

D2.1 Analytical Framework

*Understanding Transboundary Crisis Management:
A Theoretical Framework*

Authors: Arjen Boin, Lavinia Cadar, Maureen Donnelley

Delivery date: July 2015

Table of contents

Introduction: The TransCrisis project.....	2
1. Transboundary crises.....	3
1.1.What is a crisis?	3
1.2.What is a transboundary crisis?.....	3
1.3.Transboundary crises and legitimacy	5
2. Challenges for transboundary crisis management	6
2.1.Transboundary crisis management: Strategic tasks	6
2.2.Barriers to transboundary crisis management	7
3. A challenge for political leaders.....	8
3.1.Executive tasks for effective and legitimate crisis management	9
3.2.The politics of crisis management	11
4. The framework.....	11
5. Empirical research: How the work packages contribute to our understanding of transboundary crisis management	12
5.1.The transboundary crisis management capacity of EU institutions	13
Crisis management capacity in the European Commission, European Council and the Council of the European Union (WP4.1)	13
5.2.Studies of transboundary crisis management	13
Studying political leaders in the financial crisis (WP3)	13
Political leadership in EU agencies (WP4.3).....	14
Political leadership and crisis management regimes (WP5.1).....	15
Managing the immigration crisis: Inter-institutional cooperation and external relations (WP5.2)	15
5.3.A study of transboundary crisis management effects.....	16
Political leadership, national politics and transboundary crisis management (WP6)	16
5.4.A study of accountability	16
Crisis leadership in the European Parliament (WP4.2).....	16
6. The codebook	17
References	18

Introduction: The TransCrisis project

The overall aim of the TransCrisis project is to gain a deeper understanding of the factors that make transboundary crisis (TBC) management in the European Union (EU) effective and legitimate. It seeks to understand the challenges posed by TBCs, identify requirements for the management of TBCs, outline the role of EU institutions in fulfilling those requirements, and identify the critical factors that determine whether a joint response is effective and legitimate. We are particularly focused on the role of political leadership and how it can facilitate effective and legitimate crisis management in a multilevel system. In addition, the TransCrisis project aims to explain the effects of TBC management on the legitimacy of EU institutions, leaders and policies.

The main task of Work Package 2 (WP2) is to develop the theoretical framework that will help us analyse the crisis management capacities of EU institutions and of different policy domains (financial, social, environmental, etc.). In order to validate our framework, we will apply it retrospectively to a set of TBCs. The validated framework will then provide the basis for an assessment tool that can be applied to EU institutions and policy sectors.

This document presents the theoretical framework that constitutes the foundation of the TransCrisis project. It sketches the causal relations between our core concepts: political leaders, political leadership, TBCs, and (institutional capacities for) crisis management. We will build on this theoretical framework to design a codebook for empirical research. The purpose of the framework and the accompanying codebook is to ensure a shared understanding of what constitutes TBC management. Use of the codebook and consistent terminology will enable the integration of results from the research-based WPs.

This document is structured as follows:

- First, it explains the nature and dynamics of TBCs;
- Second, it conceptualizes TBC management;
- Third, it explains how political leadership can facilitate and enable TBC management that is both effective and legitimate;
- Fourth, it depicts the key variables in this research project;
- Fifth, it presents an outline of individual research-based WPs as well as where exactly they fit into the framework of the project.

1. Transboundary crises

1.1. What is a crisis?

A *crisis* refers to a shared perception of threat to a fundamental part or value of a society, which requires urgent action on the part of authorities under conditions of deep uncertainty (Rosenthal et al., 1989). A threat is a socially construed perception that something valuable may be damaged, removed or destroyed. Urgency refers to a collective notion of immediacy: the threat is perceived to be imminent and remedial actions must therefore come quicker than normally would be the case. Uncertainty refers to the absence of reliable information about the threat's causes, consequences and potential remedies.

Our definition of a crisis takes on a rather expansive view; *crisis* refers to a widely shared perception of urgent threat with no obvious resolution. This does not mean that every societal problem that carries the crisis label falls within this definition; urgency is a key variable. Therefore, when there is a societal problem (e.g. pension crisis or climate change) but not a widely shared sense that something must be done very soon, it does not fall within our crisis definition. Determining whether a situation counts as a crisis clearly is a subjective matter. Solid argumentation is thus required for employing the crisis framework in studying a specific threat.

We should also note that this definition does not include the **causes** of crisis. In the crisis literature, many categorizations of crisis exist that are based on the different causes (natural v. man-made disasters; instant v. creeping crises).¹ The origin of the threat is irrelevant in our definition. However, we do make a distinction based on the **effects** of crisis (or the effects of efforts to manage such crises) between *localized* and *transboundary* crises.

1.2. What is a transboundary crisis?

A TBC is a crisis that transcends boundaries. This definition encompasses two types of characteristics: the generic crisis characteristics (discussed above) and the boundary-crossing effects of a transboundary crisis. What makes a crisis transboundary is that its (potential) effects affect multiple sectors, groups or countries. The TBC can, in effect, cut through multiple types of barriers:

¹ See Rosenthal, Charles and 't Hart (1989).

geographic, policy, political, cultural, language, legal – **the more boundaries involved, the harder it is to manage a TBC.** Figure 1 presents a few examples of TBCs.

Figure 1: Examples of TBCs

Example 1: The ongoing financial crisis has affected the economies and budgets of virtually all EU member states, with effects visible in a wide variety of policy domains (including social policy, health care, education and defence).

Example 2: The Icelandic ash crisis paralyzed Europe’s air traffic in May 2010, affecting transportation sectors across Europe. How long the cloud would last or whether the volcano would erupt again was uncertain. As transportation is essential in today’s world, the volcanic ash had negative consequences for other sectors, such as business, trade, tourism, environment, and culture. While spill-over effects propagated at a rapid pace, individual countries struggled to agree on the opening and closing of airspace.

Example 3: Illegal immigration has produced a transboundary crisis in Europe. This crisis may not appear to qualify under our definition. The transboundary dimensions of this crisis mostly pertain to the **origins** of the crisis; the **effects** are, in principle, national. In an objective sense, this crisis does not qualify as a TBC.

Nevertheless, the **perception** of distributed effects has made this a transboundary crisis. Migrants who embark on dangerous conditions and routes to Europe and do not make it fall under the duty of the recipient countries’ authorities, who must rescue and facilitate the settlement of the people in distress with no immigration or admission visas. Uncertainty over their identity and history looms. Given that a member state is a popular destination for illegal immigrants constitutes a point of access to the EU and given the distributed effects of illegal immigration, a single state cannot cope alone with the magnitude of this threat, which requires urgent and coordinated action from European leaders.

Example 4: A large *E.coli* outbreak struck Germany in 2011. It was generated by a food-borne pathogen and affected other countries in the EU, including Sweden, Denmark and France, causing serious illness and even death. The effects of the *E.coli* outbreak soon propagated to the economic sector, as health authorities began issuing advice on food consumption. This affected EU member states’ trade in salad and salad ingredients. Furthermore, the consumption and export of Spanish vegetables dropped dramatically as Spanish cucumbers were suspected to be the source of the pathogen (although this was not confirmed by laboratory analysis). Not knowing the source of the pathogen, the need to contain its spread and its far-reaching effects necessitated an urgent response from European authorities.

Example 5: The sudden occurrence of several Ebola cases at an airport hub would create a TBC as the effects of threat could ripple across borders. The same is true for (hypothetical) cyber-attacks, electricity failures, and a natural gas shortage.

We should note that Europe has not undergone many TBCs.² However, we argue that it is likely that we will see more of these crises due to the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of European economies, and the rise of new types of transboundary threats (such as new technologies, new forms of terrorism, climate change, risks in the food chain, etc.). In the TransCrisis project, we will adopt this argument as a starting assumption.³

1.3. Transboundary crises and legitimacy

Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). In other words, legitimacy is “the long-term resultant of societal, political and legal support and acceptance” (Boin and ‘t Hart, 2000: 13). Although it cannot be measured in absolute terms, there are certain aspects that indicate alterations in levels of legitimacy, such as the degree of parliamentary involvement in a specific sector, the amount of court rulings, or the extent and content of media coverage. A decline in legitimacy is usually a result due to:

1. Significant environmental change that shatters the structure of an institution or policy sector through a shift in public demands and expectations;
2. Endemic problems that prevent an institution or sector from detecting or responding to environmental changes.

The very occurrence of a crisis signifies a significant and rapid decline in legitimacy. Crisis management can help repair that loss, or even enhance legitimacy if the resilience of institutional structures is demonstrated. However, a mismanaged TBC, spinning out of control and paralyzing critical infrastructures, will undermine the legitimacy of public institutions at home and in the EU. Paradoxically, perhaps the effective management of a TBC at the national level may undermine the legitimacy of international institutions – and vice versa. When one nation builds a wall to shield it from illegal migrants, this may well be effective (and perhaps even legitimate) at the national level. The more effective it is, the more it may increase the sense of crisis at the international level. We will therefore study the links between national and international levels.

² For a discussion of TBCs in Europe, see Attina, Boin and Ekengren (2014).

³ Theoretical support for this assumption can be found in LaPorte (1975); Turner (1978); Castells (1996); Perrow (1984); Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard (2013); Attina, Boin and Ekengren (2014).

2. Challenges for transboundary crisis management

A TBC poses various challenges to traditional crisis management structures, which are typically informed by and founded on the notion of national sovereignty. A TBC does not fall neatly within national borders or within a specific policy domain. As the nation state organizes its capacities in accordance with geographic and policy borders, there will be a mismatch between the effects of the crisis and the capacities needed to deal with these effects. Figure 2 provides a hypothetical example.

Figure 2: Challenges for TBC management

Consider the sudden death of a tourist struck by small pox in a major European city. This clearly is a threat for the health authorities, but not just for the health authorities in that city or that country. Given the incubation time of small pox (eight days) and the roads traveled by the tourist, it is likely that the tourist may have infected others. This makes it a crisis for transport authorities and the tourism sector. The fact that small pox was eradicated decades ago would create the possibility of terrorism, which in turn would bring yet another policy sector into play. If it becomes clear that more people have been infected, strategies to arrest the spread would likely involve schools, supermarkets, and the organizers of large-scale events (e.g. sports or music). This example demonstrates that even a seemingly small incident may not fall neatly in one (national) policy sector.

The response to a TBC must be organized by combining resources from various domains to be effective across borders. The challenge thus becomes one of working together across boundaries. To grasp what this might entail, we will focus on the task dimensions of TBC management.

2.1. Transboundary crisis management: Strategic tasks

We define TBC management as the set of capacities, tools, resources and strategies that can be used to limit the effects of a TBC in an effective and legitimate way. Drawing from the crisis management literature, we can identify a set of tasks that must be accomplished for such an effective and legitimate response to occur.⁴ These tasks are:

⁴ These tasks are drawn from Boin, 't Hart, Stern, Sundelius (2005). For a summary, see Boin, Kuipers and Overdijk (2013).

- ⦿ **Detection:** the timely recognition of an emerging threat.
- ⦿ **Sense-making:** the collecting, analysing and sharing of critical information that helps to generate a shared picture of the situation.
- ⦿ **Decision-making:** the selection of strategic decisions, joint decision-making, and formulating an effective strategy to implement the key decisions.
- ⦿ **Coordination:** identifying key partners in the response and facilitating collaboration between these partners.
- ⦿ **Meaning-making:** formulating a key message that offers an explanation of the threat, actionable advice, and a sense that leaders are in control of the situation.
- ⦿ **Communication:** effective delivery of the core message to selected audiences (e.g. victims, citizens, stakeholders, voters, media representatives, etc.).
- ⦿ **Accountability:** rendering an explanation in a public forum of relevant decisions and strategies that were initiated before, during and after the crisis.

The key hypothesis behind the TransCrisis project is that **the effective fulfilment of these crisis management tasks will make an effective and legitimate response more likely**. We assume that TBC management is important in two ways. First, it will help to minimize the consequences of the emerging threat and restore a sense of normalcy. A response that is based on an accurate picture of the situation, marked by effective and quick decision-making, demonstrates smooth collaboration, and is well explained to the general public is likely to be more effective than a response failing on one or more of these dimensions. Second, it helps to restore or even strengthen public trust in the functioning of core institutions within the EU and at the national level. If political leaders work together to minimize a collective threat, this will likely help to maintain or even enhance the legitimacy of the institutions they represent.

2.2. Barriers to transboundary crisis management

Each of these strategic crisis management tasks is difficult to achieve under the best of circumstances.⁵ It becomes more challenging when national authorities have to collaborate across boundaries, especially when there is no framework for such collaboration. The organization of TBC management collaboration runs into the same boundaries that TBCs seem to circumvent so easily:

⁵ There is an extensive literature detailing how and why crisis management fails. For a summary of that literature, see Rosenthal et al. (1989, 2001); Boin et al. (2005, 2008); Rodriguez, Quarantelli, Dynes (2006); Smith and Elliott (2006). Ansell, Boin, Keller (2010) explain how these factors can hamper TBC management efforts.

- ⦿ National: states still hold almost full sovereignty when it comes to threats that materialize within their borders. This means that, in response to a TBC, states may be reluctant to share information, pool resources, and submit to decisions made by other countries or international institutions, or render accountability in international fora.
- ⦿ Administrative/organizational: working across organizational boundaries is always difficult as organizations and policy sectors tend to have their own way of seeing and working. This challenge is augmented when public-private borders have to be crossed; and more so when these borders coincide with international borders.
- ⦿ Political: working across political boundaries may seem easier in times of crisis, as one would expect political adversaries to temporarily cease hostilities and collaborate to facilitate an effective response. However, this is rarely the case. Many crises suffer from politicization, which can occur in the very early phases of a crisis. This same phenomenon is witnessed in the international political arena.
- ⦿ Economic: TBC management is also hampered by economic boundaries, which refer to differences in resource availability and economic patterns in the areas a TBC occurs.
- ⦿ Legal: international collaboration in the legal domain is underdeveloped. At the national level, there are usually formal procedures in place to concentrate authority in one office or organization when a crisis is declared. No such laws exist internationally. In fact, most international treaties create exceptions for such events.
- ⦿ Conceptual: this covers leaders' (and the public's) ability to conceive what the problem is, what caused it, and who should do something about it.

For analytical purposes, we can make a rough distinction between *hard* boundaries (geographical and organizational boundaries) and *soft* boundaries (political, economic, legal and conceptual boundaries). The former are easier to discern than the latter, which are usually subject to interpretation and discussion.

3. A challenge for political leaders

The challenge of managing a TBC is clear: a response network must be swiftly put together and activated; that network must share information, make joint yet timely decisions, and coordinate actions in a context involving many participants, who are dispersed across various boundaries with divergent agendas, and probably have not worked with each other before. Moreover, this network must be able to formulate a core message that is effectively delivered in different nations to

different audiences. Finally, the key participants should be willing to render account for their (in)actions in democratic fora at both the national and international level.

Such a network is unlikely to evolve by itself. It must be created, nurtured, facilitated, managed and protected. This brings us to the task of political leadership.⁶ It is important to make a distinction between political **leaders** and political **leadership**.⁷ In this project, political leaders are those individuals who reside at the top of a political or institutional hierarchy, ultimately bearing responsibility for the decisions and actions of the country or institution they represent. On the other hand, political leadership is the execution of a set of tasks. These tasks may be performed by more than one person and they may even be executed at levels well below the organizational apex.

A key assumption in this project is that political leaders at both the national and EU level play an essential role in creating and enabling a TBC management network. They can employ a range of symbolic acts, strategies and decisions that make it possible (or impossible) to jointly respond to an emerging TBC. We are not denying the importance of other actors (e.g. opposition leaders, civil servants, NGOs, other international organizations, etc.), but we are focusing on the role of political leaders. In terms of crisis leadership, we have identified a set of executive tasks that – if fulfilled – will give rise to more effective and legitimate crisis management. We discuss these tasks below.

3.1. Executive tasks for effective and legitimate crisis management⁸

Towards an effective and legitimate crisis response, political leaders play an important role in fulfilling the aforementioned crisis management tasks.

- ⦿ Detection: political leaders can create conditions that facilitate early recognition of emerging threats. These entail continuous vigilance, consultation with experts, a shared awareness that something can happen at any given moment, a willingness to act on faint signals, and a tolerance for false alarms or voluntary admissions of error.
- ⦿ Sense-making: a well-rehearsed method helps to process information, share it across boundaries and understand information from other sectors and/or countries. Such a method helps to create a dynamic picture that everybody understands, analyse possible futures and potential consequences, and formulate specific information needs. Leaders must facilitate and rehearse such a sense-making method.

⁶ See Lodge & Wegrich (2014); Ansell, Boin and 't Hart (2014).

⁷ This is a classic distinction in the literature. See Barnard (1938); Selznick (1957); Ansell et al. (2014); 't Hart (2014).

⁸ These strategies are drawn from Boin et al. (2013).

- ⦿ Decision-making: fragmented decisions can be overcome by putting a process in place for careful yet efficient deliberation in a setting that is marked by the absence of a clear division of authority. Without such a process, joint decision-making will be ad hoc and subject to political vagaries.
- ⦿ Coordination: the threat of a fragmented or inefficient response can be countered by the presence of coordination capacity, that is, the capacity to identify key partners, monitor and assess emerging forms of vertical and horizontal cooperation, and to facilitate effective cooperation and intervene where cooperation is lacking or dysfunctional.
- ⦿ Meaning-making: an effective crisis narrative relates the events to the core values of a society. When leaders work with other leaders to create an effective message that resonates with key audiences at home but also in the affected areas, they further the legitimacy of the response and facilitate its effectiveness.
- ⦿ Communication: when the crisis communicators of political leaders and EU institutions are connected with those of other leaders/institutions, this helps to ensure a coordinated and effective delivery of the core message to selected audiences.
- ⦿ Accountability: leaders who have a joint strategy to present in selected venues a transparent and constructive account of their (in)actions before and during the crisis will enhance the legitimacy of the response and help to prevent or limit *backsliding* effects.

If leadership pertains to the execution of the tasks, we can ask how political leaders are to facilitate the fulfilment of these tasks. The answer is straightforward: leaders can further effectiveness of crisis management by ensuring that certain capacities and strategies are in place on the key dimensions of strategic crisis management. Drawing from the crisis management literature, we can identify the following critical factors:

- ⦿ Sound preparation: a response is likely to function better when leaders demonstrated commitment to establishing a sound organization and participate in the preparation of such a network (by taking part in training exercises or simulations, for instance).
- ⦿ Providing available resources: crisis management requires facilities and staff, which must be funded. Political leaders can push for funding.
- ⦿ A willingness to work together: for TBC management to be effective, political leaders have to demonstrate a willingness to work across boundaries (both vertically and horizontally).
- ⦿ A shared history: having worked with each other before, in actual crises or joint exercises, increases leaders' likelihood of success.
- ⦿ Personal experience: leaders who have managed crises before will likely be more effective.


3.2. The politics of crisis management

The fulfilment of strategic crisis management tasks and the creation of capacity to support that fulfilment are usually highly politicized activities. Crises are, by definition, about values; crisis management, by implication, is about the allocation of scarce resources (in situations where democratic considerations may have been suspended for the time being). Political leaders must canalize a sense of collective stress by providing a rationale (meaning-making). If they fail, the legitimacy of political leadership and key institutions is undermined. In the political context of crisis, many stakeholders will seek to define and impose alternative interpretations of the nature of the threat and the response that has been initiated.

4. The framework

Figure 3 depicts the framework that brings the key variables together in a simple model. On the left side are the characteristics of national crisis management systems, EU institutions and political leaders that set the stage for effective and legitimate TBC management. We are interested to see how these characteristics help shape the actual performance of crisis leaders and how this performance affects the perceived outcome of the crisis.

Figure 3: Key variables



By studying actual crises and leadership performance in those crises, we will validate this theoretical framework. Subsequently, the validated framework will give rise to an assessment tool that can be used to score the preparedness of a specific institution. This framework can be used to assess both crisis management capacity as well as actual performance. This distinction also makes clear that crisis management capacity does not necessarily guarantee success in terms of outcomes.

5. Empirical research: How the work packages contribute to our understanding of transboundary crisis management

The TransCrisis project will divide its empirical research into four blocks that will allow us to generate the insights required for a detailed understanding of the conditions for effective and legitimate management of TBCs in the EU. These blocks are:

1. A study of EU capacities.
2. A study of actual TBC management cases.
3. A study of the effects of TBC management at the national level.
4. A study of crisis management accountability at the EU level.

5.1. The transboundary crisis management capacity of EU institutions

Crisis management capacity in the European Commission, European Council and the Council of the European Union (WP4.1)

Coordinator: Mark Rhinard (Stockholms Universitet)

The aim of WP4.1 is to develop a critical assessment of the effectiveness and legitimacy of TBC management capacity residing in the European Commission, the European Council and the Council of the EU. First, WP4.1 will draw on primary sources (such as interviews with practitioners, analysis of official programs and documents) and on secondary sources (such as existing research and findings of previous EU-funded projects) to produce a comprehensive inventory of the three institutions' crisis management capacities.

Second, this sub-WP will assess the leadership resources of each institution in times of crisis. To do that, this project will carry out various case studies in which it will assess whether each institution's leadership resources derived from its legal competences, institutional position and associated personalities are actually used.

Third, WP4.1 will outline the legitimacy sources of the EU institutions according to current academic debates, thereby clustering them into political, technocratic and moral sources. Finally, WP4.1 will conduct an integrated assessment of the EU's institutional crisis management capacities and leadership sources, and how they are tied to different sources of legitimacy.

The result of this study will be an integrated and accessible report on the capacities of the European Commission, Council of the EU, and European Council, along with their effectiveness and legitimacy in managing TBCs in general. WP4.1 will also deliver practical advice in terms of reform suggestions based on the strengths and weaknesses of EU institutional capacities.

5.2. Studies of transboundary crisis management

Studying political leaders in the financial crisis (WP3)

Coordinator: Femke van Esch (Utrecht University)

This WP will study the Eurozone crisis. In this context, it investigates the nexus of political leadership and legitimacy in the EU with a specific focus on political leaders. WP3 will eventually answer three research questions:

1. How and to what extent did leaders adopt ideas from the existing expert and public discourses about microeconomic policy and European integration?
2. How and to what extent did leaders infuse these existing discourses with new ideas?
3. How and to what extent do leaders' ideas reflect the views of their national constituents?

By making use of special software, this WP will build cognitive maps based on public speeches, biographical accounts and secondary literature. The focus of this study are the leaders (such as heads of state and government as well as central bank governors) of nine EU member states: Germany, The Netherlands, Ireland, France, Spain, the UK, Hungary, Slovenia and Denmark. In addition, WP3 will study the leaders of three EU institutions, namely the European Commission, the Council Secretariat, and the European Central Bank. Furthermore, this WP will also elicit cognitive maps from 1000 citizens per country through an internet based study.

WP3 will construct three cognitive maps for the three main phases of the Euro-crisis, and develop quantitative and narrative analyses for European leaders as well as national public discourses and international expert discourse. Similarly, it will construct cognitive maps of citizens in selected countries and develop a quantitative and narrative analysis. The end-product of WP3 is a longitudinal and cross-national comparison of the cognitive maps of leaders and citizens and public discourses.

Political leadership in EU agencies (WP4.3)

Coordinator: Jacint Jordana (Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals)

WP4.3 will look at the role of EU agencies in TBC management. It will examine the political crisis leadership of EU agencies as well as the effects of their actions on the agencies' legitimacy. In particular, the study will look at agency leaders and their backgrounds, their resources (both formal and informal), as well as how these leaders employ formal and informal capacities to identify and respond to crises and how they mobilize constituencies and the wider public.

First, this study will survey the top ranking leaders and officials of each European agency having crisis management potential (about 10-20 per agency). This will be an online survey, personally assisted if necessary. The number of agencies selected will be between 15 and 20, expected to provide 150-200 answers that will be analysed quantitatively.

Second, WP4.3 will develop an in-depth case-study of four tasks performed by the European Central Bank, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention

and Control (ECDPC) in managing TBCs, namely detection, decision-making, coordination and communication. In the case of the European Central Bank, WP4.3 will consider the Euro crisis of summer 2012. In the case of the EFSA, WP4.3 will study the cucumber crisis in 2011. Finally, in the case of the ECDC, it will focus on the Ebola outbreak of 2014 and its impact on Europe.

Political leadership and crisis management regimes (WP5.1)

Coordinator: Martin Lodge (London School of Economics)

The aim of WP5.1 is to advance an understanding of EU's crisis leadership capacity by focusing on interdependence in EU multi-level governance. The central interest of this study is the interaction between the EU-level and national and regional state and non-state actors that make up multi-level crisis management regimes, particularly with respect to four crisis management tasks: sense-making, decision-making, meaning-making and coordination.

WP5.1 will analyse crisis management regimes by exploring the ways they are organized in four transboundary domains that require coordination between and across national and EU-levels: financial regulation, social policy, energy policy and environmental policy. This sub-WP will offer a case study for each of the aforementioned domains. As such, it will explore the post-financial crisis response regarding the creation of a *banking union*, pensions systems, critical infrastructure protection, and the management of invasive alien species.

To this end, desk research will be carried out to enable the selection of a significant sample of member states. Furthermore, interviews will be conducted to gain an understanding of how crisis management regimes operate. Finally, WP5.1 will produce a comparative analysis and issue policy recommendations for enhancing crisis leadership.

Managing the immigration crisis: Inter-institutional cooperation and external relations (WP5.2)

Coordinator: Fulvio Attina (Universita Degli Studi Di Catania)

This WP studies the role of leadership in EU crisis management at the borders of Europe. In the context of immigration, WP5.2 will identify the conditions that favour and hamper crisis leadership, and the consequences of leadership and lack thereof on the efficiency and legitimacy of EU crisis management. The study will offer a retrospective analysis of the role of leadership in the Libyan crisis, whereas a prospective analysis will compare existing EU crisis management capability with the lessons drawn in the retrospective study. Furthermore, the second analysis also examines the

institutional and political conditions of effective and legitimate EU crisis management in the context of immigration.

To study leadership dynamics, WP5.2 will employ process-tracing and decision-making analysis. In addition, it will explore public attitudes towards both migration and the role of the EU in migration policy, by looking at the Eurobarometer survey and national public opinion research.

5.3. A study of transboundary crisis management effects

Political leadership, national politics and transboundary crisis management (WP6)

Coordinator: Nick Sitter (Közep-Európai Egyetem – Central European University)

The aim of WP6 is to explore political leadership at the national level in response to TBCs. It investigates the causal links between TBC management and *backsliding* as well as the policy options and tools for managing backsliding.

To this end, WP6 will first investigate, map and quantify both democratic and acquis backsliding. Second, it will investigate and analyse the causes of democratic and acquis backsliding, particularly the extent to which it constitutes a response to TBC management. Third, it will investigate and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the present rules available for the EU to address democratic and/or acquis backsliding, as well as their application. In other words, it will consider the capacity of EU leaders to address the issue of backsliding and explore policy options.

This study will combine desk research with empirical data derived from interviews conducted with national and EU decision-makers and political leaders, as well as representatives of institutions, firms and civil society groups at the receiving end of policy initiatives.

5.4. A study of accountability

Crisis leadership in the European Parliament (WP4.2)

Coordinator: Maja Rasmussen (Think Tank Europa)

WP4.2 focuses on the way in which the European Parliament (potentially) exerts influence on the response to TBCs, particularly through two procedures the European Parliament can invite the European Commission to submit legislation: the legislative initiative procedure and the own-initiative procedure. This sub-WP will look at how the European Parliament uses its indirect right of initiative to put pressure on the Commission and the European Council to take its views into account

in four cases: the financial and economic crisis (the adoption and implementation of anti-crisis measures), the current societal crisis (such as the high youth unemployment in Europe), the NSA surveillance diplomatic crisis, and the energy security crisis (relations with Russia).

WP4.2 will produce a database of initiative reports and their history, covering the period 2009-2014, which contains 23 legislative initiative reports and 576 own-initiative reports. All 599 documents will be coded, after which EU official databases on legislative activity will be made use of in order to develop a complete history of each policy request (that is, whether and to what extent a request was implemented by the Commission).

6. The codebook

The framework outlined above will be translated into a codebook that will offer project partners guidelines for carrying out the research afferent to the different WPs. The codebook will provide key definitions, a precise guide to empirical research, as well as instructions on how to report findings. **The codebook will be completed after the theoretical framework has been sanctioned, accordingly updated and agreed upon by the TransCrisis partners.**

References

- Ansell, C., Boin, A., and 't Hart, P. (2014). Political leadership in times of crisis. In Rhodes, R. A. W. and 't Hart, P. (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, 418-33. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ansell, C., Boin, A., and Keller, A. (2010). Managing transboundary crises: Identifying building blocks of an effective response system. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 18 (4), 205-17.
- Attina, F., Boin, A., and Ekengren, M. (Eds.) (2014). Designing EU crisis management capacities [Special issue]. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 22 (3).
- Barnard, C. (1938). *The functions of the executive*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Boin, A., 't Hart, P., Stern, E., and Sundelius, B. (2005). *The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boin, A., Ekengren, M., and Rhinard, M. (2013). *The European Union as crisis manager: Patterns and prospects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boin, A., Kuipers, A., and Overdijk, W. (2013). Leadership in times of crisis: A framework for assessment. *International Review of Public Administration*, 18 (1).
- Boin, A., McConnell, A., and t Hart, P. (Eds.) (2008). *Governing after crisis: The politics of investigation, accountability and policy change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boin, R.A. and 't Hart, P. (2000). Institutional crises in policy sectors: An exploration of characteristics, conditions and consequences. In Wagenaar, H. (Ed.), *Government institutions: Effects, changes and normative foundations*, 9-31. Boston: Kluwer Press.
- Castells, M. (1996). *The rise of the network society*. Cambridge: Blackwell.
- 't Hart, P. (2014). Contextual analysis. In Rhodes, R. A. W. and 't Hart, P. (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, 210-224. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- LaPorte, T. R. (Ed.) (1975). *Organized social complexity: Challenges to politics and policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lodge, M. and Wegrich, K. (2014). Crowdsourcing and regulatory reviews: A new way of challenging red tape in British government? *Regulation and Governance*, 9 (1), 30-46.
- Perrow, C. (1984). *Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technologies*. New York: Basic Books.
- Rodriguez, H., Quarantelli, E. L., and Dynes, R. R. (Eds.) (2006). *Handbook of disaster research*. New York: Springer.

- Rosenthal, U., Boin, A., and Comfort, L. K. (Eds.) (2001). *Managing crises: Threats, dilemmas, opportunities*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.
- Rosenthal, U., Charles, M. T., and 't Hart, P. (Eds.) (1989). *Coping with Crisis: The management of disasters, riots and terrorism*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.
- Selznick, P. (1957). *Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation*. New York: Row-Peterson.
- Smith, D. and Elliott, D. (Eds.) (2006). *Key readings in crisis management: Systems and structures for prevention and recovery*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Suchman, M. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(3), 571–610.
- Turner, B. A. (1978). *Man-made disasters*. London: Wykeham.