

WEIHAN DING

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

Department of Economics

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GENDER: M

CITIZENSHIP: Chinese

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:

2013-14 MRes in Economics, London School of Economics
2012-13 MSc in Economics (with Distinction), London School of Economics
2008-12 B.A. in Public Finance, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics

DOCTORAL STUDIES:

PhD in Economics, London School of Economics, 2014- present

THESIS: "Essays in Information Economics and Political Economy"

EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: June 2019

REFERENCES:

Prof. Philippe Aghion (Supervisor)
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DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Fields: Political Economy

Secondary Fields: Microeconomic Theory; Development and Growth; Corporate Finance

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

2017-18	EC100: Economics A (for 1 st year undergraduate students) EC476: Contracts and Organisations (for MSc Economics)
2017-18	EC476: Contracts and Organisations (for MSc Economics) EC440: Micro and Macro Economics (for Public Policy) EC400: Introductory Course in Mathematics and Statistics (for MSc Economics)
2016-17	EC302: Political Economy (for 3 rd year undergraduate students) EC307: Development Economics (LSE Summer School)
2014-16	EC210: Macroeconomic Principles (for 2 nd year undergraduate students)

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:

2018-Present	LSE Course Manager
2017-Present	LSE Teaching Fellow
2014-17	LSE Graduate Teaching Assistant

LANGUAGES

Fluent Spoken
English, Chinese

Fluent Written
English, Chinese

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

2017-Present	LSE Teaching Fellowship
2013-2017	LSE-CFM PhD Scholarship

COMPLETED PAPERS:

Job Market Paper:

“Propaganda, Patriotic Protest, and Diplomatic Persuasion”, working paper, 2018

Abstract: When diplomatic disputes loom, governments often instil hostility in their own citizens to encourage protests against other countries. Promoting protests, however, may cause unrest and escalation of disputes. This paper provides a theory explaining why governments nevertheless have an incentive to promote protests. The foreign government will be more likely to concede if the general public in the home country protests, but when observing a protest, it cannot distinguish whether the general public or only nationalists are protesting. The home government chooses its propaganda balancing the benefit of more concessions versus the cost of more unrest from increased protests. I show that because generating hostility is costly, a government may prefer its people to have 'restrained patriotism'—intermediate responsiveness to international controversies. I also show that governments benefit most from inciting protests when: 1) there is an intermediate level of media freedom; 2) the government is to some degree fragile to political protests.

Other Papers:

“Strategic Disclosure, Primary Market Uncertainty, and Informed Trading” (with Xingchen Zhu), working paper, 2018

Abstract: We study the optimal disclosure policy in security issuance using a Bayesian persuasion approach. An issuer designs a signal to persuade an investment bank to underwrite. The bank forms a posterior on the basis of the signal and makes its underwriting and retention decisions. When there is no demand uncertainty, a partially informative disclosure is enough to curb primary market underpricing due to informed sales by the underwriter in the secondary market. When demand is uncertain, the underwriter may shy away because of more retention than his privately optimal level and larger losses due to increased total cost of capital. The optimal disclosure can solve such hold-up problem resulting from weak demand and induce the bank to underwrite. We derive predictions on the effects of the issuer's fundamentals, the underwriter's cost of capital, the demand uncertainty, and the market liquidity on the informativeness of the optimal disclosure. Our model not only captures the adverse selection problem in the originate-to-distribute lending model, but also rationalizes the phenomenon that arrangers may be willing to retain large and costly stakes in leveraged loan syndication. Finally, if viewed as an extant blockholder, we show that the underwriter may exert governance by exit to promote more transparent disclosure by the issuing firm.