

1. Introduction

In the aftermath of the 2011 London riots, Mayor Boris Johnson overtly described Tottenham as an area “brimming with opportunity and ripe for investment” (Haringey Council, 2012, p.4). This rhetoric is reflective of a growth-oriented regeneration logic that has become the London norm, whereby “planning for the market” (Keddie & Tonkiss, 2010, p.58) is embodied in the London Plan (GLA, 2011a). The tensions expressed during the riots exposed differences between the global orientation of London growth, and the local requirements of an increasingly excluded population.

These trends intersect at the site of the Tottenham Hotspur Football Club (Spurs) stadium-led regeneration, a current concern of the London Assembly (2015). The site is slated as one of Tottenham’s major growth hubs, spurred by a host of transportation upgrades. The global ambition of the football club, in converting the space into one suited towards spectacle and visitors, is in sharp contrast to the everyday concerns of the residents and businesses.


Currently the site is occupied by a council estate, industrial park, and High Road businesses. The plan is to replace this with a vogue mixed-use, dense typology around a new upgraded station and stadium walkway. The delivery of the plan relies on the market-oriented real estate sector, with profit driven developers revalorising spaces with rent gaps in turn reducing affordability of living. Haringey Council (from here onwards Haringey or the Council), caught in managing and balancing these tensile considerations, orients itself to the market.


Building from the London context, we evaluate the regeneration process and potential outcomes on this site from the perspective of urban justice. Differentiating between procedural and distributive justice, we highlight the negotiation power imbalances that currently exist between stakeholders that allow for or constrain the ability to materialise aspirations for the site. The concentration of power within the private sector is at the basis of our understanding of the regeneration process as unjust. Formulating a critique of the regeneration process, our intervention then proposes a more just regeneration framework for the site, primarily focusing on re-enabling current excluded groups through a specific set of mechanisms.

1.1 | Components of the sites including new Spurs stadium

Constrast between existing components and envisioned landscape

- 1 Love Lane Estate tower blocks
- 2 Love Lane Estate maisonette blocks
- 3 Light industrial and manufacturing estate
- 4 White Hart Lane - exit from station towards High Road
- 5 High Road diverse local businesses
- 6 Victorian listed building - current stadium entrance
- 7 Visualisation of new Spurs stadium Tottenham Plan
- 8 Visualisation of upgraded High Road (HRW Masterplan Framework, Arup)
- 9 Visualisation of new housing typologies (ibid, Arup)





2. State Of Affairs and The Critical Moment

*That things are “status quo” is the catastrophe. [...]. Definition of fundamental historical concepts:
Catastrophe – to have missed the opportunity; the Critical Moment – the status quo threatens to persist;
Progress – the first revolutionary steps.*

Walter Benjamin (1999, pp.473-474)


The High Road West (HRW) in Tottenham has reached a critical moment, where the status quo regeneration process not only threatens to persist but one which also affords the opportunity for a just intervention. Here, the status quo is an iteration of the growth machine (Logan & Molotch, 2007) – a neoliberal form of regeneration where a large-scale private actor aspires and realises change. On our site, this actor is the Tottenham Hotspur Football Club (Spurs), whose primacy is justified by its capital and influence over Haringey Council and the Greater London Authority (GLA) (Gibson, 2011). Due to financial constraints, the Council is dependent on private capital to fund and realise spatial improvement within their jurisdiction. Hence, an opportunity exists here in two ways: growing resistance to the regeneration plan by local businesses and residents, and the Council’s uncertainty about the mechanism to develop the site.

Citizens and local business have increasingly felt excluded from the regeneration effort. The Council, building upon the Tottenham Task Force, produced the Tottenham Physical Development Framework (Arup, 2014b) that eventually led to the HRW Masterplan (Arup, 2014a), which outlines the proposed outcomes of the project. The aim to economically develop the site and foster a mixed income community by creating a “balanced place to live and work” (Haringey Council, 2014a, p.10) is incongruous with the existing space, high proportion of Council housing, array of local businesses and industry, and the correlated needs of the area as it is one of the UK’s 5% most deprived spaces. The Masterplan also outlines alternative financing methods such as leveraging the Council’s assets. Concurrently, the Council attended the MIPIM conference in an attempt to attract private capital for the project (Haringey, 2014a).

This further heightened initial critique as the Mayor of London publically subsidised the stadium redevelopment while the Council, backed by the national government, facilitated the purchase of sites around the area for the stadium redevelopment. Spurs also began to aggressively purchase real estate in the area, presumably to develop and subsidise the stadium (Conn, 2013). In response to what was an inadequate consultation, community group Our Tottenham (2015a) sought to create their own Tottenham-wide Plan, while the Local businesses, designated for demolition in the Masterplan, formed the Tottenham Business Group (TBG) to lobby the council (Percy, 2015).

The critical moment’s simultaneous threat and opportunity allows for alternate groups to acquire “the capacity to aspire...that is everywhere the key to changing the terms of the *status quo* insofar as recognition and redistribution are concerned” (Appadurai, 2013, p.292, our emphasis). What we see as an unjust status quo affords the opportunity for a just development at the site.

2.1 | State of affairs timeline and stakeholder power relationships




3. Theoretical Framing



To frame the critical moment at our site in theory, we utilise the notion of justice along with the opportunity to realise an alternative to the status quo. The concentration of the ability to aspire and realise regeneration with large private interests is unjust (Appadurai, 2013), and our intervention aims to enable a more just urban framework by redistributing such abilities to other stakeholders.

In this, we turn to John Rawls' (1999) conception of justice, employing his distinction between procedural and distributive justice. Briefly put, procedural justice is concerned with the political processes that govern the relationships between social institutions, while distributive justice concentrates on the shares and outcomes of those processes. The imbalances between the stakeholders' abilities to aspire and realise change are due to the share of resources that each has available. Within the context of regeneration, this disparity – more often than not – manifests as an urban space that benefits private interests with financial resources and political clout. However, while there is a tendency to focus criticism on these outcomes of regeneration, Rawls points to the fact that distributive shares are not independent from, and thus cannot be analysed outside of, the processes that lead to it. This 'primacy of process' suggests that without a just process, it is unlikely for there to be just outcomes. Thus, while we give due attention to just outcomes, the majority of our work will be oriented around restructuring the processes which regulate the relationships between the many institutions involved.


Though drawing from the foundational philosophical formulations of Rawls, we deviate from his general political project and in turn, draw upon literature that urbanises the notion of justice. However, for the purposes of scope we omit the dimension of diversity in Susan Fainstein's (2010) definition of urban justice, instead focusing on democracy and equity. Concentrating on the everyday politics of urban development, our notion of justice rests upon enabling concerned and organised groups who aspire towards the benefit of urban inhabitants. This focus draws from the concept of the "Right to the City", aiming "in part at a fair and equitable distribution of urban resources but even more so at obtaining power over the processes producing unjust urban geographies" (Soja, 2009, p.83). Given this, we demand "the right of all city inhabitants to participate in political life of the city... [implying]... a "right to politics"" (Dikeç, 2001, p.82) or more suitably, a right to spatial process/production.



3.1 | Multiple Deprivation Index
(2011 Census)



3.2 | Social rent tenure share
(2011 Census)



3.3 | Low-income (NS-SEC classes 5-8)
% of total population (2011 Census)



3.1 Procedural Justice

Diverging from Rawls' political project towards an urbanised conception of justice, it is necessary to define procedural justice and its role in our work. As it stands, the process withholds the current population and business owners from both their right to the city and a pivotal right to politics. The concern is that the capacity to aspire and realise urban change is primarily in the hands of one major stakeholder. We diagnose this disproportionality to be the result of an uneven division of resources available to each party, which in turn preferences the interests of one over all others in the process leading to regeneration and development. Conversely, we understand a just process to be one that is open, democratic, and confers equal opportunity for all to be involved in the transformation of the city. Such a process would coordinate a more neutral dialogue between the Council, community, businesses, and Spurs so that all parties have the ability to aspire and realise change in the area. As Fainstein (2010, p.56) notes, "groups most lacking in political and financial power and most subject to disrespect are least likely to be included in deliberation or to prevail in the outcome". In order to do so, we must intercede prior to the development process and reallocate resources towards the empowerment of the worst-off and excluded.

The first challenge is to establish which enabling-resources have the most influence and faculty in the regeneration process. To analyse power with relation to this process, we draw from John Forester's (1988, p.102) remark that "relative power...[is dependent] heavily on the parties' pre-negotiation of marshalling resources," of which he specifies "time, money, expertise, information and control of capital" (ibid, p.27). We adapt this for our site to include a dimension of real estate and access to process. Though Forester places a primacy on information, we propose that the allotment of resources is itself primary. Reflecting this, we have developed a matrix to evaluate the distribution of resources among the different process actors (Figure 3.4).

3.2 Distributive Justice

In our formulation, direct outcomes are the explicit results of the urban process. In the case of the HRW masterplan, these are: built form, housing, workspace and public realm provision, and transport upgrades. The indirect outcomes are the longer-term impacts of such a development, such as rent-hike induced displacement or increased public interests and visits. Indirect outcomes are thus not necessarily associated with procedural justice, and to mitigate negative indirect impacts, a form of extra-procedural distributive justice needs to be explored and employed.

3.4 | Description of resources

Capital	Upfront investment capacity; debt financing; eligibility to apply for public funding (eg grants);
Real Estate	Asset/ equity in the form of land ownership, development rights or real estate;
Information	Knowledge of plan content, development process and goals;
Access	Ability to engage in, shape and/or lead development process and proposal at all stages;
Expertise	Technical, planning, and contextual intelligence;
Time	Capacity to attend and participate in various stages of development process.

Qualitative measure of
resource provision:

Low

Intermediate

High

4. Status Quo as Unjust

Utilising our matrix, this section explores how the processes and outcomes of status quo regeneration are unjust. The actors involved have an unequal distribution of enabling-resources, concentrated primarily between Spurs and private real estate developers. Indirect outcomes will be explored later by drawing from London gentrification literature, where comparable cases have shown the prevalence of indirect displacement. Then, drawing from site evidence and case studies, we project what is most likely to occur in lieu of the status quo persisting.

The aggressive nature of Spurs' property acquisition indicates their desire to generate revenue from real estate to fund their stadium development, which includes building new flats on their larger land acquisitions such as the industrial estate north of White Hart Lane. As is the case in Elephant & Castle (E&C), the site adjacent to the walkway will be developed using private funds in the form of a long-term lease, outright sale, or by an open tender of development and management rights. Community involvement will prospectively be limited to public consultations and framed engagements, where alternatives are presented rather than cooperatively devised. Furthermore, the Council can exploit viability assessments to void planning gain agreements, again similar to what occurred in E&C.

	Private Developer	Haringey Council	Residents	Local Businesses
Capital	High	Medium	Low	Low
Real Estate	Medium	High	Low	Low
Information	High	Medium	Medium	Medium
Access	High	Medium	Low	Low
Expertise	High	Medium	Low	Low
Time	High	Medium	Low	Low

4.1 | Status quo resource matrix

Qualitative measure of resource provision:



4.1 Procedural Injustice

Following from the evaluation matrix outlined in Section 3, the status quo cases indicate a neoliberal scenario where resources are concentrated with the private sector, and development is facilitated by the real estate and market-oriented planning of the Council.

Constrained Council: leveraging real estate

Though the Council has political access through its planning abilities and land capital, it is financially constrained and lacks the time and expertise to enact its plans. Due to the market-oriented restriction of council resources through borrowing caps, prohibition of housing revenue reinvestment, and austerity-led funding cuts, councils have had to downsize their housing departments. The regeneration has been driven by Haringey Council's ability to leverage its real estate, as on our site with the Love Lane Estate, in attracting finance and employing the resources of the private sector.

Primacy of the private sector

Buoyed by the ever-rising housing values in London, private developers are increasingly proficient at converting capital to identikit development at 20% profit (Wainwright, 2014) and are actively seeking land with an effective rent gap to do so, reflected by Spurs' aggressive property policy. Unaccountable organisations – with a concentration of capital, expertise, and time – justify these interventions through a discourse of economic growth and technological viability.

Transparency & accountability

Due to the imbalance of resources, councils are limited in negotiations at extracting social benefits. For example, the E&C case suggests that opaque viability assessments can be used by private developers to void initial planning gains. On our site, the Haringey Council and GLA have already reduced the planning gains from the Spurs stadium development from £16 million to a meagre £0.45 million (Gibson, 2011).


The participation process also lacks an appropriate and accountable framework for appeal. Petitions, such as the one submitted by the TBG containing 4000+ signatures, are subject to be accepted by councillors, who have to date not formally recognised them (Percy, 2015).

Framing of public engagement


Citizens only have access in the form of consultations, which are strictly framed and are a more *reactive*, rather than *proactive*, exercise. Participants cannot propose their visions at these events, but instead can only respond to dimensions of the plan, further highlighting their restricted access to procedural information (Haringey, 2013; 2014b).

While these processes are used by developers to legitimise their project, they have also been widely criticised as a technical, check-box exercise (Our Tottenham, 2015b).

These consultation questions focus solely on whether existing residents would like mixed communities, incoming High Street offers, new jobs, and new homes – which few would reply no to. We observe the current procedure as an undemocratic and unaccountable one that, when compounded with the inequitable distribution of procedure-enabling resources, demonstrates the unjust nature of the regeneration process. The power to aspire lies with a market-oriented Council, which in turn utilises the private sector to facilitate this process under the guise techno-economic proficiency.



4.2 | Status quo timeline and stakeholder power relationships



4.2 Direct Outcomes

Focusing in and around the area of the planned walkway, we investigate the spatial outcomes of the plan (Haringey, 2014a) outlining three dimensions: public realm, housing, and local businesses. The market-driven approach to improve the housing stock, workspaces, retail offer, and public realm is likely to result in the form of an unaffordable housing stock, displaced local business, and public realm design. Conservatively, we estimate that the plan will go through as outlined without reduction in any other social provisions, assuming that viability assessments aren't further utilised.

*So [Councillors are] going to sit there and vote.
How can they vote on [the industrial estate]
and say “we can put more houses there”, when
they don’t know what they’re losing. They don’t
know what I’m producing.*

Owner of DW General Wood Machinists Ltd, 2014


The walkway, and its retail offer, prioritises the space towards the match-day experience with retail offer to match: less affordable and less oriented towards the specific needs of the everyday.

The plan aims to de-concentrate social housing in the area by replacing council flats and densifying in and around the station area. The planning provision is to replace and upgrade the existing – and recently refurbished – council


flats, while offering no net increase to the truly affordable housing stock in the area. As was reflected in the consultation process, deprived private tenants are entirely ignored. In this, public land is effectively being leveraged for private gain with little-to-no benefit to existing residents.

The plan also seeks to demolish the industrial estates on the site, as well as the Victorian parades along the High Street at the proposed site of the station to stadium walkway. This parade will eventually be replaced with an upgraded library, including a food and beverage offer, while the industrial estates are in-line to be replaced by “flexible” (ibid, p.70) workspaces oriented towards attracting a new knowledge economy (Haringey, 2014b).

4.3 | Employment planned change
(HRW Masterplan)




4.4 | Housing planned change
(HRW Masterplan)




* Derived from interviews with Councillor Strickland and Arup of the intention of utilising the 219 rebuilt council homes as part of new Affordable Housing provision, topped off with 141 Intermediate Housing (2011 London Plan, Policy 3.11)

4.5 | Possible land ownership
post-assembly



4.3 Indirect Outcomes

There are two critical dimensions to the indirect outcomes at our site. First, while the absolute numbers for council housing are protected, new affordable housing can be deemed unviable at any time. Second, private tenants – both housing and commercial – are left unprotected and threatened by displacement, particularly in London where rents are increasing at a rate faster than the average wage. As new housing is brought through infill, we encounter a case of “gentrification without displacement” (Keddie & Tonkiss, 2010). As it is in our case, the existing social housing stock is either preserved or replaced on site, while the area’s social tenure proportions are de-concentrated. This new housing stock intends to attract higher income groups, leading to “local patterns of micro-segregation without physical displacement” (ibid, p.66) thus problematising the urban mix logic the development is premised on. Such “new build gentrification” can also cause cognitive “displacement” (Davidson & Lees, 2010), where no physical displacement occurs but the character of the place undergoes a drastic change.








5. Intervention

5.1 | Status quo resources matrix

	Private Developer	Haringey Council	Residents	Local Businesses
Capital	High	Medium	Low	Low
Real Estate	High	Medium	Low	Low
Information	High	Medium	Low	Low
Access	High	Medium	Low	Low
Expertise	High	Medium	Low	Low
Time	High	Medium	Low	Low

Qualitative measure of resource provision:




Our intervention at this critical moment is twofold. First is the proposed matrix from Section 3, which can be utilised to evaluate justice in urban development processes. The other, and the focus of this section, is a programmatic *strategy* for a just development at the HRW site in response to the status quo. This strategy is composed of a set of mechanisms operating in tandem to achieve procedural and distributive justice.

The procedural mechanisms identified are responsive to the primary resource imbalances diagnosed in the status quo process: concentration of financial capital and expertise within the private sector, the financial and institutional restrictions on the Council and the lack of information and access for the TBG and local residents, which are the result of an alienation from the process.

To redress these, we have identified a set of four mechanisms:

- the Public Consultation Commissioner,
- the Community Land Trust,
- the Community Improvement District, and
- the Council as a Developer.

The distribution mechanisms respond to the indirect outcomes of development identified in the literature review in the Arsenal stadium case. The focus then is on ensuring the affordability of living, retail, and workspaces due to our site's lower income population and the context of growing unaffordability in London. As a result, we propose implementing: a post-development Land Value Capture Tax, and zonal Rent Controls.



5.2 | Intervention flow chart

5.1 Procedural Intervention

Public Consultation Commissioner


Accounts of the public consultation exercise by members of the TBG uncovered a perception that the process was lacking in transparency and accountability. This illustrates that information, time, and expertise have primarily been held by the Council and withheld from the local business owners. Evaluating whether or not the Council acted deceptively is beyond the scope of this analysis, however it emphasises the need for a mechanism in place that would ensure resources are adequately distributed and would provide the possibility to address potential imbalances.

As such, we propose an independent body created at the GLA level – a Public Consultation Commissioner (PCC) – that would overlook participation and consultation to ensure that the process unfolded in a way that appropriately considered the interests of those affected by development. Any development project above a certain threshold of public investment would have its public consultation process mediated by this body.

The responsibilities of the PCC would include overseeing the timeframe of the consultation process, and setting potential consultation dates in tandem with groups that wish to participate. The PCC would also guarantee that information is accessible, comprehensible, and distributed in a timely manner. The Council would be held responsible to prepare and submit information packages to be approved by the PCC in order to verify that it contained all relevant details, and that the information was expressed in understandable language. As such, the PCC would enable time, information and expertise by increasing the overall transparency of the process, with the end goal to bring all stakeholders in the development to the same level of understanding.

The PCC would also provide the possibility of appeal during the process of public consultation so that potential issues are resolved as they arise, while also guaranteeing a constant check on the unfolding process. The PCC would therefore serve to increase the Council's accountability.

5.3 | Public consultation commissioner resources matrix




Community Land Trust

5.4 | Community Land Trust resources matrix

	Private Developer	Haringey Council	Residents	Local Businesses
Capital				
Real Estate				
Information				
Access				
Expertise				
Time				

Qualitative measure of resource provision:



Our analysis has unveiled a discrepancy between what local residents in the area need, and what is being proposed in the Masterplan in terms of housing provision. Local residents have been unable to secure an adequate provision of affordable housing due the prioritisation of the private developer's interests. The implementation of a Community Land Trust (CLT) would strengthen commitment to the provision of affordable housing through a reconfiguration of land ownership, which would endow local residents with access, time, information, expertise and financial resources.

At the moment, the Council is the primary owner of the land adjacent to the stadium. We believe that this provides the opportunity for the formation of a CLT – “a non-profit, community-based organisation run by volunteers that develops housings, workspaces, community facilities or other assets that meet the needs of the community, are owned and controlled by the community and are made available at permanently affordable levels” (CLT, 2015). CLTs are recognised as corporate bodies according to the conditions laid out in the Housing and Regeneration Act of 2008 (ibid.).

Once the CLT is set up, land can either be gifted, sold, or leased to it by the Council. In all cases though, the development of the site is delegated to the Trust and can be realised through various forms of subcontracting. Precedents in London, such as the East London Community Plan, have involved the participation of the Council, the expertise of Housing Associations, and a Community-Oriented Developer in a multi-stakeholder scheme. This collaborative framework arguably favours the sharing of information and expertise in a way that is mutually beneficial for all parties involved. The CLT can further benefit from other forms of expertise through the support of the National Community Land Trust network, which has been involved in providing grant support for CLTs, advice lines for communities, technical advisors, financial and legal toolkits, as well as contact with other CLT volunteers across the country (ibid.).

The development that would ensue is one where the land and new build is owned and managed by the CLT, which would enable the implementation of affordability thresholds that are customised to local residents. The Trust could, for instance, enact rents that are proportionate to tenants' wages. Furthermore, because the site would be community-owned, if the CLT decided to sell off assets, then the profit realised could be reinvested within the boundaries of the CLT, and therefore appropriately captured.

Community Improvement District

The ability for the TBG to move towards a more proactive stance in the development of HRW would require the acquisition of access and expertise it is currently lacking. Here, the opportunity emerges for the business group to formulate an alternative vision for the development that could be formally implemented by the creation of a Community Improvement District (CID). The CID would encourage a business environment that preserves local businesses and retains affordable workspace.

The CID would arise from the existing TBG and be aimed towards promoting and fostering local businesses, as well as contributing to additional physical improvements in the area. The CID board would be composed of democratically elected representatives from local businesses and consumer organisations alike, ensuring that interests on both ends are adequately represented. Each member of the board would vote to determine the agenda of the CID. The structure of the CID would increase access to the development process, allowing the business group to enter into negotiations as a unified voice. Not only would communication be facilitated, but the value and authority of local expertise in setting goals for the area would also be strengthened.

The CID could raise capital through a levy imposed on each business, which would then be pooled and reinvested according to the priorities it set out. Additionally, the CID could access government funding through the Business Improvement District (BID) grant programmes included in the Mayor’s Economic Development Strategy (GLA, 2013a). Thus, the CID would also unlock new financial resources.

The organisational structure of the CID resembles a BID, which is a model that has been developed and encouraged elsewhere in London. However, unlike BIDs such as the one set up in Holborn, which seeks to attract global brands, the rationale behind the creation of a business organisation on our site would be to help preserve independent local businesses as well as affordable workspace (InMidTown, 2015). Instead, the CID could draw from precedents in Brixton, which shares a similar locally-oriented network of businesses and priorities.

5.5 | Community Improvement District resources matrix

Private Developer	Haringey Council	Residents	Local Businesses	
				Capital
				Real Estate
				Information
				Access
				Expertise
				Time

Qualitative measure of resource provision:



Council-owned Development Company (CDC)

5.6 | CDC resources matrix

	Private Developer	Haringey Council	Residents	Local Businesses
Capital		High		
Real Estate		High		
Information		High	Medium	
Access		High		
Expertise		High		
Time		Medium		

Qualitative measure of resource provision:

High
 Medium
 Low

Although politically empowered, the Council lacks financial capital and expertise, which has led to an overreliance on planning gains. There is potential to redress this imbalance through new and alternative business models such as a Council-owned Development Company (CDC), which would redistribute resources such that the Council could set and deliver its own development targets.

The CDC is premised on similar models that have been emerging in London, for instance in Croydon and in Barking and Dagenham, where both councils have set up development companies to directly address and meet the housing needs of their constituents. There is precedent within the Localism Act that allows for the emergence of such a model given the General Power of Competence, which enables councils to do anything that individuals of full legal capacity may do and gives them the authority to take action for the benefit of “its area of persons residents or present in its area” (LGA, 2011).

Through the CDC, the Council would gain access to the development process and could set its own target thresholds for volume, typology, and affordability. It would also increase access to various forms of expertise and information, as the Council will seek to employ or collaborate with professionals from a wide-array of disciplines to deliver housing.

Setting up a CDC would open up new financing opportunities and could increase revenue for the Council. The Council could employ debt finance, enter into joint ventures of development, or build directly – cross-subsidising affordable units by providing units for private rental. As such, the CDC would function like a private developer, while aiming for smaller profit margins to allow for the viability of more affordable schemes. Although we might be sceptical of the Council’s commitment to adequate affordability thresholds, they would arguably be more accountable to the residents than a private developer.

A possible process

In comparison with 4, the Status Quo, this section will explore what a plausible procedure might be after the implementation of our set of mechanisms, highlighting the tensions and negotiations arising between the different actors. We assume the deployment of our mechanisms will redistribute resources to enable a more just process and, subsequently, more just direct outcomes. We are optimistic with our case, though aware of the political challenges involved, especially in garnering real estate for the CLT whether a gift, or a free, long term lease from the Council.

Process: New negotiations

With the enablement of the resident groups through the long-term lease of the land, the CLT can negotiate with Spurs over the provision of the walkway. In this case, the Council is removed from the negotiation process and the demands of the local residents become priority. The primary concern of the CLT is to ensure the provision of socially rented homes, as defended during the protests, while also delivering the maximum number of affordable new homes. Though the CLT has no obligation to deliver the walkway, it can utilise its real estate to further leverage financial capital from Spurs to either to subsidise affordable housing, or to directly finance the walkway. Spurs would be obligated to enter negotiations due to their desire for said walkway.

In principle, the CID would similarly support a new public space that plans to increase the number of business and shops, which would potentially join their organisation. However, it would also be concerned with incoming competition and the resulting non-affordability of these spaces. In this, the TBG advocates for the protection of the two parades of local businesses at the walkway site. The parades are a potential site of tension between the local residents and businesses because it could be utilised by the residents to extract more funding for affordable housing. However, in addition to the residents' attachment to local businesses, the CLT could conceivably delegate the management and maintenance of the public realm to the CID. If these tensions are left unresolved, the CID could potentially appeal to the PCC.

Next, the Council retains its role as planning authority, now further enabled by the CDC's provision of financial and technical expertise. The Council still holds eminent domain to intervene regarding the demolition of either the parades or the Council blocks. The CLT is similarly dependent on the technical and financial resources of the CDC to deliver such development, as the CDC is more accountable and less attuned towards profit than the private sector.

Direct outcomes: New compromises

The outcomes we arrive at are the compromises that arise from these negotiations, and are based on currently articulated visions on the site. The first is a modification of an option that was presented at the formal consultation process (Haringey, 2013), which preserved two of the Love Lane Estate's tower blocks. The second is one articulated by TBG to integrate the walkway and preserve the two Victorian parades (Percy, 2015).

In negotiating with Spurs and the CID, the CLT works towards a combination of the above visions where the walkway would be modified to only demolish the southernmost tower block, while preserving the shop parades on the high street. Infill development will be planned around the two other blocks to allow a restructured street pattern.


In this case, the CLT has the potential to ensure and preserve housing affordability by extracting financial gain from the retail spaces and negotiations with Spurs. This however, would call for a narrower walkway on either side of the parade, while still being wide enough for game day pedestrian flow and everyday accessibility. It also reduces the visibility of the stadium from the station, and provides less space for the "up-market" businesses as envisioned by Spurs and the Council.

In regard to the walkway's southern side, the CLT would protect the maisonette council blocks by densifying around the station while designating the new library as the focal point of the square.

With the provision of affordable housing – both by preserving current housing blocks and the infill housing managed by the CLT – and affordable retail spaces, the outcomes are more convergent with the needs of the current population. The inclusion of the improved public realm, in the form of a walkway, suggests a process capable of compromise in adapting to the new spatial requirements of a larger stadium. With the resources redistributed, the process is a more just one because it provides the local businesses, residents and, to an extent, the Council, the opportunity to participate proactively in the politics of the space and the processes of spatial production.

5.7 | Intervention aggregate resources matrix





5.8 | Spatialising the compromise

Charts indicate usage and building heights, and grey areas highlight the remaining built form from the current fabric.

5.9 | Possible land tenure



- Haringey Council-Housing Estate owned and managed
- CLT-Leased from Council
- Local business (freehold or leasehold)
- Spurs owned and managed

5.10 | Possible CID area




- Businesses likely to be invested in CID
- Public realm to be managed and maintained by the CID

5.11 | Mixed use



- Housing
- Food & Beverage
- Retail
- Live-work
- Community Facility
- Leisure



5.12 | Possible timeline from the procedural mechanisms and stakeholder power relationships

- Key stakeholder
- Intervening actor
- Statutory document
- Key event
- ↔ Negotiates
- Imposes
- Consults
- Appeals

5.2 Distributional Intervention

The following mechanisms intend to mitigate the indirect outcomes of urban development that, independent of procedure, tend to increase land values, gentrify without displacement, or indirectly displace precarious tenants. As with any infrastructure investment, regeneration efforts eventually result in an increase of private property value in and around the developed area (CLG, 2010; Batholemew & Ewing, 2011). The premise of the mitigation is to ensure the affordability of homes, work and retail spaces – both existing and new – in lieu of post-development land value increases. Due to the centralised British governance structure, this dimension is oriented towards national-scale policy shifts, complementing the local scale mechanisms of the procedural intervention.

To remit these two dimensions of indirect outcomes (i.e. de-concentration and increased precarity of unprotected private tenants) we propose that affordable units are made viable through a land value capture mechanism and local rent controls.

Land Value Capture for affordable housing

Our site specifically indicates a Council-driven regeneration effort with incidences of public subsidy, real estate, and eminent domain. Land Value Capture can then be deployed to attain a proportion of private property value increases due to public investment in the area, which can be redistributed in the form of public infrastructure and housing subsidies. Traditionally, land value capture mechanisms are utilised by transport agencies to subsidise the development of transport infrastructure by capturing value and rent increases within the transport corridor. We propose adapting such a mechanism towards publicly driven regeneration efforts, especially due to the extent of public facilitation, capital, and real estate on our site.

This mechanism can be attuned to the already existing scheme of Growth, Housing or Enterprise zones (GLA, 2014; CLG, 2011). Within a timeframe, the GLA could endow councils, or local land-owning trusts, specific taxation rights in the condition of reinvestment on site. The system would improve upon, and complement, the Community Infrastructure Levy; instead of a calculated, one-time charge, the tax would incrementally capture profit from, and due to, the development. This regeneration zone will cover an area larger than that of the development area (taxing zones for transit are in a 2km corridor) and taxes will be levied on any property sale or rental hike above a certain base level that is calculated by the market rate at the time of the planning application submission (Smith & Ghiring, 2006). Taxes can be calculated on a per property basis, though average proportion of increase can be used to calculate a blanket tax factor. However, a further tax on landowners is particularly difficult in the UK political context as is devolving taxation rights in lieu of centralisation. Although the mechanism is politically difficult, it is not without precedent, as it has not been tried in a non-transit context.

Rent controls

Similarly, the regeneration zone should accommodate rent controls to reduce the risk of indirect displacement. Because volume of housing supply is ensured by the new development, affordable provision remains the biggest challenge. Moving beyond traditional rent controls, “2nd generation” rent controls are more dynamic and can be cost-based, which encourages upkeep. Tenure security should also be similar to other countries where “restrictions on in-tenancy rent rises are common, and... security of tenure is indefinite” (Bentley, 2015, p.34). However, the cost-based rent increase model can lead to processes of renovation-led evictions, thus rent controls would be better adapted to the median wage rate of the zone, and/or the “already calculated Local Housing Allowance” (Foster, 2014).

6. Conclusion

From its outset, this project explicitly envisioned a Tottenham not dominated, and identified, by the Spurs. However, in our research we discovered a site, planned for regeneration, which embodies the tensions between conflicting visions of what Tottenham should, and will, look like. Though, what has truly been critical about the project is not the tentative spatial reconfiguration of the area, but rather the unilateral and unjust processes and negotiations that have commanded it. Thus, our objective has been to ameliorate this most salient feature of the redevelopment along with the effects it will likely have in Tottenham.

To do so we first disinterred the underlying problematic of these procedures, namely the asymmetrical arrangement of resources that each stakeholder has at their disposal. Because these resources have played a quintessential role in enabling different actors to aspire and realise, it became paramount to address and rectify these inequalities in our intervention. By employing a set of progressive mechanisms, informed by our evaluative matrix, each resource-divide was individually confronted such that, as whole, a more just process could be enacted.

However, while our proposed mechanisms are intended to mitigate site-specific issues, our evaluative matrix can be applied to any number of cases to reveal resource-gaps, which can guide the direction of other intercessions – a particularly unique aspect within our own multi-faceted intervention. With the intention to bring about more just redevelopment processes and outcomes, the tandem combination of mechanisms can help moderate the spuriousness of market-led regeneration.

Situated in, and responding to, the present political discourse, we advocate for a shift away from the market-hegemony where the concentration of resources are held in the private sector. Aware of our own limitations, this project asks ‘What if regeneration were just?’. We propose the kind of structural changes that must occur to get us there and how that might spatialise.

Our work emphasises the fact that the dichotomy between the global and the local of the neoliberal political project, especially within the urban context, are not diametrically opposed to one another. In Tottenham, these seemingly contradictory notions can be accommodated for through a just intervention. With justice as the focus of urban politics, we can avoid the catastrophes of the status quo.

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