



# **Towards a Global Deal on Climate Change**


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**Singapore, April 2008**

# **Part One**

## Risks and Targets

# Projected impacts of climate change



# **‘Probabilities’ (in %) of exceeding a temperature increase at equilibrium**

## **Stabilisation level**

<b>(in ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e)</b>	<b>2°C</b>	<b>3°C</b>	<b>4°C</b>	<b>5°C</b>	<b>6°C</b>	<b>7°C</b>
450	78	18	3	1	0	0
500	96	44	11	3	1	0
550	99	69	24	7	2	1
650	100	94	58	24	9	4
750	100	99	82	47	22	9

Source: Hadley Centre: From Murphy et al. 2004

- Monte Carlo estimates from Hadley Centre
- Model ‘fairly cautious’
- Those who argue e.g. for stabilisation levels of 650ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e and above are accepting very big risks of a transformation of the planet
- Figures similar to IPCC AR4 (no probabilities in TAR)

# Structure of argument on mitigation objectives (I)

- Risk of going above 5°C increase are very severe: e.g. would induce massive movements of population
- On basis of implied probabilities of temperature increase, dangerous to go beyond 550ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e
- Stabilisation to 550 or 500ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e 'buys' sharp reduction in probabilities of dangerous temperature increases relative to BAU
- Cuts of 30-50% by 2050 required for target of stabilisation range 550- 500ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e
- Cost of action to get in range looks acceptable relative to reduction of risks and damages avoided


# Structure of argument on mitigation objectives (II)

- Whilst considerations of risk steer quantity targets (i.e. cuts), efficiency requires use of market mechanism to keep down costs
- These cuts would need a carbon price of \$30 plus per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>e; thus we have a “take” on marginal abatement costs
- This is in range of marginal social cost (MSC), for paths associated with 500-550ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e but MSC is very sensitive to ethical and structural assumptions
- Equity demands that rich countries take much bigger targets for cuts than poor. Trading can then provide flow of finance to developing countries

## **Part Two**

Flows, Costs and Stern Review  
One Year On

# Delaying mitigation is dangerous and costly



Source: Stern Review



# Cost estimates

- Review examined results from bottom-up (Ch 9) & top-down (Ch 10) studies: concluded that world could stabilise below 550ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e for around 1% of global GDP
- Subsequent analyses Edenhofer/IPCC top-down have indicated lower figures
- So too have bottom-up IEA and McKinsey
- Starting planning now with clear targets and good policies allows measured action and keeps costs down. Delayed decisions/actions (or “slow ramp”), lack of clarity, bad policy will increase costs
- Associated co-benefits (energy security, reduced pollution) and opportunities (innovations, new markets)

# Reflections on damages in Stern


## Review analysis after one year

- Emphasis on risk avoidance rather than formal modelling well-founded
- Modelling without making risk central misses the point – both ethics and risk crucial
- Probably under-estimated emission growth (growth of emissions from China and India particularly)
- Probably under-estimated risks of high-temperatures (omitted features in climate science modelling) and damages from high temperatures (implausible 'overly linear' extrapolations)
- Thus magnitude of avoided damages under-estimated<sub>10</sub>

# **Part Three**

## Emissions and Technologies

# Reducing emissions requires action across many sectors



# Where energy emissions are headed


- Garnaut. Emissions will greatly exceed the highest of the SRES scenarios if current trends continue
- IEA. Reference scenario: energy emissions increase by 57% between 2005 and 2030
  - Coal now bigger source than oil
  - China and India account for more than half of increase
  - China's emissions 2-3 times as high as India's; both more than double by 2030
- Country 'responsibility' a difficult concept – consumers round the world demand products

# Oil/coal running out?

- Years of production left in ground with proven reserves and current consumption leaves
  - Oil : 45 years
  - Gas : 72 years
  - Coal : 252 years
- These reserves are enough to take GHG concentrations to very dangerous levels: e.g. if used all the coal it might add around 400ppm to concentrations
- Have to find alternatives this century in any case – better to do it sooner rather than later

# Many options: policy matters and prices crucial

2030



Source: McKinsey


# Trade/tax/standards

- Trade/quotas give greater quantity certainty and incentives to bring in developing countries; ambition, transparency, credibility are key
- Tax may be simpler for some countries and/or sectors
- Tax or trade: identify single policy instrument for sector
- With appropriate periodic revisions (and auctioning) tax and trade can be fairly similar
- Regulation may accelerate change and lower costs by reducing uncertainty and achieving economies of scale
- But complications of interactions e.g. renewables targets and size of carbon market



# Public-private partnerships for technology

## Public energy R&D investments as a share of GDP



# **Part Four**

## **A Global Deal**

# Basic Criteria for a Global Deal

- Effectiveness: the scale must be commensurate with the challenge
- Efficiency: we must keep down the costs of emissions reduction
- Equity: the rich countries must take the lead

# Commitments: percentages

- G8 Heiligendamm – 50% by 2050 (consistent with stabilisation around 500ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e)
- California (and US under e.g. Obama/Clinton) - 80% from 1990 levels by 2050
- France – 75% by 2050 (Factor 4), relative to 1990
- EU Spring Council: 60-80% by 2050 and 20-30% by 2020, relative to 1990
- Germany – 40% by 2020, relative to 1990

# Target: stocks, history, flows

- Current 40-45 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e p.a. Current stocks around 430ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e; pre-industrial stocks 280ppm
- The United States and the EU countries combined accounted for over half of cumulative global emissions from 1900 to 2005
- 50% reduction by 2050 requires per capita global GHG emissions of 2-3T/capita (20-25 Gt divided by 9 billion population)
- Currently US ~ 20+, Europe ~10+, China ~5+, India ~2+ T/capita
- Thus 80% reductions would bring Europe, but not US, down to world average. Many developing countries would have to cut strongly too if world average of 2-3 T/capita is to be achieved
- Requires close to zero carbon electricity and surface transport

# The GHG ‘reservoir’

- Long-term stabilisation at 550ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e implies that only a further 120ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e can be ‘allocated’ for emission, given that we start at 430ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e (or further 70ppm if targeting 500ppm)
- Can view the issue as the use of a “collective reservoir” of 270ppm (i.e. 550 minus the 280ppm of 1850) over 200 years. Over half of reservoir already used mainly by rich countries. Or could “start the clock” at  $X_T$ , the stock when problem was first recognised at T (e.g. around 20 years ago)
- Equity requires a discussion of the appropriate use of this reservoir given past history
- Thus convergence of flows does not fully capture the equity story, from emissions perspective
- Equity issues arise also in adaptation, given responsibilities for past increases

# Key elements of a global deal / framework (I)

## *Targets and Trade*

- Confirm Heiligendamm **50%** cuts in world emissions by 2050 with rich country cuts at least **80%**
- Rich country reductions and trading schemes designed to be **open to trade with other countries**, including developing countries
- **Supply side from developing countries** simplified to allow much bigger markets for emissions reductions: 'carbon flows' to rise to \$50-\$100bn p.a. by 2030. Role of sectoral or technological benchmarking in 'one-sided' trading to give reformed and much bigger CDM market

# Key elements of a global deal / framework (II)

## *Funding Issues*

- Strong initiatives, with public funding, on **deforestation** to prepare for inclusion in trading. For \$10-15 bn p.a. could have a programme which might halve deforestation. Importance of global action and involvement of IFIs
- Demonstration and sharing of **technologies**: e.g. \$5 bn p.a. commitment to feed-in tariffs for CCS coal would lead to 30+ new commercial size plants in the next 7-8 years
- Rich countries to deliver on Monterrey and Gleneagles commitments on **ODA** in context of extra costs of development arising from climate change: potential extra cost of development with climate change upwards of \$80bn p.a.



# Nature of deal / framework

- Combination of the above can, with appropriate market institutions, help overcome the inequities of climate change and provide **incentives for developing countries to play strong role** in global deal, eventually **taking on their own targets**.
- Within such a framework **each country can advance** with some understanding of global picture.
- Individual country action **must not be delayed** (as e.g. WTO) until full deal is in place.
- Main enforcement mechanism, country-by-country, is **domestic pressure**.
- If we argue that, “it is all too difficult” and the world lets stocks of GHGs rise to 650, 700 ppm or more must be **clear and transparent** about the great magnitude of these risks