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Visiting Speaker: Professor Adam Fagan

Evaluating the EU’s ‘new approach’ to judicial reform in the Western Balkans: unintended consequences or unrealised goals?

 
Date 

Tuesday, 19 January 2016

Time 6:00 - 7:30pm
Venue

Cañada Blanch Room, (COW 1.11),  1st floor, Cowdray House, LSE, London WC2A 2AE 

Speaker

Professor Adam Fagan, Queen Mary University of London

Chair Dr Spyros Economides, LSEE Research on SEE, London School of Economics

FaganAdam Fagan is Professor of European Politics at Queen Mary University of London, where he is also Head of the School of Politics and International Relations. He is also Professorial Fellow at the London School of Economics (LSEE – LSE South East Europe Research). Fagan is a co-investigator in the EU-funded MAXCAP (Maximizing the Integration Capacity of the European Union) research project. His research focuses on the Europeanization of the Western Balkans, with particular reference to judicial reform, minority rights and environmental governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. His most recent book is Europeanization of the Western Balkans: Environmental Governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia (Palgrave 2015). He is the author of Europe’s Balkan Dilemma: Paths to State building or Civil Society? (I B Tauris, 2010). Adam Fagan is also the editor of East European Politics.

Adam Fagan and Spyros Economides

About the seminar:

Drawing on the experience of previous accession processes - particularly the recent experience with Croatia - the European Commission proposed a ‘new approach’ in October 2011 for future entrants into the European Union (EU). The new approach rests on the principle that issues related to judiciary and fundamental rights (Chapter 23 of the acquis) and justice, freedom, and security (Chapter 24) ‘should be tackled early in the accession process and the corresponding chapters opened accordingly on the basis of action plans, as they require the establishment of convincing track records. The Commission would report regularly, at all stages of the process, on progress achieved in these areas along milestones defined in the action plans with, where appropriate, the necessary corrective measures. Whilst it is still too early to determine whether the new approach will deliver robust judicial independence in the Western Balkans, it is certainly possible, despite the different domestic challenges and legacies, to reflect on the effectiveness of the Commission’s new approach to negotiations surrounding Chapters 23 and 24 (rule of law). 

Based on extensive empirical research in BiH, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, the data suggests that prioritizing the rule of law and judicial reform, backed up with regular reporting, screening, benchmarking and the requirement for action plans does keep the pressure on candidate and potential candidate countries to comply and initiate reforms. For Montenegro and Serbia this has clearly shaped the pre-accession reform agenda. For countries further away from the start of accession negotiations (BiH, Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia), it seems to also have exerted a strong agenda-setting effect. For instance, in each country, there has been progress in the reform of the judiciary, including changes in the Judicial Councils and Judicial Academies in order to lay the foundations for real judicial independence in the future. 

However, the research has also revealed serious gaps between European standards for independence and impartiality and the realities on the ground. Moreover, it would appear that the most tangible impact of the EU is to sever links between the judiciary, and executive and legislative branches of government. Thus, independence is being bolstered throughout the region without concomitant measures to strengthen checks and balances, and there is a clear risk that stronger judicial independence is resulting in ‘judicial supremacy’. What this paper considers is whether this is an unintended consequence of the EU’s new approach and conditionality, or whether this reflects unrealised goals and the limits of the Commission’s transformative power.

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A complete listing of the 2015-16 Visiting Speaker Programme is available here.

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