

Anthony Giddens and **Lord Dahrendorf** discussed world events in an interview for the Policy Network (www.policy-network.org) and the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* in October. Their dialogue appeared in several European newspapers including *Les Echos* and *El País*. Extracts are reprinted below.

After 11 September



Giddens: The events of 11 September have punctuated people's everyday sense of security, above all in the US. They are producing changes in the structure of international relations, and these may turn out to be very consequential. They may also signal a new pattern of violence for this century, involving transnational networks. And they will drag the world economy down, at least for a while.

Dahrendorf: The initial consequences, for probably quite a long time, are more negative than positive. There is one aspect of the whole scene which is quite puzzling in a way – this whole attack coincided with the downturn in our economies. The catastrophe and the economic condition of the next year or two will be linked in people's minds and that will have quite serious consequences for people's attitudes to the world economy and economic behaviour in general. I do believe it will be harder to be as pleased with exorbitant profit in the foreseeable future than it was in the last few years.

I have another point. There is a sense of fear and unease and, in a curious way, a reassertion of certain basic values which interests me because they are not just European. They are Western, and it is a reassertion of common values of Americans and Europeans – and quite a few others in the world but not everybody. That reassertion will have consequences for the way institutions work. It may be the beginning of a new approach to international issues.

G: In terms of the anti-globalisation movement, these events expose the tensions that exist in the movement and so it is the beginning of a fragmentation. If we are seeing the end of anything, it's the end of the idea that you can treat the world as a gigantic marketplace. Rather like Ralf was saying, rather than leading us to recoil from globalisation these events plainly imply that we need more globalisation, not less. But this

globalisation has to be linked to international law; to the promotion of universal standards of human rights across the world; to concerted action to cope with some of the issues the protesters originally brought to public view. But I feel very strongly that what is happening in Afghanistan, what happened in earlier situations of disorder, is not the result of globalisation as it is ordinarily understood, in other words, the expansion of the world marketplace. This is a residue of the Cold War, which gave certain stability to Western countries but produced enormous instability in those countries where it was fought out, mainly the edges of the Soviet empire and the developing world.

Ethical globalisation has long been a part of globalisation. You have a tremendous development of globalisation from below. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have risen in number from a few hundred to about 30,000 today. This includes groups like Oxfam, Greenpeace, and many others that have a strong ethical outlook on the world and are themselves globalised.

D: The key fact of Seattle was that there were many people who hated the antics but agreed with an element of the thrust of these demonstrations. These people are looking for a way to tame globalisation without destroying it.

G: I feel the anti-globalisation movement brought issues to public attention that must be the concern of everyone. The three big issues they mention: dominance of the West over globalising processes; the role of corporate power on the intrusion of markets into too many areas of social life; and global inequality – these are core issues. But they are simply wrong to suppose that those things are just produced by globalisation, no matter how you define it.

On free market liberalism

G: I don't think there will, or can, be a return to either Keynesianism in the sense that it existed in the immediate post-war period, or any kind of heavy-handed state intervention. We have already passed the period where anyone with any sense believes that markets are a solution to anything on their own. There has been a consensus for quite a while, certainly on the centre-left, that you need government intervention, you need to balance markets with good government and effective civil society.

I do think the central European economies – Italy, France, and Germany – are going to have big unemployment problems. They are going to find it very hard to adapt to these changed economic circumstances, harder I think than the UK will. The UK always suffered most from recessions in the past but the changes in policy are positive ones, in respect of being able to cope, if there is a depression.

D: That is where we really disagree. There is no depression coming but there is a recession. On the other hand, I would argue that, in the face of this combined onslaught on accepted wisdom by terrorism and recession, there will be a rethinking and indeed there will be changes in the way in which governments see their own role.

These European countries do not have a massive unemployment problem. It may look like that in macro statistics but anybody who knows these countries knows that, if anything, unemployment is worse in Britain because people who are unemployed have no alternative. It is a very rootless upward society. Unemployment in Italy or in large parts of Germany is much more bearable for people because they have alternatives of living and even of working. I think we are going into a period in which the continued strength of the global marketplace will be coupled with a greater insis-

tence on traditional and more localised methods of living and working. Labour market flexibility, in the sense of readiness to move to another part of your country or even abroad, is going to be less rather than more popular and there is going to be a higher degree of glocalisation. I do not expect the ideas embodied in the Lisbon summit to have any mileage in the next five years.

G: We do disagree. I would expect those ideas to have a great deal of mileage. There have already been very big changes in all western economies. The proportion of people working in traditional blue-collar occupations is a small minority of the labour force, about 16 per cent of the labour force in EU countries. The knowledge economy is a real phenomenon. We have to respond to it by having much more emphasis on education and on adaptable labour markets. I don't insist on the word depression because no one knows how serious this downturn is going to be. I think there will be calls from the traditional left to revert to traditional politics but I don't think that those policies will be effective, nor do I think, in the end, that they will be put into practice.

There is some sort of economy of fear at the moment. A lot depends on the question of whether it is like the traffic accident, which unsettles you greatly and for a while you drive more cautiously. One thing you and I agree on is that, to some degree, these changes were happening anyway and they have simply been accentuated and given a different form and a different psychological feel by these other events which add to one's feeling of insecurity. In truth we live with risk, and we are all vulnerable all the time to a whole range of things, which could destroy us individually or collectively. Normally we filter them out just like we do in driving a car. The question for us is how many adjustments we need to make to surveillance systems, what will happen to civil liberties, what kind of balance would one look to

achieve there – and some of those things will produce concrete changes.

D: I entirely agree. However, there is likely to be a difference between the US and Europe with regard to economic development. I have a hunch, although I can't produce much evidence yet, that this revitalisation of civil society and the amazing solidarity of Americans in the face of a terrorist threat, translates into behaviour, which will prevent a recession from fully developing. It may turn out to be a source of economic strength, and it is quite interesting that leading Americans call on that solidarity in order to see the country out of the threat of recession. Americans reacted in old Tocquevillian ways: 'This is our country, and our society, and we mustn't allow this to happen'. I don't detect the same thing in Europe so one cannot bank on this particular factor in trying to get Europe out of the threat of recession.

On global governance

D: For the US, this experience of coalition building will have had a lasting effect and they have discovered that it is better to have friends and better to be effective in international organisations than to go it alone.

G: There is certainly a visible retreat from the original positions that the Bush administration took. This kind of Republican isolationism and suspicion of the wider world has been going on for quite a while. I hope the Bush administration will reverse aspects of some of their views on Kyoto although I still don't think they will ratify the Kyoto agreement. However, I think they will persist in this classic US posture of collaboration on the one hand, and a strong element of unilateralism on the other, which is almost dictated by the US's position as so much the dominant power economically and militarily. The kind of puncturing of invulnerability, ▶



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‘One of the battlegrounds for the century is going to be between fundamentalisms of all sorts and an ethical conception of universal standards of human rights and democracy which, in large part, is what Western values stand for’

which Americans feel in relation to the rest of the world might have happened with events in New York and Washington but one must question how durable this feeling will be. I think there will be a renewed return to normality at some point. I certainly don't expect either the Bush administration or future democratic administrations to turn simply towards a single-minded attitude of co-operation with the wider global community, and many of the problems which produced this situation will still exist to some degree because of American unilateralism.

On liberal-minded internationalism

D: Frankly I'd be happiest if we succeeded in at least bringing to the Middle East an extended period of relative stability, fully recognising that the two sides in that conflict have incompatible final objectives for the time being.

G: I am a believer in the new internationalism in the sense that, whichever way you look at it, globalisation is a reality. There is no way out of that world of interdependence and therefore we have to take that as a starting place for the need to have an active internationalist outlook. I'm not so much in favour of isolated military ventures and I think that the core international agency of the United Nations must be brought into these events wherever possible. I don't think it is realistic to suppose that whatever the Americans do will bring peace to the Middle East for the reason that you mentioned. What you might get hopefully is a coming to the end of the intensive violent conflict that exists at the moment. That will surely happen at some point, and personally I do think that the Americans should change their policy. They should have a more even-handed policy in the Middle East within the context of a realistic series of aspirations. You must have a moral imperative to try to cope with world problems on a global level and there are strategies, which are relevant.

D: The battle against poverty is, of course, not just a matter of money. You take people out of what Galbraith called the old cycle of poverty of

village life but you can't take them straight into a new world of employment and self confidence in a modern and globalised world. Between the two, there is a period in which people no longer have their villages but do not yet have life in an economically growing modern society. That is the most precarious period in economic development and the one in which it is most likely that people fall for totalitarian leaders, for beliefs which are all inclusive and don't leave any space for secular institutions. How one gets people in huge countries through this phase is one of the most difficult questions. It requires more than money and it cannot be done from outside.

G: We agree on this. In less developed parts of the world there is a strong tendency to blame the external world or the West for problems which are in some part indigenous problems and which demand indigenous structural reform – democratisation, the empowerment of women – all the things that one might say the Taliban are against, but on which in some developing countries like Mozambique, for example, a great deal of progress has been made in internal structural reform. It is one of the reasons why the idea you should simply open up developing countries to free trade is a basic mistake.

On international relationships

G: I am a believer in the European Union playing a greater role in world affairs. There is the famous problem of who represents the European Union. But there is a clearer representation than ever before in respect of foreign policy in the EU and that is a desirable development. Whatever their problems, European societies provide a better model for other countries than the US in several key aspects, especially in the management of inequality and welfare systems, but not necessarily in immigration. The EU is itself now an attempt at some kind of transnational governance which recognises the identity of the nation and treats nations as essentially co-operative within a wider world framework. It is very important in relation to

the rest of the world that this experiment is made to work and that enlargement is made compatible with the good qualities of the European Union.

I think it is very important to affirm that the conflict going on at the moment is not in any simple sense a clash of civilisations. When Huntington introduced this term, I'm not sure he realised the possibility that the term could take on a life of its own, that it could actually fuel the very things that it was supposed to describe. One of the battlegrounds for the century is going to be between fundamentalisms of all sorts and an ethical conception of universal standards of human rights and democracy which, in large part, is what Western values stand for. To me, fundamentalism is not just religious fundamentalism. It is about why you believe and what you think about other people who don't believe in the same things you do. A fundamentalist is someone who has a rigid scripture, whether it is religious, ethnic, or nationalist, and who says there can be only one identity, which is his or her, (normally his), dominant identity. Those of us on the liberal left are fighting for a cosmopolitan world. This doesn't mean a multicultural world; it means a world in which you have, and try to make count, standards of universal ethics and democratic practice within which different cultural groups can co-exist. It is not the same as just endorsing identity politics because identity politics can lead to fundamentalism and endless segmentation and weak states. Again, there is an enormous amount to fight for in all of that.

D: There are certain kinds of belief which seem to appeal particularly to people who feel disadvantaged, who feel that someone is guilty for their desperate position and so on. I would turn the whole issue around. It is not that Islam produces terror, it is that uprooted and disoriented people grasp certain versions of religions which offer them a comprehensive view of the world, and that happens to be versions of Islam in certain parts of the world which are relevant to the present conflict. The answer must surely be the kind of secular liberalism which is nevertheless tolerant of people's beliefs. ■

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Lord (Ralf) Dahrendorf was director of LSE from 1974 to 1984. He remains a governor and honorary fellow of the School.

Professor Anthony Giddens is the current director of LSE.

We begin 2002 still engaged in the ‘war against terrorism’

How will our future be shaped by it? LSE academics **Gwyn Prins, Fred Halliday, John Gray, David Held,** and **Mary Kaldor** offer their analysis so far.

How could it happen?


Gwyn Prins

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What did it all mean? Whence came the adamantine cruelty of imagination and the terrifying fixedness of will which conceived and executed what was undoubtedly, operationally, the perfect terrorist attack? A good friend from New York emails that still, a month later, things have certainly not returned to normal. She was one of the estimated 30,000 people who had narrow escapes from death that day. Broadway and the restaurants are struggling. The evidence comes in of a suicide spike in New York, and of substantial increases in prescription of anti-depressants. In designing this ultimate propaganda of the deed, the perpetrators speared the cultural self-confidence of Americans with dreadful precision. Can things ever be the same again?

At times like this, everyone has a responsibility to think coolly and clearly. Faced with any social phenomenon which disorients, or which terrifies, Professor Jim Rosenau, Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University, recommends that we start with one simple question: ‘Of what is this an instance?’ Answering this question is a reliable and essential way to delineate the boundaries.

In the case of 11 September, the Rosenau test tells us, first, that this was not a new sort of terrorism. It was the culminating act of classical, but unconditional, terror rising (as mostly it has in the last 30 years) from the spiralling vortex of the Middle East. It differs in scale, not in type. But that is not true of the response. The depth of psychological injury to Americans’ self-image and sense of personal security in public spaces has drawn forth a massive reaction. It will turn the US intelligence community upside-down, having so savagely revealed the limitations of a



bottom-up technology-driven, rather than a top-down people-focused, approach. Since the nerve gas attack in Tokyo in 1995, the telescope has been trained on the threat of mass casualties from weapons of mass destruction. Bin Laden showed that criteria of ease and reliability of function, as well as the desired shock of turning a benign airliner into a thing of horror, meant that the lesson from Japan was misunderstood.

‘On 11 September the Atlantic became, suddenly, less wide’

We have a duty to the memory of the victims to visit justice on the perpetrators and to understand: to put it in context. 11 September was peculiarly visible, occurring suddenly in the front parlour of the world's richest and most globally wired people. It is thought that a third of those earning over \$100,000 a year in the US knew someone killed in the twin towers. These were not the unobtrusive deaths of thousands in the civil wars, in collapsed states, which disfigure the Poor World.

How could it happen? Al-Qae'da successfully got ‘inside the loop’ of both the operational and the strategic organs of the US government. That means exploiting knowledge of the internal and external environments to circumvent the decision-making cycle by surprise. To get inside the operational organ enables a terrorist to attack the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, for example: to get inside both organs permits 11 September (see diagram).

But the diagram also shows the reciprocal vulnerability of the terrorist. The tactical cells of operatives (known agents, for example) can be picked off at ‘A’; the hydra-headed leadership of bin Laden and the Shura Majlis (consultative committee) of al-Qae'da attacked at ‘B’. Plainly the coalition will pursue both, acting with an unusually strong interlocking mandate from Article 5 of the NATO Treaty (an attack on one is an attack on all) and Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of the Security Council.

Will life ever be the same again? For Americans, newly blooded, maybe not. For Europeans, with our long and sad experience of terrorism, al-Qae'da promises more of what is already familiar. On 11 September, the Atlantic became, suddenly, less wide. ■

In search of international reason

Fred Halliday

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There are three core issues where, perhaps, an element of reason about international affairs may be sustainable.

First, history. Some invoke the crusades, others jihad: but the image of the crusades means little to those outside the Mediterranean Arab world. Jihad is quite an inappropriate term for the proper, Koranic, reason that the armies of Islam sought to convert those who they conquered to Islam, whereas conversion is irrelevant in the contemporary context.

As for the Cold War, it has contributed its mite to this crisis. If the Soviet system has left a mass of uncontrolled nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and unresolved ethnic problems, the West has bequeathed a bevy of murderous gangs and crazed exiles, who are now on the rampage.

A second issue that is much present, and about which we can predict more nonsense, is that of culture. The most important cause of the events, and which will define the consequences in the Muslim world of what is to come, is namely the enormous, and long very violent, clash within the Muslim world between those who want to reform, and to secularise, and those whose power, political and gendered, is threatened, or who want to take power in the name of fundamentalism. This has been the basis of the conflicts going on these past decades in Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Turkey and, most violently of all, Afghanistan. Religious fundamentalists in all societies have one goal – not to convert others to their beliefs but to seize power, political, social and gendered, within their own societies. Their greatest foe is secularism.

The third, and arguably, most important and difficult issue is that of the most effective, and just, way to combine the two instruments of international politics, force and diplomacy. States are, under international law, entitled to use force, in self-defence. An element of retribution is part of any legal system, domestic or international. The UN is not some pacifist supranational last resort, but a body which has authorised military action by states in this case. But use of force has to be matched by diplomatic and political initiative: it must, above all, address the future of Afghanistan itself.

Here the UN has, since 1993, been on record in calling for the setting up of a new government. The UN has insisted that this be broadly based, fully representative, multi-ethnic and opposed to terrorism. This is a goal which, it is generally agreed, the great majority of Afghans would support. ■



rule of law in place of war and at fostering understanding between communities in place of terror. Such a movement would lobby governments and international institutions for three fundamental things:

- A commitment to the rule of law not war. Citizens of all faiths and nationalities must be protected, wherever they live, and terrorists must be captured and brought before an International Court, which could be modelled on the Nuremberg or Yugoslav war crimes tribunals. The terrorists must be treated as criminals, and not military adversaries. This may well require internationally sanctioned military action both to arrest suspects and to dismantle terrorist networks. But such action should be understood as a robust form of policing, above all a way of protecting civilians and apprehending criminals. Moreover, this type of action must scrupulously preserve both the laws of war and human rights law.

- A massive effort must be undertaken to create a new form of global political legitimacy, one which would seek to discredit the reasons why the West is seen as self-interested, partial, selective and insensitive. This would involve renewed peace efforts in the Middle East, talks between Israel and Palestine, condemnation of all human rights violations in the area, and rethinking policy towards Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan.

- A head-on acknowledgement that the ethical and justice issues posed by the global polarisation of wealth, income and power, and with them the huge asymmetries of life chances, cannot be left to markets to resolve. Those who are poorest and most vulnerable, locked into geopolitical situations which have neglected their economic and political claims for generations, will always provide fertile ground for terrorist recruiters. The project of economic globalisation has to be connected to manifest principles of social justice; and the world economy has to be embedded in new welfare and environmental rules and conditions.

The centrepiece of global justice and political legitimacy needs to be a popular movement that spreads the values of multiculturalism, human rights and the rule of law, and that can attract people of all cultures. Everyone in every country has a role to play in bringing people together, protecting and reaching out especially but not only to Muslims.

Present the danger is that our political leaders will react according to anachronistic ways of thinking about war. The consequences could be even more terrible than we now imagine. The alternative is to recognise the novelty of the contemporary situation, to learn the lessons of earlier 'new wars' and the profound difficulties of achieving a meaningful military victory, to involve people in a political and not a military process, and to ensure that political ends and means mesh in the pursuit of justice. It is not an easy alternative but it is the only hope for the long term.

A new global covenant for justice and peace has to displace the politics of the fanatics, cowboys and lynch-mobs. ■

Longer term challenges

John Gray

is School Professor of European Thought. He is the author of *False Dawn* (Granta, 1998).

In what will be a long protracted conflict, it is very important to prevent the self-fulfilling prophecy of a clash of civilisations. This idea is the most poisonously erroneous idea of the last 20 years. But it has the potentiality of turning into something real. If mistakes are made, if errors are made by any of the major protagonists, it could actually happen and that would be an unmitigated disaster. It is absolutely critical that we prevent that cataclysmic development, which is a real risk, particularly if, as I believe, this conflict is only beginning.

The deeper, longer term challenges posed by globalisation are, first and foremost, environmental or ecological. Oil was laid down as fossil fuel by the energy of the sun some billions of years ago. That and other resources are coming up against

rising human expectations which are entirely legitimate. One of the reasons I believed, and still believe, that the dystopian experiment of a global free market is bound to break down is that it contains no mechanisms within it which are adequate to deal with the depletion of natural resources. Essentially all it says is that if free markets are allowed to work, then scarce resources will become more expensive through the technological substitution. That may be true in the models developed by social scientists and economists. It is not true in the real world. In the real world, when resources become very quickly more expensive, very quickly more scarce, what happens is war, or conflict. This also aggravates existing conflicts – conflicts in the Middle East and in Africa now are being aggravated by struggle over declining water. It is quite obvious if one thinks about the last great war of the 20th century. The last big war was the Gulf war and what was that war, at least partly, about? Access to oil, a radically finite resource. ■

What hope for the future?

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The attacks on the World Trade Centre and on the Pentagon were a global crime against humanity. The victims were people of all nationalities, ethnicities and religious faiths. The perpetrators were a shadowy transnational network of zealots, motivated by a potent mix of hatred and misplaced religious beliefs. As many commentators have pointed out, it was not just an attack on the 6,000 or more people who died, it was an attack on cherished values – freedom, democracy, the rule of law and, above all, humanity.

Every effort, including military action, needs to be made to capture the perpetrators, to eliminate the network, and to discredit totally their appeal.

But such efforts cannot be equated with the pursuit of an old-fashioned war. If we fail to grasp this, we risk a never-ending cycle of violence and terror. The contours of this 'new war' are distinctive because the range of social and political groups involved no longer fit the pattern of a classical interstate war; the type of violence deployed by the terrorist aggressors is no longer carried out by the agents of a state (although states, or parts of states, may have a supporting role); violence is dispersed, fragmented and directed against citizens; and political aims are combined with the deliberate commitment of atrocities which are a massive violation of human rights. Such a war is fought not for a state interest, but for religious identity, zeal and fanaticism. The aim is not to acquire territory, as was the case in 'old wars', but to gain political power through generating fear and hatred. War itself is a form of political mobilisation in which the experience of violence promotes extremist causes.

The only possible alternative approach is one which counters the strategy of 'fear and hate' with one of winning hearts and minds. What is needed is a movement for global, not American, justice and legitimacy, aimed at establishing the

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