The Impact of Parties and Party Systems on Democratic Consolidation: 
The Case of Turkey

Şebnem Y. Geyikçi1
PhD Candidate
University of Essex

Introduction

Today many countries around the world have chosen democracy as their political regime. Starting from ‘the third wave democratization’2, transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes spread throughout the world to the extent that some scholars have even called the twentieth century ‘the century of democracy’.3 However, following these transitions, the issue of sustaining and stabilizing these regimes has become all the more important. Accordingly, the bulk of contemporary literature on democratization has been concerned with ‘the consolidation of democracies’4. While in the beginning the notion of consolidation only referred to making new democracies stable, in time the term has also been associated with moving away from “diminished sub-type” of democracy to “non-diminished” democracy.5 Turkey has been one of those countries that has institutionalized electoral democracy but has failed to uphold the political and civil freedoms essential for liberal democracy.

While in the 1990s the country was far from even discussing consolidation,6 in the first half of the last decade Turkey experienced an intense period of political change and democratization. From 2002 to 2004, in a promising period of legislation civilian control over the military elite was increased and political and civil rights were expanded. Although these developments, at that time, were considered as signs of progress in democratizing the political regime in Turkey, looking at present (i.e. rising violence levels, a series of scandals implicating the “deep” state, retrogressive reforms to the judicial system and an apparent rise

1PhD Candidate, University of Essex, Department of Government, E-mail: syardi@essex.ac.uk
2 Samuel Huntington (1991), The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press.
6 During 1990s, economic and cultural lives in Turkey were challenged by the processes of globalization. While in the economic life export-led industrialization has been defied by neo-liberal restructuring, in the cultural sphere identity politics, social movements and civil society organizations have gained prominence demanding greater democratization, participation and recognition. The politics, on the other hand, failed to respond all these demands coming both from economic and cultural life. Instead political practice was characterized by incompetence, instability, clientelism, and corruption. Incompetence of politics has become exacerbated by the biggest financial crisis of the Republican history causing loss of approximately one million jobs. Within this environment it was not even possible to discuss prospects for democratic consolidation.
in the military’s presence in the south-east) few analysts would define the country as a consolidated democracy.

The most important achievement of Turkish experience with democracy has been the consolidation of electoral democracy, that is, a legitimate form of government has emerged only through inclusive, fair and competitive elections. However, this understanding of democracy is problematic as it fails to uphold the vital elements of the rule of law, limited government and inalienable political and civil rights. Yet, thanks to more than fifty years of institutionalized electoral democracy, democratic consolidation in the context of Turkey does not refer to regression toward either non-democratic or authoritarian regimes but progress toward liberal democracy. Consolidating democracy in Turkey requires “establishing democracy’s specific rules and organizations” which implies “constructing characteristic infrastructure of modern liberal democracies: parties and party systems, legislative bodies, state bureaucracies, judicial systems, and systems of interest mediation”. The proposed research is particularly concerned with the parties and party system in Turkey which play a significant role in the process of democratic consolidation.

In 2002 with the election of Justice and Development Party (AKP) government which is the first single-party government since 1987 elections, the process of political change and democratization was initiated in Turkey. Seeking an early date to begin the accession negotiations with the EU, the government committed itself to undertake political reforms required for further democratization. However, since 2005, the party has lost its ability to maintain the process of democratization and political change.

Regarding the party system of the country significant developments have occurred within the process of intense democratization. Since 2002 the fragmentation in Turkish party system has diminished to the extent that the center-right has been represented by the AKP, the center-left by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and ethnic nationalism by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP, Turkish nationalist) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, Kurdish

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9 Within these 50 years there had been three direct, one indirect military interruptions of the democratic process. However, in each time democracy was restored relatively quickly and smoothly.
11 For a detailed discussion on how parties and party system affects consolidation of democracy, see ‘literature review’.
However, although the crystallization of the positions and perspectives of the key political parties that make the party system has decreased the fragmentation in the party system, the level of polarization has increased, since it became possible to identify the key political parties only with reference to a particular social group they represent and particular issue-dimensions they concern. Currently, according to the 2007 general election results, all these four parties are represented in the parliament. However, what is observed is that these four parties that make up the party system fail to lead the process of democratic consolidation.

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<th>SHP %</th>
<th>HP %</th>
<th>DSP %</th>
<th>ANAP %</th>
<th>MDP %</th>
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Hitherto, although many studies have attempted to explicate the factors that aid or hinder Turkey’s prospects for democratic consolidation14, only a limited number have paid special

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13 See Table 1 for the general election results from 1983 to 2007. The table is taken from Ersin Kalaycıoğlu (2007), “Party Identification, Islam and Secularism in Turkey”, Unpublished Paper prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association’s Annual Conference. The problem with the table is that it only includes the parties that manage to pass 10% threshold so excludes the vote percentage of BDP which is known to be the representative of Kurdish population in the country. The predecessors of Kurdish political party have been the People's Labor Party (HEP), the Democracy and Equality Party (DEP), the Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), the People's Democracy Party (HADEP), the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) and the Democratic Society Party (DTP) all of which were closed down by the Constitutional Court. In order to escape the high level of 10% election threshold in the 2007 general elections the party nominated its candidates as independents. In the dissertation, in order to analyze the role of the BDP over time, the vote percentages of previous Kurdish parties and independents for the 2007 elections will be taken into account. The first election they participated was 1995 general election in which they received 4.17 % of total votes, in 1999 they received 4.75 %, in 2002 6.14 %, in 2007 5.32 %.

attention to the parties and party system as an independent variable.\textsuperscript{15} In other words, although Turkish political parties and party system has received considerable scholarly attention\textsuperscript{16}, none of these studies have analyzed the impact of parties or party system on democratization.\textsuperscript{17} The major problem with studies of Turkish political parties and party system is that most of them focused exclusively on analyzing trends in aggregate voting behaviour, voter preferences and cleavage structures. Therefore, rather than directly spelling out which aspects of political parties and party system are central to democratic consolidation or what kind of contribution can parties make to democratic consolidation, through analyzing volatility, fragmentation, and polarization they inevitably focused on indirect effects of parties to democracy.

Indeed, in the literature on democratic consolidation, there is widespread agreement on the vital role played by political parties in democratic consolidation.\textsuperscript{18} Notwithstanding the lack of clarity on the meaning of institutionalization, what these studies argue is that in order for parties to fulfil their role of advancing democracy, parties and party system require to be institutionalized.\textsuperscript{19} Taking these studies as its point of departure, the proposed paper discusses how the level of party and party system institutionalization would affect the process of democratic consolidation and why it is valid to analyze parties and party system in Turkey in order to comprehend the process of democratic consolidation.

\textsuperscript{15} The ones who analyzed party system have approached party system in numerical terms failing to provide a systematic analysis of party system as such. See Sabri Sayari (2007), ‘Towards a new Turkish party system?’, Turkish Studies, 8:2, pp. 197-210.


\textsuperscript{17} In this sense, the book of Huri Türsan seems to be an exception which elucidated the role of political parties in democratization process. Türsan’s book provides detailed descriptions of developments in Turkish politics and electoral competition together with empirical analysis of volatility, fragmentation and polarization of party system since the 1950s. However, this study only looks at parties in the electoral, governmental and parliamentary arenas and their indirect impact on democratization, leaving aside the organizational development of parties, the way they interact with society and with other parties and the relationship between the parties and the regime, all of which are keys to comprehend the impact of parties and party system on democratic consolidation. Moreover, much more decisive than this is the fact that Türsan’s book is based on her PhD dissertation written in 1999 so her analysis lacks the period after 2002 general elections which was not only a critical juncture in Turkish politics but also the starting point for this dissertation. See Huri Türsan (2004), \textit{Democratization in Turkey- The Role of Political Parties}, Brussels: Peter-Lang.


Analyzing the parties and party system (the patterns of interactions among political parties) in a country whose democratic political regime is in transition\(^{20}\) from electoral to more advanced type of democracy, I suggest, requires rethinking the existing literature on political parties, party systems and democratic consolidation by paying special attention to both political party institutionalization and party system institutionalization. Rather than looking at either individual party institutionalization\(^{21}\) or party system institutionalization\(^{22}\) in conceptualizing the contribution of political parties to consolidation of democracy, distinguished from its predecessors this paper analyzes the political parties in both individual level and system level by developing a matrix of dimensions.

Most political observers affirm that strong parties and party system are the key requirement of strong democracies not only because they shape representation but also because the stability of political leadership pertains to party activities whether in the electoral or the legislative arenas.\(^{23}\) Accordingly, as Mair asserts, it has always been appealing to “trace sources of problems of legitimacy and stability of regimes back to the character of their party systems.”\(^{24}\) This paper follows this track and, in analyzing the impact of political parties and party system on democratic consolidation, draws heavily on the assumption that the political parties and party systems remain fundamental for examining the quality of democracy and for comprehending the process of democratic consolidation.

This paper will clarify the relationship between parties, party systems and democratic consolidation together with the relevancy of looking at parties and party system as independent variables in understanding the process of democratic consolidation in Turkey. Theoretical premises of the paper are based on historical institutionalism together with rational choice approach. Hence, it is based on an understanding that not only accepts the crucial role played by institutions in structuring actor’s behaviour but also takes into account the possibility of change by actors themselves. In other words, it follows the understanding that suggests “any significant political outcome is best understood as a product of both rule following and interest maximization.”\(^{25}\) The paper goes beyond existing theories and relocates party and party system institutionalization theory in a transitional context by addressing two main problems with the existing literature: 1) the lack of distinction between the concepts of

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\(^{20}\) I acknowledge the fact that in the literature on democratization, transition refers to moving away from authoritarian regimes to democracy. But I found the term useful for also pertaining to the transition from electoral to liberal democracy.


\(^{24}\) Peter Mair (1996), ‘Party Systems and Structures of Competition’, p.84.

party and party system institutionalization, and 2) the failure to pay more attention to the relational features of party systems in analyzing the level of party system institutionalization.

First of all, what it is meant by democratic consolidation and how central political parties and party systems in the process will be discussed. Secondly, the problems with the previous conceptualizations of party system will be examined and a novel way of conceptualizing party and party system institutionalizations will be offered. Thirdly, I will inquire into the concept of regime and regime settlement which, I argue, constitutes the key element of party system institutionalization. Finally, I will discuss how this framework would explain the troubles of democratic consolidation not only with the Turkish case but also with the cases elsewhere. In this section, a brief discussion on the operationalization of the dimensions of party and party system institutionalizations will also be provided.

1. Democratic Consolidation and Political Parties

1.1. The concept of Democratic Consolidation

What is meant by democracy and the democratic consolidation? Questioning the sufficiency of electoral democracy, democracy entails not only contestation and participation but also the establishment of various sites for maintaining accountability, popular expression, collective action, and a wide range of civil and political freedoms. In other words, ‘the substantive conception of democracy’ depicts better what is meant by democracy in this paper than ‘the formal or procedural conception of democracy’. Whilst the procedural democracy which has been advocated by Schumpeter refers to the establishment of rules, procedures and institutions for ‘arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’; substantive conception of democracy questions the sufficiency of formal democracy and asks for greater opportunities for people to affect debates about important decisions that shape their society. According to Pridham, while the idea of formal democracy is related more to the process of regime transition, ‘the shift in democratization studies to concentrating on regime consolidation has moved to discussion that goes well into areas of substantive democracy’. Thanks to more than fifty years of parliamentary democracy, the process of democratization denotes moving away from procedural democracy to substantive one in the case of Turkey. In other words, Turkey experiences the process of democratic consolidation whereby the country struggles to deepen its democracy.

In the literature there are two ways of approaching the concept of consolidation: consolidation as avoiding democratic breakdown and consolidation as transformation from a diminished sub-type of democracy to a consolidated liberal democracy. While the former conceptualization has been employed to refer to the process of stabilizing and maintaining the new democracies, the latter focused on the process of deepening, completing or organizing democracies. In time, these two conceptualizations have intertwined and begun to complement each other as can be clearly seen in Pridham’s definition of consolidation:

“It involves in the first instance the gradual removal of the remaining uncertainties surrounding transition (e.g. the constitutional ones, elite behaviour, the resolution of civil-military relations.) The way is then opened for the institutionalization of a new democracy, the internationalization of rules and procedures and the dissemination of democratic values through a ‘remaking’ of the political culture.”

Accordingly, one of the most cited definitions of consolidated democracy is “a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules and patterned incentives has become, in a phrase, ‘the only game in town’”, behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally. Behaviourally, a regime is consolidated when no significant actor attempts to reach their objectives through non-democratic or violent ways. Attitudinally, it is consolidated when the majority of public opinion, even when there is a major crisis, conceive democratic procedures and institutions as the most appropriate way of overcoming the problems; and constitutionally, when both “governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, as well as habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of specific laws and procedures, and institutions that are sanctioned by the new democratic process”. Diamond also asserts that consolidation happens when democratic norms and behaviours become institutionalized on three levels: “the elite level of top decision-makers,

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36 Ibid, pp.15-16.
organizational leaders, political activists and opinion shapers; the intermediate level of parties, organizations and movements; and the level of mass publics.\textsuperscript{37}

The major predicament in employing the concept of consolidation lies in the very fact that it is a process without an end and in between transition and consolidation different types of democracies exist that are more than electoral democracies but less than consolidated ones. The concept of ‘democradura’ invented by O’Donnell and Schmitter depicts well the characteristics of in-between democracies.\textsuperscript{38} Democradura is a regime where some democratic practices are present but lacks civil liberties, restricts the participation of certain groups into politics and where competences of elected civilians are conditioned by non-elected forces.\textsuperscript{39} A number of researchers have attempted to identify various democraduras through using adjectives such as ‘illiberal democracy’, ‘protodemocracy’, ‘limited democracy’, ‘delegative democracy’, ‘low-quality democracy’, and ‘façade democracy’.\textsuperscript{40}

Many scholars including Diamond\textsuperscript{41} employ the Freedom House index in order to measure the state of democracy in the nations of the world. In the Freedom House Index political rights and civil liberties are measured on a 7 point scale-1 indicating the most free and 7 the least free. While nations that score lower than 2.5 are considered as “free”; the nations scoring between 3 and 5.5 are “partly free” and the higher scores are identified as “not free”.\textsuperscript{42} Turkish democracy has scored 3 in the 2010 Freedom House Country Report so, according to Diamond, stands in the borderline and remains a non-liberal electoral democracy.\textsuperscript{43}

1.2. How central are Political Parties and Party System?

The most significant question for the studies of the politics of democratic consolidation has been “what consolidates democracy and which institutions and agents matter most in consolidating democracy?” Within this framework, there is widespread agreement that political parties are the principal agents of democratic consolidation not only because they are the key strategic actors shaping democracy’s emergence,\textsuperscript{44} but also they still retain the

\textsuperscript{41} Samuel J. Valenzuela (1992), ‘Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings’, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{43} Larry Diamond et. al. (1995), ‘Introduction: What makes for Democracy?’
\textsuperscript{45} Larry Diamond (1999), Developing Democracy
\textsuperscript{47} Larry Diamond (1999), Developing Democracy, p.280.
\textsuperscript{48} Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt (2010), ‘The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond, Comparative Political Studies, p.941.
exclusive position of controlling access to policy making positions. According to Pasquino, democratic consolidation is differentiated from democratic transition in the sense that it is more of a party-dominated process which not always the case for the former. Accordingly, especially in studying the process of democratic consolidation approaching parties as independent variables, in other words as institutions with significant bearings on how political systems works is crucial in explicating the quality of democracy and the progress towards democratic consolidation. However, rather than focusing solely on individual parties, it is essential to study party systems together with parties since:

“Cross-party cooperation is conceivably far more effective as a determinant of consolidation than single-party behavior, as the emphasis on political pacts in the literature on democratic transition testifies. Whatever national variation in types of liberal democracy, it is clear that inter-party relations form a significant and perhaps crucial component in the process of consolidation.”

However, despite striking consensus on the significance of political parties and party systems for democratic consolidation, few studies have sought to identify this contribution. Yet, some significant exceptions exist that delineate the ways in which parties influence the process of consolidation.

Morlino scrutinizes the relationship between political parties and democratic consolidation and basically asserts that two conditions related to parties required for consolidation of democracy: stabilization of relations between parties and the public and stable patterns of competition among political parties. He goes on to argue that consolidation through parties requires organizational development of parties together with expanding party structures and party systems which become capable of controlling, moderating and aggregating diverse forms of participation. In other words, he suggests that parties need to be developed organizationally, form stable relations with other parties and be able to govern effectively since they are the ones leading the decision-making processes and occupying principal administrative roles. Similarly, Di Palma asserts that parties play the legitimizing role not only in achieving transfer of loyalties to the new regime but also in practicing decisional power and in representing diverse interests.

According to Pridham, examining the role of political parties in democratic consolidation requires adopting a three-dimensional approach that focuses on parties’ relationship with the state, inter-party relationships and the relationship between parties and

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In order to assess the relations with the state, he looks at the attitudes of parties towards constitutional settlement and whether there exists political consensus on this settlement. Here, the existence of anti-system parties, Pridham claims, might affect the process in a negative manner. In examining inter-party relationships, Pridham identifies three themes: alliance behaviour, the location of parties in the ideological spectrum and the way political competition affects the consolidation process. In terms of the relationship between parties and society, to Pridham, the parties have to take root in society through party identification.

Although these three assessments one way or other delineate the ways in which parties involve in the process of democratic consolidation, some problems persist that are common to all. First of all, none makes a clear distinction between the contribution of individual parties and party system. Secondly, especially Morlino and Di Palma focus on general features of political parties in any system and in any time period without spelling out the distinct functions of parties required in the specific process of democratic consolidation. Finally, they do not provide any concrete measurement instruments through which different cases might be explicated and compared; rather they focus on country experiences through referring specific events.

In this sense, the research of Randall and Svasand has been an exception since while seeking to highlight the contribution of political parties to democracy in third world context, they clearly indicated not only the functions of political parties but also the processes in which parties perform these functions. In their study, they, first, identified the functions of political parties: oriented towards electorate (representation and integration), linkage-related (aggregation and recruitment and training), and government-related (making government accountable and organizing opposition). They argue that how far political parties, in the system individually and through their interaction, manage to fulfil these demanding functions have implications for three processes necessary for the survival and consolidation of democracy: conflict resolution, institutionalization of democracy, and regime legitimacy. They also suggest that the ability of political parties to fulfil these functions required for democratic consolidation depends on both parties and party systems. However, Randall and Svasand are more concerned with the individual parties and party institutionalization and fail to indicate what they mean by party system and how cross-party relationship would affect the process.

57 Ibid, p.115.
58 Ibid, p.115.
Distinct from Randall and Svasand, Mainwaring and Scully, in their seminal work, focused on the notion of party system institutionalization which, they assert, is critical for democratic consolidation. They argued that in order for party system to be institutionalized four conditions must be present: stability in the patterns of interaction, strong party roots in society, legitimacy of parties and strong party organization.\(^{62}\) They mainly analyzed Latin American democracies and how the degree of party system institutionalization has influenced the kind and the quality of democracies. Mainwaring has continued to use same method in analyzing third wave democratization.\(^{63}\) Moreover, together with Torcal, Mainwaring has compared the degree of party system institutionalization of several democracies on the basis of first two dimensions of party system institutionalization: the stability of inter-party competition and the depth of party roots.\(^{64}\) In order to measure the stability in patterns of party competition, they compare electoral volatility scores of 39 democracies and semi-democracies.\(^{65}\) So they focused more on the party-society relationship. With regard to the second dimension of party anchoring in society, Mainwaring and Torcal gauge the levels of ideological voting and personalistic voting. They assume that whilst higher levels of the former manifests stronger party roots in society, personalistic voting indicates weak bonds between voters and parties.\(^{66}\)

Although introducing the notion of party system institutionalization for comparative purposes has contributed to the party system literature, except for the stability of party competition, other dimensions of party system institutionalization identified by Mainwaring and his colleagues are related more to the individual features of political parties rather than relational ones. How much a political party has managed to be rooted depends on the origins of individual parties and the patterns of societal cleavages whether based on class, ethnic or religious divisions that affected the way individual parties position themselves. In other words, to what extent voters feel attached to their parties pertains to individual parties but has no or little effects on the relations among them. The dimension of legitimacy accorded to political parties points to the attitudes towards party competition so connected more with the elements of elite political culture which, doubtlessly, affects the way party system works but cannot be qualified as one of the features of party system.\(^{67}\) The last dimension, strong party organization, needless to say, is the characteristic of individual parties and tells us little about system level relations. Here, Mainwaring and his colleagues fall into the ‘unit jump fallacy’,

\(^{65}\) Ibid, p.207.
\(^{66}\) Ibid, pp.209-216
in Sartori’s words, since their object under investigation should be party system not ‘party as a system’. 68

Moreover, even when analysing the first dimension, the stability of inter-party relations, Mainwaring and his colleagues have used electoral volatility scores to compare several countries. Though volatility scores are useful for macro-comparative purposes; as Wolinetz argues, they fail to explain the relational features of party systems such as the patterns of sympathy or antipathy that are in the core of party system discussion. 69

Numerous studies on the way political parties influence the process of democratic consolidation clearly demonstrate the relevance and significance of approaching parties and party system as independent variables in comprehending the nature and the quality of democracy in a specific context. However, even though there is a kind of general agreement that political parties and party system are required to be institutionalized in order to perform well in the process of consolidating democracy, especially regarding the study of party system, the methods employed remain problematic and fail to explicate the complexity of patterns of alliance and cooperation. In other words, defining party system as patterns of interactions among political parties, it can be argued that none of these studies depicts the relational facets of party systems. Then, the question is how party and party system institutionalization can be conceptualized with special attention to party systems.

2. Institutionalization of Political Parties and Party System

2.1. The Concept of ‘Party System’: Lost in Translation

A party system, generally, can be identified as patterns of interaction among political parties in electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas of a given political context. However, as Sartori has suggested, in order to talk about the very existence of a system, the system has to possess some characteristics that distinguish it from its constituent parts. 70 In the words of Sartori:

“...the concept of system is meaningless – for the purposes of scientific inquiry- unless, (i) the system displays properties that do not belong to a separate consideration of its component elements, and (ii) the system results from, and consists of, the patterned interaction of its component parts, thereby implying that such interactions provide the boundaries or at least boundedness, of the system.” 71

Sartori wants to signify and signal the difference between the concepts of ‘party as a system’ and ‘party system’ each of which has distinct characteristics and necessitates distinct approaches in conceptualizing. Accordingly, especially when studying the concept of party

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71 Ibid, p.39
system, researchers should pay attention not to fall into ‘unit jump fallacy’ and clarify how they approach the notion of party system.\(^{72}\)

In this sense, it is necessary, first, to identify the features of party system. According to Duverger, the party system can be defined as “the forms and modes of their coexistence” which has characteristics that do not appear in individual parties such as; “...numbers, respective sizes, alliances, geographical localization, political distribution and so on”.\(^{73}\) A specific relationship among these elements constitutes the party system.\(^{74}\) On the other hand, Sartori asserts that;

“Parties make for a ‘system’ only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from interparty competition. That is, the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in a mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the other parties.”\(^{75}\)

The definition of Sartori clearly indicates that explicating party system requires genuine understanding of the way parties approach one another, the way they envisage and react against the actions of others on the basis of their own expectations, and how they establish tactics or policies based on previous interactions. This brings us to the point that the way parties perceive the others has considerable implications on how the system operates.

According to Wolinetz, party systems possess a number of diverse characteristics which are “the number of parties..., their relative size and strength, the number of dimensions on which they compete, the distance which separates them on key issues, and their willingness to work with each other...”\(^{76}\) Ware asserts that party systems are differentiated from one another on the basis of four main criteria: the extent of penetration into society, the ideologies of parties, the stance of parties towards the legitimacy of the regime and the number of parties in the system.\(^{77}\) Ware’s modality is significant for the purposes of this research regarding the fact that he strongly states the relationship between the regime and individual parties impinge on party competition so has to be taken as an aspect of ‘party system’ in evaluating the robustness of the system.

Besides these dimensions, Mair has added the structures of competition as one of the key dimensions of party system.\(^{78}\) To Mair, competition for government might either be closed or open “depending on the patterns of alternation in government, the degree of innovation or persistence in processes of government formation, and the range of parties

\(^{72}\) Ibid, p.39.
\(^{74}\) Ibid, p.203.
\(^{75}\) Giovanni Sartori (2005), Parties and Party Systems, p.39.
\(^{77}\) Alan Ware (1996), Political Parties and Party Systems, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.149.
gaining access to government.”\textsuperscript{79} Furthermore, Mainwaring and Scully have enhanced the literature by approaching the degree of party system institutionalization as one another dimension of party systems that needs to be considered while categorizing party systems.\textsuperscript{80}

With the aim of classifying party systems for comparative purposes, scholars have developed typologies based on how different systems vary on some of these dimensions. Yet, since any categorization requires simplification they have to leave a number of dimensions out of classificatory schemes. Most conventional classification has been made on the basis of the number of parties in the system between two-party systems and multi-party systems. Using this schema, Duverger argued that whilst two party systems conform the nature of things in the sense that normally any political decision has been made between two choices, multi-party systems seems to constitute deviation and require further refinement for reaching higher stage of two-partism.\textsuperscript{81} Since then, several scholars have developed more complex classificatory schemes of party systems.

Dahl, contrary to Duverger, asserts that multi-party systems are more typical form of government in comparison to two-party systems that are more likely to be deviations.\textsuperscript{82} Dahl analyzes the competitiveness of opposition, in other words, the extent to which opposition is concentrated as the principal criteria for classifying party systems. He identifies four types of party systems: strictly competitive, cooperative-competitive, coalescent-competitive and strictly coalescent.\textsuperscript{83} However, he also considers the number and nature of parties as factors affecting competitiveness of opposition.\textsuperscript{84}

To the number of parties, Blondel adds the relative size of parties or the strength of parties as an important dimension to be gauged in identifying types of party systems.\textsuperscript{85} He looks at the percentage of the average vote of two largest parties and asserts that if it is in between 90\% and 99\% the system is clearly a two party system, between 75\% and 80\% is a three party system while less than 66\% clearly indicates multi-party systems.\textsuperscript{86} However, because there are no ideal three party systems, he finds it more appropriate to name those as two-and-a half party systems.\textsuperscript{87} Moreover, he differentiates between multi-party systems with a dominant party that receives two-fifths and less than half of the votes and multi-party systems without a dominant party in which three or four parties obtain similar amounts of votes and form coalitions.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, p.84.
\textsuperscript{80} Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully eds. (1995), \textit{Building Democratic Institutions}.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, p.301.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, p.301.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, p.184.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, p.184.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, pp.187-188.
Rokkan looks at patterns of government formation together with the number of parties in order to develop a schema. As to analyze the type of government formation he examines the likelihood of a single party majorities and the distribution of minority party strengths as principal metrics for categorization. He defines three types of party systems: the British-German “1 vs. 1+1” system; the Scandinavian “1 vs. 3-4” system; and ‘even multi-party systems which are “1 vs. 1+2+3”.

Sartori’s classification of party systems has been the most cited and accepted one since he introduces ideological distance among political parties as a crucial factor in classifying party systems. He is differentiated from others regarding the very fact that he emphasizes the functioning of the party system itself, in other words he takes into account the relational facets of party systems in developing a typology and goes beyond classifications that focus on the number of parties. Building on two variables, party fragmentation and ideological distance; basically, he formulated a four-fold typology: predominant party systems, two-party systems, moderate pluralisms, and polarized pluralisms.

He, first, distinguished between one party and multi-party systems. While the former is composed of single party and hegemonic party systems, hegemonic party systems referring to political arrangements whereby one party regularly predominates over other parties; the latter systems are differentiated between moderate pluralism where competition is centripetal and extreme pluralism where competition is centrifugal. The importance of Sartori’s classification lies in the fact that he manages to “combine a measure based on numbers and a measure based on the breadth of ideological space of competition”. In other words, he succeeds in incorporating ideological distance among political parties into his model by analyzing it together with the number and relative size of parties.

However, three main problems lie in Sartori’s model. First, he gauges party attitudes towards the regime under the notion of ideological distance. While extreme parties are considered to be anti-system, centrist parties are not so. However, he disregards cases where attitudes towards regime might differ among political parties without any of them being anti-system which is especially what has observed in the case this dissertation tackles. Secondly, as Ware argues, Sartori’s view of segmented pluralism as essentially more stable than polarized pluralism is somewhat problematic. Finally, looking at current party systems in Europe it can be observed that the category of moderate pluralism has been overloaded which jeopardizes the applicability of Sartori’s model and necessitates re-examination.

90 Ibid, pp.251-292.
93 Ibid, p.119.
95 Alan Ware (1996), Political Parties and Party Systems, p.174.
96 Ibid, p.171.
Both Mair and Mainwaring and Scully aim at addressing this necessity by developing new schemata. Focusing on the structures of competition based on the patterns of alternation in government, the types of governing formulas and access to government, Mair has identified two types of party systems open (unpredictable) and closed (predictable) systems of competition. He claims that newly emerging party systems belongs to former since they have not consolidated the structures yet but might move to a position whereby structure of competition becomes closed and predictable. Mainwaring and Scully are first to introduce the concept of party system institutionalization into the literature on party systems. They claim that new democracies are distinguished from former ones in the sense that they differ from one another with regard to the level of party system institutionalization. Accordingly, they find Sartori’s model problematic since he fails to include party systems outside the Western world in his model. Failing to fulfil Sartori’s criteria of ‘systemness’, they are left out of examination. They argue that the notion of party system institutionalization is useful in comparing differing levels of institutionalization within third wave democracies, and between them and Western democracies. Moreover, they claim that party system institutionalization has important implications for the nature of democracy and in the process of democratic consolidation.

Though scholars have formulated several typologies classifying party systems, except for Sartori they fall short of developing a model which considers relational features of parties as criteria. Keeping in mind the predicaments Sartori’s model faces, it is required that a new way of measuring different types of interrelationships among parties has to be formulated by paying special attention to relational features of parties rather than aspects of parties themselves. Only then, new typologies might emerge on the basis of those features. Accordingly, based on the case of Turkey this paper aims at contributing to the literature on party systems, first, by distinguishing the notions of party and party system institutionalization, and then by developing a novel way of construing party systems. None of typologies of party systems ever manage to include Turkish party system due to in-between character of Turkish democracy. Currently, Turkey has been experiencing a process of consolidation led by political parties. In this sense, time is opportune since this process very well discloses both the strengths and the weaknesses of parties and party system. By touching upon an intact area of study that is party systems within the consolidation process, this paper offers modality for delineating party systems experiencing similar developments.

2.2. How to Conceptualize Party and Party System Institutionalizations?

Reviewing the existing literature on political parties and democratic consolidation, following conclusions can be drawn; first, political parties are still the major agents of the process of democratic consolidation, and second, they are required to be institutionalized both individually, and in system level in order to perform well within the process. However, one crucial problem remains unresolved: in studying the role of political parties in consolidation not many studies have distinguished between individual parties and the party system

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98 Ibid, p.84.
institutionalizations, and the relational facets of party systems – patterns of alliance and opposition- have been overlooked.

Differentiating between the concept of party institutionalization and party system institutionalization is a challenging task not only because the very concept of institutionalization remains vague and obscure but also because the features of the former contribute significantly to the features of the latter, and only through party system does, party institutionalization affect the process of consolidation. Therefore, it can be argued that ‘institutionalization’ in the context of party system differs from the ‘institutionalization’ in the context of parties so requires distinctive definitions and distinctive methods of analysis.

Borrowing from Randall and Svasand, party institutionalization can be defined as “the process by which the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or culture.” They, first, distinguish between the internal and externally related aspects of the process: “internal aspects refer to developments within the party itself; external aspects have to do with the parties’ relationship with the society in which it is embedded, including other institutions.” While they identify organizational systemness and value-infusion as internal dimensions, embedded decisional authority together with reification are considered as external dimensions of party institutionalization. Although Randall and Svasand are unique in their attempts to provide a theoretical approach, they do not apply their complex notion of party institutionalization to real cases which leave the question of practicability untouched. Therefore, though the definition of party institutionalization as established behaviours, attitudes and culture can be adapted, new dimensions have to be specified for being able to measure party institutionalization empirically.

Accordingly, we can identify the degree of organizational development as an internal aspect and the regularized relations with electorate, civil society, and interest groups as an external aspect of individual party institutionalization. In order to investigate the degree of organizational development membership levels, the number of professional staff, the power relations within the party and the role of the leader in the party have to be analyzed. The external aspect of party institutionalization requires “strong party roots” in the electorate and better relations with the civil society and the interest groups. For examining the dealings with the electorate, on the one hand, the electoral volatility, the level of party identification, and the ability of political parties to survive can be measured; on the other hand, for analysing the dealings with civil society and interest groups of each individual party whether political

103 Ibid
105 Scott Mainwaring (1999), Rethinking Party Systems.
parties include civil society organizations and interest groups in the process of public policy making has to be assessed.106

With respect to the party system institutionalization, different concept of institutionalization needs to be adapted since it pertains not to institutionalization of single agents but to institutionalization of system as a whole which is composed of agents, yet has distinct characteristics of its own. The concept of system can be defined as patterns of interaction among the parts/agents that make up the system, which has its own rules, and has agents recognized both by the system itself and by other agents. In this regard, any kind of system consists of two major components, rules and agents. Accordingly, institutionalization of system refers to the process by which the principles and norms of the system have been established and agreed on; and the agents of the system have been regularized and legitimized so trusted by all other agents.

In line with this notion of ‘system’ and ‘system institutionalization’ we can identify party system as the patterns of interactions, characterized by a set of rules, among effective political parties competing for power and ‘institutionalization of party system’ requires two conditions;

(1) There must be widely accepted principles and norms on which all political parties are agreed (regime settlement) for the stability of the rules of the game.

(2) All political parties in the system should recognize one another as legitimate agents and not as a threat for the political regime (inter-party trust) for the regularization of the actors of the game.

By developing and adapting novel way of approaching party system and party system institutionalization, this paper features the relational aspects of party system. In this sense, it is concerned more with explicating the patterns of sympathy and antipathy or cooperation and opposition that characterize the ‘party system’ rather than individual parties. Accordingly, we decipher the dimensions of party systems that have been identified by scholars but have not been measured or included in typology-making such as “the stance of parties towards the legitimacy of the regime”107 or “parties’ willingness to work with each other.”108

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106 See Leonardo Morlino (1995), ‘Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe’, in Richard Günther, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds), Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp.315-387; Morlino considers including civil society and interest groups in the process of public policy making demonstrates closer relations between parties and these groups. This, in the end, is crucial for democratic consolidation.

107 Alan Ware (1996), Political Parties and Party Systems, p.149.

3. Regime Settlement and Democratic Consolidation

3.1. Conceptualizing ‘Regime’

Developing a new theoretical framework for the party system institutionalization requires, first and foremost, employment of clear concepts. In this sense, before elaborating on the question of regime settlement, the overarching concept of regime has to be discussed in detail and defined clearly. In most general terms, a political regime can be identified as the set of rules, procedures and understandings that establish the relationship between governors and governed.109 However, this general definition fails to capture the complexity of the ways in which the concept has been used. Therefore, we need to get deeper into the concept by analyzing how it has been used within democratization literature.

According to Munck, the concept of regime is a two-dimensional concept which has both procedural and behavioural dimensions.110 The former dimension, or procedural, concerns with,

“…the procedural rules that determine: 1) the number and type of actors who are allowed to gain access to the principal governmental positions, 2) the methods of access to such positions, and 3) the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions.”111

In order to avoid an approach that is limited and restricted to formal-legal analysis, as Munck suggests, it is essential to emphasize that procedural rules might be composed both of formal and informal rules.112 The behavioural dimension, on the other hand, is about the acceptance or compliance of procedural rules by the major actors.113 This dimension is related more to the fact that rules can only be sustained as long and much as actors follow and comply with them. The acceptation of procedural rules by actors might be either instrumental or normative but what is critical is that there has to be lack of normative rejection of these rules by any major actor for the stability of a political regime.114

Although there are scholars that include both dimensions within their definition of the concept of political regime like Munck,115 it has to be acknowledged that most scholars feature procedural dimension over behavioural. It might be beneficial to look at some of those

111 Ibid, p.4.
112 Ibid, p.4.
113 Ibid, p.5.
114 Ibid, p.5
definitions. According to Cardoso, regime refers to the formal rules that connect the main political institutions (legislature to executive, executive to the judiciary, and party system to them all) and to the political nature of this connection between citizens and rulers such as democratic, totalitarian and so on. Collier and Collier, in a similar vein, identified regime as “the formal and informal structure of state and governmental roles and procedures.” O’Donnell, moreover, defined the concept of regime as the set of dominant patterns that form and determine the ways of recruitment and access to government roles together with the criteria of representation. Whitehead, clearly, described the concept of political regime as “a defined set of institutions and ‘the rules of the game’ that regulate access to, and the uses of, positions of public authority in a given society.” What is common to all these definitions is the fact that they focused more on the procedural dimension of the concept. In other words, each definition one way or other manages to provide the meaning of the political regime conceptually which is less concerned with its livelihood. Therefore, it pertains to the concept of ‘regime’ itself regardless of its ‘settlement’ where behavioural dimension comes into picture.

On the other hand, scholars more interested in the process of consolidation prefer to employ two-dimensional conception since they consider ‘institutionalization’ as a decisive component of the concept of political regime. Accordingly, Mainwaring identifies the regime as the formal and informal rules that direct the relationship between major actors. He adds to his definition: “The notion of regime involves institutionalization, i.e. the idea that such rules are widely understood and accepted, and that actors pattern their behaviour accordingly.” O’Donnell and Schmitter also begin defining the concept as the explicit or implicit patterns that determine the channels of access to principal positions and the characteristics of the actors that are allowed to participate in the accession process. They also add institutionalization to their definition by asserting that in order “to be relevant the patterns defining a given regime must be habitually known, practiced and accepted”.

Although these attempts to include behavioural aspect within the definition of the concept of regime might seem to bringing us closer to the central concern of this paper, namely ‘regime settlement’, they all one way or other inflate the concept of ‘regime’ by overloading it with the notion of institutionalization. Although it is doubtless that in order for a regime to exist, it has to be accepted by the major actors on a minimum level, the degree of this acceptance and compliance might vary in different contexts. Therefore, rather than

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121 Ibid, p.296.
123 Ibid, 73.
approaching behavioural aspect as a defining characteristic of the concept, it might be more relevant to consider it as a secondary aspect of a political regime that affects the maintenance and survival but not as a part and parcel of the definition of regime.

Accordingly, concerned more with the concept of ‘regime’ per se, the definitions based on procedural aspects provide better tools for conceptualizing the concept for the subsequent discussions on regime settlement. However, one problem remains unresolved regarding procedural definitions, which is that they concerned too much with formal and informal rules that they seem to be missing the essence of the concept. In other words, those definitions attend excessively to the mechanisms of decision-making, interest articulation, aggregation and patterns of representation and participation as the constitutive elements of regime that they fail to capture the importance of commonly shared ideas or principles and norms that make up and sustain any given regime. Needless to say, all regimes enjoy key principles and norms that procreate them and that constitute the pillars on which they survive. Since this dissertation is interested with the essence rather than the shape or forms of regimes in understanding parties’ relations to them, it is required to employ a definition that pays attention to the core attributes of regimes.

Within this context, Krasner’s definition of international regimes looks promising in the sense that he includes not only procedures but also shared ideas and values in his definition of the concept of regime. He identifies regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”

Although it might appear controversial to import a concept from international relations, changing last six words into: ‘a given political arrangement’, definition can be highly relevant for political regimes as well. With this adaptation, the concept very well captures what is meant by a political regime since the logic behind international regimes and political regimes are not different and they both possess similar characteristics. Any regime whether to be international or national possess principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. According to Krasner;

“Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”

It is hardly possible to argue that constitutive elements of regimes defined by Krasner cannot be employed to identify the concept of political regime. What makes Krasner’s analysis much more interesting and appropriate for the purposes of this dissertation is that he makes a clear distinction between principles and norms on the one hand, and rules and procedures on the other. He argues that principles and norms constitute the fundamental characteristics of a regime, and many rules and procedures might be compatible with the same

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125 Ibid, p.2
126 Ibid, p.3
principles and norms. He suggests that while changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regime, changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself. To put it differently, Krasner considers principles and norms as the major components that constitute a regime.

Accordingly, this paper employs Krasner’s definition of regime by paying special attention to principles and norms as constitutive elements of political regimes. Therefore, in understanding and analyzing the degree of regime settlement it is important to look more to how much principles and norms have been agreed on and accepted by political parties, the major actors of any democratic regime. So, while examining regime settlement this paper is interested in the core of regimes, namely principles and norms rather than shape of them, namely rules and procedures. This is so due to the fact that, as Krasner also suggests, “fundamental political arguments are more concerned with norms and principles than with rules and procedures”.

3.2. Regime Settlement and Party System Institutionalization

We identified the regime settlement and the inter-party trust as the conditions of party system institutionalization. Among these conditions, regime settlement plays the principal role since it is not a condition by itself but also a condition that affects the other condition in the sense that how much parties trust each other depends highly on how they relate themselves to the regime. Therefore, the relationship between regime settlement and party system institutionalization has to be clarified.

As discussed in the previous section, regime settlement, basically, refers to the agreement on principles and norms of the political regime by effective political parties interacting within the party system. All political regimes enjoy key principles and norms on which they stand. The way political parties relate themselves to these principles and norms determines both the way they interact to one another and the extent they trust each other. Hence, institutionalization, meaning stable and proper functioning, of party system requires regime settlement and interparty trust. But how these two conditions affect party system institutionalization and subsequently democratic consolidation?

Democratic consolidation entails two basic requisites: first, political parties must be able to form a working interaction and to lead the process of consolidation, and secondly, there should not be any reserved domains of power for the other actors non-accountable to the electorate. Lack of party system institutionalization conditioned by regime settlement and interparty trust prevents both: first, political parties that do not agree on key principles fail to trust one another and to form working interaction; and secondly, the non-accountable forces that legitimized their powers in the name of guarding these principles and norms finds leverage to intervene in politics. In this context, the more party system institutionalized the

127 Ibid, p.3
128 Ibid, pp.3-4
129 Ibid, p.4
less leverage non-elected forces have within the political system. The second requisite speaks for itself. However, the first requisite requires further refinement.

Consolidating a regime, first and foremost, necessitates working relationship meaning that the parties making the party system must be capable of “negotiating and compromising”. In order to develop a working interaction, first, there should be minimal agreement on the principals and norms of the political regime by the major political parties, so there should be a kind of regime settlement and, second, they should perceive other key parties as legitimate political agents. While the former condition pertains to the relations of political parties to the existing political regime, the latter is about the relations of parties with one another.

Understanding how parties relate themselves to the regime necessitates, first, defining the principles of the regime and, then, through analyzing parties’ conceptualization of these principles, where they stand in relation to the regime can be observed that would also demonstrate how much they agree or disagree with the principles of the regime. We can illustrate how mechanism works by providing an example from the case this dissertation works on. Secularism has been one of the key principles of the political regime in the Republic of Turkey since its foundation. For the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the founder of the Republic, secularism with its current form is indispensable element of the regime in Turkey. However, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the party in the government since 2002, has a different understanding of secularism which might be called “passive secularism” meaning state neutrality towards various religions and allowing the public visibility of religion. Since two parties disagree on the principles of the existing regime, living aside compromising, they cannot even interact with one another. Accordingly, the way two parties relate themselves to the principles of the regime has determined the way they interact, or fail to interact, with each other.

Parties’ relations with other parties in the system, on the other hand, depend on how they consider other parties place themselves in relation to the regime. For instance, in the case of Turkey, examining the headscarf controversy might be highly revealing. In line with the strict understanding of secularism in Turkey, the Higher Education Council forbids female university students to wear headscarf within the borders of university since wearing the headscarf is considered a public manifestation of the breach of the Republic’s secular character. While the AKP approaches the issue as a human right, the CHP even refuses to discuss the issue with the AKP. Since the CHP regard the AKP as anti-secular, any proposal

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130 This approach is similar to the notion of trust level among elites in the literature on democratic transitions.
132 Rather than the separation of religion and state, secularism in Turkey refers to the state’s strict control over religious practice.
of the AKP is, automatically, viewed as a threat to the regime. The AKP, on the other hand, perceives the CHP not as representative of people but as a part of the status-quo so part of the problem. Consequently, the parties fail to form a “working interaction” which, in the end, blocks the process of consolidation.

True, the principles or norms of regimes themselves might contradict with the essence of liberal democracies meaning that key principles of a given regime might itself challenge the consolidation process. But even under those conditions parties should have minimal agreement on how to change those principles or on where to head those principles in order to adjust them. In other words, regime settlement as a component of party system institutionalization is not only about keeping existing principles and norms of regimes in tact but is about minimal agreement either on existing principles and norms or on ensuing principles and norms. To sum up, ongoing controversies over existing or ensuing principles and norms among major parties prevent party system institutionalization which subsequently hinders the process of democratic consolidation.

4. Research on Parties and Democratic Consolidation with New Measurement Tools and in a New Framework

4.1. Operationalizing Party and Party System Institutionalizations

The process of democratic consolidation in Turkey from 2002 to 2011 is an ample case for observing how the level of party and party system institutionalizations would affect the process of consolidation. In this sense, time is opportune since this process very well discloses both the strengths and the weaknesses of parties and party system. Besides these, several other reasons also make Turkey worth studying. First of all, due to the fact that Turkey, technically speaking, is part of second wave democratization, the continuing failure of consolidation makes Turkey an interesting case for comparative purposes.134 Secondly, studying in-between character of Turkish democracy, more advanced than third world but less advanced than Western democracies, may demonstrate the characteristics of transitional political regime. Lastly, understanding the problems of democratization in the transitional stage would illustrate the prospects and limits of democratic consolidation for several countries around the world experiencing similar transitions. Moreover, Turkey is a nation whose capacity to consolidate its democracy has far-reaching implications for the neighbouring troublesome region.

The 2002 general election was remarkable for Turkish political history since the political landscape was redefined from that day on. In 2002 not only did a political party with Islamist pedigree win the elections with a landslide victory and formed a single party government that lasted for more than 8 years135, but also all established political parties, except the CHP, were excluded from parliament and subsequently from politics. Since then Turkey has experienced several significant developments such as opening of accession

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134 Ergun Özbudun (2000), Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, p.1.
135 This is so since the AKP, one more time, managed to gain 47% of total votes in the 2007 general elections.
negotiations with the EU and numerous improvements with regard to democratization, civil-
military relations and economic development. Comprehending the last decade of Turkish
democracy is a crucial task not only because within this period of time a new era in Turkish
politics has begun but also given the nation’s size and influence in the region the process of
democratic transition in Turkey has important implications for the rest of region experiencing
similar hurdles in democratic consolidation. Underscoring how the weakness of party and
party system institutionalizations obstructed democratic consolidation and affected the quality
and the adjective of democracy in the country would both reaffirm the importance of parties
as central agents in democratization processes and constitute an ample case for future studies.

Approaching party and party system as independent variable in studying democratic
consolidation, we identified a number of dimensions through which the degree of
institutionalizations can be delineated. Table 2 summarizes these dimensions of party and
party system institutionalization and how they can be operationalized.

Table 2: Operationalization of the Dimensions of Party and Party System Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNAL</th>
<th>PARTY INSTITUONALIZATION</th>
<th>PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affects the degree of stability</td>
<td>Affects the degree of legitimation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>Membership levels</td>
<td>Levels of agreement with the principles of the regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The number of professional staff</td>
<td>The perception of democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power relations within parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The role of the leader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-How leader is selected?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-How the power of the leader is concentrated?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIME SETTLEMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXTERNAL</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL PARTY RELATIONS WITH ELECTORATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTEREST GROUPS</th>
<th>PATTERNS OF INTERACTION WITH OTHER PARTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affects the degree of stability</td>
<td>The number of effective parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With Electorate</td>
<td>The perception of other parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Index of electoral volatility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Levels of party identification</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-The ability to survive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With civil society/interest groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-The process through which public policies are made</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there is no clear-cut agreement on how political parties and party system contribute
to the process of democratic consolidation, stability and legitimation have been considered as
central conditions for consolidation of democracy for both of which political parties and party
system play the key role. Whilst stability mainly refers to regularization which pertains to “the
patterns of continuity over time”. Legitimacy is more about attitudes to the political regime.

On the one hand, I argue, party institutionalization plays the vital role in stabilization process since in order for party competition to manifest regularity, they need to be organizationally developed and have strong relations with society both through electorate and through other organizations. Legitimacy, on the other hand, implies system level acceptance and implementation of the rules of regime; so is related to party system which will be examined on the basis of regime settlement and coherent relations among political parties. While it is possible to keep the track of party competition so measure the stability empirically; legitimacy concerns with attitudes and perceptions so requires more qualitative approach. Still, in measuring each level of institutionalizations, both quantitative and qualitative ways of gathering data can be used.

While analyzing organizational development of each party membership levels, the number of professional staff, the power relations within the party and the role of the leader can be analyzed. For observing the power relations within the party and the role of the leader, the regulations of parties need to be studied, investigating how leader is selected, how the power of the leader is concentrated and how candidates for MPs are selected.

Evaluating the relations with electorate and civil society/interest groups, electoral volatility, levels of party identification, the parties’ ability to survive and the process through which public policies are made can be measured. Electoral volatility is related to parties’ relations with electorate in the sense that the lesser the volatility the more stable the parties’ vote percentages. Referring to the aggregate turnover from one party to the other parties from one election to the next, electoral volatility is quantified by adding the net change in vote percentage gained and lost by each party from one party to the other which is divided by two. To observe the ability of parties’ to survive both chronological ages of parties and persistence in traditions of thinking should be scrutinized by mapping the historical development of each political party.

In order to assess the coherency of relations with political parties and civil society/interest groups, how much each party includes civil society/interest groups in the policy making processes need to be scrutinized by analyzing the party constitution and, if possible, by interviewing the key figures of each party. Here, newspapers can also be used as

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139 Scott Mainwaring (1999), Rethinking Party Systems, p.28.
vital resources in tracking what kind of a relationship each party forms with civil society and interest groups.

Regarding party system institutionalization, two dimensions determine the degree of institutionalization: regime settlement and the level of inter-party trust. In order to delineate the first factor it is necessary to, first, identify the key principles of the regime at hand. For instance, in the case of Turkey the principles of the Republic have to be identified through reviewing existing literature on the early years of the Republic. Moreover, research can be done in order to scrutinize the leading approaches to Turkish modernization and also to provide a historical overview of the political developments that brought the contemporary situation into existence. Then, through discourse analyses, the official ideological and programmatic declarations of effective political parties and speeches by parties’ leaders and elites need to be examined in order to observe how they position themselves in relation to these principles and to the regime. Besides, while searching for parties’ placement in relation to regime, the parties’ understandings of democracy and their approaches to the process of democratization should be analyzed. Looking parties’ perception of democracy is crucial since how political parties approach ensuing principles and norms of political regime highly affects the level of regime settlement.

So as to measure the second factor, parties’ perceptions of other parties together with the effective number of parties can be analyzed. Assessing the number of parties in the system is required not only because knowing the size of party system might be useful in comprehending the nature of patterns of interactions but also because it is a means of evaluating the extent of party system consolidation. Rather than absolute number of parties, it is beneficial to use the effective numbers. The Laakso and Taagepera’s indicator of party system size that measures the effective number of parties through their strengths can be utilized.\(^\text{140}\)

With the aim of observing the level of inter-party trust, the perceptions of parties of one another have to be analyzed. In order to do so, in-depth interviews are required to be conducted with the significant figures of effective political parties seeking to examine how they perceive others in the system and so how they perceive themselves. In order to decode how parties perceive other parties, parties’ perceptions on the approaches and policies of other parties on significant issues that have important implications on the democratization process can be inquired. Here, it is important to select issues that are related to the key principles and norms of the political regime in order to observe the distance between parties in relation to their distance to the regime. For the Turkish case, the key principles of the political regime can be identified as nationalism and secularism.\(^\text{141}\) In relation to them several issue areas might be identified such as headscarf issue, the question of Alevi minorities, Kurdish issue, the constitutional reform, the approaches to the EU and the Ergenekon case are some of those. As a guiding tool, the country reports of Freedom House on Turkey will be used in order both to observe and to select the recurring issues affecting the level of democracy in the country.

\(^\text{140}\) Markku U. Laakso and Rein Taagepare (1979), “‘Effective’ Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to Western Europe”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 12:3, pp.3-27.

\(^\text{141}\) The detailed discussion on which principles should be considered as the key principles of the political regime in Turkey will be provided in the later chapters.
Looking at how parties consider and perceive others’ approaches to central issues related both with the principles of the political regime and the process of democratic consolidation will demonstrate the ways in which antagonism among parties slowed down or even hindered the process of reform. For the sake of scrutinizing the level of inter-party trust, choosing issues related to the principles and norms of the political regime is vital since this would indicate how two features of party system institutionalization affect one another and why regime settlement is more central than inter-party trust.

4.2. What Accounts for the Lack of Party System Institutionalization?

It is central thesis of this paper that political parties and party systems still play the major roles in the process of democratic consolidation. The less institutionalized parties and party systems, the harder it is for states to consolidate their democracies. While institutionalization for parties requires organizational development and stable and coherent relations with electorate and civil society/interests groups; institutionalization for party system is conditioned by regime settlement and inter-party trust. Although the features of party institutionalization contribute to the features of party system institutionalization, existence of institutionalized parties does not automatically bring about party system institutionalization. In other words, party institutionalization and party system institutionalization are separate processes that affect one another but not cause one another. In fact, imperatives of individual party institutionalization and party system institutionalization might even be at odds under certain contexts.142

In this regard, party system institutionalization, characterized by regime settlement and inter-party trust, appears to play much more critical role in the democratic consolidation processes. Particularly regime settlement, meaning agreement on either existing or ensuing principles and norms of the political regime by effective political parties, conditions party system institutionalization, and subsequently, democratic consolidation. The more controversy over the principles and norms of political regime among major parties, the less likely it is for a given nation to institutionalize its party system. Fundamentally, democratic consolidation is achieved through negotiation and compromise that necessitates, first and foremost, parties’ acceptance of both existing regime and the claims by other parties as legitimate both of which determine the level of party system institutionalization. Accordingly, party system institutionalization stands as the missing link helping to account for why it is that states that have regime problems find it difficult to establish consolidated democracies.

The question is then what factors might account for the lack of regime settlement in different contexts. Several mechanisms might be at work that perpetuate controversy over the principles of political regimes among which deep-seated sociocultural divide in societies that characterize the political system, unequal distribution of power amongst different actors representative of different cleavages, and the existence of non-accountable power centres that claim authority over the maintenance of principles and norms of political regime stand as the key ones. All three might interact with each other in some contexts, while other contexts might suffer from only one or two of these factors. While the last two factors are actor-

related, the first one pertains to the structural features of political systems that requires in-depth historical analysis.

All political systems are identified by certain cleavages whether to be based on region, language, ethnicity or social class. The critical point here is to differentiate between the types of cleavages that perpetuate the strain on the polity and the ones that facilitate integration in the system. In this regard, Lipset and Rokkan argue that the cleavages over “moral and the nature of human destiny” tend to keep the system in tighter strain than the cleavages based on “mundane and negotiable matters”. For instance, while cleavages based on religion produce tenser relations within the political system, cleavages over worker and owner put less pressure on the systems. In this regard, how much political parties, major actors of political systems, organize around these cleavages, and how strongly they persist and entrench them characterize the workings of the party system and also political regime as a whole. The stronger parties are identified in line with tense cleavages such as religious, or ethnic, the less they are likely to agree on the principles and norms that engender the political regime. Keeping in mind the fact that political parties of non-Western democracies or late-comer democracies are organized more around ethnic or religious cleavages, achieving agreement over the principles and norms of political regime becomes much more troublesome for those states and this subsequently obstructs the party system institutionalization. As Randall and Svasand also suggests;

“... exclusive forms of cleavages, above all religion and ethnicity, could be at odds with the institutionalization of the party system, through restricting the possibilities for cross-party competition, and undermining the ethos of mutual acceptance amongst parties as well as the confidence of at least a section of the public in political parties.”

In the early years of democratic experience, especially in new democracies, power is distributed unequally among different actors representative of different cleavages. The asymmetric balances of power during transitional periods provide stronger parties with chances of determining the principles and norms of a given political regime. In other words, in most of the late-comer democracies no consensus or compromise has existed in the early years of democratic transformation due to the lack of balance of power among different societal groups. However, in time other groups that could not take part in the agreement process on the principles and norms of the regime begin to organize institutionally through political parties and to garner support. As they acquire societal strength and support, needless

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144 Ibid, p.94.
to say, they begin to challenge the existing principles and norms that are drawn in the absence of them which leads to controversy over the principles and norms of political regime. Here, the relative power of strong parties in relation to weaker groups in the early years of democratic experience determines the extent of controversy. An example from the case at hand can explain very well how the lack of balance of power affects the regime settlement. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) was the founding party of the Republic of Turkey. In the early years, during the single party period representatives of different cleavage lines were represented through the CHP. However, other than strong Kemalist group, neither Islamists nor Kurdish groups were powerful enough to participate in the process of principle formation. However, in time both groups have received stronger societal roots, organized institutionally and garnered support which led to current controversy over the principles and norms of the regime in whose formation process they could not involve.

The existence of non-accountable power centres that claim authority over the maintenance of principles and norms of political regime also affects negatively the level of regime settlement. In the process of democratic transition, non-accountable actors, meaning that non-elected actors, might play role. The more non-elected forces involve in the process of principle formation, the more claim they make over those principles since they portray themselves as the guardian of those principles and norms. For instance, in some late-comer democracies military might take part in the process of principle formation which provides them with leverage within the political system. The more they take part, the more they shadow the political regime and the more they prevent the adaptation of principles and norms in accordance with the demands of different groups. Actually, this factor is both the cause and the effect of regime settlement. In the first instance, by claiming authority over the existing principles and norms of political regime non-elected forces harden the adaptation process and indirectly affect the level of regime settlement. On the other hand, as parties fail to compromise over those principles, non-accountable forces finds more leverage to intervene in politics. So, the existence of non-accountable power centres damages the regime settlement and in return the lack of regime settlement increases the power of those forces.

The principal argument of the paper is that party system institutionalization is not possible in the absence of regime settlement, and that lack of party system institutionalization prevents democratic consolidation. Conceptualizing and studying both party and party system institutionalization, it is possible to delineate all aspects of party politics both in individual and system levels and, in the light of them, to observe the way party politics shapes the process of democratic consolidation. More crucially, this approach offers ways to explain what accounts for the lack of party system institutionalization in new democracies through analyzing Turkey as a case study. I suggest that three factors have paramount importance over regime settlement, one of which is structural and the other two are actor-related: the profound sociocultural cleavage in society that finds representation over parties, the lack of balance of power among different political groups in the early years of democratic formation, and the existence of non-accountable domains of power within the political system.

Before making claims over explaining the complex process of democratic consolidation, it is worthwhile to acknowledge the limitations of this approach. We have to make it clear that the central concern of this paper is political parties and the party system so
internal dynamics rather than external ones. However, there are several other exogenous factors such as international power structures or international political environment that has profound effects on the democratization processes of non-Western democracies and which needs to be kept in mind. Unfortunately, for the sake of parsimony, political parties are chosen to be the central foci of the paper. Accordingly, it attends more to domestic processes but at least it acknowledges the very existence of international structure that affects the processes but which goes beyond the limits of current paper.

5. Concluding Remarks

This paper, primarily, deals with the role played by political parties and party systems in the process of democratic consolidation. It conceives the process of democratic consolidation as a party dominated process and claims that institutionalized parties and party systems are the major requirement, if not the only one, of democratic consolidation. Relating party system with regime settlement, the paper aims at indicating the centrality of party system institutionalization that stands as the missing link helping to account for why it is that states that have regime problems work harder to consolidate their democracies.

In the paper, first of all, it is identified what is meant by democratic consolidation as a political regime where democracy became “only game in town” behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally. Then, how central political parties and party systems are and what kind of a role they play within the consolidation process have been delineated. It is asserted that parties are still the major agents of the process and not only individual parties but also party system as a whole has to be institutionalized for consolidation. Moreover, the concept of party system has been discussed in detail and both the problems with the existent literature and the possible ways of overcoming those problems have been provided. The necessity to analyze the relational features of party systems has been stressed. Following that, how the party and the party system institutionalizations can be conceptualized have been presented by suggesting that party and party system institutionalizations are separate processes that necessitate separate approaches in conceptualization. In this sense, while party institutionalization requires organizational development internally and stable relations with the electorate and civil society/interest groups externally; the key requirements of party system institutionalization are described as regime settlement and inter-party trust. Clarifying the party and the party system institutionalizations, the concept of regime settlement, the central feature of party system institutionalization paper argues, has been examined in detail and a definition of regime have been identified together with the analysis of the relationship between regime settlement and party system institutionalization. In the fourth section, the operationalization of the dimensions of party and party system institutionalizations and the theoretical framework have been provided demonstrating both how the concepts of the party and the party system institutionalization can be measured and what accounts for the lack of party system institutionalization in different contexts.

To sum up, since it is hardly possible to find any study on democratic consolidation that does not refer to the key role of political parties or party systems, this paper is not an

exception. What makes it distinct, on the other hand, is that; first, it develops a new way of approaching the concept of party system institutionalization that takes relational features of party systems into account. Secondly, it differentiates between the concepts of party institutionalization and party system institutionalization. Finally, it accounts for the lack of party system institutionalization together with explicating the way it affects the process of democratic consolidation.

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