Firms today have unprecedented access to consumer data. We thus introduce information acquisition into a standard model of monopolistic screening, where a seller has a single good to trade with a buyer whose value (i.e. type) is binary: high or low. The seller can acquire information about the buyer's value by observing arbitrarily many independent signals conditional on the buyer's type at constant marginal cost. Transfers are bounded, so that both sides face limited liability. A contract therefore specifies, for each type report, the seller's information acquisition strategy and a trading scheme, consisting of a probability of trade and a transfer, depending on the seller's observation. After a high type report, every optimal contract prescribes no information acquisition, and allocates the good at a fixed price. After a low report, the seller optimally acquires information as if she observed only a single signal with at most three possible realisations that determine the trading scheme. Every optimal contract can be implemented by offering the buyer a choice between purchasing the good at a fixed price, or purchasing a lottery with a type-dependent distribution over discounts for the good. This choice resembles the structure of loyalty programmes offered by a wide variety of retailers.