow citizens irrespective of how well I know them personally            | -,008     | -,187 | ,452  | ,043  | ,405  |
| 20_10. The interest of the people is above institutions and laws  | ,249      | ,180  | ,417  | ,328  | ,060  |
| 20_1. I am ready to fight for what I believe is right, even by breaking the Law                         | -,138     | ,148  | ,158  | ,726  | ,011  |
| 20_5. Before my personal profit I do not consider the Law   | ,352      | -,326 | -,068 | ,636  | -,007 |
| 20_3. "Justice" is more important that "individual rights"  | ,203      | -,016 | -,168 | ,159  | ,780  |
| 20_12. Between individual freedoms and social equality, I prefer social equality                        | -,031     | ,169  | ,237  | -,135 | ,647  |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.<br>Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. |           |       |       |       |       |

Note: a. Rotation converged in 12 iterations.

the *phobic* discourse (F1) certainly is centered on the "foreigners" yet, believing in the miraculous intervention of God and the understanding of the political domain as a process of "demanding" unfolds a comprehensive cognitive model: It suggests an enclosed moral self fearful of external "intrusions" to its life-world, wrapped in traditional religiosity and a simplistic idea of politics as a demanding-serving process. The belief in the miraculous intervention of God is the most intriguing item as it suggests not only traditional non-reflective religiosity, but also a more basic cognitive predisposition toward the immanent world: the *deus ex machina* principle of solving perplexed issues in a "magic" way, a way that involves little personal effort. This is the moral stand of a traditional self, entrenched in kinship and

locality. Significantly enough, it is the discourse most likely to be structured by those who identify themselves with the far right (but not exclusively so).

The *righteous* discourse (F2) is an intriguing and most interesting combination of items. In its core lies the responsible and pacifist person which we consider, theoretical speaking, to be the foundations of a proper civil persona. Yet, it incorporates two more items that could be described as ambivalent, to say the least: self-righteousness and emotiveness. This latter blend of internal conviction and of filtering moral judgment by emotions suggests a highly personal sense of justice. This discourse matches the principles of the bi-polar individual of the Orthodox theological principles who combines righteousness with an inner, emotional, sense of justice irrespective of the consequence.

The *populist* discourse (F3) brings together the typical elements of populism and its moral principles. It is based on apocalyptic notions of good and evil, insecurity, and illegitimacy. This discourse is more secular and humanistic than the phobic one as it is neither xenophobic nor with supernatural associations, yet, we could consider it as an offshoot of the same moral discourse: it exemplifies the imagistic notion of the good and the just in equally entrenched ways. But while the phobic one is backward looking wishing for a routine life pattern, the populist one looks forward to a revolutionary “miraculous” and final resolution of the tensions of modern life. Interestingly enough, in this populist discourse we also find being included the item concerning “trust of fellow citizens” (20\_17). But, taking into account the context, this is not the civil trust of fellow citizens; instead, it is an abstract trust of the “people” who are seen as a community of transcendental worth.

The forth, *egoist* discourse (F4) is the more straightforward one. It exemplifies the identification of the moral good with the personal benefit irrespective of

the law. In this discourse moral hypergoods, personal gains, and illegal behavior are mixed to produce a highly unstable mixture of anomic action. It indicates that naked egoism is not acceptable even for the egoist. It must be connected with some moral good, thus the connection of personal gain with justice; but not without cost: it isolates the actor from other hypergoods. And it is the discourse more likely to be preferred by people who identify their political preferences as far right or far left.

Last, the *leveling* discourse (F5). It appears as the most ideological (collectivism above individuality) but it is not even remotely connected to any other item that would add to the discourse a sense of purposeful moral intention. Isolated from other connotating items, the discourse projects a moral picture that resembles more a herding mentality rather than of a people in power: someone who is willing to give up his/her individual rights as long as he/she retains his/hers essential similarity to the next individual.

The statistical measure Kaiser-Mayer Olkin (K.M.O.) was 0.722. At the same time, Bartlett's Test Sphericity =1496.7, df=120, p=0.00 verifying the possibility of variable correlation, by using factor analysis .It is important to note, that the five Factors occurred show the total variance of 51 % and 49 % loss.

In all, the statistical analysis suggests low levels of civil consciousness which is reflected in the absence of a cluster of variables that gathers together the values of an ideal-type western civility. Instead, the clusters on the Factor's Analysis Scores, that resulted from the civil consciousness test, reflect two crucial matters of civil morality: First, a high percentage of respondents do not take account of the law when it comes to issues of justice; here, the personal 'feeling' of justice clearly predominates. Second, 'people' is considered to be an entity above and beyond institutional arrangements of power, and of rule of

law. Both are clearly in line with the Orthodox perception of the hypergoods of Justice and Good and the ways that should be achieved. Indeed, the context is secular rather than religious, as Heavens has been replaced by secular hypergoods. Yet, the ways to achieve them clearly remains Orthodox Christian.

#### 4.2 The Qualitative Findings

##### **AIM AND METHOD**

The aim of the qualitative part of study was to identify regularities (and note irregularities) in the ways social actors in institutional posts as well as involved in social movements orient to the socio-political and economic challenges presented in Greece. These included key social and institutional macro-actors that shape and form the public agenda and are located in major syndicates of the public sector (ΓΣΕΕ, ΑΔΕΔΥ, ΟΛΜΕ, ΓΕΝΟΠ-ΔΕΗ, ΠΟΣΔΕΠ, ΤΡΑΙΝΟΣΕ), the private sector (federation of taxi owners, and federation of trucks), and the social movements that either emerged or came at the forefront during the last two years: 'I Do Not Pay' («Δεν Πληρώνω»), 'The Indignated' («Αγανακτισμένοι»), 'Open City' («Ανοιχτή Πόλη»), 'Potato Movement' («Κίνημα Πατάτας»). We interviewed key social actors identifying with the above organizations either as elected representatives of trade unions or who aligned themselves with particular social movements. The rationale was that, owing to the position of the social actors-representatives of trade unions, the ways in which they construct civic identity and the current situation in Greece pervade, influence but may also be 'in tune' with public understandings of them (Pavlou, 2001; Moscovici, 1984). Our central assumption is that cultural codes and moral arguments are located in discursive constructions which take their meaning from the context of their utterance (Edwards, 1997).

Similarly, due to the centrality of social movements in terms of action but also in terms of heated (public) debates and discussions around them, especially at the time of the research (March 2012-February 2013), it was assumed that people who categorized themselves along the lines of particular groups should be interviewed in order to investigate how these categories were constructed and what were the relevant categories of 'others' mobilized.

Interview data is suitable for the examination of the way participants construct and negotiate hypergoods and middle-range life goods. The focus was how people orient to issues of civic identity and action and what is the basis of participation as a citizen (collective/individual). The data analysis had three main focal points. The first was to identify the different contrary themes or ideological dilemmas participants face when they talk about civic action and identity in Greece-in-crisis. The analysis tried to identify the dominant lines of argument formulated by participants which indicate which explanatory resources participants primarily drew on and which constructions were treated by participants as more important or more relevant than others in the context of discussion. Second, emphasis was laid on category construction on behalf of the participants. Researchers argue that categories are places of contestation where different category definitions underlie different projects which try to mobilize audiences towards different actions (see for example Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). As a result, different category constructions may underlie different projects.

The aim of the study was to identify (a) the ways in which participants make sense of the contemporary situation in Greece, (b) the regularities (and irregularities) in the explanatory resources participants mobilize to make sense of the contemporary situation in Greece (and their ideological history), (c) the



‘rationalization processes’ and dilemmas in the lines of argument identified drawing on these resources.

The original plan was that we would carry out twenty (20) open-ended semi-structured interviews with members of the abovementioned groups in their everyday settings in order to attend to their social milieu. This involved holding the interviews in places familiar to participants, where they felt comfortable. We accessed participants through identifying entry points, hubs, key contact persons and gatekeepers. Participants were recruited using purposeful sampling, focusing on members of the afore-mentioned groups who act and are internally recognized as representatives of the trade unions or who identify with particular social movements. The focus of the interview schedule was on the ways in which participants orient to civic identity and culture in the context of the current situation in Greece. Namely, the topics covered were the socio-economic and cultural situation in Greece, participants’ involvement, role and action in it, the ways in which it is evolving, movements, actions, initiatives and interventions. Overall, 12 interviews and 1 group interview were conducted with representatives of the following major syndicates of the public sector: ΓΣΕΕ (N=1), ΟΛΜΕ (N=2), ΠΟΣΔΕΠ (N=2), ΠΟΣ (N=1) and of the following social movements (N=6+1): ‘I Do Not Pay’ («Δεν Πληρώνω»), ‘The Indignant’ («Αγανακτισμένοι»), ‘Potato Movement’ («Κίνημα Πατάτας»). Interviews ranged between 14 minutes and 1 hour 18 minutes (mean=43 minutes, sd=20 minutes) and were held in participants’ places of work or socialization. Interviews were transcribed and the transcriptions were firstly extensively read till some basic categories/topics were easily discernible. Initially, therefore, we focused on identifying thematic regularities.

At a second stage we concentrated on the lines of arguments used by our

participants, what explanatory resources these drew on and mobilized, what versions of social life and reality they constructed. Within our portfolio of data, therefore, we attempted to identify regularities in terms of the lines of argument (Wetherell, 1998) mobilized, as well as, in terms of the common places (Billig, 1987) around which these lines of argument were developed. Attention was also paid to the rhetorical organization of talk based on the premises set out in discursive psychology (DP) (Edwards and Potter, 1992).

The rationale for opting for such an approach overall was that, that while surveys and large-scale studies serve to identify the general stances and provide an empirical basis for the potential planning of policies, they provide limited information concerning the broader argumentative resources within which particular representations are constructed and/or about their functions in specific micro-social contexts. The two stages of the analysis follow below. The presentation of the data follows on the principles of discursive psychology (see the British Journal of Social Psychology and Discourse & Society).

## **ANALYSIS: RESOURCE AND ARGUMENTATION REGULARITIES**

Regularities were identified *mainly* in three topics which emerged as dominant in talking about the crisis in Greece:

- Orientation to change
- Treatment of 'abroad'
- Relationship between state and people

## **ORIENTATION TO CHANGE**

There were many accounts of change which were usually associated to accounts of the Greek crisis, how it was constructed and where/to whom it was attributed.

One common line of argument used by participants (mainly macro-social actors and few participants in social movements) was that a '*civic call*' was required. According to this line of argument the crisis implicated civic values and by incremental, 'educational' steps, people will be converted into citizens. The 'content' of these steps varied from as vaguely formulated as 'doing one's best', to engaging with politics, and to specific micro-actions.

#### **Extract 1 - Interview with representative of trade union in higher education**

82 if anything is to change in this model that we had up until now I think that a lot has to change  
83 eh we have to start in my opinion from what we call public and responsibilities of a citizen.  
84 Rights and responsibilities rights and responsibilities a constant thing in which as our  
85 CENTRE is the PUBLIC the public space the public whatever is public to become finally  
86 comprehensible that is to the GREEK therefore ((the Greek)) to become citizen

Another line of argument treated change as a more centralised process, gradually achieved as a result of the development of a *critical mass*. According to this argument there is a mismatch between practice and the politics which are in place to regulate it and it is a critical mass accumulating that drives change at a micro level and pushes changes at a macro level.

#### **Extract 2 - Interview with representative of trade union in higher education**

198 I have realized and I think I am not at all that there is now a a very big mass of academics  
199 that is may be it is the critical required mass of academics who want to us to leave the misery  
200 and the this not pleasant situation in which the Greek university is found for many years now  
201 and to start approximating/approaching the foreign university systems eh in the sense that  
202 they are systems that produce new knowledge eh produce good graduates it is not just a  
203 matter of public relations eh and there I think that there is a dividing line that is people who  
204 are good at their job have aligned regardless of political conviction with the group of those  
205 who want to change things

Trade unionists and most social movement participants treated *change as relevant and applicable to the state, the government, the political system and model of production*. Namely, participants mobilized the association of civic

action to outcome and argued that while *civic action comes from people, change comes from central government*.

### **Extract 3 - Interview with representative of trade union in secondary education**

114 We eh in the last couple of year more eh moved towards the logic of general strikes that is  
115 generalized strike movement in the public and private sector eh [...] these strike movements  
116 eh showed the intensity of reaction/opposition that existed in Greek people. It was the  
117 opposition in practice in any case eh [...] but as regards the results we cannot say that we  
118 have succeeded at this point we will be able to say that we have succeeded to the degree that  
119 this policy will start to be revised

A few participants argued that solidarity is the positive development of civic action.

### **Extract 4 - Interview with participant in square movement**

319 Generally though with the whole issue of solidarity there is this it is it started probably from  
320 then and worked more and it has stayed with many more or less with some more with others  
321 less nevertheless it works that is there is at any point in time that "I have a need" don't know  
322 "I will call a couple of guys" let's say "in case something happens". And you know that you  
323 will hear a good word if anything or he will try to mobilise himself to help you. Without  
324 always having a benefit. And that is very a very very good thing that we didn't have up to  
325 now. [...] And that is just from that you start to understand that a small stone was laid. You  
326 might have not achieved that is what you wanted but a small stone was laid in this. You were  
327 with a plus sign. Probably if it didn't happen this wouldn't have happened either.

### **TREATMENT OF 'ABROAD'**

References to 'abroad' (εξωτερικό), Europe, the US, and individual states were made in different contexts. The main two contexts where 'abroad' was mobilized was in relation to agency for and origin of contemporary situation in Greece and in discussing ways out of it.

In relation to agency for and origin of the contemporary situation in Greece, some participants engaged in differentiating Greece to 'abroad' in cultural

terms. These were at points treated as 'choices' (rationalizing and embedding culture with agency); or as 'pragmatic' differences (rationalization on the basis of external events, conditions or circumstances).

This differentiation was made by participants who attributed a role or blame to 'abroad' for the developments in Greece and was used as they grounds for which it was 'imposed', 'forced' and 'alien'. Attributions of agency to the state, the political system or government in Greece varied in these lines of argument but commonly treated them as 'weak'.

#### **Extract 5 - Interview with representative of trade union in secondary education**

97 Look the policy that was applied in Greece eh was designed eh imposed from abroad. As a  
98 result those that designed this policy very simply had no political cost. It was very very  
99 DIFFICULT these that they are ask asking from Greek people to try in the slightest bit to  
100 apply to their people right? Eh so from the point we fell in the calipers of supranational  
101 organisations eh it was evident that there would be highly intense eh eh attack on employees  
102 since it is a given that the lenders request only their money and ignore the human factor this  
103 is exactly what is recorded in Greece and in a milder manner in eh Portugal and Ireland

In terms of in discussing ways out of the current situation in Greece, the first argument used was formulated along the lines of an '*inward-looking*' approach, particularising the Greek case as local or particular in the sense of presenting differences with other cases in other countries and arguing that (only) local and particular or tailor-made solutions are relevant.

#### **Extract 6 - Interview with participant in social movement**

424 Also in Germany there are eh citizens' groups who who have adopted twenty trees each in  
425 the woods and go and look after them this is the other extreme there is eh saturation there and  
426 the person tries to find ways out let me give you an example at some point eh sometime the  
427 communist party of Germany in the age of seventy six seventy seven when I first went to  
428 Germany eh there were people who handed out leaflets in front of the supermarkets about an

429 armed revolution there wasn't anything more stupid for what reason? You cannot to someone  
 430 holding two cases of beer in their hands and is going home to watch the world cup I don't  
 431 know to give him a paper and tell him "armed revolution" it has no sense the person is  
 432 somewhere else has different needs there is no chance that he would leave the beers and  
 433 make ((laughs)) armed revolution right? that is there as well you SEE let's say how how silly  
 434 parties can be how stuck up they can be eh here we have different circumstances do you see  
 435 anyone leaving with two ((laughs)) cases of beer from the supermarket? Here we could talk  
 436 about an armed revolution in theory because though we are against violence that we don't  
 437 WANT such situations let's make our revolution

The second line of argument, which made an '*outward-looking*' approach relevant, was one of measuring Greece up on the basis of 'external' standards, treated as norms or as more advanced.

#### **Extract 7 - Interview with representative of trade union of Greek employees**

77 When the political system falls apart, when no formal body apart from the changes we had  
 78 gives a visible political perspective which is based on reality, which relates to the national  
 79 developments and to developments in Europe we are not alone eh we shouldn't at least have  
 80 this autism or smugness that Greece is in the centre of the world. Because there wasn't we  
 81 made very big strike movements we have made about twenty-five general strikes as many as  
 82 they have not done in all other European countries all other countries in the last five years we  
 83 have made in two years. We just managed to delay or interrupted some things but in essence  
 84 to be honest in essence a clear political victory did not exist and, therefore, lobbying was not  
 85 something that was in the culture to refer to this way of pressure in the culture of our  
 86 syndicalism. It is not exactly as it is in the northern countries and especially in the  
 87 Scandinavian ((ones)).

Participants treated this measuring up as yardstick to be reached top-down, and/or as a fact already reached bottom-up. Resource-wise, this mobilizes and engages with a common place in intellectual and lay accounts according to which modern Greeks constantly try to measure up with, though never fully achieve, a Eurocentric, metaphysical, normative and centripetal type of genealogised identity (Liakos, 2007).

It has been argued that the outward-looking view is a product of post-

Enlightenment colonialism. However, others argue that this is an oversimplification (Liakos, 2001; Herzfeld, 1987) as Greek nation builders did not passively accept European colonialist discourse but engaged in 'practical occidentalism'. 'Practical occidentalism' refers to evoking Western prototypes of Greek national character, to disavowing or criticising aspects of culture as 'oriental' or to seeking to be seen as 'occidental' (see also Herzfeld, 1995) amidst evaluative accounts of the Orient and the Occident indicating a "painful awareness of the inequality of cultural models". This semantic 'ambivalence' is seen as reproduced by Greek lay and non-lay actors, expressing a "pervasive unease about the status and identity of modern Greek culture". The long-lasting official Helleno-Christian discourse, succeeded by a resilient official discourse of 'hegemonic syncretism', of combining - without omission - both Hellenic and populist aspects which was taken up by subsequent political forces right up to today, may be argued to have enabled the re-production of these resources, constituting them as dominant and prioritised over others (see also Herzfeld, 2001).

## **RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND PEOPLE**

There were two main lines of argument here: according to some participants (macro-social actors) the state and people are one and the same thing, while other participants (in trade unions and social movements) drew a clear distinction between the two.

*The state and people are one and the same thing:* according to this line of argument the people *are* the state, and the 'public', the 'commons' are on these grounds citizens' property *and* responsibility. On these grounds, the crisis in Greece is constructed as a value one and realisation of this is treated as a

prerequisite for moving forward.

### **Extract 8 - Interview with representative of trade union in secondary education**

47 I think that eh especially the value crisis the cultural if you wish the social eh has not begun it  
48 would be absurd to say that it has begun in the last few years. Simply because of the financial  
49 of the intense financial crisis of the past few years these phenomena have been more acute. I  
50 think that the role models especially in the new eh the new generations eh have changed  
51 especially through the bombardment they receive from the mass media eh and in these I  
52 include the television the radio the press the internet and I dare say that in the Greek society  
53 there existed eh a sense that eh through the wealth through consumption will experience like  
54 a moral uplift that you will be someone who has status. And this lead us to some value some  
55 other mental standards of knowledge education eh to to weaken to weaken a lot. Eh even the  
56 phenomenon that is widespread of corruption as we adults call it eh was left all these years to  
57 be understood that there was an impunity that eh it is ok that everyone can take something or  
58 the phrase that we steal from the state thinking that it is something impersonal that it is a the  
59 state is opposite us and we can each and everyone can take something from it not the we are  
60 indeed eh we are the state.

*Distinction between the state and people:* this line of argument treats people and the state as two entities (sometimes connected through clientelism; sometimes disconnected as the state representing a distinct level of ultimate management, administration and protection or aggression derives from).

### **Extract 9 - Interview with representative of trade union**

93 Look I at least represent ((anonymised)) we are a party always in favour of dialogue always  
94 through dialogue we want to find those ways out that will be in the interest of the state and of  
95 the ((anonymised)) if you wish and personally of the employees. When there is no dialogue  
96 when there is when it is eliminated or the space for dialogue is limited from then on and they  
97 insist on certain policies that do not express us and obviously we have to defend because  
98 there are a lot of rumors for layoffs for one we have to defend even even our job. It is logical  
99 some will resort to extreme things. We of course say that in the context of legitimacy the only  
100 weapon against this hurricane that tries to come is the issue of strike.

Participants who alluded to this distinction constructed the crisis in Greece as (primarily) political and economic and change from above was treated as a prerequisite for moving forward. Some have traced the symbolic aspects of this



in the Mediterranean context where the state from the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards is associated with corruption, patronage and belated modernity. In this context, the state has been found to be counter-positioned to the individual or group, to be discursively used to represent inflexibility and estrangement from the people and, thus, ineffectiveness to respond reasonably in practice. In lay talk, this seems to enable self-criticism, but also ultimately a tendency to oppose the bureaucratic state to the people, and to direct blame attribution to (an) impersonal, external agency. This line of argument, therefore, seems to draw on an explanatory resource according to which the state is seen as the imposed, 'foreign' power, referring to a system of administration imported in the making of the modern Greek state, and history is read as a plot of foreign powers against Greece, which is in turn considered a nation symbolically disabled and condemned to servitude.

## **RATIONALIZATION PROCESSES AND HYPERGOODS**

The aforementioned rationalization processes could be seen as contextualizing cultural patterns of hypergoods. Description of the situation in Greece, of personal recounting of events, and description of emotional states in moments of heightened tension provide the background to bring forward the moral principles of the actors. Interesting enough, similar, pragmatic, descriptions of the political and economic evils of Greece (basically political corruption and economic weakness) were linked to three quite distinct lines of argumentation: A passive, an active, and a mixed one. In its passive form, 'facts' and personal experience were used to justify a preconceived idea of hypergoods, such as 'direct democracy', or 'people in power' as well as to condemn preconceived ideas of 'hyper-evils', such as the 'political system'. We call it passive as it reacts to the evils, but without any clear course of developing long-lasting

social structures. The Square Movement argumentation falls into this pattern:

#### **Extract 10 - Interview with a member of the Square Movement**

28 it means that Greece was not really developed, compared to the northern standards, capitalist  
29 society neither as the production was organized , nor what it produced nor how the  
30 productive forces were organized there was a big team: of mediators, that there is mediation,  
31 eh in all sides of life all forms of political life, legal and illegal, , and it is encouraged by the  
32 way it is organized it also holds true for the political life. This mediation encourages the  
33 development of clientelistic relations. The result is that Greece became easily the victim of  
34 blackmailing for a new relation between the forces of labor and the forces of wealth. I do not  
35 expect anything from the politicians. We will either develop direct-democracy structures, or  
36 we will be much worst in the near future. We need to resist, it is the natural consequence of  
37 the most oppressed and poor classes. We need to do something, to take the situation in our  
38 hands

In its active form, facts and personal experience were used as a basis to seek out solutions and reach out middle-range life-goods that were not appreciated beforehand. The 'no-mediators' or 'potato movement' represent such cognitive process: the worth of the community is found in actions that serve the common good in voluntary, non-hierarchical common action, inspired by a sense of contribution to the common good. The 'potato' or 'no-mediators' movement constitutes an example on an effort to develop new social structures that are both economical and moral.

#### **Extract 11 - Interview with a member of the potato movement**

12 Greece went through a period of relative prosperity which at the end of the day was standing  
13 on wooden feet  
14 Our society has collapsed because its cells are sick I mean the local authorities, I mean my  
15 neighborhood, I mean myself  
16 We need to change this situation, each and every one of us  
17 The change will not happen from the top, but from each one of us, the grass-roots  
18 Each one should be self-motivated to be a productive force in this society

A third strand, represented by the unionists, falls somewhere in the middle: Condemnation of the political system, and acknowledgement of long-term

economic weakness neither leads to questioning the whole structure of liberal democracy, nor to proposals for new types of unionism. Instead, their arguments speak of either returning to the good old comprehensive structures of a united front, or a return to forgotten values. In all, this strand indicates that charismatic action, of changing social structures in radical reshuffling of cultural codes, does not emerge easily out of established channels of institutional organizations; change comes from outside, from free-floating actors that amass resources and appropriate them in their own social structures.

#### **Extract 12 - Interview with a first unionist**

37 The problem for more than twenty years was the productive model, a wrong strategic choice  
38 We experience a crisis of values as we see values being shrank in our society  
39 Each one of us can contribute to the betterment of our society  
40 From the position each one of us has in the society, or the state, to change things for the  
41 better

#### **Extract 13 - Interview with a second unionist**

9 Our prosperity was not based on a strong productive base, markets started showing their teeth  
10 the lenders enforced hard terms that upset the most vulnerable parts of our society [the state]  
11 never implemented a just tax reform. Syndicalism is partly responsible. It entered the power  
12 sharing games, and disoriented simple unionist members that 'they are there to get me a  
13 salary increase, why should I fight?' Thus we developed the democracy of the couch. there is  
14 a great responsibility. Let us not forget that the unionist movement has achieved a lot, signing  
15 the general charter of collective bargain, the first crack on the wall of memorandum

More important, the arbitrary way by which social actors link facts with binary oppositions of hypergoods and 'hyperevils', and of middle-range life goods and life evils, strongly suggest that values alone are not enough to depict the moral universe of a social actor; most people adhere to the same hypergoods and to similar life goods. Instead, we need to know the binary *opposition* to each one of them. We need to know the *full* binary code, that is, the juxtaposition; not

only the bright side, but its shadow as well. Only then we can understand divisive lines of otherwise democrats who adhere to democratic principles but disagree on what constitutes the dark side of democracy.

## 5. Conclusions

The starting point of the analysis of civil religion in Greece was the Ramfos thesis that Greek civility is significantly affected by the 'entrenched self' that is cultivated by the still pre-modern and non-reflective Orthodox religion. The findings produced much more than a simple verification or rejection of this thesis. Indeed, the analytical scheme on which our research was based upon allowed us to read, and by the primary research to reveal, albeit only tentatively, a moral universe that permeates and deeply affects the workings of the Greek civil society: Civil consciousness in Greece strongly correlates with the Orthodox theology and related religious practices to produce a very specific type of civil *attitude* that transcends modern ideologies and links them to the cultural, indeed, to the civilizational past of the country, centered around an emotive and personalized sense of justice and righteousness 'above the law', overwhelmingly collectivist and, 'defiant' of bureaucratic rationalization processes.

Furthermore, the study showed that this *religious* mode of perceiving *modern* hypergoods may take more specific, and to no small degree, antithetical forms crystallized in various middle-range life-goods which, nevertheless, are not clearly demarcated, but instead communicate with one another according to the position of social actors in the social division of labor and personal orientations and priorities. While more detailed investigation of the subject-matter is necessary, the importance of the social division of labor in shaping an

individual discourse appears to be critical: As all of the five discourses the statistical analysis revealed are sub-routines of the same democratic code, particular binary sets of the latter could easily shift positions and priority according to the social status of the actor.

In a nutshell, out of the same cultural premises more than one political discourse emerges. These discourses, in the form of ethical behavior, are formed inside the social division of labor establishing hegemonic *wirtschaftsethiks*. It is intriguing, urging us to develop more precise methodological tools and detailed analysis, that while pragmatic reflections (e.g., ‘mistakes of the past’, ‘weak economic basis’, ‘political corruption’) are found in all interviews, this pragmatism is not identifiable in the quantitative analysis suggesting that it does not constitute a ‘value system’. Moreover, instead of being linked to a methodical rationalist value postulates, pragmatism is linked primarily to voluntarist hypergoods. All these need to be investigated in a future research project that takes into account the present findings, a comparative, cross-cultural, study if possible. For the moment, we could claim that this probing study has brought forward enough evidence that morality constitutes a key feature of social structure and social action, and as such it belongs to the core of the sociological analysis of civil society.

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