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Power, Interest and Insecurity:
A comparative analysis of workplace dualization and inclusion in Europe

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Arthur Corazza*

Abstract

In Europe’s ‘age of dualisation’, interest groups are key to contemporary political economy theory of insider-outsider divides, where only strategic, rational choice might explain a shift to inclusive representation. Yet, a recent and growing body of case studies argues that power dynamics shape preferences, strategies and, ultimately, workplace inequalities. This paper draws on theoretical developments to examine these competing hypotheses. In particular, it seeks to identify the conditions under which workplace-level representation moderates or reinforces subjective insecurity gaps between stable and atypical employment. Through an explanatory sequential mixed methodology, multi-level logistic regression using survey data maps out the set of EU28 political economies while a qualitative section compares two cases in depth. Overall, the findings reveal country clusters that support the power-based thesis, based on institutional and ideational resources, and run counter the rational choice argument. Integrated into the ‘vicious circle’ concept, adverse conditions specify endogenous relationships at a certain threshold, but can be disqualified as sine qua non catalysts. The paper therefore contributes to the ‘varieties of workplace dualisation’ literature, connecting the angle of employment relations with political economy research on inequalities.

Keywords: Dualisation, atypical work, employment insecurity, industrial relations, political economy,

JEL Codes: J5, J53, P16

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1. Introduction

In a Europe of both economic prosperity and social inequalities, industrial democracy constitutes a central, but challenged pillar of capitalism’s democratic embedding. Key to European industrial relations, representation and participation in the labour market are viewed by many as fundamental to rebalance power relations (Hyman, 2018). At the same time, however, contemporary political economy puts it at the roots of rising inequalities, a dualisation process that protects organised ‘insiders’ with secure jobs, rights and entitlements at the cost of precarious and weakly organised ‘outsiders’ (Hassel, 2014; Rueda, 2007, 2014). This ‘age of dualisation’ is seen as an expression of continued stasis of actors’ rational preferences during liberalisation and distributive conflict (Emmenegger et al., 2012a). Change, from this perspective, only occurs if ‘insiders’ come to view inclusion as a way to protect themselves. Hence, reversing the trend of dualisation is only expected to occur when interest groups are structurally weakened and strategically adapt.

Yet, a body of case studies from the 2010s contrasts this thesis. It suggests that, comparatively, trade union strategies that support ‘outsiders’ tend to occur where institutional and ideational factors are supportive. Such cases include, for example, inclusive union strategies that represent and support non-standard workers in the
Swedish and French public sectors (Grimshaw et al., 2018), in the Danish meatpacking industry (Refslund & Wagner, 2018), the Dutch construction sector (Berntsen & Lillie, 2016), Slovenia’s retail business (Mrozowicki et al., 2018) and in the metal industries of Belgium and Germany (Benassi et al., 2019; Pulignano & Doerflinger, 2018). Italy’s labour movement is also argued to have regained its inclusive standing, based on sectoral and national-level perspectives (Benvegni et al., 2018; Durazzi et al., 2018). In other instances, representation centred on ‘insiders’ has failed to support ‘outsiders’, such as in the Greek telecommunications sector (Kornelakis, 2016) or in Hungary’s local governments (Grimshaw et al., 2018). While these cases differ in many respects, they share the observation of trade unions pursuing new forms of inclusion in a context of supportive institutional and ideational factors. Labelled as ‘varieties of workplace dualisation’ by Benassi (2017), this case-based stream of industrial relations therefore examines how power dynamics and labour strategies, given a set of contextual factors, shape workplace arrangements.

This paper strives to systematically examine how the rational choice perspective of dualisation is reconcilable with the context-sensitive solidarity observed in present-day Europe’s labour markets. For that purpose, it builds on the theoretical framework recently developed in ‘Reconstructing Solidarity’ by Doellgast et al. (2018a). Key for advancing the dualisation debate, it expects inclusive trade unionisms to manifest, where both its institutional and associational power resources are encompassing. Drawing on a mixed-methods approach, this paper thus examines the drivers of workplace-level dualisation and inclusion across the entire 28 political economies of the European Union. In brief, it shows that comparatively strong power resources are indeed a necessary condition for inclusive trade unionism, whereas ‘insider’ insecurity is not. This is in line with the theoretical framework’s notion of ‘vicious circles’, as opposed to self-correcting, negative feedback effects of inequality. As such, the findings contribute to the advanced dualisation debate with a systematic, deductive approach on the conditions for inclusive European trade unionism and an original focus on subjective insecurity divides at the workplace level.
Put into context, the workplace as a specific locus of working life, representation and participation has gained in relevance through both long-term shifts and counter-movements. Prominent pessimistic accounts have questioned trade unionism’s ability to contain its nearly universal marginalisation and rejuvenate to democratise the economy (Avdagic & Baccaro, 2014; Baccaro & Howell, 2017; Streeck, 2016). Indeed, as part of a long-term trend that was reinforced by reforms during the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone (e.g. Marginson & Welz, 2015), decentralisation of collective bargaining towards the company level has raised the stakes of representation at the workplace. At the same time, the 2010s have also been shaped by political resentment and an emergent discourse about democratic participation across the Global North, manifesting in the work context as ‘workplace democracy’ (Yeoman, 2014) and ‘democracy at work’ (Wolff, 2012). Here, new forms of direct employee participation, co-determination and cooperatives contrast traditional collectivism, both challenging it and opening doorways for its future role for voice at work (Hyman, 2015; Wilkinson et al., 2013). Hence, these simultaneous shifts merit closer study of today’s ‘workplace politics’ to examine how collective representation and social divides interact and are embedded in broader contexts.

The structure of this paper is as follows. To start with, section 2 reviews the dualisation literature and identifies two streams on change, rational choice and power resources. After formulating the research question, section 4 develops the theoretical framework and conceptualises insecurity, the outcome of interest. Having presented data and the mixed methodology, the quantitative and qualitative analyses in section 7 test and examine the hypotheses. Section 8 then integrates the findings with the theoretical framework and discusses various limitations, before concluding in a final section.
2. Literature review

2.1 Dualisation & Insider-Outsider Theory

Contemporary study of inequalities in work and employment, their causes and consequences, is rooted in the segmentation theories of the 1970s. In contrast to economic theory, this approach introduced the notion of persistent labour market divides between a primary or core workforce in secure, well-paid positions and a secondary or peripheral part with less stable jobs and frequent unemployment spells (Berger & Piore, 1980; Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Lindbeck & Snower, 1988; Rubery, 1978). Following a Polanyian ontological notion, labour markets, Rubery articulates, are treated as ‘social constructs, shaped and influenced by institutions and by social actors’ (Rubery, 2003, p. xvii). Today, the dualisation literature builds on this approach and pursues a comparative institutionalist perspective to rationalise social divides. Centring on the insider-outsider theory of the mid-2000s, it argues that regulatory and policy shifts that drive labour market inequalities largely result from the insider-oriented interest representation of social-democratic parties and trade unions in face of structural change, such as liberalisation (Hassel, 2014; Rueda, 2005, 2007). Building on the well-known Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall & Soskice, 2001), these are identified as part of cross-class coalitions between employers and the organised, skilled workforce, making bargaining concessions at the expense of labour market ‘outsiders’.

Dualisation is thus understood as stasis at the centre despite liberalisation processes, maintaining coordination and institutionalised protection at the core while introducing flexibility at the periphery (Thelen, 2014). Most of the theory’s empirical underpinnings are drawn from labour market reforms in Europe between the 1990s and 2000s, labelled as ‘flexibility at the margins’ or ‘two-tiered reforms’ (Dolado et al., 2002; Palier & Thelen, 2010), and particularly refer to cases of corporatist Germany and, more broadly, Continental and Southern Europe (Hassel, 2007; Rueda, 2014; Streeck & Hassel, 2003; Thelen, 2012). By the late 2010s, the insider-outsider theory is
described by some as the ‘new political economy mainstream’ (Durazzi et al., 2018), playing an influential role in ascribing the roots of economic, social and political inequalities in parts of Europe to entrenched interest groups.

Looking ahead, the dualisation process has often been viewed as lasting trajectory of path dependencies in the tradition of historical institutionalist scholarship (Pierson, 2000). This perspective argues that downward competition and negative externalities for ‘insiders’ are prevented, for instance, due to separate labour markets for the core and the peripheral workforce (Emmenegger et al., 2012b), lacking political inactivity by ‘outsiders’ (Häusermann, 2012), as well as employers’ and trade unions’ persistent interest in shielding the core workforce and preserving involvement in policy-making (Davidsson & Emmenegger, 2013; Emmenegger et al., 2012b; Emmenegger, 2014). Hence, in the absence of significant external shocks, positive feedback effects from long-term reform and outcome trajectories are overall expected to reinforce dualisation processes in European political economies.

Reversing the process is mostly (if at all) considered from a functionalist perspective by this stream of literature. While expecting fundamentally stable cross-class coalitions, for instance in German manufacturing, these accounts see instability to only possibly arise from a lack of willingness from employers or a lack of ability from the side of trade unions (Thelen, 2014) or a ‘shrinking and softening of the core’ (Streeck, 2009) induced by the long-term structural decline of the manufacturing industry (Iversen & Soskice, 2015). Given the ‘net effect’ of dualism from the past decades, stable, instrumental preferences by insider-groups shielded from economic pressures have thus been a common feature in the dualisation literature, which has not been particularly engaged with changes in the organisation, representation and participation of labour market ‘outsiders’.
2.2 Strategies and preferences in flux

Advancing the dualisation debate, more recent research investigates how the preferences and strategies of labour and management vary and change due to contextual factors. This has emerged in the context of prominent ‘outsider’-friendly reforms in typically dualised labour markets (Picot & Tassinari, 2017; Marx & Starke, 2017). Central to these studies is the analysis of the varieties of actors’ preferences, strategies and effectiveness with regard to their potential interests, the institutional setting they operate in and their ideational influences.

From a rational choice perspective, organisational self-interests can be one source of change. While the initial insider-outsider theory views the interests of the core and the peripheral workforce as mutually exclusive, changing circumstances may require trade unions to become more inclusive to remain protective of their constituency, even if their preferences remain stable. As such, dualisation is understood ‘as one stage in a longer process of redistributing risks and privileges between labour market segments’ (Eichhorst & Marx, 2011, p. 74). This may occur when dualisation dynamics create negative externalities for the protected core, for instance through low-wage competition (Meyer, 2016). In a similar vein, Hassel (2012) argues that, in some instances, labour market ‘insiders’ have in fact been more affected by some reforms than ‘outsiders’. Indeed, short-termism can result from policy complexity or immediate necessity that might conflict with long-term interests (Jacobs & Weaver, 2015). Conceptually, such negative feedback mechanisms thus unfold when groups experience losses from strategies, policies or outcomes that were previously supported for their promised benefits. For instance, case studies underpin the relevance of core-periphery competition in the German metal industry in that respect (Benassi & Dorigatti, 2015). From this perspective, trade union interests thus remain centred on protecting their core constituency while strategies to do so can change.

In a second stream, described as ‘varieties of workplace dualisation’ (Benassi, 2017), the preferences and strategies of trade union organisations are shaped by institutional and associational contexts that interact with and are shaped by their identities and
ideologies. Here, dualisation is treated as ‘distinctive configuration of mutually reinforcing power relationships’ between actors’ preferences and behaviour at the organisational and workplace level and the institutional and legal setting they are embedded in (Pulignano & Doerflinger, 2018b, p. 76). Hence, this stream of industrial relations focuses on labour strategies and bargaining outcomes at the workplace level to reveal how these result from power dynamics that are shaped by wider processes of institutional and structural change, but also local circumstances.

In particular, previous studies show that factors explaining trade union strategies include the shape of labour market institutions, such as membership numbers, the centralisation of bargaining, involvement in labour market policy, and organisational structures (Davidsson & Emmenegger, 2013; Gordon, 2015; Oliver, 2011), as well as trade unions’ historical identity and ideologies (Benassi & Vlandas, 2016; Dorigatti, 2017; Marino, 2012; Pulignano & Doerflinger, 2013). Studying strategies’ impact, previous work often points out the ability to draw upon institutional power resources and associational capacities to coordinate and organise workers (Benassi et al., 2016; Benassi et al., 2019; Doellgast et al., 2009; Pulignano & Signoretti, 2016; Wagner & Refslund, 2016). In addition, sectoral characteristics are also shown to influence the form, levels and approaches of organisations (Carré et al., 2010; Geppert et al., 2014). Overall, previous studies often find that both institutional embedding and ideational underpinnings matter and enable inclusive strategies in support of ‘outsiders’.

### 3. Research Question

Having identified the two streams on change in the dualisation literature, this research aims to comprehensively examine whether and how trade unions’ power resources, or alternatively their core constituencies’ rationale for self-protection, condition inclusive trade unionism. Given the case evidence presented at the start, the focus lies on Europe in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. Specifically, the study investigates whether trade unions’ power resources or ‘insider’ interests explain variations in
workplace valorization and inclusion in political economies of the European Union in the mid-2010s.

The originality of this paper stems from two angles. First, the outcome of interest in this study is the subjective experience of insecurity, which has equipped recent valorization research with a new perspective on precarious work (see Chung, 2016). Here, subjective measures are seen as more accurate to approximate for the quality of working life. Precarious work, it has been argued, is the result of a range of objective factors, including the type of employment contract (see Section 4.2). In addition, this measure allows integrating political economy with research on the consequences of insecurity, which increases its relevance. A considerable body of empirical research has shown that subjective insecurities at work influence outcomes such as health and life satisfaction (Carr & Chung, 2014; De Witte et al., 2016; Meltzer et al., 2009), family well-being and the quality of partnerships (Mauno et al., 2017), work motivation and productivity (Arends et al., 2017; Rosenblatt et al., 1999), as well as welfare attitudes, social identities and political views (Marx, 2014; Mewes & Mau, 2012; Selenko et al., 2017). For instance, fear of job loss is shown to be to be comparable to the severity of psychological distress caused by unemployment (Burchell, 2011). Therefore, both the study’s accuracy and relevance benefit from using subjective measures as outcome variables, in line with recent work advancing valorization research.

Secondly, analysing workplace dynamics in their political economy context contributes to connecting the comparative institutionalist valorization literature with the field of employment relations. Advocated by Pulignano et al. (2017), this allows analysing how conditions shape actors’ behaviour and strategies, which extends the analysis from institutional valorization to institutional context of the ‘workplace politics’ of social divides. Previous comparative research has for example shown that workplaces, where collective bargaining is more encompassing and non-standard work is more strictly regulated also better prevent precarious work (Gautié & Schmitt, 2010). Focusing on valorization, Chung (2016) takes a macro-level perspective to show specifically that subjective insecurity divides between permanent and temporary
workers exhibit clear cross-country differences, with ‘insiders’ in corporatist countries feeling relatively secure. Since the micro-level nexus of workplace representation and subjective insecurity has not yet been systematically examined from a political economy perspective, this specific macro-micro perspective complements previous research on the drivers of inequalities in the world of work.

4. Theory and concepts

Building on the presented case evidence and the research question, the following framework theorises how power resources shape the variety of trade union strategies toward ‘outsiders’. This is expanded by an alternative hypothesis based on rational choice. The remainder of the section conceptualises insecurity, which subsequently serves as labour market outcome of interest.

4.1 Theoretical framework

Central to one of the most influential streams in political economy (Korpi, 1983; Korpi & Palme, 2003), the notion of power resources and its instrumental use, particularly by the labour movement, has also featured prominently in the study of dualisation (Gallie, 2007). As defined by Wright (2000) as well as Silver (2003), trade unions possess and exert ‘associational power’ and ‘structural power’. The former derives from workers’ collective organisational capacities and captures their resources and capabilities, for instance to strike. The latter dimension describes the skills and workforce structures, locations, and external technological factors in the labour market. Additionally, unions’ ‘institutional power’ stems from institutional arrangements, in particular their formal participation in collective bargaining institutions (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013). It can also include the broader environment of labour market policy, legislation and welfare. While the structural dimension of power resources can be considered as constant within a given industry at a specific time, associational and institutional power resources form the two conceptual components of interest.
Theoretical framework for this study devises a comprehensive model for contextual determinants of actor strategies and their dynamic inter-relations. Developed by Doellgast et al. (2018b), it hypothesises union strategies inclusive of the interests of precarious ‘outsiders’ to result from trade unions’ degree of power resources. On the one hand, unions’ institutional power resources increase with institutional inclusiveness, which, following Bosch et al. (2010), means extending benefits obtained by workers with stronger bargaining power to those with weaker benefits. In addition, such encompassing bargaining structures improve organisations’ leverage and thus shape associational power resources too. On the other hand, inclusive forms of worker identity and identification that are open to redefinition and integration of previous ‘outsider’ groups foster new forms of solidarity, strengthening associational union power as well. Such new solidarity emerges out of the specific circumstances and contexts of organisations, perceptions of injustice and shared interests, but also frames and narratives shaping identity and ideology (Doellgast et al., 2018). Hence, this theoretical framework accounts for the diversity of union strategies through a continuum of possible outcomes, with inclusive and exclusive union strategies at its idealised poles and views such outcomes as a product of actors’ power resources that are conditioned by contextual factors.

Dynamically, this framework models these idealised poles as ‘vicious circles’ and ‘virtuous circles’ of mutually reinforcing feedback effects. In a ‘vicious circle’, trade unions’ exclusivity reinforces labour market divides. Here, fragmented institutions, particularly characterised by weak bargaining coverage and coordination, as well as more particularistic worker identifications induce stronger exclusivity, creating more exit options for employer strategies and deepening social divides that, in turn, challenge non-market institutions. In a ‘virtuous circle’ dynamic, strong institutional and associational power resources are by contrast expected to foster inclusive union strategies. These allow closing workforce divides and encourage voice-oriented strategies based on workplace cooperation and interest mediation in the production process. At the workplace level, inclusive representation thus means bargaining for
both atypical workers’ pay as well as security and career pathways based on ‘stepping stone’ positions, whereas exclusive representation would tend to view and treat the marginal workforce as way to ensure the company’s external flexibility and competitiveness. Therefore, this dynamic perspective accounts for a variety of trade union strategies.

Conversely, the alternative hypothesis suggests that inclusive trade union strategies towards ‘outsiders’ might follow from a rational re-orientation of labour market ‘insiders’. As aforementioned, stable preferences for the primary protection of unions’ core constituency can still induce inclusive strategies, if circumstances change in a way that interests are no longer mutually exclusive, but rather positively inter-dependent. Instead of divergent ‘circle effects’, this would rather imply negative feedback effects from self-undermining policies or outcomes (Jacobs & Weaver, 2015). In that case, addressing precarious work would also improve the security of ‘insiders’, which is plausible in the context of debates around social dumping and downward competition. The rational choice hypothesis thus expects inclusive union strategies, where ‘insiders’ expose comparatively high levels of insecurity that can subsequently be attributed to the ‘outsider’ workforce.

4.2 Conceptualising insecurity

Taking a broad perspective on precarious work, Standing (2011) defines insecurity as a social category lacking seven forms of security, including distinctions of labour market, work, job and employment insecurities. Developed by international institutions, recent frameworks for ‘Decent Work’, ‘Quality of Employment’, or ‘Job Quality’ primarily account for such work-related securities (ILO, 2013; OECD, 2016; UNECE, 2015). Along those lines, the approach taken here understands insecurity as both expression and specific aspect of precarious work and thus as lack of job quality.

The conceptualisation of insecurity in working life has produced a variety of definitions and dimensions (Probst et al., 2014), only recently converging to a broader notion of employment insecurity. Initially, Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1984, p. 438)
understood job insecurity as ‘perceived powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a threatened job situation’. More contemporary literature also conceptualises job insecurity as a subjective phenomenon of workers’ perceptions rather than drawing on job characteristics of objective insecurity, such as employment status (Shoss, 2017; Sverke & Hellgren, 2002). While the two relate and overlap, ‘standard’ employees with permanent contracts may also feel insecure, whereas some highly skilled, unionised atypical workers might enjoy more security.

Additionally, an individual’s estimate of how likely a job loss is in a given period of time is measured by cognitive insecurity, whereas affective job insecurity refers to its emotional and attitudinal consequences, such as anxiety and worries (Probst, 2003). The attitudinal dimension is likely to follow from perceived risks and intersects with additional factors, such as the relational nature of subjective measures (Kalleberg & Hewison, 2013). Cognitive insecurity, by contrast, is a more robust measure for cross-country comparison and thus used in more recent studies (see Chung & Mau, 2014). In this paper, job insecurity therefore refers to the perceived risk of job loss.

For a comprehensive concept of insecurity in the world of work, focusing on the perceived likelihood of job loss alone has been criticised as insufficient as it fails to account for labour market insecurity. This arises from a perceived lack of alternatives on the labour market, as opposed to quick transitions to new positions that allow maintaining one’s living standards (Anderson & Pontusson, 2007). The concept of employment insecurity combines the established job-related concept with workers’ perceived outside options on the labour market in case of losing their current position (Chung & van Oorschot, 2011). Overall, this comprehensive concept synthesises subjective expectations of one’s ability to retain and obtain access to appropriate paid jobs, thus to secure a regular income through employment.
5. Data Collection

This study focuses on political economies of the European Union and thus includes cases of each of the established welfare regime clusters of a geographically expanded and internally nuanced classification based on Esping-Andersen (1990). The main data source is the integrated data file of the *European Working Conditions Survey* (EWCS), conducted every five years by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound, 2018a). Uniquely, this survey combines data on subjective labour market outcomes and workplace-level representation in Europe. While the survey was launched in the 1990s, union-related data was only first collected in the 6th and last wave of 2015. Still, an advantage is the large-N nature of this wave with a total of 413 variables for 43,850 observations across the 28 member states of the European Union. Such a spatial breadth that includes Central and Eastern European countries contributes an added value often absent in previous studies. This coverage suits the mid-range scope of political economy theory of dualisation, which has centred on Europe as primary geographical space.

5.1 Central components

Following the above concept of subjective insecurity, the dependent variable contains job, labour market, and employment insecurity. The EWCS is based on a questionnaire, which is conducted face-to-face with a random sample of ‘persons in employment’ representative of the working population in each of the European Union member states (Eurofound, 2018a). The relevant label for job insecurity is ‘About your job - I might lose my job in the next 6 months?’ and the one for labour market insecurity is ‘About your job - If I were to lose or quit my job, it would be easy for me to find a job of similar salary?’ (Eurofound, 2018a). The survey response options follow a Likert scale, offering five answer options ranging from strong agreement to strong disagreement (and three spontaneous evasion responses). The compound measure of ‘employment insecurity’ is constructed as simple average of the other two, thus offering a total of nine levels. After data transformation, all response variables equate
higher values to stronger insecurity. Appendix A.1 provides summary statistics of the overall survey data and bar charts for visual presentation.

The micro-level characteristics are drawn from the EWCS as well. The two individual-level variables of interest are used as binary variables that capture workers’ employment status and company-level union presence. As for the former, ‘insiders’ are understood as workers/employees with a permanent (unlimited duration) contract; ‘outsiders’ are those holding a temporary (limited duration) contract, corresponding with much previous research (e.g. Chung, 2016). Regarding unions, the data capture whether or not a trade union, works council or other workers’ representative body is present at the workplace level, though the different types are not distinguished in the survey. Initial descriptive statistics (Appendix A.2) suggest that both employment status and union presence may indeed be relevant factors for insecurity, with cross-country variations and potentially intersectional effects.

At the macro level, the key factors considered are two sets of variables. First, data on industrial democracy institutions is retrieved from Eurofound’s analytical framework of industrial relations, which provides national-level indices for all EU28 countries during the period of 2013-17 (Eurofound, 2018b). The index and its sub-indices integrate data from various sources and are measured along a scale of 0-100 with higher values indicating stronger industrial relations. Following Eurofound’s comprehensive framework, the three empirical sub-dimensional indices are associational governance, representation and participation rights, and social dialogue at company level (Eurofound, 2018c; see Appendix A.3.a). As such, the first sub-dimension captures the organisational power resources of workers’ representatives, whereas the sub-dimensions of rights and workplace social dialogue comprise the regulations and practices underpinning unions’ institutional power resources. In addition, data on labour market policy is retrieved from the LMP database of the European Commission DG EMPL and Eurostat (European Commission, 2018; Eurostat, 2019). For all 28 countries, the two variables measure the annual average public expenditure for (active/active and passive) labour market policy per
unemployed person (see Appendix A.3.a). Summary statistics are provided in Appendix A.3.b.

The second macro-level set captures the degree of ‘insider’ exposure to market pressures by aggregating EWCS data at the country level. Specifically, it measures shares of the workforce in permanent employment, used as ‘insiders’, reporting high and very high levels of employment insecurity. Here, applying the concept of employment insecurity allows for a comprehensive proxy for the subjective experience of ‘insiders’. Visual summary of country-specific shares reveals considerable cross-country differences (Appendix A.3.c). For the case the rational choice hypothesis is corroborated, data on workforce shares in temporary employment is retrieved from Eurostat’s database (Eurostat, 2019) to examine the possible causes of ‘insider’ insecurity in more detail.

5.2 Control components

In addition, studies have shown that individual and organisational factors play a role in subjective insecurity (Shoss, 2017). The most relevant predictors of insecurity are age (younger and older workers), occupation (blue-collar), education (primary level or lower) and type of contract (non-standard) (e.g. Carr & Chung, 2014; Kalleberg, 2011; Keim et al., 2014). Based on these studies, respondents’ age, gender, education level (ISCED-11), occupation (ISCO-08), and sector (NACE rev.2) are considered. Following the literature of routine-biased technological change (Goos et al., 2009), a task-related variable proxies for the perceived risk of automation by capturing whether the respondent considers job features to be monotonous.

Within organisations, known relevant factors are internal communication (Kinnunen et al., 2000) and organisational change, such as restructuring and outsourcing (e.g. Ferrie et al., 1998; Jiang et al., 2013). Selected EWCS variables account for organisational change through a question on workforce reduction in the last 12 months and, alternatively, restructuring or reorganisation in the last 3 years. Other
organisational factors mentioned above are not included to reduce the risk of an over-specification bias, as they partly overlap with individual-level, job-related factors.

Finally, at the sectoral and national level, several quantitative studies find a relationship between socio-economic conditions and insecurities (Dixon et al., 2013; Esser & Olsen, 2012; Lübke & Erlinghagen, 2014). Hence, country-level economic conditions are measured with Eurostat data through annual unemployment rates (level and changes). Overall, these components allow comprehensively controlling for evidenced individual, organisational, structural and macro-economic antecedents to forms of insecurity in working life.

6. Methodology

The research design follows a mixed-methods approach that first applies quantitative methods to test two hypotheses and then builds on these results using qualitative methods. As one of the three basic mixed methods approaches, the Explanatory Sequential Mixed Method has the key purpose of mapping out findings first, which a qualitative phase follows up on (Creswell, 2013). The main justification for the mixed-methods approach is its capacity for analytical development and complementarity that ‘seeks elaboration, enhancement, illustration, clarification from the results’ (Greene et al., 1989, p. 259). Given the deductive nature of the research question, this approach enables both testing hypotheses and exploring causal mechanisms in more depth.

In the quantitative framework, multilevel regression analysis, also known as hierarchical models, considers individuals to be nested in group-level units, which allows estimating the moderating influences of higher-level variables on lower-level relationships (Gelham & Hill, 2006; Hox, 2002). Conceptually, institutions are, in Lazarsfeld’s terminology, seen to be ‘specifying’ the interaction between micro-level factors and outcomes (Lazarsfeld, 1955). While linear and non-linear random effects allow for group-specific variation of micro-level relationships, cross-level interaction models enable to explain cross-unit variation in covariates’ effects with country-level
variables (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). The structure of a random intercept and random slope model with group-level predictors includes two levels, the micro-level regression and the cross-level interaction (see Appendix B).

In the specification of the baseline model, the response variable employment insecurity is regressed on inter alia employment status and the presence of workplace-level representation. Their country-specific interaction effect $\beta_{3j}$ captures whether (and to what degree) workplace representation, including trade unions’ presence, moderates or reinforces subjective insecurity divides between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ for each country $j$. In this first phase, the focus lies on the quantifiable explanatory variable of institutional power resources, particularly industrial democracy. Its explanatory value can be assessed descriptively or through cross-level interactions in an extended model version. Additionally, micro-level control variables include occupational status (white- or blue-collar), which serves as tested functional equivalent to educational and sectoral controls, as well as age, gender, task-related and organisation-related binary variables. This results in the following:

$$\logit\left(\text{insec}_{\text{empl}_{ij}}\right) = a_j + \beta_1 \text{stat}_{ij} + \beta_2 \text{union}_{ij} + \beta_{3j} \text{stat}_{ij} \times \text{union}_{ij} + \beta_4 \text{occ}_i + \beta_5 \text{taskm}_{ij} + \beta_6 \text{age}_{ij} + \beta_7 \text{sex}_{ij} + \beta_8 \text{org}_{\text{force}_{ij}}$$

(1)

where the coefficient $\beta_{3j}$ corresponds to the country-specific random slope in the first step and in an extended version with cross-level interactions to $\left(\delta_0 + \delta_i idx_{dem,ij}\right)$. This captures the cross-sectional average effect and a group-specific component that, in this baseline version, depends on the macro-level covariate $idx_{dem,ij}$. Given an ordered categorical response variable, ordinal logistic regression sets a threshold for cumulative probabilities of insecurity and non-insecurity outcomes. In contrast to such Generalised Linear Models, simple linear models are not appropriate, as the predicted values could lie below the lowest and above the highest categories and residual heteroskedasticity would likely arise, not being able to ensure validity.
For the qualitative analysis in the second phase, the case selection builds on the results from the regression analysis. Importantly, the Explanatory Sequential Mixed Methods approach taken here allows adding depth in the second phase. For that step, qualitative comparative analysis draws on two relevant country cases to further develop and explain the quantitative results. In this sequential approach, the respective qualitative question and the sampling procedure can be adapted to the framework and outcomes of the first stage (Creswell, 2013). This will require balancing an open-ended, qualitative question style with the theoretical framework guiding this research. Through purposeful sampling, two relevant country cases will be selected at the start of the qualitative analysis in section 7.2.

As one of the four common types of comparative analysis, most-similar comparison aims to make sense of observed differences through the ‘principle of variation’ (Pickvance, 2001). As such, the criteria for case selection will be: Two country cases that exhibit different quantitative outcomes – impacts of workplace-level union presence – but with similar scores on industrial democracy. This approximately allows controlling for institutional factors to examine the role of alternative explanatory factors, such as theoretically founded ideational drivers (worker identities and identifications). Examining the role of socio-cultural context is a common justification for an Explanatory Sequential Mixed Methods approach (Creswell, 2013, p. 281), for which the explanatory variable of worker identities and identifications is a case in point. For the analysis, evidence is drawn from secondary literature, including studies gathering primary data through interviews, as well as from online resources provided by the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and general media sources. This provides inputs for a thorough qualitative step, which will be followed by a discussion that integrates findings from the two phases.
7. Findings

This section implements the Explanatory Sequential Mixed Methods approach, first presenting findings from the cross-sectional quantitative analysis, and then examining them in a qualitative comparative analysis of two country cases.

7.1 Regression analysis

Initially, the regression model’s feasibility is checked. A log-likelihood ratio test (LRT) concludes that, for all outcome variables, the between-group variance is strong enough to justify the multi-level approach. Additionally, the relevant baseline assumption of normality for residual distributions holds (see Appendix C.1). The following section presents the estimation results stepwise for the micro-level determinants, the role of workplace-level representation with regard to insecurity divides, and finally contextual macro-level factors.

First, the regression output yields relevant and plausible results for both the central and control micro-level covariates, as presented in Table 1. Considering the baseline outcome of employment insecurity, the simple random intercept model (1) and the full version with a varying slope interaction effect (2) in Table 1 show that, across the EU28, temporary workers are more insecure than permanent ones, controlled for other factors. According to model (2), holding a temporary rather than permanent contract is associated with a 59% increase in the estimated odds of giving a response that indicates high rather than low levels of employment insecurity, controlled for other variables. This applies even more to job insecurity outcomes, which reaches 179% respectively (model 3), but not in a statistically significant way to labour market insecurity (model 4). The direct impact of workplace-level trade unions appears clearly significant only with regard to job insecurity, which is overall reduced. Furthermore, results in Table 1 for the control variables of task type, age, gender, and organisational

\[1\] Logistic regression outputs are produced as coefficients on the log-odds scale and require taking the exponential to interpret them as odds ratios.
change highlight their relevance and largely concur with previous research, though with a likely overlap between task monotony and occupation. Overall, these results plausibly suggest that higher job-related insecurity, as opposed to labour market insecurity, is the type of outcome most clearly associated with ‘outsider’ status and union presence.

**Table 1. Generalized Linear Mixed Model Results**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>inseclmpl</th>
<th>insecljob</th>
<th>insecllm</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.487***</td>
<td>0.465***</td>
<td>1.026***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
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<tr>
<td>union1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
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<td>-0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.172***</td>
<td>0.214***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
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<tr>
<td>age</td>
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<td>0.029***</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sex1</td>
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<td>-0.019</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.053)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.312***</td>
<td>0.381***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.125</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.693***</td>
<td>1.713***</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Observations: 21,462
Log Likelihood: -5,792.623
Akaike Inf. Crit.: 11,603.250
Bayesian Inf. Crit.: 11,675.010

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Secondly, the estimation results affirm the working premise that the impact of workplace-level unions on insider-outsider divides exhibits considerable variation across EU28 countries. The interaction term’s insignificance across all types of outcomes corroborates the perspective that, overall, there is no uniform moderating or reinforcing effect on evident insecurity divides between atypical and standard employment. Still, likelihood ratio tests further show that including the interaction term does raise the explanatory value when considering the outcome for job insecurity (model 3 of Table 1), while this is not the case for employment and labour market insecurity (see Appendix C.2.a). As a result, multi-level regression with cross-level interactions is methodologically not feasible for inferential methods and the analysis is limited to random slope models with a focus on job insecurity as response variable.

Importantly, however, the analysis yields two country clusters that exhibit statistically significant relationships between union presence and job-related insecurity gaps. The two significant clusters represent opposite outcomes on the spectrum of possible union impacts (see Appendix C.3). For Denmark, Finland, Malta, and Luxembourg, the workplace-level presence of a trade union or similar body is associated with a statistically significant reduction of the job insecurity gap between temporary and permanent workers. For example in Denmark, controlling for other factors, the presence of a union or similar, as opposed to its absence, is associated with a 55% reduction in the odds of a temporary worker stating to feel job insecurity (Malta: -57%; Luxembourg: -41%; Finland: -26%). Here, workplace-level representation seems to have an inclusive effect that reduces the observed labour market divides between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.

In contrast, the opposite appears to occur in Italy, Greece, Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Poland with a reinforced subjective job insecurity divide being significantly related to unions’ presence at the workplace level, controlling for other factors (Italy: +171%, Greece: +110%, Poland: 90%, Portugal: +88%, Czech Republic: 85%). For other countries by contrast, the null hypothesis of no effect cannot be rejected for the interaction term, featuring a range of plausible values for the 95%-confidence
intervals. Thus, these two country clusters suggest profound discrepancies in the role of workplace unions for job-related insider-outsider divides and will be the focus of the remaining analysis.

Turning to contextual macro-level factors, the hypothesis for power resources is supported by descriptive analysis. The relevant variation in estimated random slopes shows clear patterns when associated with institutional variables of industrial democracy. Countries with higher scores on the industrial democracy index and sub-indices, as well as labour market policy, are broadly associated with a tendency of moderating rather than reinforcing union effects (see Appendix C.4.a). The clearest contextual factor is the sub-index for ‘Social Dialogue at the Company Level’. Here, Denmark scores highest, closely followed by Finland and Luxembourg, and Malta lies at an average level. Accordingly, all countries from the second cluster score weakest for workplace social dialogue, with Portugal at the minimum. For the other two sub-dimensions, associational governance and rights at the workplace, a similar negative relationship appears less clear given the strong variation in both clusters. Hence, company-level social dialogue appears as most relevant macro-level factor of industrial democracy for the two country clusters.

The alternative hypothesis based on a rational choice logic, by contrast, is not supported by the findings. In fact, the association between random-slope point estimates and shares of the permanent workforce reporting high degrees of employment insecurity suggest the opposite. Where permanent workers feel the most insecure, workplace-level trade union presences significantly reinforce existing insecurity divides, instead of smoothing them. When considering the change of ‘insider’ insecurity shares from 2010 to 2015, no clear pattern is identifiable, with insecurity shares having increased only in Greece and Italy (see Appendix C.4.b). These findings thus strengthen the dualisation thesis of exclusivity as result of ‘insider’ insecurities as inclusion is only observed where ‘insiders’ are relatively secure.
A potentially confounding factor is the variable of socio-economic conditions, measured by the annual unemployment rate. These are more advantageous in the cluster with moderating union effects, which are all placed below unemployment rates of 10%. This however applies less to the group with union effects reinforcing divides, as countries score both above (Italy, Greece, Portugal) and below (Czech Republic, Poland) that threshold (see Appendix C.4.c). More broadly, adverse conditions correlate with subjective insecurities of ‘insiders’, corroborating again that inclusive union effects are only but not necessarily observed where the core workforce is relatively secure. Hence, the argument for an impact of socio-economic conditions on union exclusivity, instead of institutional factors, appears weakened by the cases of Czech Republic and Poland, but cannot be precluded for Italy, Greece, and Portugal from this quantitative analysis.

Overall, the findings from the large-N statistical analysis corroborate the hypothesis of a positive relationship between trade unions’ power resources and their inclusiveness. In a ‘virtuous circle’ cluster, workplace-level presence of unions or similar significantly moderates insecurity divides between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and also industrial democracy institutions, particularly company-level social dialogue, are strong. By contrast, in the country cluster with a ‘vicious circle’, the opposite is the case. The findings indicate that, comparatively, ‘insider’ groups under pressure cannot be associated with inclusive strategies, thus rejecting the rational choice hypothesis. However, due to the potentially overlapping role of socio-economic conditions, a spurious correlation cannot be precluded at this point. This is investigated in more depth in the next section.

7.2 Qualitative analysis

As second step of the mixed-methods design, the ‘most similar’ rationale for qualitative comparative analysis (Pickvance, 2001) informs the purposeful sampling strategy. Country cases should feature different outcomes of workplace-level union presence – one moderating and one reinforcing divides – but with levels of industrial
democracy as close as possible. Compared to their clusters, Italy scores relatively high on industrial democracy and Finland provides sufficient previous research available while scoring lower than Denmark. The qualitative analysis thus asks how both institutions and ideas, or socio-economic conditions, can explain the distinct impacts of company-level union presence on job insecurity divides in Italy and Finland.

Workplace representation in Italy and Finland features several relevant similarities and differences. In both countries, the predominant structures at company level centre on trade union representatives, rather than statutory forms and work councils. In the Finnish case, these are normally elected by union members within companies (at least 20 employees) and confirmed by the local union organisation. Aside from enforcing industry-level collective agreements, these representatives exert rights for information, consultation and, on a limited set of issues, co-decision-making as part of the broad and flexible ‘Cooperation Negotiations’ established in 2007. In Italy, employee representatives are appointed by unions present at the site and elected by the entire workforce through a secret ballot to a uniform committee, called unitary workplace union structures (RSUs). These structures’ occurrence is far from universal, present only for firms with 15+ employees and rare in some sectors, while partly replaced by union-based works councils in others (RSAs). Where they exist, RSUs conduct pay and non-pay negotiations that, across time and context, vary in their adherence to collective agreements in addition to their rights to be informed and consulted (Fulton, 2015). Overall, employee representation in Italy appears, at first glance, to give less unionised atypical workers in fact stronger participatory rights at the workplace than in Finland.

However, the strategies taken toward precarious work by trade union organisations in the two countries are conceptually different. Building on earlier research about possible trade union strategies toward atypical workers (Heery & Abbot, 2000), Kahancová and Martišková (2011) identify inclusion into the existing constituency for broad representation and separation into particular groups as two of five basic directions. In Finland’s trade union movement, the former approach has prevailed.
with the three main confederations SAK, STTK and AKAVA actively pursuing integration into their heterogeneous but encompassing structures. For example, case studies show how Finnish trade unions have made active efforts to represent Estonian migrant workers and engage them in union activities (Danaj et al., 2018). As a result, Finnish trade unionism has tended towards a ‘servicing model’ (Fiorito & Jarley, 2009) for addressing precarious work, fostering workplace-level union representatives’ sense of responsibility for the entire workforce, including those with fixed-term contracts.

Separation has, in contrast, been the predominant strategy in Italy since the creation of dedicated bodies to represent precarious workers since the late 1990s (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010). These new federations, such as ‘NIdiL’, ‘Alai’ and ‘Temp.@’, press for political reforms and represent atypical workers through collective bargaining, legal action, campaigns and organising strategies and negotiating agreements that guarantee the transitioning of temporary contracts to secure positions. In 2014 for example, ‘NIdiL’ reached a number of company-level agreements on reducing segmentation and transitioning atypical into standard jobs (Pulignano et al., 2016). In Italy’s segmented labour market, these dedicated structures thus represent and specifically support ‘outsiders’ specifically.

In the Italian workplace, however, this separated representation has the potential to induce new conflicts that reinforce divides between the core and atypical workers. For long, sectoral federations have expressed concerns and fears of their encompassing models being undermined by the ‘self-advocacy’ of new risk groups, such as the youth workforce. The new unions, conversely, have accused them of sustaining precarious conditions or eliminating ‘outsider’ jobs to shield their constituents (Murgia & Selmi, 2012). While much has been written about Italian trade unions’ newly gained outsider orientation, particularly toward temporary agency workers (Benassi & Vlandas, 2016; Burroni & Pedaci, 2014; Durazzi, 2017), this tension might play out as less conciliatory at the company level. As a consequence, pre-existing workplace unions might tend to see themselves as less of an integrative force, rather putting their core constituency
first. Given their higher workplace coverage compared to atypical unions despite recent growth (Keune, 2013), temporary workers may either run at risk of being subordinated to permanent workers’ interests if only traditional unions are present, or suffer from potential tensions with more resourceful and experienced ‘insider’ groups when they are separately represented. Hence, compared to the Finnish case, Italian trade union strategies of separation entail a higher risk of temporary workers’ exclusion in workplaces, particularly where their dedicated unions are not present.

What role then can be ascribed to socio-economic conditions in intersecting with these risks of workplace divides? This functionalist argument is challenged based on two reasons. First, the bifurcated ‘organising model’ of Italian trade unionism did in fact trigger controversy and conflict regarding representation of new risk groups already when the economy was still in an expansionary phase during the early to mid-2000s (Pulignano et al., 2016). Still, during the economic crisis in Italy, there was a series of successfully concluded company-level negotiations by atypical workers’ trade unions, as mentioned above, as part of a slow and fragmented, but long-term upward trajectory and despite cyclical fluctuations (Benassi & Vlandas, 2016). At the same time, Finland entered a recession in 2008-15 due to structural and political factors, being dubbed ‘the sick man of Europe’ by late 2015 (Kärppä & Teivainen, 2015), but still exposes inclusive union effects. This temporal perspective suggests that workplace inclusion is not necessarily a function of economic circumstances.

Secondly, economic crisis in Italy accelerated the decentralisation of collective bargaining, whereas in Finland the 2011 and 2013 framework agreements marked employers’ return to centralised wage coordination for the purpose of improving international competitiveness (Jokinen, 2018). One prominent example of decentralisation in Italy is the case of Fiat, the country’s largest industrial group. During the recession in 2010-11, two of the three metalwork federations had to enter unfavourable plant-level agreements under the threat of outsourcing, but Fiat still temporarily withdrew from the employers’ association ‘Cofindustria’ in 2012, stripping its ‘insider’ workforce from a source of security (Fulton, 2015). Such opposite
trajectories of industry-level bargaining in crisis thus suggest that adverse conditions do not feed back uniform effects, but rather adapt and interrelate with incentive structures and their institutional and ideational contexts. Thus, socio-economic conditions cannot be considered a necessary condition for inclusive union strategies in Finland, while they still might have acted as partial, contributing factor in Italy.

Instead, the distinctive trajectories of collective bargaining in combination with different labour histories and identities in Italy and Finland suggest explanatory value of institutional and ideational factors. Collective bargaining in Italy occurs at two levels – industry and company – and thus assigns more importance to the workplace-level RSUs than the ‘Cooperation Negotiations’ in Finland. In the wake of the crisis, Italy saw its bargaining mechanism gradually decentralised through bipartite and tripartite agreements in 2009 and 2012, but also by employers’ unilateral withdrawals and state legislation, for instance by a 2011 law that allowed company-level bargaining to undercut industry-level agreements and statutory minimum terms, e.g. on flexible employment contracts and recruitment. Hence, in Italy, institutional fragmentation occurred as a result of both ‘external factors’ and endogenous processes, including socio-economic crisis.

In Finland, by contrast, centralised bargaining was already re-strengthened in 2011, after tensions in industrial relations since the 1990s and 2000s culminated in employers’ withdrawal from national-level bargaining in 2007. While industry-level agreements dominate and set strict boundaries, company-level bargaining has become more prevalent but is still clearly secondary, even compared to the Nordic neighbours (Sippola, 2012). On the matter of firm policy on temporary employment, the ‘Cooperation Negotiations’ equip workers’ representatives with broad information and consultation rights. This includes recruitment, training and the use of different contractual arrangements, with the right to specifically request management to justify its use of and approach to fixed-term contracts (Fulton, 2015). Therefore, this means Italy’s workplace unions are responsible for the bargaining of core issues while those in Finland take a more complementary role to higher-level bargaining.
Combined, these distinctive institutional trajectories of collective bargaining and the patterns of union strategies towards precarious work are likely to shape insider-outsider dynamics at the workplace. In Italy, more substantial company-level bargaining takes place in an environment of increased intra-industry competition while, at the same time, atypical workers’ interests are at a higher risk of being subordinated or at conflict with the core workforce due to trade unions’ strategy of separation. In Finland, centralised bargaining and inclusive union strategies give workplace representatives space for advocating better conditions and prospects in temporary employment. Here, company-level social dialogue provides extensive rights for being informed and consulting on a wide range of topics.

On the other hand, both the root causes and effects of these differences in union strategies are decisively shaped by trade unions’ identities and ideologies. Building on the well-established positioning of trade unionism, functioning between market, class and society (Hyman, 2001), Italy has often served as archetypal Southern European model (Ebbinghaus, 2003) that is class-based and relies on membership mobilisation as source of power and legitimation. Indeed, dividing lines between the three main confederations have historically rooted their orientations to communist, Catholic and socialist traditions, respectively. Given its organisationally fragmented setting and more adversarial relationship to the state, Italian trade unionism thus tends to oscillate between organisation and social movement (Regalia, 2012). Given Italy’s organisational separation and institutionalised fragmentation, such identities and identifications are more likely to result in the juxtaposition of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ interests, a phenomenon for instance reported in the public sector (Pulignano et al., 2016). This factor thus both complicates and raises the relevance of ideationally driven forms of solidarity.

The Finnish model contrasts this with a history of cooperation, or yhteistoiminta, and codetermination common to Nordic social partnership and industrial democracy that dates back to its egalitarian legacy of the post-war era (Huzzard & Nilsson, 2004; Sippola, 2012). Organisations thus take a primary role as integrative and
encompassing force for distributive mediation. These historical and socio-cultural identities shape norms and behaviours, solidarity and demarcations in ways that foster the utilisation of institutional power resources. With the ‘service model’ towards precarious workers and clearer institutional boundaries for workplace representation, company-level trade unions in Finland thus might more organically pursue inclusive outcomes as part of the ‘Cooperation Negotiations’. Organisations’ and movements’ identities and ideologies thus shape collective frames that both underpin actor preferences and behaviours at the micro level and inform behaviour in face of new circumstances.

Therefore, supportive socio-economic conditions were found not to be a necessary condition for inclusive outcomes, but a role in downward spirals cannot be fully precluded as contributor. Given the causes and effects of distinct forms of union strategies towards atypical workers, it was shown that institutions and ideas indeed provide significant explanatory value for this case comparison. The qualitative comparative analysis has thus corroborated a role for institutional power resources, expanded the perspective to associational ones, and specified the role of socio-economic conditions.

8. Discussion

8.1 Diversity and divergence in Europe

The findings of this study partly corroborate existing classifications, such as the ‘virtuous’ and ‘vicious circles’ in Northern and Southern Europe, respectively. They are broadly in line with regime groupings from different traditions of the study of dualisation (Gallie, 2007; Rueda, 2014) as well as European industrial relations (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013). The findings affirm the inclusive nature of Nordic trade unionism and the relatively distinct, marginal role it plays in liberal market economies. Trade union exclusivity is observed in countries with both insecure and secure ‘insiders’, which is contra the rational choice thesis, but only where unions’
power resources – institutional and ideational – are weak. The following discussion focuses on Continental and Southern Europe to further examine stasis and change in typically dualised political economies.

Regarding Continental Europe, the insignificant quantitative results in fact constitute a conceptually significant finding. It is not clear workplace dualisation, but diversity and internal variation that emerge as the overall picture. Results suggest that workplace dynamics are not unidirectional overall, but diverse – reinforcing divides in some cases while moderating them in others. This is supported by previous case-based studies from industrial relations literature, for instance on the ‘varieties of workplace dualisation’ from a qualitative sectoral perspective on the German automotive industry (Benassi, 2017). This micro-level diversity is only partly compatible with the dualisation thesis on stable ‘insider preferences’, which suggests that also within industries, union strategies are able to draw on country-specific power resources not uniformly, but to different degrees. While positive feedback effects underpin most dualisation research, negative feedback effects from both continued self-interest and renewed solidarity have been shown to help make sense of some cases, for instance the ‘outsider’-friendly introduction of a minimum wage in Germany in 2015 (Marx & Starke, 2017). Recalling the two initial hypotheses, inclusive self-interest by ‘insiders’ thus may be supported by union power resources, rather than separate from it in these cases.

By contrast, Southern European political economies are also described as dualised, both in the literature and by the findings here (Gallie, 2007; Rueda, 2014). While the rational choice hypothesis for union inclusiveness was rejected by the quantitative findings, the relatively high ‘insider’ insecurity and adverse socio-economic conditions in the ‘vicious circle’ cluster can also be regarded as part of an endogenous feedback process instead of an alternative, unidirectional channel. As theorised by Doellgast et al. (2018), outcomes can be a source of division in the labour movement, complicating the construction of solidarity as well as leveraging employers’ exit options while simultaneously redrawing their incentive structures (Bosch et al., 2010).
At the same time, fragmenting institutions and labour solidarity can in turn reinforce conditions and deteriorate ‘insider’ insecurity. As shown in the qualitative section, this suggests that adverse conditions can fuel union exclusivity (concession bargaining) when collective institutions are fragmenting, but also result from this fragmentation.

However, adverse conditions can be disqualified as necessary catalysers of ‘vicious circles’ based on the cases of the Czech Republic and Poland. At the micro level, both countries feature union effects that reinforce divides, but they also enjoy low unemployment rates. Classified by the literature as countries of ‘embedded neoliberalism’ (Bohle & Greskovits, 2007, 2012), they both score low on industrial democracy, including company-level social dialogue. Drawing again on Lazarsfeld’s (1955) classic analytical types of inter-relations in causal models, it can thus be argued that socio-economic conditions below a certain threshold, understood as economic crisis, ‘specify’ an endogenous relationship between institutions and union strategies in ‘vicious circle’ dynamics, while it remains analytically insignificant when above this threshold. Combined, the emerging picture is thus one of positive, self-reinforcing feedback dynamics that incorporate socio-economic dynamics under conditions of highly adverse pressures and low power resources.

8.2 Limitations and further research

There are limitations in the conceptual framework, the methodological approach and the available survey data for this study. First, the conceptual framework with its emphasis on macro-micro interactions opens questions of causality and feedback effects. Dualisation is considered with regard to its direct social outcomes, not institutional change per se. What Benassi (2017) describes as ‘workplace dualisation’ however differs from the peak-level, corporatist policy-making that has institutionalised dualisation through inter alia reforming labour market regulation (Emmenegger, 2014) and welfare state protections (Palier & Thelen, 2010). While institutional change forms part of the ‘circle’ dynamics in the theoretical framework by Doellgast et al. (2018b), the power resource theory and the electoral competition
thesis (Hall & Taylor, 1996), though often corroborated (Korpi & Palme, 2003; Marx, 2014), constitute only two of several theories of institutional change. For instance, critiques of comparative studies’ typical ‘methodological nationalism’ (see Greer et al., 2015) point towards external factors. This may include ideational processes (Béland, 2005; Hall, 1993), as in the case of the Swedish model and its challenges (Blyth, 2001). Internally, public opinion toward, for example, social justice can shift and induce negative feedback effects (Marx & Starke, 2017). Future studies could foster understanding of actor strategies in a multi-dimensional approach that includes both employer strategies (Grimshaw et al., 2017) and further endogenous and exogenous factors.

Secondly, the methodological approach faces issues both typical and specific to quantitative analysis. On the one hand, the complex structure of the quantitative model does not allow for a higher number of micro-level control factors. Therefore, the potential antecedents of ethnicity, citizenship status and geographical location (urban/rural) were not included as they have so far only been evidenced as antecedents of job insecurity in the US context (Yang & Zheng, 2015). On the other hand, the merely descriptive instead of inferential analysis of macro-micro interactions forms a clear methodological limitation. While descriptive analysis can highlight patterns, causality under controlled settings, particularly over time, cannot be evidenced in statistical terms. However, the discussion has shown that conditions can be integrated in the endogenous processes that drive self-reinforcing ‘vicious circle’ dynamics. Having identified relevant clusters, future research could add a temporal perspective through plant-level case studies to better trace the process and sequence of contributing factors.

Finally, the survey data on subjective insecurity has advantages as discussed, but requires awareness for potential biases. While subjective insecurity has been shown to be a holistic approximation of objectively precarious work (e.g. Clark & Postel-Vinay, 2009), it can also be considered as potentially separate from objective risks, for example when job security for some core workers remains high despite low-wage competition. Also, ‘voluntary insecurity’ (Chung & Mau, 2014) may be desirable in certain socio-
cultural contexts, calling in mind the Danish flexicurity model. In such instances, combining subjective and objective measures may better capture pressures on ‘insiders’. Though not relevant here, this would also enable examining whether pressures on ‘insiders’ relate to the precarity of ‘outsiders’, implying their interests to be partly compatible rather than mutually exclusive and inclusive strategies thus more likely despite stable ‘insider’ preferences. Hence, the combination of subjective and objective measures of labour market risks would aid such a research direction.

9. Conclusion

Workplace representation in a changing labour market can be a source of voice and protection for some, but entail insecurity and exclusion for others. Building on case evidence and theoretical developments that run counter the dualisation thesis, this research shows that trade union power resources, as opposed to cornered ‘insiders’, can indeed explain varieties of dualisation and inclusion in European workplaces. Still, organisational interest in long-term union rejuvenation may play a role. As more integrative internal structures, particularly in the Nordics, reduce the risk of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ interests being perceived as mutually exclusive, inclusion is plausibly facilitated by the long-term pursuit of maintaining strong power resources, not only solidarity. As such, future research could examine under what conditions ‘insider’ self-interest may induce new forms of effective organising and representing of atypical workers, instead of eroding solidarity within the workforce.

Comparatively, the Nordic countries are shown to be home to ‘virtuous circles’ in particular while ‘vicious circles’ are apparent in most of Southern Europe. Economic crisis can reinforce such downward spirals, but particularistic interest representation occurs in healthy economies with weak union power resources as well. Affirming positive feedback effects, no self-correcting tendencies in the workplace-level politics of inequality emerge from austerity-afflicted cases in Europe. Considering recent inclusive trade union turns, for instance in Italy, it was shown that the ‘workplace politics’ of interest representation can also conflict with peak or industry-level
authority within the labour movement. This highlights the intricate challenge of breaking ‘vicious circles’ in climates of fragmentation and contention without supportive institutional environments.

In Europe today, trade unionism is finding itself at a crossroads, for long facing existential questions while having been further marginalised during the Eurozone crisis. This has not only hampered its turn toward inclusive representation, but has also thwarted the idea of an encompassing and resilient European social model, promising upward convergence within and between societies. Diversity and inconsistencies, however, emerge in Continental European workplaces from this comparative analysis. Looking ahead, the dualisation debate may merit from studying the conditions under which workplace-level actors in such typically dualised political economies employ power resources to re-orientate towards ‘outsiders’. Though shaped by continued self-interest where trade unionism is on the defensive, the varieties of workplace dualisation and inclusion thus point towards moments of change elsewhere.
References


Power, Interest and Insecurity


Eurofound (2018b). Industrial Relations Index [data and methodology].


Power, Interest and Insecurity


Power, Interest and Insecurity


Appendix

A. Data & Frameworks

A. 1 Descriptive statistics – Response Variable

Table A1. Frequencies - Survey Responses

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<td>%</td>
<td>.cum</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>.cum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,134</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,684</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,288</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>4,747</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,034</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>3,778</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>3,947</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5,652</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,808</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20,808</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EWCS (2015)

Figure A1. Types of insecurity

Source: EWCS (2015), own calculations
A.2 Micro-level components of interest

a. Employment status and levels of insecurity

Figure A2.
Employment status by level of employment security

Source: EWCS (2015)

b. Workplace-level union presence and levels of insecurity by region

Figure A3.
Union presence by level of employment security and region

Source: EWCS (2015)
c. Union presence by employment status and region

Figure A4.
Workplace representation by employment status and region

Source: EWCS (2015)

A.3 Macro-level indices

a. Analytical frameworks: institutional indices

| Table A3. Eurofound Analytical Framework for industrial Relations: Industrial Democracy |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Dimension                          | Sub-Dimension              | Indicator                                      | Source             |
| Industrial Democracy                | Associational governance   | 11 Trade union density                          | ICTWSS, ILO        |
|                                  |                               | 12 Employer organisation density               | ICTWSS             |
|                                  |                               | 13 Existence of bipartite council              | ICTWSS             |
|                                  |                               | 14 Collective bargaining coverage              | ICTWSS, ILO        |
|                                  |                               | 15 Routine involvement in government decisions on economic and social policy | ICTWSS             |
|                                  |                               | 16 Board-level employee representation rights  | ETUC               |
### Table A4. Analytical Framework for Labour Market Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Sub-Dimension</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Market Policy</td>
<td>Active Measures</td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>Employment incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Supported employment and rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>Direct job creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I5</td>
<td>Start-up incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I7</td>
<td>Rights of works councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I8</td>
<td>Status of works councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I9</td>
<td>Employee representation in the workplace (coverage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I10</td>
<td>Information provided to the employee representation body by management (incidence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I11</td>
<td>Degree of information provided to the employee representation body (number of topics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I12</td>
<td>Influence of the employee representation in decision-making in the workplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I13</td>
<td>Share of companies holding regular consultations (individual or collective) in which employees can express their views</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurofound (2018)
b. Summary statistics: Institutional indices

**Table A2. Summary Statistics of Macro-Level Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>idx_dem</th>
<th>sub_gov</th>
<th>sub_rights</th>
<th>sub_dia</th>
<th>lmp_actpas</th>
<th>lmp_act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>10,678.1</td>
<td>3,729.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Dev.</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>11,762.6</td>
<td>5,061.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>326.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pctl(25)</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>1,959.6</td>
<td>524.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pctl(75)</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>19,547.9</td>
<td>5,200.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>40,671.7</td>
<td>21,486.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: EWCS, LMP database, Eurostat, own calculations

---

c. Summary: ‘Insider: Employment Insecurity

**Figure A5.**

Insider insecurity by country (2015)

Source: EWCS (2015)
**B. Generalisation of Multi-level model**

The basic structure for such random intercept and slope models with group-level predictors is as follows:

\[
y_{ij} \sim N(\alpha_j + \beta_j x_{ij}, \sigma^2_y)
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix} \alpha_j \\ \beta_j \end{bmatrix} \sim N \left( \begin{bmatrix} \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 z_j \\ \delta_0 + \delta_1 z_j \end{bmatrix}, \Sigma \right)
\]

, where \( j = 1, \ldots, J \) and \( i = 1, \ldots, N \) denote subscripts for the country and the individual respondent, respectively. In the upper equation, the country subscript \( j \) of the coefficient \( \beta \) allows for varying intercepts and slopes for the independent individual-level variable \( x_{ij} \) across \( j \) groups. The second regression model captures the fixed effect \( \delta_0 \) and moderating effect \( \delta_1 \) of the macro-level variable \( z_j \) on the country-specific micro-level slope \( \beta_j \). The same applies to the second-level covariates \( \gamma_0 \) and \( \gamma_1 \) and the varying intercept \( \alpha_j \) respectively. Both intercept and slope are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution with a variance covariance matrix \( \Sigma \). As a result, the simple version produces three variance parameters, namely for the intercept \( \sigma^2_\alpha \), the slope \( \sigma^2_\beta \) and the covariance between the two \( \sigma^2_{\alpha \beta} \).

Starting from equation 1 and 2, the micro- and macro-level models can be integrated and re-expressed as single model with cross-level interaction effects:

\[
y_{ij} = \left[ \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 z_{ij} + \eta^\alpha_{ij} \right] + \left[ \delta_0 + \delta_1 z_{ij} + \eta^\beta_{ij} \right] x_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}
\]

\[
y_{ij} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 z_{ij} + \delta_0 x_{ij} + \delta_1 z_{ij} x_{ij} + \eta^\alpha_{ij} + \eta^\beta_{ij} x_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}
\]

This can be simplified to the varying intercept, varying slope model with a cross-level interaction between the micro-level covariate \( x_{ij} \) and the group-level factor \( z_{ij} \):

\[
y_{ij} = a_j + [\delta_0 + \delta_1 z_{ij}] \times x_{ij} + \eta^\alpha_{ij} + \eta^\beta_{ij} x_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}
\]

Hence, the multi-level framework expands the cross-sectional estimate \( \delta_0 \) by a country-specific random effect of the predictor.
C. Quantitative Analysis

C.1. Model diagnostics for baseline version

a. Likelihood Ratio Tests

Table A5. Likelihood Ratio Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>logLik</th>
<th>deviance</th>
<th>Chisq</th>
<th>Chi Df</th>
<th>Pr(&gt;Chisq)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LRT Random Intercept - Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fit_e_log</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12,081.310</td>
<td>-6,032.655</td>
<td>12,065.310</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;2.2e-16 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fit_e_small</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11,603.250</td>
<td>-5,792.623</td>
<td>11,585.250</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;2.2e-16 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| LRT Random Intercept - Job |     |      |        |          |        |         |             |
| fit_j_log        | 8   | 28,324.060  | -14,154.030 | 28,308.060 | 1  | <2.2e-16 *** |
| fit_j_small      | 9   | 27,057.460  | -13,519.730 | 27,039.460 | 1  | <2.2e-16 *** |

| LRT Random Intercept - Labour Market |     |      |        |          |        |         |             |
| fit_l_log        | 8   | 16,048.880  | -8,016.438  | 16,032.880 | 1  | <2.2e-16 *** |
| fit_l_small      | 9   | 15,603.380  | -7,792.690  | 15,585.380 | 1  | <2.2e-16 *** |

b. Normality of residuals

Figure A6.

Q-Plots of Random Intercept Model by Response Variable
**C.2 Regression results**

**a. Model comparison: Likelihood Ratio Tests (LRT)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A6. Model Comparison: Likelihood Ratio Tests (LRT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LRT Interaction - Employment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fit_e_small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fit_e_restr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| <strong>LRT Random Effects - Employment</strong>                      |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Df</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>logLik</th>
<th>deviance</th>
<th>Chisq</th>
<th>Chi df</th>
<th>Pr(&gt;Chisq)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fit_e_restr</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11,603.830</td>
<td>-5,791.917</td>
<td>11,583.830</td>
<td>1.412</td>
<td>0.235</td>
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<tr>
<td>fit_e_full</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11,620.640</td>
<td>-5,786.320</td>
<td>11,572.640</td>
<td>11.194</td>
<td>0.671</td>
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</table>

<p>| <strong>LRT interaction - Job</strong>                                |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Df</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>logLik</th>
<th>deviance</th>
<th>Chisq</th>
<th>Chi df</th>
<th>Pr(&gt;Chisq)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fit_j_small</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27,057.460</td>
<td>-13,519.730</td>
<td>27,039.460</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fit_j_restr</td>
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<td>-13,516.880</td>
<td>27,033.750</td>
<td>5.707</td>
<td>0.017</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<p>| <strong>LRT Random Effects - Job</strong>                              |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Df</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>logLik</th>
<th>deviance</th>
<th>Chisq</th>
<th>Chi df</th>
<th>Pr(&gt;Chisq)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fit_j_restr</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27,053.750</td>
<td>-13,516.880</td>
<td>27,033.750</td>
<td>5.707</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fit_j_full</td>
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<td>27,041.190</td>
<td>-13,496.590</td>
<td>26,993.190</td>
<td>40.564</td>
<td>0.0002***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| <strong>LRT Interaction - Labour Market</strong>                       |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Df</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>logLik</th>
<th>deviance</th>
<th>Chisq</th>
<th>Chi df</th>
<th>Pr(&gt;Chisq)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fit_l_small</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15,603.380</td>
<td>-7,792.690</td>
<td>15,585.380</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fit_l_restr</td>
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<td>15,605.070</td>
<td>-7,792.535</td>
<td>15,585.070</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| <strong>LRT Random Effects - Labour Market</strong>                     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Df</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>logLik</th>
<th>deviance</th>
<th>Chisq</th>
<th>Chi df</th>
<th>Pr(&gt;Chisq)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fit_l_restr</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15,605.070</td>
<td>-7,792.535</td>
<td>15,585.070</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>fit_l_full</td>
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<td>-7,784.603</td>
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<td>15.864</td>
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</table>
C.3 Country-specific random effects by type of insecurity

**Figure A7.**
QQ-Plots of Interaction Term by Type of Insecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Job</th>
<th>Labour Market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: based on Output Table 1 of Appendix C.2.a, Model 2, 3, 4

**Figure A8.**
Results of Random Effect Interaction Term for Job Insecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>Status x Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image5" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: based on Output Table 1 of Appendix C.2.a, Model 3
C.4. Descriptive cross-level interactions

a. Institutions

**Figure A9.**
Industrial Democracy and Random Interaction Effects (Status x Union)

![Diagram showing Industrial Democracy Index and Associational Governance](image)

![Diagram showing Rights at Workplace and Social Dialogue at Workplace](image)

Notes: based on Output Table 1 of Appendix C.2.a, Model 3
Figure A10.
Labour Market Policy and Random interaction Effects (Status x Union)

Notes: based on Output Table 1 of Appendix C.2.a, Model 3

b. ‘Insider’ employment insecurity

Figure A11.
Employment Insecurity Shares of Permanent Workers and Random interaction Effects (Status x Union)

Notes: based on Output Table 1 of Appendix C.2.a, Model 3
c. Alternative factors: socio-economic conditions

**Figure A12.**
Conditions and Random interaction Effects (Status x Union)

Notes: based on Output Table of Appendix C.2.a
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