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CONFLICTING RATIONALITIES IN
THE POLITICS OF DESIGN FOR
'MIXED COMMUNITIES'

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I don't think many people could tell you why 'mixed communities' is important or what it's supposed to achieve. But I think that, for me, it's clearly about maximising the opportunities for interaction...

Interview with housing association development manager

1. Introduction

Since 2005, planning policy relating to new-build housing development in England has promoted the creation of 'mixed communities' that incorporate a 'well-integrated mix of decent housing of different types and tenures' (ODPM 2005a:9). Positioned in contrast to areas of concentrated social housing, 'mixed communities' purport to offer a more positive social milieu from which lower-income households in particular may derive tangible benefits and improve their potential for socio-economic mobility (Power 2007). This paper draws closely on an analytic approach informed by Foucault's (1991a) notion of 'governmentality' to explore the emergence, formulation and operation of 'mixed communities' policy. It is argued that the aspirations for 'mixed communities' are premised on housing schemes adopting a 'well-integrated' tenure mix. However, as the exploratory account of a single case study housing development presented in this paper demonstrates, the aim of a well-integrated tenure-mix is difficult to achieve in practice, as housing providers must instead pursue their own management-oriented design strategies to ensure the viability of mixed-tenure schemes. The 'politics of design' for new-build mixed tenure housing is thus shown to constitute a terrain of apparent contestation between the social policy ideals of 'mixed communities' and the marketised logics of residential property development.

Foucault (2007:108) used the term 'governmentality' to refer to 'the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics' that allow the exercise of political power. As an analytic approach, 'governmentality' focuses critical attention on how interrelated 'strategies', 'programmes' and 'technologies' of government are formulated; firstly, in response to particular 'problematisations' of the object of governmental authorities; and secondly, in accordance with particular 'rationalities' regarding the appropriate forms, objects, and limits of political power (Rose and Miller 2010[1992]). The term strategies refers here to the 'formulae of government', which must be translated into programmes or discursively-formed 'plans for action' (Donzelot cited in Rose et al. 2009:8). Governmental authorities seek to render their programmes operable through 'technologies of government' (Rose and Miller 2010[1992]). As Gordon (1980:250) explains, 'a programmatic schema fulfils its vocation only in so far as it is complemented by the elaboration of a technology'. Policy programmes, such as 'mixed communities', thus deploy various mechanisms – 'technologies' – that are "imbued with aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting certain undesired effects' (Rose 1999:52). However, whilst political authorities work to convince us of the effectiveness of the technologies they deploy for various policy programmes, in reality the objects of government are often not so readily programmable (Rose et al. 2009:5). The effects of governmental technologies may not always reflect political will; either failing to achieve some or all of their intended aims, or even producing contrary effects (Rose 1999:52).

Therefore as Gordon (1980:247) states,

the concepts of strategies, programmes and technologies serve to analyse not the perfect correspondence between the orders of discourse, practice and effects, but the manner in which they fail to correspond and the positive significance that can attach to such discrepancies (emphasis added).

This paper follows Rose and Miller's (2010[1992]) framework for analysing political power which operates 'at a distance', often with the assistance of non-state actors. The first section attends to what Rose and Miller term the 'political rationalities', from which policy programmes such as 'mixed communities' emerge (in this case characterised by a neoliberal restructuring of social housing provision and the accompanying problematisation of social housing as a source of disadvantage for its inhabitants). The second section outlines the (discursive) formation of 'mixed communities' as a 'political programme' with the potential to ameliorate the social problems faced by those living in unmixed neighbourhoods of social housing. The third section turns to examine the means by which policy makers have sought to deliver new 'mixed communities' via governmental 'technologies' intended to operate 'at a distance' through an alliance of local-state and non-state actors. The fourth section then examines the ways in which tenure-mixing is achieved in practice, exploring how an alternative set of 'design technologies' deployed by the developers of a case study scheme appear to demonstrate how technologies "can be utilised for their own ends by those who are supposed merely to operate them" (Miller and Rose 2008:35). This analysis reveals a contested 'politics of design', through which non-state housing providers develop and deploy their own design technologies to ensure that schemes are manageable, economically viable, and marketable. In doing so, housing providers subvert the aim of delivering a 'well-integrated tenure mix', through a set of economically-driven decisions that nonetheless work to render operable a wider programmatic aim of privately-subsidising affordable housing provision.

2. Rationalities and Problematisations

The formulation of governmental programmes takes place, firstly, within the context of particular 'rationalities' – modes of thinking about the appropriate forms, objects, and limits for the exercise of political power (Rose and Miller 2010[1992]:273). In this regard, the rationality behind contemporary housing policy in Britain has been characterised by the withdrawal of the state from the provision¹ of social housing. The emergence of mixed-tenure development as the prevailing mode of 'affordable' housing provision in the late 1990s arguably reflected a wider and longer-running process of restructuring within the local authority housing sector. This restructuring was characterised by privatisation, deregulation, and a withdrawal of the state on the one hand and the emergence of new regulatory and institutional frameworks on the other. This process reflects what Brenner and Theodore (2002) term the 'actually existing' pathways of neo-liberalisation, whereby new institutional

¹ Following Ball (1986), the 'provision' of housing is taken here as the process which extends from the inception and development of a housing scheme, the allocation of properties to their occupants, and the ongoing management of the development as a whole

norms characterised by a reliance upon non-state actors and deference to the logics of the market emerge within the context of previous regulatory frameworks. The neoliberal rationality behind 'mixed communities' is therefore argued to be as much, if not more, a reflection of on-going political-economic restructuring as it is of a particular marketised ideology.

The period from around 1980 onwards saw a 'rolling back' of the state's involvement in the provision of public goods, together with the deregulation and dismantling of various institutions of the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state (Peck and Tickell 2002:384). Two particularly pertinent moments in the restructuring of the social housing sector in this period work to illustrate how a rationality of privatisation and demunicipalisation altered the 'forms, objects and limits' of governmental involvement in 'affordable' housing provision. Firstly, from 1980 onwards tenants were given the option to purchase their properties at a discount from the local authority. By 2004, over two million properties had been sold under the 'Right to Buy' scheme, 'privatising' around one-third of the state's housing stock (Mullins and Murie 2006:100). 'Right to buy' generated around £8.4 billion in cash receipts in today's terms from the first four years alone (Forrest and Murie 1986:46). Whilst 'right to buy' was not envisaged as a means of subsidising the provision of social-rented housing, it can be seen as a precedent to today's 'cross subsidy' model whereby revenues from private sale properties became a means of funding 'affordable' housing supply. Moreover, by undermining the local authority housing sector – which Thatcher derided as "a means through which socialism was still built into the mentality of Britain" (Tunstall 2003:156) – the 'right to buy' had a deeply-felt ideological impact whereby social renting came to be viewed as a 'tenure of the last resort' (Gurney 1999, Fitzpatrick and Pawson 2007).

A second key moment in the restructuring of local authority housing came with the Housing Act of 1988, which essentially deregulated the sector by making it possible for private- and third-sector organisations to be partly or even solely involved in the provision of social housing. Deregulation created a greatly expanded role for the 'independent rented sector' – a diverse group of non-profit organisations involved in the provision of less-than-market-rate housing. Firstly, the removal of financing restrictions left these organisations free to seek private capital, or enter into 'partnership' with private developers, allowing them the financial flexibility to replace local authorities as the main producers of social housing. Secondly, the 1988 Act laid the groundwork for the demunicipalisation of the ownership and management role that had almost exclusively been held by local authorities, by giving independent 'housing associations' the opportunity to acquire existing social housing stock and take over responsibility for their management or re-development (Malpass and Mullins 2002). These changes paved the way for 'partnerships' between housing associations and private developers to become the predominant means of providing and managing social housing.

Post-war neoliberalism offered a different way of thinking about the act of government (Gordon 1991, Foucault et al. 2008). Neoliberal restructuring redefined the 'appropriate forms, objects and limits' of the state's involvement in social housing provision, through "the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred" (Stoker 1998:17). The privatisation and deregulation of the 1980s led to the shrinking of the local authority housing sector, yet the demand for social-rented housing placed on local authorities persisted. From 1997 to 2009 the number of households on local authorities' housing waiting lists in England increased

from 1.02 to 1.76 million (CLG 2008). Having 'rolled back' its activities as a housing provider, by the mid-1990s the state was facing renewed pressure to address the demand for affordable and social-rented properties. In turn, the 'distribution of tasks' relating to the provision of affordable housing – including ongoing management – was shifted onto housing associations and the private sector amidst new paradigms for financing, regulation, and management. By mobilising housing associations, private developers and would-be owner occupiers, mixed-tenure housing development offered a 'technological and ideological shortcut' through which the government could respond to ongoing demand for 'affordable' housing, within entrenched rationalities of marketisation, deregulation and demunicipalisation (Murie and Rowlands 2008).

Governmental programmes are formulated, secondly, in response to particular 'problematisations'. Whereas political rationalities constitute the predominant mode of thinking about the appropriate forms, objects, and limits for the exercise of government – 'problematisations' constitute the predominant means of thinking (and talking) about political problems (Rose et al. 2009:9). Problematizations imbue governmental programmes with ameliorative and normative legitimacy. As Peck and Tickell argue, neoliberal restructuring entered a second ameliorative phase during the 1990s, with a paradoxical increase of policy intervention aimed at the "re-regulation, disciplining, and containment of those marginalized or dispossessed by the neoliberalisation of the 1980s" (2002:389-90). In order to endow new modes of governmental intervention with normative and ameliorative legitimacy, the police discourse of New Labour's 'Third Way' evoked "certain ways of visualising political problems, a rationality for rendering them thinkable and manageable, and a set of moral principles by which solutions may be generated and legitimised" (Rose 2000:1395). The 1990s saw the problematisation of the social-rented sector as an object of socially ameliorative policy intervention in two ways. Firstly, social-renting came to be increasingly acknowledged as a socially problematic category, as policy discourses emphasised the social and economic 'marginality' of the sector's inhabitants. Secondly, the spatial concentration of social housing was increasingly discussed as generating or compounding socio-economic disadvantages for its inhabitants (SEU 1998). This double 'problematization' legitimated new policy interventions aimed at de-concentrating social housing as means of addressing 'social exclusion' (Darcy 2010). The ameliorative and normative legitimacy of 'mixed communities' is therefore derived from a belief that a 'balanced' social mix avoids compounding the harmful effects of concentrated poverty.

Neighbourhoods of concentrated social-rented housing were problematised through an emerging spatialised social policy discourse, in which 'social exclusion' was seen not just as a problem of 'poor people' but also as one of 'poor places' (Watt and Jacobs 2000). This spatialised discourse of social exclusion was epitomised in Tony Blair's foreword to the third report of Labour's fledgling 'Social Exclusion Unit' (SEU 1998):

We all know the problems of our poorest neighbourhoods - decaying housing, unemployment, street crime and drugs. People who can, move out. Nightmare neighbours move in. Shops, banks and other vital services close. Over the last two decades the gap between these 'worst estates' and the rest of the country has grown. It has left us with a situation that no civilised society should tolerate.

Despite having originally emerged to describe the social problems arising from labour-market exclusion in those areas particularly hard-hit by the global economic restructuring of the 1970s and 80s², New Labour's 'social exclusion' discourse presented the problems faced by the 'worst estates' as resulting from the characteristics of these places themselves. As Rogers (1996:53) argues, 'exclusion discourse' renders 'major social problems innocuous by breaking them down'. In this way, New Labour were able to ground the macro-structural causes of labour market exclusion within the worst affected neighbourhoods and lay the blame for these problems in a large part on 'the increasing domination of social housing by those not in work' (ODPM 2005b:21). The problematising rationale behind tenure-mixing derives from this belief in what Darcy (2010) terms 'tenure disadvantage' (despite the apparent incongruity of viewing subsidised housing as a source of disadvantage). In laying claim to a certain understanding of social problems and thus legitimating particular responses, Rose and Miller (2010[1992]) argue that political rationalities are often required to adopt a distinct 'epistemological character'. Sociological theories of 'neighbourhood effects' (cf. Wilson 1987, Wilson 1997) provided an epistemic basis for 'tenure disadvantage', by proposing that 'the geographic propinquity of numbers of disadvantaged households creates a social or cultural dynamic at the local level which compounds and perpetuates their disadvantage' (Darcy 2010:3). Residing in a deprived area was thereby held to 'adversely affects individuals' life chances over and above what would be predicted by their personal circumstances and characteristics' (Cabinet Office and ODPM 2005:6-7). It therefore follows – both by implication and through the discursive claims of policy makers – that 'mixed communities' would avoid these deleterious effects and might in turn offer an advantageous social milieu for lower-income residents.

3. The Political Programme

The relationship between political rationalities and problematisations and the prescriptive activities of government is one of discursive translation into a political 'programme', through which a particular object of government is rendered amenable to the 'calculated activities of political forces' (Rose and Miller 2010[1992]:280). As Lupton and Fuller argue, tenure-mixing "is clearly different from the previous [...] initiatives in its adoption of the thesis that 'concentrated poverty' (or in some iterations, concentrated social housing tenure) is the problem and 'de-concentration' the solution' (Lupton and Fuller 2009:1017). Having laid claim to this particular understanding of the problem, measures to ensure a more 'balanced' social mix were discursively constituted as the legitimate antidote to the problems of concentrated poverty (Cole and Goodchild, 2001). A belief in the ameliorative potential of 'mixed communities' is made explicit by the government's statement that;

Mixed communities can help tackle deprivation by reducing the additional disadvantages that affect poorer people when they are concentrated in poor neighbourhoods. (ODPM 2005b:52)

Furthermore, the Government argued that 'integrating different housing types and needs can greatly enrich the quality of community life by engendering both a sense of belonging and a sense of respect for all' (DTLR 2001:35). The political programme for 'mixed communities' is therefore characterised by

² See Silver (1994) for an account of the origins and deployment of 'social exclusion'

a belief in the potential of tenure-mixing to address the forces of social exclusion, whilst at the same time generating additional tangible benefits for lower-income residents and for the 'community' as a whole (Joseph 2006, Joseph et al. 2007).

Tenure-mixing is thus founded on the broad premise that 'communities function best when they contain a broad social mix' (SEU cited in Cole and Goodchild 2001:355). Underlying this belief are three assumptions: Firstly, a 'dispersal consensus' holds that tenure-mixing has the potential to avoid the deleterious forms of socialisation that it is believed might otherwise occur if social-rented households are concentrated in 'monolithic' estates (Lupton and Fuller, 2009, Power, 2007). Secondly, a 'social capital' argument asserts that 'mixed communities' have the potential to nurture 'transactional' social interactions, through which social-renters might derive tangible benefits from the relationships with owner-occupiers (Cole and Goodchild, 2001). And thirdly, there is an implicit belief in the potential of 'mixed communities' to normalise and regulate the conduct of lower-income households, whether through exposure to more acceptable middle-class behaviours or through the exercise of informal social control by more 'responsible' elements of the community (Cole and Goodchild 2001, Joseph, 2006). However, in order for 'mixed communities' to have any potential for realising the propositions outlined above, the policy would have to prescribe certain characteristics for the form and layout of mixed-tenure schemes so as to maximise the potential for interpersonal contact between residents in different tenures (Talen 2006). The political programme therefore appears to rely on housing developments arranging housing units of different tenures so as to facilitate interactions between neighbours. According to the Government's own guidance, 'mixed communities' required a 'well integrated mix' of tenures (ODPM 2005a).

4. Governmental Technologies

This paper will now turn to examine the means by which governmental authorities have sought to create 'mixed communities'. Tenure mixing is understood here as a governmental 'technology', 'imbued with [programmatic] aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting certain undesired effects' (Rose 1999:52). However, as Rose and Miller argue, modern forms of neo-liberal government must increasingly seek to operationalise their political programmes 'by influencing, allying with, or co-opting resources that they do not directly control' (2010[1992]:287). In the case of 'mixed communities', central government was required to ally with local planning authorities and to co-opt the resources of housing associations and private developers in order to deliver mixed-tenure housing. Whilst the government's underlying aspiration may well have been to shape the conduct of social renters within 'mixed communities' – as some have argued (Cole and Goodchild 2001) – their immediate task instead required that they shape the activities of housing providers in order to deliver mixed-tenure schemes.

In practice, tenure-mixing operates through guidance passed down from central government to local planning authorities (in the form of Planning Police Statements³). In order to achieve the government's

³ The most up-to-date incarnation of the policy guidance for housing at the time of writing is referred to here. It differs little from the previous 'Planning Police Guidance' on housing (DETR, 2000) which applied to the case study that is described in the following section.

'strategic housing policy objectives', the local authority planning system should work to deliver 'a mix of housing, both market and affordable, particularly in terms of tenure' in all areas (CLG 2010:6). The government's guidance suggests that local authorities set out a strategy for 'achieving a good mix of housing' (ibid.:9) and should only accept proposals for development that reflect projected demand and which 'sustain mixed communities' (ibid.:10). Within London, the Greater London Authority's 'spatial development strategy' – known as the 'London Plan' – provides an additional layer of policy guidance that echoed central government's call for 'new housing development [...] to promote mixed and balanced communities by [...] offering a range of housing types and sizes' (GLA 2008:72). For most of the past decade, the GLA has advocated a 'strategic target' that 50 per cent of properties in large new-build developments be 'affordable'.

In the context of neoliberal roll back and restructuring, local governmental authorities must work to attract external sources for the funding or delivery of core services (Harvey 1989:7). As the London Plan makes explicit with regards to housing:

The Mayor strongly supports a partnership approach to the provision of affordable housing. He looks to [...] house builders, boroughs and registered social landlords to take a more pro-active approach in pre-application discussions, public consultation and negotiations over planning agreements (GLA 2008:79 emphasis added).

This 'partnership approach' requires local planning departments to engage in a complex process of negotiations with various actors in order to determine the quantity and type of 'affordable' housing in proposed developments. From their inception, most mixed-tenure schemes thus involved a range of actors – a private-sector developer, a registered social landlord (RSL), a body supplying an affordable housing grant (such as the Homes and Communities Agency), and a range of firms and organisations providing architectural, engineering, construction, and financial services (see Tiesdell 2004). These actors may have contrasting objectives. For instance, the local planning authority's main objective will likely be to ensure a sufficient supply of homes of the appropriate size and tenure to meet local demand. RSLs may also be primarily concerned with acquiring a sufficient quantity of new housing units, that are in accordance with their design, quality and space standards (cf. Housing Corporation 2007), and within tight cost constraints⁴. In contrast, the primary objective for any developer is to build properties that can be sold at a price that covers the costs of production and which generates the maximum return on investment (Tiesdell 2004). Whilst it has been found that developers 'recognise that engaging in mixed tenure development is unavoidable if they are to secure development rights to a site' (Rowlands et al. 2006:18), if local planning authorities push too hard on developers in their efforts to secure affordable housing supply, proposed schemes risk becoming commercially unviable (Roberts 2007). The London Plan (GLA 2008:77) thus advises that local planning authorities work to 'encourage rather than restrain residential development' and therefore that 'targets should be applied

⁴ RSLs may receive a capital grant from the Homes and Communities Agency (formerly the Housing Corporation), which would cover the cost of building/acquiring dwellings. Alternatively, they may seek private finance, secured on future rental income and/or equity value of the properties. Finally, they may be in a position to 'cross subsidise' less-than-market-rate units through the sale of properties (Tiesdell, 2004).

flexibly, taking account of individual site costs, the availability of public subsidy and other scheme requirements'.

The terms agreed in the negotiations between local authorities and housing providers are codified into a legally binding contract under 'Section 106' of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act. What are known as 'Section 106 agreements' are the primary mechanism through which the local planning authority guarantees the provision of affordable housing units in new developments (Burgess et al. 2007). However, negotiations over these agreements can be long drawn-out and legally complex affairs, and research has shown there to be considerable variation in the 'success' of these negotiations based on various factors including the negotiating skills of individual actors (Groves et al. 2003). As Burgess and colleagues observed in their survey of Section 106 negotiations, 'the majority of councils do not stipulate the mix of tenures required', leaving it to 'site by site negotiation' to determine the mix of tenures, sizes and types of housing to be delivered (2007:35). As a result, there is considerable variation in the proportion, tenure-type, and distribution of 'affordable' housing agreed through Section 106 negotiations.

The governmental technologies deployed in pursuit of 'mixed communities' incorporate guidance passed down from central government, 'strategic targets' adopted by local authorities, and contingent and highly idiosyncratic negotiations between various state and non-state actors, which culminate in a legally binding agreement over the provision of mixed tenure housing units. The decentralised nature of current 'affordable' housing provision thereby differs substantively from previous incarnations of top-down, rationally planned, and state-delivered forms of social housing provision. Perhaps as a result of the constraints of governing 'at a distance', existing research has questioned the potential of governmental technologies for mixed-tenure housing development to shape the conduct of housing providers in such a way as to produce the desired effects attributed to 'mixed communities'. It is toward an empirical exploration of this question that this paper will now turn.

5. Design Technologies

Rose and Miller (2010[1992]:273-4) argue that it is necessary to explore the "multiple and delicate networks" that connect the aspirations of governmental authorities to the activities of those organisations charged with delivering governmental aims. Existing analyses of completed mixed-tenure schemes reveal widespread variations in the extent to which the governmental aim of an 'integrated tenure mix' is realised in practice (Tiesdell 2004, Roberts 2007, Rowlands et al., 2006, Andrews and Reardon Smith 2005). As one researcher starkly observes;

...rather than being designed with a notion of intended social interaction, the design and layout of mixed developments was primarily a function and consequence of decisions oriented towards protecting the value of the market-rate housing from the perceived negative externality of the affordable units (Tiesdell 2004:210)

These findings suggest that those involved in the provision of mixed-tenure schemes may act to re-programme governmental aims to better suit their own requirements. As a result, the built form and layout of housing schemes – and in particular the distribution of tenures – may not correspond to governmental aspirations for 'mixed communities' (Tiesdell 2004). On the one hand, the politics of design associated with mixed-tenure housing reflects Rose and Miller's (2010[1992]:281-2) observation that 'architectural practices', 'building designs' and 'architectural forms' are among the 'mechanisms by which authorities seek to instantiate government'. At the same time, it also reflects the wider observation on the nature of governmentality – stressed by Foucault (1991b) and others (Gordon 1980) – that governmental technologies "are never simply a realisation of a programme, strategy or intention' (Rose 1999:52).

This section examines how providers of mixed-tenure housing have developed their own design 'technologies' which mediate between their requirements and the aspirations of governmental authorities. Insights gained from interviews, informal discussions and personal correspondence with key informants are used here to explore particular terrains of contestation and discord between the governmental programme for 'mixed communities' and the 'design technologies' deployed on a case study mixed-tenure scheme in the East London borough of Tower Hamlets. Key informants include the scheme's project architect, members of senior management from the developer, and a representative of a quasi-autonomous government agency responsible for delivering urban regeneration. Completed in the mid-2000s, the development itself comprises two hundred new-build residential units within four separate blocks built on a formerly-industrial brownfield site. Approximately half of the housing units were sold at market-rate, with the remainder comprising affordable housing tenures (35% for shared ownership and intermediate rent, 15% for social rent). Figure 1 shows the tenure mix within the scheme, whilst Figure 2 shows a simplified plan of the development in relation to the street and adjacent stretch of Victorian canal.


Floor	Block 1	Block 2			Block 3		Block 4	
12							4	
11							4	
10							4	
9							4	
8		2	2		2	2	4	
7		5	5		5	5	4	
6		5	5		5	5	4	
5		5	5		5	5	4	
4	2	5	4		5	5	4	
3	5	5	4		5	5	4	
2	2	5	4		5	5	4	
G	5	3	3	1	3	5	3	
		Publicly accessible plaza						
SR	14	13	3		-	-	-	30
IR/SO	-	22	30		18	-	-	70
PS	-	-	-		17	37	47	100

= social rent
 = shared ownership
 = private sale

SR = Social Rent, IR = Intermediate Rent, SO = Shared Ownership, PS = Private Sale

Figure 1 - Tenure distribution in case study in development, showing number of units on each floor

Figure 2 – Simplified plan of development layout, showing access and infrastructure features



It would be possible to identify multiple 'design technologies' in any housing scheme, such as those devised to ensure the building satisfies requirements for energy efficiency, security, and accessibility. The particular design 'technology' examined here concerns the spatial distribution of housing tenures within the development, which constitutes a primary decisions for providers of mixed-tenure housing. Tiesdell (2004) identifies three possible design approaches towards the distribution of different tenures (see Figure 3). The first approach, known as 'pepper-potting', involves a fully-integrated dispersal of tenures throughout the development. A second and contrasting approach involves completely separating tenures into single-tenure blocks, often with separate access points, amenities and public/communal spaces. The third approach involves grouping properties of the same tenure together in 'clusters', either on separate floors or different 'cores' within the building. The 'mixed communities' policy calls for a 'well integrated mix' of tenures, which would imply that 'pepper potting' corresponds most closely to the government's aspirations (CLG 2010). However, evidence from completed mixed-tenure schemes suggests the 'clustered' approach to be the most commonly used (Murie and Rowlands 2008).

Figure 3 - Typologies of tenure mixing (adapted from Tiesdell 2004), whereby each of the symbols represents a different tenure-category

Fully-integrated mix	Completely Separated	Clustered
△△○○△△△○○△ ○△○○○○△△△△ △○○△△○○△△△△ □□△△○○□□○○□□ □○○□□△○○△○○ ○○○○○□○○△○○△△ ○□□□○○△○○△△ △△○○□□△○○△○○ △□□△△△△○○△△	○○○○○ □□□□ ○○○○○ □□□□ ○○○○○ □□□□ ○○○○○ □□□□ △△△△△△△△△△ △△△△△△△△△△ △△△△△△△△△△ △△△△△△△△△△	△△△ ○○○ □□□ △△△ ○○○ □□□ △△△△△ □□□□ △△△△△ □□□□ ○○○ □□□ △△△ ○○○ □□□ △△△ ○○○○○ △△△△△ ○○○○○ △△△△△

The case study scheme examined here comprised four separate blocks, within which a clustered mix of tenures was adopted for blocks 2 and 3, whilst blocks 1 and 4 were used for the separate provision of social-rented and private-sale tenures respectively (see Figure 1). In their marketing material, the developers described the 'ethos' for the scheme as being to provide 'quality homes situated within an inclusive community'. However, the distribution of tenures illustrated in Figure 1 suggests that, in spatial terms, 'inclusion' was minimal. For instance, nearly half of the social rent and private sale properties are provided in separate blocks, and it is only on a single floor of one block (2) that social-renters are 'mixed' with other tenures. The interview accounts provide some insight into the how this clustered tenure-distribution is seen to function as a design technology, which renders tenure-mix operable within various parameters of viability envisaged by housing providers. As the case study's project architect described;

Every private housing manager and indeed every affordable housing manager will tell you that there are lots of reasons why its cleaner to be able to combine the tenures in a sensible way. It's easier for management, it's easier for apportioning of service charges, and so on. I think that's the most critical thing actually.

A 'design technology' was thus devised for the distribution of tenures within the case study scheme which aimed to produce certain desired effects, whilst averting other undesired effects (Rose 1999:52). These effects, which are considered in turn, focused on the management of service charges, the administration of one-off capital costs encountered during the life of the development, and ensuring the marketability of private-sale units.

The first issue which the 'correct' distribution of tenures is seen to address concerns the administration of service charges and routine management costs. In order to meet the 'service expectations' of potential purchasers, mixed-tenure schemes must offer similar amenities to other, non-mixed, developments. However, as the scheme's architect noted;

There are problems that go with fully-integrated schemes, particularly in high value developments where you've got differences in service expectations. With lifts, carpets, things like that, communal areas can be quite expensive to maintain

A fully-integrated (i.e. pepper-potted) tenure-mix makes it almost impossible to restrict the provision and cost of 'high end' facilities to market-rent properties. This situation is acknowledged by a senior manager for a national regeneration agency⁵:

There is the issue of the service charge, that's a massive issue in mixed tenure... If you're going to have the same level of service across the pitch, there is an issue with who's paying... So, there is an issue around cost and management

In contrast, a clustered tenure distribution allows housing providers to offer marketable features for their private-sale properties in selective areas of the development, without imposing a cost burden on housing association properties.

Secondly, clustering was also seen to ease the administration of certain one-off capital costs, both during construction and throughout the life of the building. For example, clustering can be seen to create efficiency gains through the economies of scale achieved by the simultaneous installation of similar fittings across a number of floors, or indeed, within an entire building. This would not be achievable if market-rate units – often requiring different levels of fittings⁵ – were dispersed across the site. Another issue is the cost of one-off maintenance or renovation work, for which the housing association would be liable as the freehold owner of their social-rented units. This creates a particular problem in the event of a significant investment being required – for example, repairs to the exterior of the building or upgrading of lift machinery – in which case leasehold owner-occupiers are seen as a potential source of resistance against the imposition of exceptional maintenance costs. Therefore, from the perspective of a housing association;

⁵ This is not to imply that fittings are necessarily of a higher cost or quality in market-rate units, but rather that housing associations will often opt for more durable (and sometimes equally expensive) fittings in their properties.

...your ability to make decisions about your investment in your block can be hampered by, or restricted by, the usual requirement of those purchasers to limit their exposure of costs.

Clustering thus limits the risk that the housing associations, who own and manage affordable properties within these schemes, might be forced to enter into difficult negotiations with leaseholders over these 'investment decisions', allowing them greater freedom to carry out maintenance work in areas where affordable units are located.

Thirdly, the clustering of social-rented units in particular can be seen as a way of making market-rate units within mixed-tenure schemes easier to sell. A previous study suggests that around half of owner occupiers in mixed-tenure estates believe that tenure-mix will negatively impact on their property's value (Rowlands et al., 2006:57). In the UK, social housing is widely acknowledged to suffer from considerable stigmatisation (Dean and Hastings 2000). This also constitutes a concern for those involved in the provision of mixed-tenure schemes, not least because the 'cross subsidy' model by which socially-rented units are often part-funded is reliant on the developers achieving the highest possible price for their market-rate units. The concern thus arises that private-sale properties may be less marketable if they are adjacent to social rented properties. This was a consideration in the development of the case study scheme, as the project's architect explains:

...it affects the marketability, there's no denying it, that the values of private sale are going to be dragged down by the notion that there is affordable renting there. So these aren't pepper-potted.

In this case, the distribution of social housing into a separate block within the scheme was considered more 'market friendly' by mitigating the concerns of potential purchasers regarding the proximity of social housing. This distribution of tenures was complemented by a 'tenure blind' architectural treatment of the buildings' exteriors, which ensured that any appearance of tenure difference was normalised across the site. On the one hand, there was an equity-based rationale behind the intention that 'there should be no sense that if you were living in the affordable-rented block, it was obviously treated differently'. This design strategy was presented as 'carefully considered to provide an inclusive collection of homes that promotes integration[...], creating a sense of community'. On the other hand, the interviews revealed that, in design terms, tenure-blindness was also a means of ensuring marketability for private-sale properties:

If the affordable isn't treated as well as the private sale, it can actually act as a drag on the private sale. Why would you have one block which is obviously more shabby compared to another? [...] It's only going to impact on the value. It would be short-sighted to do that.

'Tenure-blindness' and the physical separation of social-rented units can be seen to function as a design technology, which helps ensure marketability and thus helps support the 'cross-subsidy' model whereby the supply of new social housing is financially contingent on achieving a good return on the sale of market-rate properties.

A degree of separated tenure-mix – complemented by tenure-blind design and a host of commonly-used security and surveillance features – work to ensure that mixed-tenure schemes are manageable, economically viable, and marketable. In many ways, these requirements may not be met by the fully-integrated tenure-mixing that appears to constitute the 'ideal type' for policy-makers. As Roberts (2007:189) concludes "if the nostrum of an "integrated" layout were to be insisted on in each new mixed income community, some developments might never move on from the design phase". Design technologies such as 'clustering' and tenure-blindness can therefore be seen to render tenure-mixing operable, within various constraints inherent to the marketised logics behind new housing supply and management, even though they may directly hinder the social proximity required by 'mixed communities'. The 'design technologies' developed by providers of mixed tenure housing corroborate Rose and Miller's (2010[1992]:281-2) observation that building design constitutes a set of 'mechanisms by which authorities seek to instantiate government', albeit in a way that does not correspond perfectly to the discursive programmatic of 'mixed communities'.

6. Conclusion

For over a decade, planning policy in England has called for new housing developments to provide a 'well integrated mix of housing types and tenures' so as to foster the creation of 'mixed communities'. The political programme for 'mixed communities' is premised on the potential for tenure-mixing to create an social milieu in which 'positive' forms of social interaction between lower- and higher-income neighbours occurs. At the same time, however, the underlying rationality of deregulation, marketisation and state withdrawal from housing provision requires resources to be mobilised from beyond the state, to deliver mixed-tenure schemes through 'partnerships' between state and non-state actors. The governmental technologies through which mixed-tenure housing provision operates – comprising planning guidance, local authorities' 'strategic' housing supply targets, negotiations between various actors, and 'Section 106' agreements – do not intrinsically enforce the ideal schema for 'mixed communities' comprising a well-integrated tenure mix. As existing research has shown, housing providers will often adopt strategies for the design of mixed-tenure schemes that avoid the integration of different tenure groups, which would logically appear to be a requisite for fostering 'mixed communities' (Tiesdell 2004). The fact that these 'technologies' do not necessarily operate to embody the programmatic (discursive) logic for 'mixed communities' should not, however, lead to the conclusion that this policy has 'failed' through its subversion by the activities of housing providers.

As Foucault argues, the fact that schemes may not always embody their programmatic aspirations, should not detract from the fact that such schemes may nonetheless correspond to 'a whole series of diverse practices and strategies' which 'induce a whole series of effects in the real' (1991b:81). The analysis presented in this paper has aimed to elucidate how housing providers, in their search for the most effective way to render operable the government's programme for tenure-mixed housing development, deploy 'practices and strategies' through which they aim to maximise the manageability, marketability and profitability of their developments. These practices, such as the clustering of tenures, have 'effects in the real' which, whilst facilitating the process of mixed-tenure development, appear less likely to foster 'mixed communities'. It is argued that this brings us to two important conclusions. Firstly, that in 're-programming' the aspirations of 'mixed communities' to

better suit their own requirements, housing providers are, in fact, rendering operable the programme for tenure-mixing which may otherwise be simply unviable. And secondly, that in order to fully grasp the reality of life for the residents of these schemes, one must also examine the interdependencies between state and non-state actors involved in housing provision, and their discursive and non-discursive practices. Finally, it is argued that a governmentality approach, which is yet little-utilised in housing research, has considerable potential to inform and develop a critical understanding of the 'politics of design' associated with the various efforts of the state to govern building and architectural practices at a distance.

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