

MANUEL STAAB

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GENDER: M

CITIZENSHIP: Germany

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:

MRes Economics, London School of Economics, (2012-2013)

-with Distinction

MSc Economics, London School of Economics, (2011-2012)

-with Distinction

BSc Economics and Economic History, London School of Economics (2008-2011)

-Lilian Knowles Prize

DOCTORAL STUDIES:

PhD in Economics, London School of Economics (2013 – present)

Thesis: Essays in Microeconomic Theory

Expected Completion: April 2018

Advisors: Dr Francesco Nava, Prof Balazs Szentes

REFERENCES:

Dr Francesco Nava (Advisor)

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DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Field: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory
Secondary Field: Behavioral Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

Graduate Teaching Assistant, London School of Economics, (2011-2013, 2016-present)

- Teaching Assistant for *Microeconomic Principles* (EC202) (current)
- Teaching Assistant for *Macroeconomic Principles* (EC210)
- Teaching Assistant for summer school course *Intermediate Microeconomics*

LSE Fellow in Economics, London School of Economics, (2013 - 2016)

- Teaching Assistant for MSc level course *Advanced Microeconomics* (EC487);
Lecturers: Erik Eyster and Leonardo Felli
- Teaching Assistant for MRes level course *Microeconomics* (EC441);
Lecturers: Balazs Szentes and Michele Piccione

Adjunct Instructor (Lecturer), Richmond, The American Intl. University in London, (2013 - 2017)

- Courses taught (including the selection of topics, structuring of the syllabus as well as planning and delivery of lectures): *Intermediate Microeconomics, Principles of Investment, Introduction to Microeconomics*

LANGUAGES

Fluent: English, German
Basic: French

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIPS:

2013-15, 2017 LSE Economics Departmental Award

JOB MARKET PAPER:

The Formation of Social Groups under Status Concern

I study the interaction of two forces in the formation of social groups: the preference for high quality peers and the desire for status among one's peers. I present a characterization of fundamental properties of equilibrium group structures in a perfect information, simultaneous move game when group membership is priced uniformly and cannot directly depend on type. While equilibrium groups generally exhibit some form of assortative matching between individual type and peer quality, the presence of status concern reduces the potential degree of sorting and acts as a force for greater homogeneity across groups. I analyze the effect of status concern for the provision of groups under different market structures and particularly focus on the implications for segregation and social exclusion. I find that status concern reduces the potential for and benefit from segregation - both for a social planner and a monopolist - but the interaction of preference for rank and status can make the exclusion of some agents a second-best outcome.

WORKING PAPER:

The Benefits of Being Misinformed (joint with Marcus Roel)

In this paper, we show how two fundamental mistakes in information processing affect the welfare ranking of information experiments. In the spirit of Blackwell ('51), we analyze the binary ranking of informative action profiles under different classes of perception distortions. By themselves, an agent's tendency to misinterpret signals and the degree to which the prior deviates from the truth reduce expected utility in a model where payoff relevant actions also generate informative signals. However, experiments can be affected to different degrees. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when any binary ranking of action profiles can be reversed. Consequently, different types of mistakes can interact in non-obvious ways such that an agent might be better off suffering from both rather than just one. We provide a characterization when such positive interaction is possible.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:

Specialization and Cooperation in a Complex World (joint with Francesco Sannino)

We study the specialization of agents and their organization in teams in the production of knowledge. Agents choose their skills and interact in a competitive market for tasks. These tasks vary in complexity - requiring a diverse combination of skills - and difficulty - requiring a narrow set of skills. Cooperation among agents increases their effectiveness in solving a task but reduces their individual payoff. The skills researchers acquire and the teams they form are, at least to some extent, determined by market forces. These forces might explain differences across disciplines in terms of the specialization of researchers and the type of collaborations they enter. We address questions regarding the degree of specialization of agents, the diversity within teams, and their aggregate welfare consequences.