Andrew Summers


Email:  A.D.Summers@lse.ac.uk
Administrative support: Sarah Lee
Room: New Academic Building 6.02
Tel. 020-7955-6585

Andrew joined the LSE as an Assistant Professor in 2014. Previously he was a College Lecturer at Corpus Christi College, Oxford (2011-14). Andrew took Law as an undergraduate at Queens’ College Cambridge (2005-08), before studying for the BCL at Merton College Oxford (2009-10). He also completed his PhD (DPhil) on ‘Mitigation in the Law of Damages’ at Oxford.

Andrew’s research interests span the whole of private law, but particularly the law of remedies. He also teaches and researches in taxation, particularly the taxation of wealth. Andrew is jointly responsible for undergraduate admissions policy in the Law Department.

Publications prior to 2016 are listed under ‘Andrew Dyson’.

 

Research Interests
  • Contract, torts, trusts and unjust enrichment
  • Law of damages
  • Private law theory
  • Tax law and policy
      
Books  

Dyson, Goudkamp & Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Contract (Hart Publishing, 2017) [FORTHCOMING]

Dyson, Goudkamp & Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Unjust Enrichment (Hart Publishing, 2016)

This book is the second in a series of essay collections on defences in private law. It addresses defences to liability arising in unjust enrichment. The essays are written from a range of perspectives and methodologies. Some are doctrinal, others are theoretical, and several offer comparative insights. The most important defence in this area of the law, change of position, is addressed in detail, but many other defences are treated too, as well as the interrelations between these defences within the law of unjust enrichment. The essays offer novel claims and ways of looking at problems in this challenging area of legal study.

Dyson, Goudkamp & Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Tort Law (Hart Publishing 2015)

This book is the first in a series of essay collections on defences in private law. The series offers a systematic treatment of defences as a connected field. Contributions from some of the world's pre-eminent jurists and scholars provide insights from several common law jurisdictions. The present collection explores the links between tort law defences on a theoretical level, and examines the nature and scope of individual defences. It will be of value to academics and practitioners alike.

 
Selected articles
and chapters in books
 

‘Cooperation, Termination and the Agreed Sum’ in Graham Virgo and Sarah Worthington (eds), Commercial Remedies: Resolving Controversies (CUP, 2016) [FORTHCOMING]

‘Choice, Benefits and the Basis of the Market Rule’ [2016] LMCLQ 202-206

‘Central Issues in the Law of Tort Defences’ in Dyson, Goudkamp & Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Tort Law (Hart Publishing 2014) (co-written with James Goudkamp & Frederick Wilmot-Smith)

'There is No Breach Date Rule: Mitigation, Difference in Value and Date of Assessment' (2014) 130 LQR 259-281 (co-written with Adam Kramer), cited with approval in Hirtenstein v Hill Dickinson LLP [2014] EWHC 2711 (Comm) [117] and [154] (Leggatt J)

'British Westinghouse Revisited' [2012] LMCLQ 412-425

This article revisits the landmark decision of the House of Lords in British Westinghouse, one hundred years on. It highlights some of the uncertainties that still attend the doctrine of mitigation and situates the case among more recent decisions in the law of damages. It is argued that, contrary to conventional understanding, it is not necessary or plausible to explain British Westinghouse as an application of the rule that “claimants cannot recover for an avoided loss”. Instead, the case merely exemplifies the rule that benefits resulting from reasonable conduct in mitigation are taken into account in the assessment of damages.

'All's Fair in Love and Law: An Analysis of the Common Intention Constructive Trust' (2008) 4 CSLR 149-166

 The article analyses the application of the common intention constructive trust to disputes involving the family home, as the law stands after Stack v. Dowden and the numerous recent cases interpreting that decision. It is suggested that instances of actual unfairness are rarer than often thought, because of the judiciary's willingness to manipulate the formal rules of the trust in order to avoid injustice. Criticism should instead be focused on the hidden costs of allowing fairness to trump formality: a hole in the integrity of the law, and the spiralling costs of litigation which flow from the complexity of the doctrine. It is concluded that a statutory scheme is the only way forward for the law of cohabitation.