

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

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GENDER: M

CITIZENSHIP: Italian

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:

2011 - 2012	Master of Research Political Science and Political Economy, London School of Economics
2009 - 2010	Visiting Master (Erasmus Programme) Political Economy, London School of Economics
2008 - 2010	Master in Economics and Political Science, Cum Laude, University of Bologna
2005 - 2008	Bachelor in Economics and Political Science, University of Bologna

DOCTORAL STUDIES: PhD Candidate Political Economy, Department of Government, London School of Economics

DATES: 2012 to date

THESIS TITLE: "Essays in Political Economy"

EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: April 2017

THESIS ADVISOR AND REFERENCES:

Prof. Valentino Larcinese (Advisor)
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RESEARCH FIELDS:

Primary: Political Economy

Secondary: Applied Microeconomics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

2015 - 2016 Economic of the EU, BSc, LSE, Lecturer
2014 - 2017 Introduction to Political Science, BSc, LSE, Research Fellow.
2014 - 2016 Econometrics for Public Policy, EMPA, Teaching Assistant
Mathematics and Statistics Refresher, EMPA, Teaching Assistant
Fiscal Budgeting, EMPA, Teaching Assistant
2012 - 2013 Economic Policy Analysis, Summer School, Teaching Assistant

RELEVANT POSITION HELD

2014- 2017 [Fellow in Political Economy](#), London School of Economics
2016 (Spring) [Visiting Fellow](#), Harvard University, Institute of Quantitative Social Science
2012 – 2014 MainStreet Capital Partners, Investment Analyst, Emerging Markets
2010 - 2012 International Growth Centre (UK Dfid and LSE) Economist, South Sudan and Uganda

LANGUAGES

Italian (native), English (fluent), French (fluent), Spanish (intermediate)

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:

2016 Unicredit 2016 Best Presentation, Petralia Applied Economics Workshop
2014-2016 LSESU Student-Led Teaching Excellence Awards 2016
2014-2015 ESRC Research Grant, LSE
2012-2014 Government Department Research Studentship Scheme, LSE
2009-2010 Erasmus Scholarship, University of Bologna

INVITED PRESENTATIONS:

2016 NYU Abu Dhabi, Social Division Unit
Petralia Sottana, Applied Economics Workshop
Bocconi University – Political Economy Seminar
LSE – NYU Political Economy Conference
Princeton Political Economy Seminar
Yale Leitner Political Economy Seminar
NYU Political Economy Seminar
Harvard Positive Political Economy Seminar
2015 Nuffield College, Oxford

CONFERENCES

2016 The Econometric Society, European Winter Meeting, Edinburgh
American Political Science Association, Philadelphia
European Political Science Association, Bruxelles
2015 American Political Science Association, San Francisco.
European Political Science Association, Vienna
Political Economy Seminar, University of Bologna
2014 Political Science Association, Oxford
Political Economy of Media, University of Naples,

RESEARCH PAPERS (PhD Dissertation)

Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources
with Marco Di Cataldo (LSE)

What is the impact of organised crime on the allocation of public resources and on revenue collection? This paper studies the consequences of the collusion between members of criminal organisations and local politicians in Italian local governments. In order to capture the presence of organised crime, we exploit the staggered enforcement of a national law allowing the dissolution of a municipal government upon evidence of collusion between elected officials and the criminal organisations. We measure the consequences of this collusion by using a newly collected data on public spending, local taxes and elected politicians at the local level. Differences-in-differences estimates reveal that infiltrated local governments spend on average more on construction and waste management, less on policing, and collect fewer fiscal revenues. In addition, we uncover key elements of local elections associated with mafia-politics collusion. In particular, Regression Discontinuity estimates show that infiltration is more likely to occur when right-wing parties win local elections.

Information and Crime Perceptions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (Under Review *American Economic Journal, Applied Economics*) *with Luigi Minale (Carlos III)*

In modern democracies voters rely on media outlets to learn about politically salient issues. This raises an important question: *how strongly can media affect public opinion?* This paper studies the case of Italy and use a natural experiment – the staggered introduction of the Digital TV signal – to measure the effect of media persuasions on the beliefs and perceptions individuals hold. We focus on crime perception, and we show that the reduced exposure to crime related news decreased individual concerns about crime. The effect is particularly strong for the elderly who are more exposed to television and less to other sources of information. Finally, we show that this change in crime perceptions is likely to have important implication for voting behaviour.

Political Information and Sovereign Bonds Volatility

What is the impact of a variation in the nature and transparency of political information on markets behaviour? This paper attempts to answer this question by studying both theoretically and empirically the impact of political information flows on sovereign volatility during the European Debt Crisis. I develop an extension of a standard Global Game setting and I then test the prediction of the models exploiting a unique Twitter data collection of political news in five European Countries. The estimates reveal that the frequency and the type of political news presented by the media is positively correlated with high volatility for sovereign bonds but that the level of volatility is a function of each national government's credibility.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Electoral Rules, Legislative Behaviour and Accountability: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design in Italian Municipalities

With Jack Blumenau (LSE)

The Hidden Underworld: Organised Crime and Firms

The Business Model of the Narcos: Criminal Organisations' Response to the Legalisation of Cannabis in the United States

The Effect of Digital Television on Voting Behaviour in Italy

with Luigi Minale (Carlos III)

Local Democracy, Crime and Punishment in the United States.

With David Soskice (LSE) and Øyvind Skorge (University of Oslo)