

# Turkey's Accession to NATO: Building a 'Little America'

Reem Abou-El-Fadl\*

PhD Candidate  
University of Oxford

## ABSTRACT

This paper builds on the theoretical premise that nation building and foreign policy are mutually constituted, and cannot be fully understood unless analysed together. It illustrates this using the case of early 1950s Turkey, examining the process by which its NATO membership was secured. Turkey's role in the Western alliance has been a central feature of its foreign policy ever since, and has often been explained by reference to security concerns in the Cold War. However, this paper contends that pursuing a NATO role was a foreign policy developed in tandem with a *nation building* project, and that the latter was dominated by a quest to secure Turkey's Western identity, as well as foreign aid, alongside security imperatives.

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While the most commonly emphasised rupture in the literature on Turkey is the founding of the republic, the year 1950 has also received substantial attention as a transformative moment. Yet the relevant scholarship has mostly emphasised its impact in terms of the onset of multipartism, and the strengthening of Turkey's Western alliance. Enquiries into the links between these two developments – aside from references to the interaction of 'domestic and international factors' after World War II – are far rarer. More specifically, in the literature on Turkish nation building, the 1950s receive scant attention in comparison to the Kemalism of the 1930s, and the challenges posed to it after the 1980 coup. Similarly, many foreign policy analyses safely repeat the argument that foreign policymaking in Turkey has long been relatively well insulated from domestic political pressures.<sup>1</sup>

This paper is based on the premise that the 1950s represented a watershed for both nation building and foreign policy in Turkey. The Democrat Party (DP) can be said to have espoused a *liberal* nation building model which was in significant contrast to the early Kemalist one, which itself can be described as closer to a republican model, and characterised by a high dose of nationalism. Meanwhile, in foreign policy, the Democrats brought Turkey into the closest alliance with Western powers it has ever seen. This paper will argue that the reasons for these shifts, and the forms they took, were closely related. Ever since the late Ottoman era, state elites had sought the solution to questions of identity as well as independence in a modernisation process which was equated with westernisation. Kemal Atatürk had formalised this into the goal of 'reaching the level of contemporary civilisation', and through the Republican People's Party (RPP), stepped up efforts to westernise the Republic in Europe's image. The DP's contribution was to interpret this goal ever more narrowly, as both an imitation of the West, and a fostering of relations with it, but this time with the United States rather than Western Europe as the model. If both RPP and DP leaders were speaking of turning Turkey into a 'little America' in the 1940s,<sup>2</sup> it was certainly the Democrats whose liberal vision seemed more in tune with the US model. The primacy of this

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goal to the DP's role conceptions on foreign policy and nation building would see them follow increasingly connected paths.

This paper will thus argue firstly that insofar as the pursuit of Western institutions was a foreign policy, it derived from the Democrats' own perceptions of how to propel Turkey along the path towards Western civilisation, and not solely from a particular view on protecting Turkish independence in the superpower struggle. Furthermore, this paper will present Turkey's Western choice as a policy propelled equally by a nation building endeavour – one which sought to entrench Turkey's western identity, and in which westernisation was translated into a national development project modelled along American lines. Analysing Turkey's NATO accession in the early 1950s should thus serve as evidence of the mutual constitution of foreign policy and nation building in this experience – through such connected concerns with independence and national development.

This analysis begins by identifying the deficiencies in the theoretical literature on foreign policy and nation building, and the historical literature on the Cold War in the Middle East to which this paper responds. The paper then moves on to discuss the historical circumstances in which the Democrats formed their 'role conceptions'.<sup>3</sup> This term refers to the Democrat Party leaders' predispositions towards political concepts and rule, before and upon assuming power. The paper then analyses the DP's connected role conceptions on independence and nationhood in depth. Finally, an analysis follows of the ways in which these conceptions developed into policies from 1950 to 1952, also termed the Democrats' 'role performance'. This analysis should evidence a continuity between the Democrats' policy conceptions and performance, highlighting the agency of Turkish actors, and showing that pursuit of Western alliances was much more than a simple response to the superpower struggle. It reflected a pre-existent linkage between national and foreign policies in DP thinking, chiefly based on a project of westernisation and 'civilisation' dating back to Ottoman times.

### *Theoretical Debates*

This enquiry's departure point is that nation building and foreign policy are rarely considered together in international relations theory literature, which produces deficient conclusions when applied to empirical study. The gap between conventional international relations literature on foreign policy and that on identity politics, is wide. Albert Paolini laments this: 'Why is it that international relations, a discourse that sets out to explain the character of contemporary world politics and theorize the behavior of states, makes so little space for questions of identity, subjectivity, and modernity, especially as they apply to non-Western places...?'<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, conventional nation building theories rarely accord foreign relations prominence in their accounts. In their more recent and more sophisticated forms, theories on nationalism have incorporated trans-border developments, such as the spread of world capitalism, and improved methods of transport and communication, in their analyses. However, nation building literature in itself is relatively undifferentiated, and international developments are at best presented as context. No paradigm exists for considering a state's nation building as integrated with its foreign policy in particular.

Newer approaches such as constructivism and post-structuralism have brought Foucauldian discourse analysis to international relations, and have critiqued the realist idea of state interests as a 'given'. They have provided convincing identity-related explanations of the

dynamics of interstate relations.<sup>5</sup> However, even these analyses display a preoccupation with the interstate level which remains out of step with empirical evidence. No systematic consideration of identity *within* the 'domestic' nation building process has been conducted in even the most deconstructive of foreign policy accounts.

This gap is reflected in the literature on Turkey. Many scholars are arguably cynical of relating identity or even ideology too closely to foreign policy: 'In spite of the Turkish government's repeated claims of adherence to democratic values, it is likely that this factor was less important in motivating Turkey's attachment to the Western alliance than traditional territorial and security interests.'<sup>6</sup> There is a strong literature on Kemalist nation building in Turkish scholarship,<sup>7</sup> yet such analyses tend not to consider the foreign policy implications of the nation building they scrutinise. Even when foreign policy scholars do acknowledge Turkey's 'western identity' as a goal in foreign relations, they do not explore the latter in depth.<sup>8</sup>

There are a handful of studies which have paid closer attention to the interplay of identity and foreign policy in the political history of Turkey. Studies by Yavuz, Aras and Aykan have begun skilfully incorporating the fraught identity politics dimension into accounts of specific areas of Turkish foreign policy.<sup>9</sup> Another notable example is Bozdağlıoğlu's *Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy*, which argues that 'Turkey's decision to integrate itself into the West was tied to Turkey's new western identity constructed in the years following the Independence War.'<sup>10</sup> Bozdağlıoğlu does not pay attention to the 1950s, however, and does not emphasise the United States as the specific Western model for the DP. Bilgin and Yılmaz's discussion of 'intellectuals of statecraft' during the Cold War constitutes a rare exception, as an enquiry into the construction of Turkey's western identity through early Cold War foreign policy.<sup>11</sup> Here the emphasis is rather on discourse, however, which will be addressed alongside policy performance in this paper.

Meanwhile, in wider scholarship dealing with the events of the Cold War in the Middle East, there has at times been a tendency to reproduce the superpower 'satellisation' of such 'Third World' countries as early republican Turkey in analysis. Viewing their behaviour through the prism of superpower competition, the agency and motivations behind the policies of countries such as Turkey are often overlooked. Such trends tend to produce conclusions such as this one by Adeed Dawisha: 'It is perhaps this relationship of objective dependency, of the absolute need for the support of one or the other of the superpowers, of the utter inability to go it alone, that ultimately tells us most about the nature of the relationship between the Cold War and regional actors...'<sup>12</sup> This paper is a contribution to the scholarly response<sup>13</sup> to such trends in the literature on the Cold War. It attempts to 'desatellise' Turkey, and to place the agency of its political actors, their constituencies and most pressing concerns at the centre of the analysis.

### **Historical Trends in Turkey: the Civilisation Paradigm, *After Empire***

Before considering the Democrat leaders' role conceptions, the first task of this enquiry is to establish the genealogy of ideas and policies they inherited from the late Ottoman and early republican eras, and from which they tapped a particular goal, and political tradition. As Atatürk would enunciate it, this objective was to 'reach the level of contemporary civilisation', and the political strategy expressly adopted was a turning westwards. Thus while this paper asserts that the 1950s represented a revisionist break in Turkish nation

building and foreign policy, it nevertheless emphasises the endurance of an overarching goal and strategy, upheld by the Democrats as consistently as by their predecessors.

The Democrats emerged out of decade-long contestation of the different approaches to Kemalism from within the Republican People's Party. As RPP policy in turn demonstrated significant continuity with its Young Turk predecessors, the ruptures over these eras should not be exaggerated. The early Kemalists' preoccupation with independence and westernisation can be traced to the late Ottoman era. As Hanioglu states, 'the confrontation with the west and the endeavour to examine the reasons of the superiority of the west had been the turning point in the history of Ottoman thought.'<sup>14</sup> The relevance of the late Ottoman era for understanding republican era policies thus lies in the trend of defensive European-style state reform it hosted, as well as in the proto-nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).<sup>15</sup> The solutions which the Ottoman elites and Young Turks promoted on each issue displayed trends which the Democrats certainly inherited.

Kemal Atatürk, having emerged from the Young Turk cadres to fight and win the Independence War, was just as preoccupied with the independence-identity conundrum of the Empire. Following previous trends, he embarked on a nation building project that made hard-hitting superstructural changes to entrench his version of secular nationalism in Turkey, and to bring it closer to his European standards of civilisation. Whereas the Young Turk 'ideologues dreamed of several of the socio-cultural reforms Mustafa Kemal was later to implement',<sup>16</sup> Atatürk was able to conduct his revolution largely because of his success in the Independence War, and because of the alliance of forces whose support he had gained during and after it.<sup>17</sup>

Meanwhile, isolationism was Atatürk's answer to the foreign policy goal of preserving Turkey's hard-won independence. Nevertheless, this isolationism, and Turkey's skilfully handled neutrality in the next world war, were guided by a reluctance to damage relations with any European power. Indeed, Oran dates this trend to the Independence War:

In conformity with the traditional Ottoman line, Turkey's War of Liberation, though waged against the West, was not to be a war that would lead to a split with the West. The goal of westernization was manifest... There was a continuous search for contacts with the West while the war with Greece was raging on... The message went to all the West... that the new Turkey would shun communism and remain in the capitalist camp.<sup>18</sup>

Thereafter, as Yavuz explains, foreign relations 'filtered down from the secular elite's self-ascribed European identity, which in turn was the basis of framing "Turkish national interest".'<sup>19</sup> These were the legacies of the early Kemalist era, and the CUP and late Ottoman eras before it, in terms of the quest for civilisation via 'westernisation' in Turkish nation building and foreign policy.

### *Profile: The Democrat Party*

It was the Second World War, and the upheavals it would bring in terms of domestic as well as international circumstances, that paved the way for the onset of multipartism and the rise of the Democrat Party, with all the transformations this would bring to Turkey in turn. Before considering the role conceptions of the DP policymakers then, it is necessary to understand their socioeconomic and political profiles, and the domestic and international context in which their careers developed. Three transformations in particular conditioned the emergence

of the DP: firstly, a socioeconomic transformation which saw the enrichment of the landowning and bourgeois classes, secondly, an ideological transformation within the RPP elite which saw the rise of an alternative, anti-statist approach to Atatürkist Kemalism, and thirdly, an international transformation of the balance of power with the victory of the Allies and the onset of the Cold War. The dependently developing nature of Turkey was the backdrop to all three transformations.

Within Turkey, the war years elicited a breakdown of the alliance of socioeconomic forces that had shaped the early Republican years, and saw the rise of a new composition of elites with a very different profile. These were the commercial bourgeoisie and the large landowners, who were among the few to accumulate wealth rather than grow poorer during the war. By the mid-1940s, it was firmly in their interests to limit the role of the state both politically and economically. Meanwhile, their enrichment had taken place in line with the impoverishment of certain other groups during the war, as shall be discussed below. These groups laid the blame for their plight at the state's door however, for its oppressive wartime measures, and the corruption of its bureaucrats. This resulted in the singular phenomenon of a grassroots base who had suffered a great deal while the commercial and landed classes grew, and yet who were ready to support them politically against the state.

Grievances had been brewing against the state amongst increasingly broad sectors of Turkish society ever since the 1930s. For the workers, the etatist drive for industrialisation in Turkey had spelled lower real wages, while the adoption in 1936 of a strict (Italian) Labour Law prohibited unionisation and strikes. In agriculture, prices fell in line with world prices and the peasants' terms of trade suffered, while industrial prices were kept high through taxation. This ensured that much of the surplus accrued to the coalition of state bureaucrats and the industrial bourgeoisie, while the majority of the population – the middle peasants – were disadvantaged. Fundamentally, the etatist experience remained conservative, and attempted no socioeconomic restructuring, 'its main social characteristic being an attempt by the ruling elite to delimit and control a transformation dynamic.'<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile, the 'People's Houses', designed to popularise official ideology across the towns of Anatolia, did not always reach beyond a narrow group of bureaucrats.<sup>21</sup> This ideology included the state-imposed formulae of strict secularism, which deprived particularly the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie of their conventional mechanisms for coping with the trials of everyday life.

The war years exacerbated these processes, as the state extracted more and more through taxes to shore up revenue. At the time, Turkey's defence budgets were sapping over 50 per cent of national income, as future Prime Minister Menderes would later comment.<sup>22</sup> Widespread corruption characterised many of the typical collaborations between the state bureaucracy and bourgeoisie. The war economy saw shortages, inflation, and falling real wages and salaries, impoverishing the urban petty bourgeoisie as well as the peasantry. This was compounded by exploitative government laws, such as the National Defence Law of 1940, which was ostensibly a reaction to rampant black market profiteering, but which gave the government emergency powers to control pricing and market supply, as well as use forced labour. The Harvest Tax of 1942 made conditions worse for Turkey's farmers by reinstating a version of the Ottoman tithe.<sup>23</sup> Discontent at these economic conditions and government laws was then heightened by the increasing authoritarianism of İsmet İnönü's government. Attempts to placate the populace were unsuccessful: for example, İnönü's creation of the 'Independent Group' could not conceal its absolute dependence on his leadership through its short life until its dissolution in 1946.<sup>24</sup>

As these tensions were rising, the bourgeois and landed components of the coalition in ascendance since the early days of the republic soon broke away from their etatist partners. The commercial bourgeoisie had been fostered by the state since the early days of the republic, but with its newfound wealth,<sup>25</sup> was now less and less circumscribed by such connections. Meanwhile both the bourgeoisie and landowners had become wary of state intervention and wished to guard against its extraction schemes. The most notorious of these had been the Wealth Tax of 1942. Making no secret of its aim as the 'dissolution of the non-national commercial bourgeoisie',<sup>26</sup> it had nevertheless angered the Muslim Turkish equivalent, through its arbitrary and harsh application.<sup>27</sup> It was only a short step from this to their estrangement from the state's ideological prescriptions too, and their move to embrace the promise of political and economic liberalism.<sup>28</sup> The Democrat Party founders were members of this new alliance of forces, themselves a mixture of landowners and businessmen.

The interwar years had also seen substantial ideological transformation among political and intellectual elites in Turkey, as the exceptional circumstances of the young Republic faded, and different shades of opinion came into view. Gradually, there developed a fissure in the ranks of the ruling People's Party, with new voices critiquing the fundamentals of the Republic's official ideology, as institutionalised by Atatürk and preserved by İnönü. One of the main focuses of this new set of ideological trends was the principle of etatism in strategies for development. There were two main groups who advocated it as a permanent feature of the economy: the first, and the more influential, was a group of left-leaning intellectuals who published the journal *Kadro* (1932-4). These included editor Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Tevfik Rüştü Aras and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir.<sup>29</sup> A second group of statist favoured the corporatist fascist models of 1930s Italy: these included writers and politicians such as Tekin Alp and Recep Peker. The 'official' view, associated with the premiership of İnönü, was rather that statism was no alternative to capitalism, but was instead a temporary defence mechanism, a tool to sponsor private enterprise for development.<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile, a third intellectual trend had formed to compete with both the *Kadro* group and the far right for the attention of the political centre: this trend was of a liberal colouring. It was arguably the most successful, influencing RPP policy increasingly as the 1930s wore on, and can be described as the intellectual heritage of the Democrat Party. The most prominent intellectual of this persuasion was Ahmet Ağaoğlu,<sup>31</sup> one of the founding members of the Free Republican Party (FRP) of 1930, and father of later Democrat Minister Samet Ağaoğlu. The FRP was an opposition party set up at Atatürk's behest, whose popularity led to its closure within a matter of months. What the FRP shared with the DP after it, and indeed with the Progressive Republican Party<sup>32</sup> before it, was its self-identification as 'antiauthoritarian and economically liberal'.<sup>33</sup> Both the FRP and DP sharply criticised Turkey's particular application of etatism as stifling, and counselled the rolling back of the state. In his book *Devlet ve Ferd* ('The State and the Individual'), published in 1933, Ahmet Ağaoğlu wrote: 'the involvement of the state in economic affairs in the form of the suppression of the individual and by means of state entrepreneurship is very dangerous.'<sup>34</sup> The centre-right liberal ideology of Ağaoğlu and his peers gradually moved to permeate the discourse of the ruling centre, its vehicles being the political elites of the rising landowning and bourgeois class, and future founders of the DP. Members of the *Kadro* group were soon silenced and their editor exiled, while such extreme right-wingers as Peker were tolerated by the RPP.

Thus a discursive dimension had emerged to the socioeconomic changes in the fabric of the Turkish elite, together constituting a forceful political assault on the dominant narratives of

the Republic. This assault addressed official conceptions of nation as well as independence, and the ways in which both were to be handled in the advance towards civilisation. Proponents of the liberal approach to Kemalism demonstrated their increasing opposition to RPP policy in parliament from the 1930s onwards.<sup>35</sup> Prominent among them was future Democrat Celâl Bayar, whose criticisms of the economic policies of İnönü's government locked the two in a competition that would last more than a decade. İnönü and Bayar can be juxtaposed as representatives of two different camps,<sup>36</sup> broadly understood as the statist and the liberal. Bayar had been charged with forming the İş Bankası in 1924, which was the only nominally private bank among those founded by the state at the time. He had then worked as Atatürk's Minister of Economy from 1932 to 1937, during which his preference for economic liberalisation became clear.

Another founding member of the DP and future Turkish premier, Adnan Menderes, had also begun his political career as a liberal critic, in his case as Chairman of the FRP in Aydın. When the Free Party was shut down, Menderes moved to the RPP, but carried his convictions on liberal politics with him. Bayar replaced İnönü as Prime Minister in 1937, '[illustrating] the growing division of ideas among politicians and intellectuals regarding expectations and aspirations for the future of Turkey.'<sup>37</sup> When Bayar and Menderes turned together to competitive politics in 1946, it was with an inevitably liberal, anti-state stance. By that time, the debate on the need for political freedoms had already intensified in the pages of Turkey's main newspapers. The most vivid illustration of this was the feuding of *Vatan*'s Ahmet Emin Yalman with Falih Rıfkı Atay of the government mouthpiece *Ulus*.<sup>38</sup>

Meanwhile, the implications of the victory of the Allies in the world war had to be absorbed by policymakers in Turkey as elsewhere. A transformation in international forces thus became the third contributing factor to the erosion of RPP ascendancy, as it had become clear that access to much-needed foreign assistance would depend on convergence with the victorious powers' political and economic models. In 1945, President İnönü told his Ambassador to Washington, Feridun Cemal Erkin, to inform US officials at the San Francisco Conference that Turkey would move towards democracy as soon as the war ended.<sup>39</sup> İnönü announced this publicly in May 1945, just after Germany's surrender. The impact of international pressures on İnönü's decision became still more visible by mid-1947, shortly after the unveiling of the Truman Doctrine. That June, İnönü made his famous '12<sup>th</sup> July Declaration' conferring legitimacy on the opposition, despite its growth to threatening proportions, and on the same day signed Turkey's first military agreement with America. In Cem Eroğul's words, 'The link between the two is evident: for İnönü to decide to eliminate the DP, he would have to change his fundamental position on security; yet, in his eyes, alliance with the United States had become the direct condition for the continuation of the state's sovereignty.'<sup>40</sup>

Concurrently, economic policy changes would also be necessary, if these new international ties were to continue, and expand into non-military fields of assistance. The influential reports of US experts arriving in Turkey over the late 1940s recommended economic liberalisation, and legal measures to encourage industry.<sup>41</sup> The Democrat Party was very much a beneficiary of these propitious international circumstances for the ushering in of its political opportunity. Unlike the statist RPP old guard, the Democrats enjoyed a harmony between their socioeconomic and ideological positions, their political aspirations, and US preferences for liberalism in the political and economic fields. As this chapter will show, the Democrats stood out for the extent to which they identified a western *liberal* orientation as a

part of their programme and self-definition, conducting their foreign policy and nation building accordingly in years to come.

### **The Democrat Party Leaders' Role Conceptions**

Against the backdrop of these longer and shorter term transformations in Turkey, what role conceptions did future Democrat leaders develop, and apply to their nation building and foreign policy choices? It will become clear that westernisation – equated with Americanisation – would guide these role conceptions and policy with increasing consistency. This is analysed through attention to DP discourse and behaviour regarding the issues of nationhood and independence. To do this, several important episodes over 1946-50 are addressed, from the founding of the party, through the opposition years, up until the victory of 1950. Tracking DP discourse will involve paying attention not only to the Democrat politicians themselves, but also to those journalists and public figures who supported the party and participated in its campaign. For analytical clarity, the following sections separate DP role conceptions on nationhood from those on independence, but the discussion should evidence the recurrent connections between the two.

#### *On Nationhood*

The new value which would be placed at the centre of the Democrats' conceptions of nationhood was freedom – the freedom of each citizen in the nation vis-à-vis the state – and consequently in all fields in the thusfar state-dominated Turkish society. Achieving this freedom was presented as ensuring Turkey's progress towards its goal of 'contemporary civilisation'. The reference point for this was frequently declared to be the 'liberal democracies' of 'the West', among whom the United States' model would be particularly influential. As Kemal Karpat puts it, himself seeming largely convinced of the connection: 'The liberalization which started in 1945 was a step aimed at achieving political Westernisation – democracy.'<sup>42</sup>

The Democrats' stances revealed a liberal, opportunity concept of freedom as non-interference, and refuted republican notions of freedom as a concept that could only be protected through a social contract with the state. This involved a substantial disruption of the previous contours of republican-style nation building. The RPP ruling elite had invoked the 'general will' to justify a corporatist system in which they were uniquely placed to define what was in the 'national interest'. Their discourse turned on the concept of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, the 'sovereignty of the nation'. The DP's rupture would be to invoke the very similar concept of *milli irade*, the national will – through the 'people's voice' (*milletin sözü*) – but within a liberal framework which defined it very differently. For the DP, the national will represented an aggregate of the wills of each individual citizen, where the priority for each was his/her personal freedom, for the pursuit of his/her individual interests.

Here the meaning of the liberalism ascribed to the DP in its role conceptions is important, in view of the now conventional wisdom on the dissonance between the DP's promotion of liberal values before coming to power, and their selective application of such values later on. A closer analysis arguably reveals that the DP's liberalism was influenced by conservative trends, and that there was a remarkable consistency between this 'conservative liberalism' before, and upon coming to power. Substantiating this will also contribute to a fuller grasp of where DP role conceptions converged with, and broke from the mainstream trends in the RPP. In the political sphere, the DP's understanding of liberalism was mostly focused on the



multiparty system, and on the free participation of each individual in selecting their representatives. The DP did succeed in increasing the participation of non-elites, encouraging them both to vote and to stand for office, particularly in local-level politics. However, this enfranchisement was conceived within the DP's rather conservative limits. These were visible when it came to members of the Left, and to a lesser extent to those on the religious Right, whose respective ideas were deemed a threat, much as they had been ever since the founding of the republic. According to Avcıoğlu, 'one of the first innovations of the 1946 "freedom advocates" was the slogan "no freedom for the enemies of freedom"'.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, the Democrats themselves declared that 'they did not believe "in granting freedom to those who did not recognize it."'<sup>44</sup> In the cultural sphere, the DP's reverence for the peasant and its tolerance of religious values had very different consequences for rural life than did the early Kemalist cultural reforms.<sup>45</sup> In the economic sphere, liberalism was substantiated in terms of two conditions: the inviolability of private property, and a rejection of the notion of class struggle in Turkey.<sup>46</sup> This translated into a concern with reigning in the state, and encouraging free enterprise and foreign investment. On these counts, the DP's vision differed from that of the RPP, which – although it had taken the first measures for political and economic liberalisation while in government – still stood for protection of the state, its bureaucracy and reforms, and the national economy. Within the conservative limits of this liberalism, then, and in view of their dynamic contribution to the multipartist transition, the DP's role conceptions may be analysed as distinct.

The DP expressed their liberal role conceptions on nationhood by emphasising three aspects of their opposition platform – political, economic and religious freedoms. On each of these counts, the goal of 'civilisation by westernisation' was tangible, and this will be addressed after a discussion of each in turn. The first, political freedom, can be considered part of their conceptions on nationhood as it implied a different model of the relationship between the citizen and the state. Indeed, compared with the RPP's identification of the state with the nation,<sup>47</sup> the DP almost fetishised 'the people' against the state as the nation, claiming a monopoly on its enfranchisement. Writing a decade earlier, liberal intellectual Ahmet Ağaoğlu had warned that 'If the state expanded its role of protecting the natural social order, it could assume the functions of the nation, and it, in Ağaoğlu's words, "could swallow the nation" leaving no room for the unprompted development of society into a modern democratic form.'<sup>48</sup>

From its earliest days, the DP would issue statements casting doubt on the representative credentials of the parliament, and convene mass demonstrations, a novel phenomenon itself. The first of these statements was arguably the *Dörtlülük Takrir* ('Memorandum of the Four') of 1945, which was a demand for internal reform whose rejection had prompted the formation of the Democrat Party in January 1946.<sup>49</sup> Although Bayar, the new DP's chairman, had consulted İnönü in the interim,<sup>50</sup> the party immediately projected an image of itself as the party of the masses, and lambasted the RPP as insensitive and aloof in contrast. When the July 1946 election results indicated RPP tampering, Bayar openly declared: 'the elections are far from showing the real will of the country.'<sup>51</sup> Over the last days of July, the DP organised large public rallies protesting the results. These meetings were held in the major cities of İzmir, Bursa, Ankara, Konya and Adana respectively, attracting crowds of 40,000 at a time.<sup>52</sup> The Democrats made their role conceptions on the nation manifest in this conscious practice of 'going to the people' speaking often and directly to the crowds. DP speakers used an earnest vernacular that established a familiarity and rapport with their audiences, and during their first election campaign, the party even published two books of 'epic poetry', written by local poets, extolling the new horizons awaiting Turkey.<sup>53</sup> They also turned their local

branches into important centres for political socialisation, recruiting members and leaders known in their towns and villages, and publishing local newspapers to reach such audiences.<sup>54</sup> This was the time when the slogan *Yeter... Söz milletindir!* ('Enough... the nation has the word!') first emerged, 'launching the period known in Turkish political literature for its "46 spirit".'<sup>55</sup>

This discourse, connecting political freedom with the national will, was furthered at the first Democrat Party Convention of January 1947. In a contemporary account, Tunaya described the conference as presenting the DP as 'the body that millions of citizens had brought to being, through their material and spiritual sacrifices', and hence as a party 'possessing a structure broad enough to accommodate the entire nation'.<sup>56</sup> For the delegates, the Convention became something of a haven for free speech. Contemporary accounts emphasise the atmosphere of euphoria that prevailed, with delegates enthusiastically giving each other the floor in debates that lasted into each of its four nights, and which were punctuated by renditions of *türkü* folk songs on the theme of freedom.<sup>57</sup> Discussions were marked by unusually dismissive statements about RPP rule, and the affirmation that 'the Turkish people believe that, for renewed national development, national competition (the establishment of a multiparty regime) is necessary.'<sup>58</sup>

The main event at the Convention was the adoption of the *Hürriyet Misakı* ('Freedom Charter'). This text was once again a demand for political liberalisation from the government, and specifically for electoral reform, in a language that invoked the people's voice and the DP as its genuine representative. The Charter's name was understood to be intentionally reminiscent of the *Misak-i Milli* ('National Charter') of 1920, according to which Atatürk had defined the young Turkish state's boundaries in the War of Independence. While drawing on Atatürk's legacy for legitimacy, the Freedom Charter also issued a quite unprecedented threat that if the electoral laws were not modified, 'the DP Group's withdrawal from parliament would become an unavoidable decision.'<sup>59</sup> This Democrat challenge would become known as the threat to 'return to the bosom of the nation' (*sine-i millet*). Once again recalling the legacy of Atatürk, Bayar explains that this was an old phrase Atatürk had used when he left the army and launched the Independence War.<sup>60</sup> As the RPP continued to stall with liberalising the electoral law, the DP reiterated its message, this time at its Second Party Convention in June 1949. It issued one of its most aggressive statements yet, which became known as the *Milli Husumet Andı* or 'Oath of National Enmity'.<sup>61</sup> This text again threatened that 'governments that failed to heed the citizens' votes would inescapably face the "nation's enmity".'<sup>62</sup>

Which were the groups emphasised in this political discourse on the nation; who were the individuals presented as belonging to it? Answering this question involves an examination of the DP's interpretation of the Kemalist principle of populism, closely related to their role conceptions on nationhood. On the one hand, the DP adopted a corporatist attitude to populism, approving its conventional meaning that 'the country was composed not of social classes but of individuals who belonged to various occupational groups'.<sup>63</sup> In other words, every individual had a place in the national body, and shared a common economic interest. On the other hand, the Democrats rejected the implication that this did not necessitate more than one party. Menderes explained: 'instead of basing ourselves on destructive class interests we believe that all individuals... feel that it to their general benefit to be united around national parties...'<sup>64</sup>

One of the Democrats' main target groups was the Anatolian peasantry, which made up 80 per cent of the population. The DP stressed both the peasantry's disenfranchisement at the

hands of the RPP, and its special place as the repository of the nation's cultural values. For example, Fuat Köprülü wrote in 1947 that 'the Turkish villager, who is no less patriotic and politically mature than the city man, presents an intelligent, nationally unified point of view in matters pertaining to the interests of the country.'<sup>65</sup> Another DP member, İhsan Yurdoğlu, publicly declared: 'The very first ideal of the Democrat Party is to develop the village and the villagers. We will reach the villagers with political and human rights and freedoms, land, abundant production, school, healthcare, and wealth, and we will make them the master of the country.'<sup>66</sup> This reference to Atatürk's slogan – on the peasant as the master of the land – was yet another example of the DP's self-presentation as faithful to his legacy, and its assertion of the RPP's failure in this respect. Democrats were particularly aware of the strong feudal relations in the East of Turkey, where agriculture had received less attention, but where feudal ağas traditionally supported the RPP. Speaking at the DP's Second Convention in 1949, Bayar therefore made yet another link between the DP and the nation by criticising the RPP, this time for its neglect of (mostly rural) Eastern Turkey: 'Those in the East, West, and Central Anatolia have equal political rights... This is one of the Democrat Party's greatest causes...'<sup>67</sup>

Apart from their emphasis on the peasants, the DP also included the workers in their discourse on the nation: 'The Democratic Party... believes in the political maturity of the Turkish nation, and of the Turkish worker, and trusts in his patriotism.'<sup>68</sup> Indeed, the DP made significant promises to the country's workers, most notably on the right to strike. This was carefully couched in a discourse that rejected the notion of class struggle, however, prefiguring the conservative direction the party would take on this issue once in power. The DP also had to pay attention to the nation's civil servants, who had been the RPP's most enduring base.<sup>69</sup> It is worth noting that the DP was careful in its election campaign to distinguish between the two. By pledging 'not to question the past', they cleared the way for a neutral bureaucracy and focused their attacks on the RPP itself.<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, notwithstanding their corporatist discourse, the DP's liberal outlook meant the decline in political prestige of traditional power bases – state bureaucrats and the army for example<sup>71</sup> – and the rise in that of the new, votes-based power base, namely those peasants and workers who made up the majority of the electorate.

This approach to the nation's individual freedoms was firmly tied to the western orientation of Turkish national identity, which was still best expressed by reference to the Atatürk era. The Democrats placed their 'liberal democratic' nation building firmly within this western context. Where Atatürk had emphasised the cultural dimension of westernisation, the Democrats downplayed this somewhat, and seized upon the political freedoms aspect in their model:

Since Selim III, all new movements had been conducted from the top-down. For various reasons, the state's elites had felt the need for westernisation and had tried to make the non-elites accept this. In 1945, we had reached a point where the non-elites grasped these salvatory ideas. It was now necessary to launch the idea not "from the state to the nation" but rather "from the nation to the state"...<sup>72</sup>

The DP's western outlook was also manifest in the orientations of the public figures in the oppositional press and intelligentsia who supported it. A case in point is Ahmet Emin Yalman,<sup>73</sup> editor of the pro-Democrat *Vatan* newspaper. Yalman made his admiration for European and American culture and political systems well-known, and exemplified the trend of borrowing Western prototypes practised by the westernising Turkish elites of the time. In his memoirs, Yalman describes his experience at England's Liberal International: 'the

brightest hope I saw was the Liberal International, organized by liberals from nineteen countries in Oxford, England, in April, 1947, to counter the Communist International. Its “Liberal Manifesto” stood squarely for private initiative, free competition, and... public and private acceptance of responsibility for social justice.’<sup>74</sup> Yalman goes on to recount his subsequent founding of the influential Society for the Diffusion of Ideas of Liberty, which he describes as ‘a Turkish chapter of the Liberal International... a nonpolitical group mostly of prominent professors, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and journalists.’<sup>75</sup>

The next branch of the opposition platform, the economic dimension, also formed part of the DP’s westernising liberal conceptions of nation. Here, the DP emphasised the sanctity of private property, and material enrichment for all, via a liberal route to economic development. The Democrats wished to fashion a new set of priorities for this nation, which can be summarised in their catchphrase: ‘We will create a millionaire in every neighbourhood’. Thus the nation was still to be oriented towards progress and civilisation, but this was substantiated rather with an emphasis on entrepreneurship and consumption. This required an adjustment to the nation’s economic culture. Bayar had expressed such views while still in the RPP, for example in his speech on the second industrial programme, scheduled for 1939-1943: ‘Our principle... is to undertake ourselves to encourage and support private enterprise. We wholeheartedly desire the development of private initiative in the industrial sphere, and we are continually investigating the best ways of achieving it.’<sup>76</sup> Writing a sort of advocacy article for the DP in the *Middle East Journal* in 1947, Yalman clarified:

The essential point of opposition to the People’s Party lay in the Democrats’ understanding of *etatism*. (...) The Democrat Party accepted state ownership only for certain key industries which were to feed private enterprises. These state institutions were to be kept beyond the influence of particular government interests, and were not to come into competition with the endeavors of private individuals.<sup>77</sup>

These role conceptions were based in turn on a discourse that rejected the notion of class struggle, as articulated in this speech by Fuat Koprülü: ‘In our country, there is no such thing as a class issue... In Turkey, there is no such thing as capital or capitalist. Is the poverty of our farmer down to landlessness? No, we are simply at the lowest level of living standards. That is the whole issue.’<sup>78</sup> This rejection of class struggle ideology was in fact shared by the RPP, but the difference lay in the corporatist style the economy had taken under the policy of statism, and the DP’s preference for its undoing. Menderes made this clear as early as 1943, speaking as part of the parliamentary Economic Committee, and attacking government proposals for the Trade and Industrial Unions, Crafts Unions and Trade Markets Law:<sup>79</sup>

They want to make the traders, industrialist and craftsmen all part of the same obligatory corporation. They want to bring us the economic structures of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. They simply claim: “we wish to energise our national and historical institutions into guilds”... but all I see is corporatism. A fascist corporatism, a national socialist corporatism!<sup>80</sup>

Instead, the DP focused on the plight of the middle peasant in Turkey, and pledged to raise peasants’ living conditions by paying attention to the agrarian sector. This went hand in hand with the party’s conservative view on the preservation of the nation’s cultural values through the middle peasantry, and its consequent relaxing of the cultural reforms of the Atatürkist era. In short, the DP held a set of role conceptions fundamentally opposed to the implications of any class analysis in terms of redistribution or structural reform.<sup>81</sup> Indeed, it was partly in protest at the RPP’s Land Reform Bill that the *Dörtlülük Takrir* had been submitted, an early

instance of the manifestation of DP discourse in political practice. The landowners among the RPP knew that ‘the party machinery at the local level depended on small town merchants and landlords. This powerful interest group was in a position to block any attempt to radically improve the lot of the poor peasantry...’<sup>82</sup> Aydemir’s account describes the commission set up to investigate the new bill as ‘composed of large land-owners’, who were all ‘against the government and against this bill’.<sup>83</sup> More significantly, Menderes was appointed its rapporteur: according to Aydemir, he protested the bill until the end, resigning from the commission a day before its ratification.<sup>84</sup> It is also worth noting that the first version of the Land Reform bill had been presented by İnönü to parliament as early as 1937, but had been swiftly laid to rest upon Bayar’s accession as Prime Minister.<sup>85</sup>

Indeed, the DP leadership – like their RPP counterparts – were not at all representative of the vast majority of the population’s socioeconomic situation. The DP was simply able to exploit disaffection among vast strata of non-elites to generate popular support. In Aydemir’s words, ‘However close to the people the DP was, it was destined to develop as a middle class party. The DP was to be a party that drew on the support of the urban and rural middle classes, and that proceeded with national development... through its efforts to speedily create a middle class.’<sup>86</sup> Meanwhile, those who had flocked to the DP’s ranks, and whose interests it primarily served, included members of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, feudal lords and landowners, and the urban and rural middle classes.<sup>87</sup> The individual elements of the enterprising nation envisioned by the DP were summed up well in a speech from 1950 by Minister of Agriculture Nihat İyriboz. Speaking just months after the DP’s coming to power, İyriboz promised: ‘Since former times the system of tenant farming [or share-cropping, *ortakçılık*] has been in practice. Under this system the wealthy landowner provided the small farmer with credit in kind and in cash. The Land Law ended that and created conflict over land between the landlord and the tenant. Now, we shall encourage tenant farming and also try to give land to the landless as soon as possible. (...) The big landlord will be protected and the Land Law will be brought to life. We shall provide aid to set up big estates...’<sup>88</sup>

Once again, these role conceptions revealed the DP’s faithfulness to the notion of Turkey’s western identity. This was visible in the party’s conscientious following of American and European examples. The Thornburg Report of 1949 for example, commissioned by the Twentieth Century Fund, recommended full-scale privatisation as opposed to the statist system.<sup>89</sup> Thornburg was the Chairman of the Board of Engineers of the California Standard Oil Company, and Petroleum Advisor to the US government: in 1956, he would become Menderes’ personal advisor on economic affairs.<sup>90</sup> The DP’s early emphasis on the free market and the agrarian sector, for example, was in line with such American experts’ advice at the time. Echoing this, Yalman recalls a European tour in 1947: ‘Another visit to Sweden and Denmark, in search of campaign ammunition against Turkey’s wasteful state industrialization, reconvicted me that planned economy is a poor alternative to free competition.’<sup>91</sup> As discussed below, such statements served to reinforce the anti-Soviet nature of the DP’s role conceptions. The Democrat leaders were clearly devoid of any leftist inclinations, as illustrated in the debates surrounding the shaping of the party just after its founding. The pattern here was that the DP leaders had attracted a broad spectrum of oppositional elements, including the left, but would discard the support of those leftists who wished to influence the party line. According to Toker’s account for example, former Foreign Minister – and before his turn to the RPP, founder of the Turkish Communist Party – Tevfik Rüştü Aras was providing assistance with the writing of the DP programme in 1945. Aras expressed his desire for a programme ‘more progressive’ than that of the RPP on ‘ideas of

social justice'.<sup>92</sup> Upon his attempt to include the clause 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his labour', he was sidelined and ultimately dismissed by the founders.<sup>93</sup>

Similarly, before founding the DP, Bayar and Menderes had benefited from cooperation with leftist publisher Zekeriya Sertel, owner of the influential *Tan* newspaper. In 1945, they had even agreed to contribute to a new magazine, to be published by Sertel's wife Sabiha, entitled *Görüşler* ('Views'). However, that December, the headquarters of *Tan* were attacked and the Sertels accused of communist sympathies: Bayar and Menderes immediately issued a public statement distancing themselves from both publications.<sup>94</sup> Both Aras and Sertel had publicised their views on Turkish national interests lying in reconciliation with the Soviet Union<sup>95</sup>: the Democrats swiftly repudiated these views.<sup>96</sup> Once again, their role conceptions on the economic aspect of nation building not only reinforced those on Turkey's western identity, but also on Turkey's international role. When the RPP closed down the Turkish Socialist Party and Turkish Socialist Workers Party, as well as six newspapers and magazines, and nearly all trade unions in December 1946, the DP did not oppose this.

The third plank of the opposition platform – religious freedom – was among the DP's most controversial tamperings with the Kemalist legacy. Since the early republic's reforms, the state had emphasised secularism as part of its drive to modernise the country in the European image. As Gülp points out, this was in the context of the centrality, 'not of *religion* in Muslim societies, but the role that Islam has historically played in signifying a social and communal identity.'<sup>97</sup> Seeking to replace this with more 'modern', nationalist commitments, the regime had institutionalised a series of iconoclastic reforms. These had often generated frustration and dissent, which was communicated, unsurprisingly, in the religious idiom under attack. As secular reform was one of the more prominent aspects of the state's generally overbearing nature, the Democrats capitalised on it for electoral success. The DP party programme contained pledges to set up religious education foundations and university Divinity Schools, and to reform primary school education to emphasise 'spiritual values'.<sup>98</sup>

Yet these pledges also reflected the DP's convergence with an existing intellectual trend that deemed freedom of religious practice a crucial component of each citizen's individual liberties. The Democrats generally favoured a liberal interpretation of the fundamentals of the Kemalist nation building project. Thus in Bayar's opening speech at the DP's second convention in 1949, he emphasised religious freedom alongside the fight against reactionaries in Turkey.<sup>99</sup> The DP's promises on religious freedom might appear to have held the clearest implications of all their platforms for nation building. However, DP were arguably just as concerned with shaping a nation oriented towards enterprise, where religious freedom was an important aspect of a general relaxation of state control.

The DP's role conceptions on the secular nation also proved consistent with its redefinition of the route to a 'western' model of progress and civilisation. In promoting religious freedom, the Democrats invoked the example of the West, where freedom of conscience was presented as inviolable: 'Education and travel abroad disclosed to many intellectuals that religion occupied a great part in the individual's life in the Western countries which they took as models in science, art, education, and politics.'<sup>100</sup> Moreover, religious freedom would also contribute to bolstering Turkey's western identity in the international system, as it constituted a most useful value to juxtapose with communism, whose every trace the Democrats sought to crush over the 1950s. Indeed, just after speaking of freedom of religion at the 1949 DP Convention, Bayar went on to the topic of the communist threat in Turkey.<sup>101</sup> This was, as shall be further discussed below, an important dimension of their anti-Soviet stance in foreign

affairs. As Ahmad writes of the 1940s, 'Both the Republicans and the Democrats were agreed on the need to crush the Left...'<sup>102</sup> However, it will be seen that the Democrats were far bolder in their modifications of the secular laws as well as in their concurrent anticommunist campaigns. Here again, the influence on their liberal outlook of more conservative trends in society was visible. For example, it was such conservative politicians as Hamdi Tanrıöver who called for religious education expressly as a measure to combat 'leftist currents' and to 'protect the youth against the "evils of materialism"...'<sup>103</sup>

### *On Independence*

In two areas of foreign policy, the DP arguably interpreted existing Kemalist traditions in ways that would fundamentally change Turkish foreign policy for at least three decades. Specifically, these were to formalise its alliance with the United States, and to make one of the principal goals of foreign policy the overt attraction of sustained foreign assistance from the Western bloc. Yet according to several accounts, what are here termed the Democrats' role conceptions on independence in foreign policy did not differ significantly from RPP precedents. As Gönlübol says: 'the ideology and the social bases of the political parties was so limited as to leave little room for assessing or criticising the Turkish foreign policy with a new outlook.'<sup>104</sup> However, a closer look at both the ideology and the social bases of the Democrats compared with the RPP reveals some substantial differences, and these arguably did cause them to forge a new outlook on foreign policy, which would in turn cohere with their novel approach to nation building in Turkey.

It is true that two important breaks in Turkish foreign policy had occurred while the DP were in opposition: the first was Turkey's move from shunning direct military alliances, towards an increasingly comprehensive set of relations with the Council of Europe, the United States, and NATO allies in general. The conventional wisdom is that the Soviet notes of 1945-46 drove Turkey into the Western bloc,<sup>105</sup> and specifically that she needed military aid to keep her army mobilised.<sup>106</sup> Turkish policy makers were thus forced to modify 'Atatürk's foreign policy of searching for Turkey's security within a framework of weak regional pacts... which crumble in the face of great powers.'<sup>107</sup> The first note of March 1945 had informed the Turks that the Treaty of Friendship would not be extended unless its terms were changed to reflect the 'new circumstances'. Its renewal was to be conditional on the establishment of Soviet bases in the Turkish straits, and later on a revision of the Turco-Soviet borders. These unwelcome overtures were successfully confronted by Turkey alone until 1946,<sup>108</sup> until the US made its position clear with the Truman Doctrine of May 1947.<sup>109</sup> The following day, US experts arrived in Ankara to administer US aid to Turkey, and a military aid agreement was signed in July.

The Democrats did not differ from the RPP on the anti-Soviet stance, which, in view of their position on the Right, gelled well with their anticommunism. It also bolstered their representations of Turkey's western identity, which they wished to promote at home and abroad. Initially Bayar may have displayed a reluctance to believe that the years of Turkish-Soviet cooperation – which had characterised his time as Minister of Economy and Prime Minister – had passed.<sup>110</sup> However, as Karpat points out, 'as soon as the Soviet territorial claims took a definite form in 1946', Bayar made sure the DP issued statements supporting the government on foreign policy, for example at the party's Second Convention in June 1949.<sup>111</sup> One vivid example of the consistency of DP role conceptions on the western alignment thereafter comes from two similar speeches made by Menderes. In 1946, he affirmed: 'Today there is no need to say much more about our foreign policy, which is the

expression, not of a particular party, but of the entire nation's united will. Our greatest wish is to further strengthen our political and economic relations with the US with each day, in an atmosphere of sincerity and mutual understanding.'<sup>112</sup> In the first government programme of 1950, Menderes began by repeating the same lines, and continued: 'We believe that our open and sincere policy... is an important factor for the democratic front and for world peace.'<sup>113</sup> He then emphasised Turkey's gratitude to its 'great friend' the United States for supporting Turkey's peaceful policy through the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid.<sup>114</sup> As Yılmaz and Bilgin point out, 'Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft chose to locate the enduring character of Turkey's westernness with reference to the "enduring" threat posed by the USSR. So long as this narrative made sense, this identity could be sustained in the public domain. (...) The perpetuation of the master narrative of the Cold War – that represented the Soviet Union as the other – helped to (re)produce Turkey's western identity.'<sup>115</sup>

Subsumed within these new relations was the second important foreign policy shift of the late 1940s – the open pursuit of foreign economic assistance, which had been minimised since the 1920s in view of the adverse impact of borrowing on the Ottoman Empire. In 1945, with Turkey suffering economically after World War Two, İnönü approached the Export-Import Bank for a loan of 300 million dollars. In July 1947, Turkey requested inclusion in the Marshall Plan, and was admitted to the Economic Recovery Programme a year later. This was part of the broader American plan after World War Two, 'aimed at the establishment of pro-American regimes based on open, liberal economies in the periphery.'<sup>116</sup> In view of the emphasis placed on agricultural policy, it has been reasonably assumed that the role unofficially assigned to Turkey was as agricultural exporter to Western Europe. With this new 'economic dimension to her foreign policy', as Karpat terms it, 'international economic aid came to play a vital part in determining the structural transformation of Turkey, and in cementing her foreign policy affiliation with the West.'<sup>117</sup>

It is in this respect that the DP can be said to have gone beyond sharing the RPP's interest in the US relationship. For while the RPP might have launched the turn westwards for protection and aid, it was the DP whose political and economic programme most enthusiastically mirrored the prescriptions of Turkey's US advisors. The DP had fully embraced the Thornburg Report's advice on the adjustments needed to secure Marshall Aid:

American arguments met with a receptive audience, for they corresponded closely to the economic perspective determined and dictated by the domestic balance of class forces. Both the American view and domestic developments called for a liberal foreign trade regime based on agricultural production and exports. In concrete policy terms, this necessitated the implementation of a series of measures aimed fundamentally at raising total output in the agricultural sector. These developments, both domestic and international, found their political expression in 1950 when the Democrat Party came to power... there is no doubt that its ardent adoption and advocacy of the socioeconomic perspective outlined above was the major factor that brought it to power.<sup>118</sup>

The DP's foreign policy conceptions may therefore be pinpointed as seeking US protection from the perceived Soviet threat, but more enduringly, as fostering this relationship to strengthen Turkey's 'western' identity, as well as for economic reasons, regardless of changes in the Soviet position. The DP voiced their role conceptions on independence on rare occasions, but when they did, it was to present the American bloc as the only choice for Turkey. In 1948, Menderes made the following speech in Izmir, criticising the Turkish Left and the Soviet Union together: 'Those policies seeking to be described as national or



independent... amount to policies that distance [us] from cooperation with the democratic world. In such circumstances, our country would be destined to remain... [behind] the iron curtain.'<sup>119</sup> The same year, Bayar spoke in Balıkesir:

As the Atlantic Pact has no aggressive goals, it would have been appropriate for us to take our place there. The Mediterranean Pact, which will be established for defensive purposes, might cater to the same need. We wish our land to remain safe in the event of a new world war. But our geographical situation gives us pause for thought. In a war by Britain and American against Russia, our country's neutrality would be unthinkable.<sup>120</sup>

Moreover, as Harris points out, after the Allied victory, 'the United States was generally depicted by the Turkish press as the defender of right, justice, and humanity.'<sup>121</sup> DP role conceptions were reflected by important figures of the oppositional press, such as Yalman:

The stand I took in *Vatan* was that the United States of America, undertaking a heavy postwar task without adequate support elsewhere for her basic ideals, needed Turkey's sympathetic partnership; and that, since our survival and development next door to Russia must depend on collective security, our duty was to support the United States... Credit should go to the Twentieth Century Fund for underwriting, prior to the United States' government's plan to aid Turkey, an investigation which was published under the title, *Turkey, An Economic Appraisal*. (...) I found Dr Thornburg always most sympathetic to our liberal campaign.<sup>122</sup>

As heirs of the early Kemalist tradition then, the DP shared what was arguably an obsession among the RPP elite with the westernisation of Turkey. However, this had previously been understood more in terms of a reorientation in culture and foreign policy, and less in terms of formal alliances. Moreover, the focus was on the 'west' as the states of Western Europe, the simultaneous adversaries and models of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>123</sup> Under the Democrats, westernisation became understood as an imitation that focused less on the cultural sphere, and more on the establishment of direct alliances and cooperation with Western powers. Thus in the 1949 DP Convention, the RPP was criticised for its 'hesitant' foreign policy, for the 'fiasco' of Turkey's exclusion from NATO.<sup>124</sup> Moreover, in light of the postwar balance of power, attention moved increasingly to the United States as a model. Over the 1930s, the liberal capitalist model had been eclipsed somewhat after the Depression, and the rise of Germany and Italy's fascist alternatives. Now, the victory of the 'Western liberal democracies' in World War II restored the prestige of the European, and particularly the American models. In Gönlübol's words: 'the Republican Party in power till 1950, and especially the Democratic Party reinterpreted Westernization to mean intimate cooperation with the 'Western' countries at all costs and under all conditions.'<sup>125</sup> Needless to say, this tied in well with the DP's anticommunist stance domestically, and its discourse on the Turkish nation at last realising its liberal democratic destiny, within a community of western nations.

### *Implications: A Dilemma*

Once the DP was in power, how were its role conceptions translated into policy or 'role performance'? These conceptions were arguably forced to the surface by the structural realities of bipolarity, and what that meant for middle-range regional powers, and thus potential satellites, such as Turkey. Meanwhile, the particular colourings of their national discourses helped precipitate the regional alignments such countries chose.

The next question should therefore be: why did the Democrats' role conceptions necessarily imply a link between foreign policy and nation building? This paper has maintained that Turkey's leadership prioritised both independence – from the Soviet Union at this juncture – and national development, towards its civilisational goal. Turkey was to be a member of both the 'Free World' and its 'democratic community'. This aspiration produced a dilemma which is common to many developing countries: the Turks wished to achieve, on the domestic and foreign policy fronts, two goals that were seemingly irreconcilable. Role conceptions on national development (towards 'social and economic freedom') had to be premised on foreign assistance, while those on independence ('political freedom'), had to be premised on self-reliance. In Turkey's Cold War context, these freedoms became loaded terms. Unburdened by the colonial experiences of their Arab neighbours, the Democrats resolved this paradox by seeking the *same source* for assistance and models on both questions – the West, and specifically the US – and by seeking unity with it in both cases. This locked foreign policy and nation building into an intimate dynamic throughout the 1950s. This paper deals with NATO accession then, as a part of this dilemma.

### ***Role Performance: NATO Membership and the American Choice Confirmed***

Turkey's membership in NATO is generally accepted as having entrenched Turkey's western alliance, and as having been a direct consequence of the Soviet threats of 1945. This section considers the role of such foreign relations concerns in generating Turkey's 'American choice' through DP role performance. To do so, this paper employs two conceptual policy debates: the first is the 'defence debate', denoting the realm of policy options for the securing of Turkey's independence and sovereignty. The second is the 'aid debate', denoting the policy choices intended to secure Turkey's national development. The story of Turkey's NATO accession appears initially to fall within the 'defence debate'. However, by considering the simultaneous relevance of the 'aid debate', it should become clear that foreign policy and nation building measures were connected, both guided by the over-arching quest for the westernisation of Turkey.

#### *Strategic Context*

According to various accounts, 'In American eyes, Turkey and its future did not loom large during the Second World War.'<sup>126</sup> Turkey was rather perceived to lie within the British sphere of influence. When Stalin began his unwelcome overtures to Turkey, neither Western power wished this to overshadow the Potsdam talks, and both preferred that the matter be pursued bilaterally. Over the late 1940s, after their initial willingness to leave the issue to Britain, the Americans became subject to a concerted campaign by Turkish diplomats to win their support against Russia.<sup>127</sup> Harris attributes the subsequent rise in US commitment to Turkey to the breakdown of talks at the Foreign Ministers Conference of December 1945.<sup>128</sup> The heated exchange of Soviet, American, British and Turkish notes during 1946 culminated in a defusing of tension, but still in no substantial US aid for Turkey. When in February 1947, Britain asked the US to take over its economic role towards Turkey, this coincided with a peak in the strength of Washington's hardliners: the Truman Doctrine followed in May.

While Washington committed to military aid, it was thought that the Turkish economy would be buoyed by international agencies, and that its political system could not inspire levels of confidence that would merit economic assistance. When the Marshall Plan was unveiled in June 1947, however, the Turks successfully lobbied for inclusion.<sup>129</sup> Turkey duly received \$300m between 1948 and 1952, the majority invested in agriculture. Ülman cites an

American observer at the time speculating that what changed the Americans' mind was the realisation that a stronger Turkish economy would strengthen its defence capacity.<sup>130</sup>

By 1948, and with the signing of the Brussels Pact, US policy moved towards the building of a collective security arrangement for Western Europe. The Ankara government's pressure to be included went disregarded, until Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak came up with the temporary alternative of a Mediterranean Pact. This too did not induce any serious US commitment. Turkey, like Greece, was initially snubbed but then invited to join the Council of Europe in 1949, as Turkey's politicians prepared for the 1950 elections. By early 1950, US politicians were too preoccupied with events in the Far East to make any direct assurances to Turkey. Meanwhile, the UK was unsuccessful in its overtures to the US in turn, this time for collaboration on Middle East defence. At that time, the British were far more interested in Suez as a base than in the position of Turkey.<sup>131</sup>

### *Turkish Action: Foreign Policy and the 'Defence Debate'*

Once the Democrats were in office, they energetically pursued US assurances on Turkish security by switching from the RPP's calmer diplomacy to more high-risk ventures that made louder statements.<sup>132</sup> A brief survey of their individual tactics reveals the determination behind each to entrench the Democrats' role conceptions on Turkey as belonging in the West, and on its security as crucial to that of the entire 'Free World'.

One tactic was the DP's voluntary acts of commitment to NATO-approved ventures, such as the decision to send troops to Korea in July 1950. The outbreak of war provided the determined Democrats with an opportunity to prove their use and commitment to the NATO allies. Ambassador Erkin was first briefed by Menderes just two days after war broke out, and this just a month before the secret meeting in which the decision was made to send Turkish troops to Korea. This was announced on 25 July, and caused a storm among the opposition, who had not been consulted.<sup>133</sup> In a speech he made while visiting Erzurum, Prime Minister Menderes complained to the RPP members of his audience, and rationalised the government's decision as follows: '[surely] none of you will have forgotten the weight of the attacks made [upon us] at a time when the country's security and international prestige were at stake...'<sup>134</sup> Ankara's commitment of 4500 troops to Korea constituted the first military operation in the history of the republic to occur beyond the borders fixed in the National Pact. It illustrated the lengths to which the new government was prepared to go to prove its commitment to the West and to assert Turkey's place within it.

Another tactic was to take the initiative to step up ties with NATO allies, for example, by concluding Turkey's first trade agreement with Israel in July 1950. Indeed, one of the earliest signs of Turkey's attempts to ingratiate itself with the NATO allies had been its recognition of Israel in March 1949.<sup>135</sup> This was a deviation from its earlier position against partition in Palestine, which had been received with gratitude among the Arabs.<sup>136</sup> The latter was mostly taken in response to rumours of the new state's Soviet leanings, however, and when its favour among the Allies became clear, Turkey lost little time in changing sides.<sup>137</sup> Indeed, İnönü had later authorised Fatin Rüştü Zorlu to begin talks on a trade agreement with Israel.<sup>138</sup> This was finalised under Bayar's presidency within a matter of months.<sup>139</sup>

Another method was to keep up a strong publicity effort on the advantages of Turkish accession, while employing a private form of pressure which stressed the disadvantages of keeping Turkey out. Turkey's press monitoring agencies had been aware that the American

press at the time reflected the administration's preoccupations with the Korean crisis.<sup>140</sup> Thus when the Democrats reapplied to NATO in early August, Foreign Minister Köprülü issued an accompanying statement, published in the *New York Times*, containing a clear message to the US. Köprülü cautioned that the Turkish public regarded NATO membership as an 'acid test' of US interest in Turkey and that Turkey's inclusion was 'essential to close a breach' in the Allies' defence system.<sup>141</sup> Over August, the Turks had also been concerned at the unfavourable position of the Western European members of NATO. According to their Press Attaché in London, British officials had stated that Norway and Denmark were opposed to Turkish accession, as it would decrease their share of arms and increase their duties. Compounding this for the Turks was the UK's seemingly non-committal response: 'When the spokesman was asked what the UK position towards these claims was, it was learned that the spokesman refrained from using clear language.'<sup>142</sup> When the NATO Council's second refusal of Turkey's application came in September 1950, Turkey's ambassadors to the US and UK relayed the feelings of 'abandonment' which were spreading across the country.<sup>143</sup>

Turkish tactics also combined flexibility with insistence when contending with the concessionary recommendations of the NATO Council, such as the US-proposed Mediterranean Pact in 1950, and the British preference for a Middle East Command in 1951. This flexibility was maintained or reduced depending on the popularity of the concession with the strongest power, the US. Indeed a survey of both government and opposition press on the UK proposals for Middle East defence reflect a deep dissatisfaction across the political spectrum in Turkey.<sup>144</sup> Ahmet Emin Yalman wrote in *Vatan* for example: 'In return for being accepted among those charged with the defence of the Free World, we do not need to pay a toll too. We just cannot view the toll of supporting Britain's incorrect and self-destructive Middle East policy as valid.'<sup>145</sup>

The State Department's concession in September 1950 had been to recommend that Turkey and Greece be included in the military planning of NATO's Mediterranean section. The British reluctantly acceded to this, which was a further blow to their hopes for drawing the US into their plans for Middle East defence via Turkey. They had wished this to be accomplished through direct US assurances to Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey was once again disappointed, but forced to accept the State Department's offering for the time being. The Turks had further cause for alarm when Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, published an article discouraging US involvement in 'local wars' in places like Turkey.<sup>146</sup> In Oran's words, 'the Turkish leaders realized that, for Turkey, there was no alternative to NATO membership.'<sup>147</sup>

Turkey still had to contend not only with American reluctance, but with the added complication of Britain's plans being at odds with both its own and those of the US. However, the Democrats were attuned to the ways in which the Allies' respective positions seemed to be changing. In the US, developments in the Korean war, as well as Yugoslavia's recent conflict with the Soviets, were significant: 'The idea of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia becoming the shield to protect western Europe against a Soviet offensive through south-eastern Europe was developing fast in the minds of the American military.'<sup>148</sup> Furthermore, with Soviet advances in nuclear technology over 1951, US air force officials in particular favoured Turkey's inclusion in NATO as a provider of US airbases.<sup>149</sup>

As a final tactic then, the Democrats played off the Americans against the British, as fortuitous developments for Turkey brought the American and Turkish positions closer. By 1951, the UK preference was for associating Turkey primarily with Middle Eastern, rather

than Mediterranean, defence. In February 1951, the Commander of British Forces in the Middle East, General Brian Robertson, paid an official visit to Turkey and proposed an Anglo-Turkish alliance in the Middle East instead of the NATO Mediterranean command. Turkish Chief of Staff General Yamut had initially given a positive response. This was suddenly withdrawn with a government aide-mémoire in March, however, which deferred the issue pending progress on Turkey's role in NATO military planning. The Turks had reacted shrewdly to the tangible change in American circles over the same early months of 1951. Ambassador McGhee's emphatic messages to Washington on Turkey's centrality to Middle East defence had played a role, as well as his warnings that Turkey might resume its earlier neutrality otherwise. Now the Turks stuck to their guns and insisted on their position. At an Istanbul meeting of America's Middle East Ambassadors in February, it was thus recommended that the US should urgently make mutual defence arrangements with Greece and Turkey, with NATO accession as the preferred method.<sup>150</sup>

Turkey would have to confront further British diversions however. Firstly, faced with the supportive front of the US, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, Britain proposed that Turkey (and Greece) not be given full-member status in the alliance. This Turkey successfully resisted with US support. By July, Britain was proposing that Turkey enter NATO but come under a separate 'Middle East Command', to be led by a British general and aimed at finally securing the Egyptian base.<sup>151</sup> Turkey had no choice but to accept, in order to neutralise Britain's objections. At its meeting held on 16-20 September 1951, the NATO Ministerial Council decided to invite Greece and Turkey to join the alliance. The Democrats' final hurdle would come at the high-level talks held in Ankara to discuss the MEC, to which they had only agreed on condition that their outcome not precede Turkey's formal admission to NATO.

At the October talks, Menderes came under joint pressure to adhere to the Middle East rather than (Eisenhower's) western European Command. This seemed like a last-minute perversion of Turkey's steady course towards NATO accession. On the other hand, their 'relegation' to the Middle Eastern theatre was couched by the US, UK and French spokesmen in terms of Turkey's ability to work through the Defence Committee and the Finance and Economic Committee. Moreover, as might have been expected, the US commitment clearly went much further than that of its friends, and was reassuring. Thus General Bradley pledged: 'no matter what agreement is reached in NATO and which regional command Turkey falls under... the US will continue to donate equipment to Turkey directly and will keep a mission in Turkey.'<sup>152</sup> The Turks held their ground once again, and the UK was largely overruled. In the end, it was finally decided that the Turkish and Greek land forces would come under the responsibility of NATO's Allied Land Forces Southern Europe Command, while their navies would come under a new Middle East Command.<sup>153</sup> Turkey and Greece were formally admitted to NATO on 18 February 1952. How did the Turks maintain their positions at this conference?

First, Menderes stressed Turkey's unique geostrategic importance as being equally capable of protecting the Middle East as well as the 'right side of the Atlantic pact' and the Balkans. This was to rationalize Turkey's request for an increase of up to 35 regiments, and its complaints of the meagre 1.1 per cent share it was receiving in Marshall Aid. Turkey had sent a memorandum in advance which Menderes described as follows: 'Let me immediately say that we do not wish to make this a matter of bargaining.... Having said this, there are things that show us that we are not exaggerating our demands. We know that equipping the Turkish army means arming the whole Atlantic community.'<sup>154</sup>

This argument was also used to impose the Turks' preferred order for their priorities in NATO, expressed in this simple phrase: 'As a member of NATO, we will work towards the establishment of a Middle East Command with great determination...'<sup>155</sup> Menderes stressed that it was a strong Turkey that was a prerequisite for Middle Eastern defence, and not the MEC per se: 'Imagine for a moment if Turkey were not there, what would happen [to the Arab countries]? We must assume that all these countries would have gone to the other side of the Iron Curtain. (...) But if the forces [I have mentioned] were present in Turkey today... the whole area around our country would be secure.'<sup>156</sup> Menderes's words also pointed to a potential role for Turkey as the 'West's spokesman in the East', which it would indeed play actively in Baghdad and Bandung by 1955. Speaking before the parliament in December 1951, Foreign Minister Koprülü made a clear distinction between Turkish accession to NATO and the MEC:

These two issues are completely separate from each other. On the one hand, there is the Atlantic Pact, a defence organisation, which has been established in line with treaty principles. On the other, there is the Middle East Command, an idea, a concept, whose treaty basis has not been laid out. We will first accede to the Atlantic Pact and then deal with the business of the MEC, together with America, Britain and France...'<sup>157</sup>

Koprülü repeated this message in early 1952, emphasising the different place Turkey would occupy in each organisation, and its equal rights with the other members of each.<sup>158</sup>

The identity dimensions of this foreign policy process were very much in evidence throughout, and Menderes' responses in October particularly highlighted the role of national identity and its Others in his presentation, and in his own perceptions of Turkey's role. The MEC seemed not only to be stealing away Turkey's assured security, 'the American way', but also the prize of integration into the club of 'civilised' nations. Thus Menderes began his speech by responding to the British and Scandinavian countries' disparagement of Turkey's economic and democratic credentials, and their description of Turkey as 'outside European civilisation'.<sup>159</sup> He argued that the socioeconomic conditions of poverty in parts of Turkey were solely due to the necessarily high defence budgets of a country in Turkey's geostrategic position.

Secondly, to distinguish Turkey more clearly from the Middle East Command, and indeed the Middle East context, Menderes indulged in some of the Turkish elites' customary Orientalism when contrasting Turkey with its Arab neighbours. Thus after extolling the honour and self-sacrificial ethic of Turkey's 'fighter nation', Menderes added, 'When it comes to the Arab countries, they are divided into many states without so much as unity between them. Even if all these states were able to come together, the force they would generate would not be more than two or three regiments.'<sup>160</sup> Once again, Menderes emphasised Turkey's place in the Western camp: 'Turkey will perform whatever duties it must for the realisation of democratic ideals and the protection of [our] *common civilisation*.'<sup>161</sup> In an interview one month later, Menderes' language distanced Turkey even further from the Middle East, describing it as 'an area in which Turkey is obviously interested.'<sup>162</sup> Menderes went on to reiterate his commitment to Middle East defence but framed this firmly within the context of Turkey's Atlantic front role:

To mix the defense of the Middle East with the Atlantic Pact organization and to shift Turkey toward the East would mean that Turkey would be considered differently from the other members of the Pact. If Turkey is admitted to the Pact she must have the same rights, the same obligations, as any other member.<sup>163</sup>

### *Turkish Action: Nation Building and the 'Aid Debate'*

Turkey's Western choice was a policy propelled equally by a nation building endeavour – one in which westernisation was translated into a new economic liberalism modelled along American lines, championing the entrepreneur-citizen. Not only did the Democrats' models come from the West, the funds for their economic development project would also be negotiated with Western donors. This occurred within the so-called aid debate, which proceeded closely with the defence debate upon which Turkish foreign policy was focused. In the Democrat Party's first programme in government, the emphasis was on private enterprise for economic development, now proclaimed possible as the RPP's statist regime was to be swept away. Indeed, Turkey had been trying to secure US aid ever since the mid-1940s. The government of the early 1950s stepped up such efforts, and with NATO accession, 'an important advance over previous connections with the West lay in providing assurance that Turkey would continue to receive aid in quantities that could spell the success of the government's ambitious development plans.'<sup>164</sup> Thus the literature that describes post-war Turkey as developing 'a linkage between its economic and its foreign policy'<sup>165</sup> is also describing a linkage between an aspect of the nation building plan and foreign policy in Turkey. While the DP did not ultimately see through their liberal designs, their rhetoric and early years of policy can be said to have aimed at inducing a significant value shift in comparison to the earlier nation building mould in Turkey. The DP presented economic liberalism as of direct benefit to the Turkish nation, this time conceived of as individuals.

Aside from the economic individualism encouraged by the Democrat policymakers, there were also overt identity dimensions to the general westernisation process which they were in the process of recasting. The aid debate should thus also be examined in light of its implications for Turkish identity, this time considering its representations within Turkey, and not just in negotiations with foreign powers. During the RPP years, nation building was premised on an equation between contemporary civilisation and European standards, but was also committed to a specifically Turkish national culture. With the DP, however, there began a 'process of indiscriminate imitation and adoption of everything Western as being inherently good, just and superior.'<sup>166</sup> This was encouraged by US interventions, such as the publication by the United States Information Service of a pamphlet entitled *A Government Founded by the People*, distributed on the eve of the 1950 elections, and asserting people's rights to change their government.<sup>167</sup> The same message was fuelled by the Democrats' own rhetoric and that of the Turkish press loyal to them, such as *Zafer*: 'much was made of the recognition of Turkey's equality with Western European nations inherent in the agreement to include her in NATO.'<sup>168</sup> There was a total identification of Turkish with US interests by the enthusiastic DP policymakers, and this despite several clauses in the bilateral agreements they signed with the US, which accorded exclusive rights and privileges to the American mission. Meanwhile, as the Korean episode soon showed, Turkey's 'pro-Western foreign policy gave new impetus to the Turkish urge for cultural and ideological identification with the West, which in turn increased her foreign policy commitments.'<sup>169</sup> Reviewing Turkish foreign policy in late 1951, Foreign Minister Koprülü is described by the British Ambassador as having 'launched a panegyric of Turkish-American friendship... [giving] detailed figures of all forms of American aid to Turkey, the sum of which amounted so far to the equivalent of TL 1,176 millions.'<sup>170</sup>

The Democrats' pursuit of the US was accompanied by a McCarthy-like wave of 'anticommunism' from the government, which often served also as a veil for censorship of

any sort of criticism. Among those who criticised the Korean War decision were inevitably Turkey's Leftists – for example, the Paris-based Progressive Young Turks Union wrote to Bayar in 1952 asking him to take action against the biological warfare being used by the Americans in Korea. The letter warned him of the thousands of Turkish lives who would fall victim to the same fate.<sup>171</sup> These Leftists would become subject to a zero-sum game in which the government classified citizens either as at one with the nation, or as treacherous communists. According to Eroğul, 'Inönü had sought to establish a multiparty democracy of limited scope, keeping it closed to the entire Left as well as illegitimate currents on the Right. The Democrats skewed this model to an extreme beyond Inönü's plans, as their enmity towards the Left reached hysterical proportions.'<sup>172</sup> Thus even token dissent on foreign policy was discouraged, as Menderes presented it as a national unity issue. For example, when the Turkish Peace Association was formed in July 1950 and distributed leaflets against the Korean War decision, it was closed down just days later.<sup>173</sup> Also closed down on anticommunist charges were 17 magazines located in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir which published articles and caricatures critical of the decision. Meanwhile, according to Oran, 'Immediately after the decision, the Student Union of Istanbul University organized a meeting with the representatives of the DP, the PRP and the Party of the Nation at which the government's decision was backed and communism denounced. This backing continued throughout the war. Fired on by the government propaganda, the Turks began to view the war in the Far East as if it were *in the defense of Turkey itself*.'<sup>174</sup>

The speed with which the government clamped down on 'local communists' was matched by the speed with which it began relaxing the secular regime in Turkey – again, two not unrelated developments. On 16 June, the ban on making the call to prayer, or *ezan*, in Arabic was officially lifted, with Arabic now being described by the Undersecretary of Religious Affairs as 'the original language of the ezan' or 'its own original words'.<sup>175</sup> On 25 August, the Director of Religious Affairs declared that 'Islam rejects communism absolutely... Faith and the spirit are the most powerful weapons against communism.'<sup>176</sup> In July, the DP began allowing Koran broadcasts over state radio, decided to increase the number of Imam-Hatip schools for religious training, and increased the budget share of the Directorate of Religious Affairs.<sup>177</sup> By October, in a controversial new ruling, religious education had become compulsory in primary schools.<sup>178</sup> Just over a year later, a British report on internal affairs in Turkey could observe: 'The most striking evidence of the liberal policy of the government was the revival of religious observance... New mosques were built, old shrines repaired, and places of pilgrimage openly frequented.'<sup>179</sup>

In October 1951, news of Turkey's accession to NATO was accompanied by further arrests of suspected communists. A British report on 'Communism in Turkey' from 1951 noted with satisfaction: 'The fact that so little material is available on the subject is due at least in some measure to the effectiveness of Turkish methods in dealing with this problem.'<sup>180</sup> The report then reviewed the lengths to which the Democrat government were going to quash such 'subversive activity' in Turkey, for example by increasing the specificity and severity of punishment of the relevant provisions in the Penal Code. The report described the wording of a new bill that condemned 'the formation of associations with the aim of establishing the domination of a social class over other social classes... to penalties ranging from 8 to 15 years hard labour.'<sup>181</sup> Later, a clause was added stating that leaders of communist parties would be punishable by death, and the bill was passed on 3 December. Of the three left-wing periodicals which existed in 1950, only one, *Noah's Ark*, survived by late 1951, while police surveillance and government crackdowns had forced several prominent activists – most



notably the poet Nazim Hikmet – to flee the country.<sup>182</sup> Thus the British ambassador could conclude:

...deprived of their leaders, harried by the police and their informers, cut off from direct Soviet help and encouragement, and inhibited by a climate of public opinion increasingly hostile to anything bearing the taint of Moscow, the handful of active Turkish communists who remain at large have very little chance of making any progress with the organisation of an integrated Turkish Communist Party.<sup>183</sup>

With the communists so clearly deemed ‘Others’ of the Turkish nation and the ‘Free World’, the linkage between the Democrats’ foreign and national policies here was not subtle – ‘by joining the western alliance, the anti-communist tendency of the state present since its foundation was reinforced by anti-Soviet sentiment. These two overlapping anti-communist and anti-Soviet streaks became the determining factors shaping Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies.’<sup>184</sup>

## Conclusion

Evaluating the early years of DP foreign policy, Athanassopoulou writes of the Democrat leaders: ‘the new government was going to be more persistent and loud than its predecessor in promoting Turkey’s security interests and regional role.’<sup>185</sup> This is certainly true, but more specifically, there was a change in self-image which accompanied the change in government – this would have implications for both foreign policy *and* nation building. This paper began by arguing that this change was prefigured in the DP’s role conceptions. On nationhood, such conceptions did not – and publicly could not be seen to – differ from the RPP on certain Kemalist principles, namely republicanism and nationalism. However, their liberal approach to the controversial principle of reformism meant far-reaching changes to secularism, etatism and populism. The nation was still to be Turkish and still to be ‘civilised’, but its components now emphasised were the entrepreneurs and the believing village people, whose individual rights and freedoms were in turn emphasised as against the state. Meanwhile, the nation’s Others – internal division and any foreign threat – now took on communist and Soviet form respectively. These statements were certainly filtered and articulated through the prism of party politics, but this does not negate their distinct status and content. The distinction to be made is between an RPP whose nation building project was to be eroded by multipartism and the DP who stood only to gain. The DP’s direction for the Turkish nation was consistently related to the liberal democratic model of the powers victorious in World War II, and increasingly focused on the rising superpower of the West, the United States. One of the most transparent indications of this general trend comes from Metin Toker’s memoirs, recounting Bayar’s explanation for the way in which the four DP founders decided on the name of the party: ‘It’s not that the American model played no role here. Was there not a Republican and a Democrat party there too?’<sup>186</sup>

Once in government, the change which the Democrats’ role performance would bring about is hinted at in a remark by the British ambassador in Ankara, Noel Charles, according to whom the Democrats saw themselves as ‘the senior local partner in a defensive system created by the British and the Americans.’<sup>187</sup> Based on evidence from Turkish, American and British primary sources, this paper would press this line further and argue that the Democrats considered, and subsequently attempted to appoint, themselves the *spokesmen* of the West in the East. Working towards the goal of building Turkey into a ‘little America’ politically and economically, they saw themselves as embodying the attributes of their imagined West, namely its superior weight in strategic, ideational and moral terms.

It is interesting to reflect on the counterfactual that Turkey might well have stayed neutral in the Cold War and remained protected. According to Ülman, 'Turkey would be dragged into war under the NATO commitments should there be a conventional war anywhere in Europe. On the other hand, should Turkey be attacked by the Soviets, she would receive help even without NATO membership because the United States could not allow Russia to conquer the Middle East.'<sup>188</sup> This seems a reasonable view to take – however, the outlook of the incumbents of the time arguably prioritised more than simply the Soviet threat, which explains their desire to cement their US alliance as far as possible. The government did not only desire security, but also identification with the West, and access to foreign assistance. The connection between the Democrats' role conceptions and early role performance was thus the perception that approximating more closely to the US model was the panacea for both national questions and foreign policy challenges. While this model was first entrenched during the DP's time in opposition, the Democrats arguably saw their *raison d'être* increasingly in terms of leading the cry for democratisation as part of the Allied camp. Thus the civilisation paradigm melted easily into 'Free World' rhetoric, and for them – if temporarily – the dilemma was resolved.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Kemal Karpat ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1975* (Leiden, 1975), p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Reşat Kasaba, 'Populism and Democracy in Turkey, 1946-1961', Ellis Goldberg, Reşat Kasaba, Joel Migdal eds., *Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993), p. 51.

<sup>3</sup> See Bahgat Korany and Ali Dessouki, *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change*, (Boulder, Co. and Oxford, Westview, 1991).

<sup>4</sup> Albert Paolini, *Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity, and International Relations* (Boulder, Co. and London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p.5.

<sup>5</sup> For example, David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall, eds., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992); Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory*. Critical Perspectives on World Politics (Boulder, Co. and London, Lynne Rienner, 1997).

<sup>6</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000* (London, Frank Cass, 2000), p. 110.

<sup>7</sup> See Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, 1997.

<sup>8</sup> See for example, Baskin Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy* (forthcoming), Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (1999), William Hale, 2000; Evaki Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952 – The First Enlargement of NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

<sup>9</sup> Hakan Yavuz, 'Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,' *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 27, No. 1 (Autumn 1997); Bülent Aras, 'Turkish Foreign Policy And Jerusalem: Toward A Societal Construction Of Foreign Policy,' *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 2000; Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference: 1960-1992* (New York, Vantage Press, 1994).

<sup>10</sup> Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy: a Constructivist Approach* (New York and London, Routledge, 2003), p. 4.

<sup>11</sup> Pinar Bilgin and Eylem Yılmaz, 'Constructing Turkey's 'western' identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the intellectuals of statecraft', *International Journal*, Winter 2005-6.

<sup>12</sup> Adeed Dawisha, 'Egypt', in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim eds., *The Cold War and the Middle East* (1997), p. 47.

<sup>13</sup> See Fred Halliday, 'The Middle East, the Great Powers and the Cold War' in Sayigh and Shlaim eds., p. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Şükrü Hanoğlu cited in Yeğen, 'The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse,' *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1999, p. 558.

<sup>15</sup> See, Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, I.B. Tauris, 2004, Introduction.

<sup>16</sup> Ali Kazancıgil in Kazancıgil and Ergün Özbudun eds., *Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State*, (1981), p. 50.

- <sup>17</sup> There was great 'unity of purpose between the new state... and the principal economic classes, the infant bourgeoisie and the landlords.' Feroz Ahmad in Özbudun and Kazancıgil eds., 1981. p.151.
- <sup>18</sup> Baskın Oran, '1919-1923: The Time of Liberation' in *Turkish Foreign Policy* (forthcoming), p. 13.
- <sup>19</sup> Yavuz, 1997. p. 23.
- <sup>20</sup> Çağlar Keyder, 'Economic Development and Crisis' in Schick and Tonak eds., *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 292.
- <sup>21</sup> Keyder, 'The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy', in Schick and Tonak eds., p. 36.
- <sup>22</sup> Minutes of Ankara Meeting on Middle East Command and NATO Accession, 14<sup>th</sup> October 1951.
- <sup>23</sup> Mustafa Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti* (Phoenix Yayınevi, 2004), p. 28.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30. See also p. 25; Kasaba, 'Populism and Democracy', p. 50; Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, (University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 224.
- <sup>25</sup> Keyder, 'Economic Development', p. 297.
- <sup>26</sup> Text cited in Albayrak, p. 26.
- <sup>27</sup> Keyder, 'Political Economy', p. 38.
- <sup>28</sup> Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey, A Study in Capitalist Development*, (London and New York, Verso, 1987), p. 118.
- <sup>29</sup> See Hale, 'Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey, 1930-1945', *Bulletin*, 1980, p. 105.
- <sup>30</sup> John M. VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950*, (Albany, SUNY Press, 2005), p. 20.
- <sup>31</sup> Nazim İrem posits Ağaoğlu within a current of Bergsonian 'republican conservatism': 'The dominant version of Kemalism, adopted as the official ideology by the RPP in the early 1930s, was devised as an ideological product of the 'progressive-positivist West' whereas the conservative version, as developed by a semi-independent intellectual group, was the reflection of the political and philosophical sensibilities of the Other West – to use a term popular among republican conservatives in the 1930s – that appeared at the crossroads of spiritualism, romanticism and Bergsonism.' Nazim İrem, 'Undercurrents of European Modernisation', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 4, July 1994, p. 81.
- <sup>32</sup> See Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970), p. 57, fn 153. See also Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925*, (Leiden; New York, Brill, 1991).
- <sup>33</sup> Keyder, 'Political Economy', p. 35.
- <sup>34</sup> Cited in Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik* (İstanbul, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1974), pp. 220-221.
- <sup>35</sup> See Albayrak pp. 42-44 on their oppositional voices against such moves as the nationalisation of *Şirket-i Hayriye*, and the proposed Budget and Land Reform of 1945.
- <sup>36</sup> VanderLippe, p. 20 and p. 24.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.
- <sup>38</sup> See Metin Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye, 1944-1950* (Milliyet Yayınları, 1970), pp. 31-2.
- <sup>39</sup> Albayrak, p. 30. Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multiparty System*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 141.
- <sup>40</sup> Eroğul, 'The Establishment of Multiparty Rule 1945-71' in Schick and Tonak eds., p. 106. See Feroz Ahmad for a slightly different interpretation: '[İnönü] had learned... that America's principal concern was with regional and internal stability and not with democracy or multi-party politics... İnönü's intervention was undoubtedly the best way to restore political stability...' Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (London, C. Hurst: for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977), p. 24.
- <sup>41</sup> Albayrak, p. 317.
- <sup>42</sup> Karpat, *Transition*, p. 331.
- <sup>43</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, (Yenişehir, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1969) p. 250.
- <sup>44</sup> *Son Saat*, 8 March 1947 (Koprülü's views), cited in Karpat, *Transition*, p. 180 fn 44.
- <sup>45</sup> See M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, 'The Peasants in Early Turkish literature', *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 2002 and 'The People's Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey' in Sylvia Kedourie ed., *Turkey Before and After Atatürk* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
- <sup>46</sup> Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 60.
- <sup>47</sup> Karpat, p. 395.
- <sup>48</sup> İrem, 'Undercurrents', p. 104.
- <sup>49</sup> Most accounts agree that the Memorandum was not an ultimatum but that the harsh RPP reaction, both to the Memorandum and to its signatories' articles in the press, triggered the process of expulsions and resignations.
- <sup>50</sup> İnönü is said to have checked there would be no change on three issues: secularism, the Village Institutes, foreign policy. Toker in Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Çaplı, *Demirkırat*, (İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), p. 24.
- <sup>51</sup> Celâl Bayar, edited by İsmet Bozdağ, *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes*, (İstanbul, Baha Matbaası, 1986 ), p. 62.

- <sup>52</sup> See Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 18.
- <sup>53</sup> See Aşık Demokrat, *DP Seçim Destanı* (publisher and date unknown).
- <sup>54</sup> Mehmet Kabasakal, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Örgütlenmesi 1908-1960*, (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1991), pp. 228-9.
- <sup>55</sup> *Demirkırat*, p. 36. See Cem Çakmak, ‘1950’li Seçimler ve Demokrat Parti’, *Tarih ve Toplum*, Vol. 9, No. 53, May 1988, p. 24.
- <sup>56</sup> Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* (Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984), p. 650.
- <sup>57</sup> See Eroğul, *Demokrat*, pp. 25-6, citing Orhan Mete, *Bütün Tafsılatıyla ve Akisleriyle Demokrat Partinin İnci Büyük Kongresi*, (Istanbul, Ticaret Dünyası Matbaası, 1947). See also accounts in *Demirkırat*, pp. 37-8.
- <sup>58</sup> Tunaya, p. 650.
- <sup>59</sup> *DP’nin Birinci Büyük Kongresinde kabul edilen Ana Davalar Komisyonu Raporu*, text in Tunaya, p. 675. Over the following two years, a pattern was established in which crises between government and opposition erupted and were diffused, each time over the DP’s demands for electoral reform and political liberalisation. These demands crystallised around the implementation of İnönü’s 12<sup>th</sup> July Declaration of 1947. See Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 30 and pp. 43-4.
- <sup>60</sup> Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 65.
- <sup>61</sup> Bayar points out that the name which the DP gave to the statement was the ‘Freedom Oath’ (*Hürriyet Andı*) or ‘National Solidarity Oath’ (*Millî Tesanüt Andı*) but that the pro-government press at the time changed its name amidst their attacks. Bayar, *Başvekilim*, pp. 98-9.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.
- <sup>63</sup> Karpas, *Transition*, p. 308.
- <sup>64</sup> Cited in *ibid.*, p. 312.
- <sup>65</sup> Fuat Köprülü, ‘Partiler ve Milli Birlik’, *Kuvvet*, 4 April 1947, in Köprülü, edited by T. Halasi-Kun, *Demokrasi Yolunda*, (The Hague, Mouton, 1964), p. 306.
- <sup>66</sup> İhsan Yurdoğlu, *CHP’nin Oyunları ve Demokrat Parti*, (Istanbul: Rıza Koskun Matbaası, 1948), p. 9.
- <sup>67</sup> Bayar, Speech at Second Party Convention, January 1949, cited in Tunaya, p. 676.
- <sup>68</sup> *Kudret* (editorial), 30 September 1947, cited in Karpas, *Transition*, p. 313.
- <sup>69</sup> Ahmad, pp. 6-7.
- <sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 30-1.
- <sup>71</sup> Karpas, *Transition*, p. 340.
- <sup>72</sup> Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 41.
- <sup>73</sup> Yalman had been editor of *Vatan* since 1923, and after its closure in 1925, had ‘formed a company early in 1927 to act as dealers for various American products (Goodyear, Dodge, Caterpillar... and so on).’ See *An Experiment in Clean Journalism: The Life Story of the Turkish Daily ‘VATAN’* (Vatan, 1950), p. 6. Yalman had been criticised for a time for his endorsement of the idea of an American mandate for Turkey after the First World War, but was later rehabilitated as a respected member of the liberal intelligentsia and media elite.
- <sup>74</sup> Yalman, *Turkey*, p. 235.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236.
- <sup>76</sup> Bayar, cited in Hale, ‘Ideology’, p. 107.
- <sup>77</sup> Yalman, ‘The Struggle for Multi-party Government in Turkey’, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 1, 1947, p. 55.
- <sup>78</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 9 October 1948, cited in Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 60. For Bayar’s view, see *Başvekilim*, p. 12.
- <sup>79</sup> Menderes speaking in 1943, cited in Samet Ağaoğlu, *Arkadaşım Menderes* (Baha Matbaası, 1967), pp. 13-4.
- <sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- <sup>81</sup> See Avcıoğlu, pp. 249-250.
- <sup>82</sup> Keyder, ‘Political Economy’, pp. 38-9.
- <sup>83</sup> Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Menderes’in Dramı (1899-1960)*, (Yükselen Matbaası İstanbul. 1969), p. 125 and 127.
- <sup>84</sup> Aydemir, p. 127. Despite RPP party discipline ensuring the Bill ultimately passed, the law was never effective.
- <sup>85</sup> Aydemir, pp. 122-3.
- <sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 222.
- <sup>87</sup> See Çakmak, and Avcıoğlu, pp. 249-250.
- <sup>88</sup> Statement to the press, *Cumhuriyet*, 12 September 1950, cited in Ahmad, pp. 133-4.
- <sup>89</sup> Max Weston Thornburg, Graham Spry and George Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949). For a critical perspective, see Avcıoğlu, pp. 270-1.
- <sup>90</sup> Ahmad, p. 124, fn 6.
- <sup>91</sup> Yalman, *Turkey*, pp. 236-7.
- <sup>92</sup> Toker, p. 107.

- <sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107. This is Toker's transcription, and he refers to it as 'the socialist slogan' – it is likely that he meant 'to each according to his need'.
- <sup>94</sup> See M. Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım*, (Istanbul, Gözlem Yayınları, 1977), pp. 265-270. Cf. Toker, p. 108-111.
- <sup>95</sup> See Sertel, pp. 256-9, p. 261.
- <sup>96</sup> See also the Democrats' reaction to a scandal over links between Zekeriya Sertel and Democrat supporter Marshal Fevzi Çakmak: Karpas, *Transition*, pp. 177-180.
- <sup>97</sup> Haldün Gölalp, 'Whatever Happened to Secularism', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 2003, p.2.
- <sup>98</sup> See Albayrak, p. 367 and Appendix.
- <sup>99</sup> Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 47.
- <sup>100</sup> Karpas, *Transition*, p. 275.
- <sup>101</sup> Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 47.
- <sup>102</sup> Ahmad, p. 29.
- <sup>103</sup> See Karpas, *Transition*, p. 276.
- <sup>104</sup> Mehmet Gölübol, 'NATO and Turkey' in Karpas ed., *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1974*, (Leiden, Brill, 1975), p. 16.
- <sup>105</sup> See Oran's discussion of the views of Ali Suat Bilge and Kamuran Gürün: '1945-1960: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc' in *Foreign Policy*, p. 37.
- <sup>106</sup> See *ibid* on Haluk Ülman.
- <sup>107</sup> Aykan, p. 32.
- <sup>108</sup> See Oran in '1945-1960', p. 32; Avcıoğlu, p. 262.
- <sup>109</sup> In a symbolic move a year earlier, the US had returned the body of the former Turkish ambassador in its own ship, the Missouri. This symbolic move heralded the Turkish-American rapprochement, which was confirmed by President Truman's speech of April 1946.
- <sup>110</sup> See Karpas, *Transition*, p. 415, fn 62.
- <sup>111</sup> Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 97.
- <sup>112</sup> Demokrat Parti, *Demokrat Parti Tüzük ve Programı*, (Güneş Yayınları, Ankara, 1946), p. 21.
- <sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>115</sup> Yılmaz and Bilgin, p. 51.
- <sup>116</sup> Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yildizoglu, 'Agrarian Change: 1923-70' in Schick and Tonak eds., p. 277.
- <sup>117</sup> Karpas ed., p. 5.
- <sup>118</sup> Margulies and Yildizoglu, p. 278.
- <sup>119</sup> Menderes, Speech, Izmir, 27 August 1948, in Esirci, pp. 160-1 cited in Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 61.
- <sup>120</sup> Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 129.
- <sup>121</sup> George Harris, *Troubled Alliance – Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective* (American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1972), p. 14.
- <sup>122</sup> Yalman, *Turkey*, p. 236.
- <sup>123</sup> Harris, 'Turkey and the United States' in Karpas ed., p. 53.
- <sup>124</sup> Tunaya, p. 653.
- <sup>125</sup> Gölübol in Karpas ed., p. 25.
- <sup>126</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 14.
- <sup>127</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 17-8.
- <sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- <sup>129</sup> VanderLippe, pp. 176-8.
- <sup>130</sup> Haluk Ülman, *Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri: 1939-1947* (Ankara, 1961), p. 131.
- <sup>131</sup> See Evaki Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American security interests 1945-1953: the first enlargement of NATO*, (Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 149-159.
- <sup>132</sup> FO371-101848, *Annual Report on Turkey, 1951*, British Embassy, Ankara to Foreign Office, 2 January 1952.
- <sup>133</sup> See Harris, p. 39, footnote 23.
- <sup>134</sup> Report: 'The President and Prime Minister in Erzurum, 3 October 1950', p. 4. By the end of July, and formally in December, the opposition had withdrawn their complaints and supported the war effort. In a statement a year later, on 25 October 1951, RPP leader İsmet İnönü affirmed, '...in the area of foreign policy, there are no differences of opinion or principle in our country. We remain attached to our alliance, to the ideals of the UN and to our friendship with the US.' Oran, p. 82.
- <sup>135</sup> Presidential Decree, Office of the Prime Minister, General Operations Office, Decrees Section, Decree 8942, 24 March 1949.
- <sup>136</sup> Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak to the Office of the Prime Minister, *On Telegraphs Received on Occasion of Our Vote against Partition of Palestine*, 8 December 1947.

- <sup>137</sup> Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Praeger, 1999), p. 37.
- <sup>138</sup> Presidential Decree, Office of the Prime Minister, General Operations Office, Decrees Section, Decree 10855, 10 March 1950.
- <sup>139</sup> Minister of Economy and Trade, Circular 378, *On Trade Agreement and Modus Vivendi between the States of Turkey and Israel*, 12 July 1950.
- <sup>140</sup> Summary Report from Turkey's Press and Publishing General Office to Presidency, on US press, No. 496, 28 July 1950.
- <sup>141</sup> Harris, p. 40; Athanassopoulou, p. 165, citing *New York Times*, 1 August 1950.
- <sup>142</sup> London Press Attaché to Presidency's Press and Publishing General Office, No. 1404, 22 August 1950.
- <sup>143</sup> Athanassopoulou, p. 167.
- <sup>144</sup> See Aptülâhat Akşin, *Türkiye'nin 1945'den Sonraki Dış Politika Gelişmeleri – Orta-Doğu Meseleri*, (Istanbul, 1959), pp. 38-40.
- <sup>145</sup> *Vatan*, 3 August 1951, cited in Akşin, p. 39.
- <sup>146</sup> Athanassopoulou, pp. 156-160.
- <sup>147</sup> Oran, '1945-1960', p. 85.
- <sup>148</sup> Athanassopoulou, p. 196.
- <sup>149</sup> Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 230; Oran, pp. 85-6.
- <sup>150</sup> Athanassopoulou, p. 201.
- <sup>151</sup> George McGhee, p. 115.
- <sup>152</sup> Minutes, Ankara Meeting on Middle East Command and NATO accession, Untitled, 14 October 1951, p. 2.
- <sup>153</sup> Oran, '1945-1960', p. 87.
- <sup>154</sup> Minutes, Ankara Meeting on Middle East Command and NATO accession, Untitled, 14 October 1951, p. 6.
- <sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- <sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- <sup>157</sup> Koprülü, Speech in Grand National Assembly, 19 December 1951. Cited in Akşin, p. 41. See also FO371/101853 British Embassy, Ankara, to London, No. 299, 27 December 1951.
- <sup>158</sup> Koprülü, Speech in Grand National Assembly, 7<sup>th</sup> January 1952, cited in Akşin, p. 45.
- <sup>159</sup> Gönlübol et al., p. 230.
- <sup>160</sup> Minutes, Ankara Meeting on Middle East Command and NATO accession, Untitled, 14<sup>th</sup> October 1951, p. 7.
- <sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- <sup>162</sup> Text of Interview with Adnan Menderes by Howard Flieger, US News and World Report, to be initialled after correction by Mr Menderes. 5 November 1951, p. 5.
- <sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- <sup>164</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 44.
- <sup>165</sup> Çelik, p. 36. See also Karpat ed., p. 5.
- <sup>166</sup> Karpat ed., p. 5.
- <sup>167</sup> Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey* (1955), p. 129, cited in Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 39.
- <sup>168</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 44, citing Zafer, 22 September 1951.
- <sup>169</sup> Karpat, 'Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations' in Karpat ed., p. 114.
- <sup>170</sup> FO371/101853: British Embassy, Ankara, to London, No. 299, 27 December 1951, p. 2.
- <sup>171</sup> Letter from General Secretary, Union of Progressive Young Turks, Europe Committee, to Celâl Bayar, 25 March 1952. Forwarded from Turkish Presidency's General Office, No. 4-118, 1 April 1952.
- <sup>172</sup> Eroğul in Schick and Tonak eds., p. 109.
- <sup>173</sup> See FO371/101852.
- <sup>174</sup> Oran, '1945-1960', p. 83, my emphasis.
- <sup>175</sup> Undersecretary of Religious Affairs Ministry, for general distribution to Turkey's Muftis, No. 6715, 23 June 1950.
- <sup>176</sup> Ahmed Hamdi Aksek, press conference, *Cumhuriyet*, 28 August 1950. Cited in Ahmad, p. 366.
- <sup>177</sup> Binnaz Toprak, 'The Religious Right' in Schick and Tonak eds., p. 226.
- <sup>178</sup> See Albayrak, pp. 369-371.
- <sup>179</sup> FO371/107547, WK1011/1, British Embassy, Ankara to Foreign Office, 9 January 1953.
- <sup>180</sup> FO371/95274, British Embassy, Ankara to Foreign Office, 4 December 1951.
- <sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>182</sup> FO371/95274, RK1018/3, British Embassy, Ankara to Foreign Office, 26 June 1951.
- <sup>183</sup> FO371/95274, British Embassy, Ankara to Foreign Office, 4 December 1951.
- <sup>184</sup> Oran, '1945-1960', p. 37.
- <sup>185</sup> Athanassopoulou, p. 162.
- <sup>186</sup> Toker, *Tek Partiden*, p. 111.
- <sup>187</sup> Cited in Athanassopoulou, p. 162.

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<sup>188</sup> Bozdağlıoğlu, p. 64.