

**Why is there a public debate about the idea  
of a 'Civilian Power Europe'?**

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## **Abstract**

What role does or should the European Union play in the international system? Since the 1970s, the role which has received the most attention in the academic literature and in the press is the one of a 'Civilian Power Europe'. This paper examines why this is the case. The few works which do touch upon the question posit that it exists a causal correlation between the debate about the idea of a 'Civilian Power Europe', the actual state of European integration and the international system in general. This dissertation refutes the argument and identifies instead a two-fold rift as the true reason for the debate.

The first rift is within the idea of a Civilian Power Europe itself and has two components. Firstly, it is not clear whether a Civilian Power Europe can use force. Secondly, the origins of Europe's Civilian Power character are contested. The second rift exists between the idea of a 'Civilian Power Europe' and other theoretical interpretations of the Union's foreign policy, notably the concepts of a 'trading state', a 'military power' and a 'power bloc'.

**Keywords:** European Foreign Policy, role theory, Civilian Power, '*l'Europe Puissance*', trading state, power bloc

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## Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DG	Directorate General (of the European Commission)
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Since September 11<sup>th</sup> and the Iraq war, the question what role the EU does or should play in the international realm is probably more topical than ever with politicians, academics and the wider public (Orbie, 2003: 1). Plenty of roles are discussed: the EU has been called a ‘strange superpower’ (Buchan, 1993: 4), a ‘gentle power’ (K.E. Smith, 2002: 2), a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2000 and 2002), a ‘post-modern power’ (Müller-Brandeck-Boucquet, in K.E. Smith, 2002: 2), an ‘ambiguous power’ (Müller-Brandeck-Boucquet, in K.E. Smith, 2002: 2) and a ‘silent global player’ (Knodt and Princen, 2003: 1).

The role which always has received the most attention, however, is the one of a ‘Civilian Power Europe’ which was first applied to the European Community in 1972 by Duchêne, the director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in London. Whitman argues that the ‘notion of Civilian Power has resonated through the debate on the international identity of the EC’ (Whitman, 1998: 10-12). Nicolaïdis and Howse describe the idea as ‘one of the main conceptual anchors for debate over the sources of EU influence in the world’ (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002: 770). The vast amount of literature published about the idea confirms this (Lodge, 1993. Laursen, 1992).<sup>2</sup> The dissertation tries to find out why this is the case. What are the antecedent factors that cause the debate about the idea of a Civilian Power Europe? What is distinctive about the idea?

Is the question relevant? Or does it confirm Hans Morgenthau’s view who once lamented that ‘social scientists often hide in ‘(...) the politically irrelevant’ (Nachmias & Frankfort-Nachmias, 2000: 7). This dissertation maintains that the question is neither a useless academic exercise nor an unnecessary walk on the slippery ice of conflict over concepts and meanings. It allows one to identify the strengths and particularly the weaknesses of one of the most discussed concepts in the field of European Foreign Policy. Secondly, one might learn something about the state of European Integration in general. Haas argued that the

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Prof. Kevin Featherstone, Dr. Bob Hancké and Dr. Karen E. Smith for discussions on the topic of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> See also bibliography.

identification of a body of belief is a central characteristic of a political community (Whitman, 1998: 188). Does the idea of a Civilian Power Europe belong to that body of belief? Is there a sufficient reservoir of consensus in the EU about its role in the wider world? (Ifestos, 1987: 51-52). Thirdly, as Larsen maintains, struggles over meaning form perhaps the most important societal battlefield (Larsen, 1997: 19-20). Thus, analysing a debate can show us the contestants, their motives and their assumptions in the 'fight' over a role concept for European Foreign Policy. Finally, the debate about a Civilian Power Europe is important because it has an impact on the 'real-world'. Regelsberger argues that there exists a link between academic research, decision-making and public opinion (Regelsberger, de Schoutheete de Tervarent and Wessels, 1997: 10-14). The fact that the debate about the external relations of the EU has been framed in Civilian Power terms for the last 30 years, is likely to have effects on how politicians and officials interpret events, calculate interests and choose lines of action (Wæver, 2000: 267. Larsen, 1997: 25-26).

The dissertation argues that the debate about the idea of a Civilian Power Europe is caused by a two-fold rift. The first rift is within the idea itself. This rift is the most important. The contested meaning of the term influences every other debate about the idea of a Civilian Power Europe. Nevertheless, there exists also a second rift between the idea of a Civilian Power Europe and its theoretical competitors. This rift is exacerbated by Civilian Power Europe's descriptive and prescriptive dimension.

The question why there is a debate about the idea of a Civilian Power Europe has not been adequately addressed in the literature. The only scholars which touch upon the subject are Stavridis and Orbie. Their explanation is that the debate evolved along with the international context and the level of European Integration (Ehrhardt, 2002b: 10. Stavridis, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). Orbie's interpretation is the most detailed. He claims that a debate about the idea of a Civilian Power Europe emerges when an important internal-economic chapter has been closed, when there is a *détente* from power politics and a period of relative hegemonic decline. Accordingly, the different periods of the debate in the

1970s (Duchêne), the 1980s (Bull and Tsakaloyannis) and the 1990s (Hill, Karen Smith, Whitman, Stavridis) are presented (Orbie, 2003: 10). This essay rejects this approach. It merely provides an explanation why there is a debate about European Foreign Policy in general. In addition, by suggesting a causal link between the reality and the debate, the approach neglects the possibility for ideas to 'have a life of their own'. Orbie's argument is refuted by current events. The EU is occupied with one of its largest internal-economic chapters (enlargement), the international climate is one of power politics and the US enjoys an unparalleled degree of hegemony (Rhodes , 2003). Yet, the debate about the idea of a Civilian Power Europe has never been livelier than in 2002-2003.<sup>3</sup>

This dissertation draws mainly on the literature about the idea of a Civilian Power, and on work about the EU's Foreign Policy in general. Thus, in Van Everera's words, it is 'a literature-assessing or stock-taking dissertation' (Van Evera, 1997: 90). The authors most cited are Hill, Karen Smith, Stavridis and Maull. While relying on some discourse analysis work, no explicit recourse is made on this theory. Throughout this essay, the term 'European Union' (EU, 'Union', or 'Europe') is used. The term 'European Community' (EC) is only used when referring specifically to the pre-Maastricht era. The terms European Foreign Policy or External Relations System are used simultaneously and defined as the foreign policy outputs of the three EU pillars plus the foreign policies of the Member States (Ginsberg, 2001: 21-45). This work focuses on the academic debate about the idea of a Civilian Power Europe, but the contributions by politicians and the wider public are kept in sight. Defining the notion of a Civilian Power Europe in the introduction is problematic. A main reason for the debate about the idea is the lack of an accepted definition (Larsen, 2002: 289-292. Orbie, 2003).

In the remainder of this dissertation, the two-fold rift will be presented in more detail. Part two discusses the questions whether a Civilian Power can use force and what the origins of Europe's Civilian Power character are (Harnisch and Maull, 2001b: 139-140). Part three turns to the rift between the idea and its

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<sup>3</sup> See bibliography.



theoretical competitors. The debate is structured according to the Civilian Power Europe's descriptive and normative dimension: what does the EU produce and what should it produce in the way of foreign policy? The dissertation concludes in part four that the two-fold rift is indeed the reason why there is a debate about the idea of a Civilian Power Europe and makes a few suggestions for further research.

## **2. The rift within the idea of a Civilian Power Europe itself**

### **2.1. Civilian Power Europe and the use of force**

This section identifies two discourses. The first, the dominant discourse, claims that a Civilian Power Europe can use force, even though the exact conditions remain contested. The competing discourse maintains the opposite: a Civilian Power Europe by definition cannot draw on military means (Larsen, 1997: 10-18).

#### **2.1.1. The dominant discourse**

The authors in this group argue that the term Civilian Power Europe itself is the best proof that a recourse to military means within the concept is possible. The word 'power' obviously refers to a punitive sense of power (Galtung, 1973: 33-37. Tewes, 2002: 15). Otherwise one could have left out the word altogether: a Civilian Europe would have been more fitting. Hill agrees that Duchêne's notion of a Civilian Power Europe 'is not simply a new version of pacifist utopianism' (Hill, 1990: 42).

However, the authors do not belong to the *l'Europe puissance* school. They do not pretend that the use of military means is an end in itself; it is not intended to strengthen the European Union's international standing, as a tool for expansion, imperialism or hegemony (Petiteville, 2003: 137-138). Military means must always be subordinate to civilian ways of conflict management, they are 'residual', only employed as a last resort (*ultima ratio*) (Maull and Kirste, 1996: 303). The use of force as a means of self-defence clearly follows from these

premises. Duchêne argued as far back the 1970s that the acquisition of weapons for the purposes of self-defence would be totally compatible with the idea of a Civilian Power Europe (Duchêne, 1972: 42. Jünemann and Schörning, 2002: 6).<sup>4</sup> The second instance in which a Civilian Power Europe is allowed to use force appears less obvious: humanitarian interventions, peace-keeping and peace-making.<sup>5</sup> The authors justify this with their interpretation of the word ‘civilian’. Civilian means not only non-military, but also non-state, pointing out the rights of individuals and society *vis-à-vis* the state (Tewes, 2001: 10-11, 19-22. Stavridis, 2001a, 2001b).

From this viewpoint, a Civilian Power Europe should not worry too much about the means, but the democratising ends of its foreign policy (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002: 769-772). The EU should be able to draw on military means *within* the Civilian Power context in order to have the full range of instruments in relation to international crises, especially grave human rights violations (Larsen, 2002: 289-292). In a speech on 19 February 2002 the EU High Representative for foreign affairs, Javier Solana referred to Europe’s ‘unrivalled claim as a global “Civilian Power”’, together with the need to enhance European military capacity. (Larsen, 2002: 298. Solana, 2000a and 2000b). Solana’s words echo the widespread belief that the possibility of drawing on military means would make the EU a ‘real’ Civilian Power Europe, a Civilian Power ‘by design’: it could use military means as an integrated part of a much broader range of political, economic and diplomatic means. These non-military instruments, in turn, would be made much more effective by a stronger CFSP. For example, de Wilde d’Estmael claims that the economic sanctions of the EU in serious cases of political or military conflict have been of limited effectiveness because of the lack of a potential and credible resort to military action (De Wilde d’Estmael, 1998). The ultimate example and reference point, however, remains the Balkan wars of the 1990s (K.E. Smith, 2000: 17-19. Harnisch and Maull, 2001b: 144-149) : faced with the challenges of pre-modern politics in an uncivilised world<sup>6</sup>, a true

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<sup>4</sup> In contrast to humanitarian interventions, self-defence is also totally compatible with international law (see art. 51 UN charter).

<sup>5</sup> See art. 17(2) TEU.

<sup>6</sup> A ‘Hobbesian’ or ‘Lockean’ culture in Wendt’s terms. Wendt, : 246-310. Tsakaloyannis, 1989.

Civilian Power Europe has to use military force in order to help restrain the use of force in the international realm.<sup>7</sup>

However, with the use of force being a rare occurrence, the question remains what are the criteria for the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence?

Maull, primarily concerned with the case of Germany, posited two criteria initially: the use of force must be carried out by a collective security regime based on a collective decision and confined strictly to purposes of effective peace-keeping, peace-making, deterrence, and defence against the aggressive use of force (Maull, 1992b: 778. Maull, 1993). By 1996, Maull's criteria had already changed, allowing, for instance, for cooperative security structures (NATO) instead of collective security structures (UN) to implement UN security council resolutions (Tewes, 2002: 198-206. Philippi, 2001: 57-62). Despite these changes, Maull and Harnisch admit that the first criterion was not fulfilled in the Kosovo intervention (Harnisch and Maull, 2001b: 144-152). One could argue that Kosovo was a case without precedent which should not repeat itself. This argument is refuted by Maull himself, who maintains that such an action cannot be ruled out in the future (Maull, 2000: 57).

Thus, instead of providing us with a clear answer to the question to what extent and under which circumstances a Civilian Power Europe can use force, Maull's approach illustrates the vagueness and flexibility of the concept (Orbie, 2003: 14. Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002: 772-775).

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<sup>7</sup> Zielonka, 1998a: 10-12. Petiteville, 2003: 134-138. Orbie, 2003: 13. Rosencrance, 1998. Ehrhardt, 2002a: 243-257. Spinat, 2003. Stavridis, 2001b.

### 2.1.2. The competing discourse

The authors of this group interpret the words in the term 'Civilian Power' in a fundamentally different way. The word 'power' not only refers to force, but also to the ideological and remunerative types of power (Galtung, 1973: 33-37).

These two types of power make Europe a 'real' Civilian Power, not the recourse to military means. Accordingly, they understand the word 'civilian' as essentially non-military, putting strong emphasis on a peaceful foreign policy (H. Smith, 2002: 119). This view was shared by Maull, now one of the strongest advocates of a Civilian Power allowed to use force, in his earlier writings (Maull, 1990).

The authors challenge the arguments in favour of a Civilian Power Europe using force.

An EU with a self-defence capacity would turn from a 'magnet attracting would be-competitors' (Rosencrance, 1998: 16). into a defence alliance. Outsiders would see such a development as a step towards the creation of a superpower that uses military means to pursue its own interests.<sup>8</sup> How is a military EU compatible with one of the key ideas of a Civilian Power Europe, namely to reverse the balance of power logic and get away from the historical legacy of war and conquest? (Wæver, 2000: 253).

The Petersberg tasks, in particular the 'tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making'<sup>9</sup>, currently lack a solid foundation in international law (Jünemann & Schöring, 2002: 4-10. Kimminich, 1995).<sup>10</sup> This is hard to reconcile with one of the most prominent objectives of a Civilian Power Europe, which is the propagation and consolidation of public international law. (Duchêne, 1973: 19-20).

Peacemaking missions would also seriously damage the credibility of a Civilian Power as a proponent of world-wide legitimate governance because humanitarian military interventions are only possible in countries which are significantly weaker than the intervening state, leading to an 'interventionism à la carte' (Schorlemer, 2000. H. Smith, 2002: 271-272).

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<sup>8</sup> K.E. Smith, 1998a: 78-80. Ifestos, 1987: 59-67. Levrat and Willa, 2001. Beck, 1997: 78-79.

<sup>9</sup> Art. 17(2) TEU.

<sup>10</sup> Jünemann & Schöring, 2002: 4-10. Kimminich, 1995.

In any case, such interventions are far from effective, as the authors belonging to the dominant discourse claim, but dysfunctional, because inner-state conflicts cannot be resolved militarily by outsiders.<sup>11</sup> Truly effective and in the spirit of a Civilian Power Europe would be an integrated security policy that underlines the political, social, economic, demographic, cultural and ecological aspects of security, tackling the so-called root causes of possible conflicts.<sup>12</sup> Jünemann and Schöring argue that exactly these non-military means of conflict resolution in which the EU has a comparative advantage may be neglected because of the building up and maintenance of military capabilities.<sup>13</sup> Consequently, these authors regard the build up of the CFSP and particularly the ESDP not as the beginning of a 'real', but as the 'end' of a Civilian Power Europe.<sup>14</sup>

## **2.2. The origins of Europe's Civilian Power character<sup>15</sup>**

The second dispute within the idea of a Civilian Power Europe concerns the origins of Europe's Civilian Power character. If one accepts the assumption that Europe is a Civilian Power, then the question arises why it is supposed to be one. This question might seem less obvious and thus less relevant for the debate about the idea of a Civilian Power than the one regarding the use of force discussed in the previous section. However, this essay argues that it is equally, if not more, important. The answer to the question gives us insights into two further significant issues. Firstly, what about the stability of Europe's Civilian Power character? What impact have fundamental changes like the end of the Cold War or the development of an ESDP on a Civilian Power Europe? Secondly, is the Civilian Power model exportable? Or is Europe so distinctive, so unique that only it can be a Civilian Power? (K.E. Smith, 2002: 3).

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<sup>11</sup> Peters, 2001: 24-30. Vogt, 1994: 40. Sjursen, 2003b: 2.

<sup>12</sup> Orbie, 2003: 15. Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 222. Hill, 1990: 43. H. Smith, 2002: 7.

<sup>13</sup> Jünemann & Schöring, 2002. K.E. Smith, 2000: 23. Duchêne, 1972: 43.

<sup>14</sup> K.E. Smith, 2000: 11. Whitman, 1998: 10-12, 133-140, 234. Rummel, 2002: 454.

<sup>15</sup> This section draws heavily on Dembinski (2002).

This section presents four possible explanations for Europe being a Civilian Power. The explanatory weaknesses of each account as well as its implications for the two issues outlined above are briefly examined.

### **2.2.1. The realist explanation**

One of the original aims of the integration process was the creation of a European defence identity. The vision was a '*l'Europe puissance*', which should play a major role on the international scene (see part 3.2.). Unfortunately, these dreams never materialised as the European Defence Community in 1954 and all subsequent projects failed.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, Karen Smith points out that the EU is a Civilian Power not by conviction, but 'by default'. (K.E. Smith, 2000: 14). Duchêne already made the argument that the EC as a 'civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force' has an interest in behaving like a Civilian Power (Duchêne, 1973: 19). This means nothing other than the EU was a Civilian Power because it did not have military capabilities; it made a virtue out of a necessity (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002: 771-772. Kagan, 2002 and 2003).

The realist explanation is based on the old paradigm that in the long run the capabilities of an actor are decisive for its relative position in International Relations (Rose, 1998). With the external constraint of the Cold War gone, Europe will move beyond the second-type best of civilian power, build up its military capabilities and 'normalise' its behaviour (Whitman, 1998: 49).

Concerning the transferability of the concept, the Civilian Power model is restricted to Europe (and Japan) as it emerged in a specific historic situation.

### **2.2.2. The rational explanation**

A rational-choice explanation of Europe's Civilian Power character takes as an assumption that states are calculating utility-maximisers (Tewes, 2002: 13-14). The increasing levels of interdependence are transforming the international system, impinging more and more on the ability of the state to independently make and implement policy decisions. Hence the significance of societal actors

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<sup>16</sup> The other main aim of the EDC was to secure the peace within Europe. The *l'Europe puissance* ambitions connected with the EDC were mainly French. K.E. Smith, 2000: 14. Knodt and Princen, 2003: 2-3. Galtung, 1973: 105-106.

increases, and transnational relations become ever more important. In such an environment, security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability (Cooper, 2000: 19-20). The states which will best manage the challenges of complex interdependence through economic, political and cultural means will dominate the international system (Keohane and Nye, 2001. Nye 2002). Duchêne argues that being a Civilian Power could give Europe 'great influence in a world where both the positive and negative charges of interdependence seem to be growing at a rapid rate' (Duchêne, 1972: 43). Maull shares this view and explains the motivation of the EU in creating a 'friendly environment' around its borders with material objectives (Maull, 1999: 2). Thus, the EU acts like a Civilian Power because it is in its best (economic) interest (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 36).

The thesis of the rational explanation about the reduced relevance of military power is strongly contested (Bull, 1982). However, Tewes and Karen Smith maintain that at least after the end of the Cold War, civilianisation is now functionally more intensive and geographically more extensive than it has ever been. This is logical because if interdependence is the explanatory variable for Europe's Civilian Power character, then it should influence a lot of states in the OECD world (Tewes, 2001: 2-4. K.E. Smith, 2002: 4). Nevertheless, being an utility-maximiser, Europe is only a Civilian Power because it considers this approach advantageous. If the international climate changes from interdependence to independence and military force appears valuable again, Europe would use it.

### **2.2.3. The normative explanation**

In contrast to the realist and rational explanations, the normative explanation assumes an enlightened foreign policy self-understanding which trumps power and interests calculations (Kirste, 1998: 48-49. 476). The normative aspect of the Civilian Power Europe concept features strongly in Duchêne's accounts.<sup>17</sup> Europe is a Civilian Power by conviction; 'the continent which once ruled the world

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<sup>17</sup> Duchêne, 1972. In fact, the whole volume in which his essay appeared was an exercise in 'futuresology'; see Mayne, 1972.

through physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms.’ (Rosencrance, 1998: 22).

The normative explanation of Europe’s Civilian Power character rests on solid empirical observations. For example, Manners finds that ‘we cannot overlook the extent to which the EU is normatively different to other polities (...)’ (Manners, 2002: 241). The question remains, however, what is the cause of the EU’s norm-laden foreign policy. Two reasons are given in the literature, one connected to the theory of democratic peace, one to role theory. As they are often cited as the leading explanations of why Europe is a Civilian Power (Wagner and Hellmann, 2003), their weaknesses will be discussed in greater detail.

#### **2.2.3.1. Democratic Peace**

One variation of the normative explanation draws on the theory of democratic peace. This theory explains the finding that democracies do not go to war with one another and are more peaceful than autocracies by reference to the interest of the electorate, institutional barriers and the externalisation of the inner-state norm of non-violent conflict resolution. Transferred to the European level, the theory posits that the EU is a Civilian Power because its policy reflects the behavioural norms accepted within the EU.<sup>18</sup> If one accepts this answer, it would mean that the Civilian Power model is exportable to all other democratic states and that it will remain stable as long as democracy continues its reign within the EU.

However, as straightforward this explanation might appear, it has various weaknesses.

Democratic peace theory overemphasizes the significance of democracy for issues of peace and war. The fact that states do not go to war tells us little about the way they conduct their relations. Is European Foreign Policy characterized by peaceful rivalry with other ‘power blocs’ or by close cooperation within a ‘security

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<sup>18</sup> Wagner and Hellmann, 2003: 14. For one of the best applications of the theory to the European level, see Hasenclever, 2001.



community’? (Adler and Barnett, 1999: 41). Only the later option would be compatible with the idea of a Civilian Power. (Tewes, 2001: 19-20).

Secondly, the analogy between ‘inside and outside’ is problematic. Theoretically, it is not clear why the EU’s normative convictions should lead to the same kind of behaviour in two different contexts: the domestic sphere, characterized by hierarchy, and the international sphere, characterized by anarchy (Dixon, 1994: 14). Held supports this view by arguing that the frontier which democracies draw between themselves and the outside is systematically linked with the concept of democracy (Held, 1999).

Thirdly, the literature about the theory of democratic peace finds a gap between the predicted and actual behaviour of democracies. According to the theory, democracies – externalising their domestic norms – would show a peaceful foreign policy in general. The majority of the literature, however, comes to the conclusion that democracies are only peaceful in relations with other democracies (Russett and Oneal, 2001). Thus, as this account treats the EU like a state, the argument which explains the civil character of European Foreign Policy towards its non-democratic environment with the externalisation of domestic norms seems doubtful.

This leads us to the final weakness. Simply transferring the democratic peace theory to the EU and consequently treating the EU like a state, neglects its *sui generis* nature. What does the enhanced cooperation between democracies mean for their relationship with non-democratic states? (Zielonka, 1998a: 10-12). This question will be discussed in part 2.2.4.

#### **2.2.3.2. Role theory**

Another variation of the normative explanation, inspired by constructivism, draws on role theory. Harnisch, Kirste and Maull argue that the nature of a particular social unit as an ‘actor’ is given by whether and how it constructs itself as an international actor (ego-part) and whether and how the surrounding world constructs this unit as an actor (alter-part).<sup>19</sup> The ego- and the alter-part together form a role conception, a complex mixture of geographical, power-politics, historical and socio-economic characteristics, shared ideas and norms as well as

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<sup>19</sup> Harnisch and Maull, 2001b: 129-130. Wish, 1980: 532. Maull and Kirste, 1996.

system structures.<sup>20</sup> If held over a long period of time, role conceptions structure an actor's policies (Larsen, 1997: 9. Haas, 1991: 24). This claim is usually validated with a discourse approach, showing how a particular role concept dominates the political discourse of an actor (Larsen, 2002: 287. Krotz, 2002.) Kirste and Maull developed an ideal type role conception of a Civilian Power and applied it to Germany and Japan.<sup>21</sup> However, they stress that the Civilian Power model is transferable to the EU (Maull, 2001: 121-124. Whitman, 1998: 10-12). Similar to the realist explanation, the role theory approach underlines the distinctiveness of a Civilian Power Europe (Tewes, 2001: 9). In contrast to the realist explanation, a stronger persistence of Europe's Civilian Power character under changed external circumstances can be expected.

Role theory, like any constructivist account, rests on highly contestable premises.<sup>22</sup> Even if one agrees with most of these, it remains doubtful whether role theory can provide us with an explanation of Europe's Civilian Power character. The main problem is that role theory in general, and the Civilian Power model in particular, assume a highly coherent foreign policy (Dyson, 2002). In other words, the EU is only a Civilian Power if it explicitly declares that it has chosen this role concept and its foreign policy is consistent over time and between issue areas with the Civilian Power conception (Harnisch and Maull, 2001b: 144-149).

Does a sense of a common and distinctive role concept underpin the EU?<sup>23</sup> Or are the intergovernmentalists right? Does Hoffmann's 'logic of diversity' still apply? (Hoffmann, 1966: 882).

One can certainly detect Civilian Power norms and values in the Treaty on European Union<sup>24</sup>, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and in the discourse of representatives of the Union's institutions (Jünemann and Schörning, 2002: 11). Romano Prodi states that 'the EU must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development' (Manners, 2000: 26). However, if one includes the national discourses and public opinion, a common European Civilian

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<sup>20</sup> Holsti, 1970: 245-275. Tewes, 2001: 2-4. Tewes, 2002: 28-31.

<sup>21</sup> Kirste, 1998: 473. Tewes, 1997: 100-104. Maull, 1997.

<sup>22</sup> Endogamy is the most common reproach. See King, Keohane, Verba, 1994: 191-193.

<sup>23</sup> Guéhenno, 1998. Zielonka, 1998c: 137. Hill, 1998: 39. Sijursen and K.E. Smith, 2001b: 5.

<sup>24</sup> Preface, art. 6, 11 TEU.

Power role conception (ego-part) seems less convincing (Müller-Brandeck-Bocque, 2002. Whitman, 1998: 33). As the CFSP remains intergovernmental, the perspective of the Member States is arguably more important than that of the European institutions. Some Member States, for example Germany and Austria, stress the civilian element in European Foreign Policy (Larsen, 2002: 296-299). Other Member States, especially France and the United Kingdom, prefer the conception of a *l'Europe puissance*.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, the thesis that the EU acts like a Civilian Power because of internalised external role expectations (alter-part) remains unproven.<sup>26</sup>

#### 2.2.4. Institutional features

In the section on democratic peace theory, the question arose whether the Union's *sui generis* nature has any impact on the way it acts in the international realm. Some authors argue that enhanced cooperation between democracies results in heightened tensions between them and non-democratic states. Risse-Kappen, Hermann and Kegley justify this with 'ingroup/outgroup dynamics' (Herrmann and Kegley, 1995. Risse-Kappen, 1995), while Müller refers to the loss of democratic accountability due to the transfer of competences from the national to the supranational level (Müller, 2002).

Nevertheless, the majority of the authors agree that the nature of the EU foreign policy system makes the Union not more aggressive, but more civilian (Whitman, 1998. Bull, 1982. Sjöstedt, 1977). In fact, nearly all aspects of Europe's 'Civilian Power Foreign Policy' can be explained by its institutional structure and decision-making norms and procedures.<sup>27</sup> Karen Smith argues that 'the emphasis on establishing contractual relations can be seen as a reflection of the Community's origins as an attempt to instil the rule of law in relations between its member states' (K.E. Smith, 2002: 4). Hill and Hazel Smith maintain that the EU's system of multi-level governance prevents extremism as it cannot go unobserved (H. Smith, 2002: 271-272. Hill, 1998). The 'obligation to unanimity'<sup>28</sup>, the need to

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<sup>25</sup> Whitman, 1998: 192. Frenkler, 2001: 36-37. Sauter, 1995. Kornelius, 2003.

<sup>26</sup> Hill, 1993. Regelsberger, de Schoutheete de Tervarent and Wessels, 1997: 10-14.

<sup>27</sup> Whitman, 1998: 2. This supports the 'socialisation' thesis, see Joergensen, 1997.

<sup>28</sup> Art. 23 TEU.

reach a compromise between the Member States is the reason for the Union's preference of carrots over sticks.<sup>29</sup>

Karen Smith rightly remarks that this explanation can be roughly connected to a foreign policy analysis approach, highlighting internal decision-making processes and outcomes.<sup>30</sup> Obviously, if the EU's institutional features are the reason why it acts like a Civilian Power, the model is confined to the EU and not exportable. Regarding the stability of the concept, Europe will remain a Civilian Power as long as it keeps its unique and awkward foreign policy structure. Does that not imply a complete Civilian Power Europe 'by default'? Should advocates of the Civilian Power model desperately seek to preserve Europe's foreign policy system in its current state? This seems paradoxical, since the way the EU makes foreign policy is still a key obstacle to a consistent and systematic European Foreign Policy.<sup>31</sup> From this perspective, the institutional structure of the EU is responsible for Europe's Civilian Power character, but prevents it from becoming an *effective* Civilian Power in the wider world.

Summarising, part two has identified the first main reason why there is a debate about the idea of a Civilian Power Europe: a deep rift within the idea of a Civilian Power Europe itself. Two crucial questions remain contested. First, whether and to what extent a Civilian Power Europe can use force and secondly the origins of Europe's Civilian Power character. The two questions are interlinked. As long as we cannot exactly identify what a Civilian Power Europe is (can it use force or not?), we cannot discuss why Europe is supposed to be one. On the other hand, as long as we do not agree on the reason why Europe is a Civilian Power, we cannot discuss whether a Civilian Power can use force. The first rift was discussed quite extensively because it is the most important. For example, the task attempted in part three of analysing the debate between the Civilian Power model and its theoretical competitors is extremely difficult when the benchmark – the idea of a Civilian Power itself – remains vague and disputed. The first rift makes the second one even wider.

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<sup>29</sup> K.E. Smith, 1998a: 75-78. Monar, 1997. Ginsberg, 1999: 439. Whitman, 1998: 82. Hazelzet, 2001: 64.

<sup>30</sup> K.E. Smith, 2002: 2. Hill, 2003a. White, 1999.

<sup>31</sup> K.E. Smith, 1997: 2-3. K.E. Smith, 2001: 186. K.E. Smith, 1998b: 274. Missiroli, 2001.

### 3. The rift between Civilian Power Europe and other approaches

Moving beyond questions relating to the idea of a Civilian Power itself, part three presents the second reason for the debate. There is a rift between the idea of a Civilian Power – how unclear it may be – and other foreign policy concepts of the EU's international role. On the 'market place' of analytical models, the idea of a Civilian Power is not alone: a 'flop', a 'capitalist power', a 'trading state', a 'power bloc', a 'neutral Union' and a '*l'Europe puissance*' all wrestle for attention. Orbie presents an useful distinction between these 'competitors' by structuring them according to their respective IR schools: structuralism, pluralism and realism (Orbie, 2003: 4-6).

This work proposes another approach. The idea of a Civilian Power Europe always had a descriptive and a prescriptive side.<sup>32</sup> That is why this essay organises the 'competitors' debate after two questions. What are the actual outputs of European Foreign Policy? Secondly, what foreign policy outputs should the EU produce? (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002: 769).

That the idea of a Civilian Power tries to address both of these fundamental issues is certainly one of the reasons for the longevity of the concept. It is, however, also a reason why the idea is so contested. If one plays on two fields, one faces more competition. In other words, there would not be a second rift if there was an agreement that the answer to both questions posed above is 'Civilian Power'. The aim of part three is to show that such an agreement does not exist.

#### 3.1. Descriptive dimension: what *does* the EU produce in the way of foreign policy?

The Civilian Power approach is one possible answer to one of the most difficult questions in the field of European integration. Obviously, the outputs of the EU's 'External Relations System' (Ginsberg, 1999: 434) are a measurable matter, consisting of policy actions, enlargement, association accords, development and humanitarian aid, sanctions and summits (Ginsberg, 1999: 4). However, even the descriptive, more empirical, inquiry into the outputs of European Foreign Policy

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<sup>32</sup> Hill, 1990. Duchêne, 1972. Jørgensen, 1998: 93-94.

is in a way a speculative exercise because of the permanent evolutionary changes (Ifestos, 1987: 58-59). The four competing approaches challenge the claim that the EU's foreign policy outputs can be interpreted as Civilian Power actions (Harnisch and Maull, 2001a: 3-5).

### 3.1.1. Civilian Power

The problem is that very little empirical analysis has been carried out from the Civilian Power perspective.<sup>33</sup> Thus, it seems hard to make the claim that the EU is a Civilian Power. Nevertheless, if one takes the definition of a Civilian Power by Maull<sup>34</sup> – excluding the contentious issues of the use of force and the transferability of Maull's approach to the EU – and compares it with the latest research of K.E. Smith<sup>35</sup> on the EU' foreign policy objectives and foreign policy style, the similarities between an ideal Civilian Power and the EU are striking:

#### *a. Foreign Policy objectives*

Civilian Power	European Union
Promoter of international law	Respect for international law
Institution / regime enlarger	Encouragement of regional cooperation
Supporter of strong UN, OSCE	Multilateralism, Prevention of violent conflicts
Promotion of democratisation and human rights	Promotion of human rights and democracy
Promotion of sustainable development	Promotion of sustainable development, Reduction of poverty

Sources: original quotations from Maull (1993): 119-125, Kirste (1998): 53-56 and K.E. Smith (2002): 1-2.

<sup>33</sup> Stavridis, 2001c: 76. Notable exceptions are: K.E. Smith's works. Stavridis, 2001c. Stavridis and Hutchence, 2000. Holden, 2003. Lofthouse and Long, 1996.

<sup>34</sup> Maull, 1992a. Maull, 1993: 119-125. Kirste, 1998: 53-56.

<sup>35</sup> K.E. Smith, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001, 2002.

*b. Foreign Policy style/ use of Foreign Policy instruments*

<b>Civilian Power</b>	<b>European Union</b>
Bargaining, mediation and compromises	Preference for using persuasion, offering and granting rewards
Regime/institution user	Supporting action by other international organisations
Economic incentives	Preference for offering and granting rewards
Political conditionality	Political conditionality on trading preferences, cooperation and association agreements, aid, diplomatic recognition and EU membership

Sources: original quotations from Maull (1993): 119-125, Kirste (1998): 53-56, K.E. Smith (1998b): 253 and (1997): 5, 9, 13-16.

While not proving that the EU produces Civilian Power actions in the way of foreign policy, the two tables show that the EU comes close to the ideal type Civilian Power in many respects. Its foreign policy objectives are what Arnold Wolfers called ‘milieu goals’, rather than ‘possession goals’. Possession goals advance national interests. Milieu goals try to shape the environment in which the EU operates (Wolfers, in K.E. Smith, 2002: 2. Tewes, 2002: 198-206). Concerning foreign policy instruments, Maull’s Civilian Power Model is not as well developed. Thus, a direct comparison is not attempted here. However, with their emphasis on diplomatic and economic instruments, the Civilian Power model and the EU’s Foreign Policy seem again very similar (K.E. Smith, 1997: 1-13. Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 252).

The final argument supporting the claim that the EU produces Civilian Power actions is enlargement. Scholars like Moravcsik, Rosencrance and Karen Smith agree that enlargement with its unique way of offering rewards and incentives to induce policy changes<sup>36</sup> is the best example for a Civilian Power Europe at work.

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<sup>36</sup> Buchan, 1993: 1-8. Moravcsik, 2002. K.E. Smith, 2000.

### 3.1.2. Realism

Realists challenge the Civilian Power Europe argument made above insofar as they deny *any* substantial foreign policy output by the EU. In fact, realists often do not recognise the existence of an European Foreign Policy at all. The argument that European Foreign Policy is non-existent because in many instances it is ineffective, a ‘flop’ in Hill’s terms (Hill, 1990: 48-53), appears to be judging with double-standards. Sjursen and Karen Smith remark that ‘national foreign policies do not seem to suffer from the same ‘existentialist dilemmas’ when they fail to obtain their objectives’ (Sjursen and K.E. Smith, 2001b: 16).

A Civilian Power sees international anarchy as a strong reason for further civilising efforts within and outside Europe. Realists claim the opposite: anarchy constrains cooperation. States are always distrustful of their peers, and international institutions cannot alter this fact (K.E. Smith, 1999: 13).

### 3.1.3. Pluralism: Trading state

The trading state model resembles the Civilian Power idea closely. Indeed, if we accept the rational explanation for Europe’s Civilian Power character, the two concepts appear identical. Trading states, as defined by Rosencrance, understood that ‘there was no sense in using military force to acquire power and wealth when they could be obtained more efficiently through peaceful economic development and trade’ (Rosecrance, 1986: 139). They can serve as role models for the atavistic politico-military states. As the world’s largest exporter and second largest importer, the EU can be defined as a leading international trading state. Kirste admits that the foreign policy outputs of a trading state and a Civilian Power are similar (Whitman, 1998: 107-109, 123).

This implies that a trading state is not, as Duchêne, Orbie and Telo assume, a complacent political dwarf with economic power.<sup>37</sup> The differences between a Civilian Power and a trading state lie elsewhere: the underlying motivation of a trading state is exclusively its own rational self-interest. Norms and values do not come into play. In that sense, with its emphasis on interdependence and free-

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<sup>37</sup> Duchêne, 1972: 47. Orbie, 2003. Telo, in Orbie, 2003: 5.



trade, a trading state is a necessary, but not sufficient element of the multi-faceted idea of a Civilian Power Europe (Kirste, 1998: 57-58).

#### **3.1.4. Structuralism: Capitalist power**

The world systems perspective, as presented by Immanuel Wallerstein and applied to the EC by George and Galtung, assumes that the world is a single capitalist system, albeit one that has within it separate states. It sees the system as one that embodies fundamental inequalities between geographically discrete economic zones, with wealth and power concentrated in one or more core areas of the world. In this system, rivalry, sometimes resulting in conflict between core areas, is endemic. All significant advances in Western European integration, including the External Relations System, can be understood as a response to the *défi américain*, the dominance of the United States over the capitalist world. In the case of the US, there is a single state which is clearly a unified actor in international relations. In the case of the EC, the economic zone is occupied by a number of different states. Therefore, in order to pursue the interests of the economic zone through foreign relations, a coordinated policy has to be devised. Accordingly, the outputs of the common European external relations system make the EU a stronger economic competitor, at the expense of its American rival (George, 1991).

This view, obviously, is in complete contrast to the Civilian Power Europe idea. Europe is a capitalist power 'in disguise', hiding behind its Civilian Power image (Whitman, 1998: 10-12). The argument that a Civilian Power Europe tries to address gross inequalities in the system<sup>38</sup> would earn hysterical laughter from Galtung. The EC is a new superpower which tries to create an Eurocentric world by exploiting, fragmenting, and penetrating the Third World. For example, the EC's preference for group-to-group dialogues is not seen as a confirmation of Civilian Power output (Monar, 1997: 269-270), but as a deliberate attempt to split the rest of world off from each other. Galtung concludes that concerning its global role, the EC is the end of something old, not the beginning of a new Civilian Power era.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Maull, 1997 and 1999. Maull and Kirste, 1996. Kirste, 1998).

<sup>39</sup> Galtung, 1973: 131-132, 155-158. Galtung, 1989. Galtung, 1994.

### 3.1.5. Power bloc

The power bloc is very similar to the capitalist power approach. It is connected to the realist explanation of the EU's Civilian Power character (3.1.2.). The power bloc resembles a Civilian Power only in the respect that it does not use force. However, in contrast to a Civilian Power and the trading state, it is not convinced by the atavistic nature of military force. A power bloc is simply a superpower which has not yet managed to build up military means. Hill, who coined the term, sees a power bloc 'en route to superpower status' (Hill, 1990: 55), very similar to Galtung's 'superpower in the making' (Galtung, 1973).

Accordingly, a power bloc does not – like a Civilian Power – project power through non-traditional power politics. (Holden, 2003: 348). On the contrary, it behaves like large states do, with regard for its own concerns before any other values come into play and exerts influence over third-parties in a superpower-fashion, only with non-military means. (Hill, 1990: 44. Tewes, 2001: 22-24)

Unlike a Civilian Power, a power bloc prefers 'sticks' (threatening or inflicting punishment) over 'carrots' (offering and granting rewards) and using persuasion. (K.E. Smith, 1997: 13. K.E. Smith, 2002: 2-6).

In 1990, Hill wrote that 'there is little doubt that the EC already constitutes a power-bloc in certain respects (...)' (Hill, 1990: 35). The areas in which the EU can use its strength to reach its own political objectives are well-documented (K.E. Smith, 2000: 13). As an economic, financial and monetary power-house, it produces many significant and far-reaching foreign policy outputs, most importantly enlargement (Hill, 2000: 4). The EU is a magnet for surrounding states, many of whom have determined that the benefits of membership are preferable to its costs. Since the EU decides which applicant states join under which conditions and which do not, enlargement puts the EU in a position to shape large parts of applicant states' domestic and foreign policies. Traditional principles of non-interference, as established in article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, seem to be set aside in this process (Ginsberg, 1998: 197, 446. Moravcsik, 2002. Instead of regarding enlargement as *the* example for a Civilian Power Europe at work (Rosencrance, 1998. Buchan, 1993: 1-8), the power bloc approach sees the EU as 'a primarily self-interested actor in the enlargement

process' (Sjursen and K.E. Smith, 2001a: 20. Sjursen and K.E. Smith, 2001b: 7-11). Sjursen and Karen Smith find that especially valid in the case of the Mediterranean applicants (Sjursen and K.E. Smith, 2001b: 17). Stavridis, too, in a detailed case study on the Cyprus case, concludes that 'the discrepancy between the EU's rhetoric and reality is such that it does not deserve the label of a Civilian Power' (Stavridis, 2001c: 98).

Not only in the enlargement process, but also in the fields of external trade and agriculture, does the Union try to protect its interests, pursuing 'possession goals' rather than 'milieu goals' (K.E. Smith, 2002). The fact that the Union presents itself more as a Civilian Power and not as a power bloc, could be explained by the need to legitimise the EU's power politics in the eyes of its intended addressees (Sjursen and K.E. Smith, 2001b: 3).

### **3.2. Prescriptive dimension: what *should* the EU produce in the way of foreign policy ?**

The approaches presented in 3.1. may or may not be an accurate description of the Union's foreign policy outputs. They challenge the idea of a Civilian Power Europe – and thus lead to a debate – in its descriptive dimension. However, they are not prescriptive models. Nobody would advise the EU to move into the direction of a 'flop', a 'capitalist power' or a 'power bloc'. In a sense, this confirms Delors' view that '*on ne tombe pas amoureux d'un grand marché*'. (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 223).

A 'trading state' might be a desired option, but it is already presented earlier and – except for his underlying motivation – difficult to distinguish from a Civilian Power Europe anyway. On the other hand, the competitor which challenges the Civilian Power Europe concept in its normative dimension, a '*l'Europe puissance*', does not contend on the descriptive 'battlefield': no commentator sees the foreign policy system of the EU in its current form as a fully-fledged military power.

#### **3.2.1. Civilian Power**

The idea of a Civilian Power Europe, however, gives an answer to the question about the actual outputs of European Foreign Policy (see 3.1.1.). If Hill is right,

and the EU already acts in the international field as a Civilian Power (Hill, 1994), why is it then again featured under this heading? Firstly, Hill's view is far from universally accepted. The other conceptual approaches, especially the trading state and the power bloc, can also put forward strong arguments in favour of their interpretations of the Union's foreign policy outputs. Secondly, the advocates of a definition of a Civilian Power which cannot use force do not longer regard the EU as a Civilian Power since Maastricht or since St. Malo. Thus, their perspective is necessarily a prescriptive one. Thirdly, discussing the origins of Europe's Civilian Power character, we have found that a lot of explanations see the Union as a Civilian Power by default, not by conviction. A '*l'Europe puissance*' seems to be favoured by many as the role concept for the EU's future. Hence, there is a constant need for proponents of the idea to highlight the potential advantages of a Civilian Power Europe.

The exponents of the idea propose four arguments why Europe should move in the direction of a Civilian Power.<sup>40</sup>

A Civilian Power Europe moves away from the idea to recreate the state on a grander scale. It offers a more revolutionary project by transforming our notions of sovereignty and is thus more fitting for the *sui generis* EU (K.E. Smith, 2000: 27-28. Guéhenno, 1998). A '*l'Europe puissance*' is criticised for being nothing more than an imitation of the traditional Westphalian nation-state, especially the US (Jørgensen, 1998. Larsen, 2002: 296-299). This is not only old-fashioned and unsuitable, but also potentially dangerous (Zielonka, 1998a: 10). David Mitrany sees an European nation-state as a 'federal fallacy', because 'the more fully and effectively regional organisations are integrated, the deeper must be the division they would cause in the emergent unity of the world' (Mitrany, 1975: 56).

Secondly, explicitly opting for a Civilian Power image 'could help the Union to acquire a distinct profile –so important in terms of identity and legitimacy' (Zielonka, 1998b: 229). Fitzgerald defines identity as 'beliefs of personal distinctiveness, usually in relation to some Other'.<sup>41</sup> In the case of the EU, the 'significant other' is undoubtedly the US. So, instead of copying the United

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<sup>40</sup> The arguments in favour of a non-military European Foreign Policy are not repeated (see B.I.2).

<sup>41</sup> Fitzgerald, 1993: 3. Wæver, 2000: 268. Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 223.

States, the EU could become an unique actor on the world stage with its Civilian Power characteristics.

This could, thirdly, lead to an improvement in transatlantic relations, especially after the Iraq-crisis. Moravcsik and other scholars see 'complementary as the key to transatlantic reconciliation' (Moravcsik, 2003: 84). If Europe asserts itself as a Civilian Power and convinces the US that a Civilian Power 'wields effective power over peace and war as great as that of the United States', Europeans and Americans could negotiate a new 'transatlantic bargain'.<sup>42</sup> Mayer, Rittberger and Zelli, who define a Civilian Power Europe more in a constructivist way, also recommend that Europe should become a Civilian Power in order to bridge 'the cracks in the west'.<sup>43</sup> It seems doubtful whether this argument can be reconciled with the final reason: a Civilian Power Europe would be a great example for the rest of the world, especially the USA.<sup>44</sup> Thus, it is hard to imagine how a Civilian Power Europe could accept a 'division of labour' with the United States, while constantly trying to change the hegemon's unilateralist behaviour. In a way, a Civilian Power Europe would be the globe's leading role model and foreign policy consultant, possibly leading to a new form of civilised international relations (Petiteville, 2003: 134-135).

### 3.2.2. L'Europe puissance

The proponents of the idea of a '*l'Europe puissance*' (or an European superpower<sup>45</sup>) readily admit that the Union has always been and still is a Civilian Power Europe (Jørgensen, 1998: 93-94. Bull, 1982). Nevertheless, since Charles de Gaulle's days, they vigorously contest the claim that Europe should be a Civilian Power and propose the vision of a '*l'Europe puissance*' instead. What would it look like? According to Hill, it would entail six things: firstly, a single effective point of decision, probably also with an elected leader who would represent the Union; secondly, the ability to mobilise a full range of resources; thirdly, strong, competitive economic performance; fourthly, a Weberian

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<sup>42</sup> Moravcsik, 2003: 81. Moravcsik, 2002. Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002: 769-772. Rynning, 2003: 22-23.

<sup>43</sup> Mayer, Rittberger and Zelli, 2003. Rittberger and Zelli, 2003.

<sup>44</sup> Guéhenno, 1998: 34. Smith, K.E., 2002. Hill, 1990: 55.

<sup>45</sup> This essay prefers the French name in order to show the historical dimension of the concept (see B.II.1).

bureaucracy; fifthly, the ability to project power effectively across the globe; and finally, nuclear weapons (Hill, 2003b: 8).

The first, second, fifth and sixth characteristic show that a '*l'Europe puissance*' is fundamentally different from a Civilian Power Europe using force. A Civilian Power, according to the dominant discourse, uses military power as an *ultima ratio* in order to defend itself or stop grave human rights violations. For a '*l'Europe puissance*', the use of military means is central in creating the Union's identity as an international political actor (Larsen, 2002: 289-292. Heisbourg, 2000).

This brings us already to the first argument put forward in favour of a '*l'Europe puissance*'. Without military means, the Union would not get the recognition and respect which it – due to its size, history, and potential capabilities – deserves (Weidenfeld, 2002: 1363. Buchan, 1993: 1-8). The Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Spidla, declared that 'it is not acceptable for Europe to be a military pigmy' (Spidla, 2003: 8). The 'Emperor has no clothes school' (Hill, 1990: 49) repudiates the possibility of winning prestige by being a Civilian Power. Was not Europe a Civilian Power for over thirty years and still remains a political dwarf? Secondly, the nature of the international system obliges Europe to become a '*l'Europe puissance*'. The international system is seen as one of anarchy. The most important actors in world politics are states. Instead of moving away from the idea of a state, Europe should rebuild the state on a larger scale. Norms and values do not count for much in this system, since there is nobody to assure they are followed (Sjursen, 2003a: 36). In this realist system, a Civilian Power is left without any means of influence, since it cannot advance the realisation of its interests by military means (Rynning, 2003: 21) Moreover, security means the ability to control others; thus security of one actor is based on insecurity of others. In this 'Waltzian' (Hill, 1998: 38-39. Waltz, 2000) kind of system Europe must be a '*l'Europe puissance*' to be able to survive and promote its interests.<sup>46</sup> There seems to be a contradiction of this claim with the realist position in 3.1.2., which is very sceptical about future EU integration in the field of foreign policy.

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<sup>46</sup> White, 1999). Hill and Wallace, 1996). Gordon, 1997. Ifestos, 1987: 68. Knodt and Princen, 2003: 2-3.

Nevertheless, it is hard to challenge the final argument of the advocates of a '*l'Europe puissance*'. It follows from the second reason and concerns the confused relationship of a Civilian Power Europe with the United States. A Civilian Power Europe was created by the US which remains the guarantor of the feasibility of the concept. This fact is not only criticised by scholars like Kagan, but also admitted by nearly all proponents of the idea.<sup>47</sup> Does not a Civilian Power Europe ultimately depend on others behaving less civilly? Is the Civilian Power concept only viable in what Cooper termed a 'post-modern world' (Cooper, 2000)? The wish of the Civilian Power advocates for Europe to be a civilian role model appears as a 'contradiction in terms'. (Bull, 1982).

Furthermore, a Civilian Power Europe damages the transatlantic relationship as the American leaders and the public have recognized the inconsistency (Mayer, Rittberger and Zelli, 2003). Even if the US accepted a new 'transatlantic bargain' based on a division of labour, it would not be in the Union's interest to be a paymaster while gaining little political advantage (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 27-28). A '*l'Europe puissance*', on the other hand would make Europe less dependent on the US while fulfilling its wish for an interlocutor of scale as a partner in solving international problems (Ginsberg, 1997: 315-316).

#### 4. Conclusion

This dissertation discusses the question why there is a public debate about the idea of a Civilian Power Europe.

The few works which do touch upon the question posit that it exists a causal correlation between the debate and the actual state of European integration and the international system in general. This dissertation refutes the argument and identifies instead a two-fold rift as the explanation why there is a debate about a Civilian Power Europe.

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<sup>47</sup> Harnisch and Maull (2001): 139-140. Duchêne (1972): 3. Kagan (2003). Schaber and Ulbert (1994): 159-165. Whitman (1997): 33.

The rift within the idea of a Civilian Power Europe itself is presented in part two. Firstly, it is not clear whether a Civilian Power Europe can use force. The dominant discourse claims it can. What is missing, however, are specific distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate violence. The competing discourse challenges the claim of the dominant discourse and maintains that a Civilian Power Europe cannot use force. The essay found that the debate is inherent in the Civilian Power concept. It is unclear whether the word 'civilian' refers to the pursuit of peace or to the defence of democratic rights (Tewes, 2002: 10-13. Tewes, 2001: 10-11).

Secondly, the origins of Europe's Civilian Power character are contested. Five different explanations are reviewed. This leads us to five different interpretations of the stability and the exportability of the idea of a Civilian Power.

However, the debate concerning the idea of a Civilian Power Europe does not stem from the first rift alone. The idea is contested not only from within, but also from without (Wæver, 2000: 280-281). Part three presents the second rift between the idea and other theoretical interpretations of the Union's foreign policy. The Civilian Power idea leads to such a debate because it has a descriptive and a normative side. Other approaches only contest in one dimension, the idea of a Civilian Power competes in two.

What is the larger significance of the finding of this paper? Has the question been worth asking? Returning to a point which was addressed in the introduction, the question is indeed worth asking as it provides one with an unique overview of a rather complex debate and thus puts one in a good position to evaluate the needs for further research.

Firstly, the idea of a Civilian Power is a classic example of how a vague theoretical statement leaves room for divergent predictions. Disagreements can be narrowed if theories are clearly framed to begin with (Van Evera, 1997: 32-33). The dominant discourse has to agree on rules for the use of military force. Otherwise one could accuse the advocates of the dominant discourse of moulding



the '*l'Europe puissance*' model into a civilian power model that encompasses the use of military power (Ehrhardt, 2002b: 13-14).

Secondly, one of the main achievements of this essay is to highlight that the analytical use of the idea of a Civilian Power is limited as long as its origins are unclear (Tewes, 2001: 19-22). The idea of a Civilian Power is inherently complex and multi-dimensional, but bundling several specific and distinctive explanations into a whole simply does not work. In particular, the problems concerning role theory have to be addressed. Can one apply Maull's Civilian Power model to the EU? Bridging the gap between the German Civilian Power school of Maull and the scholars concerned with the study of EU Foreign Policy seems promising.

First these essential questions about the Civilian Power idea itself have to be answered – then it makes sense to discuss the idea in comparison with other approaches (part three). Concerning the actual foreign policy outputs, it is surprising how little empirical work has been done in this field from a Civilian Power perspective. In addition, the other approaches are even less well conceptualised, making any comparative work difficult. Maull's and Orbie's suggestion to develop a broad spectrum of ideal type role concepts is the right way forward (Harnisch and Maull, 2001b: 140-143. Orbie, 2003).

Regarding the prescriptive dimension of the Civilian Power concept, the '*l'Europe puissance*' model seems still far from being realised, even though the findings of this work suggest that the wish in Europe to move into that direction is strong. The appeal of a '*l'Europe puissance*' appears to be stronger than the one of a Civilian Power Europe. In order to correct this, the idea needs answers to the pressing questions about its ambiguous relationship with the US.

Concluding, one could remark that a dynamic, multi-faceted phenomena like the European Union's external relations system deserves a better conceptualisation than an ill-defined idea (Jørgensen, 1998: 96-97). However, by asking the right questions and by offering some avenues for further research, this dissertation hopes to be a first step to heal the two-fold rift. This would be a profound service for the analysis of European Foreign Policy (Hill, 1990: 55).

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