

LISA WINDSTEIGER

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

Department of Economics

Placement Officer:	Professor Silvana Tenreyro	+44 20 7955 6018	s.tenreyro@lse.ac.uk
Placement Assistant:	Mr. John Curtis	+44 20 7955 7545	j.curtis@lse.ac.uk

OFFICE ADDRESS, TELEPHONE & E-MAIL:

Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE

E-mail: L.V.Windsteiger@lse.ac.uk
Website: personal.lse.ac.uk/windstei/

Telephone: +43 650 573 0940
+44 787 992 9316

GENDER: Female

CITIZENSHIP: Austrian

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:

2011 – 2013 MRes Economics (Distinction), London School of Economics
2009 – 2011 MSc Economics (Distinction), Vienna Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
2003 – 2009 Dipl.-Ing (equiv. MSc) Mathematics (Distinction), Vienna University of Technology

DOCTORAL STUDIES: London School of Economics

DATES: 2013 - present

THESIS TITLE: "Sorting in the Presence of Misperceptions"

EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: Summer 2017

THESIS ADVISOR AND REFERENCES:

Professor Ronny Razin (Advisor)
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London
WC2A 2AE
R.Razin@lse.ac.uk
Tel. +44 20 7955 7291

Professor Gilat Levy
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London
WC2A2AE
G.Levy1@lse.ac.uk
Tel. +44 20 7955 6652

Dr. Ethan Ilzetzki
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London
WC2A 2AE
E.ilzetzki@lse.ac.uk
Tel. +44 20 7955 7510

DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Fields: Microeconomics, Political Economy

Secondary Fields: Behavioural Economics, Public Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

2014 – present: EC440 Micro and Macro Economics (for Public Policy), LSE (Graduate)

2014 – 2016: EC453 Political Economy, LSE (Graduate)

2014 and 2015: EC400 Introductory Course in Mathematics and Statistics, LSE (Graduate)

2012 – 2013: EC201 Microeconomic Principles, LSE (Undergraduate)

2010 – 2011: Mathematics 1 and Macroeconomics 2, Vienna Institute for Advanced Studies (Graduate)

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:

2014 - present: Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, LSE

October 2015: Research Assistant, Dr. Ethan Ilzetzki, LSE

2013 – 2014: Research Assistant, Lord Adair Turner

2012 – 2013: Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, LSE

LANGUAGES

German (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate), Spanish (basic)

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

- LSE Teaching Fellowship 2014-2017
- LSE PhD Scholarship 2011-2013
- Austrian Lottery Award 2010, Austrian Lotteries and Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna
- Franz Weninger Award 2009, Austrian National Bank for the Master's Thesis "The Monetary Policy Strategy of the ECB and the Role of Money"

COMPLETED PAPERS:

Job Market Paper:

"Sorting in the Presence of Misperceptions with an Application to Income Inequality"

Abstract: In this paper I analyze how social segregation and beliefs interact. Sorting decisions will be affected by beliefs about society, but these beliefs about society are in turn influenced by social interactions. In my model, people sort into social groups according to income, but become biased about the income distribution once they interact only with their own social circle. I examine, which types of misperceptions guarantee the existence of "biased sorting equilibria", i.e. stable partitions in which people want to stay in their chosen group, despite their acquired misperceptions about the other groups. I introduce a criterion - the consistency requirement - and characterize environments for which it selects a unique biased sorting equilibrium out of all possible stable partitions. The second part of the paper displays one possible application of this new framework to inequality and the demand for redistribution. I show that under segregation an increase in inequality can lead to a decline in perceived inequality and therefore to a fall in people's support for redistribution. I motivate my main assumptions with empirical evidence from a small survey that I conducted via Amazon Mechanical Turk.

Other Papers:

“Social Learning with Congestion Costs”

Abstract: This paper examines equilibria in models with private information and congestion costs. Players have to choose between two alternatives. Depending on the state of the world, one of the two alternatives yields a higher stand-alone utility. The players do not know the state of the world, but each player receives a private signal about it. Irrespective of the state, the payoff from choosing an alternative is decreasing in the overall number of players who choose the respective alternative. The paper examines equilibrium choice behaviour in two setups. In the first setup players choose simultaneously. In the second setup they choose sequentially and can observe previous players' choices. The last section of the paper discusses social efficiency in the presence of congestion costs.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:

“Optimal Signal Provision and Income Inequality” (Working Title)

In this paper I analyze optimal provision of the sorting technology for a profit-maximizing monopolist and a benevolent social planner. I identify how optimal sorting varies with the shape of the income distribution and identify under what conditions optimal partitions become finer due to an increase in inequality.