

Why did Greece block the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? An Analysis of Greek Foreign Policy Behaviour Shifts

Yannis Kechagiaras

GreeSE Paper No.58

Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe

MAY 2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
1. Introduction	1
2. Three models of Greek Foreign Policy behaviour towards FYR Macedonia	5
2.1. First model (1991-1995)	5
2.2. Second model (1995-2006)	9
2.3. Third model (2006-2009)	15
3. Permeable Perceptions': an intuitive analysis of Greek Foreign Policy Behaviour towards FYR Macedonia	24
3.1. Security perceptions	25
3.2. Power perceptions	29
3.3. National interest perceptions	31
4. Conclusions	33
References	36

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank each of the following persons for their help, comments or ideas: my academic advisor at LSE Dr Economides, Dr Syrigos (Panteion University), Professor Ifantis (University of Athens), Mr Lygeros, Drs Tzifakis and Fakiolas (University of Peloponnese), Dr Hancke (LSE), Professor Veremis (University of Athens), my colleagues Mr Antoniadis and Mr Kalamvrezos and the interviewees for their precious time.

Why did Greece block the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? An Analysis of Greek Foreign Policy Behaviour Shifts

Yannis Kechagiaras[#]

ABSTRACT

This essay analyses shifts in Greek foreign policy behaviour with regard to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from the early 1990s to the late 2000s, with a particular emphasis on the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit. In this paper, I attempt to provide an understanding of foreign policy decisions that examines the interplay of all the international, domestic and individual levels of analysis. Two parallel analyses take place: first, a historical analysis, showing how international threats/opportunities and domestic variables shape the strategic adjustments of the Greek Foreign Policy Executives (FPE); secondly, an intuitive analysis of the rationale behind the ‘Greek blocking’ based on the role of ‘permeable’ perceptions of Greeks on security, (negotiating) power and national interest.

Keywords: Greek Foreign Policy, Name Issue, LRT Worlds, Nationalism, Globalization, pragmatism

[#] Yannis Kechagiaras. Email: Kechagiaras@alumni.lse.ac.uk

This essay is based on a dissertation submitted for the MSc. International Relations Programme, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, 2010.

Why did Greece block the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? An Analysis of Greek Foreign Policy Behaviour Shifts

1. Introduction

At the April 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit, Greece convinced its partners and allies that the accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter FYR Macedonia) to NATO should be postponed until a resolution could be found with respect to its constitutional name. One year later, the European Council decided to postpone the opening of EU membership talks with FYR Macedonia on account of Greek objections.

The objections to the accession of FYR Macedonia to both international organisations stem from an international dispute over the name of Greece's neighbour (the Name Issue) dating from 1991, when the Socialist Republic of Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia. In 1995, Greece recognised FYR Macedonia with this provisional name by signing the Interim Accord, which inter alia pledged the two states to continue the UN-sponsored negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement in conformity with Resolutions 817 and 845 of the UN Security Council (see Zaikos, 2003).

Since then, the negotiation talks have often stagnated reaching no concrete results. The legal dimension of the Name Issue (namely, the sporadic proposals of the UN Secretary General special envoy) will not concern this paper's question, inasmuch as any ultimate resolution would require the decision to be taken at the highest political level, that is, the Greek *Foreign Policy Executive* (FPE).

In this analysis, I use the theoretical model proposed by Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro in their book *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy* (2009) –hereafter referred as LRT– that academically belongs to Neoclassical Realism¹. According to this model, foreign policy is seen through the lens of the FPE which personifies the state. The FPE examines the external stimuli that come from the international/regional environment. Meanwhile, whether the FPE's response quality to an external stimulus is the optimal² or not, depends on the impact of intervening variables in the process of decision making. For instance, a lack of autonomy of the FPE, resulting from societal and institutional structures inclusive of the leverage of public opinion, the elites and other interest groups can have an impact on FPE's response (e.g. Christensen, 1996, Ripsman, 2002). In particular, LRT pay tribute to *how* the FPE in charge assesses the *international threats/opportunities* and

¹ Neo-classical realism is an academic endeavour to re-examine political realism and, mainly, its newer version, neorealism, in foreign policy theorising (thereon, see Wohlforth, 2008). Neorealism, dogmatically, theorises that political leaders are working self-evidently for the state and take only rational decisions relative to the distribution of power. By and large, neorealists disdain any analysis focusing on domestic or human levels of a state by giving emphasis to systemic explanations of foreign policy decisions (see Waltz, 1979).

² For LRT, an optimal choice tends to be equated with a rational choice in that a. it is provided with a clear assessment of external stimuli and b. it provides clear information on strategic responses.

what kind of *strategic adjustments* are followed according to assessments previously made (Lobell, 2009).

Another issue under LRT consideration is *perceptions*. Perceptions affect the formulation of foreign policy and in combination with intervening domestic pressures may, in turn, distort a rational foreign policy choice based on purely international demands; in the same vein, national interest becomes dependent on these perceptions of the FPE (Dueck, 2009). As for perceptions, psychological, cultural and historical factors may affect how political actors perceive their own and others' capabilities (Rose, 1998: 168).

What makes LRT's book most interesting is that it stipulates that FPEs' behaviour can change in time, by generating different models of foreign policy. To sketch out potential models, LRT propose three basic worlds in their conclusions: *World 1* gives fully systemic explanations to foreign policy decisions; *World 2* complies with the conditions of neoclassical realism (international environment-oriented decisions affected by domestic variables), while in *World 3* decisions are better explained by domestic factors (LRT, 2009: 283).

My purpose is to apply the main argumentation of LRT, in order to detect how *threat/opportunity assessments*, and *strategic adjustments* change in Greek Foreign Policy vis-à-vis FYR Macedonia from the early 1990s to the late 2000s (part 1): I define three behavioural models and argue that there is a shift from what LRT call World 3 to World 1.

In brief, the first period (1991-1995) represents one of high-level international threats with a direct impact on Greek state/society

relations and leads to a less rational approach of foreign policy towards FYR Macedonia. The second period (1995-2006) constitutes a U-turn of Greek external behavior, based on more international opportunities with a reverse impact on Greek state/society relations. It entails a more rational approach towards FYR Macedonia involving economic penetration and institutional integrationist incentives. The third period (2006-2009) constitutes a rather *pragmatic* change of strategic adjustment, free from domestic pressure and is marked by the role of *timing* as international opportunity.

From this *historical* analysis, two legitimate questions are engendered: Why the strategic adjustment of economic interdependence and the incentive of Euro-Atlantic integration for FYR Macedonia, though a rational choice, did not help to resolve a bilateral dispute and why the more powerful part of the dispute in question, Greece, could not exert the necessary influence for this purpose? In part 2, an *intuitive* analysis proposes some answers: a reflection on the Greek blocking by examining the role of perceptions in foreign policy, explores how Greek perceptions on security, power and national interest affected the Name Issue. This dual historical *and* intuitive analysis of the paper allows for more convincing answers about questions of foreign policy of a complicated nature, which an analyst should be aware of.

For the analysis of the third model (2006-2009), four Greek officials have been interviewed: the then Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Valinakis; the then Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Stylianidis; the then Secretary General for European Affairs of the Greek Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Mr Katsoudas, and a high-level foreign policy advisor of the Greek government.

2. Three models of Greek Foreign Policy behaviour towards FYR Macedonia

2.1. First model (1991-1995)

Due to systemic imperatives, the Greek FPE for almost forty years after the end of the Greek Civil War (1949) did not raise any substantial objections to the denomination of the southern republic of the Socialist Yugoslavia as 'Macedonia'; a name that describes a broader geographical region, the largest part of which is Greek territory. On the one hand, the bipolar system of the Cold War would require good relations between the West and Tito's Yugoslavia; on the other hand, after 1974, Greece would have to counter-balance a high-level threat on the east (Turkey), from which its allies were not willing to fully defend it. Therefore, the strategic adjustment would require the Greek FPE to cooperate with Yugoslavia, neglecting the slow and steady building of a Slav Macedonian identity³.

In 1991-1995, Greek foreign policy was dominated by both extreme uncertainty and change in the international and Balkan environment *and* a strong interplay with domestic politics, public opinion, the media, civil

³ In this paper, I will technically use the term 'Slav Macedonians', when I refer to the FPE of FYR Macedonia. 'Slav Macedonians' is the English equivalent of the Greek term 'Σλαβομακεδόνες' which a great part of Greek bibliography uses, when referring to the people of FYR Macedonia. According to this view, 'Macedonians' is a geographical designation rather than ethnological and pertains to the nations that used to or live in the geographical region of Macedonia. Accordingly, we can distinguish Greek Macedonians in Greece, Bulgarian Macedonians in Bulgaria and Slav Macedonians and Albanian Macedonians in FYR Macedonia.

society and the electorate (see Tsoukalis, 1996: 26-28). The first, far from facilitating, contributed to risky threat and opportunity assessments, while the second to a distortion of a strategy appropriate for an unstable regional environment of intense renationalisation of Balkan politics, irredentism, hatred and war.

a. International threats/opportunities assessments

In the early 1990s, Greece had to confront not only Turkey as a threat but, also its loss of her Balkan strategic 'cushion', Yugoslavia. Instead, the fledgling FYR Macedonia would, officially, follow practices of extreme nationalism: use of ancient Greek symbols on its flag, irredentist articles in its new Constitution, anti-Greek propaganda in the education system, etc. (see Axt, 1997: 172).

Second, by adopting a 'worst-case-scenario' approach in its threat assessments, Greece assessed that it would be encircled by client states to Turkey (Albania, FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia), the so-called 'Muslim arc'. Indeed, Turkish diplomacy, since the mid-1980s, had approached Skopje, while since the early 1990s it inaugurated an 'economic facilities' provision with Skopje and Tirana (see Conostas, 1995: 91-92; Wallden, 2003: 433-435). Instead of facing this rapprochement by tending a hand of friendship, Greece adopted defensive reflexes.

Hence, the assessment of the Greek–FYR Macedonia relations was one of a win-lose approach. However, potential security dilemmas were not based on the real distribution of power (Slav Macedonians were economically and politically weaker). During this period, less security for FYR Macedonia meant more security for Greece, which eventually

resorted to the logic of a regional balance of power and found her ally in the face of Serbia (see Michas, 2002).

Finally, the seemingly 'negative' performance of the Europeans and NATO in the Balkans impacted the FPE's assessment of the situation (Eyal, 1996: 144; see Tsakaloyannis, 2005: 447). The inadequacy of the newly established EU Common Foreign and Security Policy to enforce peace in the region gave the impression to Greece that it should follow a self-willed approach with 'instinctive' strategic adjustments. Unlike Greeks, Europeans wanted, by any means, stability in FYR Macedonia; the Name Issue would complicate things (see Larrabee in Conostas, 1995: 88).

b. Domestic variables

Research has revealed that collective public opinion changes abruptly during periods of high threat, because 'uncertainty about the intentions of allies and adversaries is high' (Isernia, Juhász, Rattinger, 2002: 222). In the early 1990s, Greeks reacted strongly sentimentally. Robert Kaplan eloquently narrates: 'When in late 1991, Yugoslav Macedonia declared its independence as 'Macedonia', Greece went wild. Hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in the streets of Salonica, and the Greek army went on border 'maneuvers'' (Kaplan, 2005: 281).

Indeed, public opinion and civil society, inclusive of the Greek Orthodox Church, during this period, expressed their nationalistic sentiments, having a clear impact on the FPE's strategic adjustments and choices (see Kalaitzidis, 2010: 69-80). Moreover, the media had a role of

seconding the people's reactions for Greek Macedonia by fomenting nationalism (Mitropoulos, 2003: 289).

On the other hand, other intervening variables were even more determinate. Both the opposition party (socialists) and the internal governing party opposition (right-wing) were expressing maximalist positions contrary to premier Mitsotakis who was indifferent about the Name Issue, leading shortly thereafter to the collapse of his government: different perceptions on foreign policy between Mitsotakis and his Foreign Minister, Samaras, led the latter to resign and found a new party (see Ifantis, 1996: 152-153).

c. Strategic adjustments

Both Mitsotakis and the next government's (socialist) FPE strategic adjustment involved a multiparty decision (1992) to pledge all future governments not to accept the term 'Macedonia' and its derivatives for the name of the neighboring state, thus, creating a strong political dependence path until 2007. Second, there was a clear preference for negative instruments of foreign policy: one partial (1993) and one complete embargo (1994) was set in place. In addition, Greece attempted in the framework of international organisations to dissuade countries from recognizing the new state, and block the accession of FYR Macedonia to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe. Regarding the EU, Greece tried to invoke the solidarity principle (Eyal, 1996: 144), until Europeans were forced to withdraw their support for Greece for the sake of regional stability.

The Greek FPE has received severe criticism as being unready for the great challenge of the post-communist era (Koppa, 2005): Greece could have interpreted its proximity to the Balkans as an international opportunity to become a stabilising factor. Yet, it is vague whether the Balkan states would readily respond. Indeed, Greece was 'chastised by paternalistic Europeans for not behaving like civilised Scandinavians' (Tsoukalis, 1996: 28). The early 1990s saw in the face of Greece a 'Balkan Israel' which many times exaggerated, on account of bad historical memories and potential security threats (ibid: 26).

According to LRT, the model of 1991-1995 was a sort of a partial combination of World 3 and World 2: Even though domestic variables were not the exclusive factor that led to the strategic choices of the FPE, the outcome of the FPE position would be different without them, both because Mitsotakis had a different point of view on the issue and because the next socialist premier Andreas Papandreou had raised expectations before the elections. To conclude, the difficulty in assessing clearly the international threats and opportunities and the low level autonomy of the FPE from society and politics both affected strategic adjustment, bringing in elements of irrationality.

2.2. Second model (1995-2006)

In 1995, the Interim Accord imposed by American diplomacy (see Holbrooke's book mentioned in Tziampiris, 2003: 100) was 'manna from heaven' both for the Greeks and the Slav Macedonians. As for Greece, it removed a thorny political issue without retreating from the 1992 multiparty decision. As for FYR Macedonia, the Greek embargo was

removed and the state was recognised by Greece. Yet, the Interim Accord left the Name Issue unresolved. It was a formula that provided the framework for a final resolution. This was disregarded: the Greek FPEs did not interpret the dynamics of the Accord's time space, while the other side remained satisfied with the Name Issue as becoming a forgotten dispute.

What differentiates the first model of Greek behaviour from the second is the decrease of direct threats coming from FYR Macedonia, the absence of the sense of surprise, prevalent in the 1991 events, and the increase of international opportunities. This had corollaries on the perceptions of the FPE, with strategic adjustments being facilitated by domestic developments adaptive to positive external stimuli.

a. International threats/opportunities assessment

At the outset, two incidents regarding international threats led Greece to reassess its relations with FYR Macedonia. The Turkish threat resurfaced with the Imia Crisis five months after the Interim Accord, and the developments concerning Kosovo's secession (1999) and the Albanian Macedonian uprising (2001), led Greece to revise its security dilemmas. Gradually, Greece saw in the face of FYR Macedonia a buffer zone that would prevent the Albanian aspirations for a Greater Albania from materializing (see, Couloumbis & Yannas, 1996: 169): Greece, then, looked for respect for existent borders and minority rights. To satisfy these threat assessments, Greece opted for a 'De-macedonisation' of its foreign policy which had an impact on the Name Issue per se: internal stability issues and the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country became

more important. The 'win-lose' approach to relations with FYR Macedonia became a thing of the past.

In addition, international opportunities in the region rendered the Greek FPE less insecure. The improved performance of the European initiatives in the Balkans and the normative role of the EU was one opportunity (see Tzifakis, 2003). Another came from international fora that made an effort to persuade Greece to adopt a more accommodative strategic adjustment for FYR Macedonia with a view to establish an economic hegemony in the Balkans. According to Joseph Nye:

'Like any other nation, Greece possesses two forms of power: hard and soft power...while some concentrate their energies on calculating the regional balance of hard power, Greece has a tremendous advantage over its Balkan neighbours in soft power' (Nye, 1995: 148).

The Greek FPE *rationaly* adjusted to the global requirements favouring the establishment of a liberal, free and democratic globe based on international cooperation, institutional integration and open markets (Tsakaloyannis, 2005: 448). The result was the convergence between the international community's (US and EU) objectives in the Balkans and the Greek ones (something missing from the first model). This created a new neoliberal ideology in Greek foreign policy: cooperation is easier to achieve and offers absolute gains to states; economic welfare is preferred to security and international institutions can mitigate anarchy (Baldwin in Smith, 2000: 381)⁴.

⁴ Morgenthau highlights 'I call an ideology, regardless of the motive or the state of mind of its propounder, any system of thought which rationalises or justifies a particular social

b. Domestic variables

This ideological U-turn coincided with a remarkable evolution of the Greek state and society. The socialisation of Greece with its European counterparts played an important role on this: The EU had an impact on Greek FPE objectives⁵: the most prevalent of them became the entry of Greece into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)⁶. The Greek modernizing government of Simitis (socialists) attempted to introduce European practices and trends in domestic processes. 'According to Simitis, Greece meant democracy, the state of law, prosperity, Europe, rather than fatherland, religion and family; accordingly, a robust Greece was an open, globalised Greece not a xenophobic and traditional one' (Keridis, 2005: 303).

As a result of reduced uncertainty in international relations and the promise of modernisation within Europe, the Greeks in the early-2000s prioritised their economic prosperity to their security. According to opinion polls, foreign policy issues became of minor importance (3,8 %) with the most important issue being unemployment (41,6%) (Metron Analysis, 2003). After the Interim Accord, Greek economic interest groups penetrated in the market of FYR Macedonia in view of the positive climate. Greece became the most important economic partner of its neighbour. Bilateral trade soared from \$US 57.8 million in 1995 to \$US 758.5 in 2006. Additionally, between 1995 and 2005, Greek investors contributed 20,8% of the total Foreign Direct Investment in

position...ideology is not a propagandistic addition to foreign policy. It is an intrinsic element within the foreign policy process itself' (Morgenthau, 1978: 117-118).

⁵ Many scholars describe this impact under the academic title of 'Europeanisation' (see Lavdas, 1997).

⁶ Secondly, the accession of Cyprus to the EU and, thirdly, organising the Athens 2004 Olympic Games.

FYR Macedonia (Panagiotou, 2008: 69, 75). Finally, the Greek media during this period followed the main trends in society.⁷

Finally, the Greek FPE at the time was free of the opposition's and the internal opposition's severe criticism. The new leader of the right-wing opposition party, Kostas Karamanlis, upheld the strategic choices of the FPE on FYR Macedonia by supporting the socialist government vis-a-vis the 2001 insurgency (see Karamanlis' article in Herald Tribune in Tziampiris, 2003: 123).

The above intervening variables favoured by international opportunities resulted in the autonomy of the Greek FPE. As Conostas had predicted in an early stage, 'such decisions will not be attractive targets for exploitation by the opposition and that close interaction with the European environment of foreign policy will further narrow the distance between objective reality and its cognition' (Conostas, 1995: 75).

c. Strategic adjustments

From the late-1990s, Greece made effort to introduce a more institutionalised Balkan cooperation scheme by supporting, inter alia, the Charter on Good Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe (2000) and favouring initiatives of the EU: namely, the Stability Pact for region-building and the South-East European Cooperation Process. In the framework of the Stability Pact, Greece launched a fairly ambitious Hellenic Plan for the Economic

⁷ The role of the burgeoning Greek International Relations (IR) academia as an intervening variable seems ambiguous as for its contribution to the rationalisation of the then FPE. Certain scholars stress its failure to become forerunner of change (Tsakonas, 2005), while others are more optimistic (Conostas, 1995). The role of academics in modernising Simitis' FPE is barely mentioned in Keridis (Keridis, 2005). For a critical view regarding IR liberal scholars' leverage in foreign policy, see Ifestos (Ifestos, 2005).

Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB) ‘an effort on the part of Greece to incorporate certain individual initiatives of development assistance into one single plan’⁸. The amount of \$US 74 million was allocated to FYR Macedonia.

The 2001 insurgency in FYR Macedonia, when an armed conflict began after an ethnic Albanian military group started attacking state forces, was an exogenous feedback for the Greek FPE. The security of the country was put into peril and thanks to the international community’s (American) intervention, a resolution was found taking the shape of the Ohrid Agreement, according to which the Slav Macedonians made several concessions on Albanian Macedonian rights. During the crisis, the Greek FPE accepted a Slav Macedonian request for military material aid. Additionally, Greece refused a call from Bulgaria for bilateral military intervention, by supporting a multinational military presence. In the midst of the crisis, Greece made high efforts and succeeded in the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between FYR Macedonia and the EU so as to ensure the prospect of Albanian Macedonians within a united state (on this paragraph, Tziampiris, 2003: 124).

During the second model, the Greek FPE made new strategic adjustments by changing its foreign policy priorities, the means of foreign policy, its perception of both national security and the constructive role of international organisations. On account of favourable circumstances, the Greek FPE adopted a neoliberal accommodating strategy hoping that cooperation, institutional

⁸ See <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/HiPERB/>

deepening and widening and economic influence would bring medium term benefits to the Greek foreign policy. During that period, negotiation talks became a subordinate issue and fell into a 'leisureliness state' (Interview, Katsoudas), particularly after the 2001 crisis. Contrarily, the 2001 insurgency prompted Slav Macedonians to keep a more uncompromising stance by arguing that the name 'Republic of Macedonia' would strengthen their internal stability and regional peace.

The clear international threats and opportunities, the accommodating economic interest groups and an indifferent public opinion gave the Greek FPE the autonomy needed to shift its strategy towards a more rational approach: the fact that economic interests favoured the 'De-macedonisation' of foreign policy (World 2 according to LRT) coincided with and facilitated (but did not impose) a position that was determined by international imperatives (World 1). Finally, in this model, the role of perceptions of the FPE was primordial: According to Tsakonas, 'this transformation of Greek foreign policy was not exclusively born of changes at the international and regional level, but, rather it was the sequel to the conceptions of these developments by the Greek foreign policy makers' (Tsakonas, 2005: 313).

2.3. Third model (2006-2009)

The third model of Greek foreign policy shift towards FYR Macedonia is one of clear international threat and opportunity assessment and an accommodating domestic environment for the Greek FPE, that both facilitate a rational and pragmatic strategic adjustment. This fact makes the decision to block FYR Macedonia one of World 1, according to LRT. In

this case, the international/regional system can better interpret the final foreign policy decisions.

a. International threats/opportunities assessment

In fact, the assessments affecting the NATO/EU blockage date from the aftermath of the 2001 insurgency crisis. Although the unyielding positions of FYR Macedonia with regard to its constitutional name were pretty much known since the 1990s, what troubled the Greek FPEs was the zero reciprocation of the Slav Macedonian FPE in regard to the accommodating strategic adjustment of Greece after the 2001 crisis and its staunch support for European integration (Tziampiris, 2003). Instead, the Slav Macedonian FPE stipulated that the Name Issue was unilateral dispute and the UN-sponsored negotiation process should lead to the unilateral usage of a name by the Greeks and not by the international community as a whole. Finally, it emphasised its right to self-determination by underrating the validity of the pledges of the UN resolutions and the Interim Accord.

Second, FYR Macedonia succeeded in its recognition by two thirds of the UN General Assembly members as 'Republic of Macedonia' in their bilateral relations, by turning its Permanent Representation in New York into an area of lobbying for its bilateral recognitions (Interview, Katsoudas). The 'final blow' came from the US: the first day of the second term of Bush administration, Washington announced its decision to use the name 'Republic of Macedonia' in its bilateral relations with Greece's neighbour (November 2004). In his interview, Mr Valinakis suggests that the American recognition was designed to circumvent, inter alia, the Greek FPE's objections with respect to the Name Issue as

expressed during the first Karamanlis' visit to the US (May, 2004). Objections with regard to the Name Issue had also been expressed to the UK Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Jack Straw, by Minister Molyviatis and Mr Valinakis during the EU presidency of Great Britain in September 2004.

The increasing number of recognitions undermined the UN-sponsored negotiations for the Name Issue. Surprisingly, Greece reacted slowly to this. Mr Katsoudas stresses that when he took office (2007), there were neither diplomatic directives nor verbal note patterns or *démarches* on the issue: 'Greece was taking no measure against these recognitions' he insists, something he calls 'inertia'.

Third, we should further explain the US support of the Slav Macedonian constitutional name. Before 9/11, Americans persuaded Slav Macedonians to accept the Albanian Macedonian claims during the 2001 crisis (Ohrid Agreement) by promising support for their name and full integration within the NATO structures (Burns, 2004: 7)⁹. After 9/11 the US started disengaging from the Balkans. Its implicit support, during the 1990s, of Muslim Albanian military groups in Kosovo faded, while its main focus became the 'War on Terror' and Islamic fundamentalism. As for the Western Balkans, the strategic adjustment of the US FPE favoured small developing, albeit manipulable, nation-states willing to support American President Bush's aspirations across the Globe.¹⁰ This took place by intervening in domestic ethnic disputes, which could

⁹ In this State Department edition, US's increasing intentions become clear: 'Allies new and old have an interest in assisting ['Macedonia'] to meet the political, economic, and military requirements of NATO membership' (Brzezinski, 2004: 12).

¹⁰ FYR Macedonia became a member of 'the coalition of willing'.

threaten ‘adverse effects’ on the overall regional stability (Arvanitopoulos, 2008).

The Kostas Karamanlis FPE that succeeded the Simitis government in March 2004, during the first period, maintained a moderate position and supported the Slav Macedonian side in its European integration. First, at the December 2005 European Council, Greece voted in favour of giving FYR Macedonia the status of a candidate country, allowing for extra funding to flow from Brussels to Skopje. On this occasion, Greece managed to ensure the usage of the provisional name of FYR Macedonia in all EU documents (Interview, Valinakis)¹¹.

Second, another accommodating gesture of the Greek FPE was the speeding up of bilateral economic relations. In his interview, Mr Stylianidis underlined his role with respect to Greek initiatives towards bilateral collaboration in development projects (European Corridor No 10 co-sponsored by Greece), the construction of a Greek oil pipeline that connects Thessaloniki with FYR Macedonia, and in a series of environmental issues with respect to Vardar river pollution. He also mentioned the re-activation of the HiPERB.

b. Strategic adjustments

Two independent international events played a primordial role in the Greek foreign policy strategic adjustment of the third model. The first

¹¹ Before the European Council, Prime Minister Karamanlis had stated that lack of cooperation from Skopje to find a resolution under the UN for the Name Issue ‘is a *parameter* that bears highly upon its European perspective’. In the framework of the European Council, Foreign Minister Molyviatis and Mr Valinakis had informed the presidency and the member states that the common decision on FYR Macedonia did not constitute a ‘blank cheque’ for the opening of membership talks with FYR Macedonia (Interview, Valinakis).

was the NATO enlargement which constituted an international opportunity for Greece. The second one was the new ultra-nationalistic government in Skopje. Both events provoked the pragmatic strategic adjustment of the Greek FPE and I posit both at the beginning of the third model accounting for the clear-cut World 1 case, according to LRT.

First, although the Name Issue was a top priority for the Karamanlis administration since 2004, *timing* impacted the Greek FPE, when NATO seemed to invite FYR Macedonia for membership. According to research, this became clear in 2005: the person that introduced the idea of 'resolution of the Name Issue as a condition for the NATO accession of FYR Macedonia' was Foreign Minister Molyviatis, in 2005 (Stylianidis, Interview). In reality, Greece was forced to act in response to the intention of its allies, mainly, the US. As Mr Valinakis reveals, the Greek FPE envisaged a prospective *EU* blocking of FYR Macedonia, but it was the chronological order of the NATO invitation that imposed the Greek blocking.

Second, the new Slav Macedonian FPE (August 2006) facilitated the Greek decision in that, with a series of actions, it presented Greece, a member of NATO, no other alternative but to react. The Gruevski government revalidated a nationalistic policy, insisting on every occasion that Slav Macedonians are not a Slavic nation but direct descendants of Alexander the Great (Macedonist theory). Nationalistic manifestations can be found in instances of renaming central squares, avenues and airports with ancient Greek historical names, Gruevski's wreathing of a monument depicting Greek Macedonia as a part of 'Greater Macedonia', etc.

The Greek FPE, perceiving the negative international climate manifested in international imperatives (stalemate of negotiations, rolling in of recognitions, US open support, Slav maximalist actions) and its past 'inertia', and availing itself by an international opportunity, reformulated its adjustment. First, it tacitly reversed the multiparty decision of 1992 (no name with the term 'Macedonia') by weighing that the majority of states use the name 'Macedonia' for their bilateral diplomatic relations¹². Second, it defined the Greek position (something never fully clarified, hitherto) and set the Greek red lines: 'a name with a geographical designation with erga omnes validity' (Interviews, Stylianidis, Valinakis, confidential).

Third, it proclaimed that 'without a mutually acceptable solution, there can be no allied relations, no invitation for participation in the same Alliance'¹³. Fourth, it reformulated the Greek argumentation: it rejected the rather sentimental and history-centric argumentation of the first model by adjusting the Greek position to international agreements' standards on good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation requirements as well as on national interest arguments (Interview, Valinakis); Greece emphasised that accepting a new member with an unresolved international dispute in a security club, NATO would lose its coherence – and thus raised issues of 'political conditionality' for candidate members (Interview, confidential). Last, it postponed the sponsoring of the European Corridor 10 and blocked European funding (Interview, confidential).

¹² In fact, the term 'Macedonia' in various forms has been on the table of secret negotiations even before the 1992 Greek multi-party decision.

¹³ Speech of the Prime Minister before the Greek Parliament (Feb. 2008).

As a result, a systematic preparation for the Bucharest NATO Summit lasted one year (confidential interview) by taking its final shape after the 2007 Greek national elections (Interview, Katsoudas). The Greek FPE did not send clear-cut messages about its definite decision to block FYR Macedonia until late 2007, because such messages would not leave space for last-time compromise: 'our target was a resolution not a blockage' (confidential interview). However, this made the US FPE calculate that Greeks, finally, would not block (see Lygeros, 2008). The Slav Macedonian FPE received erroneous messages that the US FPE would finally 'control' the Greek objections before or during the Bucharest Summit (Interview, Valinakis).

With regard to the EU, the Greek FPE worked consistently to enrich the criteria of candidates' admission to the EU by asking for further requirements regarding foreign policy issues, and neighbourly relations between a candidate state and the member-states (Interview, Valinakis). Mr Valinakis highlights that, in the previous enlargement process of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), foreign policy issues were not prioritised by the EU for political reasons.

c. Domestic variables

The Greek FPE's decision to declare that it accepts the term 'Macedonia' with a geographical designation for FYR Macedonia's name, did not receive any serious public protestations. The fact that the 'De-macedonisation' of the Greek foreign policy of 1995-2006 had an impact on public opinion was obvious. Although polls illustrated that public opinion did not want the term 'Macedonia' for their neighbours' name (67%), simultaneously, it fully supported the red lines posed by the

government (80%) (Metron Analysis, 2008)¹⁴. That said, what tilted the Greek public opinion towards a rather moderate position with respect to FYR Macedonia's name could be explored in the question 'do you think that FYROM is a threat for your country?'. 69% of the respondents say 'No' (Public Issue, 2008a).

It seems that public opinion did not express itself in the way Kaplan had described for the Greeks of the early 1990s¹⁵. After all, Greek public opinion became an accommodating variable for the FPE's blocking, while its engagement became undesirable. Mr Valinakis emphasizes that the government did not favour a 'bumbling engagement' of domestic protestations against Slav Macedonians, because it would harm the Greek national interests.

As for the Greek opposition parties, only the populist right-wing party LAOS expressed its discomfort with the rejection of the 1992 decision but its reaction had no duration¹⁶. The other parties fully consented to the government's red lines. Notably, the socialist major opposition party (PASOK) supports the government by criticising Gruevski's government, while SYRIZA, a leftist party, that sometimes its members have expressed sympathetic positions for Slav Macedonian claims, consents to both red lines and the intent of the Greek blocking¹⁷.

¹⁴ In general, public opinion continued to consider that the issues of foreign policy are of low importance. 'Foreign Policy' occupied the seventh position in the question 'which is the most important problem for Greece?' (2.7%) (Metron Analysis, 2007).

¹⁵ Into 'Does FYR Macedonia need Greece to survive as a country?' 'Yes' say 90% (Public Issue, 2008b).

¹⁶ For a contrary view, see Agnantopoulos, 2010:10.

¹⁷ Kalaitzidis has a similar idea for the accommodating role of domestic politics regarding the third model (see Kalaitzidis, 2010: 139, 146). Arguably, the Greek blocking decision was not based on domestic politics, because the popular mandate of the Karamanlis government was quite fresh.

Again, the role of the mass media during this period is moderate though sporadically broadcasting Gruevski's nationalistic statements and stressing his FPE's 'arrogant behaviour'. Yet, one part of media that we would call 'attentive media' or 'elite analysts' were either criticising the Greek FPE's inertia of the second model towards FYR Macedonia (Lygeros, 2008, Delastik, 2007) or in line with a premise that the Name Issue has become an absurd issue Greece should disengage or resign from¹⁸. For instance, a well-known Greek analyst's article, one year before the 2008 NATO Summit, was entitled '*the Balkans loser*' arguing that Greeks are entrapped in a lost contest (Papahelas, 2007).

After the September 2007 elections, the Karamanlis administration ensured the blocking alternative and instructed the Greek Foreign Minister, Bakoyannis, to implement the strategic choice. The FPE commenced an attempt to inform *all* NATO partners on its intention to object to FYR Macedonia's accession (Interviews, Valinakis, confidential). One of Mr Katsoudas' missions was to visit the US to mitigate American FPE's reactions on the Greek decision and inform US academia on the new Greek foreign policy adjustment (January 2008); Greece attempted to approach in secret the Bulgarian government and influence Bulgaria's position in the Summit (Interview, Katsoudas). With Mr Valinakis' diplomatic efforts, a number of states that had recognised the constitutional name of FYR Macedonia, declared that they will henceforth use the provisional name 'FYR Macedonia' in their bilateral and international relations by respecting the resolutions 817 and 845 of the UN.

¹⁸ For the impact of 'elite media' in the shaping of elite opinion and foreign policy, see Baum and Potter, 2008.

Greece succeeded in institutionalising an international dispute by making the resolution of it a criterion for the accession of FYR Macedonia to NATO¹⁹. During the summit, 'the Greek FPE touched with a rather technocratic argumentation the 'post-modern' members, while it received condescending reactions from its traditional allies' (Interview, Katsoudas). France, Bulgaria, Spain, Romania and Iceland supported the Greek objections (confidential interview). After the NATO blocking, the Greek FPE followed the same pattern regarding the EU membership talks with FYR Macedonia. The Council of the European Union has lately adopted similar phrasing in its conclusions on enlargement/stabilisation and association process of 5 December 2011. Domestically, the red lines and the NATO/EU blockage have become a political dependence path for the next socialist and the transitional Greek FPE. In this sense, the third model could have been extended for the period 2006-2011.

3. Permeable Perceptions': an intuitive analysis of Greek Foreign Policy Behaviour towards FYR Macedonia

From the previous analysis of the Greek foreign policy change results the relationship between international threats/opportunities, the state/society relations and FPE's strategic adjustments towards FYR Macedonia. According to Neo-classical realism, 'there is no perfect transmission belt linking the relative distribution of power and the

¹⁹ In paragraph 20 of the Bucharest Summit Declaration it is stated that 'Within the framework of the UN, many actors have worked hard to resolve the name issue, but the Alliance has noted with regret that these talks have not produced a successful outcome. Therefore we agreed that an invitation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached. We encourage the negotiations to be resumed without delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible'.

states' foreign policy behaviour' (Taliaferro, 2006). This implies, inter alia, that the historical analysis of the patterns of behaviour based on the LRT Worlds suggested in this essay is at the moment incomplete.

An intuitive analysis of the FPE's perceptions is further required. Foreign policy perceptions on threats/opportunities and security dilemmas are called 'permeable perceptions', because their hard core often conflicts with elements of dynamism or immobility, dissimilating states' actions in time or place, something that neorealist analysts fail to mention (see footnote 2). Hence, perceptions had an impact on Greek behaviour during the three models, and, therefore, played a decisive role in the Greek blocking.

3.1. Security perceptions

Reflecting on the previous analysis, we discern two diametrically opposed trends that affected the FPE security perceptions: Nationalism and Globalisation. *Nationalism* pertains to common identity beliefs, historical memories, and necessity engendering realities in the present. In the Western Balkans 'still almost Middle Ages on the eastern edge of the European Renaissance' (Glykatsi-Arveler, 2010), nationalism remains redundant and late. Macedonia as a part of an erstwhile Ottoman Empire's hierarchical system saw in the face of national awakenings a perennial struggle between the three historical nations of Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbians and 'the rivalry between their patrons' that culminated in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 (Kontogiorgi, 2006)²⁰.

²⁰ After 1878, Bulgarians launched a struggle for the separation of Macedonia from the Ottomans, envisaged in the Treaty of San Stefano. For this purpose, organizations, such as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), started a revolutionary

Historical memories of hatred and bloodshed fed by recurrent patterns of neighbours' behaviours constructed a nationalism that is in need of the state-psyche which constitutes a state/shelter for a nation in stark contrast to the liberal theorising of state as a state/medium for a society (see Brown, 2001). Reasonably, the collapse of a later hierarchical system (Yugoslavia) automatically brings about the re-emergence of the same patterns and thence insecurity for Greece, something that Featherstone has, succinctly, called 'the shock of the old' (Featherstone, 1996).

Morgenthau defines national security as 'the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power without compromise' (Morgenthau, 1948: 382). Briefly, Greece's geographical proximity to the Western Balkans has been influencing its perceptions of national security. Thus, a neighbour's use of the term 'Macedonia' relativises the security dilemmas: it awakens the feeling of potential threat in the future against its territory, while it subverts Greek History facts and self-beliefs. Buzan confirms this by stressing that 'security also rests on ideational bases' (Buzan, 1991). As a result, Greek nationalism counterbalances the Slav Macedonian nationalism of the early 1990s or that embodied in Gruevski's rhetoric²¹, a state's reaction alien to the

struggle urging all nations of Macedonia to revolt. Yet, Bulgaria privileged a manipulation of the local population by favouring a Bulgarian Macedonian identity for all Macedonians. Later, Greece organised its own engagement in the region to protect the Greek population. Harsh treatment by Bulgarians provoked the disengagement of a large part of Slavs from Bulgarians paving the way for a distinct Macedonian identity in parallel with a mixing with socialist ideas of the time. With the advent of Tito and the intervention of Stalin, the idea of a Macedonian federation resurfaced. During the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), most of Slav Macedonians were compelled to leave Greece for their role in the secession of Greek Macedonia. Thereafter, Tito cultivated the idea of a distinct 'Macedonian nation' that has territorial affinities to Greek Macedonia (Kofos, 1964).

²¹ Gruevski's party VMRO-DPMNE is the successor of the 1893 established IMRO.

mainstream concept of security dilemmas which are based on purely economic and military capabilities' perceptions of states.

Conversely, *globalisation* is the spreading of liberal prescriptions in both a global and local scale, with an impact on political, social, economic and cultural relations. It can involve an alternative to the nation-state. However, it is the states with their actions that may determine the level of globalization's penetration. 'States in stable regions have had their security policies affected by globalisation the most, whereas those in regions of enduring conflict have been affected the least' (Paul, Ripsman, 2010).

The globalisation of liberal principles has stigmatised the Greek FPE and society, mainly, after 1995 (see Ioakimidis, 1996)²². Alongside economic interdependence, a promising aspect of globalisation is cooperation through international organisations or communities of prosperity. It is not a coincidence that, since 1999, Greece has adopted as for Turkey a 'pushing policy' towards 'difficult and modernizing paths of European integration, whereby Athens hopes for an entrapment of Ankara under strong multilateral regimes which can stabilise the aspirations of their members and satisfy their security needs in a logic of absolute profits' (Ifantis, 2005: 438).

Indeed, Greece imagined the West Balkan EU enlargement in the same way. The 'win-lose'-oriented logic of the early 1990s seemed inactive. As a result, globalisation had a share in the FPE's perceptions and contributed to envisage security on a differentiated basis: becoming

²² The impact of Globalisation on decisions of the FPE as a 'structural power' is alluded in Brown and Ainley, 2009: 100. For Lobell, 'systemic structural forces shape the broad parameters of a state's behaviour' (Lobell, 2009: 62).

with respect to the second model, more rational, and with regard to the third model more pragmatic.

The use of a liberal dividend served rational instincts of a part of FPE of a state proximate to an area of instability. Within this context, one has to evaluate what Sterling-Folker argues about liberal theories: 'liberal theories ignore nationalism and unilateralism entirely or treat them as irrational 'historical residues' to be overcome through ever greater institutionalised cooperation' (Sterling-Folker, 2009). In her research, Sterling-Folker suggested that profit in economic relations between Beijing and Taipei was not sufficient to eliminate the peril that accumulates in the historical memories of China and Taiwan (Sterling-Folker, 2009). This can be juxtaposed with the almost zero impact of Greek economic penetration in FYR Macedonia on solving the Name Issue.

In fact, the antagonism of *immobility* (nationalism) and *dynamism* (globalisation) remains a continuous process with an impact on threat/opportunity assessments, state/society relations and states' strategic adjustments. This concurs with Mastanduno's observation that 'the liberal order remains an ongoing project' (Mastanduno, 2009). Hence, the process of westernisation of FYR Macedonia is not a teleological process. Regarding Greece, so long as Europeanisation of the Western Balkans remains doubtful, nationalism would impact the FPE's behaviour towards FYR Macedonia, leaving the Name Issue an important *security* issue.

3.2. Power perceptions

Power constitutes another ‘permeable perception’. According to Carr, ‘power is indivisible and the military and economic weapons are merely different instruments of power’ (Carr, 1946: 111). For some, it can be seen as an *attribute*. This makes power a rather measurable criterion of a state’s material and intangible capabilities. Yet, power is a rather complex notion: power is a relational concept that relates *influence* exerted from one state to another. However, influence becoming a synonym of power has less to do with capabilities: relational power can be measured ‘only in terms of action, in the effect one state has on another’ (Brown, Ainley, 2009: 93). After all, measuring the influence of a state becomes rather difficult. For Brown and Ainley:

‘power is the ability to resist change, to throw the costs of adaptation on to others, and, characteristically, the ability to resist change requires fewer resources to be placed on the line than the ability to bring change about’ (Brown, Ainley, 2009: 95).

‘Perceptions of power are more dynamic than measurements of material relationships’ (Wohlforth, 1993: 294). The three models suggest that the Greek FPE did not grasp the chance given by the Interim Accord. Its strategic adjustment to a neoliberal foreign policy based on soft power did not result in a mutually acceptable solution for the Name Issue. This was ex post facto a matter of *negotiating power* in that Greece should have changed a position that FYR Macedonia seemed able to resist. The Greek FPE had to be on the offensive not the defensive during negotiations.

Analysing the Name Issue, Zahariadis points out: 'Success in international negotiations is, mainly, a function of strategy, not power' (Zahariadis, 2003). Ultimate proof of the success of Slav Macedonians is the Greek retreat regarding the use of the term 'Macedonia'. Moreover, Slav Macedonians satisfied with the Interim Accord developed an independent approach by working out their strategy outside the framework of negotiations. Greece's influence on the Slav Macedonian FPE was overbalanced by the influence of Slav Macedonians in terms of an 'outside-negotiations logic' (recognitions' rolling in, networking in the UN, good relations with the US President Bush strategy); the negotiation process automatically acted at the expense of Greece.

For Brown and Ainley, 'the ability to control what gets on to the agenda is more important than the ability to determine what happens when items are actually raised in discussion' (2009: 98). After 2006, Slav Macedonians did not reject the role of the UN negotiations (although arguing that the Name issue is a unilaterally imposed 'absurd' issue). Instead, they asked for recognition of their national identity and language in the final agreement.

Greece's inability to exert its power towards FYR Macedonia and impose a solution can be viewed through two lenses: one pessimist on which Greece was inadequate in transforming its hegemonic presence in the Balkans into substantial influence, and one optimist where international processes of negotiations treated two states as equal irrespective of their power distribution. However, these two functions probably worked in parallel.

3.3. National interest perceptions

Finally, we examine a third ‘permeable perception’: the *national interest*. According to Gilpin, a state has a number of political, economic, and ideological objectives which are dictated by national interests and to defend its most vital interests a state is ready to go to war (Gilpin, 1981: 25). Borrowing a phrase of Charles Evans Hughes, Carr insisted that ‘foreign policy is the result of the national interest which is based on real emergency or stands in the historical perspective’. For a realist like Carr, ‘any such interpretation of reality is, finally, deterministic’ (Carr, 1946).

On the contrary, for Neo-classical realists, ‘the process of identifying national interests is not a given...a wide variety of domestic political factors may influence this process’ (Dueck, 2009: 146). In this way, regardless of the role of power in bilateral negotiations or an alleged Greek FPE inertia²³, the national interest of Greeks was revised, during the second model, in view of FPE’s assessments of the international opportunities (juxtapose Taliaferro, 2009: 224).

In any case, the reformulation of the FPE’s goals vis-a-vis FYR Macedonia as a buffer state and the ‘modernisation’ of Greek society had an impact on the outcome of negotiations. Besides, the lack of interest of the public opinion in foreign policy issues posed no significant obstacles to the FPE. From a reverse standpoint, Sarah Kreps has argued that the convergence of main political parties regarding the FPEs’ strategic decisions makes leaders be ‘less concerned about being outflanked or losing votes to competitors’ (Kreps, 2010). In fact, these two narrations

²³ The so-called inertia was possibly a result of two separate phenomena: the deterioration of the Greek negotiating power and the shift in Greek national interest.

had some effects with regard to the Greek FPE's autonomy from society with an impact on national interest perceptions.

Both the historical and the intuitive analysis of Greek Foreign Policy towards FYR Macedonia regarding the Name Issue sought to give a comprehensive answer to the primary question of this essay: 'Why did Greece block the Euro-Atlantic integration of FYR Macedonia'. The Greek resorting to international organisations has an ambiguous meaning. It is either proof of lack of power and influence in the region or proof that being member of international communities of security and prosperity implies veto power. Either way, the role of security organisations within a post-Cold War environment regarding the FPEs' strategic adjustments seems remarkable. As for NATO, Mastanduno, clearly, suggests that 'NATO is no longer focused on a common external threat and its members do not necessarily share the same security priorities, as evidenced by the alliance conflict over Iraq in 2003' (Mastanduno, 2009). Against the rhetoric of the Bush Administration that 'it is the mission that determines the Coalition not the process' (Patrick, 2009), the 2008 Bucharest Summit could be characterised as one victory of institutions.

Notwithstanding, the Greek blocking has to be evaluated under the prism of *timing* as an international opportunity. Timing can offer *pressure* to a negotiating part which is one of the traditional instruments of diplomacy (Morgenthau, 1948: 388), but timing, by definition, cannot stay for long. Thus far, Greece has not grasped the opportunity given by the blocking, hoping that Slav Macedonians will change their maximalist position in order to embrace the benefits of the Euro-Atlantic integration.

Instead, it is indicative that after the NATO Bucharest Summit, the Slav Macedonian FPE proceeded in three aggressive tactical moves: a. FYR Macedonia filed a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice in November 2008 accusing Greece of a 'blatant violation' of international law (article 11 of the Interim Accord) in blocking its bid to join NATO²⁴, b. Gruevski sent an official letter to his Greek counterpart Karamanlis (July 2008) asking for a recognition of the 'Macedonian' minority in Greece, and full enjoyment of its members' rights and asked for a return of the Slavs that were expatriated after the Greek Civil War, in late 1940s, c. FYR Macedonia stepped up its maximalist policy at home by renaming roads and squares with ancient Greek names and erecting a giant Alexander of Macedon statue in central Skopje (June 2011).

4. Conclusions

The Greek FPE's strategic adjustment towards FYR Macedonia evolved influenced by external stimuli and the relation between state and Greek society. Over the course of two decades, international threats have been replaced by international opportunities. What is more, prosperity in Greek society distanced the impact of public opinion and the electorate on the FPE, which indicated an important change in the structure of intervening variables. In the first place, these had an impact on the rationalisation of Greek adjustment to the external feedback of the 2001 insurgency, the new threats' assessments in the region and the dictates of the international community.

²⁴ To read the judgment of 5 December 2011 of the International Court of Justice: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf>.

Yet, the new adjustment of neoliberal foreign policy of the second model did not properly weigh the factor of nationalism that sometimes can spring despite the callings of globalisation and a series of security dilemmas fully identified with the historical context of the region. The new ultra-nationalistic government in Skopje was a stark contrast to the accommodating Greek behaviour with respect to FYR Macedonia and led to a reformulation of Greek FPE adjustment towards a more pragmatic one (NATO, EU blocking), as first degree research revealed. This reformulation seems unchangeable, at present.

Within this context, we have to take into account a. the role of the US support for the Slav Macedonian FPE during the Bush Administration, b. the imbalance of negotiating power against Greece, on account of either an 'outside-negotiations logic' of FYR Macedonia or a probable Greek inertia with respect to this logic, c. the new foreign policy priorities for Greece regarding her national interests. Finally, we have to consider the current role of international organisations regarding states' actions.

The globalisation and European socialisation of the Greek FPE in the 2000s assisted Greece in assessing, first, more rationally and, next, more pragmatically the Name Issue by affecting the strategic assessments of the FPE, the role of intervening variables, and the strategic adjustments of the FPE. To this effect, the timing of the Euro-Atlantic integration process itself propelled by the US and the EU was a catalyst. Morgenthau argued 'a nation can only take a rational view of its national interests after it has parted company with the crusading spirit of the political creed' and added 'compromise on any issue, however minor, is impossible so long as both sides are not secure in their national

interests' (Morgenthau, 1978: 384). This opens up a new discussion about what is, indeed, the national interest of Slav Macedonians and how they could provide a rather rational/pragmatic view of it with respect to the Name Issue, which could be the subject of a separate essay.

As for the LRT Worlds, they can plausibly serve as 'a methodological compass' insofar as a state's behaviour change in time can range through different 'level of analysis' causations. In Part 1 of this paper, it was illustrated that there was a shift of the Greek Foreign Policy behavior: a clear tendency to move from a quasi-World 3 case –where intervening variables were of high importance– towards a World 1 case, whereby decisions taken were closer to the assessment of the international and regional environment, was highlighted.

References

- Agnantopoulos Apostolos. 'The EU and Macedonia's Accession process: Derailed or Delayed? CFSP-Forum, 2010: 8: 2.
- Arvanitopoulos Constantine. 'The US policy in the Balkans'. Newspaper Eleftheros Typos, 6.3.2008. Also, accessed on 21st July 2010 <http://www.e-logos.gr/articles.asp?subject_id=33&article=716&lang=GR>. [in Greek].
- Axt Heinz-Jurgen. 'National Interests on Top of the Agenda: Greece's Role in Common Foreign and Security Policy'. In Axt Heinz-Jurgen (ed.). Greece and the European Union: Stranger among Patrnrs?. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997.
- Baum Matthew, Potter Philip. 'The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis'. Annual Review of Political Science, 2008: 11: 39-65.
- Brown Chris. 'Fog in the Channel: Continental International Relations Theory Isolated'. In Crawford, Jarvis (ed.). International Relations: Still an American Discipline? Toward Diversity of International Thought. Albany: State of New York University Press, 2001.
- Brown Chris, Ainley Kirsten. Understanding International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Brzezinski Ian. 'NATO: An Alliance transforming'. In US Department of State. The US and NATO: An Alliance of Purpose. US Foreign Policy Agenda. June 2004: 9, 2.
- Burns Nicholas. 'NATO remains our essential Alliance'. In US Department of State. The US and NATO: An Alliance of Purpose. US Foreign Policy Agenda. June 2004: 9, 2.
- Buzan Barry. 'New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century'. International Affairs. 1991: 67: 3: 431-451.
- Carr Edward. The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939. London: Macmillan, 1946 (1939).
- Christensen Thomas. Useful adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilisation, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958. Princeton: Priceton University Press, 1996.
- Constas Dimitri. 'Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy: Domestic and External Parameters'. In Conostas Dimitri, Stavrou Theofanis (ed.). Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995.

- Couloubis Theodore, Yannis Prodromos. 'Greek foreign policy priorities for the 1990s'. In Featherstone Kevin, Ifantis Kostas (ed.). *Greece in a Changing Europe, Between European integration and Balkan disintegration?*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.
- Delastik George. 'Veto or Compromise with Skopje?'. Newspaper Ethnos. 25.10.2007. Accessed on 21st July 2010 <<http://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid=11826&subid=2&pubid=139694>> [in Greek].
- Dueck Colin. 'Neoclassical realism and the national interest: presidents, domestic politics, and major military interventions'. In Lobell Steven, Ripsman Norrin, Taliaferro Jeffrey (ed.). *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Eyal Jonathan. 'Comment: A western view of Greece's Balkan policy'. In Featherstone Kevin, Ifantis Kostas (ed.). *Greece in a Changing Europe, Between European integration and Balkan disintegration?*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.
- Featherstone Kevin. 'Introduction'. In Featherstone Kevin, Ifantis Kostas (ed.). *Greece in a Changing Europe, Between European integration and Balkan disintegration?*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.
- Gilpin Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Glykatsi-Arveler Eleni. 'The Byzantium was uni-cultural but not uni-national' (Interview to Stelios Koukos). Newspaper Makedonia. 30.5.2010. Accessed on 20th July 2010 <<http://www.makthes.gr/news/politics/56131/>> [in Greek].
- Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Official Website on HiPERB. Accessed on 21st July 2010. <<http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/HiPERB>>
- Interview with Mr. Dimitris Katsoudas, Secretary General of EU Affairs of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007-2009). 6.7.2010
- with Mr. Evripidis Stylianidis, Deputy Minister of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004-2007), Minister of Education (2007-2009). 19.4.2010
- with Mr. Yannis Valinakis, Deputy Minister of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004-2009). 18.8.2010
- (confidential) with a governmental advisor of Karamanlis Administration. 21.4.2010
- Ifantis Kostas. 'Greece and the USA after the Cold War'. In Featherstone Kevin, Ifantis Kostas (ed.). *Greece in a Changing Europe, Between European*

- integration and Balkan disintegration?. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.
- '. 'Looking for Options: Strategies of Balancing and Systemic Polarity'. In Arvanitopoulos Constantine, Koppa Marilena (ed.). *Thirty Years of Greek Foreign Policy 1974-2004*. Athens: Livanis, 2005. [in Greek].
- Ifestos Panagiotis. 'Power and Justice in International Politics'. In Arvanitopoulos Constantine, Koppa Marilena (ed.). *Thirty Years of Greek Foreign Policy 1974-2004*. Athens: Livanis, 2005. [in Greek].
- Isernia Pierangelo, Juhász Zoltán, Rattinger Hans. 'Foreign Policy and the Rational Public in Comparative Perspective'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2002: 46: 201-224.
- Ioakimidis Panayiotis. 'Contradictions between Policy and Performance'. In Featherstone Kevin, Ifantis Kostas (ed.). *Greece in a Changing Europe, Between European integration and Balkan disintegration?*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.
- Kalaitzidis Akis. *Europe's Greece: A giant in the making*. Basingstone: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Kaplan Robert. *Balkan Ghosts*. New York: Picador, Distributed by Holtzbrinck Publishers, 2005.
- Keridis Dimitris. 'Foreign Policy of Modernisation'. In Tsakonas Panagiotis (ed.). *Modern Greek Foreign Policy*. Athens: I. Sideris, 2003, vol. 1. [in Greek].
- Kofos Evangelos. *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*. Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1964.
- Kontogiorgi Elizabeth. *Population exchange in Greek Macedonia*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.
- Koppa, Marilena. 'Greek Balkan Policy: Thirty Years After'. In Arvanitopoulos Constantine, Koppa Marilena (ed.). *Thirty Years of Greek Foreign Policy 1974-2004*. Athens: Livanis, 2005. [in Greek].
- Kreps Sarah. 'Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan'. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2010: 6: 191-215.
- Lavdas Kostas. *The Europeanisation of Greece: interest politics and the crises of integration*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.
- Lobell Steven. 'Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model'. In Lobell Steven, Ripsman Norrin, Taliaferro Jeffrey (ed.). *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

- Lygeros Stavros. In the Name of Macedonia. The war of diplomacy for the Name. Athens: Livanis Publishing Organisation, 2008.
- Mastanduno Michael. 'System Maker and Privilege Taker U.S. Power and the International Political Economy'. *World Politics*, 2009, 61: 1: 121-154.
- Metron Analysis. Greek Nationwide Survey. November 2003. Accessed on 21st July 2010
<http://www.metronanalysis.gr/gr/polls/pub756FORUM/index_files/frame.htm> [in Greek].
- Greek Nationwide Survey, Metron Forum. December 2007. Accessed on 21st July 2010
<<http://www.metronanalysis.gr/web/html/index.asp?language=greek&page=surveys>> [in Greek].
- Greek Nationwide Survey on the Name Issue of FYROM. February 2008. Accessed on 21st July 2010. <<http://www.metronanalysis.gr/gr/polls/zipped/pub1238.pdf>> [in Greek].
- Michas Takis. *Unholy alliance: Greece and Milošević's Serbia*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.
- Mitropoulos Dimitris. 'Foreign Policy and Greek Mass Media: Subordination, Emancipation and Apathy'. In Tsakonas Panagiotis (ed.). *Modern Greek Foreign Policy*. Athens: I. Sideris, 2003, vol. 2. [in Greek].
- Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993, (1948).
- 'The Organic Relationship between Ideology and Political Reality'. In Schwab George (ed.). *Ideology and Foreign Policy, A Global Perspective*. New York: Irvington Publishers Inc., 1978.
- Nye Joseph. 'Greece and the Balkans: A Moment of Opportunity'. In Allison Graham, Nicolaidis Kalypso. *The Greek Paradox: Promise vs. Performance*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997.
- Panagiotou Ritsa. *FYROM's Transition: From Yugoslavia to the EU?*. Athens: Centre for Planning and Economic Research. Report 55, 2008.
- Papahelas Alexis. 'The Balkans Loser'. I Kathimerini Newspaper. 27.5.2007.
- Patrick Stewart. 'The Mission determines the Coalition: The US and multilateral cooperation since 9/11'. In Jones Bruce, Forman Shepard, Gowan Richard (ed.). *Cooperating for Peace and Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Paul Tharza, Ripsman Norin. *Globalisation and the National Security State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

- Public Issue (a). Greek Nationwide Survey on Greek Foreign Policy. February 2008. Accessed on 22nd July 2010 < <http://www.publicissue.gr/122/foreign-affairs/#3>> [in Greek].
- (b). Greek Nationwide Survey on the Attitude of Public Opinion towards the Issue of FYROM and the NATO Summit. April 2008. Accessed on 22nd July 2010 < <http://www.publicissue.gr/144/skopia/>> [in Greek].
- Ripsman Norrin. *Peacemaking by Democracies*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.
- Rose Gideon. 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy'. *World Politics*. 1998, 51: 1: 144-172.
- Smith Steve. 'The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?'. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2000: 2: 3: 374-402.
- Sterling-Folker Jennifer. 'Neoclassical realism and identity: peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait'. In Lobell Steven, Ripsman Norrin, Taliaferro Jeffrey (ed.). *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Taliaferro Jeffrey. 'State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the resource-extractive state'. *Security Studies*, 2006, 15: 3: 464-495.
- '. 'Neoclassical Realism and resource extraction: State building for future war'. In Lobell Steven, Ripsman Norrin, Taliaferro Jeffrey (ed.). *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Taliaferro Jeffrey, Lobell Steven, Ripsman Norrin. 'Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy'. In Lobell Steven, Ripsman Norrin, Taliaferro Jeffrey (ed.). *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- '. 'Conclusion: The state of Neoclassical realism'. In Lobell Steven, Ripsman Norrin, Taliaferro Jeffrey (ed.). *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Tsakaloyannis Panos. 'Greek Foreign Policy and Systemic Change'. In Arvanitopoulos Constantine, Koppa Marilena (ed.). *Thirty Years of Greek Foreign Policy 1974-2004*. Athens: Livanis, 2005. [in Greek].
- Tsakonas Panagiotis. 'The Contribution of the IR Community in the Formulation of Greek Foreign Policy'. In Arvanitopoulos Constantine, Koppa Marilena (ed.). *Thirty Years of Greek Foreign Policy 1974-2004*. Athens: Livanis, 2005. [in Greek].
- Tziampiris Aristotelis. *International Relations and the Macedonian Question*. Athens: ELIAMEP, 2003. [in Greek].

- Tsoukalis Loukas. 'Comment: Is Greece an awkward partner?'. In Featherstone Kevin, Ifantis Kostas (ed.). *Greece in a Changing Europe, Between European integration and Balkan disintegration?*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.
- Tzifakis Nikolaos. *The Question of Security in Southeastern Europe: a Systemic Approach*. Athens: Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, I. Sideris, 2003.
- Wallden Sotiris. 'The Balkan Policy of Greece: Critical review of the Post World-War Era and Perspectives'. In Tsakonas Panagiotis (ed.). *Modern Greek Foreign Policy*. Athens: I. Sideris, 2003, vol. 1. [in Greek].
- Waltz Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: Mac-Grau Hill, 1979.
- Wohlforth William. *The Elusive Balance, Power and Perceptions during the Cold War*. Ithace: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- '. 'Realism and foreign policy'. In Smith Steve, Hadfield Amelia, Dunne Tim (ed.). *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Zaikos Nikos. 'The Interim Accord: Prospects and Developments in accordance with International Law'. In Kofos Evangelos, Vlasidis Vlasidis (ed.). *Athens-Skopje An Uneasy Symbiosis*. Athens: ELIAMEP, 2003.
- Zahariadis Nikolaos. 'Domestic Strategy and International Choice in Negotiations between Non-Allies'. *Polity*. 2003: 35: 4: 573-594

Latest Papers in this Series

57. Ladi, Stella, [*The Eurozone Crisis and Austerity Politics: A Trigger for Administrative Reform in Greece?*](#), April 2012
56. Chardas, Anastassios, [*Multi-level governance and the application of the partnership principle in times of economic crisis in Greece*](#), March 2012
55. Skouroliahou, Melina, [*The Communication Factor in Greek Foreign Policy: An Analysis*](#), February 2012
54. Alogoskoufis, George, [*Greece's Sovereign Debt Crisis: Retrospect and Prospect*](#), January 2012
53. Prasopoulou, Elpida, [*In quest for accountability in Greek public administration: The case of the Taxation Information System \(TAXIS\)*](#), December 2011
52. Voskeritsian, Horen and Kornelakis, Andreas, [*Institutional Change in Greek Industrial Relations in an Era of Fiscal Crisis*](#), November 2011
51. Heraclides, Alexis, [*The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity*](#), October 2011
50. Christodoulaki, Olga; Cho, Haeran; Fryzlewicz, Piotr, [*A Reflection of History: Fluctuations in Greek Sovereign Risk between 1914 and 1929*](#), September 2011
49. Monastiriotis, Vassilis and Psycharis, Yiannis, [*Without purpose and strategy? A spatio-functional analysis of the regional allocation of public investment in Greece*](#), August 2011
48. Monastiriotis, Vassilis and Psycharis, Yiannis, [*Without purpose and strategy? A spatio-functional analysis of the regional allocation of public investment in Greece*](#), August 2011
- SPECIAL ISSUE edited by Vassilis Monastiriotis, [*The Greek crisis in focus: Austerity, Recession and paths to Recovery*](#), July 2011
47. Skouras, Spyros and Christodoulakis, Nicos, [*Electoral Misgovernance Cycles: Evidence from wildfires and tax evasion in Greece and elsewhere*](#), May 2011
46. Pagoulatos, George and Zahariadis, Nikolaos, [*Politics, Labor, Regulation, and Performance: Lessons from the Privatization of OTE*](#), April 2011
45. Lyrantzis, Christos, [*Greek Politics in the Era of Economic Crisis: Reassessing Causes and Effects*](#), March 2011
44. Monastiriotis, Vassilis and Jordaan, Jacob A., [*Regional Distribution and Spatial Impact of FDI in Greece: evidence from firm-level data*](#), February 2011

43. **Apergis, Nicholas**, [Characteristics of inflation in Greece: mean spillover effects among CPI components](#), January 2011
42. **Kazamias, George**, [From Pragmatism to Idealism to Failure: Britain in the Cyprus crisis of 1974](#), December 2010
41. **Dimas, Christos**, [Privatization in the name of 'Europe'. Analyzing the telecoms privatization in Greece from a 'discursive institutionalist' perspective](#), November 2010
40. **Katsikas, Elias and Panagiotidis, Theodore**, [Student Status and Academic Performance: an approach of the quality determinants of university studies in Greece](#), October 2010
39. **Karagiannis, Stelios, Panagopoulos, Yannis, and Vlamis, Prodromos**, [Symmetric or Asymmetric Interest Rate Adjustments? Evidence from Greece, Bulgaria and Slovenia](#), September 2010
38. **Pelagidis, Theodore**, [The Greek Paradox of Falling Competitiveness and Weak Institutions in a High GDP Growth Rate Context \(1995-2008\)](#), August 2010
37. **Vraniali, Efi**, [Rethinking Public Financial Management and Budgeting in Greece: time to reboot?](#), July 2010
36. **Lyberaki, Antigone**, [The Record of Gender Policies in Greece 1980-2010: legal form and economic substance](#), June 2010
35. **Markova, Eugenia**, [Effects of Migration on Sending Countries: lessons from Bulgaria](#), May 2010
34. **Tinios, Platon**, [Vacillations around a Pension Reform Trajectory: time for a change?](#), April 2010
33. **Bozhilova, Diana**, [When Foreign Direct Investment is Good for Development: Bulgaria's accession, industrial restructuring and regional FDI](#), March 2010
32. **Karamessini, Maria**, [Transition Strategies and Labour Market Integration of Greek University Graduates](#), February 2010

Online papers from the Hellenic Observatory

All GreeSE Papers are freely available for download at <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pubs/GreeSE.aspx>

Papers from past series published by the Hellenic Observatory are available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pubs/DP_oldseries.htm