Why does regulation vary so dramatically from one area to another? Why are some risks regulated aggressively and others responded to only modestly? Is there any logic to the techniques we use in risk regulation? These key questions are explored in The Government of Risk. This book looks at a number of risk regulation regimes, considers the respects in which they differ, and examines how these differences can be justified.

Analyzing regulation in terms of 'regimes' allows us to see the rich, multi-dimensional nature of risk regulation. It exposes the thinness of society-wide analyses of risk controls and it offers a perspective that single case studies cannot reach. Regimes analysis breaks down the components of risk regulation systems and shows how they interact. It also shows how different parts of the same regime may be shaped by different factors and have to be explained and understood in quite different ways. The Government of Risk shows how such an approach is of high policy relevance as well as of considerable theoretical importance.

 click here for publisher's site

Really Responsive Regulation seeks to add to current theories of enforcement by stressing the case for regulators to be responsive not only to the attitude of the regulated firm but also to the operating and cognitive frameworks of firms; the institutional environment and performance of the regulatory regime; the different logics of regulatory tools and strategies; and to changes in each of these elements. The approach pervades all the different tasks of enforcement activity: detecting undesirable or non-compliant behaviour; developing tools and strategies for responding to that behaviour; enforcing those tools and strategies; assessing their success or failure; and modifying them accordingly. The value of the approach is shown by outlining its potential application to UK environmental and fisheries controls. Putting the system into effect is itself challenging but failing to regulate really responsively can constitute an expensive process of shooting in the dark.

 click here for full text via Blackwells Synergy

Emissions trading is the governmentally promoted hope for a sustainable world. In different contexts, trading regimes display varying potential – both in absolute terms and in comparison with other regulatory instruments. Emissions trading, however, is a device that raises urgent issues regarding its objectives, cost-effectiveness, fairness, transparency and legitimacy. Its use places emphasis on its “acceptability” and the virtues of regulation that is “lite” because it is non-threatening to the most powerful interests. Emissions trading is resonant with assumptions that are highly contentious – notably that it is acceptable because it involves no losers, or because, in desperate global circumstances, we have no choice but to use it. There is a need to confront the difficult issues presented by emissions trading; to face the challenges of combining “market” and “democratic” systems of legitimation; and to avoid taking refuge in all too comfortable beliefs in cumulative checks and balances.

click here for full text via Ingenta [ON CAMPUS]
click here for full text via Ingenta [OFF CAMPUS]

The discourse of 'Better Regulation' is a hot topic, intimately associated with the drive for cost savings and a more efficient economy. In the UK and in the EU, rule-makers have lately endeavoured to achieve a more satisfactory balance between the demands of proper protection from market failure and inequity on the one hand, and commercial freedom and the potential for innovation on the other. But who is the regulator listening to, and what effect does this have on the regulatory pattern governing the integrating EU market? What is best practice in the matter of regulatory assessment. The essays in this collection explore these and other questions and will foster greater understanding of UK and EU regulation, the accountability issues involved, and problems of enforcement. It is no coincidence that since efforts to construct a Constitution for Europe have stalled the attention of policy-makers, politicians and the business community has turned instead to the quest for Better Regulation - or perhaps, it might be said, a "Better European Union".

click here for publisher's site

click here for full text via CUP [ON CAMPUS]
click here for full text via CUP [OFF CAMPUS]

Discusses whether efforts by the Government, the EU and the OECD towards ensuring a better regulatory regime will necessarily result in a smarter system of regulation. Traces the development of the better regulation movement and considers various regulatory tools designed to achieve better regulation, such as regulatory impact assessments and the system of administrative and regulatory simplification.

 click here for access via Westlaw [ON CAMPUS]
 click here for access via Westlaw [OFF CAMPUS]

There is now some evidence of a potential drift towards 'punitive' approaches to regulation in which greater emphasis is placed on criminal sanctions. This new enthusiasm for punishment can be seen in government policy, legislation and some regulators' public stances. There is evidence, however, that companies (even top ones) deal with punitive regulatory risks in a confused manner and that even when they do act rationally, this may not lead to compliance. One response to punitive approaches and their limitations is to move towards greater reliance on stimulating the self-regulatory capacities of corporations. Such stimulation, however, has to be carried out with an awareness of the dangers of self-regulation – notably that it may lead to controls that lack legitimacy, prove unfair and are exclusive and inefficient.

 click here for full text via Blackwells Synergy [ON CAMPUS]
 click here for full text via Blackwells Synergy [OFF CAMPUS]

There is now some evidence of a potential drift towards 'punitive' approaches to regulation in which greater emphasis is placed on criminal sanctions. This new enthusiasm for punishment can be seen in government policy, legislation and some regulators' public stances. There is evidence, however, that companies (even top ones) deal with punitive regulatory risks in a confused manner and that even when they do act rationally, this may not lead to compliance. One response to punitive approaches and their limitations is to move towards greater reliance on stimulating the self-regulatory capacities of corporations. Such stimulation, however, has to be carried out with an awareness of the dangers of self-regulation – notably that it may lead to controls that lack legitimacy, prove unfair and are exclusive and inefficient.

 click here for full text via Blackwells Synergy [ON CAMPUS]
 click here for full text via Blackwells Synergy [OFF CAMPUS]

This innovative volume in the prestigious series of Oxford Handbooks provides a comprehensive overview of law and legal scholarship at the dawn of the 21st century. Through 43 essays by leading legal scholars based in USA, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Germany it will provide a varied and stimulating set of road maps to guide readers through the increasingly large and conceptually sophisticated body of legal scholarship.

 click here for publisher's site