Archive

• Groups Can Make a Difference: Voting Power Measures Generalized by Claus Beisbart
• A Note on Measuring Voters' Responsibility by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
• Maintaining OPOV: Some Problems Associated with the Periodic Need to Re-draw Parliamentary Boundaries in the UK and US by Dan S Felsenthal

• Discussion Topic: Voting Power When Voters' Independence Is Not Assumed by Moshé Machover
• Penrose's Square-root Rule and the EU Council of Ministers: Significance of the Quota by Moshé Machover. Published in Distribution of Power and Voting Procedures in the EU, 12-13 October 2007, European Centre Natolin, Warsaw, Poland.
• The QM Rule in the Nice and EU Reform Treaties: Future Projections by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
• Analysis of QM Rule Adopted by the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 23 June 2007 by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
• Extended Shapley-Owen Indices and Power Distribution in the III State Duma of the Russian Federation by Fuad Aleskerov and Olga Otchour
• Homogeneity, Heterogeneity and Direct Democracy: The Case of Swiss Referenda by Abraham Diskin, André Eschet-Schwartz and Dan S Felsenthal. Published in Canadian Journal of Political Science 40:2 (June 2007), pp. 317–342.
• Individual Rationality and Bargaining by Abraham Diskin and Dan S Felsenthal. Published in Public Choice 133: 1–2 (October 2007), pp. 25–29.
• Non-Voting and the Decisiveness of Electoral Outcomes by Paul R Abramson, Abraham Diskin and Dan S Felsenthal. Published in Political Research Quarterly 60:3 (September 2007) pp. 500–515.
• A Behavioural Power Index by Serguei Kaniovski and Dennis Leech

• Coalition Formation Theories Revisited: An Empirical Investigation of Aumann's Hypothesis by Vincent C H Chua and Dan S Felsenthal. Published in Matthew Braham and Frank Steffen (eds.), Power, Freedom, and Voting: Essays in Honour of Manfred J. Holler. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2008, pp. 159–183.
• Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Published in Matthew Braham and Frank Steffen (eds.), Power, Freedom, and Voting: Essays in Honour of Manfred J. Holler. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2008, pp. 39–55.

• L. S. Penrose's Limit Theorem: Tests by Simulation by Pao-Li and Chua Chang, CH Vincent and Moshé Machover. Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 51 (1). pp. 90–106. ISSN 0165-4896.
• An Interview with Michael Dummett: From Analytical Philosophy to Voting Analysis and Beyond by Rudolf Fara and Maurice Salles. Published in Social Choice and Welfare.
• Voting Power Measurement: A Story of Misreinvention by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Published in Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 25(2–3) December 2005 (Volume Title: The History of Social Choice), pp 485–506.
• Voting Power and Voting Blocs by Dennis Leech and Robert Leech. Published in Public Choice.
• Voting Power Implications of a Unified European Representation at the IMF by Dennis Leech and Robert Leech

• A New Approach to Rights in Social Choice Theory which Incorporates Utilitarianism by Richard Barrett, Anne Petron-Brunel and Maurice Salles
• Social Choice with Fuzzy Preferences by Richard Barrett and Maurice Salles
• Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003 by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 23 (1). pp. 1–20. ISSN 1432-217X
• Analysis of QM rule adopted by the EU Inter-Governmental Conference Brussels, 18 June 2004 by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
• A Priori Voting Power: What Is It All About? by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Published in Political Studies Review, 2 (1). pp. 1–23. ISSN 1478-9299
• The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council: A Reply to Moberg (2002) by Madeleine O Hosli and Moshé Machover. Published in Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (3). pp. 497–521. ISSN 1468-5965
• L.S. Penrose's Limit Theorem: Proof of Some Special Cases by Ines Lindner and Moshé Machover. Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 47 (1). pp. 37–49. ISSN 0165-4896
• Duverger's Law, Penrose's Power Index and the Unity of the United Kingdom by Iain McLean, Alistair McMillan and Dennis Leech
• La Théorie du Choix Social: Une Introduction à Quelques Résultats Fondamentaux by Maurice Salles
• Michael Dummett on Social Choice and Voting by Maurice Salles
• The Launching of Social Choice and Welfare and the Creation of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare by Maurice Salles

• The Voting Power Approach: Response to a Philosophical Reproach by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. An edited version of this report was published in European Union Politics 4:(4) (December 2003), pp. 473–479, 493–497. ISSN 1741-2757
• The Utility of the Voting Power Approach by Dennis Leech. Published in Warwick Economic Research Papers Number 678
• Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions by Dennis Leech and Robert Leech
• Qualified Majority Voting: The effect of the Quota by Dennis Leech and Moshé Machover. Published in Manfred J Holler, H Kliemt, D Schmidtchen and M E Streit, (eds.) Power and Fairness (Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie Vol 22); Mohr Siebeck, pp. 127–143.

• Annexations and Alliances: When Are Blocs Advantageous A Priori? by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 19 (2). pp. 295–312. ISSN 1432-217X
• An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices by Dennis Leech. Published in Political Studies : 2002 Vol 50, pp. 1–22.
• Computation of Power Indices by Dennis Leech. Published in Warwick Economic Research Papers Number 644.
• Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union by Dennis Leech. Published in Public Choice 113: 437–464, 2002.
• Power Indices as an Aid to Institutional Design: The Generalised Apportionment Problem by Dennis Leech. Published in Warwick Economic Research Papers Number 648.
• Shareholder Voting Power and Ownership Control of Companies by Dennis Leech. Published in Homo Oeconomicus.
• The Use of Coleman's Power Indices to Inform the Choice of Voting Rule with Reference to the IMF Governing Body and the EU Council of Ministers by Dennis Leech. Published in Warwick Economic Research Papers Number 645.
• Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund by Dennis Leech. Published in Annals of Operations Research 109, 375–397, 2002.
• Comment on Braham and Steffen by Moshé Machover. Published in M J Holler, H Kliemt, D Schmidtchen and M E Streit, (eds.) Power and Fairness (Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie Vol 20) (2002); Mohr Siebeck, pp. 349–353.
• Comment on Schmidtchen and Steunenberg by Moshé Machover. Published in M J Holler, H Kliemt, D Schmidtchen and M E Streit, (eds.) Power and Fairness (Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie Vol 20) (2002); Mohr Siebeck, pp. 225–227.

• Myths and Meanings of Voting Power: Comments on a Symposium by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Published in Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13 (1). pp. 81–97. ISSN 1460-3667
• The Treaty of Nice and Qualified Majority Voting by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 18 (3). pp. 431–464. ISSN 1432-217X
• Shareholder Voting Power and Corporate Governance: A Study of Large British Companies by Dennis Leech. Published in Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 27(1), 2001, pp. 33–54.

• Enlargement of the EU and Weighted Voting in the Council of Ministers by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
• Notions of a Priori Voting Power: Critique of Holler and Widgrén by Moshé Machover. Published in Homo Oeconomicus, XVI(4):415–25.
• Voting Power and Parliamentary Defections: The 1953–54 French National Assembly Revisited by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover

Voting Power in Social/Political Institutions: Typology, Measurement, Applications

London School of Economics 20–22 March 2011

Sponsored by The Leverhulme Trust

Programme | Abstracts

Papers

These were posted for the benefit of participants to read prior to the workshop. Often they are draftworks in progress or have citation restrictions. Please do not quote from the texts without permission from the author. The papers are listed in alphabetical order of the presenting authors at the workshop.

• Power distribution in the Weimar Reichstag 1919-1933 by Fuad Aleskerov, Manfred Holler and Rita Kamalova
• An analysis of the intrinsic differences between the commonly applied voting techniques by Sreejith Das
• Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik indices in games with a coalition structure: a special case study by Maria Ekes
• Ordinal equivalence olf power indices by Josep Freixas
• Pathology or revelation? The Public Good Index by Manfred J Holler
• Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes by Serguei Kaniovski and Alexander Zaigraev
• Theorems for exchangeable binary random variables with applications (slides) by Serguei Kaniovski
• Optimal apportionment by Yukio Koriyama and Jean-François Laslier
• Power indices in large voting bodies by Dennis Leech
• The direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting by Nicola Maaser and Stefan Napel
• Fair apportionment in the Italian senate: which reform should be implemented? by Vincent Merlin, Fabrize Barthelemy, Gabriele Esposito and Mathieu Martin
• A priori voting power when one vote counts in two ways with application to two variants of the US Electoral College by Nicholas R. Miller
• A priori voting power when one vote counts in two ways with application to two variants of the US Electoral College (slides) by Nicholas R. Miller
• The market value of votes: an experiment by Maria Montero, Alex Possajennikov and Martin Sefton
• Strategic vs. non-strategic voting power in the EU Council of Ministers: the consultation procedure by Stefan Napel and Mika Widgren
• Aspects of power overlooked by power indices by Hannu Nurmi
• A probabilistic "re-view" on F&M's Measurement of Voting Power by Friedrich Pukelsheim
• A probabilistic "re-view" on F&M's Measurement of Voting Power (slides) by Friedrich Pukelsheim
• On the possibility of a preference-based power index: the strategic power index revisited by Dieter Schmidtchen and Bernard Steunenberg
• The Shapley index for games with r alternatives with a priori unions by Justyna Winnicka
• Square root voting system, optimal threshold and pi by Karol Zyczkowski and WojciechSlomczynski

Chateau du Baffy, Normandy, France, 30 July‒2 August 2010

This Voting Power in Practice workshop was generously sponsored by The Leverhulme Trust.

Call for papers | Note on workshop discussion topic | Workshop programme

Papers

These were posted for the benefit of participants to read prior to the workshop. Often they are draftworks in progress or have citation restrictions. Please do not quote from the texts without permission from the author. Affiliations and emails of all workshop participants are given at the end of the workshop programme above. The papers/abstracts below are listed in their order of presentation at the workshop.

• The underlying assumptions of electoral systems by Moshé Machover (LSE and King's College London)
• The underlying assumptions of electoral systems ‒ comment on Machover by DanFelsenthal (University of Haifa and LSE)
• Review of paradoxes afflicting various voting procedures where one out of m candidates (m≥2) must be elected by Dan Felsenthal (University of Haifa and LSE)
• On the relevance of theoretical results to voting system choice by Hannu Nurmi (Public Choice Research Centre and University of Turku)
• The impact of group coherence on the likelihood of voting paradoxes by William Gehrlein (University of Delaware) and Dominique Lepelley (University of La Réunion)
• The value of research based on simple assumptions about voters' preferences by William Gehrlein (University of Delaware) and Dominique Lepelley (University of La Réunion)
• Election inversions and the US Electoral College by Nicholas Miller (University of Maryland, Baltimore County)
• Assessing the probability of the referendum paradox  by Rahhal Lahrach (University of Caen) and Vincent Merlin (University of Caen)
• Electoral reform in Germany: A positive twist to negative voting weights? by Friedrich Pukelsheim (University of Augsburg)
• Manipulability, decisiveness and responsiveness in voting rules by William Zwicker (Union College) See also section 4 of Voting with rubber bands, weights and strings
• Putting paradoxes into perspective by Ken Ritchie (Electoral Reform Society) and Alessandro Gardini (Electoral Reform Society)
• Which result for which voting rule? An analysis based on a framed field experiment on approval and evaluation voting rules by A. Baujard (University of Caen), H.Igersheim (University of Strasbourg) and J. F. Laslier (École Polytechnique, Paris)
• In Silico voting experiments by Jean-Francois Laslier (École Polytechnique, Paris)
• Social threshold aggregations by F.T. Aleskerov (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia), V. V. Chistyakov and V. A. Kalyagin (State University Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod, Russia) See also Tables & graphs
• Approval balloting for fixed-sized committees by D. Marc Kilgour and Erica Marshall (Wilfried Laurier University, Ontario, Canada)
• The structure of the election-generating universe by T. Nicolaus Tideman (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia) and Florenz Plassmann (State University of New York at Binghamton)
• One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy proofness by M. Remzi Sanver (Bilgi University, Istanbul) and William Zwicker (Union College)
• A stochastic synopsis of binary voting rules by Olga Ruff and Friedrich Pukelsheim(University of Augsburg)

University of Warwick, 14–16 July 2009

This Voting Power in Practice workshop, sponsored by The Leverhulme Trust, considers problemsof governance of institutions with shareholder/stakeholder voting.

Call for Papers | Workshop Programme | Paper Abstracts

Papers

These papers are posted for the benefit of participants to read prior to the workshop. Often theyare draft works in progress or have citation restrictions. Please do not quote from the texts withoutpermission from the author.

• Cost Efficiency and Shareholders' Voting Power in Russian Banking by Fuad Aleskerov, Veronika Belousova, Irina Ivashkovskaya, Kirill Pogorelskiy and Anastasia Stepanova
• How to Make a Difference - Measures of Voting Power Revamped by Claus Beisbart and Luc Bovens
• Minimizing the Threat of a Positive Majority Deficit in Two-Tier Voting Systems with Equipopulous Units by Luc Bovens and Claus Beisbart
• An Anatomy of Moral Responsibility by Matthew Braham and Martin van Hees
• Unifying EU Representation at the IMF Executive Board: A Voting and Veto Power Analysis by Peter Brandner, Harald Grech and Iain Paterson
• Royal Bank of Scotland Fiasco: Exit, Voice or Loyalty? by Shanti Chakravarty and Lynn Hodgkinson
• Criticality in Games with Multiple Levels of Approval by Sreejith Das
• A Note on Measuring Voters' Responsibility by Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
• Arrow's Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise by Grant Hayden and Matthew Bodie
• Volkswagen vs Porsche: A Power-Index Analysis by Roland Kirstein
• Voting in Truth-Tracking Situations by Ines Lindner and Guillermo Owen
• More on Equal Representation in Two-Tier Voting Systems by Nicola Maaser and Stefan Napel
• Optimal Quota in a Mixed Fairness Model by Olga Ruff
• The Role of Ownership Concentration Measures in Exploring the Ownership-Performance Relationship by Victoria Soboleva

University of Warwick, 29–31 August 2007

This VPP workshop was focused on the problems of measuring a posteriori or "actual" voting power.

Workshop Discussion Topic | Workshop Programme

Papers

• Measuring Influence for Dependent Voters: A Generalisation of the Banzhaf Measure by Luc Bovens and Claus Beisbart
• Voting Power as a Probability When Votes are Not Independent by Serguei Kaniovski
• Measuring Influence for Dependent Voters: A Generalisation of the Banzhaf Measure by Claus Beisbart
• What Can We Learn From A Council Of Elders? by George Wilmers
• A Behavioural Power Index by Serguei Kaniovski and Dennis Leech
• Power in Social Influence Dynamics by Maurice Koster and Ines Lindner
• Comment on Discussion by Ines Lindner
• Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting by Bernard Grofman, Ines Lindner and Guillermo Owen

University of Warwick, 20–22 July 2005

Sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR).

The fourth VPP workshop was on the theme of voting power analysis with special emphasis on its application to the institutions of global governance.

Call for Papers | Workshop Programme

Papers

• Power indices taking into account agents' preferences by Fuad Aleskerov
• The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy by Ariel Buira
• Two Types of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index in Games with a Priori Unions by Maria Ekes
• Computation of the Shapley-Owen Power Index in Two Dimensions by Joseph Godfrey
• Holler-Packel Value and Index – A new characterization by Ruxandra Haradu and Stefan Napel
• International Organization Analyzed with the Power Index Method by Jan-Eric Lane
• On the Power Distribution Among the Parties of the UNFCCC by Jerome Le Tensorer and Vincent Merlin
• The Geometry Behind Paradoxes of Voting Power by Michael A Jones
• Non-cooperative Foundations of Bargaining Power in Committees by Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
• Voting Power Implications of a Unified European Representation at the IMF by Dennis Leech and Robert Leech
• Equal Representation in Two-tier Voting Systems by Nicola Maaser and Stefan Napel
• EU Representation and the Governance of the International Monetary Fund by Géraldine Mahieu, Dirk Ooms and Stéphane Rottier
• On the Nucleolus as a Power Index by Maria Montero
• Maximal Proportionality between Votes and Voting Power: the Case of the Council of the European Union by Antti Pajala
• United Nations Security Council Reform: A Proposal for Weighted Voting by Matthew Rablen
• Voting Power: Notes for a Revision of the Paradigm (extended abstract) by Federico Valenciano and Annick Laruelle

LSE, 17–19 August 2004

Sponsored by The Leverhulme Trust

Workshop Programme

Papers

• Power Distribution Among Groups and Fractions in Russian Parliament (1994-2003) by Fuad Aleskerov, Nikolay Blagoveschenski, Georgiy Satarov, Anna Sokolova and Vyacheslav Yakuba
• Freedom, Power and Success: A Game Theoretic Perspective by Matthew Braham
• L. S. Penrose's Limit Theorem: Tests by Simulation (Appendix: tables and figures) by Pao-Li Chang, Vincent C H Chua and Moshé Machover
• Party Competition and Electoral Turnout by Juha Helin and Hannu Nurmi
• Voting Models for the Council of Ministers of the European Union by Mark R Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent R Merlin and Jean-Louis Rouet
• Nice, Convention, Compromises – About Procedures' Meaning in Projected Political Institutions by Mikolaj Jasinski
• Coordination in N-Person Games by Jan-Erik Lane and Reinert Maeland
• Success Versus Decisiveness: Conceptual Discussion and Case Study by Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
• Voting Power and Voting Blocs by Dennis Leech and Robert Leech
• Discrepancies Among TU Games Solutions: A Probabilistic Approach by Vincent Merlin, Mallesh Pai and Fabrice Valognes
• EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 vs. Parliament 6 by Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén
• The Category of Simple Voting Games by Simon Terrington
• I-Power and P-Power: Shapley-Shubik and/or Penrose-Banzhaf by Frantisek Turnovec, Jacek W Mercik and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
• Bargaining in Committees of Representatives: The Optimal Voting Rule by Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano

University of Caen, 2–3 July 2003

Sponsored by The Leverhulme Trust and the French Ministry of Education through Grouped'Économie Mathématique et de Micro-économie Appliquée (GEMMA)

Workshop Programme

Papers

The Workshop this year concentrated on voting procedures in the European Union. Some talks were delivered as Powerpoint displays, overhead transparencies and without available written texts, so not all presentations listed on the programme are given below.

• Non-Voting and the Decisiveness of Electoral Victories by Paul R Abramson, Abraham Diskin, Dan S Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
• Critical Strategies Under Approval Voting: Who Gets Ruled In and Ruled Out by Steven J Brams and Remzi Sanver
• An Electoral System to Consolidate a Regional, National and Continental Peace by Peter Emerson
• Fair and Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union by M R Feix, D Lepelley, V Merlin and J L Rouet
• Approval Voting : An Experiment during the French 2002 Presidential Election by Jean-François Laslier and Karine Vander Straeten
• Note on an Extension of a Theorem of Saari and Merlin by William S Zwicker

LSE, 9–11 August 2002

Sponsored by The Leverhulme Trust

Workshop Programme and Abstracts of Papers

Papers

• Local Monotonicity of Voting Power: A Conceptual Analysis by Matthew Braham and Frank Steffen
• The Probability of Conflicts in a U.S. Presidential Type Election by M R Feix, D Lepelley, V Merlin and J L Rouet
• The Market Value of Weighted Votes: An Alternative Approach to Voting Power by Scott L Feld, Bernard Grofman and Leonard Ray
• Weighted Voting, Abstention and Multiple Levels of Approval by J Freixas and W Zwicker
• How to Sell Power Indices by Manfred J Holler
• Positive and Normative Assessment of Voting Situations by Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
• Voting Power Paradoxes Revisited by Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
• Power Indices as an Aid to Institutional Design: The Generalised Apportionment Problem by Dennis Leech
• Voting Power in Weighted (j, k) Games: A Limit Theorem and a Numerical Method by Ines Lindner
• Strategic Power Revisited by Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén
• On Some Properties of the Hoede-Bakker Index by Agnieszka Rusinowska and Harrie de Swart
• The Strategic Power Index by Dieter Schmidtchen and Bernard Steunenberg