Current Visitors

Marius Backmann

Marius Backmann obtained his PhD in 2011 at the University of Cologne with a thesis on Humean Libertarianism: Outline of a Revisionist Account of the Joint Problem of Free Will, Determinism and Laws of Nature. After a brief stint at the Centre for Science and Research Management in Speyer, he returned to academia in 2013 to take up a postdoc position at Thomas Müller’s project „What is Really Possible?“ at the University of Konstanz. Since November 2015, Marius is funded within his own research project The Metaphysics of Induction  in Konstanz. Apart from his work on ontologically motivated attempts at a justification of induction, my research focuses on philosophy of time, analytic metaphysics, metaphysics of science, laws of nature, and free will.

Dates of visit: 21 July 2017 – 20 July 2018


Research Project

Induction and Necessary Connections in the Sciences

Some of the proponents of the view that the problem of induction could be solved by inferring the existence of necessary connections from which to deduce regularities concerning future or unobserved cases have also claimed that such an inference pattern can be found in scientific reasoning. If these necessitarians are correct, we should be able to identify the proposed inference patterns in scientific publications. The working hypothesis is that these reconstructions of scientific reasoning do not fit actual scientific practice. In order to establish this, I will survey publications in medical and chemical research. 


Dinçer Çevik

Dinçer Çevik is a graduate student at the Department of Philosophy in Mugla Sitki Kocman University, Turkey. He graduated from Middle East Technical University, Turkey in 2008 with a major in Philosophy, and a minor in industrial design . In fall 2010 he was offered a research assistant position by Mugla Sitki Kocman University Philosophy Department and accepted it. Since then he has been a research assistant and a graduate student at that Department. He graduated from Mugla Sitki Kocman Philosophy Department’s MA program in 2011. In the same year, he applied for their PhD program and got accepted, enabling him  to resume his position as a research assistant as well. Currently He is a research assistant at Mugla Sitki Kocman University Philosophy Department. 

Dates of visit: 8 January – 8 June 2018 


Research Project

As a PhD candidate Dinçer Çevik  is working on the causal explanations in economics. His questions are (a) What do models explain in economics? (b) What kind of explanations do models in economics provide? (c) Is there a single unifying account of all explanations in economics like Physics and Evolutionary Biology? Answering (a) and (b) and (c) He will focus on the modelling practice of economics. In his research he will approach this problem complex by focusing on how generalizations are being used in explanatory practices in economics. Currently He is working on the issue of the nature of economical evidence and what can it tell about the nature of explanations in economics.


Dong-Ryul Choo

Dong-Ryul Choo is a professor of philosophy at Hallym University, South Korea.  He studied at Seoul National University (Korea) and at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (USA), from which he got his Ph. D. in philosophy in 1994.  He has been a Visiting Scholar at the University of California-San Diego (Dept. of Philosophy) in 2003-2004, and at Yale University (Dept. of Political Science) in 2010 - 2011.  His research interests include moral realism and naturalism in metaethics, forms and the flexibility of consequentialism in normative ethics, and distributive justice and viable forms and structure of egalitarianism in political philosophy.

Dates of visit: 

8 January 2018 – 3 January 2019


Research Project

Priority revisited 

At the LSE, the primary subject of his research will be the contrast between luck egalitarianism and prioritarianism.  He plans to substantiate three theses:  First, the advertised merits of prioritarianism are widely overestimated.  Second, there are many more cases than usually expected where two positions would send different (often opposite) normative signals concerning the justice of a particular distributive profile or change.  And finally, when it comes to its credential as a robust form of distributive pluralism, prioritarianism faces serious problems.


Thomas Ferretti

After completing a BA (2009) and MA (2011) in Philosophy at Université de Montréal (Canada), Thomas Ferretti received his PhD in Philosophy from Université catholique de Louvain (Belgium) in October 2016. Thomas specialises in contemporary political philosophy, theories of justice and economic ethics. He am currently an FRQSC postdoctoral fellow (2016-2018) (Quebec’s Research Fund). Thomas started his postdoctoral research project and taught business ethics at the University of Toronto (2016-2017). As a postdoctoral fellow at the LSE (2017-2018), he will focus on what justice requires in terms of financial regulation. 

Dates of visit: 17 October 2017 – 16 October 2018


Research Project

Justice requires egalitarian organizations: The case of financial risks

The way our public institutions regulate economic organizations has an important impact on the distribution of resources. This project focuses on what liberal egalitarian theories of justice require in terms of the regulation of economic organizations in various sectors of the economy. During my PhD at Université catholique de Louvain, I investigated whether public institutions should promote worker cooperatives. In the first year of my postdoctoral research at the University of Toronto, I studied the case of the collaborative economy and investigated whether public institutions should promote specific kinds of collaborative platforms. This year at the LSE, I investigate what justice requires in terms of the regulation of finance organizations, and more specifically in terms of the management of financial risks. 


Roberto Fumagalli

Dr. Roberto Fumagalli is Junior Professor at the University of Bayreuth and Visiting Scholar at the London School of Economics and the University of Pennsylvania. He completed his PhD at the London School of Economics in 2011 with a thesis on the philosophical foundations of neuroeconomics. His main research interests are in philosophy of economics, philosophy of science, and moral philosophy. He has published articles in several journals, including Economics and Philosophy, Biology and Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Erkenntnis, Social Choice & Welfare, the Journal of Economic Methodology, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, and Studia Leibnitiana.


Research Project

Who is Afraid of Scientific Imperialism?

In recent years, several authors debated about the justifiability of scientific imperialism, the systematic application of a discipline's findings and methods to model and explain phenomena investigated by other disciplines. To date, however, widespread disagreement remains regarding both the identification and the normative evaluation of scientific imperialism. In this paper, I aim to remedy this situation by making some conceptual distinctions concerning scientific imperialism and by providing a normative evaluation of the most prominent objections to it. I shall argue that these objections provide a basis for opposing some instances of scientific imperialism, but do not yield any cogent reason to think that scientific imperialism in general is objectionable or unjustified. I then highlight this result's implications for the ongoing philosophical debate about the justifiability of scientific imperialism.


Katherine Furman

Katherine is a philosophy lecturer at University College Cork, where she directs the MA in Health and Society. Previously she was a Postdoctoral Research Associate on the Knowledge for Use project at Durham University. She received her PhD in Philosophy from the London School of Economics in 2016. Her research interests are in Philosophy of Science, Epistemology and Ethics, especially in the context of health policy cases.

Dates of visit: August 2017 – July 2018


Research Project

During her time at CPNSS, Katherine will focus on whether causal claims can be made about single cases (or a small number of cases). In particular, whether ‘model cases’ can be used to assess an intervention’s success in situations where RCTs (Randomised Control Trials) are not appropriate. This has implications for two distinct but related areas of academic debate. The first is the methodological debate over the evidential dominance of RCTs for testing the success of interventions. The second is the philosophical debate over what kinds of evidence are required for causal inference. Both of these issues will be examined in the context of the ongoing Greater Manchester Project, as part of the Knowledge for Use project.


Catherine Greene

Catherine Greene have an undergraduate degree in Philosophy from LSE. After this she spent the next 15 years working in finance. Catherine returned to the LSE to do a Masters and PhD in the Philosophy of Social Science. Her thesis topic is laws in the social sciences. She also do some consulting for a number of financial firms.

Dates of visit: March 2017 – June 2018


Research Project

The philosophical assumptions of financial theory

I am currently researching a number of topics in the philosophy of finance, including the relationship between asset prices and valuation methodologies, the assumptions of behavioural finance, and the application of physics to finance.


Hiroyuki Kano

Hiroyuki Kano is a research fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and a PhD student at Osaka University (Japan). He holds a Bachelor's degree in Sociology from Hosei University and a Master's degree in Human Science from Osaka University. His research interests lie in ethical, legal, and social issues of science and technology.

Dates of visit: 13 September 2017 – 12 March 2018


Research Project

A Philosophical Study of Uncertainty for Climate Governance

Hiroyuki’s research focuses on the strategy for assessment and management of climate risk. His objectives are to identify the fundamental perils and to delineate the roles of experts, policy makers and the public in these practices. His research consists of three sub-projects. The first step conducts a detailed analysis of the debates concerning the climate governance and a reconstruction of the arguments about uncertainties involved. The second step examines the nature of each uncertainty with a particular focus on epistemological and axiological perspectives and then elucidates how to frame as decision problems in the policy process. The third step investigates a framework for the science-policy interface and its implications for establishing a climate governance scheme.


Mikael Klintman

Mikael Klintman is Professor of Sociology at Lund University in Sweden, and a visiting scholar at CPNSS, at London School of Economics. The overriding theme of his research concerns preconditions for people and organisations to produce valid knowledge and make choices that reduce environmental and health-related harm, in a wide range of sectors. Theoretically, he combines social and behaviour economic strands of thought with evolutionary theory. This combination of thought has helped him to develop a framework of “social rationality” for explaining human and organisational motivations to engage in, or not engage in, activities that reduce environmental and health-related harm. This is discussed in depth in his book: “Citizen-Consumers and Evolution: Reducing Environmental Harm through Our Social Motivation” (Palgrave, 2013). More recently, he has examined fundamental lessons that ought to be subject to mutual learning about human interests across the social, economic, and evolutionary sciences, despite the compartmentalisation of each discipline’s knowledge, and often "proud ignorance" of what the others are doing. This work led to his book “Human Sciences and Human Interests”: Integrating the Social, Economic and Social Sciences” (Routledge, 2017). 

Dates of visit: 25 January 2017 – 31 July 2018


Research Project

Understanding and Managing Knowledge Resistance Concerning Environmental Problems

Currently, I am working on how to understand and overcome certain versions of, the universal phenomenon of knowledge resistance (including but moving far beyond post-truth and alternative facts), applied to environmental and health-related problems (how various human sciences perceive and analyse resistance to knowledge, with empirical analyses of the extent knowledge resistance can be managed and reduced through various types of knowledge collaborations of diverse participants). I’m doing interviews and focus group discussions with human scientists, and try to see to what extent inter- and transdisciplinary collaboration can serve as ways for coping with conscious as well as unconscious knowledge resistance.


Réka Markovich

Réka Markovich, JD holds four positions in Hungary: she is assistant professor at the Department of Business Law at Budapest University of Technology and Economics; she is a PhD student (ABD) at the Department of Logic at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), where she is also employed as a junior research fellow and a lecturer. She obtained her law degree at Pázmány Péter Catholic University (in 2005), also receiving there an M.A. in Communication (in 2007). She received her M.A. in Logic and Theory of Science at ELTE (in 2012). In the spring of 2017, she was a visiting research scholar at University of Edinburgh’s Law School. Her research focuses on deontic logic and other facets of the relations between logic and law; she is currently working on developing a formal representation of Hohfeldian fundamental legal conceptions.

Dates of visit: 21 September 2017 – 23 March 2018


Research Project

Hohfeld’s analysis of the different types of rights and duties is highly influential in analytical legal theory. Yet a century later, the formalization of his theory remains, in various ways, unresolved. Réka Markovich has been developing her own uniform approach to formally representing Hohfeldian conceptions. Her starting point is David Makinson’s and Marek Sergot’s critique and comments on the theory of normative positions’ developed by Kanger and Lindahl. She aims, on the one hand, to provide solutions to what Sergot perceives as shortcomings or limitations of classical approaches. On the other hand, she incorporates various considerations from legal theory that she considers fundamental to formalizing law (as well as understanding, grasping what being law consists in). The formal system she has developed is based on state enforcement in the case of the claim-right’s group of rights and duties, and the power’s duty-generating potential in case of the power’s group. During her time at CPNSS, Réka Markovich will focus on developing a semantics that can be added to a syntax built up along the above lines using SDL and ET as axiomatic background systems.


Joe Mazor

Joe Mazor received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2009.  He has since been a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton’s Center for Human Values and at Stanford’s Center for Ethics in Society.  He was an LSE Fellow and a temporary assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy, Logic & Scientific Method. During his time at the CPNSS, he will work on projects related to natural resource property rights, the ethics of severe uncertainty, and the philosophy of welfare economics.

Dates of visit: 4 November 2016 – 30 September 2018


Research Project

On the Nature and Significance of Welfare Economics

A key project I will be working on at CPNSS is a book on the philosophy of welfare economics.  The book will develop a comprehensive critique of welfare economics as it is currently practiced.  In advancing this critique, the book has several key goals a) a careful explanation of the different welfare economics frameworks in use today, b) clear connections between contemporary scholarship in political philosophy and contemporary welfare economics, with a focus on the practical consequences of the philosophical debates for the field c) a critique of the welfare economic frameworks aimed at welfare economists, but accessible to anyone who has taken microeconomics at the undergraduate level.


Johanna Privitera

Johanna is a PhD candidate at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. She holds an MA in Philosophy (also from Humboldt) and a BA in Political Science and Philosophy (from Freie Universität Berlin). During her stay at the CPNSS she will be working on her dissertation, which explores questions related to the permissibility of risky actions.

Dates of visit: 8 September 2017 – 31 March 2018


Research Project

The Permissibility of Risky Actions

During my stay at the CPNSS I will engage with a part of my dissertation concerning questions related to adopting an ex ante perspective on the permissibility of risky actions. More specifically, I will investigate what speaks in favour of adopting an ex ante perspective, how the importance of caution can best be captured from an ex ante perspective, and whether one can, from an ex ante perspective, account for certain differences in deontic judgements that common sense morality seems to require. 


Anselm Spindler

Anselm Spindler was born in 1981 in Frankfurt am Main (GER). He received his Magister Artium (MA) in Philosophy from Goethe-University Frankfurt in 2008. His thesis was on weakness of the will and the concept of practical reason in Donald Davidson's work. Anselm received his Dr. phil. (PhD) from Goethe-University Frankfurt in 2015. His doctoral thesis was on the concept of autonomy in the moral thought of the 16th-century „School of Salamanca“. Since then, he's been working mainly on medieval political philosophy and on today's discussion about collective intentionality, group agency, and collective responsibility. Anselm's interests in the history of philosophy include: medieval practical philosophy (Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham), modern practical philosophy (Hume, Kant). His interests in contemporary philosophy include: theory of action, conceptions of rationality, moral philosophy, philosophy of law, political philosophy. 

Dates of visit: 3 May 2017 – 3 April 2018


Research Project

Realism about Collective Agents: The Current Debate about the Nature of Collective Action and its Relation to Medieval Political Philosophy

Many philosophers today believe that not just individuals but also certain groups of individuals are (or can be) intentional agents. We share this realism about group agents with medieval philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius of Padua, and William of Ockham. What I would like to show is that the key to understanding their political thought is the concept of group agency. Thus, what I'm looking for is a path that leads from today's discussion about the nature of group agents back to medieval political philosophy.


Jeremy Steeger

Jeremy Steeger received his B.S. in physics from MIT, and he is currently a doctoral candidate in the John J. Reilly Center’s History and Philosophy of Science Graduate Program at the University of Notre Dame. His research focuses on the metaphysics, logic, and epistemology of quantum theories—particularly where the concerns of these fields intersect. His academic interests also include philosophy of physics, formal epistemology, and philosophical logic.

Dates of visit: 15 January – 23 March 2018


Research Project

New Subjectivist Foundations for Quantum Probability

This project explores the consequences of combining two views concerning the observables of quantum theory: the view that pure quantum states encode objective chances for observables to obtain given values, and the view that quantum probabilities are the subjective degrees of belief (or credences) of a given observer. At stake is how truth, chance, and credence should relate when these views are combined. I develop generalized Dutch-book and accuracy-dominance arguments to defend the claim that the Born rule (the usual rule of quantum probability) governs rational credence on this combination of views.


David Strohmaier

David Strohmaier received his Bachelor in sociology and philosophy at the University of Göttingen and his master in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield, where he now also undertakes research for his PhD. Much of his work focuses on the connection between the social sciences and philosophy drawing on game and decision theory. He has an interest in preference change, including which rationality criteria apply to our motivational changes and how to model such dynamics.

Dates of visit: 1 March – 8 June 2018


Research Project

Towards a Pragmatist Theory of Preference Change


In recent years issues of preferences change have attracted increasing attention, for example in the work of L. A. Paul, Richard Pettigrew, and Christian List. During my stay at the LSE I will explore the potential of a pragmatist theory of preference change. According to classical pragmatists such as Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey, disruptions in activity can lead to a recalibration of decision processes, which might include a change of preferences. I formalise this proposal and connect to research at the LSE.


Nicholas Teh

Nicholas Teh is Director of the Program in Philosophy, Science and Mathematics and Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He obtained his PhD in History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Cambridge in 2012, after which he was a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics at Cambridge till 2015. He is the recipient of a National Science Foundation award for his research in the philosophy of physics. Teh’s interests within the philosophy of physics include the philosophy of symmetry (especially gauge symmetry), the philosophy of duality, spacetime theory, and the application of category theory as a meta-mathematical framework for doing science. He has been widely-published in journals such as Philosophy of Science and British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. His recent publications include “Why surplus structure is not superfluous” in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , “Galileo’s Gauge” in Philosophy of Science , and “Recovering Recovery” in Philosophy of Science.

Dates of visit: 8 January – 6 June 2018


Research Project

Representing the Observable 

During his visit, Dr Teh will be collaborating with Dr Bryan Roberts on exploring the philosophical foundations of "observables" in classical and quantum physics, especially in relation to the tradition initiated by Pascual Jordan, as well as more recent developments in the theory of PT symmetry and complexified observables. He will also be investigating the notion of an "observer" in spacetime physics, particularly in the non-relativistic regime that has recently found many applications to condensed matter theory


David Thorstad

I am a doctoral student in the philosophy department at Harvard University. My primary interests lie in decision theory and formal epistemology. I’m currently working on bounded epistemic rationality. I also have secondary interests in epistemic permissivism and norms for inquiry.

Dates of visit: 23 October 2017 – 15 April 2018


Research Project

Bounded epistemic rationality

Developments in behavioral economics and decision theory have led to a gradual loosening of norms for rational judgment and choice. The resulting notion of bounded rationality will, it is hoped, be more appropriate for creatures with cognitive and computational capacities like our own. My research focuses on boundedly rational norms for judgment. I argue that assessments of bounded rationality play important, but separate, functional roles from traditional unbounded normative assessments. Hence bounded rationality should be viewed as complimentary to, rather than competing with traditional normative paradigms. I use this functional characterization of bounded epistemic rationality to derive characteristic features of boundedly rational norms, and to advocate a new requirement of bounded rationality: appropriate metacognitive control. I then apply my account of bounded epistemic rationality to recent discussions of imprecise Bayesianism, norms of inquiry and suspension of judgment.


Ya-nan Wang

Ya-nan Wang is a Lecturer of the Research Center for Philosophy of Science and Technology at Shanxi University. She received her PhD degree in Philosophy of Science and Technology from Shanxi University in 2015. Her research interests lie in general philosophy of science and philosophy of social science. Her current work focuses on complexity of social science.

Dates of visit: 24 April 2017 – 24 April 2018


Research Project

Research on Philosophy of Social Science in the Perspective of Complexity Theory

Philosophy of social science is a series of studies that focus on the scientific status of social knowledge. Complexity science provides new answers for many significant and difficult issues about the rationality of social science, such as the complexity of social reality, the intentionality of individuals, the influence of cultural ideas on social science research, and so on. My project attempts to study the following aspects among these many issues: whether there are laws in the social sciences; the reliable modes of social scientific explanation; the modeling trend of social science. And other related core problems would be also investigated. My research is funded by The Research Center for Philosophy of Science and Technology, Shanxi University.