

➤ The Making of Southern Europe: An Historical Overview

Effie Pedaliu

The 2008 euro crisis came hot on the heels of the global economic crisis that exploded in 2007. Almost overnight, Southern Europe became home to the profligate and the indolent.¹ The derogatory term PIGS, which had fallen into disuse soon after it was coined in the 1990s,² resurfaced to describe the economies and (at times) the people of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.³ How the geopolitical region termed Southern Europe came about, and why Greece, Portugal and Spain joined the EEC has apparently become lost in the panic that gripped the EU. It is useful, therefore, to re-examine and reiterate how the current notion of a 'Southern European region' emerged in order to provide some depth and context to the current Eurozone debate.

From the late 1980s until the mid-1990s, several brilliant historians and political scientists tried to address the question of 'what is Southern Europe?' Most prominent among them were Roberto Aliboni,⁴ John Chipman,⁵ Edward Malefakis⁶ and Giulio Sapelli.⁷ Their work helped to categorise a region of Europe which had been largely overlooked in the historiography of the European continent. These academics raised the profile of the region and made it a discrete area of study in many universities. Their efforts were compromised, however, by the homogenisation brought about by closer European integration after the signing of the Schengen Treaty (1985), the introduction of the Single European Act (1986), the creation of the Eurozone and the horrors of 9/11. The emphasis for Europeans in the 1990s and 2000s became concentrated on 'ever' closer unity and a 'fortress Europe' mentality. Diversification became passé around 2004, a time when the EU was focused on its most challenging enlargement to date: the incorporation of countries of the former Soviet bloc. During this period of 'plenty' and European expansion, the essence of Southern Europe was once again mislaid.

In terms of geography, topography and climate Southern Europe stretches from Portugal to Turkey. It consists of Portugal, Spain, Southern France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, the island states of Malta and Cyprus and the Balkan states bound by the Adriatic and the Black Seas. Trying to define present-day Southern Europe as region is not an exercise that lends itself to consistency, and exact or even objective criteria are hard to come by. Borders can be fuzzy, as Christiansen, Petito and Tonra have shown.⁸

1 *The Washington Post*, 28 February 2010.

2 *Le Monde*, 24 April 1997.

3 *Newsweek Magazine*, 28 June 2008; *The Guardian*, 2 February 2010.

4 R. Aliboni, ed., *Southern European Security in the 1990s* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992); R. Aliboni, 'Southern Europe and the United States: The Community Approach' in *Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of the Mediterranean*, ed. J. W. Holmes (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 1994); R. Aliboni, 'Riforme Economiche nel Mediterraneo: il Contesto Politico' in *Nuove Prospettive per la Cooperazione alto Sviluppo: I Processi di Integrazione Economica e Politica con i Paesi del Mediterraneo*, eds. G. Barba Navaretti and R. Faini (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997), 167-89.

5 J. Chipman, ed., *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges* (London: Routledge, 1988).

6 E. Malefakis, *Southern Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries: An Historical Overview* (Instituto Juan March), Working Paper 35, 1992, http://www.march.es/ceacs/publicaciones/working/archivos/1992_35_en.pdf; E. Malefakis, 'The Political and Socioeconomic Contours of Southern European History,' in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, eds. R. Gunther, N. Diamandouras and H. Puhle (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 33-76.

7 G. Sapelli, *Southern Europe Since 1945: Tradition and Modernity in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey* (London: Longman, 1995).

8 T. Christiansen, F. Petito and B. Tonra, 'Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: The European Union's Near Abroad,' *Cooperation and Conflict* 35/4 (2000): 389-415.

Tangible and 'mental' maps do not always coincide. As Ellis and Esser point out, 'regions' and so by definition 'regional interests, need not have stable, clear and generally accepted frontiers'.⁹ Therefore, regional boundaries are fluid and drawing them often involves exclusion rather than inclusion. The exclusion does not always take place intentionally, but stems from the historical processes that have affected the socioeconomic and political development of certain regions to such a degree as to create collective memories, aspirations, security needs in some of the region's states to a greater degree than others.

In present day Southern Europe, the Cold War, decolonisation and European integration have been the major forces behind region-building.¹⁰ In this respect 'Southern Europe' is a new phenomenon that emerged in the 20th Century roughly at the same time that the categories Western Europe and Eastern Europe acquired increasing political currency, but the term has been used regularly only since the 1970s. The countries that make up Southern Europe today are Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. Turkey is excluded as it is not a member of the EU, as are Malta and Cyprus because they are not members of NATO. The rest of the Balkans states are excluded because the division of the world that ensued after the outbreak of the Cold War located these countries on the other side of the 'Iron Curtain'. This means that in developmental terms, they followed a different pattern dominated by the Soviet model.¹¹ France, according to Braudel had stopped facing South following 'the great barbarian invasions in the fifth century'.¹² France is also excluded because its high levels of industrialisation make it share more characteristics with the European North than the European South. Italy is included because the Mezzogiorno was absorbed into the Italian Kingdom after the unification of the country in the 1870s. Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich's snipe that 'Italy is a geographical expression'¹³ was acknowledged by the Liberal Italian politician Giovanni Giolitti who referred to it, in turn, as a 'hunchback'.¹⁴ In terms of industrialisation, the Italian North shares more characteristics with the European North than with the Italian South and the rest of Southern Europe.¹⁵ Portugal and Spain are included because of their incorporation into the Cold War Western security system and their membership of the EEC in 1986. For Greece, American ascendancy in the Mediterranean, the Truman Doctrine and the defeat of the Greek Communists in its civil war secured its place in the West. The country became recipient of ERP aid, a member of NATO, the European Council and by 1981 a fully-fledged member of the EEC.¹⁶

Post-1945 events affecting region-building did not occur on a sterile ground and were not purely top-down processes. No profound rupture with the past took place. The four countries had undergone similar experiences in that the major forces that defined the 19th Century touched and affected them all in similar ways. It was during the age of nationalism that Greece was liberated in 1821 and Italy unified in the 1860s and 1870s. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars affected all the countries of the Southern European coast, disrupting Mediterranean shipping and trade. These events unleashed an instability and trauma that shook their socio-economic and political foundations and created suspicion and animosity towards 'foreigners'.¹⁷

9 S. Ellis, R. Esser, J. Berdah and M. Xeznik, *Frontiers, Regions and Nations in Europe* (Pisa: Edizioni Plus - Pisa University Press, 2009).

10 E. Pedaliu, 'A Sea of Confusion: The Mediterranean and Détente, 1969-1974,' *Diplomatic History* 33/4 (2009): 735-50; E. Pedaliu, 'Fault Lines in Post War Mediterranean and the "Birth of Southern Europe", 1945-1979: An Overview,' in *Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, eds. E. Calandri, D. Caviglia and A. Varsori (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), 15-32.

11 R. Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century-and After* (London: Routledge, 1997).

12 F. Braudel, *L'identité de la France. Les Hommes et les Choses* (Paris: Arthaud- Flammarion, 1986), 425-26.

13 H. Hearder, *Italy: A Short History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

14 A. De Grand, *The Hunchback's Tailor: Giovanni Giolitti and Liberal Italy: From the Challenge of Mass Politics to the Rise of Fascism, 1882-1922* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001).

15 M. Blim, *Made in Italy: Small-Scale Industrialisation and its Consequences* (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990); P. Malanima, and V. Zamagni, '150 Years of the Italian Economy, 1861-2010,' *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 15/1 (2010): 1-20.

16 A. Gerolymatos, *Red Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American Rivalry* (New York: Basic Books, 2004); J. Iatrides, ed., *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981); B. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); L. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. Close, ed., *The Greek Civil War, Studies of Polarization 1943-1950* (London: Routledge, 1993).

17 K. Galani, 'The Napoleonic Wars and the Disruption of Mediterranean Shipping and Trade: British, Greek and American Merchants in Livorno,' *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 7 (2010): 179-198; C. Esdaile, *Napoleon's Wars: An International History 1803-1815* (London: Penguin Press, 2007).

A deep cleavage opened up between liberalism and absolutism. From Portugal to Italy a period of turmoil ensued with revolutionary movements emerging triumphant in Naples, Portugal and Piedmont. In Greece the revolution against the Ottoman Empire began. These events highlighted the region's susceptibility to political contagion, prompting Metternich to convene a Congress of the Great Powers to ensure that the forces of counterrevolution prevailed.¹⁸

All these countries remained laggards in industrialisation and economic development. Throughout the 19th Century, their economies remained backward, underdeveloped and agrarian. When some economic development occurred towards the end of the 19th Century, it proved unsustainable because of scant natural resources and difficulties in communications. This legacy exacerbated social conflict and working class radicalisation. Similarly, social change did not keep pace with developments in industrial societies. Exclusive clientelistic and nepotistic networks remained in place and failed to transition to meritocratic systems. Weak and fragile democratic institutions became a common feature in all of the countries throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries. Their political systems exhibited a rigid dualism between those who favoured democratic forms of governance and those who favoured autocracy and executive choice. All experienced coups, authoritarian rule, dictatorships and fascism.¹⁹

The political fermentation that shared such similarities had occurred organically yet imperceptibly in this part of the world. The shared aims and norms that can lead to feelings of community in states and nations and the identification of individuals with each other were obscured by religious dogma, an abundant cultural diversity and, above all, by a lack of awareness of each other's commonalities (at least until after 1945). The patterns of interaction of the four countries with the wider Mediterranean world did not take place along East-West alignments, but through North-South coast-to-coast channels determined by intertwined commercial and colonial interests.²⁰ However, as Malefakis convincingly argues, a lack of awareness of commonalities and the existence of certain differing traits do not suffice to negate the existence of a common ground. 'Nations,' he says, 'need not be identical in all their myriad aspects for an identity to exist among them; it suffices that they resemble one another in significant ways for such an identity to be valid'.²¹

After the end of WWII, the new bipolarity of the international system created frameworks where interaction among the Southern European states became institutionalised, and this allowed for their shared behaviours to become intelligible to Southern Europeans and the wider world. This process was to be propelled by the rigid application of the policy of containment, the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the American decision to fortify the Northern Mediterranean littoral. By 1953, the countries of the Northern Mediterranean, from Portugal to Turkey, had become part of an American-centred security system either through membership of NATO or through bilateral treaties in the case of Franco Spain. These countries experienced extraordinary socio-economic change because of the forces of modernisation that the Cold War unleashed through the Marshall Plan. American economic aid brought economic growth and affluence, transforming Greece and Italy into modern consumer societies.²² Within this framework, the Southern European countries began to see each

18 M. Lyons, *Post-Revolutionary Europe, 1815-1856* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); H. Schenk, *The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars: The Concert of Europe, an Experiment* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1947).

19 D. Aldcroft, *Europe's Third World. The European Periphery in the Interwar Years* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); I. Berend and R. Gyorki, *The European Periphery and Industrialization, 1780-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); S. Pamuk and J. Williamson, *Ottoman De-industrialization, 1800-1913: Assessing the Magnitude, Impact, and Response*, *Economic History Review* 64/1 (2011): 45-75 and 159-184; J. Williamson, *Globalization and the Poor Periphery before 1950* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006); S. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

20 P. Mansel, *Levant: Splendour and Catastrophe on the Mediterranean* (London: John Murray, 2010); D. Abulafia, *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean*; D. Abulafia, ed., *The Mediterranean in History* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2003).

21 E. Malefakis, 'The Political ...', in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, eds. N. Diamandouros, H. Puhle and R. Gunther (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 34.

22 D. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: America and West European Reconstruction* (London, Longman, 1992); M. Hogan, 'American Marshall Planners and the Search for a European Neocapitalism,' *The American Historical Review* 90/1 (1985): 44-72; M. Leffler, 'The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan,' *Diplomatic History* 12/3 (1998): 77-306; J. Asselain, *Histoire économique de la France du XVIII^e siècle à nos jours* (Paris: Seuil, coll. Points Histoire, 1984). From 1959-62, the Italian economy grew on average at a rate of 6.3 percent per year. From 1950-1973 the Greek economy achieved average growth rates of 7 percent; the French economy's performance was equally impressive.

other's strategic value rather than simply focusing on traditional rivalries. At its creation in 1957, the EEC, another byproduct of the Marshall Plan, had France and Italy as founding members. Soon afterwards, Greece and Turkey gained EEC association status (in 1962 and 1963, respectively). A huge American cultural transfer to all these countries followed. Exposure to Hollywood films, rock 'n' roll, tourism and increasingly conspicuous consumption had a huge influence on the social mores and aspirations of the local populations.²³ In time, it created common cultural reference points augmented by the influences of decolonisation. At the same time, the demise of the Levant, the Arab-Israeli dispute and the rise of Arab nationalism in the Maghreb and the Mashreq brought to an abrupt end to intra-Mediterranean cultural exchanges and commercial activity that had existed for centuries and hardened the 'North-South' political and cultural divide across the sea.²⁴

During the 'high Cold War', the vast disparity of power between the US and its Southern European allies encouraged the latter to seek bilateralism and direct interaction with the hegemon to fulfil their needs. This stifled the emergence of regional multilateral networks. Later, during the periods of flexible response and détente, a series of developments conspired to undermine their trust in the US. American involvement in Vietnam and their neglect of Mediterranean problems sowed the seeds of discontent. The Harmel report of 1967 came as too little too late to address these concerns. These countries viewed détente as encouraging American inattention to the affairs of the basin and allowing the Soviets to build up their naval strength.²⁵ It threatened their security at a time when it was compromised by the side-effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Air-piracy, for example, became a major security concern for the Southern European nations. Terrorist attacks as a proportion of violent international crime had risen from 18 percent in 1968 to 49 percent in 1972.²⁶ Thus, the more involved the US became with superpower détente, the less convinced the Southern Europeans became of the détente process as a safeguard for their interests and security. Italy saw it had no role in the process.²⁷ The Greek, Spanish and Portuguese dictators openly opposed it.²⁸ The Southern European states experienced the superpower dialogue and détente as a centrifugal force that compounded the disruptive effects that decolonisation and the Cold War had wrought on the region. The Americans attempted to mask the accruing tensions but, from Lisbon to Ankara, disquiet and even resentment of American foreign policy emerged.²⁹

The ordinary people of the region also perceived détente as a harmful policy. The Nixon Administration had adopted a negative attitude towards any political evolution in Southern Europe and had no wish for détente to precipitate a redistribution of political power. Consequently, the US saw the three Southern European dictatorships as promoting stability in the region. The US tolerated the flagrant human rights abuses taking place in Greece, which coincided with the Portuguese colonial wars, and it covertly inhibited change in Italian domestic politics. The conservative American world view, however, coincided with a time of growing political radicalism, and soon the attention of European and US public opinion and politicians turned to the actions

23 V. de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through 20th-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

24 A. Kitroeff, *The Greeks in Egypt, 1919-1937: Ethnicity and Class* (London: Ithaca Press, 1989); F. Karanasou, 'The Greeks in Egypt from Mohammed Ali to Nasser' in *The Greek Diaspora in the 20th Century*, ed. R. Clogg (London: Macmillan, 1999).

25 FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXXIV *National Security Policy*, 1969-1972, docs 192 and 183; E. Pedaliu, 'A Sea of Confusion,' 735-41; E. Pedaliu, ' "Footnotes" as an Expression of Distrust? The U.S. and the NATO "Flanks" in the Last Two Decades of the Cold War' in *Trust, but Verify: The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969-1971*, ed. R. Kreis, M. Klimke and C. Ostermann, 2014 (forthcoming).

26 R. Carrere and P. Valat-Morio, 'La violence mondiale en 1973: Comparaison avec 1968-1972,' *Etudes polemologiques* 13 (1974): 72-85; D. Fromkin, 'The Strategy of Terrorism,' *Foreign Affairs* 53/4 (1975): 683; E. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980).

27 E. Ortona, *Anni d'America*, Vol. 3, 1967-1975, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989), 55; M. Dassú, 'The Italian View' in *European Détente: A Re-Appraisal*, ed. R. Davy (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 117.

28 FRUS, 1969-76, I, *Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972*, Documents 39, 41, 71, 73; G. Bennett and K. Hamilton, eds., *Documents on British Policy Overseas Series III, Volume III, Détente in Europe, 1972-1976* (London: Whitehall History Publishing, 2001); C. de Gaulle, *Memoirs d'espoir* (Paris: Plon, 1971), 189; E. Kolodziej, *French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 490-1; F. Bozo, 'The French View' in *European Détente: A Re-Appraisal*, ed. R. Davy (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 64, 69.

29 E. Pedaliu, 'A Sea of Confusion,' 735-50; E. Pedaliu, 'Fault Lines in Post War Mediterranean,' 15-32.

of the Southern European dictators.³⁰ By the late 1960s and early 1970s, both the Council of Europe (CoE) and the EEC had joined the fight for the restoration of democracy and the upholding of human rights in Greece. The CoE eventually manoeuvred Greece into suspending itself from membership of the institution in 1969. The EEC froze Greece's 1962 association agreement and refused to countenance Spanish membership. These actions strengthened and augmented European political institutions at a time when the EEC was trying to develop its own distinctive European identity and led many Southern Europeans to perceive the EEC as a beacon of democracy.³¹ Their experience of dictatorship with the US had a profound long term effect on how the different political forces in these countries engaged with each other in the post-dictatorship period, but it also strengthened their determination to safeguard human rights and civil liberties. Thus, by the time the three dictatorships tumbled, the foundations had been laid for similar civic cultures to appear in all three countries.³²

When the 'third wave of democratisation'³³ began in April 1974 with the 'Carnation Revolution' in Portugal, the region again displayed its susceptibility to contagion. Greece and Spain began their transitions to democratisation within a few months and a year, respectively. Disillusion with US policies drove the three countries to look for political models and tutelage from the EEC rather than the US, a turn towards the EEC took place alongside rising anti-Americanism. For a while the southern flank seemed on the verge of unravelling, especially after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Greek withdrawal from NATO and the revolutionary upheaval in Portugal. In response, the EEC willingly picked up the baton of stabilising the geostrategic community the Cold War and the US had created in the northern Mediterranean littoral. This action benefited the EEC as it gave it the major political role in international affairs that had hitherto eluded it and enabled it to exit the years of so-called 'euro-sclerosis'. The European solution to stabilising Southern Europe proved a profoundly strategic and political act by the EEC and by the leaderships of the three Southern countries. If the late 1970s had been a time of transition from dictatorial to democratic forms of government for Southern Europe, the 1980s were to be a period of democratic consolidation and integration into the EEC.³⁴

In Italy, the period of consolidation coincided with the stabilisation of its political system. Italy presented another problematic democracy in Southern Europe, and after the political traumas of 'gli anni di piombo' it entered a period of economic growth and political stability.³⁵ During this period all four countries had managed to consolidate their democracies so successfully that they withstood a host of disruptive events – the rise of the Left, 'pronunciamentos' against the Spanish Parliament, trials against terrorists in Italy, general elections (in all countries) that brought socialist parties to power, the euro-missiles crisis and the end of the Cold War.³⁶ Greece, Portugal and Spain underwent constitutional, judicial, political and economic reforms. The deeply democratic 'acquis' of the EEC served as a useful yardstick, as the three newer democracies viewed their full

30 NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC files, 109; *ibid.*, Italy, 694; *ibid.*, NSDM67, 296; *ibid.*, White House, Subject files, Italy, 41; FRUS, I, 1969-72, documents 71 and 72; DBPO, III, V, Documents 13 and 14; J. Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); R. Gualtieri, 'The Italian Political System and Détente,' *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 9/4 (2004): 428-449; A. Nafpliotis, *Britain and the Greek Colonels: Accommodating the Junta in the Cold War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012); E. Pedaliu, 'Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967-1970,' *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 18/1 (2007): 205; E. Pedaliu, 'A Discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-74,' *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 22/1 (2011): 101-20.

31 E. De Angelis, *The Political Discourse of the European Parliament, Enlargement and the Construction of a European Identity*, unpublished PhD Thesis, LSE, 2011; E. Karamouzi, *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War 1974-1979* (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2014); A. Varsori, ed., *Alle origini del presente: L'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta* (Milano: Angeli, 2007); J. Checkel and P. Katzenstein, eds., *European Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); A. Gfeller, 'Imagining European Identity: French Elites and the American Challenge in the Pompidou-Nixon Era,' *Contemporary European History* 19/2 (2010), 133-149.

32 Digital National Security Archive, 00566, 12/6/1970; E. Pedaliu, 'Human Rights and Foreign Policy,' 185-214.

33 S. Huntington, *The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

34 M. del Pero, V. Gavin, F. Guirao and A. Varsori, eds., *Democrazie: L'Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature* (Florence, Le Monnier, 2010); F. Bicchi, *European Foreign Policy Making toward the Mediterranean* (Basingstoke, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007); A. Varsori, 'Crisis and Stabilization in Southern Europe during the 1970s: Western Strategy, European Instruments,' *Journal of European Integration History* 15/1 (2009): 5-14.

35 P. Ginsborg, *Italy and its Discontents 1980-2001: Family, Civil Society, State* (London: Penguin, 2003).

36 Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle, *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, 1-32, 79 and 389; S. Rizas, *The Rise of the Left in Southern Europe: Anglo-American Responses* (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012).

membership of the EEC as the litmus test of their break with the past.³⁷ The close cooperation between the US and the EU to achieve stability had also provided the security they craved. During the late 1980s and 1990s, the Southern European countries managed to overcome Glenn Snyder's two 'bads' of the Alliance security dilemma (abandonment and entrapment), and this delivered them from the ghosts of their past. Indeed, their common memories and shared experiences came together during this period. These welded into their very recent formative political experiences so as to promote a conscious region-building and a growing common identity.³⁸

Cooperation among the four Southern European countries did not begin until they became members of the EEC. They needed to learn to work together for their own good as well as the region's. Italy and Greece had regarded the incorporation of Spain and Portugal with suspicion. Greece in particular fought a rearguard action during the early 1980s to delay the integration of the two Iberian countries until it ensured that the adoption of the *Integrated Mediterranean Programme* made it the main beneficiary.³⁹ Thereafter, membership of the EEC institutionalised the four countries' interactions, which made them realise very quickly that their interests did not always coincide with the priorities set by their Northern colleagues. The post-Cold War American and EU inattention to the region brought them together to take common action to safeguard their interests. The main issue of concern for Southern Europe that led to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona process) in 1995 was security, in particular international terrorism and immigration from the Maghreb. The Southern Europeans found a European solution to their concerns by joining the bandwagon of 'fortress Europe'. They attempted, initially, through the Barcelona Declaration, to turn 'the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity'.⁴⁰ However, the process failed not because of lack of cooperation between the Southern European states but because of the failure of the Oslo Accords and the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia.⁴¹ Ironically, in this period of growth the undocumented migrants who had initially alarmed them became a convenient and cheap labour resource subsidising their own inflexible labour markets.

During these years the Southern European countries built up their economic systems and endured until the crisis of 2007-2008. Greece, Spain and Portugal had entered the European community with small public sectors in comparison to their Northern counterparts. Entry had offered them a choice. They could let the private sector and market forces meet the needs of growth along Thatcherite lines, or they could opt to maintain and enhance the economic and political roles of the public sector. All three opted for the latter choice. Their choices were neither challenged nor discouraged by the EEC or the EU. This economic model enabled them to develop, accelerate modernisation, build a welfare system, reduce social inequality, increase GDP and join the 'First World'.⁴² Their model and driver for growth, however, was not problem-free, as it prompted a widespread black market, tax evasion and a gigantic public sector that almost strangled private enterprise. The seeds of many of the problems that Southern Europe now faces were sown during these years.

37 J. Linz and A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); N. Diamandouros and S. Larrabee, 'Democratisation in South-Eastern Europe: Theoretical Considerations and Evolving Trends,' in *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans*, eds. G. Pridham and T. Gallagher (London: Routledge, 2000), 24-64.

38 E. Malefakis, 'The Political ...,' 33-76; E. Pedaliu, 'Fault Lines in Post War Mediterranean,' 15-32.

39 R. Bideleux and R. Taylor, eds., *European Integration and Disintegration: East and West* (London: Routledge, 1996), 111-153.

40 http://www.barcelonaproject.ie/Barcelona_Declaration_online.htm.

41 R. Aliboni, 'European Union Security Perceptions and Policies towards the Mediterranean,' in *Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millennium*, ed. S. Blank (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999); F. Bicchì, *European Foreign Policy Making toward the Mediterranean* (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007); G. Joffé, ed., *Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership* (London: Frank Cass, 1999); M. Maresceau and E. Lannon, eds., *The EU's Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative Analysis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

42 L. Morlino, 'Consolidation and Party Government in Southern Europe,' *International Political Science Review* 16/2 (1995): 145-167; M. Ferrera, 'Democratisation and Social Policy in Southern Europe: From Expansion to "Recalibration"', Working Paper, 2005 [http://www.unrind.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/\(httpAuxPages/3C777705E330316BC1256FFF005652AB/\\$file/dferrera2.pdf](http://www.unrind.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages/3C777705E330316BC1256FFF005652AB/$file/dferrera2.pdf); D. Sotiropoulos, 'The EU's impact on the Greek Welfare state: Europeanization on Paper?' *Journal of European Social Policy* 14/3 (2004): 267-284.

When the financial crisis struck, it impacted not only economies but also sparked North-South fragmentation in the EU which in turn prompted a further round of 'Southern-Europeanisation'. The economic crisis spilled over into the political, social and cultural affairs of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece with unintended consequences. It has made Southern Europeans reassess their beliefs and the way they have constructed their national and regional consciousness and identity over the past thirty years. It has also laid before them the significance and worth of the organic cohesion to the EU that they have achieved over the last forty years. The result has been a new type of region building – one missing until now – of feelings of solidarity and common destiny arising out of shared problems. This new regional identity and social awareness is being forged in part through the internet and social media and through the shared experiences of humiliation, unemployment, helplessness and disillusionment. However, these negative emotions have not been internalised as in the 19th Century, which precluded Southern Europeans from forging a regional identity. Now, technology has facilitated the externalisation of discontent and this has been manifested in a way that is transforming Southern European culture and society. The disaffection of citizens at the lack of 'communication and persuasion'⁴³ by the current Southern European governments, as they try to avert economic collapse, has not led to apathy and disengagement. On the contrary, Spanish 'indignados' type movements have spread rapidly throughout the region. This denotes not only a challenge to the national governments implementing austerity, but also a potential experiment in 'participatory and deliberative democracy'.⁴⁴

This is particularly significant for a region that always registered high levels of dissatisfaction with the way the democratic process has worked.⁴⁵ It has also further compromised the trust of Southern Europeans in EU institutions and in their own national politicians. They are by-passing the institutions of the state, which directly undermines the pivotal role of traditional political parties.⁴⁶ The recent Greek (2012) and the Italian (2013) general elections illustrate this tendency well, as large percentages of the votes cast went to parties of protest such as SYRIZA in Greece and the *Movimento 5 Stelle* in Italy rather than to mainstream parties..

The concepts of 'Southern European Syndrome' or 'Southern European exceptionalism' have in the past been evoked in relation to the low levels of trust shown by Southern Europeans towards political institutions. Such views were put forward by those who wanted to emphasise the cultural differences between the EU's North and South, and served certain political agendas. The evidence from the contemporary Northern European press, however, illustrates that low levels of trust do not limit themselves to Southern Europe.⁴⁷ Deep economic crises always lead to societal crises and the birth of new and different behaviours. Thus, what could be characterised as a 'Southern European syndrome' is coming about right now. It is based on the dualism between those who seek democratic solutions to the crisis and those who hark back to anachronistic and xenophobic solutions.

Southern Europe as a region did not emerge as a planned intellectual product or as a philosophical debate. It came from of a chain of events over the last two centuries and has gone through many formative stages. Currently, the region is undergoing another bout of 'regional deepening' that is being promoted from below. The role of the historian ends here. ■

43 G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963); R. Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture,' *American Political Science* 82/4 (1988): 1203-1230.

44 D. della Porta and L. Zamponi, 'Protest and Policing on October 15th, Global Day of Action,' *Policy and Society* 23/1(2012): 65–80; M. Kaldor, H. Moore and S. Selchow, *Global Civil Society 2012: Ten Years of Critical Reflection* (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2012); *The Guardian*, 26 May 2011 and 14 November 2012; D. della Porta and M. Andretta, 'Protesting for Justice and Democracy: Italian Indignados?' *Contemporary Italian Politics* 5/1 (2013): 23-37.

45 R. Jowell and the Central Co-ordinating Team, *European Social Survey 2002/2003, Technical Report* (London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University, 2003); *ibid.*, 2005; *ibid.*, 2007.

46 J. Linz and A. Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); M. Torcal, R. Gunther and J. Montero, 'Anti-Party Sentiments in Southern Europe,' in *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, eds. R. Gunther, J. R. Montero and J. Linz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

47 M. Torcal and P. Magalhães, 'Political Culture in Southern Europe: Searching for Exceptionalism' (2009), 20. <http://www.pedro-magalhaes.org/PDFs/PoliticalCultureinSouthernEuropemarc.pdf>.