

**ROBERTO CLAUDIO SORMANI**

**LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**Department of Economics**

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**GENDER:** M

**CITIZENSHIP:** Italian

**PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:**

Sept'11 - Sept'13 M.Res. in Economics (Merit), LSE  
Sept'08 - Apr'11 M.Sc. in Economics (cum laude), Bocconi University  
Jan'08 - May'08 Exchange semester, UC Berkeley  
Sept'05 - Sept'08 B.Sc. in Economics (cum laude), Bocconi University

**DOCTORAL STUDIES:** London School of Economics

DATES: 2013 - present

THESIS TITLE: Essays on Cooperation

EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: December 2018

THESIS ADVISOR AND REFERENCES:

Oriana Bandiera (Advisor)  
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## **ROBERTO CLAUDIO SORMANI**

### **DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:**

Primary Fields: Experimental Economics, Psychology and Economics, Behavioural Public Finance.

Secondary Fields: Public Economics, Development Economics.

### **TEACHING EXPERIENCE:**

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Sept '18 -        | Teaching Assistant in Intermediare Microeconomics, LSE            |
| Sept'15 - Aug'18  | Teaching Fellow and Course Manager in Introductory Economics, LSE |
| Jul'17 - Jul'18   | Teaching Assistant in Microeconomics, LSE Summer School           |
| Jul'18            | Teaching Assistant in Introductory Economics, LSE Summer School   |
| Jul'15; Jul'17    | Teaching Assistant in Political Economics, LSE Summer School      |
| Jul'14 - Jul'15   | Teaching Assistant in Development Economics, LSE Summer School    |
| Sept'15 - Jun'16  | Teaching Assisstand in Development Economics, LSE                 |
| Sept'13 - Jun'15  | Teaching Assistant in Economic for Public Policy, LSE             |
| Sept'14 - Sept'15 | Teaching Assistant in Statistics, Pre-sessional course, LSE       |
| Sept'13 -         | Teaching Assistant in Mathematics, LSE Pre-sessional course       |
| Sept'12 - Jun'15  | Teaching Assistant in Intermediate Microeconomics, LSE            |

### **RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:**

|                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| Jan'15 - Aug'18  | Associate Examiner, University of London International Programmes |
| Apr'15 - Jun'17  | Consultant, The World Bank Group                                  |
| May'12 - Sept'12 | Impact Evaluation Analyst, LSE (partnership with BRAC)            |
| Jan'09 - Jun'11  | Research Assistant, Bocconi University                            |

### **LANGUAGES:**

|                       |   |
|-----------------------|---|
| Basic Spoken Spanish  | Fluent Spoken Italian<br>English<br>French  |
| Basic Written Spanish | Fluent Written Italian<br>English<br>French |

### **HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS:**

2015 - 2018 LSE Teaching Fellow

### **COMPLETED PAPERS:**

***Job Market Paper:***

Career Choice and Cooperation in a Prosocial Team Task", working paper, October '18

Does the type of career chosen by partners affect willingness to cooperate in a pro-social team activity? Using a lab-on-the-field experiment, this paper shows that agents draw inferences on their partners' motivation from the career path chosen by them, and increase their effort in team production when their partner's career choice reveals higher motivation. In an experiment conducted at the LSE in 2017, subjects were paired up in teams and asked to fill envelopes for an LGBTI charity. Team production was structured in such a way that teammates' effort would be perfectly complementary. Before the task, subjects were given a chance to obtain the full compensation or to volunteer part of it. Subjects who were partnered with a volunteer produced significantly more envelopes than subjects partnered up with a non-volunteer. The effect was highest on the higher quantiles of the distribution of effort and was concentrated among the most driven by the cause. Mediation analysis suggests that the effect is mediated by expectations about one's partner's effort. These findings suggest that the composition of teams is an important factor of team production when there are complementarities of production and there is scope for pro-social motivation.

**RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:**

"Using Behavioural Insights to Improve Tax Collection: Evidence from Poland", working paper, Oct'18

This paper investigates the results from a randomised controlled trial in Poland which used reminder letters to promote voluntary compliance among 149,925 taxpayers who declared their Personal Income Tax but had not paid by the deadline. Taxpayers were randomly allocated to receive the letter originally used by the authorities or one of nine letters adapted using behavioural design. We test the impact of simplified delivery method, the effect of a behaviourally informed message that simplifies and adopts best practices, and the effect of variations on this message that appeal to conformity motives, drive for cooperation wth the government, outright deterrence.

"Few, But Good. Financial Incentives to Participate as a Signal of Participants' Types", working paper, Oct'18

I argue with a theoretical model that incentives to participation in a cooperative environment can increase participation, but disrupt cooperation itself. In circumstances where the production of a pro-social good has relevant complementarities between the levels of effort exerted by team members, higher pay will select less pro-socially motivated agents into the task and other agents are going to lower their effort accordingly. The effect is amplified when the principal has information on the state of the world that is not available to agents. In this case, a higher incentive will not only select less motivated people, but provide information that the populaiton is on average less motivated.