Telegram from Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.M. Molotov, to President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, I.V. Stalin, 17 November 1946[[1]](#footnote-1)

SOCHI, TO DRUZHKOV.

PRIORITY.

[…]

At the meeting of the five in connection with the letter of Bevin I consider it necessary to stick to the following policy:

1. We are not against Bevin’s suggestion of consultation of representatives of the five in the Security Council, when it is possible, before voting on the issues which make it desirable to have a previously known agreement.

2. We do not see reasons for any new resolutions or special agreements between the five permanent members on veto enforcement in the Security Council, since such intensive regulation of Security Council activities may be negative for the results of its work, constraining it with unnecessary formalities.

3. We believe that the spiteful atmosphere, recently created in the Security Council around the veto issue, harms the United Nations Organization; and thus the United Nations interests require that this campaign against the veto is duly stopped.

I believe it corresponds to our general policy in this issue[[2]](#footnote-2).

[…]

17.11.46. MOLOTOV.

New York.

[RSASPH, f. 17, inv. 167, file 72, p. 185]

Keywords: United Nations

1. For commentaries to the following document see Sergey Mazov’s article in Cold War History (vol.2, N 3, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. During the first session of the General Assembly smaller countries protested against frequent use of veto by the Security Council permanent members, especially by the USSR, which often found itself outnumbered both at the Security Council and the General Assembly. The USA and the UK also became increasingly frustrated by this Soviet practice. Bevin’s letter was an attempt to liberalize the use of veto and which Molotov had to neutralize. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)