



1. London's Housing Crisis



1.1 | Housing prices, London
(Savills, 2013)


Over the past 30 years, London has experienced a re-urbanisation following decades of urban decline. This boost in population – hitting a record high of 8.6m in February 2015 (BBC, 2015) – has created immense pressure on the city's housing supply. Rising housing prices due to this increased demand for housing, coupled with huge cuts in housing benefits, priced out London's most deprived populations from affordable forms of housing. Furthermore, large gaps between supply and demand of social housing were created with the introduction of Margaret Thatcher's Right to Buy (RTB) policy (1980 Housing Act). RTB allowed social housing tenants to buy their homes at a highly discounted rate, resulting in large numbers of social housing stock becoming privately owned – Figure 1.3 illustrates this missing segment of Council-provided housing. Post-Thatcher, New Labour policies continued to rely on the market to provide housing for citizens. Within this framework, local councils were unable to build sufficient housing and were given minimal funding to maintain current stock through national policies such as the 1988 Housing Act.



1.2 | Number of households living in social housing, Haringey
(Office for National Statistics, 2014a)

The Housing Crisis in Tottenham

The housing crisis is felt acutely in Tottenham, an area in the east of the Haringey Borough with a population of 78,000 (Haringey Council, 2015, p.6). Here, 29% of the population live in social and affordable housing and a majority are dependent on benefits (GVA, 2014). Throughout Haringey and specifically in Tottenham – where a high concentration of the borough's social housing is located (Figure 1.2) – this crisis is reflected in an inability to meet the housing need both in terms of quantity and quality. Policy decisions from over 40 years ago continue to intensify the crisis today, leaving Haringey Council with limited scope for action over housing stock and prices, and over 8,000 households currently on the waiting list for social housing (GLA, 2014). Stripped of resources, the Council has turned to market-driven solutions to support affordable housing. While affordable housing has mostly been built by housing associations (HA), they are increasingly built by private developers today. This often results in a fulfilment of high-end demand for housing rather than meeting the needs of lower-income residents. Further, as an area of overlapping deprivations, Tottenham's lower land values have made it an area of interest for private developers seeking wide profit margins. Without sufficient resources and leverage, Haringey Council often finds itself at the losing end of negotiations and Section 106 (S106) agreements, making it almost impossible to meet housing needs in Tottenham.



1.3 | Housing completions, London
(GLA, 2013a)

2. Mass Estates in Tottenham


Research interest and methodology

Drawing on this understanding of the housing crisis in Tottenham, our study aims to examine the impacts of mass estates on the current crisis, asking: How can mass estates address the need for housing in Tottenham? This project explores three estates in Tottenham, built during different periods from the 1950s onwards, and shaped by evolving political, planning and spatial ideologies. Our case studies of Broadwater Farm Estate (BWF), Ferry Lane Estate (FL) and Hale Village (HV) were carried out via observations, ad-hoc and expert interviews, and document analysis. In the next section we present our learnings from these case studies and advocate for four non-negotiable principles for truly affordable housing in Tottenham:

1. Build for local needs
2. Support proactive measures
3. Provide social infrastructure
4. Activate open spaces

These principles seek both quantitative and qualitative answers for the question: How can a mass estate be implemented in Tottenham within the current climate of economic and political austerity?

To ensure robustness, we tested these principles against our interviewees, including representatives of the Council, private developer Lee Valley Estates (LVE), Homes for Haringey (HFH) and local residents. We then applied these principles as an intervention on a site in Tottenham, Ashley Road (AR), culminating in a proposal of a process model for truly affordable (TA) housing. TA seeks to provide attainable housing for Tottenham's most vulnerable in a manner that respects long-term quality of life for residents. It will be led by Haringey Council in conjunction with housing associations, with the aim of addressing urgent housing needs through mass estates. In contrast to various existing masterplans for the area, our process plan is less concerned with physical masterplanning and is focused instead on tenure schemes, services and social infrastructure to deliver high quality, TA housing.



Case Study 1: Broadwater Farm

BWF was built by borough architects CE Jacobs and Alan Weitzel in west Tottenham. The modernist development, with large tower blocks built on stilts that prioritised car use, is fairly representative of other social housing developments built during the 1960s. Initially praised for its high standard of living, BWF was in severe disrepair soon after its completion. Consequently, the Department for the Environment proposed its demolition only three years after its opening, against the will of residents who advocated for site improvements and investments by the local authority (Gardiner, 2015). However, the riots in 1985, for which BWF is notoriously known today, became a catalyst for regeneration.

Basic Facts

Year of Construction
1967, fully occupied 1973

Population
3800

Site
70,000 m²

Density
7,760 p/km²
2.2 (plot ratio)


Dwelling Types

1-Bedroom Flat: 504
2-Bedroom Maisonette: 424
3-Bedroom Flat: 108
4-Bedroom Terraced House: 8


On-site Services

Better Life for Women and Families (1997)
BMX track (2007)
Childcare centre (2004)
Church on the Farm
Community Centre (1992)
Gym (2010)
Harmony Gardens (2010)
Health Centre (1996)
Neighbourhood Office (1983)
Resident Association (1987)
School (1970, rebuilt 2009)
Shell Theatre
Shop

Accessibility



Tenure Structure in %



Actors


BWF is a social housing estate developed by the Haringey Council. In order to receive more funding from Communities and Local Government to maintain the Decent Homes Standard, the council created an Arms Length Management Organisation (ALMO), Homes for Haringey (HFH). HFH took over management of the estate and is presently on site with a Neighbourhood Office where residents can drop in for enquiries and complaints. Having an on-site building where residents can address issues has been an important part of sustaining the health and viability of BWF.

Security Retrofitting & Social Infrastructure


After the riots, strategies to cope with safety and security concerns at BWF – which at times were so acute that even the police avoided the area – manifested in a two ways: Physical changes combined with an emphasis on social services, which transformed the structure and feel of the estate.

In 1993, £33 million were allocated to an eight-year estate action plan to retrofit BWF as part of Design Improvement Controlled Environment, a project that tested Alice Coleman's findings in her book *Utopia on Trial* (Coleman, 1985). The first major intervention was the dismantling of elevated walkways that fostered anonymity and were hotspots for crime. BWF's ground floors were activated through this relocation of pedestrian circulation to the street level. Secondly, a concierge system was put into place, controlling accessibility at the ground floor (Figure 2.4), and 150 CCTVs were also installed after the riots to increase security.

In addition to the physical changes, investments were made in social infrastructure to cultivate security. BWF's community centre was established along with sports clubs, a community garden, and further services that helped to provide an outlet of residents and activate lively ground floors. This led to an incremental improvement of safety on the estate, significantly reducing crime rates.



2.2 | Spatial representation of the modernist ideology realised in Broadwater Farm



2.3 | Change in organisation of tenure structure



2.4 | Security retrofitting: controlled access through concierges

Case Study 2: Ferry Lane

The 1970's response to the apparent failure of modernist estates saw a decline in high-rise buildings. High volume typologies were avoided and FL epitomises a typological return to Victorian terraced housing. The estate was originally built as social housing, but with almost a third of its residents exercising their RTB, it has transitioned into a mixed-tenure estate. FL improved on open space practices, with different degrees of privacy and public programmed spaces such as a children's playground, outdoor seating, semi-public spaces including football and basketball courts, and private gardens for ground floor flats. The estate also represents car-oriented design exemplified by ground floor garages, despite adequate public transportation accessibility.

Basic Facts

Year of Construction
1974

Population
1076

Site
143,900 m²

Density
1,040 p/km²
0.58 (plot ratio)


Dwelling Types

1-Bedroom Flat: 556
2-Bedroom Maisonette: 336
3-Bedroom Flat: 136
4-Bedroom Terraced House: 20

On-site Services

Cornershop
FLAG Housing Association
FL Estate Office
GP surgery (closed early 2000)
Primary School
Pub (closed)

Accessibility



Tenure Structure in %

1978

2015

■ Social Rented ■ Rent-free
■ Privately Rented ■ Owned



Low-density development



Although FL had a fairly high resident satisfaction rate, its low density was insufficient to sustain the estate's services. The GP surgery, community centre and local shops were pulled out due to a lack of critical mass. Now, with only one corner shop and primary school left, residents rely on services outside of the estate. However, the Ferry Lane Action Group (FLAG) meets quarterly to solve issues and support residents, and has created and maintained strong relationships with local stakeholders like the police, local councillors and HHF.

Security

This low-density development was also conducive to a more natural surveillance, or "eyes on the street" (Jacobs, 1961), where residents have been able to self-police. This phenomenon is highlighted in Figure 2.7.

Effects of Right to Buy

At FL, 30% of the estate has been bought using RTB to date. This corroborates the general trend (Figure 1.3) of dwindling Council stock, which continues to intensify the housing crisis. Furthermore, a portion of these privately-owned homes are put on the private rental market at an inflated price, limiting options for affordable homes for vulnerable populations.



Case Study 3: Hale Village

HV is a mixed-use development adjacent to the Tottenham Hale transport hub. Its first phase was developed in 2007 by LVE on the site of a former furniture factory along the River Lea. HV was developed within an Opportunity Area as a Transit-Oriented Development, a high-density, mixed-use residential and commercial site. HV is being developed in several phases: First, student housing was developed by UNITE in 2008, followed by affordable housing units completed by Newlon Housing Trust in 2011. The second phase saw the completion of shared and privately owned flats, with an anticipated third phase of private residences to come.

Basic Facts

Year of Construction
2008 - 2015

Population
3000

Site
42,000 m²


Density
17,000 p/km²
2.8 (plot ratio)

Dwelling Type
1-Bedroom Flat: 1759
2-Bedroom Flat: 502
3-Bedroom Flat: 127
4+- Bedroom Flat: 62

On-site Services

Coffee Shop (upcoming)
Coppermill Heights (Shared Ownership, Keyworker Tenant Association)
Engine Room
Gym
HAVRA (Affordable Housing Tenant Association)
NHS Kidney & Diabetes Centre
Nursery (upcoming)
Tesco Express

Accessibility




Tenure Structure in %

2011



2025 (Projected)



Affordable Housing
 Intermediate Housing
 Shared Ownership
 Privately Rented
 Private Ownership



Transit-Oriented Development (TOD)


HV's high density and proximity to transport links strive to address the quantity aspect of the housing crisis. Mixed land use is implemented to encourage short walking trips, discourage auto-dependence and create active ground floors. The estate is divided by different building typologies, uses and tenure. This scheme was envisaged to include offices, retail, and a primary school among other services.

Open Space

Public open spaces in HV are accessible for residents and external visitors, but are highly controlled. Families in affordable flats are located on ground floors with access to private gardens and residents have access to semi-private ground floors and roof top spaces. However, activities here are considered over-regulated by both residents and visitors (Figure 2.10).

Tenure

Initially, HV was obligated to include 46% affordable housing due to grants received by the Council. However, many tenants have exercised their Right to Acquire (RTA), the RTB equivalent for affordable housing, diminishing affordable housing stock to 27% of HV. This will further decrease over time as more flats are sold and a proposed 25-storey private housing tower is built. Not only is the amount of affordable homes dwindling, but actual affordability is decreasing as well. Affordable rents priced at 60% of market rate are already too high for many, but with the development of HV, market prices have risen, squeezing out those who would have previously been eligible.







3. Learnings

Studying BWF, FL and HV provides an illustration of the wider narrative of social housing provided by the state, as well as the evolution towards affordable housing built through private developments. The difficulties of BWF, leading to the riots, demonstrate the importance of addressing social exclusion and building strong social networks, and the importance of providing community services within mass estates.


In FL, a low density estate resulted in the removal of most of its on-site services. Furthermore, RTB is particularly harmful in the midst of a heightened housing crisis, encouraging purchase of social homes even as increasing numbers of deprived families remain unplaced.

HV emerges as the following chapter of the housing crisis narrative. As a result of the state's inability to fund social housing, the Council was forced to find alternate means to meet increasing needs for a growing population through S106 negotiations.


The Council's Housing Allocation Policy places applicants for social housing within a banding system, ranging from Band A to Band E. Privately-developed affordable homes like HV no longer seek to place bands A and B, the most vulnerable populations, and prefer instead to build for bands C, D, E and private owners. As the waiting list for social housing grows, Haringey Council has been unable to meet the needs of people in bands A and B.

In our case studies, the issues of dwindling housing stock, unaffordable "affordable" housing and the importance of engaging in qualitative aspects of estates stood out as key elements of the housing crisis in Tottenham. In the following section, we explore in detail four principles for truly affordable (TA) housing, based on these learnings from our case studies:

1. Build for local needs
2. Support proactive measures
3. Provide social infrastructure
4. Activate open spaces



3.1 | Trends in household tenure in percentage, London (GLA, 2013a)



3.2 | Annual demand and supply by completions, London (Savills, 2013)

3.1 Build for Local Needs

The housing crisis in Tottenham is not just a traditional issue of supply and demand, but can be better understood through analysing local need. Tottenham's need for inexpensive homes does not match its current supply. For example, Haringey's median income of £19,952 means that many households cannot afford to rent at market rate. In Haringey, only 42% of households can afford market rent for two and three bedroom accommodations, with 8,364 households on the waiting list for social housing (GVA, 2014). Our HV case study shows the urgent need to house bands A and B, a section of the population affordable housing does not provide for.



In order to mitigate the crisis, we propose a rent-only mass estate with a 3-tier rent system with 35% Truly Affordable units, 35% affordable rent units, and 30% let at market rate to ensure viability. This estate will also focus on providing various flat sizes to reduce overcrowding. Although home ownership is a powerful ideal in the UK, populations who are able to buy homes in Haringey are declining (Haringey Council, 2014): Many households cannot raise the deposit needed to access mortgages. Further, there is also a shift in attitudes, as young people are less inclined to buy homes (see Figure 3.1) (GVA, 2014). Additionally, Figure 3.2 highlights the gap between current supply and rental demand, further illuminating the need for rental units.

Furthermore, there is an incongruence between flat sizes and occupancy rates, as seen in Figure 3.4. BWF exemplifies this problem, with its minimal flat-size mix of mostly one or two bedroom accommodations. These flats are overcrowded and cannot house larger families in Haringey who are disproportionately underserved (GVA, 2014).

RTB and RTA also significantly amplify the housing crisis. At FL and HV, social and affordable housing stock were bought at a discount of up to £102,000 for RTB and £16,000 for RTA respectively. Consequently, social and affordable housing stock has also diminished, creating a significant gap in housing supply.

In Tottenham, building for local needs means accounting for flat size requirements, securing long-term inexpensive stock and providing wage-based rental units.

3.3 | Housing need and demand, Haringey (GVA, 2014)



3.4 | Under-occupation and overcrowding, Haringey. Almost 30% of Haringey residents live in overcrowded conditions (Office for National Statistics, 2014b)

3.2 Support Proactive Measures

Proactive measures are the structural and operative functions that maintain and support the longevity of mass estates through physical and social measures. They emphasise security, maintenance and management strategies that are preventive rather than retroactive. Physical maintenance – including maintenance of outdoor spaces, buildings and individual flats – strengthen estates, as do community support infrastructure such as resident associations and on-site estate offices.

I'm glad that they [Newlon Housing management] are right here. It's easy for me to walk in and make complaints.

Jamaica, Hale Village resident, 2015

Reinforcing networks between the residents, Council, management agencies and existing neighbourhood organisations is crucial for creating a sense of belonging and ownership on the estate that in turn produces stability and trust. The case studies show that neglected estates require more financial and human resources for policing and upkeep, and impact

residents' wellbeing. Conversely, creating opportunities for residents to interact and problem-solve with the council, local police officers, management representatives and other tenants reduces insecurity and fosters trust between stakeholders while increasing management efficiency. Residents from both HV and BWF felt that on-site management offices provided a direct outlet for grievances and held management accountable.

Maintaining physical [infra]structure is also important when considering an estate's lifecycle. Many mass estates risk demolition due to dilapidation, as seen in BWF. Keeping an estate in good condition is not only more efficient but also fiscally responsible for the long term.

Security on estates is not just about spatial design and policing, but is the crux of the proactive approach. BWF and HV illustrate extremes in terms of security: BWF was long-considered one of the least safe estates in London until the Council injected funds into the site post-riots, as explored in the case study. In contrast, HV was the only case where residents consistently expressed concern about security in our interviews. Paradoxically, people who lived here felt the most unsafe and also felt that the space was over-managed with CCTVs all over the estate, signs telling you what you cannot do, and even security guards making sure no one takes photographs.

3.3 Provide Social Infrastructure

Social infrastructure is crucial to place-making and accessibility is key to enhancing quality of life on mass estates. While new housing developments increase pressures on existing services in the area, new provisions of infrastructure can increase accessibility and services for surroundings areas.

Our study of HV uncovered regeneration plans for Tottenham Hale – including a new district centre with 5,000 additional homes and 4,000 new jobs. This implies a rising population change, consistent with the 27.7% growth between 2001 and 2013 (Tottenham Area Action Plan, 2015). However, provision of social infrastructure has not kept up with this growth, mounting pressure on existing infrastructure. Our interviews highlighted issues of healthcare provision and education as particularly critical in Tottenham.

The closure of the GP service in FL and the NHS's withdrawal from plans to establish a practice at HV (a previously earmarked site) worsened the deficiencies of healthcare provision in the area. HV added over 3000 new residents to the area, further overloading existing GPs. This highlights the difficulties of providing social infrastructure for an estate, as it is reliant on other stakeholders who are also facing significant budget cuts. If an NHS cannot be secured, temporary health centres must be a priority.

When building HV, Lee Valley Estates complied with requirements to assess current deficiencies in the area and additional social infrastructure needs. The need for new GP services and existing healthcare under-provision in Tottenham has been well documented by the Council in their 2010 Community Infrastructure Study, yet services have not been added thus far.


No one thinks about social infrastructure, whether it's schools or healthcare facilities. One in five residents of Hale Village cannot find a doctor.

Chris Shellard, Development Director of Lee Valley Estates, 2014

In a 2014 capacity study, Healthwatch Haringey assessed GP accessibility in Tottenham Hale, surveying residents in HV and FL. Unsurprisingly, many residents were unable to access GP services, with a shortfall of 12 - 20% of appointments per week. At current capacity, Tottenham Hale requires an additional GP practice with four practitioners, nurses, healthcare assistants and administrative staff (Haringey Strategic Partnership, 2008a, p.7). This is crucial in order to create “[h]ealthier communities with a better quality of life” – a key objective highlighted in the Local Area Agreement Haringey 2008-2011 (Haringey Strategic Partnership, 2008b, p.11) – both today and in view of growth planned for the area.



Education is also a key concern, as seen in BWF and FL. Estates like BWF and FL built primary schools on site in anticipation of population increases caused by their developments. LVE was also obliged by S106 to add 60 reception and 210 primary school places as new developments in the area increased the need for primary school capacity by 9.9% (Haringey Council, 2010) (Haringey Council 2014c, p.32). However, this plan has yet to be realised and children at HV have been redistributed to nearby schools, increasing class sizes and taking up limited capacity.

While the current capacity for schools in Tottenham Hale could cover current demand, extrapolations of population growth and slated new developments show that secondary schools will run out of places by September 2017, emphasising the need to create sufficient social infrastructure provisions.



3.5 | Access to GP services, Tottenham

79% of the residents are registered at GPs within 1km of their home. 19% are registered elsewhere, 1% is not registered at all (Healthwatch Haringey, 2014)



3.6 | School placements, Tottenham (Haringey Council, 2010)

3.4 Activate Open Spaces

As Tottenham densifies, programmed open spaces become increasingly important. While Haringey is a relatively green borough in terms of open and green spaces at 1.7 ha/1000 persons, the distribution and quality of these spaces are uneven (Haringey Council, 2006). Addressing this inequality is key as open, public spaces “show respect for human dignity and begin at least to compensate for inequality in other realms” (Peñalosa, 2007, p.312).

“There are currently 11 [sports] teams based here. This has made a huge difference to young people in the area, being a key part of the area’s positive transformation.”

Michelle, BWF resident on Lordship Rec fields, 2015

The Council’s Open Space Strategy is focused on (i) protecting existing open and green spaces and (ii) providing links between them to “secur[e] positive visual contribution and variety through the borough” (Haringey Council, 2013, p.122). However, these plans are abstract, reading more as trickle-down policies from the London Plan than as actionable plans based on the specificities of Haringey’s context and residents’ needs.

Beyond this, our case studies have raised further considerations for open space in Tottenham: programmed and differentiated spaces, and avoiding over-regulation.

BWF and FL show that programming significantly affects the quality of open spaces and their usability. At BWF, large plots of empty spaces remained unused as they simultaneously belong to everyone and no one. After the riots, efforts to programme these spaces created differentiated areas for varied users, ranging from active play areas for children to passive, seated areas for the elderly.

At FL, programmed public space created a sense of trust and security among neighbours when a regular pop-up café was set up. Community Centre Manager Andrew said of the café, “Some local residents said, “Thank you for this. I feel like I know my neighbours and I feel safer now” (Kwapong, 2014).

BWF’s latent ground floors reduced connections between open spaces, impacting residents’ use of these spaces. However, post-riot retrofitting at BWF brought positive changes with activated ground-floor links, giving residents a reason to linger along paths connecting programmed spaces.

HV, a privately built and managed estate, has a number of programmed open spaces, but connections are severed by the privatisation of the space, which is highly monitored and over-supervised creating a perception of insecurity. Publicness is a non-negotiable principle for open spaces – without public access, they remain empty, unused spaces.

With high quality, programmed open spaces and active ground floor links between them, Tottenham’s open spaces will be more usable, fostering greater inclusivity, security and stability.


4. Proposing Truly Affordable Housing

In contrast to existing approaches, our proposal seeks to empower Haringey Council with a plan that looks back to social housing and a model of Council-led development of homes. We provide a process-driven model for building truly affordable housing on AR, exploring the hows of building a mass estate that focus on both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the housing crisis.

This proposal does not operate in a vacuum but is a response to specific political-economic planning rationales. Stakeholders on national, regional and local levels are concerned with alleviating the housing crisis: The National Planning Policy Framework and the London Housing Strategy seek to increase housing in London through incentives like grants and increasing borrowing capacities. Our intervention proposal at our chosen site of Ashley Road (AR) is outlined by these frameworks, with Tottenham slated as a major Opportunity Area (Figure 4.1).

A number of plans refer directly to the AR site (Figure 4.1), including the newly designated Housing Zones policy, which targets 29% affordable housing in Tottenham Hale. The Tottenham Hale District Centre Framework also sets out specific goals for AR, with explicit physical parameters such as building height and typologies, and square metres for retail, commercial and housing. However, these strategies remain abstract with no clear plan for how they might be executed: They illustrate the “whats” of a future site yet fail to present a model for the “hows”. Furthermore, these plans present just one solution for the housing crisis: S106 negotiations to finance Tottenham’s crucial needs. In this process, the Council’s role is diminished as it relinquishes increasing control to private investors.

4.1 | Multiple layers of planning policies



Ashley Road

AR is our proposed mass estate northwest of Tottenham Hale Station within a GLA Housing Zone. The site is currently occupied by industrial-use sheds, which would be torn down with the exception of a few terraced houses and the historic Berol House pencil factory, which will be incorporated into the estate. AR would be unique: as the sole rent-only mass estate in London, it prioritises the needs of the local population while understanding the importance of maintaining TA housing over time. AR would be a Council-led effort, made possible through close collaborations with a housing association. AR will house 1,300 residential units with mixed tenure including 35% wage-related truly affordable (TA) units, 35% traditional affordable units and 30% market-rate units. Along the main roads, commercial units will occupy the ground floors and services such as schools, healthcare centres and parks will be included within the estate, as explored in the following sections.

Basic Facts

Year of Construction
2020

Population
3200

Site
40,000 m²


Density
26,200 p/km²
2.44 (plot ratio)

Dwelling Type
1-Bedroom Flat: 385
2-Bedroom Flat: 426
3-Bedroom Flat: 355
4-Bedroom Flat: 134

On-site Services

GP
Management Office
Primary School
Commercial

Accessibility



Tenure Structure in %

2011

2025 (Projected)

Truly Affordable
Shared Ownership
Market Rent



4.1 Implementing Ashley Road


Securing funding is one of the major challenges in the development process of a rent-only mass estate. Under the Affordable Homes Programme, the average cost of building an affordable home is £116,379 including infrastructure (Frontier Economics, 2014, p.14). At 1,300 units, AR will require over £150 million in investment. Assuming that Haringey Council would not have the capital or the capabilities to build mass estates in the current market, a housing association (HA), a non-profit organisation that builds affordable housing, would help to fill this gap.

The process plan created for AR will secure funding through multiple avenues, relying predominantly on patient capital. Unlike most private developers who require a quick return on investment, HAs work on much longer timescales. Further, AR is in a Housing Zone, opening up access to capital as the GLA and HM Treasury have reserved £44 million in grants to build 1,950 new homes (with 560 slated to be affordable) along with £500 million in borrowing guarantees to support housing and transport infrastructure within the Tottenham regeneration site (Arup, 2014, p.1) AR will provide 1,300 of these new homes with a significant portion of TA units (455) and affordable units (455), targetting up to £30 million of the Housing Zones grant. In addition, partnerships with a diverse range of actors, such as NHS and schools, would provide additional capital through cross-funding. Where grants do not meet financial needs, housing bonds, commonly used by HAs, would fill the gap. Build to Rent, a £1 billion government equity fund (provided alongside £10 billion in debt guarantees available for up to 30 years) can also be utilised for the site.

Income will be garnered from the rental of commercial units occupying the ground floor along the estate's main roads: Hale Road, A1055, and Ashley Road. Based on average commercial rent in Tottenham, we have calculated that AR will be able to earn £22 a year per square foot amassing up to £700,000 per year in commercial rent. This approach, along with careful phasing, will allow Haringey Council and a HA to build a rent-only mass estate.

In order to gain sufficient annual income to repay loans, the estate will need to have a 3-tier rental scheme. 35% of AR housing units will charge wage-related rents, calculated using the council's quondam method for social housing based on relative average local wages (£24,884/year) and national average rent (£311.64/month). Although it is nearly impossible to build true Council housing in this socio-political climate, we look back to this model in our quest to deliver housing for those most in need.

4.2 | Stakeholders and processes at Ashley Road




Next, rents for 35% of AR units will be calculated at traditional affordable housing prices at 60% of the market rate, and the final 30% will be rented at market rate. Each level of rent meets different needs in the area: The lowest rental bracket reaches those most in need – bands A and B. This will alleviate pressures on the Council by reducing the amount of households in temporary accommodation. Currently 2,869 households in temporary accommodation cost Haringey Council over £115 million/year (Haringey Council, 2014a, p.6). The affordable units will house bands C, D, and E, and will also be a source of housing for key workers. Because affordable rents are market-based, Local Housing Allowances already provided by the Council will decrease rents to a more attainable rate where necessary. The market rent units create viability on the estate while also meeting rental demand.

To meet local needs, each tier will provide a different mix of flat sizes, built according to contextualised, local need (Figure 4.3). Each tier currently demands different flat sizes, but because the units cannot be sold the system is flexible to demographic changes in the future.

To ensure that TA units remains truly affordable, the RTA must be abolished. As this massive policy change is outside our scope, we have instead considered loopholes to circumvent RTA, which HAs are obliged to uphold. In collaboration with Haringey Council, the HA will create a private company to act as the landlord, since private organisations need not uphold RTA, allowing TA stock to be retained. Figure 4.2 shows the process for transferring finances, property and responsibility between AR stakeholders. Exploiting this loophole has its potential problems, however its success is dependent on a strong Council and cooperative HA. The new landlord agency must be bound by strong prior agreements and explicit contracts with the Council and HA, outlining the specific role of the new agency, which is simply to bypass the RTA, not to acquire profit. Although this program will be primarily executed by the HA, the Council is to be the leader in this alternative effort to address the housing crisis in Tottenham.

Although this is not a scheme that is currently practiced, we have identified a number of progressive HAs and council-led experiments that lead us to believe this is viable in the current landscape. For example, Enfield Council has created a private company that has been buying up homes in the borough and renting them out to those in need. As a private company, they can ensure that their housing stock will not diminish over time while also decreasing their expenditure for temporary accommodations. Unfortunately, this scheme has only been produced on a small scale thus far. Haringey Council will work with a forward-thinking HA such as Family Mosaic and One Housing Group who take a more holistic view of housing, incorporating programmes that diminish worklessness and creating partnerships with the NHS respectively.



4.3 | Number of flats and monthly rent by tenure type

This implementation process is important, but qualitative aspects of the estate are equally crucial to its success. How can we ensure that the needs of residents are met, including access to healthcare, education, child and elderly care and green space? The following pages illustrate a visual proposal for AR, emphasising existing assets that the site integrates and necessary additions to social infrastructure and services.

At AR, healthcare facilities are within proximity, but are currently overburdened. Adding 3,200 inhabitants will require two additional GPs, as 1 GP can accommodate 1,700 patients. Integrating AR into the existing fabric will also benefit neighbouring areas where there is currently lack of capacity. Our goal is to open an NHS that can grow over time, enabling the addition of the 6 - 8 doctors needed in Haringey 2017 (Community Infrastructure Study, 2010). As noted, HV already earmarked a healthcare site that the NHS was unable to fulfill. With this in mind, alternative health care options provide an immediate strategy to fill the gap. One such scenario includes providing a nurse practitioner that will be the first contact point for residents on the estate, funded by partnerships with NGOs such as the Kings' Fund.


Schools and childcare facilities are also crucial at AR. The existing nursery at Down-Lane Park (Figure 4.10), The Pavillion Pre-School, is leased from the council and can be expanded. There is also a plan to build a new nursery at HV. Together, these facilities can meet the community's projected demand. Currently, the local primary school has a surplus capacity of 235 places, meeting our projected demand of 230 children aged 5-11 (Haringey Council, 2010). However, this will not cover total future demand when accounting for new development. We plan to include space for a new primary school on our site for future development, while a secondary school is already in the works at a Council-owned site just north of Down-Lane Park.

Maintenance of the estate is also a key element to ensuring the longevity and preservation of AR. The Haringey average for social housing maintenance is £40 per flat per month depending on the density of the estate. This sum includes the salary of an estate manager, concierge services, caretakers (who take care of grounds maintenance, street sweeping, waste collection and basic repairs), and upkeep of roads on the estate (Homes for Haringey, 2015). AR will need one estate manager, an estimate of 8 - 9 concierges – one for every 150 residents (Power and Bergin, 2009) – a local repair service team, and a group of caretakers. The presence of an estate neighbourhood manager on-site and in a visible location is essential, ensuring that residents can easily access this office with claims or concerns. By applying many of the approaches described above, significant costs of maintenance such as repairs and security can be saved in the long-term.

AR has satisfactory access to already-existing programmed spaces as it is located near pedestrian-accessible open spaces and wildlife sites: Down-Lane Park to the Northwest, the Paddock Community Nature Park to the east, and Tottenham Marshes, a district park along River Lea (Figure 4.10). AR will integrate these existing assets and provide additional improvements and new open spaces as outlined in the images on the following pages.

The implementation of our principles onto the AR site creates a robust, contextualised proposal that engages with both qualitative and quantitative aspects of building mass estates in Tottenham.

4.2 Existing and Future Assets





- 4.4 | **Berol House:** Collocation of community-related and commercial functions in the heritage building.
- 4.5 | **Programmed green spaces on the estates**
- 4.6 | **Down-Lane Park (adjacent to AR):** Offers programmed outdoor spaces like football pitches and an outdoor gym.
New access streets will ensure better connectivity as industrial estates currently block off the park.
- 4.7 | **Southern Annex, Down-Lane Park:** This section of the park contains tennis courts and basketball courts. An adjacent playground for children will be maintained and a doorstep park for toddlers will be built on the estate.
- 4.8 | **View to AR from Down-Lane Park and children's playground**
- 4.9 | **View to AR from Tottenham Hale Bus Terminal**

4.10 | Existing and future assets surrounding Ashley Road



5. Conclusion

Our investigation of the housing crisis in Tottenham illustrates the immense scope of the problem facing politicians, Councils, developers and most importantly, citizens who are urgently seeking housing that is truly affordable. Engels, writing in 1887, aptly described the housing problem, which we experience in a similar manner in London today. He argues that there is no way to solve the housing crisis via supply and demand adjustments, as this only reproduces the problem. This does not mean, however, that it cannot be acted upon.

Engels suggests that the crisis can be mitigated: “One thing is certain: there are already in existence sufficient buildings for dwellings in the big towns to remedy immediately any real “housing shortage,” given *rational utilisation* of them” (Engels, 1887, emphasis added). This project is our attempt to approach a “rational utilisation” of housing in Tottenham – an alternative means of addressing an imperfect housing market in the midst of an unyielding housing crisis.

We recognise that the housing crisis cannot be solved by a set of principles, but it also cannot be solved by inaction. Our proposal for truly affordable housing as applied on Ashley Road is presented as a “modeling approach” – as a “space that might demonstrate... what is possible” (Marcuse, 2014, p.7) with strong public intervention and changes in the current mode of housing production. AR is a rent-only mass estate, which incorporates wage-related rents and an emphasis on social infrastructure and services towards local needs. It is based on a contextual study of evolving forms of housing paradigms in Tottenham, which each attempt to address enduring issues through different propositions.

This process model is far from perfect. It is still a compromise, seeking incremental solutions within a market-driven logic. However, it is a sincere effort to address the housing crisis in Tottenham not only in terms of the quantitative but also in ensuring a fulfilling quality of life for all its residents.

References

- Allies and Morrison. (2014). *Tottenham Hale District Centre Framework*. London: Allies and Morrison.
- Arup. (2014). *Tottenham Physical Development Framework*. London: Arup.
- BBC. (2015). London's population hits record high. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-31082941> [Accessed 18 March 2015].
- Bergin, E. and Power, A. (1999). "Neighbourhood Management", CASE paper 31, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion London School of Economics.
- Coleman, A. (1985). *Utopia on Trial: Vision and Reality in Planned Housing*. London: Hilary Shipman.
- DCLG. (2012). *National Planning Policy Framework*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government.
- DCLG. (2014). *School Place Planning Report 2014*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government.
- Engels, F. (1887 [1872]). *The Housing Question*. London: Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers.
- Frontier Economics. (2014). *Assessing the Social and Economic Impact of Affordable Housing Investment*. London: Frontier Economics.
- Gardiner, S. (2015). Interview with Tenancy Management West Team Leader. In person.
- GLA. (2011a). *The London Plan*. London: Greater London Authority.
- GLA. (2011b). *Opportunity Area Planning Frameworks*. London: Greater London Authority.
- GLA. (2013a). *The 2013 London Strategic Housing Market Assessment*. London: Greater London Authority.
- GLA. (2013b). *Upper Lee Valley - Opportunity Area Planning Framework*. London: Greater London Authority.
- GLA. (2014a). *Homes for London. The London Housing Strategy*. London: Greater London Authority.
- GLA. (2014b). *Housing Zones - A Prospectus*. London: Greater London Authority.
- GOV.UK. (2010). Registered social landlord: average weekly rents in England 2010. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/registered-social-landlord-average-weekly-rents-in-england-2010> [Accessed 19 March 2015].
- GVA. (2014). *London Borough of Haringey Strategic Housing Market Assessment*. London: GVA.
- Hale Village Newsletter. (2014). Available at: <http://www.halevillagelondon.com/hale-village-big-lunch-2014/> [Accessed 16 March 2015].
- Haringey Council. (2006). *London Borough of Haringey Open Space Strategy*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2009). *Haringey's Housing Strategy*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2010). *Community Infrastructure Study*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2012a). *A plan for Tottenham*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2012b). *Tottenham Hale Profile*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2013a). *Haringey's Local Plan: Strategic Policies 2013-2026*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2013b). *Guide to Social Housing Availability in Haringey 2013*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2014a). *Homelessness*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2014b). *Tottenham strategic regeneration framework delivery plan 2014*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2014c). *Haringey Council School Place Planning Report 2014*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2014d). *London Borough of Haringey Strategic Housing Market Assessment*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Council. (2015). *Tottenham Area Action Plan: Preferred Option Consultation*. London: Haringey Council.
- Haringey Strategic Partnership. (2008). *Haringey Strategic Framework for improving Adult's Well-being 2007-2010*. London: Haringey Strategic Partnership.
- Haringey Strategic Partnership. (2008). *Local Area Agreement Haringey 2008-2011*. London: Haringey Strategic Partnership.
- Healthwatch Haringey (2014). *GP Access in Tottenham Hale: Capacity Study*. London: Haringey Council.
- Heywood, A. (2013). *Investing in Social Housing*. London: The Housing Finance Corporation.
- Homes for Haringey. (2015). Rent consultation 2015/16. Available at: http://www.homesforharingey.org/almo/information_for_tenants/rent/rentconsultation.htm [Accessed 19 March 2015].
- Jacobs, J. (1961). *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. London: Vintage.
- Jamaica. (2015). Interview with Hale Village resident. In Person.
- Kwapong, A. (2014). Interview with community organiser and missionary at Hale Village, Ferry Lane and Tiverton. In person.
- Marcuse, P. (2014) "Reading the Right to the City", *City*, 18(1), pp. 4-9.

Michelle. (2015). Interview with Broadwater Farm resident. In Person.

Mumford, K. and Power, A. (2003). *East Enders: Family and Community in East London*. Bristol: Policy Press.

Office for National Statistics. (2014a). Tenure - Households, 2011. Available at: <http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk> [Accessed 19 March 2015].

Office for National Statistics. (2014b). Occupancy Rating (Rooms), 2011. Available at: <http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk> [Accessed 19 March 2015].

Penalosa, E. (2007). "Politics, Power, Cities", in R. Burdett and D. Sudjic (eds.) *The Endless City*, pp. 307-319. London: Phaidon.

Power, A. (1997). *Estates on the Edge: The Social Consequences of Mass Housing in Northern Europe*. New York: St. Martin's.

Rightmove. (2015). Tottenham retail properties. Available at: <http://www.rightmove.co.uk/> [Accessed: 19 March 2015].

Savills. (2013). *Spotlight London Demand*. London: Savills.

Shellard, C. (2014). Interview with Development Director at Lee Valley Estates. In person.

Shellard, C. (2015). Interview with Development Director at Lee Valley Estates. In person.

Strickland, A. (2015). Interview with Councillor, Cabinet Member for Housing and Regeneration. In person.