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Cultivating Institutions: Regulating Cannabis Production in a Weak State

Cannabis production provides a weak state with employment opportunities and a needed source of revenue. Yet on-going commitment to a top-down, security-led approach results in the utilisation of crop eradication strategies that are costly, ineffective, and can result in unintended effects that place pressure on limited budgets and over-stretched justice systems. Local law-enforcers are often already embedded in drug producing communities, which makes it difficult to dismantle entrenched protection economies. Field research undertaken with cannabis farmers in Sierra Leone reveals, however, that it is possible to identify local actors who are skilled at working with the informal “rules of the game” responsible for governing cannabis production from the bottom-up. Community policing boards are examined as part of a case study to consider how a weak state may formulate more useful drug control policies that transition from the costs of prohibition to capturing the benefits of regulation.

The limitations of securitising cannabis production

Cannabis production is often associated with the violent modes of accumulation involved in producing narcotics such as heroin in contexts characterised by conflict and non-governance. It is common for cannabis production to be viewed as organised according to a “Mafia” model of crime, so that West African states may come to foster the cartel violence of Latin America. The logic is that cannabis markets are characterised by low entry barriers which increase competition between participants and drive down profitability. In response, small and collusive organisations based on loyalty, obligation, and trust emerge and try to monopolise the market by levying credible threats of violence against competitors and by co-opting state officials to prevent interference from law-enforcers. It is typical that violent enforcement and organisational hierarchy are treated as complements, motivating a security-led approach that focuses on ameliorating the perceived damaging effects of cannabis production, and in so doing claims they should primarily be dealt with by force.

Counter-narcotics policy often begins with this logic to argue that cannabis production contributes to the criminalisation of states by corrupting bureaucratic officials, in addition motivating the onset and continuation of violent conflict. This view is emotionally charged in Sierra Leone, where the consumption of narcotics is associated with the brutal violence exhibited by the anti-government Revolutionary United Front during the country’s descent into civil conflict in the 1990s. Despite analyses of cannabis markets in Western Europe, North America (Curtis 1998, 1250; Curtis and Wendel 2000, 141–144; Reuter 2009, 376), and more recently in sub-Saharan Africa (Laudati 2014), concluding they do not share the violent characteristics of other narcotics, it is typical for counter-narcotics policy to emphasise connections perceived between drug production, organised violence, and weak states. This is despite the paucity in available evidence to support such claims.

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Since West Africa was identified as a transit hub for cocaine and heroin during the early 2000s, a security-led approach has taken-off. Often, however, law-enforcers bypass the intended targets of this strategy and, in practice, focus on eradicating cannabis production. This is because they have struggled to intercept and dismantle clandestine trafficking networks that are financially-stronger and more innovative than the expertise and institutions available to detect, intercept, and dismantle them. As the former executive Director of UNODC stated in 2008:

“ Drug planes don’t have to fly below the radar, because in most cases there is no radar (or electricity). Soldiers sometimes help smugglers by closing airports and unloading the cargo. Police cars run out of gas when giving chase or are left in the dust by smugglers’ all-terrain vehicles [...] Traffickers are seldom brought to trial; in some cases, there are no prisons to put them in. ”

Antonio Maria Costa (2008), Washington Post.

Prison guards in Sierra Leone's capital of Freetown reported, for example, that few inmates were charged with drug-related offences. Drug offenders were instead dealt with at local police stations, often paying a small bribe to secure release. When cases passed formally through the courts, magistrates decriminalised cannabis production, sale, and possession by reverting to lenient provisions under the Pharmacy and Drugs Act 2001. This was principally because the more recent National Drugs Control Act 2008 replicated laws that were originally designed for Europe and North America. These shorter-term, more reactive responses prevent bottlenecks in the courts and the overcrowding of prisons, but at the same time advertise high-profile cases of crop eradication in order to secure continued external support.

Cannabis production is more visible than amphetamine, cocaine or heroin trafficking. It is an easier target for conducting a successful counter-narcotics campaign. According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports, 12.4 per cent of the adult population in West and Central Africa consumes cannabis herb, compared to 3.9 per cent globally (WACD 2015: 40). Rather than playing catch-up with the drug traffickers, governments in weak states have a vested interest to present cannabis production as a security threat of equal measure. Furthermore, a paucity of reliable data regarding the production, trafficking, and consumption of narcotics in West Africa allows for a particular story to be told within media and policy discussions regarding the nature and scope of this drug threat. By maintaining the narrative that cannabis production is a threat to security, weak states have been able to access financing and expertise provided by a host of global drug authorities and donor agencies.

Eradication policies can reconfigure the incentives of farmers and dealers, leading to the organisation of more violent arrangements that operate against already weak states.

Cannabis production does not, however, operate through the same social networks or according to the same criminal norms as transnational traffickers. Crop eradication as a one-size-fits-all strategy targets the communities the government is responsible for protecting. It also undermines the employment and financial opportunities provided by an activity that, at least in Sierra Leone, has been regarded by communities producing the crop as a legitimate commercial enterprise since the 1940s (Akyeampong 2005). An eradication approach is also not cost effective, because it is not joined-up with underlying development issues, and because it works against law-enforcers already embedded within local protection economies that benefit from production in a variety of economic and social ways. Furthermore, eradication policies can reconfigure the incentives of farmers and dealers, leading to the organisation of more violent arrangements that operate against already weak states.



Resilience of Local Protection Economies

The legal and moral distinctions cannabis producers and the police draw between law-enforcers and law-breakers in their everyday encounters are usually not as clean-cut as framed by the rule of law. Cannabis farmers in Sierra Leone lived in the same communities as police officers who, even if not already a family member, would financially sponsor farming activities. Local police officers explained this was the case because cannabis farming provided youth with stable employment, preventing more costly forms of criminality such as theft.

Local police and farmers engaged in a mutually beneficial practice they referred to in Sierra Leone's lingua franca of Krio as "*haju*". To *haju* meant "giving a little something for something in return". This "something" amounted to periodic cash-payments for forest guards and Local Unit Commanders (LUCs) of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP).

These payments permitted the release of offenders. They also prevented details concerning the locations and owners of larger and more-profitable farms being passed onto senior law-enforcement officials based in the capital who were responsible for co-ordinating cannabis eradication operations through a separate, United Nations (UN) backed agency.

Protection economies prove especially costly and time-consuming to dismantle for law-enforcers working outside of cannabis producing communities. For example, the UN introduced a Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU) to Sierra Leone in 2010. The TOCU was created as part of a multi-agency strategy known as the "West Africa Coast Initiative" to tackle organised crime and trafficking. The agency is responsible for gathering intelligence and co-ordinating law-enforcement operations – including cannabis crop eradication – with local counterparts in the SLP. The UN approach suggests that because new officers undergo a selective recruitment process and enhanced training to

ensure they act impartially and are subject to institutional monitoring, counter-narcotics operations will be more effective. The TOCU has led numerous crop eradication operations since 2010. Yet none of these operations targeted Sierra Leone's largest, most-established, and most profitable farms. This discrepancy arises precisely because top-down agencies rely on local officers whose incentives are aligned to the needs of the community, rather than with the interests of the state. Consequently, eradication efforts have proven to be selective, with those farmers who did not pay periodic bribes of *haju* being most frequently targeted.

The TOCU has led numerous crop eradication operations since 2010. Yet none of these operations targeted Sierra Leone's largest, most-established, and most profitable farms.

Such approaches work against protection economies. Law-enforcers cannot be "neutral" actors if they are embedded in drug producing communities that require them to suspend the rule of law in their everyday social encounters. This results in diluting risks to producers. And yet a security approach is committed to because of the conventional wisdom that when the producers of drugs are exposed to greater risks they respond by increasing costs to consumers. Costlier retail drugs price-out consumers, reducing demand (Reuter and Kleiman 1986). For example, by 2012, the TOCU's cannabis seizures had increased to 2,812 kilograms. Government officials pointed to these statistics as evidence for the effectiveness of crop eradication, namely because it fits the logic of a risks and prices model: seizures indicate a contraction in production and resulting increase in price with a demand-reducing effect. Taken in isolation from the selective nature of eradication operations, such statistics imply an effective policy outcome. Over the same period, however, survey data gathered during field research suggested that the average price for one kilogram of cannabis sold at the farm gate remained stable at Le170,000 (USD42.6). Local protection economies had severed the relationship between risks, prices, and demand reduction. Such evidence demonstrates that, in a context of limited state capacity, cannabis producers are not subject to the same risks and payoffs as their counter-parts in stronger states.

Research also revealed that land-owners responded to the threat of top-down eradication efforts by increasing bribe payments to broker closer-knit relations with LUCs. This allowed farmers to gain forewarning of operations and prevented information being passed to TOCU officers. As a result, more isolated and small-scale clusters of producers began to centralize around more established farmers who had long-standing relationships with local law-enforcers. The resulting institutional structure, what sociologists describe as a “hub-and-spoke” network, was suited to maintaining a hierarchy among producers, while allowing for the efficient communication of information between law-enforcers and law-breakers. In short, the good intentions of policy-makers toward demand reduction were undermined because they privileged the reality of a model over the reality of local context.



From pathology to economic opportunity

Side-lined from security-focused policies is the potential for a joined-up approach that considers the relationship between changing economic conditions and agricultural policies, on the one hand, and the growth of cannabis production on the other. Cannabis production in Sierra Leone expanded under economic and political conditions similar to those that characterise other weak states with dominant agricultural sectors. During the 1980s, President Siaka Stevens' one-party state subsidised agricultural imports and, through the patronage network of a "shadow state", allowed patrimonial authorities to concentrate their control over access to land. Rural-to-urban migration resulted, reallocating the country's youthful labour from agriculture production in the rural provinces to a burgeoning informal economy in the capital. Subsidised food imports and the disruption of violent conflict in the 1990s undermined domestic agricultural production and created a susceptibility to fluctuations in global commodity prices. These historic factors have undermined the effectiveness of policies intended to stimulate the production of *legal* agricultural goods, pushing agriculturalists into the production of *illegal* agricultural goods. As the incentives for small-scale producers to engage in legal production diminished, agricultural activity was pushed outside formal channels of exchange and into the unregulated economy.

Cannabis production can therefore be understood primarily as a by-product of deficient agricultural and economic policy, indicative of a "mercenary strategy" reverted to amid diminishing returns when producing legitimate "cash crops" (Reuter and Kleiman 1986). Research revealed that the displacement of Jamaican farmers amid the War on Drugs in the 1980s also had the unintended effect of introducing a new, higher-yielding variety of cannabis: cannabis *sativa*. During field research in Sierra Leone's

historically most well-established clusters of cannabis production (see Akyeampong 2005), cultivators noted that:

“The Jamaicans brought this straight to the country [...] *Ganja* was in Sierra Leone, but they brought a different kind of production, because we used to grow it [*cannabis indica*] the local way. Things had established then, unlike before.”

Cheap agricultural imports undermined the economic viability of local agricultural production and, much like in Sierra Leone, resulted in the growing production of *cannabis sativa* as a “compensation crop”.

Cannabis production in Jamaica represented one of President Nixon’s first targets in the US-led War on Drugs. Multilateral lenders imposed a programme of economic structural adjustment on Jamaica in the early 1980s that significantly increased unemployment, particularly among youth. Cheap agricultural imports undermined the economic viability of local agricultural production and, much like in Sierra Leone, resulted in the growing production of *cannabis sativa* as a “compensation crop”. Former Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga acknowledged that cannabis farming was:

“The only healthy segment of the Jamaican economy. The USD 1.1 billion business had been the economic lifeline of Jamaica for years, especially after traditional segments of the economy failed.”

Like other weak states, Jamaica’s dependence on external borrowing amounted to a considerable debt burden. Access to concessional budgetary support was conditional upon the then-ruling People’s National Party (PNP) implementing Nixon’s flagship US-funded “Cannabis Eradication

Programme". Following implementation, the US State Department recorded a spike in arrests from 2,272 in 1985 down to 341 in 1986, with crop yields declining from 1,755 Mt in 1986 to 460 Mt in 1987 as the eradication programme took effect (INCSR 1996). Crop eradication had the effect of displacing production. In the context of rising unemployment and the loss of alternative livelihoods, many Jamaican farmers skilled in utilising higher-yielding seed varieties and who acted as gatekeepers to international markets decided to migrate elsewhere, including to reside with Sierra Leone's small-scale farmers. The War on Drugs had inadvertently created the conditions for the rapid growth of cannabis production in Sierra Leone.

Facing limited livelihood prospects in the rural provinces, many young men in Sierra Leone migrate to Western Area, taking up jobs as hawkers, street vendors and taxi drivers, among other informal employment opportunities. By contrast, cannabis production is an illegal livelihood, but has the comparative advantage of providing those who lack economic capital with the opportunity to obtain a relatively sustainable income and to attain the longer-term security of land ownership. Cannabis represented the main source of income for 55 farmers interviewed in 2013. At least 67 per cent of farmers claimed they previously undertook other income-generating activities, including artisanal diamond and gold mining, carpentry, vehicle repair and street vending.

There were clear economic reasons for undertaking cannabis production. The average net profit across all farmers surveyed was Le2.64 million (USD 644) per year, or Le9,962 (USD 1.8) per day based on 265 working days. This is in addition to land owners providing daily meals, access to land (usually for a token payment of one bundle of cannabis) and, eventually, the opportunity to be recognised by cannabis dealers in more profitable parts of the value chain as a skilled (and richer) farmer. All but three farmers had switched from inter-cropping arrangements, typical of the 1980s and 1990s, to mono-cropping cannabis.

Cannabis represented the main source of income for 55 farmers interviewed in 2013.

These benefits resulted from the displacement of cannabis *indica* following arrival of the *sativa* variety. *Sativa*'s agronomy is adaptable and resilient, allowing it to grow in rockier and thinner soils. Farmers typically required 3 to 4 months from planting to harvest, approximating yields estimated by the UNODC (2009: 93) for a well-tended, outdoor farm with no irrigation based in the United States.¹ This is despite the assumption that cannabis production in sub-Saharan Africa relies on rudimentary farming techniques, and because the *indica* variety require 5 to 6 months until harvest and results in lower yield efficiencies (UNODC 2010: 191-3).

Because local protection economies are resilient and production is organised through informal institutions, centralised governments are seldom the locus of regulatory authority in a weak state.



¹ Based on an average farm size of 60.75m², a combined 26.2 kilogram of cannabis herb was produced during the dry and rainy season in 2013.

The complexity and strength of informal institutions

For a weak state to capture these economic benefits of cannabis production by formulating policies that regulate rather than prohibit, it is important to grasp the market conditions and identify the social institutions according to which production is organised. For instance, many youth beginning to farm cannabis in Sierra Leone relied on credit from more established cultivators in order to sell their product in instalments. Such illiquid markets are an indicator of weak effective demand. Probing further, research revealed this characteristic arose only with domestic sales; with the cannabis market possessing a two-tiered structure. Established farmers who owned land and rented plots to young start-ups sold to higher value cross-border buyers in bulk. By conducting qualitative research alongside established farmers, it became clear they taught youth how to cultivate cannabis in a process of “learning by doing”. This learning process granted youth knowledge of what was treated by others as a valuable craft. This relationship had a history and production was organised through adaptations to a system of apprenticeship that was likely introduced in Sierra Leone during the late 19th century by Abolitionists such as William Wilberforce. While the apprenticeship system trained returnee slaves to undertake a range of craft practices, it also acted as a means of social control.

The apprenticeship institution’s durability was evident in one young farmer’s explanation that:

“Those that first started inside the business [ie, farming cannabis] are called the ‘shareholders’. We are the small boys, and we have our ‘head’ that we call an ‘overseer’. We must

live like them and help them. My boss has over 15 small boys working for him. So I have lived like him and started to develop my own farm with his help.” ”

Another cannabis farmer who rented land from an established cultivator suggested, furthermore, that:

“ “In the bush we have leaders. When you first meet them they control you. If they see you want to work there then you can clear the bush in that place. No one will interfere with you there.” ”

By replicating the Abolitionists trade-off between economic opportunity and a desire for social control, the institution of apprenticeship has organised cannabis production without taking recourse to the “Mafia model” implied in a security-led approach.

Because local protection economies are resilient and production is organised through informal institutions, centralised governments are seldom the locus of regulatory authority in a weak state. To formulate useful entry points for transitioning from prohibition to regulation, authority should instead be treated as hybrid. A weak state comprises a range of actors, from town chiefs, police forces, women’s associations, secret societies, and “Big Men” that partake in governance rather than government. The loci of governance in Sierra Leone’s cannabis economy are Local Policing Partnership Boards (LPPB). LPPBs were the product of reforms implemented in the 1990s to develop a community-based approach to police work that allowed for the inclusion of local stake-holders. This was especially necessary in a context where the state had historically not exerted its authority in

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every community. LPPBs therefore incorporated a variety of local stakeholders that participated in investigating and resolving conflicts between the police and local communities.

LPPBs were well-placed to interpret and re-shape the “rules of the game” that governed drug production in Sierra Leone. As Peter Albrecht (2015: 618) remarks in a study of LPPBs in Sierra Leone, a successful policing strategy depends on the ability of law-enforcers to “work with and through actors who draw their authority from both state-sanctioned and ‘extremely localised’ sources of authority”. This observation is especially pertinent in the case of cannabis production, because police officers are already embedded in and able to navigate the complexities of protection economies, land tenure, social networks of exchange, and multiple sources of authority that have allowed illicit economies in weak states to operate viably, but fall outside the regulatory framework of the state. When a weak state works with the existing rules of the game; what social scientists refer to as informal institutions, they can regulate rather than prohibit cannabis production. In doing so, the financial costs and unintended effects of imposing top-down prohibition can be transformed into a bottom-up regulatory strategy that supports development-focused demand-reduction policies.

Working with the rules of the game is especially important in weak states where production is tied into issues of land ownership. Land tenure in Sierra Leone is governed by a dual system. Western Area, for example, comprises a combination of state and privately-owned land, and operates under the colonial legacy of English freehold tenure. Land in the rural provinces is governed by communal tenure arrangements. Land tenure is further complicated by additional, informal tenure arrangements introduced by those who claim rights of first-ownership in what is usually referred to as “government land”. Where descendants or private-owners are not available, farmers claim rights to first ownership endorsed verbally by the local town chief. These contracts are not written down and

recorded, and so are difficult for bureaucrats unfamiliar with the community to monitor effectively. Despite their complexity, tenure arrangements in Western Area have encouraged individual land ownership. The resulting allocated sizes of farming plots through the rent, pledge, and lease of land to youth do not differ greatly.

Communal tenure arrangements, by contrast, result in those individuals with the greatest power and influence – usually due to existing family connections – claiming ownership of the largest tracts of land. This results in strengthening tied labour arrangements that have historically exploited youth in weak states. For example, academic research has concluded that these same customary institutions generated grievances among youth who participated in a civil uprising that later degenerated into formation of the anti-government Revolutionary United Front during a decade-long violent conflict from 1991 to 2001. Supporting informal institutions may inadvertently reproduce the Mafia model by strengthening the incentives for more powerful actors to (violently) defend their ownership claims if they are threatened by the state. It is therefore important to utilise local actors already familiar with informal institutions, so as to avoid working with those that may have costly and harmful consequences.

Regulations are only effective if they are properly monitored and enforced. When transitioning away from prohibition, a weak state should ensure that cannabis production and exchange does not leak out into unregulated social networks engaged in more costly and damaging criminal activities. This shift in policy direction is particularly challenging for a weak state because limited government budgets and bureaucratic capacity mean they cannot afford to cope with additional regulatory burdens.

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Cannabis Social Clubs

Identifying local actors, such as LPPBs, who comprise actors already embedded in local protection economies and are familiar with informal institutions, represents a useful entry point for introducing regulation. To summarise, enabling such actors to work with and monitor cannabis production has a number of benefits for a weak state:

- Hybrid authorities are already well-understood by cannabis producers and dealers in their everyday social encounters.
- Local actors are skilled in navigating the complex networks through which production and exchange is organised, and can therefore identify those institutions conducive to developmental outcomes.
- Working with these informal institutions to capture their economic and social benefits is more cost-effective than trying to dismantle them.
- Such actors are more capable of anticipating and mitigating unintended effects when implementing new regulations.

LPPBs provided one such entry point for introducing a model of regulation referred to as Cannabis Social Clubs (CSCs). CSCs operate in a quasi-legal fashion and depend on the decriminalisation of production and consumption, which is already informally practiced as such in many weak states. CSCs are contained and self-regulated on the basis of a voluntary code of conduct, with members pooling capped farming allowances. The volume of cannabis produced is limited according to the number of members, such that CSCs operate on a not-for-profit basis that prevents demand inflation. By enabling LPPBs to record the details of CSCs and ensuring only current cannabis users can become members, CSCs can also be closely monitored. Moreover, CSCs are permissible under the UN Drug Conventions and are therefore less likely to strain relations with foreign donors who provide significant budgetary support to weak states.

Although the imposition of a not-for-profit motive is likely to encourage farmers to seek unregulated production arrangements, especially in cases where there already exists a commercial market, field research demonstrated that farmers typically reinvested a proportion of profits into public goods – such as the construction of a market place or fees for schooling – and were motivated to redistribute profits in order maintain their social standing within the community. Furthermore, farmers already paid their apprentices a seasonal wage. By altering the proportional share of cannabis crops that can be grown by members in line with their position in the existing social hierarchy, incentives to engage in unregulated production can be managed.

CSCs are an especially useful starting point for introducing new regulation because they can be adapted to different local contexts. This is particularly important because the status of farmers is often based on their claims to non-codified land ownership. If the status of an established farmer's claim to own and grant access to land is challenged, then as demonstrated by various land reform initiatives across sub-Saharan Africa, any transition to state regulated production that is not joined up with wider reform efforts could result in recourse to organised violence as farmers try and protect their most crucial of investments. Yet the cost of renting land to newcomers, usually Le150,000 (USD 38), is a negligible barrier to entry in comparison to the profits that stand to be gained, and the status of established cultivators can be secured by virtue of their progressive formalisation into a wider regulatory framework as the better remunerated staff of CSCs.

By adapting regulatory models to the reality of existing informal institutions, weak states could, for example, introduce corporation taxes on CSCs and variable value added tax on the cannabis produced. This would allow them to capture revenue otherwise expensed on resourcing law-enforcement. Managing the expectations of established farmers is also crucial because they represent the link to higher value buyers and are therefore well-placed to

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minimise the potential for revenue leakage, and associated criminal activity, which is typical of cannabis sold through third-parties.

Adaptability is also required to ensure regulations work with existing market conditions. Drawing on data collected in a survey of five production clusters in Sierra Leone, seasonal returns ranged widely between different clusters.

Average seasonal net profits and margins for cannabis production clusters in Western Area, Sierra Leone

Cluster of production	Net profit (Le/USD)	Net profit margin (per cent)
A	1,334,000 / 338	22
B	1,284,000 / 325	31
C	1,869,000 / 474	33
D	2,761,780 / 700	56
E	5,284,167 / 1,339	61

Source: Fieldwork data

Farmers in cluster “E” discriminated higher prices indicative of oligopolistic competition, whereby a minority of cultivators operate as price-setters. Those occupying smaller and less-established production clusters were less successful in competing with larger and more established ones, while apprentices obtained lower returns on average than their land-owning counter-parts. Using LPPBs as a forum to adapt regulations to uneven economic competition, makes it possible to maximize economic gains for both local producers and a weak state, while limiting the potential for unintended effects.

Cultivating a regulatory policy

Drug control strategies in weak states are currently informed by a paucity of data regarding how drug production operates and what its effects on local communities and the state might be. Field research revealed, however, that cannabis production can provide weak states with a needed source of employment and revenue; benefits that can be captured by adopting a policy of regulation rather than prohibition. Weak states can begin shifting towards a regulatory approach to drug control by keeping in mind four key recommendations:

First, the drug control debate can progress by drawing attention to the fact that cannabis production is organised according to local protection economies which are costly and time-consuming for a top-down law enforcement agency to dismantle. Given the resilience of these protection economies, crop eradication results in the unintended effect of strengthening cannabis farmers' protection from law-enforcers, because they respond by resorting to the use of organised violence.

Second, authority is hybrid, and it is local police forces that already interact with and are well-understood by cannabis producers. Actors are well-placed to navigate the informal "rules of the game" responsible for securing the positive economic effects of cannabis production, particularly in facilitating youths' access to land and labour.

Third, weak states can engage these actors and work with the informal institutions governing cannabis production in order to capture economic and social benefits, such as youth employment and taxation. Doing so is more cost-effective, conducive to developmental outcomes, and reduces the likelihood of inadvertently producing more damaging outcomes.

Finally, the Cannabis Social Club (CSC) represents a useful regulatory model with which weak states can begin to engage cannabis producers and local police forces. The CSC is adaptable to local power dynamics and does not contravene the UN Drug Conventions.

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