5th Conference of the LSEE Research Network on Social Cohesion in South East Europe in collaboration with EBRD

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Stream: Income inequality and social protection policies

Pension policy developments in SE Europe

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(SE Europe = from Romania to former Yugoslavia)

Outline of presentation

Pension-policy-relevant features of the countries

Pension systems in the Balkan countries

Recent policy initiatives

Empirical evidence

Challenges to be faced

The role of the EBRD

Pension-policy-relevant features of the countries

Ageing populations

Little different from rest of Europe (except Kosovo)

- Low labour force participation + high unemployment Use of "early retirement" to relieve labour market High level of "informal working"
- Low tax collection rates
 - Evasion and contribution non-compliance

Fiscal problems

Pressures from IFIs and EU

Underdeveloped capital markets

Stock markets and banking system

Pension systems in the Balkan countries

| | tax financed universal | public PAYGO | mandatory savings accounts | WB classification |
|------------|---------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| Albania | Х | DB | | low spending |
| Armenia | | DB | Х | low spending |
| BiH | | DB points | vol. in Rep Srpska | high spending |
| Bulgaria | | DB | X1 | low spending |
| Croatia | | DB points | X ² | low spending |
| Kosovo | Х | NONE | Х | young |
| Macedonia | | DB | X ³ | high spending |
| Moldova | | DB | | low spending |
| Montenegro | | DB points | | high spending |
| Romania | | DB points | X ⁴ | high spending |
| Serbia | | DB points | | high spending |
| Slovenia | | DB | | high spending |

¹ Contrib. increases stopped, now allows opt-outs; ² Now allows opt-outs; ³ Now allows opt-outs and reversion to PAYGO; ⁴ Has cut contributions and allows partial reversion to PAYGO

Source: based on WB, 2014, and own analysis

Recent policy initiatives

Repeated "parametric" reforms

Moving up pension age (+ equalisation)

Cutting benefits (including indexation changes) Increasing contribution periods

Unwinding "paradigmatic" reforms

Dealing with "transition costs"

Freezing amount diverted to funded accounts (Croatia)

Threats to "nationalise" funded accounts (Bulgaria)


Late "paradigmatic" reformers

Armenia (2014); "rumours" in Serbia and Slovenia

Recent policy initiatives (2)

Unwinding "paradigmatic" reforms Dealing with "transition costs" Disguised PAYGO "fake privatisation" Maastricht rules and fiscal deficits and debts Is R>G or G>R? Charges on funds Empirical evidence

Illustrating "transition costs"



assumption:

transition costs financed by

- 1) cuts elsewhere
- 2) additional taxes, contributions
- 3) benefit cuts
- 4) greater efficiency, better compliance
- 5) privatisation receipts
- 6) borrowing

but, money is fungible, so there is always an opportunity cost

Is R>G or G>R?

Samuelson-Aaron perspective*

where G=growth of wage sum and R=return on investment PAYGO superior if G>R, funding superior if R>G

Blanchard and debate about historical r or i and g^{**}

where *r* or *i* = long govt. bonds and *g*=nominal growth higher public debt might have limited welfare consequences and no fiscal costs if g > r or *i*

* Samuelson, P. A. [1958], An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With or Without the Social Contrivance of Money, in *Journal of Political Economy*, 66, 467-482; Aaron, H. J.[1966], The Social Insurance Paradox, in *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 33, 371-374. ** Blanchard, O. [2019], Public Debt and Low Interest Rates, in *American Economic Review*, 109(4): 1197–1229.

Empirical evidence

Countries with funded second pillar


| date of privatis | since inception until end 2007 | | since inception until end 2018 | | standard deviation | | | |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| -ation | real | GDP | | real | GDP | | 2nd | |
| | return | growth | diff | return | growth | diff | pillar | GDP |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Apr-02 | 4.3 | 6.5 | -2.2 | 1.2 | 3.5 | -2.3 | 8.1 | 3.0 |
| May-02 | 4.5 | 4.8 | -0.3 | 3.5 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 6.4 | 3.5 |
| Feb-06 | 2.9 | 5.8 | -2.9 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 0.4 | 6.6 | 2.2 |
| May-08 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 4.8 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 4.3 | 4.2 |
| | privatis -ation Apr-02 May-02 Feb-06 | privatis -ation Apr-02 May-02 Feb-06 2.9 | privatis -ationsince incept until end 20realGDP returnApr-024.3Apr-024.5May-024.5Feb-062.95.8 | Since inceptionprivatis -ationuntil end 2007real returnGDP growthdiffApr-024.36.5-2.2May-024.54.8-0.3Feb-062.95.8-2.9 | since inceptionsinceprivatis -ationuntil end 2007untilreal returnGDP growthreal diffreal returnApr-024.36.5-2.21.2May-024.54.8-0.33.5Feb-062.95.8-2.93.2 | privatis -ationsince inceptionsince inception-ationuntil end 2007until end 20realGDP returnrealGDP returnApr-024.36.5-2.21.2Apr-024.36.5-2.21.2Apr-024.54.8-0.33.5Feb-062.95.8-2.93.2 | since inceptionsince inceptionationuntil end 2007until end 2018realGDPrealGDPreturngrowthdiffreturngrowthdiffreturngrowthApr-024.36.5-2.21.2Apr-024.54.8-0.33.51.6Feb-062.95.8-2.93.22.8 | privatis -ationsince inceptionsince inceptionstanda-ationuntil end 2007until end 2018deviatrealGDPrealGDP2ndreturngrowthdiffreturngrowthdiffApr-024.36.5-2.21.23.5-2.3May-024.54.8-0.33.51.61.96.4Feb-062.95.8-2.93.22.80.46.6 |

Note: Real returns represent semi-net returns. They exclude asset-based fees but include contributionbased fees.

Source: Nikola Altiparmakov and Milan Nedeljković

Empirical evidence

High charges associated with individual accounts



Impact of charges - assuming 30 years saving

| at 0% | 100.0 |
|---------|-------|
| at 0.5% | 91.6 |
| at 1% | 84.0 |
| at 1.5% | 77.2 |
| at 2% | 71.0 |

Empirical evidence

Underdeveloped capital markets Small domestic stock exchanges and little of "investment grade" Reliance on investment in government bonds

Private schemes as "disguised" public systems

| Asset Allocation (%) of 2 nd pillar funds (mid/late 2018) | | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-------------|--------|--------|
| | govt debt | corp. bonds | shares | others |
| Bulgaria | 48 | 15 | 33 | 3 |
| Croatia | 69 | 2 | 16 | 14 |
| Macedonia | 57 | 0 | 9 | 34 |
| Romania | 63 | 3 | 19 | 15 |
| Kosovo | 12 | 23 | 42 | 23 |

Source: national pension authorities

| Impact of 4% "carve out" on debt as % GDP | | |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--|
| year | accumulated debt | |
| 1 | 2.4 | |
| 5 | 12.0 | |
| 10 | 24.0 | |
| 15 | 36.0 | |
| 20 | 48.0 | |
| 25 | 60.0 | |

Source: own calculations (assuming wages=60% of GDP)

Challenges to be faced

Distrust of (financial) institutions

- Albania and the 1997 pyramid investment scandal 2008-09 financial crisis and impact on Kosovo's KPST
- Political opposition to WB/IMF (Serbia, Slovenia, Albania)
- Protests in Armenia following 2014 reform proposal (a "racket", allowing the government to "get its hands into people's pockets")
- "Governance metrics", rule of law, contract enforcement – WB, TI, etc, – discouraging inward FDI

The role of the EBRD

EBRD unlike other multi-lateral lenders

No social policy or anti-poverty function (e.g. WB/IMF) Promotion of privatisation

But more in general than in particular – not directly in pensions

Interest in development of financial markets

- Stock markets as capital allocators
- Concern about closure of Poland's 2nd pillar (2011-13)
- Some interest in "long-term financing" and "infrastructure", but only tangential refs to pension funds
- Investor in pension fund providers (AXA until 2009, PRVA, 2007-17, EPF, 2017-)

Limited research in pensions issues Mainly in earlier period

The role of the EBRD (2)

Appropriate old-age benefit schemes WB "Pillar 0" or "universal" = flat rate, anti-poverty benefit (Kosovo and Albania as examples?) But avoid discrimination in application (minorities) Well-managed supplementary fund (Kosovo?) But make it voluntary Develop administrative capacity And avoid the "siren call" of the IFIs Get the "economy" right, "stupid" a sine qua non Improve understanding of what ageing means Take advantage of EU resources

The case of Kosovo

