After the EU Referendum: 
What Next for Britain and Europe?

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Outline

1. Why did the UK vote to Leave the EU?
   Why didn’t “Project Fear” work?
   *The role of 3 i’s: inequality, identity, immigration*

2. What are/might be the consequences for British politics and the economy?

3. What is the best option going forward, and how might the UK and the EU get there?
Trends in Support for Remain and Leave Options in Referendum on UK Membership in European Union, 256 Polls, September 8, 2010 - June 22, 2016

Note: trends estimated using Hodrick-Prescott filter

Source: Matthew Goodwin
The Result

51.9% Leave
17,410,742

48.1% Remain
16,141,241

72% turnout

with big variations on vote patterns by across the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Leave</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>Remain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire and The Humber</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
More Nuanced Geographical Divides

Leave
Rural England & Wales, small towns, East Coast, North East

Remain
London, university towns, more cosmopolitan areas in South/Northern cities

Source: BBC
Social and Economic Divisions

% residents with higher education: 70%
% residents with no formal qualifications: 70%
Median annual income of residents: 40k

% residents of ABC1 social grade: 90%
Median age of residents: 55
% residents not born in the UK: 60%

Source: FT
UKIP Vote + 25% = Brexit Vote

Source: Jon Mellon & Steve Fisher
Cosmopolitanism vs. Localism

Fig: Share of population with no passports, versus vote share for Leave at the EU referendum, by local authority (England and Wales)
Source: ONS, Electoral Commission
## Social Divisions at the Individual Level

### Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Remain</th>
<th>Leave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Social Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Remain</th>
<th>Leave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Education

The chart above illustrates how Britain voted by demographic, including age, social class, and education. The data shows a significant division, with younger age groups (18-24) favoring to remain more than those over 65. Social class also plays a role, with higher social classes (AB) being more likely to vote to remain, while the lower classes (C2 and DE) are more likely to vote to leave.
## “Inequality and Identity”, Matt Goodwin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average in 20 most pro-Remain Local Authorities</th>
<th>Average in 20 most pro-Leave Local Authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Non-White”</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners (&gt;65)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>£27,000</td>
<td>£18,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It's an indictment of the UK that many of the poorest will vote to make their lives worse because they don't believe life can get better.
The Roll of “English” Identity

Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?

- **English not British**
  - 21% Remain
  - 79% Leave

- **More English than British**
  - 34% Remain
  - 66% Leave

- **Equally English and British**
  - 49% Remain
  - 51% Leave

- **More British than English**
  - 63% Remain
  - 37% Leave

- **British not English**
  - 60% Remain
  - 40% Leave

Lord Ashcroft Polls
@lordAshcroft
All Parties Are Divided (except UKIP!)

By 2015 GE vote

- **Remain**
  - Conservatives: 42%
  - Labour: 63%
  - Liberal Democrats: 70%
  - UKIP: 4%
  - Greens: 75%
  - SNP: 64%

- **Leave**
  - Conservatives: 58%
  - Labour: 37%
  - Liberal Democrats: 30%
  - UKIP: 96%
  - Greens: 25%
  - SNP: 36%

Source: Lord Ashcroft Polls
The Issues: Economy vs. Immigration

Distributional impacts of immigration:

- Wage pressures in certain sectors
- Pressure on public services: schools, NHS, housing
- Social integration pressures

Source: Matthew Goodwin
“Project Fear” worked in Scottish referendum but not Brexit referendum

Impact of Scottish independence/Britain leaving the EU on personal finances

Do you think you personally would be financially better or worse off if Scotland became an independent country/Britain left the European Union or would it make no difference?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scottish Independence Referendum</th>
<th>EU Referendum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better off</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse off</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: YouGov 2014 (Scottish sample) and 2016 (GB sample)
YouGov Post Referendum Survey, 28 June

Support for a second referendum:

57% No, 31% Yes (but 61% of Remain voters want a 2\textsuperscript{nd} referendum)

Expectations:

£350m will be saved and spent in Britain:
34% Yes, 55% No (59% Yes amongst Leave voters)

Immigration will be more tightly controlled:
48% Yes, 42% No (75% Yes amongst Leave voters)

We will be less safe once we leave:
31% Yes, 53% No (83% No amongst Leave voters)

People will be significantly worse off once we leave:
44% Yes, 42% No (11% Yes amongst Leave voters)
Two Versions of “Leave”

**Nationalists**

*Leave.EU / GrassrootsOut*  
(UKIP, Farage)  
anti-immigration, nativist,  
English identity

**Libertarians**

*VoteLeave* (Boris/Gove, LabLeave, +)  
sovereignty/controlling immigration  
(“Vote Leave: Take Control”)  
free trade, anti-EU budget/regulation
Immediate Consequences 1: Political & Constitutional

Prime Minister resigns -> Conservative leadership election (by 2 Sept)

Labour leader no-confidence vote (172 to 40 MPs) -> leadership election

Early General Election (?), in Autumn 2016 or Spring 2017

Pressure in Scotland for independence (Polls: 54-59% support Independence)
    Nicole Sturgeon in Brussels to discuss Scotland remaining in EU
    Support in Brussels for Scotland remaining in the EU, e.g.
    http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36649450

Uncertainty in Northern Ireland -> Border? Unification referendum?
Immediate Consequences 2: *Economic*

£ fell to lowest level against $ since 1985

FTSE100 fell to 2007 level, but then recovered

Banks starting to move staff to Frankfurt, Dublin, Paris

Pause in investment decisions -> job losses
Immediate Consequences 3: Social

Explosion of spontaneous anti-immigrant attacks
leaflets through doors in Cambridgeshire
graffiti on Polish Social & Cultural Association in London
lots of anecdotes of personal attacks

Police confirm a 57% increase in incidents of “hate crimes”:
85 vs. 54 over same period 4 week ago

What is driving this (in addition to pent-up anger)?
People thought they were voting to “kick foreigners out”
Only vague commitments about permanent rights of EU citizens
in UK from prominent politicians
Longer-term Consequences?

Political & Constitutional

Collapse of the Labour Party?
  If Corbyn wins again, could there be a split?
  Labour could lose many seats to UKIP in Northern England

Independence for Scotland (to stay in the EU)
  second referendum in 2019/2020?

Northern Ireland leaves UK? Referendum on unification with Ireland?

Devolved tax-raising power for London
  Sadiq Khan: “London must take back control”
  => less money for rest of the country

UK in the world? Less important to US?
  Although UK still on Security Council, in G8, G20, NATO etc.
Longer-term Consequences? Economic

Treasury & others estimate a 2-5% fall in GDP over next 5 years
Mid point => on avg. £2,500 per household worse-off than if Remain

Pressure on public finances because of falling tax revenues (esp. loss of banks)
=> higher deficits and/or more spending cuts and/or higher taxes

Inflation: falling Pound will lead to higher grocery & petrol prices
but, house prices will probably decline in line with lower income expectations

Lower regulation vs. battle over EU social (& environment) standards
Economists for Brexit: “elimination of manufacturing & increase in wage inequality”

Trade: declining trade with EU (currently 50% of UK trade)
but increased trade with rest of the world (UK-USA FTA?)

End of City of London as a global financial centre?
depends long-term UK-EU relationship (e.g. “passporting” rights)
What Now?

Article 50 of the EU Treaty

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

....
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.

5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.
Medium-Term: “Norway Option”?

To minimise economic, political and social risk, the UK should request to move into the **European Economic Area (EEA)**, until a longer-term solution is available.

EEA => part of the single market (free movement of goods, services, capital, and people), including *financial services passporting*

But, no direct access to ECJ, for example for Treaty interpretations very important for financial services

Freedom of Movement of People -> EEA means free movement, but the EEA Agreement includes a “Safeguarding provision”, that could be adapted to allow for a mutual quota system  
  e.g. monthly quota on work permits for EU citizens in UK & UK citizens in EU
Problem with the “Norway Option”

House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2013) *Future of the European Union*, 11 June 2013, HC 87-I

“Norway and Switzerland ... are in practice obliged to adopt EU legislation over which they have had no effective say. ... On our visits to Oslo and Berne, we gained the impression that both Norway and Switzerland were prepared to accept what they acknowledge to be a ‘democratic deficit’ ... as the ‘price’ for their continued access to (parts of) the Single Market .... However, our interlocutors in both Berne and Oslo largely advised the UK to remain inside the EU, as a way of retaining influence over the legislation that it would be obliged to adopt if it remained part of the Single Market.”
Longer-Term?

“Associate Membership” => some form of common decision-making?

UK-EU Free-Trade Agreement
   an FTA is just an agreement to trade in a sub-set of goods and services => far less “open” than the single market

No agreement => UK would become a normal member of the WTO
   zero/low tariffs on many industrial goods
   but high tariffs on some goods & non-tariff barriers (standards) on services

2 issues will dominate (*Boris Johnson*: “I want to have my cake and eat it”):
   1. Loss of control: accept rules of EU to access single market (“passporting” / ECJ)
   2. Free movement of people between EU and UK

What about security => a new EU-UK “Security Agreement” (within NATO)?
Issues from the EU’s Side: Economics

**Angela Merkel:** “I see no way to reverse this ... UK cannot cherry-pick”
- access to single market means accepting free movement of people
- EU will make rules for EU: UK must accept that, if wants access

UK would be EU’s largest external trading partner
- 16% of EU exports to UK vs. 15% of EU exports to US

UK is Germany’s third largest trading partner
- 7% of German exports (below France and US)

But EU trade with UK is only 2-3% of EU GDP, whereas UK trade with EU is 18-20% of UK GDP => EU in a stronger bargaining position than UK

Single market is more important for services than goods (already low tariffs). UK operates a large surplus in services with EU, so needs access to single market
Issues from the EU’s Side: Politics

Need to make it look painful, to avoid “contagion”
e.g. to Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Italy

Strong pressure not to undermine the “four freedoms”
including free movement of people

Any final agreement will require unanimous agreement between all 27 member states, and domestic ratification, including referendums (e.g. France) => could take a long time & be derailed

Battle over the future of the EU: deeper integration vs. more flexibility

French Presidential election in 2017 -> EU determined to stop Le Pen
Summary

UK was never fully committed to the EU project
e.g. UK not in Euro or Schengen, so not involved in key decisions about
the Eurozone crisis or the migration crisis

Britain (esp. England & Wales) voted decisively to leave the EU
driven mainly by “3 i’s”: inequality, identity, immigration

Best hope is a UK-EU relationship link Canada-USA relationship
free trade, close economic partners, close security partners

UK choice: Access to single market or Controlling immigration?
Choosing full single market access without immigration controls will
anger people who thought they were voting to “restrict immigration”
=> this will need political leadership & flanking policies to deliver
“The future treaty which you are discussing has no chance of being agreed; if it was agreed, it would have no chance of being ratified; and if it were ratified, it would have no chance of being applied. And if it was applied, it would be totally unacceptable to Britain. You speak of agriculture, which we don't like, of power over customs, which we take exception to, and institutions which frighten us. Monsieur le president, messieurs, au revoir et bonne chance.”

*Russell Bretherton, British Foreign Office representative at a meeting of the Spaak Committee, November 1955*